From 055c9ec2584fb7faa4bfb24b5e060e3aa1838ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 12:54:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 01/27] updated type to use batch or streaming instead of product name --- .../email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml | 2 +- ...ple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml | 2 +- detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml | 2 +- .../application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml | 2 +- .../application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml | 2 +- ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 2 +- ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 2 +- ...ws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 2 +- ...tect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 2 +- ..._network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 2 +- ...cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- ...oud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 2 +- ...ud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 2 +- ...te_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +- .../cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +- .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 +- ...detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 2 +- .../detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml | 2 +- .../high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +- ...aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...tect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml | 2 +- .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml | 2 +- .../detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml | 2 +- .../dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml | 2 +- ...c2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml | 2 +- .../extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...ell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- ...reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml | 2 +- .../suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml | 2 +- ...lt_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml | 2 +- .../attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- .../creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml | 2 +- .../credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml | 2 +- .../detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 2 +- .../detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml | 2 +- .../detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml | 2 +- ...rocesses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 2 +- .../detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml | 2 +- .../detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml | 2 +- ...ershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 2 +- .../malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml | 2 +- ...malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml | 2 +- .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml | 2 +- .../reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml | 2 +- .../shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...sa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- ...sa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +- ...a___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 2 +- ...sa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...__illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...agement_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- ...gement_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...vilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...egal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...g_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml | 2 +- ...ss_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ..._active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ..._recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...nd_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...econ_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ivilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...a___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml | 2 +- .../application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml | 2 +- .../application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml | 2 +- .../email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml | 2 +- .../application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml | 2 +- .../application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml | 2 +- ...gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- ...ubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ...tes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- ...ure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ...s_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml | 2 +- ...ubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ...tes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml | 2 +- ...ceiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml | 2 +- .../network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml | 2 +- .../detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml | 2 +- .../web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml | 2 +- .../detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml | 2 +- detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml | 2 +- detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml | 2 +- detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml | 2 +- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml | 2 +- detections/network/tor_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 2 +- 334 files changed, 334 insertions(+), 334 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml index 72f7d62648..0d7a357497 100644 --- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml +++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml index 7e1aee1fb3..eac9a0223f 100644 --- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml +++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for users originating from the same ip address. how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml index fd98d502a5..f1d34102e0 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-07-21' description: Detect Okta user lockout events how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml index c86ba9b53c..b652887ef6 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-07-21' description: Detect failed Okta SSO events how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml index fa99bb296a..3d1c326a11 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search detects logins from the same user from different states a 24 hour period. how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml index 9c37ecd7fb..13ceace112 100644 --- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml +++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index 1f3fe92088..0bdda08d0b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud insta previously created and alerts on any outliers. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml index 5c2f23adaa..6e0ff07208 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instanc previously created and alerts on any outliers. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml index fb209ffccc..12affd7747 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml index 95e5e21722..0a56017ef9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml index 7efc31a0ca..a7d885f748 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml index 0d70d67878..10d63f3cd7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml @@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags: automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml index 86d3a1d318..8aa4ad4c53 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml index 6a0f81f147..7be2dd2a61 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACL how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail inputs. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 40a9a9a53b..dbeee66296 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanism how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml index baeec7bf0e..e093ebd4fa 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml index 629c0c6d36..49563bb1f3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml index a25498761a..3fd7155256 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml index 46f32353e5..fa51a72e73 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index 64bedd2548..080b467f85 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index c310f1290d..2ba725f196 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search has a dependency on other searches to create and u a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index b255668a85..d5ef91e812 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index 37808e4598..8f84898792 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index 4f2875fc30..6044e42ede 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index 55f8dca6b2..d72ec12c6e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml index 854bbf4d48..80850d1c40 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (vers IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml index d00f89e65c..c56eaf22e5 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (vers IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml index a431b99676..102fa22c87 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (vers to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml index afde87e13f..46ce22ec97 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (vers to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index ab57ad4e4b..a765e5fe76 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-08-10' description: This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Shannon Davis, Splunk search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml index 50987b2983..a3d35e8ddc 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-05' description: This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. how_to_implement: 'This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Shannon Davis, Splunk search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml index 660b47d619..d88a00c678 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2021-01-12' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml index c9facc4ed6..d5f3c20bf7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index 39ac7b5ee1..f73c0f52be 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml index 7f05f630eb..50f2ef1b9e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub aler how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml index 31735b8276..ac9d7f4198 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml index 37291f9163..5ad603f0f3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml index af0649ef3f..55bccf4a61 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub aler how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml index 04d49c1634..1561b67555 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222 version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' description: This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml index 8dbb7808cf..712b92f26f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml index f7f7620d2e..f9f01c5ef7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml index c86ae36f31..63f366bc4e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml @@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags: automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml index 884eef6232..e35dd8550d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml index aca38d6a56..ece1b17711 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml index 25134d8980..cac147ffaf 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' description: This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml index ffe0176a0d..8482fcee80 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-15' description: This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml index 09df22b713..c4ddfd60a5 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' description: This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml index 68b19e161f..cc69f41eaa 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully l how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index c51e21ff40..988d43d369 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully l how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Jason Brewer, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml index 6424cd86fe..c3d0873d90 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high nu how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 4b3ec25530..5e2ac4fb07 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully t how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Jason Brewer, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index a533496b7f..14e7c0c938 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index fc2879c6b9..71cb995b18 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index 8e6e67d3d9..a6c35670e2 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index c4d0a4c992..ccee2959d2 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml index 2472b1f58d..b3a9f09931 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and popu Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -type: ESCU +type: batch author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 629964de7e..8c981622d9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanism how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Peter Gael, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn | diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml index 11fe53acc1..bb5c8533bd 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml index 89740af552..73f2a7b165 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml index 2398a3cddd..e56db2c8c4 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Res \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\ \ to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\ \n" -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml index cb10f9672b..04edbb4da3 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml index af7bfefbcb..d70639f01f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, whic (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml index df72bec23d..0958605b99 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also en on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes.' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml index 1540ae1f92..1ad2fff35c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml index 8879b9c41b..0744be6ba8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml index 024bbc6312..1eef974f4b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml index 93aca93ef1..f030ba0423 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml index d131c86cfe..01d7652719 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml index f5da48a4e2..88f48e52c5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index f54409a169..67d5930b21 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. Yo Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate.' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml index 381cfd8f74..5e9d0c9f47 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count from diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml index 6d3cf7e2f7..79a3c10041 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index e8ed080ce9..373512912f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml index 7f1a983db7..75c427dabf 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml index a295dcb93f..ce1fe1e359 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index 6aebf95a70..c9e5a2b3f4 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 55bcbd1cf8..d057eb07c7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml index 68ae5a4620..0a813c27d3 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml index 98d9b617c6..815f1878de 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml index 3209dd61d3..7a51b5416e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml index 2c4b21a42d..bac1633316 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or late then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml index bf41341710..5208e353a0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This detection search will help profile user accounts in your envir how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml index 640a6e97e5..4d309da69c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml index 6176c2b120..447c72a9b0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you m which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml index ed789747a8..ec9ec061f1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2017-09-19' description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. how_to_implement: No extra steps needed to implement this search. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter` diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml index 1f690d96a4..bdd591a891 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml index 49a42fd229..5d06c723df 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute vari how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml index b402bc90bb..ded959b9c9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml index 781a143121..280a27fed5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml index 119f1105e0..78e204c898 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the ` such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml index e8517957e2..576a09541b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml index 9935ab3bdb..21a0ec187d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml index f7cc9124d7..f5c81ea636 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE how_to_implement: The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml index df2bc38889..6bec2aa83c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml index 9b4a6d61cd..f7bf133f1e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml index 76e5bdeaf1..fb40dd6147 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folde how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\ diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml index 57cf51b81b..4aa8e76c03 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml index b859415e57..2e82d0fd63 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, whi (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml index 92f94a59a8..6085d162c8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml index baef5608b0..56e1f8f78e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system act from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml index 5cf387faaf..228402ec2f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system act from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml index 67ea4db373..1d00816c32 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml index ed0fc17aba..fe6e4eafe2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, w (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml index b44a84c732..07a51d04ad 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml index 4bdf35e8e0..72e7664a92 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml index 09fd05ff4f..ff7ac15f85 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi use on the command line and surround with asterisks (*****), so that they work properly when searching the command line. The file should be updated with the names of any services you would like to monitor for attempts to stop the service., -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 030f1e0232..87d761fbe5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml index 7351f5db1e..acd69814af 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml index e0a1fe6c70..817c0e4be2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair author: Michael Haag, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml index da77ff7675..2ac5dc2772 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activi Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml index 19faa3b1d2..d8a111c0bd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity f populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml index 2fdfd241dc..c57a58cabe 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml index c63a5de23d..3566c3b0fa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml index 94db3d8e12..cfbe6e8324 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, whi (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml index 9f27e6a9f9..ded117f0cd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml index e4a1570b99..1405be238e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' description: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml index 2ee2c1d029..a2e1dd2a85 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml index d6891fa516..d7a281a271 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml index 577db5492e..3942ff0fd5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml index 8b735df584..aec2b5d4ee 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windo Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml index 0bcab5ef91..51cd395bbf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires audit computer account management to be e (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/ author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml index 1bad92dbd3..4423a45a5b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, whic (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml index f99fd34165..b9a113edf4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Chan \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\ \ to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\ \n" -type: ESCU +type: batch author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml index 2f9e622ac0..0ad9892b1e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml index 414d02c1e3..a6983ef573 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml index 8a0442f6c9..bb2974d0de 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml index 3a57d4fa7f..188d8bb349 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (msht how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml index dece28c383..f814764ac9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-08' description: This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml index b27260d533..84d7159f68 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-07-03' description: 'The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml index 3acc761759..dcd5ad4c5e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml index 70843ce6c3..dea9e35beb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml index 95fb5a7a2c..26a39de64d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml index 0f4c970998..59deabcf95 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml index 194a204078..ddb94c73d3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inl how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml index 5d981e2785..a7f80b21a6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml index 27b1a12a56..e163951290 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml index a95e490715..b1f09f2453 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/ - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml index 583414d64b..f9ccbee735 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: This search looks for processes launched from files that have doubl how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml index 3fc94422ab..d7c2c5a323 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity f your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml index 17bf6db3ce..3c62c6a118 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml index d42c148b37..61b7d1bde4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_service_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml index fca1569cef..4ea19b7ca0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml index 29541c0336..5995a610fc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service pr name requests how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md - https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml index 43392d1336..2bdb9e51c8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml index ac7aebd11d..26896db71a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml index 2dd7302b37..883e5d2a31 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml index 76f06b3dc0..9ab136c2cf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml index b5bf730dbd..238a99537a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml index 05b3db139b..f8ae5a6266 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-li how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md - https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml index ce24129f8c..272df950b9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml index ae7c7211d4..d67a2edd1f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk" diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml index ad68010807..23ed3870dd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml index 1f2397e669..fad8084c94 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a com executing commands via the command line. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml index 90b15bb425..774025357b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-11-26' description: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml index 51e4bcfbc2..a9d425afd9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the C such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml index bc486e1190..984cd3fb52 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml index 049395f3af..28dabcf573 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/ author: David Dorsey, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml index df8ab52e44..bd1d504bd7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml index a7d04547be..5b21356ec2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml index 7d6363e5be..4bc58555ed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml index 3908a5cae9..c38fc9f6fb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml index 05d618c672..7d8637b7b6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' description: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml index fbc4146c75..7ee777a4c1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml index b3e5c247f6..68a91e75e7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml index 04cb8c6246..66c1ca1bd4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-l how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml index 69de98ce68..7cda9ac9be 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml index 9e9c14e34d..d039871b36 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml index 6b23449e1d..b9ada8bee8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml index 230328d096..7b86b02bd8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a sho how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml index d0f669641e..7d6b7d9650 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 3a277f3db7..45d865785f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of in references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275 -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index a4d98d908f..16281abb97 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: Stolen credentials are applied by methods such as user impersonatio how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index f0c9285536..1e4a1a0340 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that verify pa how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index d1edada072..e481059ee7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an expo of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting windows endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints. -type: SSA +type: streaming references: ['https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml'] author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: ' diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml index 34fbeb3b19..2ad648f3b1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml index 0ceec5a47e..ef6252e182 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml index f26fb9107f..7894e285b7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes from a system's registry. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: [] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml index d553a1c287..c8f4f50aab 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes from a system's registry. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: [] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml index 51adcf6a30..c61390584a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma PowerSploit and DSInternals are common exploit APIs offering PowerShell modules for various exploits of Windows and Active Directory environments. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: [] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml index 6c4ccfadc5..36bbbd605e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma LaZagne is a tool that extracts various kinds of credentials from a local computer, including account passwords, domain passwords, browser passwords, etc. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: [] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml index a0c1fb08ee..a7658474ce 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml index 905e04ef41..b332480fda 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma memory and process dumps. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: [https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml index 2f85ddfdbb..3d53934538 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma memory and process dumps. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: [] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml index 22f38fcaf7..7b8b1bd9fa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml index 82e92a35ac..11d2773f01 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-09-15' description: This search detects the memory of lsass.exe being dumped for offline credential theft attack. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml). -type: SSA +type: streaming references: ['https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf'] author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml index 5aeb1bf935..4855805989 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service pr name requests how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2 -type: SSA +type: streaming references: [Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss] author: Xiao Lin, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml index 5d9be08f39..a46f46d447 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windo Security Event logs to detect potential attempts using Pass-the-Hash technique. how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2 -type: SSA +type: streaming references: [Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss] author: Xiao Lin, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml index c164f2ffd8..2480f802d1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` param This is an implementation on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel." how_to_implement: "You must be populating the endpoint data model for SSA and specifically the process_name and the process fields" author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk -type: SSA +type: streaming search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml index b51852f95d..8225e826e4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enabl how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 6ec710832f..fbd14dbdf9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index b231b28199..0b2d7dab11 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 4cfbb27758..513ad3f9f5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delet how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 2df76e9031..cf2ae7f987 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal ma how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 6faf38595e..f593cdb674 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enabl how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 1429023e6e..b7f5e95089 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illeg how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 7c09cd1509..4829d1bbb9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privi how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 073c7640fc..54f7cf3293 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal contr how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml index b49d52660d..ccedd63de5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enabl how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 4fde4e1318..8a62ff6eba 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitat how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml index eb5c2f83f9..6263088194 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This is a SPL2 implementation of the rule `Detect Prohibited Applications Spawni how_to_implement: "You must be ingesting sysmon logs. This search has been modified to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP." author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk -type: SSA +type: streaming search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml index a1b93715cd..fe7fad1256 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applicatio The list of application has been extracted from https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. references: [] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 76676e1841..55dbf666f6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml index aa48c598d7..8feb499e09 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discov how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 04b0a2bd86..d0a12be52c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 398dc25c07..dfc38511ae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconna how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 98b8898290..6c35f1b557 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discov how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 2659c08edd..5a7dbade26 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 7eb01c48bd..c44fce6b6b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discov how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 0615cc686d..4635692845 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 28fb7059e8..96028bbd02 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discov how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 22a11f6be0..53c6e9117f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconna how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 2e6d2f0e5a..f584bd5306 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and u how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml index b309edf014..6c5359a74d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 0f3dac4eb6..bfa01cb4ea 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 95b7f51c73..10324929f9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of in references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Detours -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index e8e4ed3185..96af33ada5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index e184d9252f..78143d07cd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInte how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index ceff64a664..79400ba5b5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimika how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 87746e0c08..d87b15f8ff 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerS how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml index 9f66e81256..70c9a33310 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system co and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. references: [] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml index a8e52c4c1d..fadc448f76 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: over a window of time, by building profiles per machine. how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. references: [https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml index 5a8d03134e..c16cee3109 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of maliciou This detection is inspired on Unusually Long Command Line authored by Rico Valdez. