Refactor SpcIndirectDataContent parsing helpers

attach-signature now uses digest-only verification instead of full
signature validation; output file is not kept if digest verification fails

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+<!--
+Please use one of the available issue templates.
+Bug reports without required information may be closed.
+-->
+
+If you are reporting a bug or crash, please use the appropriate issue template.
+
+For questions or support, use please use [Discussions](<https://github.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/discussions>).

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/10_crash_report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+name: Crash report
+about: Report a segmentation fault or other crash
+labels: crash
+---
+
+<!--
+Thank you for your crash report.
+Note: Please search to see if an issue already exists for the bug you encountered.
+-->
+
+### Segmentation Fault / Crash Details
+<!--
+Provide exact, reproducible steps.
+Include the complete command, exactly as executed.
+-->
+- Signal / exit code: <!-- SIGSEGV, SIGABRT -->
+- Reproducibility: <!-- always / sometimes / once -->
+- Affected command or operation: <!-- e.g. `osslsigncode sign`, `osslsigncode verify` -->
+- First observed version:
+- Last known working version (if any):
+
+#### Backtrace
+<!--
+Provide a backtrace from gdb or lldb.
+Build with debug symbols if possible. Use `bt full` if possible.
+Crash reports without a backtrace may be closed without investigation.
+-->
+- `(gdb) bt`
+
+#### Memory / Sanitizers
+<!--
+Attach relevant output if available.
+-->
+- [ ] Valgrind
+- [ ] ASan / UBSan
+- [ ] Other tools
+
+#### Crash Context
+<!--
+Anything that may be relevant:
+- OpenSSL provider / engine in use
+- PKCS#11 modules
+- Custom OpenSSL configuration
+- Threading or concurrency
+-->
+
+### Environment
+- Operating system and version (e.g. Ubuntu 24.04):
+- Architecture (x86_64, arm64, etc.):
+
+### Versions
+<!--
+Please verify that the issue is reproducible with the current upstream master.
+-->
+- osslsigncode built from:
+  - [ ] upstream master
+  - [ ] upstream release (tag):
+  - [ ] distribution package (name and version):
+- `openssl version -a`
+- `osslsigncode --version`
+
+### Configuration / Settings
+<!--
+Anything that could affect signing or verification:
+- Custom OpenSSL configuration
+- Engine / provider settings
+- Environment variables (OPENSSL_CONF, etc.)
+-->
+
+### Anything else
+<!--
+Links, references, related issues, workarounds or additional observations.
+-->

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/20_documentation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+name: Documentation
+about: Report an error in (or missing) documentation
+labels: documentation
+---
+
+<!--
+Thank you for taking the time to report a documentation issue.
+-->
+
+### Documentation Location
+<!--
+Where is the problem located?
+Provide a link, file path, or section name.
+-->
+
+### Issue Description
+<!--
+Describe what is wrong or missing.
+-->
+
+### Suggested Improvement (optional)
+<!--
+If you know how it should be fixed, describe it here.
+Proposed wording or examples are especially helpful.
+-->

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/30_feature_request.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+name: Feature request
+about: Suggest a new feature or improvement
+labels: feature
+---
+
+<!--
+Thank you for your feature request.
+Please describe the use case and motivation as clearly as possible.
+-->
+
+### Use Case / Motivation
+<!--
+What problem are you trying to solve?
+Why is this feature needed?
+-->
+
+### Proposed Change
+<!--
+Describe the feature or improvement you are proposing.
+High-level description is sufficient.
+-->
+
+### Additional Notes (optional)
+<!--
+Anything else that may help:
+- examples
+- references
+- related issues
+-->

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/40_questions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+name: Questions / Support
+about: Please use Q&A in Discussions instead
+labels: question
+---
+
+### Questions and Support
+
+Please do **not** use GitHub issues for general questions or support requests.
+
+For:
+- usage questions
+- "how do I..." questions
+
+please use [Q&A category in Discussions](<https://github.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/discussions/new?category=q-a>)
+
+Bug reports and crashes should be reported using the appropriate issue templates.

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/50_bug_report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+name: Other bug report
+about: Report a bug
+labels: bug
+---
+
+<!--
+Thank you for your bug report.
+Note: Please search to see if an issue already exists for the bug you encountered.
+-->
+
+### Current Behavior
+<!--
+A concise description of what is happening.
+Include error messages or incorrect results.
+-->
+
+### Expected Behavior
+<!--
+A concise description of what you expected to happen instead.
+-->
+
+### Steps To Reproduce & Observed Output
+<!--
+Provide exact, reproducible steps together with full stdout/stderr for each.
+-->
+1. Signing with osslsigncode
+<!--
+Full `osslsigncode sign` command and complete stdout/stderr output.
+-->
+
+2. Verification with osslsigncode
+<!--
+Full `osslsigncode verify` command and complete stdout/stderr output.
+-->
+
+3. Signing / verification with Windows signtool (if applicable)
+<!--
+Full signtool command (`signtool verify /pa /v`) and complete stdout/stderr output.
+-->
+
+### Environment
+- Operating system and version (e.g. Ubuntu 24.04):
+- Architecture (x86_64, arm64, etc.):
+
+### Versions
+<!--
+Please verify that the issue is reproducible with the current upstream master.
+-->
+- osslsigncode built from:
+  - [ ] upstream master
+  - [ ] upstream release (tag):
+  - [ ] distribution package (name and version):
+- `openssl version -a`
+- `osslsigncode --version`
+
+### Files
+<!--
+Attach files if possible, or mention that you will share them privately.
+-->
+- [ ] unsigned file
+- [ ] file signed with osslsigncode
+- [ ] file signed with signtool or the other tool (for comparison)
+- [ ] certificate chain used for verification (PEM format)
+
+### Configuration / Settings
+<!--
+Anything that could affect signing or verification:
+- Custom OpenSSL configuration
+- Engine / provider settings
+- Environment variables (OPENSSL_CONF, etc.)
+-->
+
+### Anything else
+<!--
+Links, references, related issues, workarounds or additional observations.
+-->

.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+<!--
+Thank you for your pull request.
+Provide a concise summary of the changes in the PR title.
+-->
+
+### Pull Request Type
+<!--
+Limit this PR to a single type. If necessary, split changes into multiple PRs.
+-->
+
+- [ ] Bug fix
+- [ ] New feature
+- [ ] Code style / formatting / renaming
+- [ ] Refactoring (no functional or API changes)
+- [ ] Build / CI related changes
+- [ ] Documentation
+- [ ] Other (please describe):
+
+### Related Issue
+<!--
+If this fixes a GitHub issue, make sure to have a line saying 'Fixes #XXXX' (without quotes) in the commit message.
+-->
+Issue number: N/A
+
+### Current Behavior
+<!--
+Describe the current behavior or limitation this PR addresses.
+Include error messages or crash symptoms if relevant.
+-->
+
+### New Behavior
+<!--
+Describe the new or changed behavior introduced by this PR.
+-->
+
+### Scope of Changes
+<!--
+Briefly describe what was changed and why.
+Focus on relevant parts only.
+-->
+
+### Testing
+<!--
+Describe how the changes were tested.
+Include commands, environments, or platforms if relevant.
+-->
+- [ ] Existing tests
+- [ ] New tests added
+- [ ] Manual testing
+
+### Additional Notes
+<!--
+Any additional information relevant for reviewers:
+- design decisions
+- backward compatibility
+- known limitations
+-->
+
+## License Declaration
+<!--
+All contributions to this project are licensed under the project's license.
+By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have the right to submit
+the code and agree to license it accordingly.
+-->
+- [ ] I hereby agree to license my contribution under the project's license.

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ on:
 env:
   # Customize the CMake build type here (Release, Debug, RelWithDebInfo, etc.)
   BUILD_TYPE: Release
-  version: osslsigncode-2.10
+  version: osslsigncode-2.14-dev
 
 jobs:
   build:

CMakeLists.txt

@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ set(BUILTIN_SOCKET ON CACHE BOOL "") # for static Python
 
 # configure basic project information
 project(osslsigncode
-    VERSION 2.10
+    VERSION 2.14
     DESCRIPTION "OpenSSL based Authenticode signing for PE, CAB, CAT, MSI, APPX and script files"
     HOMEPAGE_URL "https://github.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode"
     LANGUAGES C)
 
 # force nonstandard version format for development packages
-set(DEV "")
+set(DEV "-dev")
 set(PROJECT_VERSION "${PROJECT_VERSION_MAJOR}.${PROJECT_VERSION_MINOR}${DEV}")
 
 # version and contact information
@@ -97,14 +97,25 @@ set_target_properties(osslsigncode PROPERTIES INSTALL_RPATH_USE_LINK_PATH TRUE)
 # testing with CTest
 include(CMakeTest)
 
+# documentation with Pandoc
+include(CMakeDoc)
+
 # installation rules for a project
-set(BINDIR "${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/bin")
+include(GNUInstallDirs)
-install(TARGETS osslsigncode RUNTIME DESTINATION ${BINDIR})
+
+install(TARGETS osslsigncode RUNTIME DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR})
+
+install(FILES
+    "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/README.md"
+    "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/NEWS.md"
+    DESTINATION "${CMAKE_INSTALL_DOCDIR}")
+
 if(UNIX)
     include(CMakeDist)
 else(UNIX)
     install(
-        DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/ DESTINATION ${BINDIR}
+        DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/
+        DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}
         FILES_MATCHING
         PATTERN "*.dll"
         PATTERN "vcpkg_installed" EXCLUDE
@@ -112,6 +123,15 @@ else(UNIX)
         PATTERN "Testing" EXCLUDE)
 endif(UNIX)
 
+# uninstall target
+configure_file(
+    "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake/cmake_uninstall.cmake.in"
+    "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake_uninstall.cmake"
+    IMMEDIATE @ONLY)
+
+add_custom_target(uninstall
+    COMMAND ${CMAKE_COMMAND} -P "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake_uninstall.cmake")
+
 #[[
 Local Variables:
     c-basic-offset: 4

NEWS.md

@@ -1,5 +1,48 @@
 # osslsigncode change log
 
+### 2.14 (unreleased)
+
+- attach-signature now uses digest-only verification instead of full signature
+  validation; output file is not kept if digest verification fails
+
+### 2.13 (2026.02.10)
+
+**MULTIPLE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES**
+
+This release includes important security fixes. Users are strongly encouraged
+to upgrade, as the issues below may be exploitable when processing untrusted
+files.
+
+- fixed integer overflows when processing APPX compressed data streams
+  (by Małgorzata Olszówka)
+- fixed double-free vulnerabilities in APPX file processing
+  (by Małgorzata Olszówka)
+- fixed multiple memory corruption issues in PE page hash computation
+  (by Antoni Klajn (Opera) and Małgorzata Olszówka)
+
+### 2.12 (2026.02.02)
+
+**CRITICAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY**
+
+This release fixes a critical memory corruption vulnerability.  A malicious
+attacker could create a signed file, which, when verified with osslsigncode,
+triggers arbitrary code execution.  Any previous version of osslsigncode should
+be immediately upgraded if the tool is used for verification of untrusted
+files.
+
+- fixed a buffer overflow while extracting message digests
+  (reported and fixed by Antoni Klajn, Opera)
+
+### 2.11 (2026.01.20)
+- added keyUsage validation for signer certificate
+  (thanks to Hanqing Zhao and Zi-Quan You for reporting the issue)
+- added printing CRL details during signature verification
+- implemented a workaround for CRL servers returning the HTTP Content-Type
+  header other than application/pkix-crl (thanks to Chris Thibodeaux)
+- fixed HTTP keep-alive handling
+- fixed macOS compiler and linker flags
+- fixed undefined BIO_get_fp() behavior with BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK_INTERNAL
+
 ### 2.10 (2025.06.23)
 
