---
title: "WSReset UAC Bypass"
excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
categories:
  - Endpoint
last_modified_at: 2020-01-28
toc: true
toc_label: ""
tags:
  - Bypass User Account Control
  - Privilege Escalation
  - Defense Evasion
  - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
  - Privilege Escalation
  - Defense Evasion
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
  - Endpoint
---



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#### Description

This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.

- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)
- **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28
- **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- **ID**: 8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122


#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/)

| ID             | Technique        |  Tactic             |
| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- |
| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion |

| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion |

#### Search

```

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
|rename process_guid as proc_guid 
|join proc_guid, _time [
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
|rename process_guid as proc_guid 
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] 
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name 
| `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`
```

#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)

Note that `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

#### Required field
* _time
* Registry.registry_path
* Registry.registry_key_name
* Registry.registry_value_name
* Registry.dest


#### How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.

#### Known False Positives
unknown

#### Associated Analytic story
* [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics)
* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land)


#### Kill Chain Phase
* Exploitation



#### RBA

| Risk Score  | Impact      | Confidence   | Message      |
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------|
| 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ |


Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100`



#### Reference

* [https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME](https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME)
* [https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass](https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass)



#### Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server)

* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log)



[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml) \| *version*: **2**