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command lines. references: [] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml index 6ec574c916..bdbf22aef9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml index 6aa74baac1..c87917e85d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe u how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml index 1b99bd0d80..a0090bc79c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non- how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml index f827194f4c..c78dea9325 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml index 49a37d6b5a..ca5c8a0d38 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml index bf483827dd..1061cbdb7b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml index 334f896bd6..733fda808d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml index b1539438c7..93c02fc2c3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001 author: David Dorsey, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml index a6435e94c8..6f3403e592 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml index c2fe0b625d..b1738c36b2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other th how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml index f387a25d9b..6de558d311 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-12' description: Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml index 61ac0e2803..de39a1c68c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search looks for system processes that normally run out of C:\ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest details about process execution from your hosts. Specifically, this search requires the process name and the full path to the process executable. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml index ab71a6d9a4..db287196e7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml index 701fc5e8f8..74e34bec15 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml index dea463a213..8dc7b5a1b6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command line as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml index 03259d6828..d98771ec20 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml index 3999fe577e..5b60149e3a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup A how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/ diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml index a3f6d71055..55e43e4cfd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml index 80d29d1d26..a6144b059e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for Windows events that indicate one of the Windo event logs has been purged. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineventlog_system` diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml index 0135e3d661..431366242b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system act from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml index 4a57b90630..299e33ac34 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml index f1a47e286b..d1e9d04d96 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the net router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml index 9aa9b1f21d..3fb2e5ce0a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open a how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject and its message body. references: [ ] -type: SSA +type: streaming author: Xiao Lin, Splunk search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get(input_event, "From"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Subject"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Content"), "string", " "), " "), _time=map_get(input_event, "_time") diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml index cf550ea395..7caf0d619a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender \ will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\ \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\ \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox." -type: ESCU +type: batch author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml index 3ed9919343..447a7e1941 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml index aa409d05fa..0930e60dce 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender' address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml index 679b7cd72e..80a4e8e36d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'U wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml index 199d0e1fca..1c4dd0ca37 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to t Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. how_to_implement: The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml index 670696c514..60625c205e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of thei how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml index 7871c2c057..64bca3f968 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender \ gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\ \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\ \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox." -type: ESCU +type: batch author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml index f490f00a6e..8c701efc2b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index fc1e9a0b87..51dcc66687 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via us how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Splunk search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml index 3c9a9fcb39..ae9d75e509 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Splunk search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml index 6ad2d36501..f999f3d9b9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml @@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1078 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml index 5637090c3d..18c1c089da 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml @@ -17,5 +17,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1078 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml index 20e485d0c8..ab40d18708 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml @@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1078 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml index aef85a6e15..64e6bb2ade 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml @@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1078 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml index c00cbfcd07..6bada0375f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml @@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1550 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml index 2bf308813d..f7cab22be4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml @@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1078 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml index d247bb8014..abc20c672b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml @@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1078 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml index 8495c184eb..b53d7f62ad 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml @@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1078 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml index fa55c444ec..cff2815c66 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml @@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1078 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml index 502146513c..c5ef84b3f9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via us agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Splunk search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`' diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index 3ef4ab6319..57a1111700 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or late then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rod Soto, Splunk search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index 70c6e10b56..e467b28181 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml index 4e924129c4..dba4b5dc32 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 3609f8f322..cdcd732181 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index f961ab7ed4..ec9bd03358 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index 78d5a034cf..f59a59778e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index cce8135a08..5ab4387546 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml index 3defb5fe1b..4b7ff017f2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml index 27735f6ce3..25b4f5194e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index d506228c52..675dc0626a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index 0201873217..e984209cc6 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index f13081df0e..a4921f92ea 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index f2a3fc18e2..d98c373dc5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml index 4dad0447e8..f177f56f03 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Reconnaissance security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml index 0957b1d0ed..284ed6f2b6 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1526 security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml index 77d64ee061..a24e704f01 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index cd214b7b56..50366c9235 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index abcc7efa8e..d1e886915e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index fdaabb5bcc..37db4556df 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index 3fce1bf564..04d40a843a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index ab67a869ef..4ff9bf1879 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags: kill_chain_phases: - Lateral Movement security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml index 5e1cb995bf..a18983c8f4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml index 2d61882308..12b5fd5f62 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml index 7ae4dacf1d..fa1378bef9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml index 39decd6c57..9b6b8dcde5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest p pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Jamie Windley, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml index 7b6754c43a..13263244f4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml index 1530b23673..2db7bb5698 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml index ec80b049b5..b6ab4b681d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpo and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml index f02513eaf0..d8ad9814f8 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: 'The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.Bus how_to_implement: This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml index c81d99bcbf..b0450766ac 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscript how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml index f4ba067c63..ee8d0be050 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscript how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml index 6ae72d7a99..5d5c1ec73b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk search: '`cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection" diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml index 41d7d2f2fd..a34201b777 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure \ when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to\ \ active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\ \n" -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml index bcf9f1b92b..6f02f157c8 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml index 960f47a9a9..9bc2f145c1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml index 416473dfdd..f29d7a7dcd 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastruct for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml index d5ebc31e78..c834714490 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml index f4238b9dd7..477e76ccc8 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: Running this search properly requires a technology that can in network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml index b9b741640f..a73f94827c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search looks for cleartext protocols at risk of leaking creden run on different assigned ports in those cases. how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml index 9cc94a66ce..caa7af4ccb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml index 33a6ca285c..9ae1faa6ad 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may no you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;).' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/ - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml index ba130244e6..d831f3db39 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to ex how_to_implement: You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml index 0386c2f7fb..eb16863b3b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be acc by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml index c1ea6ac2ea..0a5d002c2d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitori network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml index f5c5c08e6d..4d07bff1d0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBU how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/ diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index ce570976d5..1450dd90ae 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'First, you''ll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -type: ESCU +type: batch author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml index 7429341313..f7d72e2ef9 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml index 18c8d30a1f..7084eaf82f 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml index d0d81b20ab..20a78e6c02 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app="smb") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action="blocked" OR All_Traffic.dest_category="internal" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml index 0628b422df..33dbfb3502 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation") diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml index afd91c41ed..dd5a59e0a7 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT" diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml index 66196167ef..702374ae38 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/ - https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml index 66f19a7867..c6f2e9c0a7 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' description: Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. how_to_implement: This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml index c35150a815..142af05efd 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml index 2b744a5089..7cda3dc73d 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml index bf9a722f49..cc643529d9 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ author: Shannon Davis, Splunk diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml index 66b9f2b7f9..9165f63e4b 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ author: Shannon Davis, Splunk diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml index 8cc7f5e728..2ce9029ec5 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. description: This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon - https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472 diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml index 9d8d04261f..a782408d0d 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml index 701e72bd21..1021fef07a 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the sta standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml index c69a0c7bd5..3cc6018a65 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters a average traffic. how_to_implement: You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml index bd3f499b43..fa4cb04db3 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to identify sys to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml index a95f6ede1b..6d3d92dbf3 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block traffic connections. how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml index 8255d8122b..01d2ca9a32 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Rico Valdez, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml index c05ee864cd..2d0c12525c 100644 --- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: David Dorsey, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml index be724f2a1a..f359848778 100644 --- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml +++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type ht how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml index e3a7425763..ac6ef5a15b 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the emai reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/ - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/ diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml index af980c23eb..af72b43bc6 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data f such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science) diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml index d04e6668fc..216b13c48a 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the valu or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science) From 25a0f1fa56b21806d97d2cf192d17bdbf199c3ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 12:54:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 02/27] updated valudate.py to use the new type --- bin/validate.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py index 7c3696e8d2..93a69fa717 100644 --- a/bin/validate.py +++ b/bin/validate.py @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ def validate_objects(REPO_PATH, objects, verbose): if verbose: print("validating object {0}".format(object['name'])) for object in objects['detections']: - if object['type'] == 'ESCU': + if object['type'] == 'batch': errors = errors + validate_detection_search(object, objects['macros']) for object in objects['baselines']: From 1d629678a627e47171249431ced7eb60b14890d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 12:54:55 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 03/27] updated spec to respect the new type change --- spec/detections.spec.json | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/spec/detections.spec.json b/spec/detections.spec.json index 9fe66a1f61..5379f1c41e 100644 --- a/spec/detections.spec.json +++ b/spec/detections.spec.json @@ -127,13 +127,12 @@ "default": "", "description": "type of detection", "examples": [ - "ESCU" + "streaming" ], "items": { "enum": [ - "ESCU", - "SSE", - "RBA" + "batch", + "streaming" ], "type": "string" }, From 83382be5f68c1d4484f14681a053b84f963e3fc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:13:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/27] updating spec doc --- docs/spec/README.md | 49 ++ docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md | 22 + docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md | 22 + docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md | 26 + .../baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md | 24 + docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md | 22 + .../baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md | 22 + docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md | 24 + .../spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md | 15 + docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md | 47 ++ docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md | 22 + docs/spec/baselines.md | 282 ++++++++ docs/spec/baselines.spec.json | 107 --- docs/spec/baselines.spec.md | 283 -------- docs/spec/deployments-default.md | 15 + ...oyments-properties-alert_action-default.md | 15 + ...s-alert_action-properties-email-default.md | 15 + ...ion-properties-email-properties-message.md | 22 + ...ion-properties-email-properties-subject.md | 22 + ...t_action-properties-email-properties-to.md | 22 + ...roperties-alert_action-properties-email.md | 120 ++++ ...s-alert_action-properties-index-default.md | 15 + ...action-properties-index-properties-name.md | 22 + ...roperties-alert_action-properties-index.md | 66 ++ ...alert_action-properties-notable-default.md | 15 + ...ies-notable-properties-rule_description.md | 22 + ...roperties-notable-properties-rule_title.md | 22 + ...perties-alert_action-properties-notable.md | 93 +++ .../deployments-properties-alert_action.md | 153 ++++ ...ployments-properties-scheduling-default.md | 15 + ...ies-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md | 22 + ...ies-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md | 22 + ...rties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md | 22 + ...s-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md | 22 + .../spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md | 147 ++++ docs/spec/deployments.md | 258 +++++++ docs/spec/deployments.spec.json | 264 ------- docs/spec/deployments.spec.md | 656 ------------------ ...ctions-properties-known_false_positives.md | 24 + ...-properties-references-the-items-schema.md | 23 + docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md | 31 + docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md | 24 + docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md | 22 + docs/spec/detections.md | 384 ++++++++++ docs/spec/detections.spec.json | 157 ----- docs/spec/detections.spec.md | 380 ---------- docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md | 15 + docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md | 15 + ...lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md | 31 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md | 22 + docs/spec/lookups.md | 321 +++++++++ docs/spec/lookups.spec.json | 88 --- docs/spec/lookups.spec.md | 282 -------- .../spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md | 15 + docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md | 21 + docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md | 22 + docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md | 22 + docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md | 22 + docs/spec/macros.md | 123 ++++ docs/spec/macros.spec.json | 43 -- docs/spec/macros.spec.md | 131 ---- docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md | 15 + ...nse_tasks-properties-automation-default.md | 15 + .../response_tasks-properties-automation.md | 62 ++ docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md | 27 + .../response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md | 40 ++ docs/spec/response_tasks.md | 395 +++++++++++ docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json | 159 ----- docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md | 437 ------------ docs/spec/responses-default.md | 15 + .../responses-properties-is_note_required.md | 27 + ...onses-properties-response_phase-default.md | 15 + .../responses-properties-response_phase.md | 51 ++ docs/spec/responses.md | 340 +++++++++ docs/spec/responses.spec.json | 117 ---- docs/spec/responses.spec.md | 270 ------- docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md | 15 + ..._phase-properties-response_task-default.md | 15 + ...esponses_phase-properties-response_task.md | 57 ++ docs/spec/responses_phase.md | 389 +++++++++++ docs/spec/stories-default.md | 15 + docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md | 26 + docs/spec/stories.md | 287 ++++++++ docs/spec/stories.spec.json | 106 --- docs/spec/stories.spec.md | 283 -------- spec/responses_phase.spec.json | 36 +- 95 files changed, 4881 insertions(+), 3783 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/spec/README.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines.md delete mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines.spec.json delete mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines.spec.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments.md delete mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments.spec.json delete mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments.spec.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-known_false_positives.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections.md delete mode 100644 docs/spec/detections.spec.json delete mode 100644 docs/spec/detections.spec.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups.md delete mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups.spec.json delete mode 100644 docs/spec/lookups.spec.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/macros.md delete mode 100644 docs/spec/macros.spec.json delete mode 100644 docs/spec/macros.spec.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/response_tasks.md delete mode 100644 docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json delete mode 100644 docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses-properties-is_note_required.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses.md delete mode 100644 docs/spec/responses.spec.json delete mode 100644 docs/spec/responses.spec.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/responses_phase.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/stories-default.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md create mode 100644 docs/spec/stories.md delete mode 100644 docs/spec/stories.spec.json delete mode 100644 docs/spec/stories.spec.md diff --git a/docs/spec/README.md b/docs/spec/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c4e1f7821 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +# README + +## Top-level Schemas + +* [Analytics Story Schema](./stories.md "schema analytics story") – `http://example.com/example.json` + +* [Baseline Schema](./baselines.md "schema for baselines") – `http://example.com/example.json` + +* [Deployment Schema](./deployments.md "schema for deployment") – `http://example.com/example.json` + +* [Detection Schema](./detections.md "schema for detections") – `http://example.com/example.json` + +* [Lookup Manifest](./lookups.md "A object that defines a lookup file and its properties") – `https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json` + +* [Macro Manifest](./macros.md "An object that defines the parameters for a Splunk Macro") – `https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json` + +* [Response Schema](./response_tasks.md "schema for response task") – `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json` + +* [Response Schema](./responses.md "schema for response") – `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response.spec.json` + +* [Response Schema](./responses_phase.md "schema for phase") – `http://example.com/example.json` + +## Other Schemas + +### Objects + +* [Untitled object in Baseline Schema](./baselines-properties-tags.md "An array of key value pairs for tagging") – `#/properties/tags#/properties/tags` + +* [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-alert_action.md "Set alert action parameter for search") – `#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action` + +* [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md "By enabling it, an email is sent with the results") – `#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email` + +* [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md "By enabling it, the results are stored in another index") – `#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index` + +* [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md "By enabling it, a notable is generated") – `#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable` + +* [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-scheduling.md "allows to set scheduling parameter") – `#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling` + +* [Untitled object in Response Schema](./response_tasks-properties-automation.md "An array of key value pairs for defining actions and playbooks") – `#/properties/automation#/properties/automation` + +### Arrays + +* [Untitled array in Detection Schema](./detections-properties-references.md "A list of references for this detection") – `#/properties/references#/properties/references` + +* [Untitled array in Macro Manifest](./macros-properties-arguments.md "A list of the arguments being passed to this macro") – `https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments` + +* [Untitled array in Response Schema](./responses-properties-response_phase.md "Response divided into phases") – `#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase` + +* [Untitled array in Response Schema](./responses_phase-properties-response_task.md "Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed") – `#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..25b1c05002 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/author#/properties/author +``` + +Author of the baseline + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## author Type + +`string` + +## author Examples + +```yaml +Bahvin Patel, Splunk + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f91effacdf --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/date#/properties/date +``` + +date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## date Type + +`string` + +## date Examples + +```yaml +'2019-12-06' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e61031299b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/description#/properties/description +``` + +A detailed description of the baseline + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## description Type + +`string` + +## description Examples + +```yaml +>- + This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and + creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) + we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the + last 30 days + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0bac7d7e11 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement +``` + +information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations. + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## how_to_implement Type + +`string` + +## how_to_implement Examples + +```yaml +>- + This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes + EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ac191b7fb --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/id#/properties/id +``` + +UUID as unique identifier + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## id Type + +`string` + +## id Examples + +```yaml +fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63 + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..46e7b91cba --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Name of baseline Schema + +```txt +#/properties/name#/properties/name +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## name Type + +`string` ([Name of baseline](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md)) + +## name Examples + +```yaml +Previously Seen AWS Regions + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dae22b4ca4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/search#/properties/search +``` + +The Splunk search for the baseline + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## search Type + +`string` + +## search Examples + +```yaml +>- + cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as + latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6338be86cf --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/tags#/properties/tags/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6e89f04806 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +# Untitled object in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/tags#/properties/tags +``` + +An array of key value pairs for tagging + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## tags Type + +`object` ([Details](baselines-properties-tags.md)) + +## tags Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +## tags Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +## tags Examples + +```yaml +analytics_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities +custom_key: custom_value + +``` + +# tags Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------- | :--- | :------- | :---------- | :--------- | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d241c5920 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled integer in Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/version#/properties/version +``` + +version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ... + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## version Type + +`integer` + +## version Examples + +```yaml +1 + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.md b/docs/spec/baselines.