 - added JavaScript signing

README.md

@@ -133,8 +133,9 @@ To sign a CAB file containing Java class files:
 ```
 Only the 'low' parameter is currently supported.
 
-If you want to use a PKCS#11 token, you should specify the PKCS#11 engine and module.
+### Using the PKCS#11 Engine with osslsigncode
-An example of using osslsigncode with SoftHSM:
+If you want to use a PKCS#11 token, specify the PKCS#11 engine and module.
+Example usage with SoftHSM:
 ```
   osslsigncode sign \
     -engine /usr/lib64/engines-1.1/pkcs11.so \
@@ -144,8 +145,10 @@ An example of using osslsigncode with SoftHSM:
     -in yourapp.exe -out yourapp-signed.exe
 ```
 
-Since OpenSSL 3.0, you can use a PKCS#11 token with the PKCS#11 provider.
+### Using the PKCS#11 Provider with osslsigncode (OpenSSL 3.x only)
-An example of using osslsigncode with OpenSC:
+OpenSSL 3.0 introduced a new provider-based architecture. To use a PKCS#11 token
+ with `osslsigncode`, specify the PKCS#11 provider and module.
+Example usage with OpenSC:
 ```
   osslsigncode sign \
     -provider /usr/lib64/ossl-modules/pkcs11prov.so \
@@ -155,26 +158,40 @@ An example of using osslsigncode with OpenSC:
     -in yourapp.exe -out yourapp-signed.exe
 ```
 
-You can use a certificate and key stored in the Windows Certificate Store with
+### Using the CNG Engine with osslsigncode (Windows only)
-the CNG engine version 1.1 or later. For more information, refer to
+The CNG engine allows using certificates and keys stored in the Windows
+Certificate Store. It requires CNG engine version 1.1 or later. For more
+information, refer to
 
   https://www.stunnel.org/cng-engine.html
 
 A non-commercial edition of CNG engine is available for testing, personal,
 educational, or research purposes.
 
-To use the CNG engine with osslsigncode, ensure that the `cng.dll` library is
+To ensure `osslsigncode` can locate and load the CNG engine module (`cng.dll`)
-placed in the same directory as the `osslsigncode.exe` executable.
+even when it is not installed in the default system engine directory, you can:
 
-Below is an example of how to use osslsigncode with the CNG engine:
+- Specify the full or relative path to `cng.dll`:
 ```
-  osslsigncode sign \
+  osslsigncode sign -engine C:\my\engines\cng.dll ...
-    -engine cng \
+```
-    -pkcs11cert osslsigncode_cert \
+- Or set the `OPENSSL_ENGINES` environment variable to the directory containing
-    -key osslsigncode_cert \
+`cng.dll`, and refer to the engine by its ID:
-    -engineCtrl store_flags:0 \
+```
-    -engineCtrl store_name:MY \
+  set OPENSSL_ENGINES=C:\my\engines
-    -engineCtrl PIN:yourpass \
+  osslsigncode sign -engine cng ...
+```
+
+Below is an example of how to use `osslsigncode` with the CNG engine on Windows:
+```
+  set OPENSSL_ENGINES=C:\my\engines
+  osslsigncode sign ^
+    -engine cng ^
+    -pkcs11cert osslsigncode_cert ^
+    -key osslsigncode_cert ^
+    -engineCtrl store_flags:0 ^
+    -engineCtrl store_name:MY ^
+    -engineCtrl PIN:yourpass ^
     -in yourapp.exe -out yourapp-signed.exe
 ```
 

appx.c

@@ -470,32 +470,33 @@ static int appx_hash_length_get(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx)
  */
 static int appx_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
 {
-    if (is_content_type(p7, SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID)) {
+    SpcIndirectDataContent *idc;
-        ASN1_STRING *content_val = p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence;
+    BIO *hashes;
-        const u_char *p = content_val->data;
-        SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &p, content_val->length);
 
-        if (idc) {
+    idc = pkcs7_get_indirect_data_content(p7);
-            BIO *hashes;
+    if (!idc)
-            if (!appx_extract_hashes(ctx, idc)) {
+        return 1; /* OK - no SpcIndirectDataContent */
-                fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract hashes from the signature\n");
+
-                SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+    if (!appx_extract_hashes(ctx, idc)) {
-                return 0; /* FAILED */
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract hashes from the signature\n");
-            }
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-            hashes = appx_calculate_hashes(ctx);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
-            if (!hashes) {
-                SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-                return 0; /* FAILED */
-            }
-            BIO_free_all(hashes);
-            if (!appx_compare_hashes(ctx)) {
-                fprintf(stderr, "Signature hash verification failed\n");
-                SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-                return 0; /* FAILED */
-            }
-            SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-        }
     }
+
+    hashes = appx_calculate_hashes(ctx);
+    if (!hashes) {
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    BIO_free_all(hashes);
+
+    if (!appx_compare_hashes(ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Signature hash verification failed\n");
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+
+    SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
     return 1; /* OK */
 }
 
@@ -1077,13 +1078,13 @@ static int appx_extract_hashes(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, SpcIndirectDataContent *con
     AppxSpcSipInfo_free(si);
     BIO_free_all(stdbio);
 #endif
-    int length = content->messageDigest->digest->length;
+    int len = ASN1_STRING_length(content->messageDigest->digest);
-    uint8_t *data = content->messageDigest->digest->data;
+    const uint8_t *data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(content->messageDigest->digest);
     int mdlen = EVP_MD_size(ctx->appx_ctx->md);
     int pos = 4;
 
     /* we are expecting at least 4 hashes + 4 byte header */
-    if (length < 4 * mdlen + 4) {
+    if (len < 4 * mdlen + 4) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Hash too short\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
@@ -1091,7 +1092,7 @@ static int appx_extract_hashes(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, SpcIndirectDataContent *con
         fprintf(stderr, "Hash signature does not match\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
-    while (pos + mdlen + 4 <= length) {
+    while (pos + mdlen + 4 <= len) {
         if (!memcmp(data + pos, AXPC_SIGNATURE, 4)) {
             ctx->appx_ctx->existingDataHash = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)mdlen);
             memcpy(ctx->appx_ctx->existingDataHash, data + pos + 4, (size_t)mdlen);
@@ -1503,6 +1504,7 @@ static int zipAppendSignatureFile(BIO *bio, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t *data, uint64
     if (!get_current_position(bio, &offset)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get offset\n");
         OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
+        header.fileName = NULL;
         OPENSSL_free(dataToWrite);
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
@@ -1513,6 +1515,7 @@ static int zipAppendSignatureFile(BIO *bio, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t *data, uint64
         if (!BIO_write_ex(bio, dataToWrite + written, toWrite, &check)
             || check != toWrite) {
             OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
+            header.fileName = NULL;
             OPENSSL_free(dataToWrite);
             return 0; /* FAILED */
         }
@@ -1685,6 +1688,8 @@ static int zipRewriteData(ZIP_FILE *zip, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *entry, BIO
 out:
     OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
     OPENSSL_free(header.extraField);
+    header.fileName = NULL;
+    header.extraField = NULL;
     return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1852,6 +1857,11 @@ static size_t zipReadFileData(ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t **pData, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECT
     }
     if (entry->overrideData) {
         compressedSize = entry->overrideData->compressedSize;
+        /* Validate sizes for safe allocation */
+        if (compressedSize > (uint64_t)(SIZE_MAX - 1)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted compressedSize : %" PRIu64"\n", compressedSize);
+            return 0; /* FAILED */
+        }
         uncompressedSize = entry->overrideData->uncompressedSize;
         compressedData = OPENSSL_zalloc(compressedSize + 1);
         memcpy(compressedData, entry->overrideData->data, compressedSize);
@@ -1863,6 +1873,8 @@ static size_t zipReadFileData(ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t **pData, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECT
         if (!zipReadLocalHeader(&header, zip, compressedSize)) {
             OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
             OPENSSL_free(header.extraField);
+            header.fileName = NULL;
+            header.extraField = NULL;
             return 0; /* FAILED */
         }
         if (header.fileNameLen != entry->fileNameLen
@@ -1873,14 +1885,20 @@ static size_t zipReadFileData(ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t **pData, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECT
             fprintf(stderr, "Local header does not match central directory entry\n");
             OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
             OPENSSL_free(header.extraField);
+            header.fileName = NULL;
+            header.extraField = NULL;
             return 0; /* FAILED */
         }
         /* we don't really need those */
         OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
         OPENSSL_free(header.extraField);
+        header.fileName = NULL;
+        header.extraField = NULL;
 
-        if (compressedSize > (uint64_t)zip->fileSize - entry->offsetOfLocalHeader) {
+        /* Validate sizes for safe allocation */
-            fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted compressedSize : 0x%08" PRIX64 "\n", entry->compressedSize);
+        if (compressedSize > (uint64_t)(SIZE_MAX - 1)
+            || compressedSize > (uint64_t)zip->fileSize - entry->offsetOfLocalHeader) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted compressedSize : %" PRIu64"\n", compressedSize);
             return 0; /* FAILED */
         }
         compressedData = OPENSSL_zalloc(compressedSize + 1);
@@ -1899,11 +1917,26 @@ static size_t zipReadFileData(ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t **pData, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECT
         *pData = compressedData;
         dataSize = compressedSize;
     } else if (entry->compression == COMPRESSION_DEFLATE) {
-        uint8_t *uncompressedData = OPENSSL_zalloc(uncompressedSize + 1);
+        uint8_t *uncompressedData;
-        uint64_t destLen = uncompressedSize;
+        uint64_t destLen, sourceLen;
-        uint64_t sourceLen = compressedSize;
         int ret;
 
+        /* Validate sizes for safe allocation */
+        if (uncompressedSize > (uint64_t)(SIZE_MAX - 1)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted uncompressedSize : %" PRIu64"\n", uncompressedSize);
+            OPENSSL_free(compressedData);
+            return 0; /* FAILED */
+        }
+        /* Detect suspicious compression ratio (zip bomb protection) */
+        if (uncompressedSize > 1024 * 1024 && uncompressedSize / 100 >= compressedSize) {
+              fprintf(stderr, "Error: suspicious compression ratio\n");
+              OPENSSL_free(compressedData);
+              return 0; /* FAILED */
+        }
+        uncompressedData = OPENSSL_zalloc(uncompressedSize + 1);
+        destLen = uncompressedSize;
+        sourceLen = compressedSize;
+
         ret = zipInflate(uncompressedData, &destLen, compressedData, (uLong *)&sourceLen);
         OPENSSL_free(compressedData);
 
@@ -1970,6 +2003,8 @@ static int zipReadLocalHeader(ZIP_LOCAL_HEADER *header, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint64_t
     header->extraFieldLen = fileGetU16(file);
     /* file name (variable size) */
