Name: AiTM Kit Device PRT Enrollment
Id: 6e06936a-54b0-42a9-81ba-4ee0ec8e9a87
MitreIds:
- T1098.005
Tactics:
- Persistence
Techniques:
- 'Account Manipulation: Device Registration'
DetectionPriority: HIGH
ThreatPrevalence: MEDIUM
DetectionDifficulty: LOW
Description: >
  After capturing a victim's session via AiTM proxy, the Tycoon 2FA kit registers a
  synthetic device with Microsoft Device Registration Service (DRS) to obtain a
  Primary Refresh Token (PRT) bound to a kit-controlled device object. This PRT
  survives the standard IR playbook of revokeSignInSessions because the device is a
  separate Entra ID principal - its PRT remains valid indefinitely unless the device
  object is explicitly deleted first. The enrollment call always uses the kit's
  Node.js HTTP client (axios/1.15.2), not the native Entra ID join clients (Dsreg,
  DeviceRegistrationClient, Dalvik) - a binary distinction exploitable as a
  high-fidelity detection. Critical IR finding: the correct containment sequence is
  atomically disable account → enumerate and DELETE all registered devices →
  THEN revoke sign-in sessions → reset password. Reversing steps 2 and 3 leaves
  the device-PRT valid and allows the kit to continue brokering fresh access tokens
  via HMAC-SHA256 signed PRT assertions.

LastUpdated: '2026-05-29'
Author: '@iimp0ster'

Prerequisites:
- Kit has already captured victim's session via AiTM relay (Tier 1 success)
- Kit holds a Microsoft Authentication Broker refresh token for the victim
- Victim tenant allows device registration (not restricted to Entra ID joined devices only)
- Kit has network access to enterpriseregistration.windows.net (DRS endpoint)

Chokepoints:
- Stage: DRS Enrollment with Non-Native User Agent
  Input: Kit has captured MAB refresh token; proceeds to register synthetic device
    for PRT persistence
  Invariant: The attacker MUST call the DRS EnrollmentServer/device endpoint to
    register a device - this is the only path to a device-bound PRT in Entra ID.
    The enrollment always generates an audit event in Entra ID AuditLogs.
    The kit's HTTP client (axios/1.15.2) is the user agent on this call, not the
    native clients (Dsreg / DeviceRegistrationClient / Dalvik) used by legitimate
    join workflows.
  Observable: >
    Entra ID AuditLogs: operationName == "Add registered users to device" AND
    resultType == "0" (success) AND userAgent NOT IN [Dsreg,
    DeviceRegistrationClient, Dalvik, Windows-AzureAD-Authentication-Provider].
    The non-native UA is the binary invariant - legitimate device enrollment
    from managed endpoints never uses axios or node.
  WhyCantBypass: >
    DRS EnrollmentServer/device is the only API path to obtain a device-bound PRT
    in Entra ID. There is no alternative enrollment mechanism. The audit event is
    generated server-side by Microsoft's DRS - the attacker cannot suppress it.
    The kit cannot use native Dsreg/DeviceRegistrationClient because those are
    Windows OS components that would require code execution on a managed endpoint,
    defeating the purpose of the cloud-side AiTM kit.
  LogSources:
  - Entra ID AuditLogs (AuditLogs table in Sentinel; filter ActivityDisplayName "Add registered users to device")
  - Entra ID Sign-in Logs (cross-reference UPN for preceding AiTM sign-in within 5-15 min)
  DetectionTier: Analyst
  SigmaRef: sigma-rules/aitm-device-prt-enrollment/analyst.yml

- Stage: PRT Persistence Post-Revocation
  Input: IR team has executed revokeSignInSessions (but NOT deleted device objects first)
  Invariant: >
    The attacker MUST use the PRT + session key to sign per-request
    HMAC-SHA256 assertions for ongoing oauth2/token calls - these generate
    non-interactive sign-in records with incomingTokenType: primaryRefreshToken
    even after revokeSignInSessions has been executed.
  Observable: >
    Microsoft Graph Activity Logs or Entra ID NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs:
    incomingTokenType == "primaryRefreshToken" from same UPN AFTER a
    revokeSignInSessions event. This confirms device-PRT is still active and
    device objects were not deleted before session revocation.
  WhyCantBypass: >
    PRT token grants always log incomingTokenType in Microsoft's audit infrastructure.
    The attacker cannot obtain fresh access tokens without making oauth2/token calls
    that generate log entries. The signal is generated server-side by Microsoft.
  LogSources:
  - Microsoft Graph Activity Logs (incomingTokenType field)
  - Entra ID NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
  DetectionTier: Hunt
  SigmaRef: sigma-rules/aitm-device-prt-enrollment/hunt.yml
  BypassNote: >
    If IR deletes device objects before revoking sessions (correct order), the PRT
    is invalidated and this stage never fires. This stage is a post-IR-failure
    indicator, not a preventive detection.