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2ee3e87feb --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/baselines.md @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +# Baseline Schema Schema + +```txt +http://example.com/example.json +``` + +schema for baselines + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Baseline Schema Type + +`object` ([Baseline Schema](baselines.md)) + +# Baseline Schema Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :------------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | +| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | +| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement") | +| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | +| [search](#search) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search") | +| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | +| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## author + +Author of the baseline + +`author` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") + +### author Type + +`string` + +### author Examples + +```yaml +Bahvin Patel, Splunk + +``` + +## date + +date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd + +`date` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") + +### date Type + +`string` + +### date Examples + +```yaml +'2019-12-06' + +``` + +## description + +A detailed description of the baseline + +`description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +>- + This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and + creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) + we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the + last 30 days + +``` + +## how_to_implement + +information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations. + +`how_to_implement` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement") + +### how_to_implement Type + +`string` + +### how_to_implement Examples + +```yaml +>- + This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes + EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. + +``` + +## id + +UUID as unique identifier + +`id` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") + +### id Type + +`string` + +### id Examples + +```yaml +fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63 + +``` + +## name + + + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` ([Name of baseline](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` ([Name of baseline](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md)) + +### name Examples + +```yaml +Previously Seen AWS Regions + +``` + +## search + +The Splunk search for the baseline + +`search` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search") + +### search Type + +`string` + +### search Examples + +```yaml +>- + cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as + latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv + +``` + +## tags + +An array of key value pairs for tagging + +`tags` + +* is required + +* Type: `object` ([Details](baselines-properties-tags.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") + +### tags Type + +`object` ([Details](baselines-properties-tags.md)) + +### tags Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +### tags Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### tags Examples + +```yaml +analytics_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities +custom_key: custom_value + +``` + +## version + +version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ... + +`version` + +* is required + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") + +### version Type + +`integer` + +### version Examples + +```yaml +1 + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.spec.json b/docs/spec/baselines.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index c13fc47497..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/baselines.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,107 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "description": "schema for baselines", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of the baseline", - "examples": [ - "Bahvin Patel, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "A detailed description of the baseline ", - "examples": [ - "This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "how_to_implement": { - "$id": "#/properties/how_to_implement", - "default": "", - "description": "information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.", - "examples": [ - "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "examples": [ - "Previously Seen AWS Regions" - ], - "title": "Name of baseline", - "type": "string" - }, - "search": { - "$id": "#/properties/search", - "default": "", - "description": "The Splunk search for the baseline", - "examples": [ - "cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", - "examples": [ - { - "analytics_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities", - "custom_key": "custom_value" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object", - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 1 - ], - "type": "integer" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "author", - "search", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Baseline Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.spec.md b/docs/spec/baselines.spec.md deleted file mode 100644 index fc66502080..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/baselines.spec.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,283 +0,0 @@ - -# Baseline Schema Schema - -``` -http://example.com/example.json -``` - -schema for baselines - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In | -|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------| -| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted | | - -# Baseline Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by | -|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------| -| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| [search](#search) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required** | No | `{}` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required** | No | `0` | Baseline Schema (this schema) | -| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties | - -## author - -Author of the baseline - -`author` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### author Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### author Example - -```json -"Bahvin Patel, Splunk" -``` - - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### date Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### date Example - -```json -"2019-12-06" -``` - - -## description - -A detailed description of the baseline - -`description` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### description Example - -```json -"This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days" -``` - - -## how_to_implement - -information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations. - -`how_to_implement` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### how_to_implement Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### how_to_implement Example - -```json -"This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe." -``` - - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### id Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### id Example - -```json -"fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63" -``` - - -## name -### Name of baseline - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### name Example - -```json -"Previously Seen AWS Regions" -``` - - -## search - -The Splunk search for the baseline - -`search` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### search Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### search Example - -```json -"cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv" -``` - - -## tags - -An array of key value pairs for tagging - -`tags` - -* is **required** -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### tags Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | -|----------|------|----------| - - - - -### tags Example - -```json -{ - "analytics_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities", - "custom_key": "custom_value" -} -``` - - -## version - -version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is **required** -* type: `integer` -* default: `0` -* defined in this schema - -### version Type - - -`integer` - - - - - - -### version Example - -```json -1 -``` - diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a7b518209 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +http://example.com/example.json#/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..55e2308c13 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c8b32006bb --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e01fa30a39 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message +``` + +message of email + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## message Type + +`string` + +## message Examples + +```yaml +Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields% + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e72fd29af3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject +``` + +Subject of email + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## subject Type + +`string` + +## subject Examples + +```yaml +Splunk Alert $name$ + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0bef21838f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to +``` + +Recipient of email + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## to Type + +`string` + +## to Examples + +```yaml +test@test.com + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..070e95ee64 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email +``` + +By enabling it, an email is sent with the results + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## email Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md)) + +## email Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +## email Examples + +```yaml +message: Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields% +subject: Splunk Alert $name$ +to: test@test.com + +``` + +# email Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [message](#message) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message") | +| [subject](#subject) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject") | +| [to](#to) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## message + +message of email + +`message` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message") + +### message Type + +`string` + +### message Examples + +```yaml +Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields% + +``` + +## subject + +Subject of email + +`subject` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject") + +### subject Type + +`string` + +### subject Examples + +```yaml +Splunk Alert $name$ + +``` + +## to + +Recipient of email + +`to` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to") + +### to Type + +`string` + +### to Examples + +```yaml +test@test.com + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0acb5762ae --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be9a681a97 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name +``` + +Name of the index + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## name Type + +`string` + +## name Examples + +```yaml +asx + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..edc5070f0e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index +``` + +By enabling it, the results are stored in another index + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## index Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md)) + +## index Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +## index Examples + +```yaml +name: asx + +``` + +# index Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## name + +Name of the index + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` + +### name Examples + +```yaml +asx + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84226f6fc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..23882cd515 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description +``` + +Rule description of the notable event + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## rule_description Type + +`string` + +## rule_description Examples + +```yaml +'%description%' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9d5eb151c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title +``` + +Rule title of the notable event + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## rule_title Type + +`string` + +## rule_title Examples + +```yaml +'%name%' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d117f24ef9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable +``` + +By enabling it, a notable is generated + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## notable Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md)) + +## notable Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +## notable Examples + +```yaml +rule_description: '%description%' +rule_title: '%name%' + +``` + +# notable Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :------------------------------------ | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| [rule_description](#rule_description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description") | +| [rule_title](#rule_title) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## rule_description + +Rule description of the notable event + +`rule_description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description") + +### rule_description Type + +`string` + +### rule_description Examples + +```yaml +'%description%' + +``` + +## rule_title + +Rule title of the notable event + +`rule_title` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title") + +### rule_title Type + +`string` + +### rule_title Examples + +```yaml +'%name%' + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5fa09670a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action.md @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action +``` + +Set alert action parameter for search + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## alert_action Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action.md)) + +## alert_action Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +## alert_action Examples + +```yaml +email: + message: Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields% + subject: Splunk Alert $name$ + to: test@test.com +index: + name: asx +notable: + rule_description: '%description%' + rule_title: '%name%' + +``` + +# alert_action Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| [email](#email) | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email") | +| [index](#index) | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index") | +| [notable](#notable) | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## email + +By enabling it, an email is sent with the results + +`email` + +* is optional + +* Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email") + +### email Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md)) + +### email Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### email Examples + +```yaml +message: Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields% +subject: Splunk Alert $name$ +to: test@test.com + +``` + +## index + +By enabling it, the results are stored in another index + +`index` + +* is optional + +* Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index") + +### index Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md)) + +### index Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### index Examples + +```yaml +name: asx + +``` + +## notable + +By enabling it, a notable is generated + +`notable` + +* is optional + +* Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable") + +### notable Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md)) + +### notable Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### notable Examples + +```yaml +rule_description: '%description%' +rule_title: '%name%' + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f39294b0a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..52cbbfae51 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule +``` + +Cron schedule to schedule the Splunk searches. + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## cron_schedule Type + +`string` + +## cron_schedule Examples + +```yaml +'*/10 * * * *' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5808ddd97f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time +``` + +earliest time of search + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## earliest_time Type + +`string` + +## earliest_time Examples + +```yaml +'-10m' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..566141825e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time +``` + +latest time of search + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## latest_time Type + +`string` + +## latest_time Examples + +```yaml +now + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41aad873d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window +``` + +schedule window for search + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## schedule_window Type + +`string` + +## schedule_window Examples + +```yaml +auto + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf64fb3727 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling +``` + +allows to set scheduling parameter + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## scheduling Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-scheduling.md)) + +## scheduling Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +## scheduling Examples + +```yaml +cron_schedule: '*/10 * * * *' +earliest_time: '-10m' +latest_time: now +schedule_window: auto + +``` + +# scheduling Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :---------------------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| [cron_schedule](#cron_schedule) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule") | +| [earliest_time](#earliest_time) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time") | +| [latest_time](#latest_time) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time") | +| [schedule_window](#schedule_window) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## cron_schedule + +Cron schedule to schedule the Splunk searches. + +`cron_schedule` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule") + +### cron_schedule Type + +`string` + +### cron_schedule Examples + +```yaml +'*/10 * * * *' + +``` + +## earliest_time + +earliest time of search + +`earliest_time` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time") + +### earliest_time Type + +`string` + +### earliest_time Examples + +```yaml +'-10m' + +``` + +## latest_time + +latest time of search + +`latest_time` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time") + +### latest_time Type + +`string` + +### latest_time Examples + +```yaml +now + +``` + +## schedule_window + +schedule window for search + +`schedule_window` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window") + +### schedule_window Type + +`string` + +### schedule_window Examples + +```yaml +auto + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments.md b/docs/spec/deployments.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3d2c089fa --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/deployments.md @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +# Deployment Schema Schema + +```txt +http://example.com/example.json +``` + +schema for deployment + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [deployments.spec.json](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Deployment Schema Type + +`object` ([Deployment Schema](deployments.md)) + +## Deployment Schema Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +# Deployment Schema Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :---------------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [alert_action](#alert_action) | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action.md "#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action") | +| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | +| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | +| [scheduling](#scheduling) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling.md "#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling") | +| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## alert_action + +Set alert action parameter for search + +`alert_action` + +* is optional + +* Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action.md "#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action") + +### alert_action Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action.md)) + +### alert_action Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### alert_action Examples + +```yaml +email: + message: Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields% + subject: Splunk Alert $name$ + to: test@test.com +index: + name: asx +notable: + rule_description: '%description%' + rule_title: '%name%' + +``` + +## date + +date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd + +`date` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") + +### date Type + +`string` + +### date Examples + +```yaml +'2019-12-06' + +``` + +## description + +description of the deployment configuration + +`description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +>- + This deployment configuration provides a standard scheduling policy over all + rules. + +``` + +## id + +uuid as unique identifier + +`id` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") + +### id Type + +`string` + +### id Examples + +```yaml +fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 + +``` + +## name + +Name of deployment configuration + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` + +### name Examples + +```yaml +Deployment Configuration all Detections + +``` + +## scheduling + +allows to set scheduling parameter + +`scheduling` + +* is required + +* Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-scheduling.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling.md "#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling") + +### scheduling Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-scheduling.md)) + +### scheduling Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### scheduling Examples + +```yaml +cron_schedule: '*/10 * * * *' +earliest_time: '-10m' +latest_time: now +schedule_window: auto + +``` + +## tags + +An array of key value pairs for tagging + +`tags` + +* is required + +* Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-tags.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") + +### tags Type + +`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-tags.md)) + +### tags Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +### tags Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### tags Examples + +```yaml +analytics_story: credential_dumping + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments.spec.json b/docs/spec/deployments.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index c417cc0bf3..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/deployments.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,264 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "schema for deployment", - "properties": { - "alert_action": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "Set alert action parameter for search", - "examples": [ - { - "email": { - "message": "Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%", - "subject": "Splunk Alert $name$", - "to": "test@test.com" - }, - "index": { - "name": "asx" - }, - "notable": { - "rule_description": "%description%", - "rule_title": "%name%" - } - } - ], - "properties": { - "email": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "By enabling it, an email is sent with the results", - "examples": [ - { - "message": "Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%", - "subject": "Splunk Alert $name$", - "to": "test@test.com" - } - ], - "properties": { - "message": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message", - "default": "", - "description": "message of email", - "examples": [ - "Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "subject": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject", - "default": "", - "description": "Subject of email", - "examples": [ - "Splunk Alert $name$" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "to": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to", - "default": "", - "description": "Recipient of email", - "examples": [ - "test@test.com" - ], - "type": "string" - } - }, - "required": [ - "to", - "subject", - "message" - ], - "type": "object" - }, - "index": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "By enabling it, the results are stored in another index", - "examples": [ - { - "name": "asx" - } - ], - "properties": { - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of the index", - "examples": [ - "asx" - ], - "type": "string" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name" - ], - "type": "object" - }, - "notable": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "By enabling it, a notable is generated", - "examples": [ - { - "rule_description": "%description%", - "rule_title": "%name%" - } - ], - "properties": { - "rule_description": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description", - "default": "", - "description": "Rule description of the notable event", - "examples": [ - "%description%" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "rule_title": { - "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title", - "default": "", - "description": "Rule title of the notable event", - "examples": [ - "%name%" - ], - "type": "string" - } - }, - "required": [ - "rule_title", - "rule_description" - ], - "type": "object" - } - }, - "type": "object" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "description of the deployment configuration", - "examples": [ - "This deployment configuration provides a standard scheduling policy over all rules." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "uuid as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of deployment configuration", - "examples": [ - "Deployment Configuration all Detections" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "scheduling": { - "$id": "#/properties/scheduling", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "allows to set scheduling parameter", - "examples": [ - { - "cron_schedule": "*/10 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-10m", - "latest_time": "now", - "schedule_window": "auto" - } - ], - "properties": { - "cron_schedule": { - "$id": "#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule", - "default": "", - "description": "Cron schedule to schedule the Splunk searches.", - "examples": [ - "*/10 * * * *" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "earliest_time": { - "$id": "#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time", - "default": "", - "description": "earliest time of search", - "examples": [ - "-10m" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "latest_time": { - "$id": "#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time", - "default": "", - "description": "latest time of search", - "examples": [ - "now" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "schedule_window": { - "$id": "#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window", - "default": "", - "description": "schedule window for search", - "examples": [ - "auto" - ], - "type": "string" - } - }, - "required": [ - "cron_schedule", - "earliest_time", - "latest_time" - ], - "type": "object" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", - "examples": [ - { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object", - "uniqueItems": true - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "date", - "description", - "scheduling", - "alert_action", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Deployment Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments.spec.md b/docs/spec/deployments.spec.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8d86ed47ff..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/deployments.spec.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,656 +0,0 @@ - -# Deployment Schema Schema - -``` -http://example.com/example.json -``` - -schema for deployment - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In | -|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------| -| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted | | - -# Deployment Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by | -|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------| -| [alert_action](#alert_action) | `object` | **Required** | No | `{}` | Deployment Schema (this schema) | -| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Deployment Schema (this schema) | -| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Deployment Schema (this schema) | -| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Deployment Schema (this schema) | -| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Deployment Schema (this schema) | -| [scheduling](#scheduling) | `object` | **Required** | No | `{}` | Deployment Schema (this schema) | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required** | No | `{}` | Deployment Schema (this schema) | -| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties | - -## alert_action - -Set alert action parameter for search - -`alert_action` - -* is **required** -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### alert_action Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | Default | -|----------|------|----------|---------| -| `email`| object | Optional | `{}` | -| `index`| object | Optional | `{}` | -| `notable`| object | Optional | `{}` | - - - -#### email - -By enabling it, an email is sent with the results - -`email` - -* is optional -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` - - -##### email Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | Default | -|----------|------|----------|---------| -| `message`| string | **Required** | `""` | -| `subject`| string | **Required** | `""` | -| `to`| string | **Required** | `""` | - - - -#### message - -message of email - -`message` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### message Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### message Example - -```json -Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields% -``` - - - - -#### subject - -Subject of email - -`subject` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### subject Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### subject Example - -```json -Splunk Alert $name$ -``` - - - - -#### to - -Recipient of email - -`to` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### to Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### to Example - -```json -test@test.com -``` - - - - - -##### email Example - -```json -[object Object] -``` - - - - -#### index - -By enabling it, the results are stored in another index - -`index` - -* is optional -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` - - -##### index Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | Default | -|----------|------|----------|---------| -| `name`| string | **Required** | `""` | - - - -#### name - -Name of the index - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### name Example - -```json -asx -``` - - - - - -##### index Example - -```json -[object Object] -``` - - - - -#### notable - -By enabling it, a notable is generated - -`notable` - -* is optional -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` - - -##### notable Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | Default | -|----------|------|----------|---------| -| `rule_description`| string | **Required** | `""` | -| `rule_title`| string | **Required** | `""` | - - - -#### rule_description - -Rule description of the notable event - -`rule_description` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### rule_description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### rule_description Example - -```json -%description% -``` - - - - -#### rule_title - -Rule title of the notable event - -`rule_title` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### rule_title Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### rule_title Example - -```json -%name% -``` - - - - - -##### notable Example - -```json -[object Object] -``` - - - - - -### alert_action Example - -```json -{ - "email": { - "message": "Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%", - "subject": "Splunk Alert $name$", - "to": "test@test.com" - }, - "index": { - "name": "asx" - }, - "notable": { - "rule_description": "%description%", - "rule_title": "%name%" - } -} -``` - - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### date Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### date Example - -```json -"2019-12-06" -``` - - -## description - -description of the deployment configuration - -`description` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### description Example - -```json -"This deployment configuration provides a standard scheduling policy over all rules." -``` - - -## id - -uuid as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### id Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### id Example - -```json -"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" -``` - - -## name - -Name of deployment configuration - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### name Example - -```json -"Deployment Configuration all Detections" -``` - - -## scheduling - -allows to set scheduling parameter - -`scheduling` - -* is **required** -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### scheduling Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | Default | -|----------|------|----------|---------| -| `cron_schedule`| string | **Required** | `""` | -| `earliest_time`| string | **Required** | `""` | -| `latest_time`| string | **Required** | `""` | -| `schedule_window`| string | Optional | `""` | - - - -#### cron_schedule - -Cron schedule to schedule the Splunk searches. - -`cron_schedule` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### cron_schedule Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### cron_schedule Example - -```json -*/10 * * * * -``` - - - - -#### earliest_time - -earliest time of search - -`earliest_time` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### earliest_time Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### earliest_time Example - -```json --10m -``` - - - - -#### latest_time - -latest time of search - -`latest_time` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### latest_time Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### latest_time Example - -```json -now -``` - - - - -#### schedule_window - -schedule window for search - -`schedule_window` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### schedule_window Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### schedule_window Example - -```json -auto -``` - - - - - -### scheduling Example - -```json -{ - "cron_schedule": "*/10 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-10m", - "latest_time": "now", - "schedule_window": "auto" -} -``` - - -## tags - -An array of key value pairs for tagging - -`tags` - -* is **required** -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### tags Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | -|----------|------|----------| - - - - -### tags Example - -```json -{ - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" -} -``` - diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-known_false_positives.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-known_false_positives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae7c1bafbd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-known_false_positives.