     if (header->fileNameLen > 0) {
+        /* fileNameLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
+         * so fileNameLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
         header->fileName = OPENSSL_zalloc(header->fileNameLen + 1);
         size = fread(header->fileName, 1, header->fileNameLen, file);
         if (size != header->fileNameLen) {
@@ -1981,6 +2016,8 @@ static int zipReadLocalHeader(ZIP_LOCAL_HEADER *header, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint64_t
     }
     /* extra field (variable size) */
     if (header->extraFieldLen > 0) {
+        /* extraFieldLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
+         * so extraFieldLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
         header->extraField = OPENSSL_zalloc(header->extraFieldLen + 1);
         size = fread(header->extraField, 1, header->extraFieldLen, file);
         if (size != header->extraFieldLen) {
@@ -2011,6 +2048,8 @@ static int zipReadLocalHeader(ZIP_LOCAL_HEADER *header, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint64_t
             fprintf(stderr, "The input file is not a valid zip file - flags indicate data descriptor, but data descriptor signature does not match\n");
             OPENSSL_free(header->fileName);
             OPENSSL_free(header->extraField);
+            header->fileName = NULL;
+            header->extraField = NULL;
             return 0; /* FAILED */
         }
         header->crc32 = fileGetU32(file);
@@ -2477,6 +2516,8 @@ static ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *zipReadNextCentralDirectoryEntry(FILE *file)
     entry->offsetOfLocalHeader = fileGetU32(file);
     /* file name (variable size) */
     if (entry->fileNameLen > 0) {
+        /* fileNameLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
+         * so fileNameLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
         entry->fileName = OPENSSL_zalloc(entry->fileNameLen + 1);
         size = fread(entry->fileName, 1, entry->fileNameLen, file);
         if (size != entry->fileNameLen) {
@@ -2487,6 +2528,8 @@ static ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *zipReadNextCentralDirectoryEntry(FILE *file)
     }
     /* extra field (variable size) */
     if (entry->extraFieldLen > 0) {
+        /* extraFieldLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
+         * so extraFieldLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
         entry->extraField = OPENSSL_zalloc(entry->extraFieldLen + 1);
         size = fread(entry->extraField, 1, entry->extraFieldLen, file);
         if (size != entry->extraFieldLen) {
@@ -2497,6 +2540,8 @@ static ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *zipReadNextCentralDirectoryEntry(FILE *file)
     }
     /* file comment (variable size) */
     if (entry->fileCommentLen > 0) {
+        /* fileCommentLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
+         * so fileCommentLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
         entry->fileComment = OPENSSL_zalloc(entry->fileCommentLen + 1);
         size = fread(entry->fileComment, 1, entry->fileCommentLen, file);
         if (size != entry->fileCommentLen) {
@@ -2635,6 +2680,8 @@ static int readZipEOCDR(ZIP_EOCDR *eocdr, FILE *file)
     }
 #endif
     if (eocdr->commentLen > 0) {
+        /* ZIP_EOCDR commentLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
+         * so fileCommentLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
         eocdr->comment = OPENSSL_zalloc(eocdr->commentLen + 1);
         size = fread(eocdr->comment, 1, eocdr->commentLen, file);
         if (size != eocdr->commentLen) {
@@ -2744,7 +2791,10 @@ static int get_current_position(BIO *bio, uint64_t *offset)
     FILE *file = NULL;
     int64_t pos;
 
-    BIO_get_fp(bio, &file);
+    if (BIO_get_fp(bio, &file) != 1 || file == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BIO_get_fp() failed\n");
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
     pos = ftello(file);
     if (pos < 0) {
         return 0; /* FAILED */

cab.c

@@ -337,19 +337,7 @@ static int cab_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
     u_char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     u_char *cmdbuf;
 
-    if (is_content_type(p7, SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID)) {
+    if (!pkcs7_get_content_digest(p7, mdbuf, &mdtype)) {
-        ASN1_STRING *content_val = p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence;
-        const u_char *p = content_val->data;
-        SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &p, content_val->length);
-        if (idc) {
-            if (idc->messageDigest && idc->messageDigest->digest && idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm) {
-                mdtype = OBJ_obj2nid(idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
-                memcpy(mdbuf, idc->messageDigest->digest->data, (size_t)idc->messageDigest->digest->length);
-            }
-            SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-        }
-    }
-    if (mdtype == -1) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract current message digest\n\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }

cat.c

@@ -297,27 +297,39 @@ static int cat_add_content_type(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7 *cursig)
  */
 static int cat_sign_content(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7 *contents)
 {
-    u_char *content;
+    const unsigned char *sequence_data;
-    int seqhdrlen, content_length;
+    const unsigned char *content;
+    ASN1_STRING *sequence;
+    int seqhdrlen, sequence_len, content_length;
 
-    if (!contents->d.other || !contents->d.other->value.sequence
+    if (!contents->d.other || !contents->d.other->value.sequence) {
-          || !contents->d.other->value.sequence->data) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get content value\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
-    seqhdrlen = asn1_simple_hdr_len(contents->d.other->value.sequence->data,
+
-        contents->d.other->value.sequence->length);
+    sequence = contents->d.other->value.sequence;
-    content = contents->d.other->value.sequence->data + seqhdrlen;
+    sequence_data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(sequence);
-    content_length = contents->d.other->value.sequence->length - seqhdrlen;
+    sequence_len = ASN1_STRING_length(sequence);
+
+    if (!sequence_data) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get content value\n");
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+
+    seqhdrlen = asn1_simple_hdr_len(sequence_data, sequence_len);
+    content = (const unsigned char *)sequence_data + seqhdrlen;
+    content_length = sequence_len - seqhdrlen;
 
     if (!pkcs7_sign_content(p7, content, content_length)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Failed to sign content\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
+
     if (!PKCS7_set_content(p7, PKCS7_dup(contents))) {
         fprintf(stderr, "PKCS7_set_content failed\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
+
     return 1; /* OK */
 }
 
@@ -381,27 +393,22 @@ static int cat_print_content_member_digest(ASN1_TYPE *content)
 {
     SpcIndirectDataContent *idc;
     u_char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    const u_char *data ;
     int mdtype = -1;
-    ASN1_STRING *value;
 
-    value = content->value.sequence;
+    idc = asn1_type_get_indirect_data_content(content);
-    data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(value);
-    idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &data, ASN1_STRING_length(value));
     if (!idc)
         return 0; /* FAILED */
-    if (idc->messageDigest && idc->messageDigest->digest && idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm) {
+
-        /* get a digest algorithm a message digest of the file from the content */
+    if (spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
-        mdtype = OBJ_obj2nid(idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract message digest from signature\n\n");
-        memcpy(mdbuf, idc->messageDigest->digest->data, (size_t)idc->messageDigest->digest->length);
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-    }
-    SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-    if (mdtype == -1) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract current message digest\n\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
+    SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+
     printf("\tHash algorithm: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(mdtype));
     print_hash("\tMessage digest", "", mdbuf, EVP_MD_size(EVP_get_digestbynid(mdtype)));
+
     return 1; /* OK */
 }
 

cmake/CMakeDoc.cmake

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# documentation with Pandoc
+# cmake --build .
+
+find_program(PANDOC pandoc)
+
+if(NOT PANDOC)
+    message(WARNING "CMakeDoc: pandoc not found, documentation disabled")
+    return()
+endif(NOT PANDOC)
+
+set(DOC_MD "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/osslsigncode.md")
+
+if(NOT EXISTS "${DOC_MD}")
+    message(WARNING "CMakeDoc: markdown source not found: ${DOC_MD}")
+    return()
+endif(NOT EXISTS "${DOC_MD}")
+
+set(MAN_PAGE "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/osslsigncode.1")
+set(HTML_PAGE "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/osslsigncode.html")
+
+add_custom_command(
+    OUTPUT "${MAN_PAGE}"
+    COMMAND "${PANDOC}" -s "${DOC_MD}" -t man -o "${MAN_PAGE}"
+    DEPENDS "${DOC_MD}"
+    COMMENT "CMakeDoc: generating man page"
+    VERBATIM)
+
+add_custom_command(
+    OUTPUT "${HTML_PAGE}"
+    COMMAND "${PANDOC}" -s --toc --toc-depth=2 "${DOC_MD}" -t html -o "${HTML_PAGE}"
+    DEPENDS "${DOC_MD}"
+    COMMENT "CMakeDoc: generating HTML documentation"
+    VERBATIM)
+
+add_custom_target(docs ALL DEPENDS "${MAN_PAGE}" "${HTML_PAGE}")
+
+#[[
+Local Variables:
+    c-basic-offset: 4
+    tab-width: 4
+    indent-tabs-mode: nil
+End:
+    vim: set ts=4 expandtab:
+]]

cmake/CMakeTest.cmake

@@ -196,18 +196,12 @@ if(Python3_FOUND AND NOT cryptography_error)
         foreach(format ${formats})
             add_test(NAME "attached_${format}_${ext}"
                 COMMAND ${Python3_EXECUTABLE} ${EXEC} ${OSSLSIGNCODE} "attach-signature"
-                # sign options
                 "-add-msi-dse"
                 "-h" "sha512"
                 "-nest"
                 "-sigin" "${FILES}/${ext}.${format}"
                 "-in" "${FILES}/signed.${ext}"
-                "-out" "${FILES}/attached_${format}.${ext}"
+                "-out" "${FILES}/attached_${format}.${ext}")
-                # verify options
-                "-require-leaf-hash" "FILE ${CERTS}/leafhash.txt"
-                "-time" "1567296000" # Signature verification time: Sep  1 00:00:00 2019 GMT
-                "-CAfile" "${CERTS}/CACert.pem"
-                "-CRLfile" "${CERTS}/CACertCRL.pem")
             set_tests_properties("attached_${format}_${ext}" PROPERTIES
                 DEPENDS "signed_${ext};extract_pem_${ext};extract_der_${ext}")
             list(APPEND ALL_TESTS "attached_${format}_${ext}")
@@ -413,17 +407,11 @@ if(Python3_FOUND AND NOT cryptography_error)
             foreach(format ${formats})
                 add_test(NAME "attached_data_${ext}_${data_format}_${format}"
                     COMMAND ${Python3_EXECUTABLE} ${EXEC} ${OSSLSIGNCODE} "attach-signature"
-                    # sign options
                     "-add-msi-dse"
                     "-h" "sha384"
                     "-sigin" "${FILES}/signed_data_${ext}_${data_format}.${format}"
                     "-in" "${FILES}/unsigned.${ext}"
-                    "-out" "${FILES}/attached_data_${data_format}_${format}.${ext}"
+                    "-out" "${FILES}/attached_data_${data_format}_${format}.${ext}")
-                    # verify options
-                    "-require-leaf-hash" "FILE ${CERTS}/leafhash.txt"
-                    "-time" "1567296000" # Signature verification time: Sep  1 00:00:00 2019 GMT
