From 11ff0fa87d6b66907bb02663d07ee8432c50b7b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Haag <5632822+MHaggis@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 06:38:23 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] onenote

---
 .../endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml  |  7 ++++---
 .../endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml    |  7 ++++---
 .../office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml      |  7 ++++---
 .../office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml      |  7 ++++---
 .../office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml         |  7 ++++---
 .../endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml  |  7 ++++---
 ...fice_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml |  7 ++++---
 .../endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml      |  7 ++++---
 .../endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml     |  7 ++++---
 .../endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml      |  7 ++++---
 .../office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml   |  6 +++---
 .../office_product_spawning_windows_script_host.yml    |  7 ++++---
 detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml   |  7 ++++---
 .../endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml     |  7 ++++---
 detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml        |  7 ++++---
 .../endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt.yml  |  7 ++++---
 .../web/proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected.yml | 10 +++-------
 17 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml b/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml
index 803050cfe7..97e41b731b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: MSHTML Module Load in Office Product
 id: 5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122
-version: 3
-date: '2022-08-25'
+version: 4
+date: '2023-01-24'
 author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ description: The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll in
   malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The
   vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel
   processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=7  parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe")
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=7  parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe")
   ImageLoaded IN ("*\\mshtml.dll", "*\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll","*\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll","*\\MshtmlDac.dll","*\\MshtmlDed.dll","*\\MshtmlDer.dll")
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name,
   ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, ProcessGuid | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ references:
 - https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/
 - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444
 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml
index d3f6c51466..5ab6711147 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Application Drop Executable
 id: 73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122
-version: 1
-date: '2021-09-13'
+version: 2
+date: '2023-01-24'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that dr
   but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office
   application
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
-  where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe")
+  where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe")
   by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest
   Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as
   proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation
 - https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/
 - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - FIN7
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml
index cc439561e2..e61d873189 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process
 id: 2d9fc90c-f11f-11eb-9300-acde48001122
-version: 2
-date: '2021-07-30'
+version: 3
+date: '2022-01-24'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ description: this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned proces
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name
   = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name
-  = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "outlook.exe") `process_regsvr32`
+  = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "outlook.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenote.exe") `process_regsvr32`
   by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid
   Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting
 known_false_positives: unknown
 references:
 - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - IcedID
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml
index f0e0c7590b..161ed98cbb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Application Spawn rundll32 process
 id: 958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122
-version: 2
-date: '2021-04-13'
+version: 3
+date: '2023-01-23'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: This detection was designed to identify suspicious spawned processe
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name
   = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name
-  = "powerpnt.exe") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name= "onenote.exe") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`'
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ references:
 - https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot
 - https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe
 - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml
index 4e50acae24..336fadb9a8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Document Creating Schedule Task
 id: cc8b7b74-9d0f-11eb-8342-acde48001122
-version: 2
-date: '2022-08-25'
+version: 3
+date: '2023-01-23'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ description: this search detects a potential malicious office document that crea
   source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command
   to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel
   processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 parent_process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE")
+search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 parent_process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE","onenote.exe")
   ImageLoaded = "*\\taskschd.dll" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
   values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image parent_process_name
   ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ known_false_positives: unknown
 references:
 - https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/
 - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml
index bc5e992a48..c40fff996b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Document Executing Macro Code
 id: b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122
-version: 1
-date: '2021-04-14'
+version: 2
+date: '2023-01-24'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ description: this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documen
   or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default
   to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document
   files.
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 parent_process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE")
+search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 parent_process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE","onenote.exe")
   ImageLoaded IN ("*\\VBE7INTL.DLL","*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL") | stats min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count
   by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
 - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/02cbc1ab80695fc12ff8822b926957c3a600247b9ca412a137f69cb5716c8781/
 - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/latest-remcos-rat-phishing
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml
index d26b64a7d2..45735bf403 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download
 id: 6fed27d2-9ec7-11eb-8fe4-aa665a019aa3
-version: 3
-date: '2021-09-20'
+version: 4
+date: '2023-01-23'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: This search is to detect potential malicious office document execut
   blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
-  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") Processes.process
+  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe") Processes.process
   IN ("*http:*","*https:*") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","msedge.exe"))  by
   Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
 known_false_positives: Default browser not in the filter list.