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Untitled string in Detection Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/knwon_false_positives#/properties/known_false_positives +``` + +known false postives + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## known_false_positives Type + +`string` + +## known_false_positives Examples + +```yaml +>- + Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory + dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c184428f27 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# The Items Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/references/items#/properties/references/items +``` + +An explanation about the purpose of this instance. + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## items Type + +`string` ([The Items Schema](detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md)) + +## items Examples + +```yaml +>- + https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..07618fc3f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +# Untitled array in Detection Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/references#/properties/references +``` + +A list of references for this detection + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## references Type + +`string[]` ([The Items Schema](detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md)) + +## references Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +[] +``` + +## references Examples + +```yaml +- >- + https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..226980c0e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Untitled string in Detection Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/type#/properties/type/items +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## items Type + +`string` + +## items Constraints + +**enum**: the value of this property must be equal to one of the following values: + +| Value | Explanation | +| :------------ | :---------- | +| `"batch"` | | +| `"streaming"` | | diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98c36f20ac --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Detection Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/type#/properties/type +``` + +type of detection + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## type Type + +`string` + +## type Examples + +```yaml +streaming + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/detections.md b/docs/spec/detections.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bb4b3b7b14 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/detections.md @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ +# Detection Schema Schema + +```txt +http://example.com/example.json +``` + +schema for detections + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [detections.spec.json](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Detection Schema Type + +`object` ([Detection Schema](detections.md)) + +# Detection Schema Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :---------------------------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | +| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | +| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement") | +| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | +| [known_false_positives](#known_false_positives) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-known_false_positives.md "#/properties/knwon_false_positives#/properties/known_false_positives") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-name-of-detection.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | +| [references](#references) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") | +| [search](#search) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search") | +| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | +| [type](#type) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-type.md "#/properties/type#/properties/type") | +| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## author + +Author of the detection + +`author` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") + +### author Type + +`string` + +### author Examples + +```yaml +Patrick Bareiss, Splunk + +``` + +## date + +date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd + +`date` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") + +### date Type + +`string` + +### date Examples + +```yaml +'2019-12-06' + +``` + +## description + +A detailed description of the detection + +`description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +>- + dbgcore.dll is a specifc DLL for Windows core debugging. It is used to obtain + a memory dump of a process. This search detects the usage of this DLL for + creating a memory dump of LSASS process. Memory dumps of the LSASS process can + be created with tools such as Windows Task Manager or procdump. + +``` + +## how_to_implement + +information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations. + +`how_to_implement` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement") + +### how_to_implement Type + +`string` + +### how_to_implement Examples + +```yaml +>- + This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes + EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. + +``` + +## id + +UUID as unique identifier + +`id` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") + +### id Type + +`string` + +### id Examples + +```yaml +fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 + +``` + +## known_false_positives + +known false postives + +`known_false_positives` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-known_false_positives.md "#/properties/knwon_false_positives#/properties/known_false_positives") + +### known_false_positives Type + +`string` + +### known_false_positives Examples + +```yaml +>- + Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory + dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. + +``` + +## name + + + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` ([Name of detection](detections-properties-name-of-detection.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-name-of-detection.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` ([Name of detection](detections-properties-name-of-detection.md)) + +### name Examples + +```yaml +Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation + +``` + +## references + +A list of references for this detection + +`references` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string[]` ([The Items Schema](detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") + +### references Type + +`string[]` ([The Items Schema](detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md)) + +### references Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +[] +``` + +### references Examples + +```yaml +- >- + https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf + +``` + +## search + +The Splunk search for the detection + +`search` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search") + +### search Type + +`string` + +### search Examples + +```yaml +>- + `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR + CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as + lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, + SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | + `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | + `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` + +``` + +## tags + +An array of key value pairs for tagging + +`tags` + +* is required + +* Type: `object` ([Details](detections-properties-tags.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") + +### tags Type + +`object` ([Details](detections-properties-tags.md)) + +### tags Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +### tags Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### tags Examples + +```yaml +analytics_story: credential_dumping +kill_chain_phases: Action on Objectives +mitre_attack_id: T1078.004 +cis20: CIS 13 +nist: DE.DP +security domain: network +asset_type: AWS Instance +risk_object: user +risk_object_type: network_artifacts +risk score: '60' +custom_key: custom_value + +``` + +## type + +type of detection + +`type` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-type.md "#/properties/type#/properties/type") + +### type Type + +`string` + +### type Examples + +```yaml +streaming + +``` + +## version + +version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... + +`version` + +* is required + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") + +### version Type + +`integer` + +### version Examples + +```yaml +2 + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/detections.spec.json b/docs/spec/detections.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index 9f9fc25482..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/detections.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,157 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "description": "schema for detections", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of the detection", - "examples": [ - "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "A detailed description of the detection", - "examples": [ - "dbgcore.dll is a specifc DLL for Windows core debugging. It is used to obtain a memory dump of a process. This search detects the usage of this DLL for creating a memory dump of LSASS process. Memory dumps of the LSASS process can be created with tools such as Windows Task Manager or procdump." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "how_to_implement": { - "$id": "#/properties/how_to_implement", - "default": "", - "description": "information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.", - "examples": [ - "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "known_false_positives": { - "$id": "#/properties/knwon_false_positives", - "default": "", - "description": "known false postives", - "examples": [ - "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "examples": [ - "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation" - ], - "title": "Name of detection", - "type": "string" - }, - "references": { - "$id": "#/properties/references", - "additionalItems": true, - "default": [], - "description": "A list of references for this detection", - "examples": [ - [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ] - ], - "items": { - "$id": "#/properties/references/items", - "default": "", - "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.", - "examples": [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "title": "The Items Schema", - "type": "string" - }, - "type": "array" - }, - "search": { - "$id": "#/properties/search", - "default": "", - "description": "The Splunk search for the detection", - "examples": [ - "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter`" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", - "examples": [ - { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping", - "custom_key": "custom_value" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object", - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "type": { - "$id": "#/properties/type", - "default": "", - "description": "type of detection", - "examples": [ - "ESCU" - ], - "items": { - "enum": [ - "ESCU", - "SSE", - "RBA" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "type": "string" - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 2 - ], - "type": "integer" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "type", - "author", - "search", - "known_false_positives", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Detection Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/docs/spec/detections.spec.md b/docs/spec/detections.spec.md deleted file mode 100644 index 74c9176a96..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/detections.spec.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,380 +0,0 @@ - -# Detection Schema Schema - -``` -http://example.com/example.json -``` - -schema for detections - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In | -|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------| -| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted | | - -# Detection Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by | -|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------| -| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [known_false_positives](#known_false_positives) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [references](#references) | `string[]` | Optional | No | `[]` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [search](#search) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required** | No | `{}` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [type](#type) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required** | No | `0` | Detection Schema (this schema) | -| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties | - -## author - -Author of the detection - -`author` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### author Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### author Example - -```json -"Patrick Bareiss, Splunk" -``` - - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### date Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### date Example - -```json -"2019-12-06" -``` - - -## description - -A detailed description of the detection - -`description` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### description Example - -```json -"dbgcore.dll is a specifc DLL for Windows core debugging. It is used to obtain a memory dump of a process. This search detects the usage of this DLL for creating a memory dump of LSASS process. Memory dumps of the LSASS process can be created with tools such as Windows Task Manager or procdump." -``` - - -## how_to_implement - -information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations. - -`how_to_implement` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### how_to_implement Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### how_to_implement Example - -```json -"This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe." -``` - - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### id Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### id Example - -```json -"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" -``` - - -## known_false_positives - -known false postives - -`known_false_positives` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### known_false_positives Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### known_false_positives Example - -```json -"Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual." -``` - - -## name -### Name of detection - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### name Example - -```json -"Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation" -``` - - -## references - -A list of references for this detection - -`references` - -* is optional -* type: `string[]` - -* default: `[]` -* defined in this schema - -### references Type - - -Array type: `string[]` - -All items must be of the type: -`string` - - - - - -An explanation about the purpose of this instance. - - - - - -### references Example - -```json -[ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" -] -``` - - -## search - -The Splunk search for the detection - -`search` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### search Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### search Example - -```json -"`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter`" -``` - - -## tags - -An array of key value pairs for tagging - -`tags` - -* is **required** -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### tags Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | -|----------|------|----------| - - - - -### tags Example - -```json -{ - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping", - "custom_key": "custom_value" -} -``` - - -## type - -type of detection - -`type` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### type Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### type Example - -```json -"ESCU" -``` - - -## version - -version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is **required** -* type: `integer` -* default: `0` -* defined in this schema - -### version Type - - -`integer` - - - - - - -### version Example - -```json -2 -``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md b/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..78403ade45 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/oneOf/0 +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## 0 Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md b/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4b493c4f17 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/oneOf/1 +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## 1 Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b067278e67 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/case_sensitive_match +``` + +What the macro is intended to filter + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## case_sensitive_match Type + +`string` + +## case_sensitive_match Constraints + +**enum**: the value of this property must be equal to one of the following values: + +| Value | Explanation | +| :-------- | :---------- | +| `"true"` | | +| `"false"` | | + +## case_sensitive_match Examples + +```yaml +'true' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62b7028b4d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/collection +``` + +Name of the collection to use for this lookup + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## collection Type + +`string` + +## collection Examples + +```yaml +prohibited_apps_launching_cmd + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..46369bbdda --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/default_match +``` + +The default value if no match is found + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default_match Type + +`string` + +## default_match Examples + +```yaml +'true' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e9fc0cfe11 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/description +``` + +The description of this lookup + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## description Type + +`string` + +## description Examples + +```yaml +This lookup contains file names that exist in the Windows\System32 directory + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0a699ee17 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/fields_list +``` + +A comma and space separated list of field names + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## fields_list Type + +`string` + +## fields_list Examples + +```yaml +_key, dest, process_name + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..80584c0215 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filename +``` + +The name of the file to use for this lookup + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## filename Type + +`string` + +## filename Examples + +```yaml +prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad1a68ff22 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filter +``` + +Use this attribute to improve search performance when working with significantly large KV + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## filter Type + +`string` + +## filter Examples + +```yaml +dest="SPLK_*" + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ca467f6a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/match_type +``` + +A comma and space-delimited list of \(\) specification to allow for non-exact matching + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## match_type Type + +`string` + +## match_type Examples + +```yaml +WILDCARD(process) + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..652395498b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled integer in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/max_matches +``` + +The maximum number of possible matches for each input lookup value + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## max_matches Type + +`integer` + +## max_matches Examples + +```yaml +'100' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e950b97fbd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled integer in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/min_matches +``` + +Minimum number of possible matches for each input lookup value + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## min_matches Type + +`integer` + +## min_matches Examples + +```yaml +'1' + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca27b5144c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/name +``` + +The name of the lookup to be used in searches + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## name Type + +`string` + +## name Examples + +```yaml +isWindowsSystemFile_lookup + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups.md b/docs/spec/lookups.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..79b6e284e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/lookups.md @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +# Lookup Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json +``` + +A object that defines a lookup file and its properties. + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [lookups.spec.json](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Lookup Manifest Type + +`object` ([Lookup Manifest](lookups.md)) + +one (and only one) of + +* [Untitled undefined type in Lookup Manifest](lookups-oneof-0.md "check type definition") + +* [Untitled undefined type in Lookup Manifest](lookups-oneof-1.md "check type definition") + +# Lookup Manifest Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [case_sensitive_match](#case_sensitive_match) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/case_sensitive_match") | +| [collection](#collection) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-collection.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/collection") | +| [default_match](#default_match) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-default_match.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/default_match") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-description.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/description") | +| [fields_list](#fields_list) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-fields_list.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/fields_list") | +| [filename](#filename) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-filename.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filename") | +| [filter](#filter) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-filter.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filter") | +| [match_type](#match_type) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-match_type.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/match_type") | +| [max_matches](#max_matches) | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-max_matches.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/max_matches") | +| [min_matches](#min_matches) | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-min_matches.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/min_matches") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-name.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/name") | + +## case_sensitive_match + +What the macro is intended to filter + +`case_sensitive_match` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/case_sensitive_match") + +### case_sensitive_match Type + +`string` + +### case_sensitive_match Constraints + +**enum**: the value of this property must be equal to one of the following values: + +| Value | Explanation | +| :-------- | :---------- | +| `"true"` | | +| `"false"` | | + +### case_sensitive_match Examples + +```yaml +'true' + +``` + +## collection + +Name of the collection to use for this lookup + +`collection` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-collection.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/collection") + +### collection Type + +`string` + +### collection Examples + +```yaml +prohibited_apps_launching_cmd + +``` + +## default_match + +The default value if no match is found + +`default_match` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-default_match.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/default_match") + +### default_match Type + +`string` + +### default_match Examples + +```yaml +'true' + +``` + +## description + +The description of this lookup + +`description` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-description.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +This lookup contains file names that exist in the Windows\System32 directory + +``` + +## fields_list + +A comma and space separated list of field names + +`fields_list` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-fields_list.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/fields_list") + +### fields_list Type + +`string` + +### fields_list Examples + +```yaml +_key, dest, process_name + +``` + +## filename + +The name of the file to use for this lookup + +`filename` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-filename.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filename") + +### filename Type + +`string` + +### filename Examples + +```yaml +prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv + +``` + +## filter + +Use this attribute to improve search performance when working with significantly large KV + +`filter` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-filter.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filter") + +### filter Type + +`string` + +### filter Examples + +```yaml +dest="SPLK_*" + +``` + +## match_type + +A comma and space-delimited list of \(\) specification to allow for non-exact matching + +`match_type` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-match_type.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/match_type") + +### match_type Type + +`string` + +### match_type Examples + +```yaml +WILDCARD(process) + +``` + +## max_matches + +The maximum number of possible matches for each input lookup value + +`max_matches` + +* is optional + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-max_matches.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/max_matches") + +### max_matches Type + +`integer` + +### max_matches Examples + +```yaml +'100' + +``` + +## min_matches + +Minimum number of possible matches for each input lookup value + +`min_matches` + +* is optional + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-min_matches.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/min_matches") + +### min_matches Type + +`integer` + +### min_matches Examples + +```yaml +'1' + +``` + +## name + +The name of the lookup to be used in searches + +`name` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-name.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` + +### name Examples + +```yaml +isWindowsSystemFile_lookup + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups.spec.json b/docs/spec/lookups.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index 0c85720259..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/lookups.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", - "description": "A object that defines a lookup file and its properties.", - "oneOf": [ - { - "required": [ - "collection" - ] - }, - { - "required": [ - "filename" - ] - } - ], - "properties": { - "case_sensitive_match": { - "description": "What the macro is intended to filter", - "enum": [ - "true", - "false" - ], - "examples": [ - "true" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "collection": { - "description": "Name of the collection to use for this lookup", - "examples": [ - "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "default_match": { - "description": "The default value if no match is found", - "examples": [ - "true" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "description": "The description of this lookup", - "examples": [ - "This lookup contains file names that exist in the Windows\\System32 directory" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "filename": { - "description": "The name of the file to use for this lookup", - "examples": [ - "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "match_type": { - "description": "A comma and space-delimited list of () specification to allow for non-exact matching", - "examples": [ - "WILDCARD(process)" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "max_matches": { - "description": "The maximum number of possible matches for each input lookup value", - "examples": [ - "100" - ], - "type": "integer" - }, - "min_matches": { - "description": "Minimum number of possible matches for each input lookup value", - "examples": [ - "1" - ], - "type": "integer" - }, - "name": { - "description": "The name of the lookup to be used in searches", - "examples": [ - "isWindowsSystemFile_lookup" - ], - "type": "string" - } - }, - "title": "Lookup Manifest", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups.spec.md b/docs/spec/lookups.spec.md deleted file mode 100644 index 38f87220d1..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/lookups.spec.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,282 +0,0 @@ - -# Lookup Manifest Schema - -``` -https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json -``` - -A object that defines a lookup file and its properties. - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In | -|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------| -| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted | | - -# Lookup Manifest Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | -|----------|------|----------|----------|------------| -| [case_sensitive_match](#case_sensitive_match) | `enum` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| [collection](#collection) | `string` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| [default_match](#default_match) | `string` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| [description](#description) | `string` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| [filename](#filename) | `string` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| [match_type](#match_type) | `string` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| [max_matches](#max_matches) | `integer` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| [min_matches](#min_matches) | `integer` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| [name](#name) | `string` | Optional | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) | -| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties | - -## case_sensitive_match - -What the macro is intended to filter - -`case_sensitive_match` - -* is optional -* type: `enum` -* defined in this schema - -The value of this property **must** be equal to one of the [known values below](#case_sensitive_match-known-values). - -### case_sensitive_match Known Values -| Value | Description | -|-------|-------------| -| `true` | | -| `false` | | - - - -### case_sensitive_match Example - -```json -"true" -``` - - -## collection - -Name of the collection to use for this lookup - -`collection` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### collection Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### collection Example - -```json -"prohibited_apps_launching_cmd" -``` - - -## default_match - -The default value if no match is found - -`default_match` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### default_match Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### default_match Example - -```json -"true" -``` - - -## description - -The description of this lookup - -`description` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### description Example - -```json -"This lookup contains file names that exist in the Windows\\System32 directory" -``` - - -## filename - -The name of the file to use for this lookup - -`filename` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### filename Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### filename Example - -```json -"prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv" -``` - - -## match_type - -A comma and space-delimited list of () specification to allow for non-exact matching - -`match_type` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### match_type Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### match_type Example - -```json -"WILDCARD(process)" -``` - - -## max_matches - -The maximum number of possible matches for each input lookup value - -`max_matches` - -* is optional -* type: `integer` -* defined in this schema - -### max_matches Type - - -`integer` - - - - - - -### max_matches Example - -```json -"100" -``` - - -## min_matches - -Minimum number of possible matches for each input lookup value - -`min_matches` - -* is optional -* type: `integer` -* defined in this schema - -### min_matches Type - - -`integer` - - - - - - -### min_matches Example - -```json -"1" -``` - - -## name - -The name of the lookup to be used in searches - -`name` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### name Example - -```json -"isWindowsSystemFile_lookup" -``` - - - -**One** of the following *conditions* need to be fulfilled. - - -#### Condition 1 - - - -#### Condition 2 - - diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34f73377e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled string in Macro Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments/items +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## items Type + +`string` diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1334acd3c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# Untitled array in Macro Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments +``` + +A list of the arguments being passed to this macro + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## arguments Type + +`string[]` + +## arguments Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `0` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..128ea17364 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Macro Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/definition +``` + +The macro definition + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## definition Type + +`string` + +## definition Examples + +```yaml +(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*) + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e5f8aed632 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Macro Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/description +``` + +What the macro is intended to filter + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## description Type + +`string` + +## description Examples + +```yaml +Use this macro to filter out known good objects + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..484c1e4e3f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Untitled string in Macro Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/name +``` + +The name of the macro + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## name Type + +`string` + +## name Examples + +```yaml +detection_search_output_filter + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/macros.md b/docs/spec/macros.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c3cb8dc57b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/macros.md @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +# Macro Manifest Schema + +```txt +https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json +``` + +An object that defines the parameters for a Splunk Macro + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [macros.spec.json](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Macro Manifest Type + +`object` ([Macro Manifest](macros.md)) + +# Macro Manifest Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| [arguments](#arguments) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-arguments.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments") | +| [definition](#definition) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-definition.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/definition") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-description.