-                    "-CAfile" "${CERTS}/CACert.pem"
-                    "-CRLfile" "${CERTS}/CACertCRL.pem")
                 set_tests_properties("attached_data_${ext}_${data_format}_${format}" PROPERTIES
                     DEPENDS "signed_data_${ext}_${data_format};signed_data_pem_${ext}_${data_format}")
                 list(APPEND ALL_TESTS "attached_data_${ext}_${data_format}_${format}")

cmake/SetCompilerFlags.cmake

@@ -96,16 +96,11 @@ function(add_compile_flags target)
                 message(WARNING "No stack protection supported")
             endif(HAVE_STACK_PROTECTOR)
         endif(HAVE_STACK_PROTECTOR_ALL)
-        # Support address space layout randomization (ASLR)
+        # Support address space layout randomization (ASLR) / PIE
-        if(NOT (MINGW OR CYGWIN OR CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID STREQUAL "AppleClang"
+        if(UNIX AND NOT APPLE)
-            OR ((CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES Darwin) AND (CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID MATCHES Clang))))
             target_compile_options(${target} PRIVATE -fPIE)
-            target_link_options(${target} PRIVATE -fPIE -pie)
+            target_link_options(${target} PRIVATE -fPIE -pie -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now,-z,noexecstack)
-            target_link_options(${target} PRIVATE -Wl,-z,relro)
+        endif(UNIX AND NOT APPLE)
-            target_link_options(${target} PRIVATE -Wl,-z,now)
-            target_link_options(${target} PRIVATE -Wl,-z,noexecstack)
-        endif(NOT (MINGW OR CYGWIN OR CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID STREQUAL "AppleClang"
-            OR ((CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES Darwin) AND (CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID MATCHES Clang))))
         target_link_options(${target} PRIVATE -fstack-check)
         add_compile_flag_to_targets(${target})
     endif(MSVC)

cmake/cmake_uninstall.cmake.in

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# uninstall target
+#
+# CMake does not provide a built-in uninstall target.
+# This target removes files listed in install_manifest.txt,
+# generated by the install step.
+#
+# cmake --build . --target uninstall
+
+if(NOT EXISTS "@CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR@/install_manifest.txt")
+    message(FATAL_ERROR "Cannot find install manifest")
+endif()
+
+file(READ "@CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR@/install_manifest.txt" files)
+string(REPLACE "\n" ";" files "${files}")
+
+foreach(file ${files})
+    message(STATUS "Removing ${file}")
+
+    if(EXISTS "${file}" OR IS_SYMLINK "${file}")
+        file(REMOVE "${file}")
+    else()
+        message(STATUS "File does not exist: ${file}")
+    endif()
+endforeach()

get_code_signing_ca.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from csv import reader
 from requests import get
 from requests.exceptions import RequestException
 from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+from re import search
 
 def download_cert(hash):
     for attempt in range(10):
@@ -17,23 +18,33 @@ def download_cert(hash):
             sleep(10)
         try:
             creds = f'{attempt}{hash}:{attempt}{hash}'
-            resp = get(f'https://crt.sh/?d={hash}',
+            proxies = dict(https=f'socks5://{creds}@127.0.0.1:9050')
-                proxies=dict(https=f'socks5://{creds}@127.0.0.1:9050'))
+
+            url = f'https://crt.sh/?sha1={hash}&match=='
+            resp = get(url, proxies=proxies)
             resp.raise_for_status()
+
+            m = search(r'\bid=(\d+)\b', resp.content.decode('ascii', 'replace'))
+            id = m.group(1)
+
+            url = f'https://crt.sh/?d={id}'
+            resp = get(url, proxies=proxies)
+            resp.raise_for_status()
+
             print('.', file=stderr, end='')
             stderr.flush()
-            return resp.content.decode('utf-8')
+            return resp.content.decode('utf-8', 'replace')
-        except RequestException as e:
+        except Exception as e:
-            print(f'\nAttempt {attempt}: {e}', file=stderr)
+            print(f'\n{url} attempt {attempt}: {e}', file=stderr)
     print('\nGiving up on', hash, file=stderr)
 
-resp = get('https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/microsoft/IncludedCACertificateReportForMSFTCSV')
+resp = get('https://ccadb.my.salesforce-sites.com/microsoft/IncludedCACertificateReportForMSFTCSV')
 resp.raise_for_status()
 lines = resp.content.decode('utf-8').splitlines()[1:]
 hashes = [row[4] for row in reader(lines)
     if row[0] != 'Disabled'
         or row[4] == 'F38406E540D7A9D90CB4A9479299640FFB6DF9E224ECC7A01C0D9558D8DAD77D']
-with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=20) as executor:
+with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=10) as executor:
     certs = executor.map(download_cert, hashes)
 for cert in certs:
     if cert is not None:

helpers.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ static int pkcs7_signer_info_add_purpose(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, FILE_FORMAT_CTX
 static int pkcs7_signer_info_add_sequence_number(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx);
 static STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_get_sorted(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int signer);
 static int X509_compare(const X509 *const *a, const X509 *const *b);
+static void sk_X509_remove_duplicates(STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
 
 /*
  * Common functions
@@ -340,6 +341,91 @@ PKCS7 *pkcs7_set_content(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *content)
     return p7;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Retrieve the message digest and digest algorithm from PKCS7
+ * SpcIndirectDataContent.
+ *
+ * [in] p7: PKCS7 structure containing SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID content
+ * [out] mdbuf: message digest buffer, at least EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes
+ * [out] mdtype: OpenSSL NID of the digest algorithm
+ * [returns] 0 on error or 1 on success
+ */
+int pkcs7_get_content_digest(PKCS7 *p7, u_char *mdbuf, int *mdtype)
+{
+    SpcIndirectDataContent *idc;
+
+    if (!mdbuf || !mdtype)
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+
+    *mdtype = -1;
+
+    idc = pkcs7_get_indirect_data_content(p7);
+    if (!idc) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to decode SpcIndirectDataContent\n\n");
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    if (spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(idc, mdbuf, mdtype) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract message digest from signature\n\n");
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+    if (*mdtype == -1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract current message digest\n\n");
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    return 1; /* OK */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode SpcIndirectDataContent from a PKCS7 signedData content.
+ *
+ * [in] p7: PKCS7 structure containing SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID content
+ * [returns] newly allocated SpcIndirectDataContent, or NULL on error
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the returned object with
+ * SpcIndirectDataContent_free().
+ */
+SpcIndirectDataContent *pkcs7_get_indirect_data_content(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+    if (!is_content_type(p7, SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!p7->d.sign || !p7->d.sign->contents || !p7->d.sign->contents->d.other)
+        return NULL;
+
+    return asn1_type_get_indirect_data_content(p7->d.sign->contents->d.other);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode SpcIndirectDataContent from an ASN1_TYPE object.
+ * The ASN1_TYPE is expected to contain a V_ASN1_SEQUENCE value.
+ *
+ * [in] content: ASN1_TYPE containing DER-encoded SpcIndirectDataContent
+ * [returns] newly allocated SpcIndirectDataContent, or NULL on error
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the returned object with
+ * SpcIndirectDataContent_free().
+ */
+SpcIndirectDataContent *asn1_type_get_indirect_data_content(ASN1_TYPE *content)
+{
+    ASN1_STRING *value;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    int len;
+
+    if (!content || content->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+        return NULL;
+
+    value = content->value.sequence;
+    if (!value)
+        return NULL;
+
+    data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(value);
+    len = ASN1_STRING_length(value);
+
+    return d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &data, len);
+}
+
 /*
  * Return spcIndirectDataContent.
  * [in] hash: message digest BIO
@@ -562,6 +648,42 @@ int compare_digests(u_char *mdbuf, u_char *cmdbuf, int mdtype)
     return mdok;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Safely extract digest from SpcIndirectDataContent with bounds checking.
+ * This function validates that the digest length from the ASN.1 structure
+ * does not exceed the destination buffer size, preventing buffer overflows
+ * from maliciously crafted signatures.
+ * [in] idc: parsed SpcIndirectDataContent structure
+ * [out] mdbuf: output buffer (must be at least EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes)
+ * [out] mdtype: digest algorithm NID
+ * [returns] digest length on success, -1 on error
+ */
+int spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(SpcIndirectDataContent *idc, u_char *mdbuf, int *mdtype)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest_asn1;
+    const unsigned char *digest_data;
+    int digest_len;
+
+    if (!idc || !idc->messageDigest || !idc->messageDigest->digest ||
+        !idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm) {
+        return -1; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    digest_asn1 = idc->messageDigest->digest;
+    digest_len = ASN1_STRING_length((ASN1_STRING *)digest_asn1);
+
+    /* Validate digest length to prevent buffer overflow */
+    if (digest_len <= 0 || digest_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid digest length in signature: %d (expected 1-%d)\n",
+            digest_len, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+        return -1; /* FAILED */
+    }
+
+    digest_data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data((ASN1_STRING *)digest_asn1);
+    *mdtype = OBJ_obj2nid(idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
+    memcpy(mdbuf, digest_data, (size_t)digest_len);
+    return digest_len; /* OK */
+}
+
 /*
  * Helper functions
  */
@@ -617,8 +739,16 @@ static int spc_indirect_data_content_create(u_char **blob, int *len, FILE_FORMAT
     idc->data->value->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
     idc->data->value->value.sequence = ASN1_STRING_new();
     idc->data->type = ctx->format->data_blob_get(&p, &l, ctx);
-    idc->data->value->value.sequence->data = p;
+    if (!idc->data->type) {
-    idc->data->value->value.sequence->length = l;
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(idc->data->value->value.sequence, p, l)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(p);
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(p);
     idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(mdtype);
     idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->parameters = ASN1_TYPE_new();
     idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->parameters->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
@@ -763,6 +893,9 @@ static STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_get_sorted(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int signer)
     }
     /* sort certificate chain using the supplied comparison function */
     sk_X509_sort(chain);
+    /* remove duplicates */
+    sk_X509_remove_duplicates(chain);
+
     return chain;
 }
 
@@ -814,6 +947,35 @@ static int X509_compare(const X509 *const *a, const X509 *const *b)
     return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Remove duplicate certificates from a sorted STACK_OF(X509).
+ *
+ * This function assumes the stack is sorted according to X.690-compliant
+ * certificate comparison, so duplicate certificates appear consecutively.
+ * It iterates through the stack and removes any duplicate certificates
+ * by comparing each element with its immediate predecessor.
+ * The stack is modified in place.
+ */
+static void sk_X509_remove_duplicates(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    int i, n = sk_X509_num(chain);
+
+    if (n < 2)
+        return;
+
+    /* start from the second element */
+    for (i = 1; i < n; ) {
+        if (!X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(chain, i - 1), sk_X509_value(chain, i))) {
+            /* duplicate found: remove the certificate at index i */
+            (void)sk_X509_delete(chain, i);
+            n--; /* reduce stack size since one element was removed */
+            /* do not increment i, as next element shifts into index i */
+        } else {
+            i++; /* advance only if no removal was done */
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /*
 Local Variables:
    c-basic-offset: 4

helpers.h

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ PKCS7 *pkcs7_create(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx);
 int add_indirect_data_object(PKCS7 *p7);
 int sign_spc_indirect_data_content(PKCS7 *p7, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *content);
 PKCS7 *pkcs7_set_content(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *content);
+int pkcs7_get_content_digest(PKCS7 *p7, u_char *mdbuf, int *mdtype);
+SpcIndirectDataContent *pkcs7_get_indirect_data_content(PKCS7 *p7);
+SpcIndirectDataContent *asn1_type_get_indirect_data_content(ASN1_TYPE *content);
 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *spc_indirect_data_content_get(BIO *hash, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx);
 int pkcs7_sign_content(PKCS7 *p7, const u_char *data, int len);
 int asn1_simple_hdr_len(const u_char *p, int len);
@@ -25,6 +28,7 @@ MsCtlContent *ms_ctl_content_get(PKCS7 *p7);
 ASN1_TYPE *catalog_content_get(CatalogAuthAttr *attribute);
 SpcLink *spc_link_obsolete_get(void);
 int compare_digests(u_char *mdbuf, u_char *cmdbuf, int mdtype);
+int spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(SpcIndirectDataContent *idc, u_char *mdbuf, int *mdtype);
 
 /*
 Local Variables:

msi.c

@@ -414,19 +414,7 @@ static int msi_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
     const EVP_MD *md;
     BIO *hash;
 
-    if (is_content_type(p7, SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID)) {
+    if (!pkcs7_get_content_digest(p7, mdbuf, &mdtype)) {
-        ASN1_STRING *content_val = p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence;
-        const u_char *p = content_val->data;
-        SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &p, content_val->length);
-        if (idc) {
-            if (idc->messageDigest && idc->messageDigest->digest && idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm) {
-                mdtype = OBJ_obj2nid(idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
-                memcpy(mdbuf, idc->messageDigest->digest->data, (size_t)idc->messageDigest->digest->length);
-            }
-            SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-        }
-    }
-    if (mdtype == -1) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract current message digest\n\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }

osslsigncode.md

@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+---
+title: osslsigncode
+lang: en-US
+---
+
+# NAME
+
+osslsigncode - Authenticode signing, timestamping, extraction, attachment, removal, and verification tool
+
+# SYNOPSIS
+
+`osslsigncode` [`--help`] [`--version`]
+
+`osslsigncode` `sign`
+[`-certs` *file* | `-spc` *file* | `-pkcs12` *file*]
+[`-key` *file-or-URI*]
+[`-ac` *file*]
+[`-pass` *password* | `-readpass` *file* | `-askpass`]
+[`-pkcs11module` *module*] [`-pkcs11cert` *URI*]
+[`-engine` *engine*] [`-provider` *provider*]
+[`-login`] [`-engineCtrl` *command*[:*parameter*]]
+[`-h` *digest*]
+[`-n` *description*] [`-i` *URL*]
+[`-jp` `low`] [`-comm`] [`-ph`]
+[`-t` *URL* ... | `-ts` *URL* ...]
+[`-TSA-certs` *file* `-TSA-key` *file-or-URI* [`-TSA-time` *unix-time*]]
+[`-HTTPS-CAfile` *file*] [`-HTTPS-CRLfile` *file*]
+[`-time` *unix-time*]
+[`-addUnauthenticatedBlob` [`-blobFile` *file*]]
+[`-nest`] [`-add-msi-dse`] [`-verbose`] [`-pem`]
+`-in` *input* `-out` *output*
+
+`osslsigncode` `extract-data`
+[`-pem`] [`-h` *digest*] [`-ph`] [`-add-msi-dse`]
+`-in` *input* `-out` *output*
+
+`osslsigncode` `add`
+[`-addUnauthenticatedBlob` [`-blobFile` *file*]]
+[`-t` *URL* ... | `-ts` *URL* ...]
+[`-TSA-certs` *file* `-TSA-key` *file-or-URI* [`-TSA-time` *unix-time*]]
+[`-HTTPS-CAfile` *file*] [`-HTTPS-CRLfile` *file*]
+[`-h` *digest*] [`-index` *n*] [`-verbose`] [`-add-msi-dse`]
+`-in` *input* `-out` *output*
+
+`osslsigncode` `attach-signature`
+`-sigin` *signature*
+[`-h` *digest*] [`-nest`] [`-add-msi-dse`]
+`-in` *input* `-out` *output*
+
+`osslsigncode` `extract-signature`
+[`-pem`]
+`-in` *input* `-out` *output*
+
+`osslsigncode` `remove-signature`
+`-in` *input* `-out` *output*
+
+`osslsigncode` `verify`
+`-in` *input*
+[`-c` | `-catalog` *catalog-file*]
+[`-CAfile` *file*] [`-CRLfile` *file*]
+[`-HTTPS-CAfile` *file*] [`-HTTPS-CRLfile` *file*]
+[`-TSA-CAfile` *file*] [`-TSA-CRLfile` *file*]
+[`-p` *proxy*] [`-index` *n*]
+[`-ignore-timestamp`] [`-ignore-cdp`] [`-ignore-crl`]
+[`-time` *unix-time*]
+[`-require-leaf-hash` *alg*:*hex*]
+[`-verbose`]
+
+# DESCRIPTION
+
+`osslsigncode` signs and verifies Microsoft Authenticode signatures on
+supported file formats.  It can also extract data for detached signing,
+attach an externally produced signature, add timestamps or unauthenticated
+blobs to an existing signature, and remove an embedded signature.
+
+Supported input formats include PE files such as EXE, DLL, and SYS, CAB,
+CAT, MSI, APPX, and several script file types, including `.ps1`, `.ps1xml`,
+`.psc1`, `.psd1`, `.psm1`, `.cdxml`, `.mof`, and `.js`.
+
+The program supports these common workflows:
+
+- direct signing of an unsigned file
+- detached signing via `extract-data`, `sign`, and `attach-signature`
+- post-sign timestamping with `add`
+- verification of embedded signatures or catalog signatures with `verify`
+
+If no subcommand is given, `sign` is assumed.
+
+# FORMATS
+
+Support is not identical across all file formats.
+
+In particular, detached-signature workflows, nested signatures, catalog-based
+verification, and signature removal are format-dependent features.  A command
+that is valid for one supported file type may be unsupported for another.
+
+CAT files are a special case.  They are detached catalog containers for
+hashes of other files, not ordinary embedded-signature payloads.  A CAT
+file is itself a PKCS#7 structure containing authenticated entries for one
+or more external files.  In practice, the catalog signs file digests
+recorded in the catalog, rather than embedding a signature into each
+covered file.
+
+Because of this, CAT files behave differently from embedded-signature
+formats.  They do not support `attach-signature`, `remove-signature`,
+`extract-data`, or nested signatures.
+
+MSI files are also a special case.  They support an extended signature mode
+controlled by `-add-msi-dse`.  In this mode, the MSI signature covers file
+metadata as well as file content.  Detached-signing workflows and any later
+re-signing or nesting operations must use a mode consistent with the MSI
+file's existing signature structure.
+
+# COMMANDS
+
+## `sign`
+
+Create a new Authenticode signature.
+
+This command can sign a normal unsigned file, or it can sign PKCS#7 data
+previously produced by `extract-data`.
+
+## `extract-data`
+
+Extract the PKCS#7 content to be signed later.  This is used for detached
+signing workflows.
+
+## `add`
+
+Add unauthenticated attributes to an existing signature, typically an
+Authenticode timestamp, an RFC 3161 timestamp, or an unauthenticated blob.
+
+With `-index`, the selected signature in a multi-signature file is updated.
+
+## `attach-signature`
+
+Attach a detached PKCS#7 signature to an input file.
+
+With `-nest`, the new signature is attached as a nested signature instead of
+replacing the primary one, if the file format supports nested signatures.
+
+## `extract-signature`
+
+Extract the embedded PKCS#7 signature from a signed file.
+
+## `remove-signature`
+
+Remove the embedded signature from a signed file.
+
+## `verify`
+
+Verify an embedded signature or a catalog signature.
+
+Verification may include digest consistency, certificate chain validation,
+certificate revocation checking, timestamp validation, and optional checking
+of the signer's leaf certificate hash.
+
+When verifying that a file is covered by a catalog, use `verify -catalog
+catalog.cat -in file`.  Verifying the CAT file by itself validates the
+catalog signature; verifying with `-catalog` checks whether the specified
+input file is covered by that catalog.
+
+# OPTIONS
+
+Some options are available only in particular builds or OpenSSL versions.
+In particular, `-askpass` is build-dependent, `-provider` and `-nolegacy`
+require OpenSSL 3, and engine-related options depend on engine support in the
+build.
+
+## General options
+
+`--help`  
+: Show help text.  With a subcommand, show help for that subcommand.
+
+`-v`, `--version`  
+: Show version information.
+
+`-in` *file*  
+: Input file.
+
+`-out` *file*  
+: Output file.  Required for all commands except `verify`.
+
+`-verbose`  
+: Produce more detailed diagnostic output.
+
+## Signing material
+
+`-pkcs12` *file*  
+: Read the signing certificate and private key from a PKCS#12 container.
+
+`-certs`, `-spc` *file*  
+: Read the signing certificate chain.  The historical alias `-spc` is accepted.
+
+`-key` *file-or-URI*  
+: Read the private key.  This may also be a store or PKCS#11 URI.
+
+`-ac` *file*  
+: Add extra certificates to the signature block.
+
+`-pass` *password*  
+: Password or PIN for the key, token, or PKCS#12 container.
+
+`-readpass` *file*  
+: Read the password or PIN from *file*.  Use `-` to read from standard input.
+
+`-askpass`  
+: Prompt for the password interactively.
+
+## PKCS#11, engines, and providers
+
+`-pkcs11module` *module*  
+: Path to a PKCS#11 module.
+
+`-pkcs11cert` *URI*  
+: PKCS#11 URI identifying the certificate object.
+
+`-provider` *provider*  
+: OpenSSL 3 provider to load.  This is the preferred modern interface for
+  provider-based PKCS#11 use.
+
+`-engine`, `-pkcs11engine` *engine*  
+: OpenSSL engine identifier or path to a dynamic engine module.  This
+  interface is retained for compatibility with builds and deployments that
+  still support engines.
+
+`-login`  
+: Force login to the token for engine-based PKCS#11 use.
+
+`-engineCtrl` *command*[:*parameter*]  
+: Pass a control command to the selected engine.
+
+`-nolegacy`  
+: On OpenSSL 3 builds, do not automatically load the legacy provider.
+
+## Signature contents and digest control
+
+`-h` `md5` | `sha1` | `sha2` | `sha256` | `sha384` | `sha512`  
+: Select the digest algorithm.  The default is `sha256`.  `sha2` and
+  `sha256` are equivalent.
+
+`-n` *description*  
+: Description of the signed content.
+
+`-i` *URL*  
+: Informational URL associated with the signed content.
+
+`-comm`  
+: Use Microsoft Commercial Code Signing purpose instead of the default
+  individual purpose.
+
+`-jp` `low`  
+: Add the Java CAB permission attribute.  Only `low` is currently supported.
+
+`-ph`  
+: Generate page hashes for executable files.
+
+`-add-msi-dse`  
+: For MSI files, enable the `MsiDigitalSignatureEx` signing mode.  In this
+  mode, the signature covers MSI metadata as well as file content.  The
+  metadata portion includes stream names, sizes, and selected timestamps in
+  the MSI structure.  This option changes the MSI signature format and should
+  be used consistently in any detached-signing workflow involving
+  `extract-data`, `sign`, `attach-signature`, or `add`.
