{ update_check_enabled: true, threat_intel: { // Configuration for custom threat intel feeds // Allowed format for the contents of both online feeds and custom file feeds is one IP or domain per line // Online feeds must be valid URLs online_feeds: ["https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/downloads/ipblocklist.txt"], // MODIFY THE MOUNT DIRECTORY IN DOCKER COMPOSE, this should rarely need to be changed custom_feeds_directory: "/etc/rita/threat_intel_feeds" }, filtering: { # These are filters that affect the import of connection logs. They # currently do not apply to dns logs. # A good reference for networks you may wish to consider is RFC 5735. # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5735#section-4 // internal_subnets identifies the internal network, which will result // in any internal to internal and external to external connections being // filtered out at import time. Reasonable defaults are provided below, // but need to be manually verified before enabling. internal_subnets: ["10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "fd00::/8"], # Private-Use Networks RFC 1918 and ULA prefix // always_included_subnets overrides the never_included_* and internal_subnets section, // making sure that any connection records containing addresses from these arrays are kept and not filtered // Note: the IP address of a proxy must be included here if the proxy is internal always_included_subnets: [], // array of CIDRs always_included_domains: [], // array of FQDNs // connections involving ranges entered into never_included_subnets are filtered out at import time never_included_subnets: [], // array of CIDRs never_included_domains: [], // array of FQDNs filter_external_to_internal: true // ignores any entries where communication is occurring from an external host to an internal host }, scoring: { beacon: { // The default minimum number of unique connections used for beacons analysis. // Any two hosts connecting fewer than this number will not be analyzed. You can // safely increase this value to improve performance if you are not concerned // about slow beacons. unique_connection_threshold: 4, // min number of unique connections to qualify as beacon // The score is currently comprised of a weighted average of 4 subscores. // While we recommend the default setting of 0.25 for each weight, // these weights can be altered here according to your needs. // The sum of all the floating point weights must be equal to 1. timestamp_score_weight: 0.25, datasize_score_weight: 0.25, duration_score_weight: 0.25, histogram_score_weight: 0.25, // The number of hours seen in a connection graph representation of a beacon must // be greater than this threshold for an overall duration score to be calculated. // Default value: 6 duration_min_hours_seen: 6, // This is the minimum number of hours seen in a connection graph representation // of a beacon for the consistency subscore of duration to score at 100% // Default value: 12 (half the day) duration_consistency_ideal_hours_seen: 12, // The histogram score has a subscore that attempts to detect multiple // flat sections in a connection graph representation of a beacon. The // variable below controls the bucket size for grouping connections. // This is expressed as a percentage of the largest connection count. For example, // if the max connection count is 400 and this variable is set to 0.05 (5%), // the bucket size will be 20 (400*0.05=20). As you make this variable // larger, the algorithm becomes more forgiving to variation. // Default value 0.05 histogram_mode_sensitivity: 0.05, // This is the number of buckets that can be considered outliers and dropped // from the calculation. // Default value: 1 histogram_bimodal_outlier_removal: 1, // This is the minimum number of hours seen in a connection graph representation // of a beacon before the bimodal subscore score is used. // Default value: 11 (sets the minimum coverage to just below half of the day) histogram_bimodal_min_hours_seen: 11, score_thresholds: { // beacon score base: 50, low: 70, medium: 90, high: 100 } }, long_connection_score_thresholds: { // duration, in seconds base: 3600, // 1 hour low: 14400, // 4 hours medium: 28800, // 8 hours high: 43200 // 12 hours }, c2_score_thresholds: { // number of subdomains base: 100, low: 500, medium: 800, high: 1000 }, strobe_impact: { category: "high" // any strobes will be placed in the high category }, threat_intel_impact: { category: "high" // any threat intel hits will be placed in the high category } }, modifiers: { threat_intel_score_increase: 0.15, // score +15% if data size >= 25 MB threat_intel_datasize_threshold: 25000000, // 25MB (as bytes) prevalence_score_increase: 0.15, // score +15% if prevalence <= 2% prevalence_increase_threshold: 0.02, prevalence_score_decrease: 0.15, // score -15% if prevalence >= 50% prevalence_decrease_threshold: 0.5, // must be greater than the increase threshold // first seen scoring only applies to rolling datasets // ** a dataset should be imported as rolling only if the logs are current (within the past 24 hours) i.e: coming from a live zeek sensor ** first_seen_score_increase: 0.15, // score +15% if first seen <= 7 days ago first_seen_increase_threshold: 7, first_seen_score_decrease: 0.15, // score -15% if first seen >= 30 days ago first_seen_decrease_threshold: 30, // must be greater than the increase threshold missing_host_count_score_increase: 0.1, // +10% score for missing host header rare_signature_score_increase: 0.15, // +15% score for connections with a rare signature c2_over_dns_direct_conn_score_increase: 0.15, // +15% score for domains that were queried but had no direct connections mime_type_mismatch_score_increase: 0.15 // +15% score for connections with mismatched MIME type/URI }, http_extensions_file_path: "/http_extensions_list.csv", # path is relative to where it is in the container if run via docker months_to_keep_historical_first_seen: 3, batch_size: 100000 }