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/description") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-name.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/name") | + +## arguments + +A list of the arguments being passed to this macro + +`arguments` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string[]` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-arguments.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments") + +### arguments Type + +`string[]` + +### arguments Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `0` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +## definition + +The macro definition + +`definition` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-definition.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/definition") + +### definition Type + +`string` + +### definition Examples + +```yaml +(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*) + +``` + +## description + +What the macro is intended to filter + +`description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-description.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +Use this macro to filter out known good objects + +``` + +## name + +The name of the macro + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-name.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` + +### name Examples + +```yaml +detection_search_output_filter + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/macros.spec.json b/docs/spec/macros.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index cd0f5cafe1..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/macros.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", - "description": "An object that defines the parameters for a Splunk Macro", - "properties": { - "arguments": { - "description": "A list of the arguments being passed to this macro", - "items": { - "type": "string" - }, - "minItems": 0, - "type": "array", - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "definition": { - "description": "The macro definition", - "examples": [ - "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "description": "What the macro is intended to filter", - "examples": [ - "Use this macro to filter out known good objects" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "description": "The name of the macro", - "examples": [ - "detection_search_output_filter" - ], - "type": "string" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "description" - ], - "title": "Macro Manifest", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/docs/spec/macros.spec.md b/docs/spec/macros.spec.md deleted file mode 100644 index f39fdeffe4..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/macros.spec.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,131 +0,0 @@ - -# Macro Manifest Schema - -``` -https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json -``` - -An object that defines the parameters for a Splunk Macro - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In | -|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------| -| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted | | - -# Macro Manifest Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | -|----------|------|----------|----------|------------| -| [arguments](#arguments) | `string[]` | Optional | No | Macro Manifest (this schema) | -| [definition](#definition) | `string` | Optional | No | Macro Manifest (this schema) | -| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required** | No | Macro Manifest (this schema) | -| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required** | No | Macro Manifest (this schema) | -| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties | - -## arguments - -A list of the arguments being passed to this macro - -`arguments` - -* is optional -* type: `string[]` -* at least `0` items in the array -* defined in this schema - -### arguments Type - - -Array type: `string[]` - -All items must be of the type: -`string` - - - - - - - - - - -## definition - -The macro definition - -`definition` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### definition Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### definition Example - -```json -"(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)" -``` - - -## description - -What the macro is intended to filter - -`description` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### description Example - -```json -"Use this macro to filter out known good objects" -``` - - -## name - -The name of the macro - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* defined in this schema - -### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### name Example - -```json -"detection_search_output_filter" -``` - diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..31296217d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json#/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation-default.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b2cdd45428 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/automation#/properties/automation/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bdd1eb66d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation.md @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +# Untitled object in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/automation#/properties/automation +``` + +An array of key value pairs for defining actions and playbooks + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## automation Type + +`object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-automation.md)) + +## automation Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +## automation Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{ + "is_note_required": false, + "sla_type": "minutes", + "sla": "", + "role": "", + "action": [], + "playbooks": [] +} +``` + +## automation Examples + +```yaml +is_note_required: false +sla_type: minutes +sla: 30 +action: + - run_query +playbooks: + - scm: local + playbook: automate something + - scm: local + playbook: automate something else + +``` + +# automation Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------- | :--- | :------- | :---------- | :--------- | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9de4e3e98f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# Untitled integer in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/sla#/properties/sla +``` + +Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## sla Type + +`integer` + +## sla Examples + +```yaml +5 + +``` + +```yaml +30 + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..28319602eb --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +# Untitled string in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type +``` + +Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc) + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## sla_type Type + +`string` + +## sla_type Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +"minutes" +``` + +## sla_type Examples + +```yaml +minutes + +``` + +```yaml +hours + +``` + +```yaml +days + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e5500835e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +# Response Schema Schema + +```txt +https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json +``` + +schema for response task + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [response_tasks.spec.json](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Response Schema Type + +`object` ([Response Schema](response_tasks.md)) + +## Response Schema Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +# Response Schema Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | +| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | +| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | +| [sla](#sla) | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla") | +| [sla_type](#sla_type) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type") | +| [automation](#automation) | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-automation.md "#/properties/automation#/properties/automation") | +| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | +| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | +| [references](#references) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## author + +Author of the response task + +`author` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") + +### author Type + +`string` + +### author Examples + +```yaml +ButterCup, Splunk + +``` + +## date + +date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd + +`date` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") + +### date Type + +`string` + +### date Examples + +```yaml +'2019-12-06' + +``` + +## description + +Description of response task + +`description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +Response example. + +``` + +## id + +UUID as unique identifier + +`id` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") + +### id Type + +`string` + +### id Examples + +```yaml +fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 + +``` + +## name + +Name of response task + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` + +### name Examples + +```yaml +Response Example + +``` + +## sla + +Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase + +`sla` + +* is optional + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla") + +### sla Type + +`integer` + +### sla Examples + +```yaml +5 + +``` + +```yaml +30 + +``` + +## sla_type + +Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc) + +`sla_type` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type") + +### sla_type Type + +`string` + +### sla_type Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +"minutes" +``` + +### sla_type Examples + +```yaml +minutes + +``` + +```yaml +hours + +``` + +```yaml +days + +``` + +## automation + +An array of key value pairs for defining actions and playbooks + +`automation` + +* is optional + +* Type: `object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-automation.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-automation.md "#/properties/automation#/properties/automation") + +### automation Type + +`object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-automation.md)) + +### automation Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +### automation Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{ + "is_note_required": false, + "sla_type": "minutes", + "sla": "", + "role": "", + "action": [], + "playbooks": [] +} +``` + +### automation Examples + +```yaml +is_note_required: false +sla_type: minutes +sla: 30 +action: + - run_query +playbooks: + - scm: local + playbook: automate something + - scm: local + playbook: automate something else + +``` + +## tags + +An array of key value pairs for tagging + +`tags` + +* is required + +* Type: `object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-tags.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") + +### tags Type + +`object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-tags.md)) + +### tags Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +### tags Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### tags Examples + +```yaml +analytics_story: credential_dumping + +``` + +## version + +version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... + +`version` + +* is required + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") + +### version Type + +`integer` + +### version Examples + +```yaml +1 + +``` + +## references + +A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation) + +`references` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](response_tasks-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") + +### references Type + +`string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](response_tasks-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md)) + +### references Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +[] +``` + +### references Examples + +```yaml +- Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Alarm Triage Overview pages 146-148 +- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json b/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index 257e12f5fb..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,159 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "schema for response tasks", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of response task", - "examples": [ - "Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "dashboard": { - "$id": "#/properties/dashboard", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of dashboard used as response task", - "examples": [ - "process_chain_analysis.json" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "Description of response task", - "examples": [ - "Response Task example description" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "how_to_implement": { - "$id": "#/properties/how_to_implement", - "default": "", - "description": "information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.", - "examples": [ - "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "inputs": { - "$id": "#/properties/inputs", - "default": [], - "description": "Inputs used from the response task", - "examples": [ - [ - "lookup_file" - ] - ], - "type": "array" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Namo fo response task", - "examples": [ - "Response Tas Example" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "playbook": { - "$id": "#/properties/playbook", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "A phantom playbook as response task", - "examples": [ - { - "name": "lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json", - "url_json": "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json", - "url_python": "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py" - } - ], - "properties": { - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/playbook/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of Phantom Playbook", - "examples": [ - "lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "url_json": { - "$id": "#/properties/playbook/properties/url_json", - "default": "", - "description": "URL for phantom playbook json file", - "examples": [ - "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "url_python": { - "$id": "#/properties/playbook/properties/url_python", - "default": "", - "description": "URL for phantom playbook python file", - "examples": [ - "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py" - ], - "type": "string" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "url_json", - "url_python" - ], - "type": "object" - }, - "search": { - "$id": "#/properties/search", - "default": "", - "description": "Search as response task", - "examples": [ - "`sysmon` EventCode=1 | search [| inputlookup %lookup_file% ] | stats count by dest user process_name" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 3 - ], - "type": "integer" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "author" - ], - "title": "Response Task Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md deleted file mode 100644 index be14942e11..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,437 +0,0 @@ - -# Response Task Schema Schema - -``` -http://example.com/example.json -``` - -schema for response tasks - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In | -|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------| -| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted | | - -# Response Task Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by | -|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------| -| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [dashboard](#dashboard) | `string` | Optional | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [inputs](#inputs) | `array` | Optional | No | `[]` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [playbook](#playbook) | `object` | Optional | No | `{}` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [search](#search) | `string` | Optional | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required** | No | `0` | Response Task Schema (this schema) | -| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties | - -## author - -Author of response task - -`author` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### author Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### author Example - -```json -"Patrick Bareiß, Splunk" -``` - - -## dashboard - -Name of dashboard used as response task - -`dashboard` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### dashboard Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### dashboard Example - -```json -"process_chain_analysis.json" -``` - - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### date Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### date Example - -```json -"2019-12-06" -``` - - -## description - -Description of response task - -`description` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### description Example - -```json -"Response Task example description" -``` - - -## how_to_implement - -information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations. - -`how_to_implement` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### how_to_implement Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### how_to_implement Example - -```json -"This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe." -``` - - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### id Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### id Example - -```json -"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" -``` - - -## inputs - -Inputs used from the response task - -`inputs` - -* is optional -* type: `array` - -* default: `[]` -* defined in this schema - -### inputs Type - - -Array type: `array` - - - - -### inputs Example - -```json -[ - "lookup_file" -] -``` - - -## name - -Namo fo response task - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### name Example - -```json -"Response Tas Example" -``` - - -## playbook - -A phantom playbook as response task - -`playbook` - -* is optional -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### playbook Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | Default | -|----------|------|----------|---------| -| `name`| string | **Required** | `""` | -| `url_json`| string | **Required** | `""` | -| `url_python`| string | **Required** | `""` | - - - -#### name - -Name of Phantom Playbook - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### name Example - -```json -lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json -``` - - - - -#### url_json - -URL for phantom playbook json file - -`url_json` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### url_json Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### url_json Example - -```json -https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json -``` - - - - -#### url_python - -URL for phantom playbook python file - -`url_python` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` - - -##### url_python Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -##### url_python Example - -```json -https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py -``` - - - - - -### playbook Example - -```json -{ - "name": "lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json", - "url_json": "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json", - "url_python": "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py" -} -``` - - -## search - -Search as response task - -`search` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### search Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### search Example - -```json -"`sysmon` EventCode=1 | search [| inputlookup %lookup_file% ] | stats count by dest user process_name" -``` - - -## version - -version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is **required** -* type: `integer` -* default: `0` -* defined in this schema - -### version Type - - -`integer` - - - - - - -### version Example - -```json -3 -``` - diff --git a/docs/spec/responses-default.md b/docs/spec/responses-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3478b338bd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response.spec.json#/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses.spec.json*](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/responses-properties-is_note_required.md b/docs/spec/responses-properties-is_note_required.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..26aed247e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses-properties-is_note_required.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# Untitled boolean in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/is_note_required#/properties/is_note_required +``` + +Global assignment for notes being required for tasks, can be individually set in the task + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses.spec.json*](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## is_note_required Type + +`boolean` + +## is_note_required Examples + +```yaml +true + +``` + +```yaml +false + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase-default.md b/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e773e97379 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses.spec.json*](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase.md b/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bdd06286c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +# Untitled array in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase +``` + +Response divided into phases. These will used to referenced known response_phase parameters + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses.spec.json*](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## response_phase Type + +`array` + +## response_phase Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +## response_phase Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +## response_phase Examples + +```yaml +preparation: + - id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b + name: Preparation NIST +identification: + - id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892 + name: Detection and Analysis + - id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0 + name: Analysis + +``` + +# response_phase Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------- | :--- | :------- | :---------- | :--------- | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.md b/docs/spec/responses.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c42c8297f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses.md @@ -0,0 +1,340 @@ +# Response Schema Schema + +```txt +https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response.spec.json +``` + +schema for response + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses.spec.json](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Response Schema Type + +`object` ([Response Schema](responses.md)) + +## Response Schema Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +# Response Schema Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :------------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | +| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | +| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | +| [response_phase](#response_phase) | `array` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-response_phase.md "#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase") | +| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | +| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | +| [is_note_required](#is_note_required) | `boolean` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-is_note_required.md "#/properties/is_note_required#/properties/is_note_required") | +| [references](#references) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## author + +Author of the response + +`author` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") + +### author Type + +`string` + +### author Examples + +```yaml +Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk + +``` + +## date + +date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd + +`date` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") + +### date Type + +`string` + +### date Examples + +```yaml +'2019-12-06' + +``` + +## description + +Description of response + +`description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +Response example. + +``` + +## id + +UUID as unique identifier + +`id` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") + +### id Type + +`string` + +### id Examples + +```yaml +fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 + +``` + +## name + +Name of response + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` + +### name Examples + +```yaml +Response Example + +``` + +## response_phase + +Response divided into phases. These will used to referenced known response_phase parameters + +`response_phase` + +* is required + +* Type: `array` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-response_phase.md "#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase") + +### response_phase Type + +`array` + +### response_phase Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +### response_phase Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### response_phase Examples + +```yaml +preparation: + - id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b + name: Preparation NIST +identification: + - id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892 + name: Detection and Analysis + - id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0 + name: Analysis + +``` + +## tags + +An array of key value pairs for tagging + +`tags` + +* is required + +* Type: `object` ([Details](responses-properties-tags.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") + +### tags Type + +`object` ([Details](responses-properties-tags.md)) + +### tags Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +### tags Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### tags Examples + +```yaml +analytics_story: credential_dumping + +``` + +## version + +version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... + +`version` + +* is required + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") + +### version Type + +`integer` + +### version Examples + +```yaml +1 + +``` + +## is_note_required + +Global assignment for notes being required for tasks, can be individually set in the task + +`is_note_required` + +* is optional + +* Type: `boolean` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-is_note_required.md "#/properties/is_note_required#/properties/is_note_required") + +### is_note_required Type + +`boolean` + +### is_note_required Examples + +```yaml +true + +``` + +```yaml +false + +``` + +## references + +A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation) + +`references` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](responses-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") + +### references Type + +`string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](responses-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md)) + +### references Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +[] +``` + +### references Examples + +```yaml +- Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Alarm Triage Overview pages 146-148 +- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.spec.json b/docs/spec/responses.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index f14d63f109..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/responses.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,117 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "schema for response", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of the response", - "examples": [ - "Rico Valdez, Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "Description of response", - "examples": [ - "Response example." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of response", - "examples": [ - "Response Example" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "response_tasks": { - "$id": "#/properties/response_tasks", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "Response tasks divided into phases", - "examples": [ - { - "another_phase": [ - { - "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b", - "name": "Another investigation" - } - ], - "identification": [ - { - "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892", - "name": "Investigate Indicator of Compromise Hash" - }, - { - "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0", - "name": "Investigate Domains" - } - ] - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "array" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", - "examples": [ - { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object", - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 1 - ], - "type": "integer" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "author", - "response_tasks", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Response Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.spec.md b/docs/spec/responses.spec.md deleted file mode 100644 index 55779a8dfa..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/responses.spec.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,270 +0,0 @@ - -# Response Schema Schema - -``` -http://example.com/example.json -``` - -schema for response - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In | -|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------| -| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted | | - -# Response Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by | -|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------| -| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) | -| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) | -| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) | -| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) | -| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) | -| [response_tasks](#response_tasks) | `array` | **Required** | No | `{}` | Response Schema (this schema) | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required** | No | `{}` | Response Schema (this schema) | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required** | No | `0` | Response Schema (this schema) | -| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties | - -## author - -Author of the response - -`author` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### author Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### author Example - -```json -"Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk" -``` - - -## date - -version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`date` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### date Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### date Example - -```json -"2019-12-06" -``` - - -## description - -Description of response - -`description` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### description Example - -```json -"Response example." -``` - - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### id Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### id Example - -```json -"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" -``` - - -## name - -Name of response - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### name Example - -```json -"Response Example" -``` - - -## response_tasks - -Response tasks divided into phases - -`response_tasks` - -* is **required** -* type: `array` -* at least `1` items in the array -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### response_tasks Type - - -Array type: `array` - - - - -### response_tasks Example - -```json -{ - "another_phase": [ - { - "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b", - "name": "Another investigation" - } - ], - "identification": [ - { - "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892", - "name": "Investigate Indicator of Compromise Hash" - }, - { - "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0", - "name": "Investigate Domains" - } - ] -} -``` - - -## tags - -An array of key value pairs for tagging - -`tags` - -* is **required** -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### tags Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | -|----------|------|----------| - - - - -### tags Example - -```json -{ - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" -} -``` - - -## version - -version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is **required** -* type: `integer` -* default: `0` -* defined in this schema - -### version Type - - -`integer` - - - - - - -### version Example - -```json -1 -``` - diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1576f1e4e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +http://example.com/example.json#/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses_phase.spec.json*](../../out/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task-default.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ede2dfaf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses_phase.spec.json*](../../out/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..780e4b3d5b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +# Untitled array in Response Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task +``` + +Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed. These will used to referenced known response_task parameters. Order is as positioned and with unique name. + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses_phase.spec.json*](../../out/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## response_task Type + +`array` + +## response_task Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +## response_task Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +## response_task Examples + +```yaml +id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b +name: Prepare for Incident Handling + +``` + +```yaml +id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892 +name: Preventing Incidents + +``` + +```yaml +id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0 +name: Practice + +``` + +# response_task Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------- | :--- | :------- | :---------- | :--------- | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d666beef8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +# Response Schema Schema + +```txt +http://example.com/example.json +``` + +schema for phase + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses_phase.spec.json](../../out/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Response Schema Type + +`object` ([Response Schema](responses_phase.md)) + +## Response Schema Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +# Response Schema Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | +| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | +| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | +| [response_task](#response_task) | `array` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-response_task.md "#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task") | +| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | +| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | +| [sla](#sla) | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla") | +| [sla_type](#sla_type) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type") | +| [references](#references) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## author + +Author of the phase + +`author` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") + +### author Type + +`string` + +### author Examples + +```yaml +Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk + +``` + +## date + +date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd + +`date` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") + +### date Type + +`string` + +### date Examples + +```yaml +'2019-12-06' + +``` + +## description + +Description of phase + +`description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +Response phase descripion. + +``` + +## id + +UUID as unique identifier + +`id` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") + +### id Type + +`string` + +### id Examples + +```yaml +fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 + +``` + +## name + +Name of phase + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` + +### name Examples + +```yaml +Preparation + +``` + +## response_task + +Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed. These will used to referenced known response_task parameters. Order is as positioned and with unique name. + +`response_task` + +* is required + +* Type: `array` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-response_task.md "#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task") + +### response_task Type + +`array` + +### response_task Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +### response_task Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### response_task Examples + +```yaml +id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b +name: Prepare for Incident Handling + +``` + +```yaml +id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892 +name: Preventing Incidents + +``` + +```yaml +id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0 +name: Practice + +``` + +## tags + +An array of key value pairs for tagging + +`tags` + +* is required + +* Type: `object` ([Details](responses_phase-properties-tags.