 references:
 - https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml
index 2e3fa3b1eb..9d3a2b0b6c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Product Spawn CMD Process
 id: b8b19420-e892-11eb-9244-acde48001122
-version: 2
-date: '2021-07-19'
+version: 3
+date: '2022-01-24'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that s
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name
   = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name= "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name
-  = "powerpnt.exe") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name= "onenote.exe") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest
   Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`'
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ references:
 - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21
 - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/02cbc1ab80695fc12ff8822b926957c3a600247b9ca412a137f69cb5716c8781/
 - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/latest-remcos-rat-phishing
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Trickbot
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml
index 3c57516a33..28771ee8a0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin
 id: e8c591f4-a6d7-11eb-8cf7-acde48001122
-version: 2
-date: '2021-04-26'
+version: 3
+date: '2023-01-24'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ description: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by
   for further activity.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
-  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_bitsadmin`
+  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe") `process_bitsadmin`
   by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting
 known_false_positives: No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml
index d82f0b92d0..75890a26f0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Product Spawning CertUtil
 id: 6925fe72-a6d5-11eb-9e17-acde48001122
-version: 2
-date: '2021-04-26'
+version: 3
+date: '2023-01-24'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ description: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by
   for further activity.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
-  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_certutil`
+  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe") `process_certutil`
   by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ known_false_positives: No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml
index f594c3f59d..e55665da18 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL
 id: c661f6be-a38c-11eb-be57-acde48001122
-version: 2
-date: '2021-04-22'
+version: 3
+date: '2023-01-24'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ description: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by
   additional parallel processes for further activity.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
-  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_rundll32`
+  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe") `process_rundll32`
   (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_windows_script_host.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_windows_script_host.yml
index 5794eb6433..937fb4e3da 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_windows_script_host.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_windows_script_host.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host
 id: b3628a5b-8d02-42fa-a891-eebf2351cbe1
-version: 1
-date: '2022-09-26'
+version: 2
+date: '2023-01-24'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ datamodel:
 description: The following analytic will identify a Windows Office Product spawning WScript.exe or CScript.exe. Tuning may be required based on legitimate application usage that may spawn scripts from an Office product.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
-  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") Processes.process_name IN ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
+  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe") Processes.process_name IN ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
   by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ known_false_positives: False positives may be present based on macro based appro
 references:
   - https://blog.cluster25.duskrise.com/2022/09/23/in-the-footsteps-of-the-fancy-bear-powerpoint-graphite/
   - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/latest-remcos-rat-phishing
+  - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml
index 9adedc663f..84742cf93b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Product Spawning Wmic
 id: ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122
-version: 3
-date: '2021-09-16'
+version: 4
+date: '2023-01-24'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ description: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by
   activity.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
-  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_wmic`
+  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe") `process_wmic`
   by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
 - https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml
index b906212777..e3690efbd4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Product Writing cab or inf
 id: f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122
-version: 2
-date: '2022-07-07'
+version: 3
+date: '2023-01-23'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-4044
   (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint
   to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes 
-  where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") 
+  where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe") 
   by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   |rename process_guid as proc_guid
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
 - https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/
 - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444
 - https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml
index 8d514f5f02..21e5ac73d3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Office Spawning Control
 id: 053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122
-version: 1
-date: '2021-09-08'
+version: 2
+date: '2023-01-23'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ description: The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an off
   identify further suspicious behavior
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
-  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe")
+  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe")
   Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe/
 - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt.yml
index d6a27dfdda..40980ea271 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT
 id: 127eba64-c981-40bf-8589-1830638864a7
-version: 1
-date: '2022-05-30'
+version: 2
+date: '2023-01-23'
 author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawni
   processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
-  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
+  IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe")
   Processes.process_name=msdt.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
 - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection
 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html
+- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spearphishing Attachments
diff --git a/detections/web/proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected.yml b/detections/web/proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected.yml
index 26eace0384..7c32c19363 100644
--- a/detections/web/proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected.yml
+++ b/detections/web/proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected.yml
@@ -6,13 +6,9 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: Correlation
 datamodel:
   - Risk
-description: The following correlation will identify activity related to Windows Exchange being actively exploited by adversaries related to ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell. In addition, the analytic correlates post-exploitation Cobalt Strike analytic story. Common post-exploitation behavior has been seen in the wild includes adversaries running nltest, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz and adding a new user. The correlation specifically looks for 5 distict analyticstories to trigger, modify or tune as needed for your organization.
-  5 analytic stories is an arbitrary number but was chosen to reduce the amount of noise but also require the 3 analytic stories to fire. Adversaries will exploit the vulnerable Exchange server, abuse SSRF, drop a web shell, utilize the PowerShell Exchange modules and begin post-exploitation.
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.analyticstories) as analyticstories values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count dc(All_Risk.analyticstories) as dc_analyticstories from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN ("ProxyNotShell","ProxyShell", "Cobalt Strike")   All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by _time span=1h All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type 
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` 
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | where dc_analyticstories >= 5
+description: The following correlation will identify activity related to Windows Exchange being actively exploited by adversaries related to ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell. In addition, the analytic correlates post-exploitation Cobalt Strike analytic story. Common post-exploitation behavior has been seen in the wild includes adversaries running nltest, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz and adding a new user. The correlation specifically looks for 5 distinct analyticstories to trigger. Modify or tune as needed for your organization.
+  5 analytics is an arbitrary number but was chosen to reduce the amount of noise but also require the 2 analytic stories or a ProxyShell and CobaltStrike to fire. Adversaries will exploit the vulnerable Exchange server, abuse SSRF, drop a web shell, utilize the PowerShell Exchange modules and begin post-exploitation.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.analyticstories) as analyticstories values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count dc(All_Risk.analyticstories) as dc_analyticstories from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN ("ProxyNotShell","ProxyShell") OR (All_Risk.analyticstories IN ("ProxyNotShell","ProxyShell") AND All_Risk.analyticstories="Cobalt Strike") All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by _time span=1h All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where source_count >=5
   | `proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To implement this correlation, you will need to enable ProxyShell, ProxyNotShell and Cobalt Strike analytic stories (the anaytics themselves) and ensure proper data is being collected for Web and Endpoint datamodels. Run the correlation rule seperately to validate it is not triggering too much or generating incorrectly. Validate by running ProxyShell POC code and Cobalt Strike behavior. 
 known_false_positives: False positives will be limited, however tune or modify the query as needed.