+
+  For a newly signed MSI, this mode is generally preferred because it extends
+  signing coverage beyond file content alone.  For an already signed MSI,
+  however, the chosen mode must match the file's existing signature
+  structure.  Switching between basic MSI signing and `MsiDigitalSignatureEx`
+  during re-signing or nested-signature operations can invalidate the
+  existing signature.
+
+`-pem`  
+: Write PKCS#7 output in PEM format instead of DER.
+
+## Timestamping and network options
+
+The following timestamping modes are **mutually exclusive** within a single
+`sign` or `add` invocation:
+
+- Authenticode timestamping with `-t`
+- RFC 3161 timestamping with `-ts`
+- built-in RFC 3161 timestamp generation with `-TSA-certs` and `-TSA-key`
+
+`-t` *URL*  
+: Add an Authenticode timestamp from the specified URL.  May be repeated.
+
+`-ts` *URL*  
+: Add an RFC 3161 timestamp from the specified URL.  May be repeated.
+
+`-p` *proxy*  
+: Proxy used for timestamp or CRL retrieval.
+
+`-noverifypeer`  
+: Do not verify the TLS certificate of the remote timestamp service.
+
+`-HTTPS-CAfile` *file*  
+: PEM bundle used to verify HTTPS peers contacted by `osslsigncode`.
+
+`-HTTPS-CRLfile` *file*  
+: PEM CRL file used while verifying HTTPS peers.
+
+`-TSA-certs` *file*  
+: PEM certificate chain for locally generated RFC 3161 timestamps.
+
+`-TSA-key` *file-or-URI*  
+: Private key for locally generated RFC 3161 timestamps.
+
+`-TSA-time` *unix-time*  
+: Timestamp time for locally generated RFC 3161 responses.
+
+## Nested signatures and indexed operations
+
+`-nest`  
+: Add a nested signature instead of replacing the primary signature.
+
+`-index` *n*  
+: Select a signature by index for `add` or `verify`.  Index 0 is the primary
+  signature.
+
+## Unauthenticated blob options
+
+`-addUnauthenticatedBlob`  
+: Add an unauthenticated blob to the signature.
+
+`-blobFile` *file*  
+: Read blob contents from *file*.  If omitted, a placeholder blob is created.
+
+## Verification options
+
+`-c`, `-catalog` *file*  
+: Verify the input file against the specified catalog file.
+
+`-CAfile` *file*  
+: PEM bundle of trusted CA certificates for signer validation.
+
+`-CRLfile` *file*  
+: PEM file containing CRLs for signer validation.
+
+`-TSA-CAfile`, `-untrusted` *file*  
+: PEM bundle of trusted CA certificates for timestamp validation.
+
+`-TSA-CRLfile`, `-CRLuntrusted` *file*  
+: PEM file containing CRLs for timestamp validation.
+
+`-time`, `-st` *unix-time*  
+: Verification time.  If a valid timestamp is present and used, chain
+  validation is normally performed at the timestamp time.
+
+`-ignore-timestamp`  
+: Skip verification of the timestamp signature.
+
+`-ignore-cdp`  
+: Do not fetch CRLs from CRL Distribution Points.
+
+`-ignore-crl`  
+: Disable CRL retrieval and CRL validation.
+
+`-require-leaf-hash` *alg*:*hex*  
+: Require the signer's leaf certificate to hash to the specified value.
+  The hash is computed over the DER encoding of the leaf certificate.
+
+# EXIT STATUS
+
+`0`  
+: Success.
+
+non-zero  
+: Failure.
+
+# DIAGNOSTICS
+
+Common causes of failure include:
+
+missing CA trust bundle  
+: On Unix-like systems, `verify` expects a readable CA bundle, either from
+  `-CAfile` or from a detected system default.
+
+detached-signing mismatch  
+: `extract-data`, `sign`, and `attach-signature` must use compatible
+  digest-affecting options such as `-h`, and where relevant `-ph` and
+  `-add-msi-dse`.
+
+unsupported format feature  
+: Some file formats do not support every subcommand or every signature mode.
+
+missing TSA trust chain  
+: Timestamp verification may fail unless the appropriate TSA trust anchors
+  are supplied with `-TSA-CAfile`, and where needed `-TSA-CRLfile`.
+
+conflicting timestamp modes  
+: `-t`, `-ts`, and built-in TSA signing cannot be combined in one command.
+
+MSI signature mode mismatch  
+: Re-signing or nesting an MSI signature must be consistent with whether the
+  file already uses `MsiDigitalSignatureEx`.  Mixing modes may invalidate the
+  existing signature.
+
+# ENVIRONMENT
+
+`HTTP_PROXY`, `http_proxy`  
+: Default proxy for HTTP access if `-p` is not given.
+
+`HTTPS_PROXY`, `https_proxy`  
+: Default proxy for HTTPS access if `-p` is not given.
+
+`OPENSSL_ENGINES`  
+: May help OpenSSL find engine modules.
+
+# FILES
+
+On Unix-like systems, `osslsigncode` tries common CA bundle locations for
+its default `-CAfile`, including:
+
+- `/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt`
+- `/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt`
+- `/usr/share/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt`
+- `/usr/local/share/certs/ca-root-nss.crt`
+- `/etc/ssl/cert.pem`
+
+If no readable CA bundle is available, `verify` may require an explicit
+`-CAfile`.
+
+# NOTES
+
+Use `extract-data` when you need to create a new detached signature object.
+Use `extract-signature` when you need to copy an existing embedded PKCS#7
+signature out of a file.
+
+For safer secret handling, prefer `-readpass` or `-askpass` over `-pass`.
+
+Data added with `-addUnauthenticatedBlob` is not protected by the signature
+and must not be treated as trusted.
+
+For new MSI signatures, `-add-msi-dse` is generally preferred because it
+extends signing coverage to MSI metadata as well as file content.  However,
+it is format-affecting rather than cosmetic, so existing signed MSI files
+should be re-signed only in a mode consistent with their current signature
+structure.
+
+Output files are not overwritten.
+
+# EXAMPLES
+
+## Sign and verify a file
+
+```sh
+osslsigncode sign \
+  -pkcs12 signer.p12 \
+  -readpass p12-pass.txt \
+  -n "Example Application" \
+  -i "https://example.com/" \
+  -ts "https://tsa.example.net/" \
+  -in app.exe \
+  -out app-signed.exe
+
+osslsigncode verify \
+  -CAfile ca-bundle.pem \
+  -TSA-CAfile tsa-ca-bundle.pem \
+  -in app-signed.exe
+```
+
+## Detached signing workflow
+
+```sh
+osslsigncode extract-data \
+  -h sha384 \
+  -ph \
+  -in app.exe \
+  -out app-data.der
+
+osslsigncode sign \
+  -pkcs12 signer.p12 \
+  -readpass p12-pass.txt \
+  -h sha384 \
+  -in app-data.der \
+  -out app-sig.der
+
+osslsigncode attach-signature \
+  -h sha384 \
+  -sigin app-sig.der \
+  -in app.exe \
+  -out app-signed.exe
+
+osslsigncode verify \
+  -CAfile ca-bundle.pem \
+  -in app-signed.exe
+```
+
+## Sign a new MSI with extended MSI metadata coverage
+
+```sh
+osslsigncode sign \
+  -pkcs12 signer.p12 \
+  -readpass p12-pass.txt \
+  -add-msi-dse \
+  -in installer.msi \
+  -out installer-signed.msi
+```
+
+## Use a PKCS#11 provider
+
+```sh
+osslsigncode sign \
+  -provider /path/to/pkcs11prov.so \
+  -pkcs11module /path/to/opensc-pkcs11.so \
+  -pkcs11cert 'pkcs11:token=my-token;object=cert' \
+  -key 'pkcs11:token=my-token;object=key' \
+  -readpass pin.txt \
+  -in app.exe \
+  -out app-signed.exe
+```
+
+## Add a timestamp to an already signed file
+
+```sh
+osslsigncode add \
+  -ts "https://tsa.example.net/" \
+  -in app-signed.exe \
+  -out app-signed-ts.exe
+```
+
+## Verify that a file is covered by a catalog
+
+```sh
+osslsigncode verify \
+  -catalog drivers.cat \
+  -CAfile ca-bundle.pem \
+  -CRLfile ca-crl.pem \
+  -in driver.sys
+```
+
+# REPORTING BUGS
+
+Report bugs and suspected issues via the project issue tracker:
+
+<https://github.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/issues>
+
+# AUTHORS
+
+Originally written by Per Allansson.
+
+Maintained and extended by Michał Trojnara.
+
+Major contributions by Małgorzata Olszówka.
+
+Additional contributions by other project contributors.
+
+# SEE ALSO
+
+**OpenSSL** Library
+
+<https://openssl-library.org/>
+

pe.c

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static uint32_t pe_calc_checksum(BIO *bio, uint32_t header_size);
 static uint32_t pe_calc_realchecksum(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx);
 static int pe_modify_header(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, BIO *hash, BIO *outdata);
 static BIO *pe_digest_calc_bio(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md);
+static int pkcs7_get_page_hash(PKCS7 *p7, u_char **ph, int *phlen, int *phtype);
 static int pe_page_hash_get(u_char **ph, int *phlen, int *phtype, SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue *obj);
 static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype);
 static int pe_verify_page_hash(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, u_char *ph, int phlen, int phtype);
@@ -163,8 +164,10 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *pe_spc_image_data_get(u_char **p, int *plen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX
         if (EVP_MD_size(ctx->options->md) > EVP_MD_size(EVP_sha1()))
             phtype = NID_sha256;
         link = pe_page_hash_link_get(ctx, phtype);
-        if (!link)
+        if (!link) {
+            SpcPeImageData_free(pid);
             return NULL; /* FAILED */
+        }
         pid->file = link;
     } else {
         pid->file = spc_link_obsolete_get();
@@ -245,49 +248,34 @@ static int pe_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
     u_char *cmdbuf = NULL;
     u_char *ph = NULL;
 
-    if (is_content_type(p7, SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID)) {
+    if (!pkcs7_get_content_digest(p7, mdbuf, &mdtype)) {
-        ASN1_STRING *content_val = p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence;
-        const u_char *p = content_val->data;
-        SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &p, content_val->length);
-        if (idc) {
-            if (!pe_page_hash_get(&ph, &phlen, &phtype, idc->data)) {
-                fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract a page hash\n\n");
-                SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-                return 0; /* FAILED */
-            }
-            if (idc->messageDigest && idc->messageDigest->digest && idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm) {
-                mdtype = OBJ_obj2nid(idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
-                memcpy(mdbuf, idc->messageDigest->digest->data, (size_t)idc->messageDigest->digest->length);
-            }
-            SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-        }
-    }
-    if (mdtype == -1) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract current message digest\n\n");
-        OPENSSL_free(ph);
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
     md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdtype);
     cmdbuf = pe_digest_calc(ctx, md);
     if (!cmdbuf) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Failed to calculate message digest\n\n");
-        OPENSSL_free(ph);
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
     if (!compare_digests(mdbuf, cmdbuf, mdtype)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Signature verification: failed\n\n");
-        OPENSSL_free(ph);
         OPENSSL_free(cmdbuf);
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
+    OPENSSL_free(cmdbuf);
+
+	if (!pkcs7_get_page_hash(p7, &ph, &phlen, &phtype)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract page hash\n\n");
+		return 0; /* FAILED */
+	}
     if (!pe_verify_page_hash(ctx, ph, phlen, phtype)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Signature verification: failed\n\n");
         OPENSSL_free(ph);
-        OPENSSL_free(cmdbuf);
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
     OPENSSL_free(ph);
-    OPENSSL_free(cmdbuf);
+
     return 1; /* OK */
 }
 
@@ -402,6 +390,7 @@ static PKCS7 *pe_pkcs7_signature_new(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, BIO *hash)
     content = spc_indirect_data_content_get(hash, ctx);
     if (!content) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get spcIndirectDataContent\n");
+        PKCS7_free(p7);
         return NULL; /* FAILED */
     }
     if (!sign_spc_indirect_data_content(p7, content)) {
@@ -834,6 +823,36 @@ static BIO *pe_digest_calc_bio(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
  * Page hash support
  */
 
+/*
+ * Retrieve a page hash from PKCS7 SPC_INDIRECT_DATA structure.