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") + +### tags Type + +`object` ([Details](responses_phase-properties-tags.md)) + +### tags Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. + +### tags Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### tags Examples + +```yaml +analytics_story: credential_dumping + +``` + +## version + +version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... + +`version` + +* is required + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") + +### version Type + +`integer` + +### version Examples + +```yaml +1 + +``` + +## sla + +Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase + +`sla` + +* is optional + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla") + +### sla Type + +`integer` + +### sla Examples + +```yaml +5 + +``` + +```yaml +30 + +``` + +## sla_type + +Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc) + +`sla_type` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type") + +### sla_type Type + +`string` + +### sla_type Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +"minutes" +``` + +### sla_type Examples + +```yaml +minutes + +``` + +```yaml +hours + +``` + +```yaml +days + +``` + +## references + +A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation) + +`references` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string[]` ([3.1 Preparation](responses_phase-properties-references-31-preparation.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") + +### references Type + +`string[]` ([3.1 Preparation](responses_phase-properties-references-31-preparation.md)) + +### references Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +[] +``` + +### references Examples + +```yaml +https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/stories-default.md b/docs/spec/stories-default.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9abc854a40 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/stories-default.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Untitled undefined type in Analytics Story Schema Schema + +```txt +http://example.com/example.json#/default +``` + + + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [stories.spec.json*](../../out/stories.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## default Type + +unknown diff --git a/docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md b/docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc4532dd7b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# Untitled string in Analytics Story Schema Schema + +```txt +#/properties/narrative#/properties/narrative +``` + +narrative of the analytics story + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [stories.spec.json*](../../out/stories.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## narrative Type + +`string` + +## narrative Examples + +```yaml +>- + gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted, is a + common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, + an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on + their own systems. + +``` diff --git a/docs/spec/stories.md b/docs/spec/stories.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0a452500f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/spec/stories.md @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +# Analytics Story Schema Schema + +```txt +http://example.com/example.json +``` + +schema analytics story + +| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | +| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [stories.spec.json](../../out/stories.spec.json "open original schema") | + +## Analytics Story Schema Type + +`object` ([Analytics Story Schema](stories.md)) + +## Analytics Story Schema Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +# Analytics Story Schema Properties + +| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | +| :-------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | +| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | +| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | +| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | +| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | +| [narrative](#narrative) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-narrative.md "#/properties/narrative#/properties/narrative") | +| [search](#search) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search") | +| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | +| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | +| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | + +## author + +Author of the analytics story + +`author` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") + +### author Type + +`string` + +### author Examples + +```yaml +Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk + +``` + +## date + +date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd + +`date` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") + +### date Type + +`string` + +### date Examples + +```yaml +'2019-12-06' + +``` + +## description + +description of the analytics story + +`description` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") + +### description Type + +`string` + +### description Examples + +```yaml +>- + Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique where + attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. + +``` + +## id + +UUID as unique identifier + +`id` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") + +### id Type + +`string` + +### id Examples + +```yaml +fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 + +``` + +## name + +Name of the Analytics Story + +`name` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") + +### name Type + +`string` + +### name Examples + +```yaml +Credential Dumping + +``` + +## narrative + +narrative of the analytics story + +`narrative` + +* is required + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-narrative.md "#/properties/narrative#/properties/narrative") + +### narrative Type + +`string` + +### narrative Examples + +```yaml +>- + gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted, is a + common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, + an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on + their own systems. + +``` + +## search + +An additional Splunk search, which uses the result of the detections + +`search` + +* is optional + +* Type: `string` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search") + +### search Type + +`string` + +### search Examples + +```yaml +>- + index=asx mitre_id=t1003 | stats values(source) as detections values(process) + as processes values(user) as users values(_time) as time count by dest + +``` + +## tags + +An explanation about the purpose of this instance. + +`tags` + +* is required + +* Type: `object` ([Details](stories-properties-tags.md)) + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") + +### tags Type + +`object` ([Details](stories-properties-tags.md)) + +### tags Constraints + +**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` + +### tags Default Value + +The default value is: + +```json +{} +``` + +### tags Examples + +```yaml +analytics_story: credential_dumping + +``` + +## version + +version of analytics story, e.g. 1 or 2 ... + +`version` + +* is required + +* Type: `integer` + +* cannot be null + +* defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") + +### version Type + +`integer` + +### version Examples + +```yaml +1 + +``` + +## Additional Properties + +Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/stories.spec.json b/docs/spec/stories.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3eda58b394..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/stories.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,106 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "schema analytics story", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of the analytics story", - "examples": [ - "Rico Valdez, Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "description of the analytics story", - "examples": [ - "Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique where attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of the Analytics Story", - "examples": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "narrative": { - "$id": "#/properties/narrative", - "default": "", - "description": "narrative of the analytics story", - "examples": [ - "gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted, is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "search": { - "$id": "#/properties/search", - "default": "", - "description": "An additional Splunk search, which uses the result of the detections", - "examples": [ - "index=asx mitre_id=t1003 | stats values(source) as detections values(process) as processes values(user) as users values(_time) as time count by dest" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.", - "examples": [ - { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object" - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of analytics story, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 1 - ], - "type": "integer" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "narrative", - "author", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Analytics Story Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/docs/spec/stories.spec.md b/docs/spec/stories.spec.md deleted file mode 100644 index 722c1ac936..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/stories.spec.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,283 +0,0 @@ - -# Analytics Story Schema Schema - -``` -http://example.com/example.json -``` - -schema analytics story - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In | -|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------| -| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted | | - -# Analytics Story Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by | -|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------| -| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| [narrative](#narrative) | `string` | **Required** | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| [search](#search) | `string` | Optional | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required** | No | `{}` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required** | No | `0` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) | -| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties | - -## author - -Author of the analytics story - -`author` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### author Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### author Example - -```json -"Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk" -``` - - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### date Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### date Example - -```json -"2019-12-06" -``` - - -## description - -description of the analytics story - -`description` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### description Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### description Example - -```json -"Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique where attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords." -``` - - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### id Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### id Example - -```json -"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" -``` - - -## name - -Name of the Analytics Story - -`name` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### name Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### name Example - -```json -"Credential Dumping" -``` - - -## narrative - -narrative of the analytics story - -`narrative` - -* is **required** -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### narrative Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### narrative Example - -```json -"gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted, is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems." -``` - - -## search - -An additional Splunk search, which uses the result of the detections - -`search` - -* is optional -* type: `string` -* default: `""` -* defined in this schema - -### search Type - - -`string` - - - - - - -### search Example - -```json -"index=asx mitre_id=t1003 | stats values(source) as detections values(process) as processes values(user) as users values(_time) as time count by dest" -``` - - -## tags - -An explanation about the purpose of this instance. - -`tags` - -* is **required** -* type: `object` -* default: `{}` -* defined in this schema - -### tags Type - - -`object` with following properties: - - -| Property | Type | Required | -|----------|------|----------| - - - - -### tags Example - -```json -{ - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" -} -``` - - -## version - -version of analytics story, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is **required** -* type: `integer` -* default: `0` -* defined in this schema - -### version Type - - -`integer` - - - - - - -### version Example - -```json -1 -``` - diff --git a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json index cc57305c5c..6cc1ccbc3f 100644 --- a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json +++ b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ "default": "", "description": "Author of the phase", "examples": [ - "Rico Valdez, Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk" + "Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk" ], "type": "string" }, @@ -57,18 +57,16 @@ "description": "Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed. These will used to referenced known response_task parameters. Order is as positioned and with unique name.", "examples": [ { - { - "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b", - "name": "Prepare for Incident Handling" - }, - { - "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892", - "name": "Preventing Incidents" - }, - { - "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0", - "name": "Practice" - } + "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b", + "name": "Prepare for Incident Handling" + }, + { + "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892", + "name": "Preventing Incidents" + }, + { + "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0", + "name": "Practice" } ], "minItems": 1, @@ -97,7 +95,7 @@ ], "type": "integer" }, - "sla":{ + "sla": { "$id": "#/properties/sla", "default": null, "description": "Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase", @@ -107,7 +105,7 @@ ], "type": "integer" }, - "sla_type":{ + "sla_type": { "$id": "#/properties/sla_type", "default": "minutes", "description": "Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc)", @@ -124,9 +122,7 @@ "default": [], "description": "A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation)", "examples": [ - [ - "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf" - ] + "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf" ], "items": { "$id": "#/properties/references/items", @@ -139,7 +135,7 @@ "type": "string" }, "type": "array" - }, + } }, "required": [ "name", @@ -149,7 +145,7 @@ "description", "author", "response_task", - "tags", + "tags" ], "title": "Response Schema", "type": "object" From 782f762059914655386b1af14a93e91d0c8fa28b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:23:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 05/27] fixed up generate to use type batch --- bin/generate.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py index 3027958dfd..f7df009658 100644 --- a/bin/generate.py +++ b/bin/generate.py @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ def generate_workbench_panels(response_tasks, stories, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PAT j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), trim_blocks=True) template = j2_env.get_template('panel.j2') - file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml + file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, file_path) response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace(">",">") response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace("<","<") @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ def main(args): detections = sorted(detections, key=lambda d: d['name']) # only use ESCU detections to the configurations - detections = [object for object in detections if object["type"].lower() == "escu"] + detections = [object for object in detections if object["type"].lower() == "batch"] response_tasks = sorted(response_tasks, key=lambda i: i['name']) baselines = sorted(baselines, key=lambda b: b['name']) From 8b5aef2b1b0784ca6cf6e926652575d42344d297 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:58:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 06/27] fixing templates to use the ESCU name prefix --- bin/generate.py | 12 ++++++++---- bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py index f7df009658..18bedf8937 100644 --- a/bin/generate.py +++ b/bin/generate.py @@ -431,7 +431,8 @@ def map_detection_to_stories(detections): if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']: for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']: if 'type' in detection.keys(): - rule_name = str(detection['type'] + ' - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') + if detection['type'] == 'batch': + rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') else: rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') if not (story in sto_det): @@ -448,7 +449,8 @@ def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks): if 'analytics_story' in response_task['tags']: for story in response_task['tags']['analytics_story']: if 'type' in response_task.keys(): - task_name = str(response_task['type'] + ' - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task' ) + if response_task['type'] == 'batch': + task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') else: task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') if not (story in sto_res): @@ -465,7 +467,8 @@ def map_baselines_to_stories(baselines): if 'analytics_story' in baseline['tags']: for story in baseline['tags']['analytics_story']: if 'type' in baseline.keys(): - baseline_name = str(baseline['type'] + ' - ' + baseline['name']) + if baseline['type'] == 'batch': + baseline_name = str('ESCU - ' + baseline['name']) else: baseline_name = str('ESCU - ' + baseline['name']) if not (story in sto_bas): @@ -499,7 +502,8 @@ def prepare_stories(stories, detections): if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']: for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']: if 'type' in detection.keys(): - rule_name = str(detection['type'] + ' - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') + if detection['type'] == 'batch': + rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') else: rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 index 39c670f201..2000e97f78 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 +++ b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ ### ESCU DETECTIONS ### {% for detection in detections %} -[{{ detection.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ detection.name }} - Rule] +[ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = {{ detection.description }} @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None action.escu.creation_date = {{ detection.date }} action.escu.modification_date = {{ detection.date }} action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = {{ detection.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ detection.name }} - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection {% if detection.product is defined %} action.escu.product = {{ detection.product | tojson }} @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ cron_schedule = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.cron_schedule }} dispatch.earliest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.earliest_time }} dispatch.latest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.latest_time }} action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = {{ detection.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ detection.name }} - Rule +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {{ detection.savedsearch_annotations | tojson }} {% if detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window is defined %} schedule_window = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window }} From bbdd2bd8605e9ddf7d40e5510e230854b420a0fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 22:28:19 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 07/27] add products to responses, added new type response, also new checks for product tag and mitre_attack_id in validate --- bin/validate.py | 10 +- response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml | 72 +++++---- response_phases/containment.yml | 53 ++++--- response_phases/detection_analysis.yml | 52 ++++--- response_phases/eradication.yml | 47 +++--- response_phases/identification.yml | 72 +++++---- response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml | 24 --- response_phases/preparation.yml | 63 ++++---- response_phases/recovery.yml | 47 +++--- response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml | 11 +- ...azon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml | 18 ++- ...nvestigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml | 21 ++- ...stigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml | 18 ++- ...aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml | 17 ++- .../aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml | 14 +- ...twork_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml | 11 +- .../aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml | 16 +- .../deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml | 15 +- ...stigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml | 11 +- .../get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml | 11 +- .../deprecated/get_notable_info.yml | 11 +- .../get_process_registry_activity.yml | 11 +- .../deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml | 11 +- .../get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml | 11 +- .../get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml | 11 +- .../get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml | 11 +- ...t_user_information_from_identity_table.yml | 11 +- .../get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml | 11 +- ...ate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml | 11 +- ...gate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml | 11 +- ...e_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml | 11 +- ...user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml | 11 +- .../investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml | 11 +- .../investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml | 11 +- .../deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml | 30 +++- .../deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml | 15 +- response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml | 12 +- .../domain_certificate_investigation.yml | 11 +- ...count_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml | 12 +- .../gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml | 18 ++- .../get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml | 11 +- .../get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml | 11 +- .../get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml | 12 +- .../get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml | 11 +- .../get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml | 11 +- .../get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml | 11 +- .../get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml | 11 +- response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml | 16 +- ...get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml | 26 ++-- response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml | 18 ++- response_tasks/get_email_info.yml | 11 +- .../get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml | 13 +- ...e_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml | 11 +- .../get_history_of_email_sources.yml | 13 +- ...ogon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml | 11 +- ...et_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml | 11 +- response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml | 13 +- ...d_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml | 13 +- response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml | 22 +-- response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml | 17 ++- response_tasks/get_process_info.yml | 21 +-- ..._process_information_for_port_activity.yml | 28 ++-- ...rocess_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml | 23 +-- .../get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml | 15 +- ...web_session_information_via_session_id.yml | 15 +- ...stigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml | 16 +- ...gate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml | 11 +- ...ailed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml | 11 +- ...nvestigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml | 11 +- .../investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml | 11 +- ...nvestigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml | 11 +- .../investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml | 14 +- .../investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml | 15 +- .../investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml | 14 +- ...cessful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml | 24 +-- ...gate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml | 17 ++- .../investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml | 11 +- .../investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml | 14 +- .../playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml | 57 ++++--- ...nalyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml | 74 +++++---- ...nalyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml | 72 +++++---- .../analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml | 64 ++++---- ...ze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml | 78 +++++----- ...lyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml | 92 ++++++------ .../analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml | 65 +++++--- .../analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml | 82 +++++----- response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml | 84 ++++++----- response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml | 57 ++++--- response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml | 67 +++++---- .../playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml | 76 +++++----- .../determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml | 58 ++++--- .../determine_incident_prioritization.yml | 95 +++++++----- .../document_and_notify_of_incident.yml | 96 +++++++----- .../identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml | 79 ++++++---- .../playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml | 64 ++++---- .../implement_additional_monitoring.yml | 59 +++++--- .../implement_recovery_monitoring.yml | 76 ++++++---- ...e_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml | 48 +++--- .../playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml | 80 +++++----- ...igate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml | 86 +++++++---- .../playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml | 37 +++-- .../prepare_for_incident_handling.yml | 142 ++++++++++++------ .../playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml | 78 +++++++--- ...ovide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml | 59 +++++--- .../playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml | 41 ++--- .../playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml | 76 ++++++---- .../restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml | 70 +++++---- ...mail_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml | 56 ++++--- .../playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml | 75 +++++---- .../playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml | 60 ++++---- responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml | 64 ++++---- responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml | 62 ++++---- responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml | 37 +++-- 113 files changed, 2280 insertions(+), 1596 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py index 93a69fa717..65d7adf312 100644 --- a/bin/validate.py +++ b/bin/validate.py @@ -132,8 +132,16 @@ def validate_standard_fields(object, uuids): # the first two fields risk_object, and risk_object_type are an enum of fixed values # defined by ESCU risk scoring - if 'tags' in object: + # check product tag is present in all objects + if 'product' not in object['tags']: + errors.append("ERROR: a `product` tag is required for object: %s" % object['name']) + + # check detections have mitre_ids + if 'search' in object and 'known_false_positives' in object: + if 'mitre_attack_id' not in object['tags']: + errors.append("ERROR: a `mitre_attack_id` tag is required detection object: %s" % object['name']) + for k,v in object['tags'].items(): if k == 'risk_score': diff --git a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml index 2f7cb515b0..bd8ae16868 100644 --- a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml +++ b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml @@ -1,31 +1,43 @@ -name: Containment, Eradication, Recovery -id: 15442b70-49a1-4e4b-afea-bc1acd63f4bc -sla_type: minutes -sla: -description: The containment, eradication and recovery phase is for the acquiring, preserving, securing, and documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate containment or mititgation of the incident. Eradication is focused on removing any future threats from vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident. Recovery is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) and customers affected by the incident. -references: - - 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: - - id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c - name: identify_additional_affected_hosts - - id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f - name: contain_incident - - id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c - name: implement_additional_monitoring - - id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 - name: identify_vunlerabilities - - id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 - name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities - - id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 - name: remove_malicious_content - - id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 - name: validate_hosts_eradicated - - id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 - name: restore_systems_to_operational_status - - id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d - name: validate_restored_hosts - - id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae - name: implement_monitoring -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 2 author: ButterCup, Splunk +date: '2020-07-30' +description: The containment, eradication and recovery phase is for the acquiring, + preserving, securing, and documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate + containment or mititgation of the incident. Eradication is focused on removing any + future threats from vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident. + Recovery is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) and customers affected + by the incident. +id: 15442b70-49a1-4e4b-afea-bc1acd63f4bc +name: Containment, Eradication, Recovery +references: +- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +response_task: +- id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c + name: identify_additional_affected_hosts +- id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f + name: contain_incident +- id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c + name: implement_additional_monitoring +- id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 + name: identify_vunlerabilities +- id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 + name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities +- id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 + name: remove_malicious_content +- id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 + name: validate_hosts_eradicated +- id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 + name: restore_systems_to_operational_status +- id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d + name: validate_restored_hosts +- id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae + name: implement_monitoring +sla: null +sla_type: minutes +tags: + analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_phases/containment.yml b/response_phases/containment.yml index 794c7ee5c5..238e1c2b86 100644 --- a/response_phases/containment.yml +++ b/response_phases/containment.yml @@ -1,26 +1,29 @@ -name: Containment -id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c -sla_type: minutes -sla: -description: The containment phase is for the acquiring, preserving, securing, and documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate containment or mititgation of the incident. This