From 14461f46ffed04aaf995046d40ae91f36f1eb557 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lou Stella Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 16:44:49 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] modifying window --- .../endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml index ff041c1a3b..beb82bc48b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: Anomaly datamodel: - Authentication description: This is an anomaly generating detection looking for multiple interactive logins within a specific time period. An insider threat may attempt to steal colleagues credentials in low tech, undetectable methods, in order to gain access to additional information or to hide their own behavior. This should capture their attempted use of those credentials on a workstation. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), auth_type=ucast(map_get(input_event, "authentication_type"), "string", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), src_user=ucast(map_get(input_event, "endpoint_user_windows_account_names"), "string", null), reason=ucast(map_get(input_event, "reason"), "string", null) | where auth_type="2" OR auth_type="11" | where reason = "success" | where src_user NOT in("DWM-*", "SYSTEM", "ANONYMOUS LOGON") | stats estdc(src_user) AS user_counter by device, span(timestamp, 1200s, 300s) | where user_counter>=2 | rename window_end AS timestamp | eval start_time=window_start, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(device), body=create_map(["user_counter", user_counter, "device", device]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), auth_type=ucast(map_get(input_event, "authentication_type"), "integer", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), src_user=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_original_artifact"), "string", null), reason=ucast(map_get(input_event, "reason"), "string", null) | where auth_type=2 OR auth_type=11 | where reason = "success" | where src_user NOT in("DWM-*", "SYSTEM", "ANONYMOUS LOGON") | stats estdc(src_user) AS user_counter by device, span(timestamp, 300s, 300s) | where user_counter>=2 | rename window_end AS timestamp | eval start_time=window_start, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(device), body=create_map(["user_counter", user_counter, "device", device]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this detection, you need to be ingesting logon events from workstations. known_false_positives: Shared workstations can cause false positives references: