Files
intel-linux-sgx/psw/ae/pse/pse_pr/sigma_crypto_layer.cpp
T
Li, Xun 1ccf25b64a Linux 2.1 Open Source Gold release
Signed-off-by: Li, Xun <xun.li@intel.com>
2018-01-19 11:02:56 +08:00

355 lines
13 KiB
C++

/*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
* * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include "sigma_crypto_layer.h"
#include "sgx_ecc256_internal.h"
#include "pse_pr_inc.h"
#include "pse_pr_types.h"
#include "safe_id.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <cstring>
#include "le2be_macros.h"
#include "prepare_hmac_sha256.h"
#include "prepare_hash_sha256.h"
#include "epid/verifier/1.1/api.h"
#include "epid/common/1.1/types.h"
#include "sgx_trts.h"
#include "ae_ipp.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "Keys.h"
#include "pairing_blob.h"
static ae_error_t MapEpidResultToAEError(EpidStatus epid_result)
{
ae_error_t status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
switch (epid_result)
{
case kEpidNoErr: status = AE_SUCCESS; break;
case kEpidSigInvalid: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_SIG_INVALID; break;
case kEpidSigRevokedInGroupRl: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_SIG_REVOKED_IN_GROUPRL; break;
case kEpidSigRevokedInPrivRl: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_SIG_REVOKED_IN_PRIVRL; break;
case kEpidSigRevokedInSigRl: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_SIG_REVOKED_IN_SIGRL; break;
case kEpidSigRevokedInVerifierRl: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_SIG_REVOKED_IN_VERIFIERRL; break;
case kEpidErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_UNKNOWN_ERROR; break;
case kEpidNotImpl: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; break;
case kEpidBadArgErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_BAD_ARG_ERR; break;
case kEpidNoMemErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_NO_MEMORY_ERR; break;
case kEpidMemAllocErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_NO_MEMORY_ERR; break;
case kEpidMathErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_MATH_ERR; break;
case kEpidDivByZeroErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_DIVIDED_BY_ZERO_ERR; break;
case kEpidUnderflowErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_UNDERFLOW_ERR; break;
case kEpidHashAlgorithmNotSupported: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_HASH_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED; break;
case kEpidRandMaxIterErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_RAND_MAX_ITER_ERR; break;
case kEpidDuplicateErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_DUPLICATE_ERR; break;
case kEpidInconsistentBasenameSetErr: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_INCONSISTENT_BASENAME_SET_ERR; break;
case kEpidMathQuadraticNonResidueError: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_MATH_ERR; break;
default: status = PSE_PR_PCH_EPID_UNKNOWN_ERROR; break;
}
return status;
}
SigmaCryptoLayer::SigmaCryptoLayer()
{
}
SigmaCryptoLayer::~SigmaCryptoLayer(void)
{
memset_s(m_local_private_key_b_little_endian, SIGMA_SESSION_PRIVKEY_LENGTH, 0, SIGMA_SESSION_PRIVKEY_LENGTH);
memset_s(m_SMK, SIGMA_SMK_LENGTH, 0, SIGMA_SMK_LENGTH);
memset_s(m_SK, sizeof(m_SK), 0, sizeof(m_SK));
memset_s(m_MK, sizeof(m_MK), 0, sizeof(m_MK));
}
ae_error_t SigmaCryptoLayer::DeriveSkMk(/* In */ sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle)
{
ae_error_t ae_status = PSE_PR_DERIVE_SMK_ERROR;
IppStatus Status;
Ipp8u Gab[SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE*2] = {0};
Ipp8u Gab_Wth_00[SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE*2+1] = {0};
Ipp8u Gab_Wth_01[SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE*2+1] = {0};
Ipp8u GabHMACSha256[SGX_SHA256_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
/* convert m_remotePublicKey_ga_big_endian to little endian format */
uint8_t public_key_little_endian[SIGMA_SESSION_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
memcpy(public_key_little_endian, m_remote_public_key_ga_big_endian, SIGMA_SESSION_PUBKEY_LENGTH);
SwapEndian_32B(&(public_key_little_endian[0]));
SwapEndian_32B(&(public_key_little_endian[32]));
do
{
// Watch for null pointers
if (ecc_handle == NULL)
{
ae_status = PSE_PR_PARAMETER_ERROR;
break;
}
sgx_status_t sgx_status = sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_point((sgx_ec256_private_t *)m_local_private_key_b_little_endian,
(sgx_ec256_public_t *)public_key_little_endian,
(sgx_ec256_shared_point_t *)Gab,
ecc_handle);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != sgx_status)
{
if (SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY == sgx_status)
ae_status = PSE_PR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY_ERROR;
break;
}
//Initialize Variables required to get SK, SMK, MK
memcpy(Gab_Wth_00, Gab, sizeof(Gab));
Gab_Wth_00[sizeof(Gab)] = 0;
memcpy(Gab_Wth_01, Gab, sizeof(Gab));
Gab_Wth_01[sizeof(Gab)] = 1;
Ipp8u HMAC_Key[SIGMA_HMAC_LENGTH] = {0};
//Compute SMK
Status = ippsHMAC_Message(Gab_Wth_00, sizeof(Gab_Wth_00), HMAC_Key, sizeof(HMAC_Key),
m_SMK, sizeof(m_SMK), IPP_ALG_HASH_SHA256);
if (Status != ippStsNoErr)
{
if (Status == ippStsNoMemErr || Status == ippStsMemAllocErr)
ae_status = PSE_PR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY_ERROR;
break;
}
// Compute SK and MK
Status = ippsHMAC_Message(Gab_Wth_01, sizeof(Gab_Wth_01), HMAC_Key, sizeof(HMAC_Key),
GabHMACSha256, sizeof(GabHMACSha256), IPP_ALG_HASH_SHA256);
if (Status != ippStsNoErr)
{
if (Status == ippStsNoMemErr || Status == ippStsMemAllocErr)
ae_status = PSE_PR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY_ERROR;
break;
}
// Derive SK and MK from SHA256(g^ab)
memcpy(m_SK, (GabHMACSha256), SIGMA_SK_LENGTH); // SK: bits 0-127
memcpy(m_MK, (GabHMACSha256 + SIGMA_SK_LENGTH), SIGMA_MK_LENGTH); // MK: bits 128-255
ae_status = AE_SUCCESS;
} while (false);
// Defense-in-depth: clear secrets in stack before return
memset_s(Gab, sizeof(Gab), 0, sizeof(Gab));
memset_s(Gab_Wth_00, sizeof(Gab_Wth_00), 0, sizeof(Gab_Wth_00));
memset_s(Gab_Wth_01, sizeof(Gab_Wth_00), 0, sizeof(Gab_Wth_00));
memset_s(GabHMACSha256, sizeof(GabHMACSha256), 0, sizeof(GabHMACSha256));
return ae_status;
}
ae_error_t SigmaCryptoLayer::calc_s2_hmac(
SIGMA_HMAC* hmac, const SIGMA_S2_MESSAGE* s2, size_t nS2VLDataLen)
{
PrepareHMACSHA256 p(m_SMK, sizeof(m_SMK));
p.Update(s2->Gb, sizeof(s2->Gb));
p.Update(s2->Basename, sizeof(s2->Basename));
p.Update(&s2->OcspReq, sizeof(s2->OcspReq));
p.Update(s2->Data, nS2VLDataLen);
//NRG: SIGMA_HMAC - HMAC_SHA256 of [Gb || Basename || OCSP Req ||
// Verifier Cert || Sig-RL List ], using SMK
return p.Finalize(hmac);
}
ae_error_t SigmaCryptoLayer::calc_s3_hmac(
SIGMA_HMAC* hmac, const SIGMA_S3_MESSAGE* s3, size_t nS3VLDataLen)
{
PrepareHMACSHA256 p(m_SMK, sizeof(m_SMK));
p.Update(&s3->TaskInfo, sizeof(s3->TaskInfo));
p.Update(s3->Ga, sizeof(s3->Ga));
p.Update(s3->Data, nS3VLDataLen);
//NRG: SIGMA_HMAC -- HMAC_SHA256 of [TaskInfo || g^a ||
// EPIDCertprvr || EPIDSig(g^a || g^b)], using SMK
return p.Finalize(hmac);
}