Variations:
- Name: Tycoon 2FA - Device PRT Enrollment Chain
  FirstSeen: 2023-Q3
  Status: Active
  SourceURL: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/tycoon-2fa-aitm-detection-engineering
  Notes: >
    Full API call chain documented by Elastic Security Labs. Five steps:
    (1) Resource-swap MAB refresh token for DRS access token at oauth2/token
        (resource=urn:ms-drs:enterpriseregistration.windows.net).
    (2) POST EnrollmentServer/device with PKCS#10 CSR + synthetic device metadata.
    (3) Build RS256 JWT signed with kit-generated device private key.
    (4) POST jwt-bearer grant to obtain PRT + encrypted session key.
    (5) Sign per-request HMAC-SHA256 PRT assertions for ongoing access.
    User agent on enrollment call: axios/1.15.2.
  VariantId: tycoon-2fa-device-prt
  Command:
    Invocation: |
      # Step 1: Resource-swap MAB refresh token for DRS access token
      # User-Agent: axios/1.15.2
      POST https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/token
        grant_type=refresh_token
        refresh_token=<stolen_refresh_token>
        resource=urn:ms-drs:enterpriseregistration.windows.net
        client_id=29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e

      # Step 2: Register synthetic device
      # User-Agent: axios/1.15.2
      POST https://enterpriseregistration.windows.net/EnrollmentServer/device
        {"CertificateRequest":{"Type":"pkcs10","Data":"<base64_PKCS10_CSR>"},
         "DeviceDisplayName":"<fabricated>","OSVersion":"<fabricated>"}

      # Step 3-4: JWT bearer grant → obtain PRT
      POST https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/token
        grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer
        assertion=<RS256_JWT_signed_with_device_key>

      # Step 5: Ongoing - sign PRT assertions with HMAC-SHA256 session key
    Context: >
      Audit event fires on Step 2 (DRS enrollment). Kit user agent (axios/1.15.2)
      is the binary distinguishing signal vs. legitimate Dsreg/DeviceRegistrationClient.
      PRT obtained in Step 4 survives revokeSignInSessions - device must be deleted first.
    Artifacts:
    - 'Entra ID AuditLogs: operationName "Add registered users to device" resultType "0" userAgent "axios/1.15.2"'
    - 'Entra ID Device objects: fabricated DeviceDisplayName, OSVersion on registeredDevices/ownedDevices'
    - 'Graph Activity Logs: incomingTokenType "primaryRefreshToken" from cloud-VPS ASN post-revokeSignInSessions'
  ChokepointMapping: 'Kit captures session → axios enrolls DRS device (audit event) → PRT obtained → survives revokeSignInSessions → ongoing non-interactive sign-ins'

EvolutionTimeline:
- Date: 2023-Q3
  Event: Tycoon 2FA introduces device-PRT enrollment as post-session-theft persistence
  Change: >
    First documented AiTM kit to implement device-PRT enrollment as an automated
    persistence step following session token theft. Previous AiTM kits relied solely
    on session tokens, which are invalidated by revokeSignInSessions. Device-PRT
    enrollment creates a persistence layer that survives the most common IR response,
    requiring IR teams to change their containment playbooks.
  DetectionImpact: >
    Standard IR playbooks (revokeSignInSessions → password reset) are insufficient.
    New detection requirement: audit "Add registered users to device" events for
    non-native user agents. New IR requirement: device enumeration and deletion
    before session revocation.
  TheConstant: DRS EnrollmentServer/device call with non-native UA → audit event → device-bound PRT
  Variants: []
  EventType: event

- Date: 2026-05-27
  Event: Elastic Security Labs documents full DRS enrollment API chain and IR playbook gap
  Change: >
    Complete 5-step API call chain published. Correct IR atomic sequence documented:
    disable account → delete registered devices → revoke sessions → reset password.
    Automated Elastic response workflow confirmed to execute in <10 seconds.
  DetectionImpact: >
    Non-native UA on DRS enrollment audit event becomes the primary analyst-tier
    detection. Post-revocation incomingTokenType: primaryRefreshToken becomes the
    hunting signal for IR teams that executed revocation in the wrong order.
  TheConstant: DRS EnrollmentServer/device call with axios UA → audit event → device-bound PRT
  Variants: []
  EventType: event

