From d70af77b668d78d07dff78e2080d627c8127d01f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: S12cybersecurity <79543461+S12cybersecurity@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 11:50:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Create
 Suspicious_Special_User_APC_Injection_With_Handle_Enumeration_And_RWX_Scan.yar

---
 ...n_With_Handle_Enumeration_And_RWX_Scan.yar | 49 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Suspicious_Special_User_APC_Injection_With_Handle_Enumeration_And_RWX_Scan.yar

diff --git a/Suspicious_Special_User_APC_Injection_With_Handle_Enumeration_And_RWX_Scan.yar b/Suspicious_Special_User_APC_Injection_With_Handle_Enumeration_And_RWX_Scan.yar
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d879f3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Suspicious_Special_User_APC_Injection_With_Handle_Enumeration_And_RWX_Scan.yar
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+rule Suspicious_Special_User_APC_Injection_With_Handle_Enumeration_And_RWX_Scan
+{
+    meta:
+        author = "0x12 Dark Development"
+        description = "Detects binaries that combine system-wide handle enumeration (likely for leaked/open handles), RWX memory region scanning in remote processes, and use of NtQueueApcThreadEx2 with the special user APC flag for forced execution. Characteristic of advanced stealthy APC-based process injection techniques (e.g., Frankenstein APC Injection variants)."
+        date = "2025-12-16"
+        category = "Process Injection"
+        technique = "T1055.004 - Asynchronous Procedure Call (Special User APC)"
+        confidence = "Medium-High"
+        reference = "Advanced evasion using existing handles, natural RWX regions, and QUEUE_USER_APC_FLAGS_SPECIAL_USER_APC"
+
+    strings:
+        // NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemHandleInformation (5) or SystemExtendedHandleInformation (64) - common for handle leaking/enumeration
+        $handle_enum1 = { 68 05 00 00 00 }                   // push 5 ; SystemHandleInformation
+        $handle_enum2 = { 68 40 00 00 00 }                   // push 64 ; SystemExtendedHandleInformation
+        $ntqsi = "NtQuerySystemInformation" ascii wide
+
+        // VirtualQueryEx loop for finding RWX (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40)
+        $vqe = "VirtualQueryEx" ascii wide
+        $protect_rwx = { 83 ?? 40 }                          // cmp dword, 0x40 (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)
+        $hex_rwx = { C7 ?? 40 00 00 00 }                     // mov dword, 0x40
+
+        // WriteProcessMemory - almost always present
+        $wpm = "WriteProcessMemory" ascii wide
+
+        // Key indicator: NtQueueApcThreadEx2 (rare in benign software)
+        $ntqat_ex2 = "NtQueueApcThreadEx2" ascii wide
+
+        // Special flag: QUEUE_USER_APC_FLAGS_SPECIAL_USER_APC = 0x2 (or sometimes cast as 2)
+        $special_flag1 = { 6A 02 }                            // push 2
+        $special_flag2 = { C7 ?? 02 00 00 00 }               // mov dword, 2
+        $special_flag3 = { 83 ?? 02 }                        // cmp dword, 2
+
+    condition:
+        // Must be a PE file
+        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
+
+        // At least one handle enumeration pattern
+        (any of ($handle_enum*) or $ntqsi) and
+
+        // RWX scanning indicators
+        ( $vqe or any of ($protect_rwx, $hex_rwx) ) and
+
+        // Writing to remote process
+        $wpm and
+
+        // The rarest and most suspicious: NtQueueApcThreadEx2 + special flag usage
+        $ntqat_ex2 and any of ($special_flag*)
+}