ae_error_t SigmaCryptoLayer::ComputePR(SIGMA_SECRET_KEY* oldSK, Ipp8u byteToAdd, SIGMA_HMAC* hmac)
{
Ipp8u Sk_Wth_Added_Byte[sizeof(SIGMA_SIGN_KEY)+1];
ae_error_t ae_status = PSE_PR_PR_CALC_ERROR;
memset(hmac, 0, sizeof(*hmac));
do
{
memcpy(Sk_Wth_Added_Byte, oldSK, SIGMA_SK_LENGTH);
Sk_Wth_Added_Byte[SIGMA_SK_LENGTH] = byteToAdd;
//Compute hmac
IppStatus ippstatus = ippsHMAC_Message(Sk_Wth_Added_Byte,
SIGMA_SK_LENGTH+1, (Ipp8u*)m_MK, SIGMA_MK_LENGTH,
(Ipp8u*)hmac, SIGMA_HMAC_LENGTH, IPP_ALG_HASH_SHA256);
// defense-in-depth, clear secret data
memset_s(Sk_Wth_Added_Byte, sizeof(Sk_Wth_Added_Byte), 0, sizeof(Sk_Wth_Added_Byte));
if (ippStsNoErr != ippstatus)
{
if (ippStsNoMemErr == ippstatus || ippStsMemAllocErr == ippstatus)
ae_status = PSE_PR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY_ERROR;
break;
}
ae_status = AE_SUCCESS;
} while (0);
return ae_status;
}
ae_error_t SigmaCryptoLayer::ComputeId(Ipp8u byteToAdd,
SHA256_HASH* hash)
{
memset(hash, 0, sizeof(*hash));
PrepareHashSHA256 p;
p.Update(m_SK, sizeof(SIGMA_SIGN_KEY));
p.Update(m_MK, sizeof(SIGMA_MAC_KEY));
p.Update(&byteToAdd, sizeof(Ipp8u));
return p.Finalize(hash);
}
ae_error_t SigmaCryptoLayer::MsgVerifyPch(Ipp8u* PubKeyPch, int PubKeyPchLen,
Ipp8u* EpidParamsCert, Ipp8u* Msg, int MsgLen,
Ipp8u* Bsn, int BsnLen, Ipp8u* Signature,
int SignatureLen,
Ipp8u* PrivRevList, int PrivRL_Len, Ipp8u* SigRevList, int SigRL_Len,
Ipp8u* GrpRevList, int GrpRL_Len)
{
ae_error_t status = AE_FAILURE;
EpidStatus SafeIdRes = kEpidNoErr;
Epid11Signature Epid11Sig;
Epid11Signature *SigPointer = NULL;
memset_s(&Epid11Sig, sizeof(Epid11Sig), 0, sizeof(Epid11Sig));
UNUSED(EpidParamsCert);
UNUSED(Bsn);
UNUSED(BsnLen);
Epid11VerifierCtx* ctx = NULL;
do
{
// Watch for null pointers
if ((PubKeyPch == NULL) || (Msg == NULL) || (Signature == NULL))
{
status = PSE_PR_PARAMETER_ERROR;
break;
}
// Verify the length of public key and signature buffers
if (((size_t)PubKeyPchLen < (SAFEID_CERT_LEN - ECDSA_SIGNATURE_LEN)) ||
(SignatureLen < SAFEID_SIG_LEN))
{
status = PSE_PR_PARAMETER_ERROR;
break;
}
SafeIdRes = Epid11VerifierCreate(
(Epid11GroupPubKey* )(PubKeyPch),
NULL, &ctx);
status = MapEpidResultToAEError(SafeIdRes);
if (AE_FAILED(status)){
break;
}
if(PrivRevList != NULL){
SafeIdRes = Epid11VerifierSetPrivRl(ctx, (Epid11PrivRl *)(PrivRevList), PrivRL_Len);
status = MapEpidResultToAEError(SafeIdRes);
if(AE_FAILED(status)) {break;}
}
if(SigRevList != NULL){
SafeIdRes = Epid11VerifierSetSigRl(ctx, (Epid11SigRl *)(SigRevList), SigRL_Len);
status = MapEpidResultToAEError(SafeIdRes);
if(AE_FAILED(status)) {break;}
}
if(GrpRevList != NULL){
SafeIdRes = Epid11VerifierSetGroupRl(ctx, (Epid11GroupRl *)(GrpRevList), GrpRL_Len);
status = MapEpidResultToAEError(SafeIdRes);
if(AE_FAILED(status)) {break;}
}
//verify signature with Pub Key in ctx
//For epid-sdk-3.0, when the sigRL is null, the signature size includes "rl_ver" and "n2" fields
//(See structure definition of Epid11Signature)
//So we must use bigger buffer add 8 bytes to the length
if(SignatureLen == sizeof(Epid11BasicSignature)){
memcpy(&Epid11Sig, Signature, SignatureLen);
SignatureLen = static_cast<int>(SignatureLen + sizeof(Epid11Sig.rl_ver) + sizeof(Epid11Sig.n2));
SigPointer = &Epid11Sig;
}
else
{
SigPointer = (Epid11Signature *)Signature;
}
SafeIdRes = Epid11Verify(ctx,
SigPointer, SignatureLen,
Msg, MsgLen);
status = MapEpidResultToAEError(SafeIdRes);
if (AE_FAILED(status)){
break;
}
status = AE_SUCCESS;
} while (false);
if (NULL != ctx)
{
Epid11VerifierDelete(&ctx);
}
return status;
}