Detections:
- Level: Research
  Description: >
    Log all successful device registration audit events regardless of user agent.
    Baseline for understanding legitimate enrollment patterns.
  LogSources:
  - Entra ID AuditLogs
  Logic: >
    ActivityDisplayName == "Add device" OR operationName == "Add registered users
    to device" AND Result == "success". No UA filter - capture all to understand
    baseline enrollment volume and UA distribution.
  ExpectedFPRate: Medium (legitimate MDM enrollment, Intune, SCCM)
  UseCase: Baseline enrollment activity; identify MDM and Intune patterns before
    adding UA-based filters.
  SigmaRule: sigma-rules/aitm-device-prt-enrollment/research.yml

- Level: Hunt
  Description: >
    Device registration with user agent NOT in the native Entra ID join client set.
    High-fidelity due to binary distinction between kit and native clients.
  LogSources:
  - Entra ID AuditLogs
  Logic: >
    operationName == "Add registered users to device" AND resultType == "0" AND
    userAgent NOT contains_any [Dsreg, DeviceRegistrationClient, Dalvik,
    Windows-AzureAD-Authentication-Provider]. Correlate with preceding AiTM
    sign-in from same UPN within 5-15 minutes (Node.js UA on OfficeHome/Auth Broker).
  ExpectedFPRate: Low (custom MDM tools with non-standard UAs; document and exclude)
  UseCase: >
    Active hunting for device-PRT persistence. High-fidelity due to binary UA
    distinction. False positives limited to bespoke MDM automation.
  SigmaRule: sigma-rules/aitm-device-prt-enrollment/hunt.yml

- Level: Analyst
  Description: >
    Device registration with non-native UA correlated with preceding AiTM sign-in
    signal from same UPN within 15 minutes.
  LogSources:
  - Entra ID AuditLogs
  - Entra ID Sign-in Logs (for AiTM correlation)
  Logic: >
    operationName == "Add registered users to device" AND resultType == "0" AND
    userAgent NOT contains_any [Dsreg, DeviceRegistrationClient, Dalvik] AND
    same UPN has preceding sign-in with Node.js UA within 15 minutes. Correlated
    alert: high confidence AiTM device-PRT persistence chain.
  ExpectedFPRate: Very Low
  UseCase: >
    SOC alerting. Immediate IR escalation. Trigger automated response:
    disable account → delete registered devices → revoke sessions → reset password.
  SigmaRule: sigma-rules/aitm-device-prt-enrollment/analyst.yml

Intel:
- Name: Elastic Security Labs - Tycoon 2FA AiTM Detection Engineering
  Tier: primary
  URL: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/tycoon-2fa-aitm-detection-engineering
  Description: >
    Primary source. Full DRS enrollment API chain documented (Steps 1-5).
    IR playbook gap identified. Correct containment sequence published.
    Automated response workflow (disable → delete devices → revoke → reset)
    executes in <10 seconds.

- Name: "MITRE ATT&CK - T1098.005 Account Manipulation: Device Registration"
  Tier: primary
  URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
  Description: Primary technique definition.

RelatedChokepoints:
- aitm-websocket-relay
- oauth-device-code-phishing

KnownBypasses:
- Bypass: IR executes revokeSignInSessions before deleting device objects
  Mitigation: Update IR playbooks to enumerate/delete devices first; automate
    the correct sequence via Logic Apps / playbook
  Detection: >
    Graph Activity Logs: incomingTokenType == "primaryRefreshToken" from same UPN
    after revokeSignInSessions event. Confirms device-PRT active post-revocation.
    Trigger immediate device deletion and second revocation cycle.

- Bypass: Attacker uses custom MDM UA that mimics Dsreg/DeviceRegistrationClient
  Mitigation: Validate device certificate issuance chain; monitor for device
    objects with fabricated metadata (unusual DeviceDisplayName, synthetic OSVersion)
  Detection: >
    Device objects with display names matching no corporate naming convention.
    Device cert issued for non-corporate domain. Cross-reference with Intune/SCCM
    inventory - any device in Entra not in MDM inventory is suspicious.

# PENDING LAB VALIDATION
# RawLogs: No sample Entra ID AuditLogs device registration entries attached yet.
# UserAgent field: Verify that AuditLogs surface the user agent in the UserAgent field
# vs. InitiatedBy.app.displayName, AdditionalDetails, or a nested property - field
# name must be confirmed against real AuditLogs from a lab tenant.
# filter_known_automation in hunt.yml: Replace <UNKNOWN> with documented MDM/Intune
# service principal IDs.
# PRT Persistence Post-Revocation stage: Confirm that incomingTokenType: primaryRefreshToken
# is available in Graph Activity Logs (vs. NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs only).
# KQL correlation: analyst.yml stub requires multi-table join (AuditLogs + SigninLogs).

TheConstant: >
  DRS EnrollmentServer/device call with non-native UA (axios/1.15.2 not Dsreg) →
  Entra ID audit event → device-bound PRT surviving revokeSignInSessions