+ * [in] p7: PKCS7 signature
+ * [out] ph: page hash
+ * [out] phlen: page hash length
+ * [out] phtype: NID_sha1 or NID_sha256
+ * [returns] 0 on error or 1 on success
+ */
+static int pkcs7_get_page_hash(PKCS7 *p7, u_char **ph, int *phlen, int *phtype)
+{
+    SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = pkcs7_get_indirect_data_content(p7);
+
+    if (!idc) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to decode SpcIndirectDataContent\n\n");
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    if (!idc->data) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Missing SpcIndirectDataContent data\n\n");
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    if (!pe_page_hash_get(ph, phlen, phtype, idc->data)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract a page hash\n\n");
+        SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
+    return 1; /* OK */
+}
+
 /*
  * Retrieve a page hash from SPC_INDIRECT_DATA structure.
  * [out] ph: page hash
@@ -842,43 +861,71 @@ static BIO *pe_digest_calc_bio(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
  * [in] obj: SPC_INDIRECT_DATA OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 containing page hash
  * [returns] 0 on error or 1 on success
  */
-static int pe_page_hash_get(u_char **ph, int *phlen, int *phtype, SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue *obj)
+static int pe_page_hash_get(u_char **ph, int *phlen, int *phtype,
+    SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue *obj)
 {
-    const u_char *blob;
+    const unsigned char *blob;
+    const unsigned char *sequence_data;
+    const unsigned char *classid_data;
+    const unsigned char *serialized_data;
     SpcPeImageData *id;
     SpcSerializedObject *so;
-    int l, l2;
+    int sequence_len, classid_len, serialized_len, l, l2;
     char buf[128];
 
+    /* Validate input object */
     if (!obj || !obj->value)
         return 0; /* FAILED */
-    blob = obj->value->value.sequence->data;
+
-    id = d2i_SpcPeImageData(NULL, &blob, obj->value->value.sequence->length);
+    /* Decode SpcPeImageData from ASN.1 sequence */
-    if (!id) {
+    sequence_data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(obj->value->value.sequence);
+    sequence_len = ASN1_STRING_length(obj->value->value.sequence);
+
+    /* d2i_* modifies the input pointer, so use a temporary variable */
+    blob = sequence_data;
+    id = d2i_SpcPeImageData(NULL, &blob, sequence_len);
+    if (!id)
         return 0; /* FAILED */
-    }
+
+    /* Validate SpcPeImageData contents */
     if (!id->file) {
         SpcPeImageData_free(id);
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
+
+    /* Type 1 means SpcSerializedObject */
     if (id->file->type != 1) {
         SpcPeImageData_free(id);
-        return 1; /* OK - This is not SpcSerializedObject structure that contains page hashes */
+        return 1; /* OK - no page hashes present */
     }
+
     so = id->file->value.moniker;
-    if (so->classId->length != sizeof classid_page_hash ||
+
-        memcmp(so->classId->data, classid_page_hash, sizeof classid_page_hash)) {
+    /* Validate serialized object class ID */
+    classid_data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data((ASN1_STRING *)so->classId);
+    classid_len = ASN1_STRING_length((ASN1_STRING *)so->classId);
+
+    if (classid_len != sizeof classid_page_hash ||
+        memcmp(classid_data, classid_page_hash, sizeof classid_page_hash)) {
         SpcPeImageData_free(id);
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
-    /* skip ASN.1 SET hdr */
+
-    l = asn1_simple_hdr_len(so->serializedData->data, so->serializedData->length);
+    /*Get serialized ASN.1 blob */
-    blob = so->serializedData->data + l;
+    serialized_data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data((ASN1_STRING *)so->serializedData);
-    obj = d2i_SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue(NULL, &blob, so->serializedData->length - l);
+    serialized_len = ASN1_STRING_length((ASN1_STRING *)so->serializedData);
+
+    /* Skip ASN.1 SET header */
+    l = asn1_simple_hdr_len(serialized_data, serialized_len);
+    blob = serialized_data + l;
+
+    /* Decode nested SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue */
+    obj = d2i_SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue(NULL, &blob, serialized_len - l);
     SpcPeImageData_free(id);
     if (!obj)
         return 0; /* FAILED */
 
+    /* Determine page hash algorithm */
     *phtype = 0;
     buf[0] = 0x00;
     OBJ_obj2txt(buf, sizeof buf, obj->type, 1);
@@ -890,15 +937,30 @@ static int pe_page_hash_get(u_char **ph, int *phlen, int *phtype, SpcAttributeTy
         SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue_free(obj);
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
-    /* Skip ASN.1 SET hdr */
+
-    l2 = asn1_simple_hdr_len(obj->value->value.sequence->data, obj->value->value.sequence->length);
+    /* IMPORTANT:
-    /* Skip ASN.1 OCTET STRING hdr */
+     * obj now points to the newly decoded structure,
-    l = asn1_simple_hdr_len(obj->value->value.sequence->data + l2, obj->value->value.sequence->length - l2);
+     * so refresh sequence_data/sequence_len */
+    sequence_data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(obj->value->value.sequence);
+    sequence_len = ASN1_STRING_length(obj->value->value.sequence);
+
+    /* Skip ASN.1 SET header */
+    l2 = asn1_simple_hdr_len(sequence_data, sequence_len);
+
+    /* Skip ASN.1 OCTET STRING header */
+    l = asn1_simple_hdr_len(sequence_data + l2, sequence_len - l2);
     l += l2;
-    *phlen = obj->value->value.sequence->length - l;
+
+    /* Extract raw page hash blob */
+    *phlen = sequence_len - l;
     *ph = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*phlen);
-    memcpy(*ph, obj->value->value.sequence->data + l, (size_t)*phlen);
+    if (!*ph) {
+        SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue_free(obj);
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    memcpy(*ph, sequence_data + l, (size_t)*phlen);
     SpcAttributeTypeAndOptionalValue_free(obj);
+
     return 1; /* OK */
 }
 
@@ -914,12 +976,25 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
     uint16_t nsections, opthdr_size;
     uint32_t alignment, pagesize, hdrsize;
     uint32_t rs, ro, l, lastpos = 0;
-    int pphlen, phlen, i, pi = 1;
+    int mdlen, pphlen, phlen, i, pi = 1;
-    size_t written;
+    size_t written, off, sect_off, sect_tbl, need;
-    u_char *res, *zeroes;
+    u_char *res = NULL, *zeroes = NULL;
     char *sections;
     const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(phtype);
-    BIO *bhash;
+    BIO *bhash = NULL;
+    uint32_t filebound;
+    size_t pphlen_sz, sections_factor;
+
+    if (rphlen == NULL || ctx == NULL || ctx->options == NULL || ctx->pe_ctx == NULL
+        || ctx->options->indata == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    if (mdlen <= 0)
+        return NULL;
 
     /* NumberOfSections indicates the size of the section table,
      * which immediately follows the headers, can be up to 65535 under Vista and later */
@@ -961,10 +1036,46 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
         fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted optional header size: 0x%08X\n", opthdr_size);
         return NULL; /* FAILED */
     }
-    pphlen = 4 + EVP_MD_size(md);
+    /* Validate that pagesize >= hdrsize to prevent integer underflow */
-    phlen = pphlen * (3 + (int)nsections + (int)(ctx->pe_ctx->fileend / pagesize));
+    if (pagesize < hdrsize) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Page size (0x%08X) is smaller than header size (0x%08X)\n",
+                pagesize, hdrsize);
+        return NULL; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    pphlen = 4 + mdlen;
+
+    /* Compute an upper bound for result size and guard overflow */
+    pphlen_sz = (size_t)pphlen;
+    sections_factor = 3 + (size_t)nsections + ((size_t)ctx->pe_ctx->fileend / pagesize);
+    if (sections_factor > SIZE_MAX / pphlen_sz) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Page hash allocation size would overflow\n");
+        return NULL; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    phlen = (int)(pphlen_sz * sections_factor);
+    /* Sanity limit - page hash shouldn't exceed reasonable size (16 MB) */
+    if (phlen < 0 || (size_t)phlen > SIZE_16M) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Page hash size exceeds limit: %d\n", phlen);
+        return NULL; /* FAILED */
+    }
+
+    /* Determine the file boundary for section data validation */
+    filebound = ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos ? ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos : ctx->pe_ctx->fileend;
+
+    /* Validate section table bounds before reading section headers */
+    sect_off = (size_t)ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 24u + (size_t)opthdr_size;
+    sect_tbl = (size_t)nsections * 40u;
+
+    if (sect_off > (size_t)filebound || sect_tbl > (size_t)filebound - sect_off) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Section table out of bounds: off=%zu size=%zu filebound=%u\n",
+            sect_off, sect_tbl, filebound);
+        return NULL; /* FAILED */
+    }
+    sections = (char *)ctx->options->indata + sect_off;
 
     bhash = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+    if (bhash == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
 #if defined(__GNUC__)
 #pragma GCC diagnostic push
 #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-qual"
@@ -977,7 +1088,10 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
 #if defined(__GNUC__)
 #pragma GCC diagnostic pop
 #endif
-    BIO_push(bhash, BIO_new(BIO_s_null()));
+    if (BIO_push(bhash, BIO_new(BIO_s_null())) == NULL) {
+        BIO_free_all(bhash);
+        return NULL;
+    }
     if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, ctx->options->indata, ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 88, &written)
         || written != ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 88) {
         BIO_free_all(bhash);
@@ -989,36 +1103,83 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
         BIO_free_all(bhash);
         return NULL;  /* FAILED */
     }
-    if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash,
+    off = ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 160 + (size_t)ctx->pe_ctx->pe32plus * 16;
-        ctx->options->indata + ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 160 + ctx->pe_ctx->pe32plus*16,
+    if (hdrsize < off || hdrsize > filebound) {
-        hdrsize - (ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 160 + ctx->pe_ctx->pe32plus*16), &written)
+        BIO_free_all(bhash);
-        || written != hdrsize - (ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 160 + ctx->pe_ctx->pe32plus*16)) {
+        return NULL;  /* FAILED: header too small */
+    }
+    if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, ctx->options->indata + off, (size_t)hdrsize - off, &written)
+        || written != hdrsize - off) {
         BIO_free_all(bhash);
         return NULL;  /* FAILED */
     }
+    if (pagesize < hdrsize) {
+        BIO_free_all(bhash);
+        return NULL;  /* FAILED: header larger than page */
+    }
     zeroes = OPENSSL_zalloc((size_t)pagesize);
-    if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, zeroes, pagesize - hdrsize, &written)
+    if (zeroes == NULL) {
-        || written != pagesize - hdrsize) {
+        BIO_free_all(bhash);
+        return NULL;  /* FAILED */
+    }
+    if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, zeroes, (size_t)pagesize - (size_t)hdrsize, &written)
+        || written != (size_t)pagesize - (size_t)hdrsize) {
         BIO_free_all(bhash);
         OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
         return NULL;  /* FAILED */
     }
     res = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)phlen);
+    if (res == NULL) {
+        BIO_free_all(bhash);
+        OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
