---
title: "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver"
excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution
, Rundll32
"
categories:
  - Endpoint
last_modified_at: 2021-02-09
toc: true
toc_label: ""
tags:
  - Signed Binary Proxy Execution
  - Rundll32
  - Defense Evasion
  - Defense Evasion
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
  - Endpoint
---



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#### Description

The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.

- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types)
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)
- **Last Updated**: 2021-02-09
- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk
- **ID**: 8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159


#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/)

| ID             | Technique        |  Tactic             |
| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- |
| [T1218](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/) | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion |

| [T1218.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/) | Rundll32 | Defense Evasion |

#### Search

```

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`
```

#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml)

Note that `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

#### Required field
* _time
* Processes.dest
* Processes.user
* Processes.parent_process_name
* Processes.parent_process
* Processes.original_file_name
* Processes.process_name
* Processes.process
* Processes.process_id
* Processes.parent_process_path
* Processes.process_path
* Processes.parent_process_id


#### How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.

#### Known False Positives
This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.

#### Associated Analytic story
* [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity)


#### Kill Chain Phase
* Actions on Objectives



#### RBA

| Risk Score  | Impact      | Confidence   | Message      |
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------|
| 35.0 | 70 | 50 | $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code |




#### Reference

* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/)
* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md)
* [https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32)
* [https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east)
* [https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt](https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt)
* [https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/)
* [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx)



#### Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server)


* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log)



[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml) \| *version*: **2**