mirror of
https://github.com/andreacristaldi/DefenderRuleParser
synced 2026-06-16 13:55:00 +00:00
159 lines
6.6 KiB
C#
159 lines
6.6 KiB
C#
// DefenderRuleParser
|
|
// Author: Andrea Cristaldi 2025 - https://github.com/andreacristaldi/DefenderRuleParser
|
|
// This project is licensed under the Apache 2.0 License.
|
|
using DefenderRuleParser2;
|
|
using DefenderRuleParser2.Models;
|
|
using DefenderRuleParser2.Parsers.Wildcards; // 0x90-based wildcard engine (WildcardPattern/TokLiteral/TokWild)
|
|
using System;
|
|
using System.Collections.Generic;
|
|
using System.IO;
|
|
using System.Text;
|
|
|
|
namespace DefenderRuleParser2.Parsers
|
|
{
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Parser for SIGNATURE_TYPE_FOLDERNAME (hex-dump driven, .NET 4.7-safe).
|
|
///
|
|
/// Empirical layout from hex dumps:
|
|
/// u16 Threshold
|
|
/// u8[] Payload → folder name text (ASCII or UTF-16LE), sometimes with 0x90-based wildcard sequences.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Behavior:
|
|
/// - Read threshold, then the remaining payload as raw bytes.
|
|
/// - If the payload appears to use Defender-style 0x90 wildcard constructs, tokenize it and render:
|
|
/// · Human-friendly string (ASCII literals + [=WILD]/[=WILD:0xNN])
|
|
/// · Conservative YARA-like hex (ranges for wildcards)
|
|
/// Also log an ASCII-only view made from literal tokens for quick visual checks.
|
|
/// - Otherwise, decode payload as ASCII/UTF-16LE by heuristic and log it plainly.
|
|
/// - Persist ONE human-friendly string per signature in SignatureEntry.Pattern
|
|
/// (wildcarded human form when present, else decoded text) to keep JSON/HTML stable.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
public class FolderNameParser : ISignatureParser
|
|
{
|
|
public void Parse(BinaryReader reader, int size, uint threatId)
|
|
{
|
|
long offset = reader.BaseStream.Position;
|
|
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
byte[] buffer = reader.ReadBytes(size);
|
|
if (buffer == null || buffer.Length < 2)
|
|
{
|
|
Logger.Info("[FOLDERNAME] ❗ Signature too short.");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
using (var ms = new MemoryStream(buffer))
|
|
using (var br = new BinaryReader(ms))
|
|
{
|
|
ushort threshold = br.ReadUInt16();
|
|
byte[] payload = ReadRest(br);
|
|
|
|
bool isWild = LooksLikeWildcardPattern(payload);
|
|
|
|
string humanOut;
|
|
if (isWild)
|
|
{
|
|
int consumed;
|
|
bool hadTerm;
|
|
var tokens = WildcardPattern.Tokenize(payload, 0, payload.Length, out consumed, out hadTerm);
|
|
|
|
string human = WildcardPattern.RenderHuman(tokens, Encoding.ASCII);
|
|
string yara = WildcardPattern.RenderYaraHex(tokens);
|
|
|
|
// ASCII-only (concat literal tokens) for logging
|
|
var sbAscii = new StringBuilder();
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < tokens.Count; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
var lit = tokens[i] as TokLiteral;
|
|
if (lit != null && lit.Bytes != null && lit.Bytes.Length > 0)
|
|
sbAscii.Append(Encoding.ASCII.GetString(lit.Bytes));
|
|
}
|
|
string asciiOnly = sbAscii.ToString();
|
|
|
|
Logger.Info(string.Format("[FOLDERNAME] Threat ID: {0}, Threshold: {1} (wildcarded)", threatId, threshold));
|
|
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(asciiOnly)) Logger.Info(" · ASCII-only : " + asciiOnly);
|
|
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(human)) Logger.Info(" · WILD/Human : " + human);
|
|
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(yara)) Logger.Info(" · WILD/YARA : " + yara);
|
|
|
|
humanOut = !string.IsNullOrEmpty(human) ? human : asciiOnly;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
string folderName = DecodeBestEffort(payload);
|
|
|
|
Logger.Info(string.Format("[FOLDERNAME] Threat ID: {0}, Threshold: {1}", threatId, threshold));
|
|
Logger.Info(" > Folder: " + folderName);
|
|
|
|
humanOut = folderName;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(humanOut) &&
|
|
ThreatDatabase.TryGetThreat(threatId, out var threat))
|
|
{
|
|
threat.Signatures.Add(new SignatureEntry
|
|
{
|
|
Type = "SIGNATURE_TYPE_FOLDERNAME",
|
|
Offset = offset,
|
|
Pattern = new List<string> { humanOut },
|
|
Parsed = true,
|
|
ConditionType = (threshold > 1) ? "MIN_MATCHES" : "PRESENT",
|
|
ConditionValue = Math.Max(1, (int)threshold)
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
catch (Exception ex)
|
|
{
|
|
Logger.Error(string.Format("[!] FOLDERNAME Error parsing at offset 0x{0:X}: {1}", offset, ex.Message));
|
|
}
|
|
finally
|
|
{
|
|
reader.BaseStream.Seek(offset + size, SeekOrigin.Begin);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------- helpers ----------
|
|
|
|
private static byte[] ReadRest(BinaryReader br)
|
|
{
|
|
int left = (int)(br.BaseStream.Length - br.BaseStream.Position);
|
|
if (left <= 0) return new byte[0];
|
|
return br.ReadBytes(left);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Detect Defender-style 0x90 wildcard usage:
|
|
/// - 0x90 0x00 (terminator), 0x90 0x90 (escape), or 0x90 followed by an opcode-like byte (< 0x32).
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
private static bool LooksLikeWildcardPattern(byte[] data)
|
|
{
|
|
if (data == null || data.Length < 2) return false;
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < data.Length - 1; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (data[i] != 0x90) continue;
|
|
byte n = data[i + 1];
|
|
if (n == 0x00 || n == 0x90 || n < 0x32) return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Decode bytes as ASCII vs UTF-16LE based on NUL distribution; trim trailing NULs/whitespace.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
private static string DecodeBestEffort(byte[] bytes)
|
|
{
|
|
if (bytes == null || bytes.Length == 0) return string.Empty;
|
|
|
|
int nullOdd = 0;
|
|
for (int i = 1; i < bytes.Length; i += 2)
|
|
if (bytes[i] == 0x00) nullOdd++;
|
|
|
|
bool utf16 = (bytes.Length >= 4) && (nullOdd >= bytes.Length / 4);
|
|
string s = utf16 ? Encoding.Unicode.GetString(bytes) : Encoding.UTF8.GetString(bytes);
|
|
return s.TrimEnd('\0').Trim();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|