+        return NULL;  /* FAILED */
+    }
     memset(res, 0, 4);
-    BIO_gets(bhash, (char*)res + 4, EVP_MD_size(md));
+    if (BIO_gets(bhash, (char *)res + 4, mdlen) != mdlen) {
+        BIO_free_all(bhash);
+        OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
+        OPENSSL_free(res);
+        return NULL;  /* FAILED */
+    }
     BIO_free_all(bhash);
-    sections = ctx->options->indata + ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 24 + opthdr_size;
+
-    for (i=0; i<nsections; i++) {
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)nsections; i++) {
-        /* Resource Table address and size */
+        /* SizeOfRawData and PointerToRawData from section header */
         rs = GET_UINT32_LE(sections + 16);
         ro = GET_UINT32_LE(sections + 20);
-        if (rs == 0 || rs >= UINT32_MAX) {
+        if (rs == 0) {
             sections += 40;
             continue;
         }
-        for (l=0; l<rs; l+=pagesize, pi++) {
+        /* Validate section bounds against file size to prevent OOB read */
-            PUT_UINT32_LE(ro + l, res + pi*pphlen);
+        if (ro >= filebound || rs > filebound - ro) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Section %d has invalid bounds: offset=0x%08X, size=0x%08X, fileend=0x%08X\n",
+                    i, ro, rs, filebound);
+            OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
+            OPENSSL_free(res);
+            return NULL; /* FAILED */
+        }
+        for (l = 0; l < rs; l += pagesize, pi++) {
+            need = (size_t)(pi + 1) * (size_t)pphlen;
+
+            /* Prevent OOB write into res if pi grows beyond allocated factor */
+            if (need > (size_t)phlen) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Page hash buffer overflow prevented: pi=%d need=%zu phlen=%d\n",
+                    pi, need, phlen);
+                OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
+                OPENSSL_free(res);
+                return NULL; /* FAILED */
+            }
+
+            PUT_UINT32_LE(ro + l, res + (size_t)pi * (size_t)pphlen);
+
             bhash = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+            if (bhash == NULL) {
+                OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
+                OPENSSL_free(res);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+
 #if defined(__GNUC__)
 #pragma GCC diagnostic push
 #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-qual"
@@ -1033,17 +1194,24 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
 #if defined(__GNUC__)
 #pragma GCC diagnostic pop
 #endif
-            BIO_push(bhash, BIO_new(BIO_s_null()));
+            if (BIO_push(bhash, BIO_new(BIO_s_null())) == NULL) {
-            if (rs - l < pagesize) {
+                BIO_free_all(bhash);
-                if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, ctx->options->indata + ro + l, rs - l, &written)
+                OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
-                    || written != rs - l) {
+                OPENSSL_free(res);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            if (l < rs && rs - l < pagesize) {
+                size_t tail = (size_t)(rs - l);
+
+                if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, ctx->options->indata + ro + l, tail, &written)
+                    || written != tail) {
                     BIO_free_all(bhash);
                     OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
                     OPENSSL_free(res);
                     return NULL;  /* FAILED */
                 }
-                if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, zeroes, pagesize - (rs - l), &written)
+                if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, zeroes, pagesize - tail, &written)
-                    || written != pagesize - (rs - l)) {
+                    || written != pagesize - tail) {
                     BIO_free_all(bhash);
                     OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
                     OPENSSL_free(res);
@@ -1058,17 +1226,34 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
                     return NULL;  /* FAILED */
                 }
             }
-            BIO_gets(bhash, (char*)res + pi*pphlen + 4, EVP_MD_size(md));
+            if (BIO_gets(bhash, (char *)res + (size_t)pi * (size_t)pphlen + 4, mdlen) != mdlen) {
+                BIO_free_all(bhash);
+                OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
+                OPENSSL_free(res);
+                return NULL;  /* FAILED */
+            }
             BIO_free_all(bhash);
         }
         lastpos = ro + rs;
         sections += 40;
     }
-    PUT_UINT32_LE(lastpos, res + pi*pphlen);
+    /* Final entry */
-    memset(res + pi*pphlen + 4, 0, (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md));
+    need = (size_t)(pi + 1) * (size_t)pphlen;
+
+    if (need > (size_t)phlen) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Page hash buffer overflow prevented at final entry: pi=%d need=%zu phlen=%d\n",
+            pi, need, phlen);
+        OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
+        OPENSSL_free(res);
+        return NULL; /* FAILED */
+    }
+
+    PUT_UINT32_LE(lastpos, res + (size_t)pi * (size_t)pphlen);
+    memset(res + (size_t)pi * (size_t)pphlen + 4, 0, (size_t)mdlen);
     pi++;
+
     OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
-    *rphlen = pi*pphlen;
+    *rphlen = pi * pphlen;
     return res;
 }
 
@@ -1088,6 +1273,10 @@ static int pe_verify_page_hash(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, u_char *ph, int phlen, int
     if (!ph)
         return 1; /* OK */
     cph = pe_page_hash_calc(&cphlen, ctx, phtype);
+    if (!cph) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Page hash verification failed: could not calculate page hash\n");
+        return 0; /* FAILED */
+    }
     mdok = (phlen == cphlen) && !memcmp(ph, cph, (size_t)phlen);
     printf("Page hash algorithm  : %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(phtype));
     if (ctx->options->verbose) {
@@ -1190,7 +1379,8 @@ static int pe_check_file(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx)
 {
     uint32_t real_pe_checksum, sum = 0;
 
-    if (!ctx) {
+    if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pe_ctx == NULL || ctx->options == NULL
+        || ctx->options->indata == NULL) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Init error\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
@@ -1202,25 +1392,52 @@ static int pe_check_file(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx)
         printf("Calculated PE checksum: %08X\n", real_pe_checksum);
         printf("Warning: invalid PE checksum\n");
     }
+    /* Signature directory bounds */
     if (ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos == 0 || ctx->pe_ctx->siglen == 0
-        || ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend) {
+        || ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend
+        || ctx->pe_ctx->siglen > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend - ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos) {
         fprintf(stderr, "No signature found\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }
     /*
+     * Validate WIN_CERTIFICATE chain.
      * If the sum of the rounded dwLength values does not equal the Size value,
      * then either the attribute certificate table or the Size field is corrupted.
      */
     while (sum < ctx->pe_ctx->siglen) {
-        uint32_t len = GET_UINT32_LE(ctx->options->indata + ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos + sum);
+        uint32_t len, off;
-        if (ctx->pe_ctx->siglen - len > 8) {
+
+        /* Prevent overflow in sigpos + sum */
+        if (sum > UINT32_MAX - ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos) {
             fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted attribute certificate table\n");
-            fprintf(stderr, "Attribute certificate table size  : %08X\n", ctx->pe_ctx->siglen);
-            fprintf(stderr, "Attribute certificate entry length: %08X\n\n", len);
             return 0; /* FAILED */
         }
-        /* quadword align data */
+        off = ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos + sum;
-        len += len % 8 ? 8 - len % 8 : 0;
+
+        /* Need at least 4 bytes to read dwLength */
+        if (off > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend || ctx->pe_ctx->fileend - off < 4) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted attribute certificate table\n");
+            return 0; /* FAILED */
+        }
+        len = GET_UINT32_LE(ctx->options->indata + off);
+
+        /* dwLength must include the 8-byte WIN_CERTIFICATE header */
+        if (len < 8 || len > ctx->pe_ctx->siglen - sum || len > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend - off) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted attribute certificate table\n");
+            return 0; /* FAILED */
+        }
+
+        /* Quadword align data */
+        if (len % 8) {
+            uint32_t pad = 8 - (len % 8);
+
+            /* Ensure quadword alignment does not overflow or exceed remaining table size */
+            if (pad > ctx->pe_ctx->siglen - sum - len) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted attribute certificate table\n");
+                return 0; /* FAILED */
+            }
+            len += pad;
+        }
         sum += len;
     }
     if (sum != ctx->pe_ctx->siglen) {

script.c

@@ -288,20 +288,7 @@ static int script_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
     const EVP_MD *md;
     BIO *bhash;
 
-    /* FIXME: this shared code most likely belongs in osslsigncode.c */
+    if (!pkcs7_get_content_digest(p7, mdbuf, &mdtype)) {
-    if (is_content_type(p7, SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID)) {
-        ASN1_STRING *content_val = p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence;
-        const u_char *p = content_val->data;
-        SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &p, content_val->length);
-        if (idc) {
-            if (idc->messageDigest && idc->messageDigest->digest && idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm) {
-                mdtype = OBJ_obj2nid(idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
-                memcpy(mdbuf, idc->messageDigest->digest->data, (size_t)idc->messageDigest->digest->length);
-            }
-            SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
-        }
-    }
-    if (mdtype == -1) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract current message digest\n\n");
         return 0; /* FAILED */
     }

tests/make_certificates.py

@@ -338,6 +338,17 @@ class LeafCertificate(X509Extensions):
         authority_key = AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_subject_key_identifier(
             self.issuer_cert.extensions.get_extension_for_class(SubjectKeyIdentifier).value
         )
+        key_usage = KeyUsage(
+            digital_signature=True,
+            content_commitment=False,
+            key_encipherment=False,
+            data_encipherment=False,
+            key_agreement=False,
+            key_cert_sign=False,
+            crl_sign=False,
+            encipher_only=False,
+            decipher_only=False
+        )
         extended_key_usage = ExtendedKeyUsage(
             [ExtendedKeyUsageOID.CODE_SIGNING]
         )
@@ -352,6 +363,7 @@ class LeafCertificate(X509Extensions):
             .add_extension(BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), critical=False)
             .add_extension(SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(public_key), critical=False)
             .add_extension(authority_key, critical=False)
+            .add_extension(key_usage, critical=False)
             .add_extension(extended_key_usage, critical=False)
             .add_extension(self.create_x509_crldp(), critical=False)
             .sign(self.issuer_key, SHA256())