Files
Nate Guagenti 77178c2a21 forward with merge of master
Signed-off-by: Nate Guagenti <neu5ron@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-06-11 12:07:59 -04:00

5.2 KiB

Data Sources

None

Data Fields

Data Source Description
Access Tokens Logs tracking the identity and privileges of the user account associated with a process or thread.
Anti-virus Logs provided by AV providers such as alerts that need to be investigated
API monitoring Logs monitoring API calls on endpoints
Application Logs TBD
Asset Management Logs providing up to date information about active endpoints in an environment (Scope)
Authentication logs Logs tracking log on activity in an environment. For example, users authenticating to other endpoints via WinRM, WMI, etc.
Binary file metadata Information about binary files over the wire or locally on an endpoint.
BIOS Logs providing information about the integrity of existing BIOs
Browser extensions Logs monitoring for browser extensions or plugins that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. Monitoring for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk could correlate with browser extension installation
Data loss prevention Logs monitoring file access and removable media devices. Those could be similar to the ones from Windows security logs object access category
Detonation chamber TBD
Digital Certificate Logs Logs needed to detect primarily suspicious Root certificate installations. For example, you can get good information about the use of this technique from the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates registry keys
DLL monitoring Logs monitoring the creation, modification or rename of DLLs. For example. One could monitor HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors for DLLs loaded by spoolsv.exe
DNS records Logs monitoring for changes to DNS records in endpoints.
EFI Logs providing information about the integrity of existing EFI. EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules
Email gateway TBD
Environment variable Logs tracking users checking or changing their environment variables (HISTCONTROL). (Lunix/MacOs)
File monitoring Logs tracking any modification, creation or rename of files either locally or over the wire
Host network interface Logs tracking changes to the host network interface. For example, an adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode
Kernel drivers Logs monitoring the registry and file system for driver installs
Loaded DLLs Logs monitoring dlls being loaded by process execution. Similar approach to DLL monitoring. They both can be used together in certain techniques.
Mail server TBD
Malware reverse engineering Information obtained by looking at samples of malware. For example, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples of malware using custom encryption. This can help to decode network traffic.
MBR Logs providing information about changes to the MBR (might not be provided by default logs on the endpoints)
Named Pipes Logs tracking named pipes creation and connection events (i.e Sysmon Event IDs 17 and 18)
Netflow/Enclave netflow Netflow logs - TBD
Network device logs TBD
Network intrusion detection system TBD
Network protocol analysis Network logs prodiving information about protocols being used in network connections. This can be obtained from endpoint and network data sets
Packet capture TBD
PowerShell logs Windows PowerShell logs
Process command-line parameters Logs monitoring process command line arguments
Process monitoring Logs monitoring process execution
Process use of network Logs tracking processes making network connections
Sensor health and status Logs monitoring data sensor status in case they are disabled to stop collecting and sending logs to a SIEM. For example, Sysmon EID 4 tells you when its service stops
Services Logs about services being installed or highjacked in a system (i.e Windows Security Log 4697 or Windows System log 7045)
SSL/TLS inspection Information about encrypted channels being used by adversaries. This could be part of netflow data
System calls TBD
Third-party application logs Logs indicating the usage of third party software. For example, an adversary using VNC
User interface Logs inidicating processes that normally require user-driven events. For example, clicking or typing a password in a fake credentials prompt. This might be provided by API monitoring data sources
VBR Logs tracking changes to the VBR (might not be provided by default logs on the endpoints)
Web application firewall logs TBD
Web logs TBD
Web proxy TBD
Windows Error Reporting Logs providing software and operating system crash information. OS system crash reports (usually offline analysis of crash reports need to happen)
Windows event logs Windows event logs used to track user creation, permissions modifications, and even changes to groups. Based on the techniques linked to this data source, it seemed to be also focused on scheduled tasks, account manipulations, account creation and SID-history logs. (We can say every Windows event log here)
Windows Registry Logs tracking any creation, deletion and modification of registry keys in Windows environments
WMI Objects Logs capturing WMI event subscription events