phase will identify additional hosts and known vulnerabilities and implememt monitoring of the containment. -tags: - analytics_story: - NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - usecase: - Advanced Threat Detection - nist: - RS.RP -references: - - 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: - - id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c - name: identify_additional_affected_hosts - - id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f - name: contain_incident - - id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c - name: implement_additional_monitoring - - id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 - name: identify_vunlerabilities -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 2 author: ButterCup +date: '2020-07-30' +description: The containment phase is for the acquiring, preserving, securing, and + documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate containment or mititgation + of the incident. This phase will identify additional hosts and known vulnerabilities + and implememt monitoring of the containment. +id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c +name: Containment +references: +- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +response_task: +- id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c + name: identify_additional_affected_hosts +- id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f + name: contain_incident +- id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c + name: implement_additional_monitoring +- id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 + name: identify_vunlerabilities +sla: null +sla_type: minutes +tags: + analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml index 1d4e33e74f..93d1618e0e 100644 --- a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml +++ b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml @@ -1,21 +1,33 @@ -name: Detection and Analysis -id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d -sla_type: minutes -sla: -description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process is a template to ensure the right process is being followed. -references: - - 3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: - - id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 - name: Determine if an incident has occurred - - id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 - name: Analyze precursors to the event - - id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03 - name: Confirm Incident - - id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 - name: Determine incident prioritization - - id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a - name: Document and Notify of Incident -date: '2020-07-17' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +date: '2020-07-17' +description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared + violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase + is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing + incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step + instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process + is a template to ensure the right process is being followed. +id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d +name: Detection and Analysis +references: +- 3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +response_task: +- id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 + name: Determine if an incident has occurred +- id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 + name: Analyze precursors to the event +- id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03 + name: Confirm Incident +- id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 + name: Determine incident prioritization +- id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a + name: Document and Notify of Incident +sla: null +sla_type: minutes +tags: + analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_phases/eradication.yml b/response_phases/eradication.yml index 317a5f4399..eeb45f3bd6 100644 --- a/response_phases/eradication.yml +++ b/response_phases/eradication.yml @@ -1,24 +1,25 @@ -name: Eradication -id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c -sla_type: minutes -sla: -description: The eradication phase is focused on removing any further exposure from vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident. -tags: - analytics_story: - NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - usecase: - Advanced Threat Detection - nist: - RS.RP -references: - - 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: - - id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 - name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities - - id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 - name: remove_malicious_content - - id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 - name: validate_hosts_eradicated -date: '2020-07-17' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +date: '2020-07-17' +description: The eradication phase is focused on removing any further exposure from + vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident. +id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c +name: Eradication +references: +- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +response_task: +- id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 + name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities +- id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 + name: remove_malicious_content +- id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 + name: validate_hosts_eradicated +sla: null +sla_type: minutes +tags: + analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_phases/identification.yml b/response_phases/identification.yml index 391c25df72..3a015156fe 100644 --- a/response_phases/identification.yml +++ b/response_phases/identification.yml @@ -1,31 +1,43 @@ -name: Identification -id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100 -sla_type: minutes -sla: -description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process is a template to ensure the right process is being followed. -references: - - 3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: - - id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 - name: Determine if an incident has occurred - - id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 - name: Analyze precursors to the event - - id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e - name: Analyze host indicator and reputation - - id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5 - name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation - - id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747 - name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation - - id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35 - name: Analyze url indicator and reputation - - id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620 - name: Analyze email indicator and reputation - - id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03 - name: Confirm Incident - - id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 - name: Determine incident prioritization - - id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a - name: Document and Notify of Incident -date: '2020-07-17' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +date: '2020-07-17' +description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared + violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase + is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing + incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step + instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process + is a template to ensure the right process is being followed. +id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100 +name: Identification +references: +- 3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +response_task: +- id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 + name: Determine if an incident has occurred +- id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 + name: Analyze precursors to the event +- id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e + name: Analyze host indicator and reputation +- id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5 + name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation +- id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747 + name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation +- id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35 + name: Analyze url indicator and reputation +- id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620 + name: Analyze email indicator and reputation +- id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03 + name: Confirm Incident +- id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 + name: Determine incident prioritization +- id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a + name: Document and Notify of Incident +sla: null +sla_type: minutes +tags: + analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml b/response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 2deb1664fb..0000000000 --- a/response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -name: Post-Incident Activities -id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80 -sla_type: minutes -sla: -description: One of the most important parts of incident response is learning and improving. Each incident response team should evolve to reflect new threats, improved technology, and lessons learned. Holding a “lessons learned” meeting with all involved parties after a major incident and lessor incidents at a regular interval. Consolidating the incident details and measuring the incident important data points to ensure the most effective proceses are being used. -tags: - - nist - - picerl - analytics_story: - NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - usecase: - Advanced Threat Detection - nist: - RS.RP -references: - - 3.4 Post-Incident Activity - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: - - id: 69d25415-408f-462a-899f-9bc8eef8c299 - name: create_follow-up_report - - id: 43fc5e87-d819-460a-a740-de2066b18a29 - name: provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 2 -author: ButterCup, Splunk diff --git a/response_phases/preparation.yml b/response_phases/preparation.yml index e38fd151ef..028ed74519 100644 --- a/response_phases/preparation.yml +++ b/response_phases/preparation.yml @@ -1,30 +1,35 @@ -name: Preparation NIST -id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a -sla_type: minutes -sla: -description: Incident response methodologies typically emphasize preparation not only for establishing an incident response capability so that the organization is ready to respond to incidents, but also preventing incidents by ensuring that systems, networks, and applications are sufficiently secure. Incident response teams need to know what they have available and what they need to prepare, aquire or configure for success within the incident response process. -tags: - analytics_story: - NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - usecase: - Advanced Threat Detection - nist: - RS.RP -references: - - 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: - - id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08 - name: Prepare for Incident Handling - - id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503 - name: Preventing Incidents - - id: 97d00b14-dd01-47e4-b7eb-0a82f4998c4e - name: Practice Real World Events - - id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968 - name: Conduct Training - - id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4 - name: Raise Personnel Awareness - - id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057 - name: Make Personnel Report Suspicious Activity -date: '2020-07-17' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +date: '2020-07-17' +description: Incident response methodologies typically emphasize preparation not only + for establishing an incident response capability so that the organization is ready + to respond to incidents, but also preventing incidents by ensuring that systems, + networks, and applications are sufficiently secure. Incident response teams need + to know what they have available and what they need to prepare, aquire or configure + for success within the incident response process. +id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a +name: Preparation NIST +references: +- 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +response_task: +- id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08 + name: Prepare for Incident Handling +- id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503 + name: Preventing Incidents +- id: 97d00b14-dd01-47e4-b7eb-0a82f4998c4e + name: Practice Real World Events +- id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968 + name: Conduct Training +- id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4 + name: Raise Personnel Awareness +- id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057 + name: Make Personnel Report Suspicious Activity +sla: null +sla_type: minutes +tags: + analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_phases/recovery.yml b/response_phases/recovery.yml index 2b559cf5f8..a1b57bbfaf 100644 --- a/response_phases/recovery.yml +++ b/response_phases/recovery.yml @@ -1,24 +1,25 @@ -title: Recovery -id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a -sla_type: minutes -sla: -description: The recovery phase is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) and customers affected by the incident. -tags: - analytics_story: - NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - usecase: - Advanced Threat Detection - nist: - RS.RP -references: - - 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: - - id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 - name: restore_systems_to_operational_status - - id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d - name: validate_restored_hosts - - id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae - name: implement_monitoring -date: '2020-04-21' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +date: '2020-04-21' +description: The recovery phase is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) + and customers affected by the incident. +id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a +references: +- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +response_task: +- id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 + name: restore_systems_to_operational_status +- id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d + name: validate_restored_hosts +- id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae + name: implement_monitoring +sla: null +sla_type: minutes +tags: + analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection +title: Recovery +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml b/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml index 412f36e5fa..7cf3185442 100644 --- a/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml @@ -1,15 +1,18 @@ -name: All backup logs for host -id: bc91a8cf-aaaa-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72 -version: 1 +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk date: '2017-09-12' description: Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully. how_to_implement: The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk. -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-aaaa-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72 inputs: - dest +name: All backup logs for host search: '| search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" dest=$dest$' tags: analytics_story: - Monitor Backup Solution + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml index a91b9d249b..98e360c9f2 100644 --- a/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml +++ b/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip -id: a636cca4-7434-4a15-a278-c70734938e39 -version: 1 +author: Rod Soto, Splunk date: '2020-04-13' description: This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster @@ -8,12 +6,18 @@ description: This search provides investigation data about requests via user age how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs. -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +id: a636cca4-7434-4a15-a278-c70734938e39 inputs: - src_ip -search: sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} - as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) - values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip +name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip +search: sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search + src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) + values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision + src_ip tags: analytics_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml index 6f61ee287d..801e0c7948 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml @@ -1,19 +1,26 @@ -name: AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest -id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2020-06-08' -description: This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). +description: This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub + for a specific dest(instance_id). how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822 inputs: - dest -search: 'sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance -| rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation' +name: AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest +search: sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance + | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance + as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text + as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState + Remediation tags: analytics_story: - Cloud Compute Instance - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml index d582513856..84643fa8c1 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml @@ -1,18 +1,22 @@ -name: AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId -id: 703b65a4-a0ae-4171-965d-45507506c64f -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2018-06-08' description: This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials. how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 703b65a4-a0ae-4171-965d-45507506c64f inputs: - accessKeyId -search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ - | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | - table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage' +name: AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId +search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| + search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename + sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, + errorMessage' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml index 2f7fb7ea95..6212b5b0f2 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN -id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-04-30' description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of @@ -9,12 +7,12 @@ description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specifi how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72 inputs: - user -search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time - userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion - eventName eventType' +name: AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN +search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type + userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -30,4 +28,7 @@ tags: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities - AWS Security Hub Alerts - + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml b/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml index ff855f9c31..84e061a2d2 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml @@ -1,18 +1,22 @@ -name: AWS Network ACL Details from ID -id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7ah9534c242 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-01-22' description: This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7ah9534c242 inputs: - networkAclId -search: '| search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*' +name: AWS Network ACL Details from ID +search: '| search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ + | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS Traffic + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml b/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml index d7b216c3ff..0c105cfa85 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: AWS Network Interface details via resourceId -id: f3fb4d1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c3ah9534c241 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-05-07' description: This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will @@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the informat how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: f3fb4d1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c3ah9534c241 inputs: - resourceId +name: AWS Network Interface details via resourceId search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp' @@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ tags: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS Traffic + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml b/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml index 73b392737d..b89fbbed02 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName -id: f3fb2q1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c2ah9534c242 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-06-26' description: This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket @@ -10,11 +8,17 @@ description: This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the informat how_to_implement: To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: f3fb2q1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c2ah9534c242 inputs: - bucketName -search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime - bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList' +name: AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName +search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |search + bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action + aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList' tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml index 4f05a42663..6d2feea69e 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ -name: Analyze Malicious File -id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e -version: 1 -date: '2020-04-29' -description: Perform a static and dynamic malware analysis for the malicious file. Use the findings for further response tasks. author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +date: '2020-04-29' +description: Perform a static and dynamic malware analysis for the malicious file. + Use the findings for further response tasks. +id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e +name: Analyze Malicious File tags: analytics_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -14,4 +14,7 @@ tags: - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - Ransomware - SamSam Ransomware - + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml index 3b2a42a44c..ba63694607 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -name: AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User -id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf891 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-06-08' description: This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific ARNs. how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf891 inputs: - src_user +name: AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail userIdentity.arn=$src_user$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage' @@ -18,3 +17,7 @@ tags: - AWS Cross Account Activity - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml index 1539cbd67e..3e69175bf5 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml @@ -1,14 +1,13 @@ -name: Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd76 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-11-01' description: This search returns all users that have attempted to access a particular endpoint. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd76 inputs: - dest +name: Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint search: '| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest=$dest$ by _time, Authentication.dest, Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`' @@ -55,3 +54,7 @@ tags: - Windows Privilege Escalation - Windows Service Abuse - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml index 91a66fbd5d..8edf84043b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -name: Get Notable Info -id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7af9534c242 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-09-20' description: This search queries the notable index to retrieve detailed information captured within the notable. Every notable has a unique ID associated with it, which is used to point us directly to the notable event under investigation. how_to_implement: If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7af9534c242 inputs: - event_id +name: Get Notable Info search: '| search `notable_by_id($event_id$)` | table time, rule_name, dest, dest_asset_id, dest_owner, priority, severity, owner, status_description' tags: @@ -71,3 +70,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml index c522b90708..9a74f9ddef 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -name: Get Process Registry Activity -id: d8362a34-b78a-4364-9733-59b505f5b8d5 -version: 2 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2019-11-06' description: This search returns the registry activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: d8362a34-b78a-4364-9733-59b505f5b8d5 inputs: - process_id - dest +name: Get Process Registry Activity search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name, values(Registry.dest) as dest, values(Registry.process_id) as process_id from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.process_id=$process_id$ @@ -19,3 +18,7 @@ tags: analytics_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml index 5ee2c4385f..17bb44f90f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get Registry Activities -id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41xf9 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-03-01' description: This search queries the Endpoint Datamodel to give you details of the latest registry values for a specific destination computer. @@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41xf9 inputs: - dest +name: Get Registry Activities search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.dest = "$dest$" by Registry.process_id @@ -31,3 +30,7 @@ tags: - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml index 665c2dd28a..9d64113807 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -name: Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint -id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d65 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-10-19' description: 'For the last 7 days, the search will query the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security and calculate the count, sum of the risk\_scores, names of the correlation searches that contributed to create a risk score for a specific endpoint(machine\_name) ' how_to_implement: Enable the correlation searches included in Splunk Enterprise Security that include Risk Analysis alert actions by leveraging the Risk Analysis Framework -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d65 inputs: - dest +name: Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=system risk_object=$dest$ | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' @@ -63,3 +62,7 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - Windows Service Abuse + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml index 37d53e5e5c..54f0d181e6 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -name: Get Risk Modifiers For User -id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d55 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-10-19' description: 'For the last 7 days, the search will query the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security and calculate the count, sum of the risk_scores, names of the correlation searches that contributed to create a risk score for a specific user ' how_to_implement: Enable the correlation searches included in Splunk Enterprise Security that include Risk Analysis alert actions by leveraging the Risk Analysis Framework -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d55 inputs: - user +name: Get Risk Modifiers For User search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=user risk_object=$user$ | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` ' @@ -57,3 +56,7 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - Windows Service Abuse + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml index 0c26920660..530c258dac 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ -name: Get Update Logs For Endpoint -id: d98675ed-da43-4a7e-96a7-eeca3232ba8e -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2017-08-24' description: This search will tell you give you the update logs for a specific endpoint for the last week. how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting the update logs from your various systems. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: d98675ed-da43-4a7e-96a7-eeca3232ba8e inputs: - dest +name: Get Update Logs For Endpoint search: '| from datamodel Updates.Updates | search (vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" OR vendor_product="OSX:Update" OR vendor_product="Linux:Update") dest=$dest$' tags: @@ -16,3 +15,7 @@ tags: - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - Ransomware - SamSam Ransomware + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml index 60df58e6d6..c86af75e9b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ -name: Get User Information from Identity Table -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd74 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-09-20' description: Gather more information about the user identified in the Notable Event. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must have populated the identity table with information about your users. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd74 inputs: - user +name: Get User Information from Identity Table search: '| `identities` | search identity=$user$ | table _time, identity, first, last, email, category, watchlist' tags: @@ -56,3 +55,7 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - Windows Service Abuse + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml index 9daed1be94..326336493f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ -name: Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint -id: df7a7f50-30f2-4cde-8448-69d2d5f9b3c5 -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2017-09-10' description: This search will show you any vulnerabilities noted for a specific endpoint for the last week. how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting the logs from your vulnerability scanner. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: df7a7f50-30f2-4cde-8448-69d2d5f9b3c5 inputs: - dest +name: Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint search: '| from datamodel Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities | search dest=$dest$' tags: analytics_story: @@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ tags: - Ransomware - SamSam Ransomware - Windows Log Manipulation + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml index 435c5c701a..4f25639ac4 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity -id: 6027623f-7d10-4847-af3b-8d7e87970451 -version: 1 +author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk date: '2020-02-20' description: This search lists all the users performing a list image operation on AWS Elastic Container Registry. Listing source user, image id, source IP, user type, @@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search lists all the users performing a list image operation o how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.You must also install Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk +id: 6027623f-7d10-4847-af3b-8d7e87970451 inputs: - Compute.event_name +name: Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.event_name="ListImages" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.http_user_agent Compute.user_type | rename @@ -21,3 +20,7 @@ search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datam tags: analytics_story: - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml index 417a96ff09..283ff7658f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml @@ -1,15 +1,18 @@ -name: Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities -id: 33a95cf2-900c-4636-8fca-5c5f71474720 -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2018-03-12' description: This search returns a logs of events that operated on the compute instance. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 33a95cf2-900c-4636-8fca-5c5f71474720 inputs: - dest +name: Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search dest=$dest$ | fields - _*' tags: analytics_story: - Cloud Cryptomining + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml index e162510d2a..51f6044fca 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml @@ -1,17 +1,20 @@ -name: Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions -id: 2ef6310f-8e79-42af-b20b-b4eeaba9608a -version: 2 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2019-04-30' description: This search lists all the logged cloud infrastructure activities by a specific cloud user how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 2ef6310f-8e79-42af-b20b-b4eeaba9608a inputs: - region - src_user +name: Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search user=$src_user$ | fields - _*' tags: analytics_story: - Cloud Cryptomining + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml index be63a4df81..b0f17b1b1c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml @@ -1,17 +1,20 @@ -name: Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region -id: 3dc3a8e7-394b-44ae-8262-4ef8e90b723d -version: 2 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2019-04-30' description: This search lists all the logged cloud infrastructure activities by a specific cloud user in a specific cloud region how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 3dc3a8e7-394b-44ae-8262-4ef8e90b723d inputs: - region - src_user +name: Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search region=$region$ user=$src_user$ | fields - _*' tags: analytics_story: - Cloud Cryptomining + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml index e8b14e65f3..9c51b7e746 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -name: Investigate Web Activity From Host -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd22 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-11-09' description: This search allows you to find all the web activity from a specific host. During an investigation, it is important to profile web activity to characterize user or host activity. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your web traffic and populating the Web data model. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd22 inputs: - dest +name: Investigate Web Activity From Host search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$dest$' tags: analytics_story: @@ -33,3 +32,7 @@ tags: - Windows Log Manipulation - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml index f23344f44a..13e42a991c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -name: Investigate Web Activity From src ip -id: 2f5b960b-71df-49c0-affc-74992ce60e45 -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2018-06-15' description: This search searches for all web activity from a specific host. During an investigation, it is important to profile web activity to characterize user or host activity. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web traffic and populating the web data model. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 2f5b960b-71df-49c0-affc-74992ce60e45 inputs: - src_ip +name: Investigate Web Activity From src ip search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$src_ip$' tags: analytics_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - Dynamic DNS - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml index 7baae05075..e23a42a0e8 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml @@ -1,12 +1,26 @@ -name: Process Chain Analysis -id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79 -version: 1 -date: '2020-04-29' -description: Analyze the Process Chain and identify the malicious file. By analyzing the parent process guid and searching for the process guid, the spawning process chain can be identified. author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +date: '2020-04-29' +description: Analyze the Process Chain and identify the malicious file. By analyzing + the parent process guid and searching for the process guid, the spawning process + chain can be identified. +id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79 inputs: - process_guid -search: '`sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_process_guid process_name AS out_process_name parent_process_guid AS out_parent_process_guid parent_process_name AS out_parent_process_name | stats count by out_process_guid out_process_name out_parent_process_guid out_parent_process_name | eval join_process_guid = out_process_guid | join join_process_guid [ search `sysmon` process_guid={process_guid} EventCode=1 | rename process_name AS sub_process_name process_guid AS sub_process_guid parent_process_name AS sub_parent_process_name parent_process_guid AS sub_parent_process_guid | stats count by sub_process_name sub_process_guid sub_parent_process_name sub_parent_process_guid | eval join_process_guid = sub_parent_process_guid] | rename sub_process_guid AS process_guid sub_process_name AS process_name out_process_guid AS parent_process_guid out_process_name AS parent_process_name out_parent_process_guid AS grandparent_process_guid out_parent_process_name AS grandparent_process_name | stats count by process_guid process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name | head 1 | fields - count' +name: Process Chain Analysis +search: '`sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_process_guid + process_name AS out_process_name parent_process_guid AS out_parent_process_guid + parent_process_name AS out_parent_process_name | stats count by out_process_guid + out_process_name out_parent_process_guid out_parent_process_name | eval join_process_guid + = out_process_guid | join join_process_guid [ search `sysmon` process_guid={process_guid} + EventCode=1 | rename process_name AS sub_process_name process_guid AS sub_process_guid + parent_process_name AS sub_parent_process_name parent_process_guid AS sub_parent_process_guid + | stats count by sub_process_name sub_process_guid sub_parent_process_name sub_parent_process_guid + | eval join_process_guid = sub_parent_process_guid] | rename sub_process_guid AS + process_guid sub_process_name AS process_name out_process_guid AS parent_process_guid + out_process_name AS parent_process_name out_parent_process_guid AS grandparent_process_guid + out_parent_process_name AS grandparent_process_name | stats count by process_guid + process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name + | head 1 | fields - count' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -39,3 +53,7 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - Windows Service Abuse + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml index 76fbf36d7f..eb00ca9075 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ -name: Quarantaine Infected Host -id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78 -version: 1 -date: '2020-04-29' -description: Quarantine the infected hosts in order to stop the malware from spreading to further hosts. This is a short-term containment with the focus on limiting the damage as soon as possible. author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +date: '2020-04-29' +description: Quarantine the infected hosts in order to stop the malware from spreading + to further hosts. This is a short-term containment with the focus on limiting the + damage as soon as possible. +id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78 +name: Quarantaine Infected Host tags: analytics_story: - Ransomware + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml index 5e80570f74..11985a057c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml +++ b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: DNS Hijack Enrichment -id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd9a72c712 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-02-14' description: 'This Playbook is part of the Splunk Analytic Story called DNS Hijacking. It is made to be run when the Detection Search within that story called "DNS Record @@ -26,12 +24,16 @@ how_to_implement: 'If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a P (Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ ' -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd9a72c712 +name: DNS Hijack Enrichment playbook: name: dns_hijack_enrichment url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.json url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.py - tags: analytics_story: - DNS Hijacking + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml index 1f93a68844..2a6f974244 100644 --- a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml +++ b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Domain Certificate Investigation -id: c096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8272b712 -version: 1 +author: Philip Royer, Splunk date: '2019-04-29' description: Investigate domain names and URLs of a potentially malicious website. These domain names and URLs could come from anywhere, but this Playbook was designed @@ -16,7 +14,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this phantom playbook, you must inte Enterprise Security with Phantom. Configure this playbook in the correlation search `Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2` ,as an adaptive response action. -author: Philip Royer, Splunk +id: c096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8272b712 +name: Domain Certificate Investigation playbook: name: lets_encrypt_domain_investigate url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json @@ -24,3 +23,7 @@ playbook: tags: analytics_story: - Common Phishing Frameworks + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml index a729fb48cb..90147e1a3b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml +++ b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response -id: ab62b5c1-95d4-4e71-8fd7-53a55db33da4 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-02-14' description: This Playbook is part of the Splunk Analytic Story called Account Monitoring and Controls. It is made to be run when the Detection Search within that story called @@ -13,12 +11,16 @@ description: This Playbook is part of the Splunk Analytic Story called Account M to login to the source of the lockouts, gather more information, and allow Phantom to shutdown the server after prompting an analyst or responder. how_to_implement: Import playbook into phantom -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: ab62b5c1-95d4-4e71-8fd7-53a55db33da4 +name: Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response playbook: name: excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.json url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.py - tags: analytics_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml index 490faf1631..168627faa0 100644 --- a/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml +++ b/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip -id: c00e7626-92cc-4e06-9a51-b6db0a50bd1f -version: 1 +author: Rod Soto, Splunk date: '2020-04-13' description: This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes @@ -9,15 +7,21 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or late then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +id: c00e7626-92cc-4e06-9a51-b6db0a50bd1f inputs: - src_ip -search: sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) - as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names - values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) +name: GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip +search: sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp + as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) + as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type tags: analytics_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml index 5724dcaf9d..722ba15882 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get All AWS Activity From City -id: 0abeeb40-1255-4b68-91d1-7a7eb410c4b8 -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2018-03-19' description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source @@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and wil how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 0abeeb40-1255-4b68-91d1-7a7eb410c4b8 inputs: - City +name: Get All AWS Activity From City search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename @@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc tags: analytics_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml index beb035556c..fb6e01b1c2 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get All AWS Activity From Country -id: e763cdb9-00da-41e0-9bda-444debc9501a -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2018-03-19' description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the @@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: e763cdb9-00da-41e0-9bda-444debc9501a inputs: - Country +name: Get All AWS Activity From Country search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename @@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc tags: analytics_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml index 01863254e1..80d8576c2c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get All AWS Activity From IP Address -id: 446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6 -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2018-03-19' description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP @@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address a how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6 inputs: - src_ip +name: Get All AWS Activity From IP Address search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename @@ -25,4 +24,7 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities - + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml index 8a0a73b1a3..e44f5bf29c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get All AWS Activity From Region -id: 5b794bef-1743-4f6f-804a-43915a2702ff -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2018-03-19' description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the @@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic r how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 5b794bef-1743-4f6f-804a-43915a2702ff inputs: - Region +name: Get All AWS Activity From Region search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename @@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc tags: analytics_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml index 30d16c96e0..f62cf7aece 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml @@ -1,16 +1,19 @@ -name: Get Backup Logs For Endpoint -id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44 -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2017-09-14' description: This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your backup logs. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44 inputs: - dest +name: Get Backup Logs For Endpoint search: '| search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature' tags: analytics_story: - Ransomware - SamSam Ransomware + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml b/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml index a0838f51f4..21b5a50923 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get Certificate logs for a domain -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-2240-e756cc06fd73 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-04-29' description: This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by "Let's Encrypt" @@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ description: This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-2240-e756cc06fd73 inputs: - domain +name: Get Certificate logs for a domain search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$ by All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name @@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as la tags: analytics_story: - Common Phishing Frameworks + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml b/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml index c392604282..e4efcf018b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get DNS Server History for a host -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-11-09' description: While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data @@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ description: While investigating any detections it is important to understand wh host has connected to the previous 24 hours. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72 inputs: - src_ip +name: Get DNS Server History for a host search: '| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count' @@ -26,3 +25,7 @@ tags: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Suspicious DNS Traffic + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml b/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml index 1f2ba1a2f3..741a0e6c64 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get DNS traffic ratio -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-11-09' description: 'This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this @@ -8,14 +6,16 @@ description: 'This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and co high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your network traffic -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73 inputs: - src_ip - dest_ip +name: Get DNS traffic ratio search: '| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_out" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "bytes_in" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic - All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval - ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio' + All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` + | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search + dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -25,3 +25,7 @@ tags: - Hidden Cobra Malware - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Suspicious DNS Traffic + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml b/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml index afb490a09f..33b7ad04b6 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml @@ -1,23 +1,23 @@ -name: Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId -id: f3db4d1b-5f33-4b01-c541-c7ah9514c242 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-02-12' description: This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: f3db4d1b-5f33-4b01-c541-c7ah9514c242 inputs: - instanceId +name: Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId search: '| search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup id - sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," - = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table - id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, - state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, - instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time - as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as - Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC' + sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath + output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address + == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, + placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, + tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address + as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement + as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, + vpc_id as VPC' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -25,3 +25,7 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications - AWS Security Hub Alerts + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml b/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml index 33b30b37d5..6f761f95c8 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml @@ -1,18 +1,16 @@ -name: Get EC2 Launch Details -id: 0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-03-12' description: This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance. how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: 0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6 inputs: - dest -search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$ - |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId - as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, - responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture +name: Get EC2 Launch Details +search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as + arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress + as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName' tags: @@ -21,3 +19,7 @@ tags: - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities - AWS Security Hub Alerts + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml index 48e051569b..2ebc0ac3ec 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml @@ -1,16 +1,19 @@ -name: Get Email Info -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-11-09' description: This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75 inputs: - message_id +name: Get Email Info search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$' tags: analytics_story: - Brand Monitoring - Suspicious Emails + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml b/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml index e7c4b4f3f8..38b25aace1 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -name: Get Emails From Specific Sender -id: 5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2017-11-09' description: This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe inputs: - - src_user +- src_user +name: Get Emails From Specific Sender search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$' tags: analytics_story: - Brand Monitoring - Suspicious Emails - Web Fraud Detection + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml b/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml index 351dc4c90b..2b7ce4bcaf 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd33 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-09-13' description: This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine @@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ description: This search allows you to gather more context around a notable whic your network. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the logs from your DHCP server. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd33 inputs: - src_mac +name: Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST All_Sessions.All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user @@ -18,3 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime tags: analytics_story: - Asset Tracking + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml b/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml index e5e615dc8e..edf40a1338 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get History Of Email Sources -id: ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c -version: 1 +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk date: '2019-02-21' description: This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each @@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ description: This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hour how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +id: ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c inputs: - src +name: Get History Of Email Sources search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` @@ -24,4 +23,8 @@ tags: - Orangeworm Attack Group - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - Ransomware - - SamSam Ransomware \ No newline at end of file + - SamSam Ransomware + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml index 8bf608d76d..b2df57e9ab 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml @@ -1,17 +1,20 @@ -name: Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint -id: 03bffe94-ec7a-4cbe-b677-6af40d1c4505 -version: 2 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2017-09-12' description: This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 03bffe94-ec7a-4cbe-b677-6af40d1c4505 inputs: - dest +name: Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint search: '| search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature' tags: analytics_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml index 9118a6df0f..0ee8673e03 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml @@ -1,17 +1,20 @@ -name: Get Logon Rights Modifications For User -id: 552bc86c-f72c-4d44-b3f2-06ede13af7bb -version: 2 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2019-02-27' description: This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 552bc86c-f72c-4d44-b3f2-06ede13af7bb inputs: - user +name: Get Logon Rights Modifications For User search: '| search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature' tags: analytics_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml b/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml index 1c9e9a5f52..92179a3845 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -name: Get Notable History -id: 3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-09-20' description: This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation. how_to_implement: If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: 3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7 inputs: - dest +name: Get Notable History search: '| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description' tags: @@ -82,4 +81,8 @@ tags: - Ryuk Ransomware - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities - - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 \ No newline at end of file + - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml b/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml index 672480a6d0..175e74f167 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors -id: 5df39b3f-347d-4869-b673-8r45ad4616fe -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-06-14' description: 'This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, @@ -8,14 +6,19 @@ description: 'This search returns the information of the users that sent emails how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: 5df39b3f-347d-4869-b673-8r45ad4616fe inputs: - src_user - recipient +name: Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.com OR src_user=redhat@gmail.com | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' tags: analytics_story: - - Hidden Cobra Malware \ No newline at end of file + - Hidden Cobra Malware + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml index 6dbff7d256..3222204252 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get Parent Process Info -id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-02-28' description: This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. @@ -9,16 +7,16 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9 inputs: - parent_process_name - dest +name: Get Parent Process Info search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) - as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest -| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` -| search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ -| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` -| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' + as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user + Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` + | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' tags: analytics_story: - Collection and Staging @@ -48,4 +46,8 @@ tags: - Windows Log Manipulation - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service Abuse \ No newline at end of file + - Windows Service Abuse + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml index ca681e30c1..b4e2296e69 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml @@ -1,20 +1,25 @@ -name: Get Process File Activity -id: 6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5 -version: 2 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2019-11-06' description: This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5 inputs: - process_name - dest +name: Get Process File Activity search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name - from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem - by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path' + from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, + Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ | + search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, + file_path' tags: analytics_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml index 83b5ca7f57..0da0650ed8 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml @@ -1,23 +1,20 @@ -name: Get Process Info -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-04-01' description: This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71 inputs: - process_name - dest +name: Get Process Info search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) - as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest -| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` -| search process_name= $process_name$ -| search dest = $dest$ -| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` -| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' + as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user + Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` + | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -50,3 +47,7 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - Windows Service Abuse + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml index 7eb5011af8..c664c62cc4 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml @@ -1,27 +1,21 @@ -name: Get Process Information For Port Activity -id: 9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-04-01' description: This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: 9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341 inputs: - dest_port - dest +name: Get Process Information For Port Activity search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as - lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name - Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id -| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` -| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` -| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` -| search dest=$dest$ -| join dest type=inner - [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port - | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` - | search dest_port=$dest_port$ - | rename src as dest]' + lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user + Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner + [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by + Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search + dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -35,3 +29,7 @@ tags: - SamSam Ransomware - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Use of Cleartext Protocols + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml index b2b536a8a7..50924b792d 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic -id: 910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672 -version: 2 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2019-04-01' description: While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and @@ -9,16 +7,17 @@ description: While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: 910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672 inputs: - dest +name: Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as - lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process - Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner - [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where - Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src - | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` - | rename src as dest]' + lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name + Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search + dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` + count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id + Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -29,3 +28,7 @@ tags: - Hidden Cobra Malware - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Suspicious DNS Traffic + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml b/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml index 266e3f2cb9..b188d2db36 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -name: Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host -id: 155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94 -version: 1 +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk date: '2018-10-23' description: This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +id: 155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94 inputs: - process - dest +name: Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host search: sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode>18 - EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, - Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter + EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, + Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter tags: analytics_story: - Ransomware - Suspicious WMI Use + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml b/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml index 5ce6d009df..bc22f3435a 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Get Web Session Information via session id -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-1120-e756cc06fd89 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-10-08' description: This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID @@ -9,11 +7,16 @@ description: This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find ou how_to_implement: This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-1120-e756cc06fd89 inputs: - session_id -search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) - by src_ip status' +name: Get Web Session Information via session id +search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) + values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status' tags: analytics_story: - Web Fraud Detection + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml index 75f6f8379c..5a88e2eae3 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Investigate AWS activities via region name -id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-02-09' description: This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters @@ -8,14 +6,20 @@ description: This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11 inputs: - vendor_region -search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId - as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region' +name: Investigate AWS activities via region name +search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename + requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) + by user instanceId vendor_region' tags: analytics_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml index cc9aebbd48..fa8e82752f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Investigate AWS User Activities by user field -id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2018-03-12' description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the @@ -9,12 +7,17 @@ description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specifi how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76 inputs: - user +name: Investigate AWS User Activities by user field search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType ' tags: analytics_story: - AWS User Monitoring - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml index 835474a349..50ac6f2a4a 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ -name: Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations -id: 097e8030-8662-4254-a735-bf0bdda696e3 -version: 1 +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk date: '2019-12-10' description: This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model. -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +id: 097e8030-8662-4254-a735-bf0bdda696e3 inputs: - user +name: Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication @@ -17,3 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs tags: analytics_story: - Credential Dumping + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml index af381cae68..c9df6aae28 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml @@ -1,16 +1,19 @@ -name: Investigate Network Traffic From src ip -id: 9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050 -version: 1 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk date: '2018-06-15' description: This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model. -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +id: 9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050 inputs: - src_ip +name: Investigate Network Traffic From src ip search: '| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$' tags: analytics_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml index b281e92d21..8b7af6c318 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml @@ -1,15 +1,18 @@ -name: Investigate Okta Activity by app -id: 420eb1b8-2992-45d1-80cf-0b1b2759524d -version: 1 +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk date: '2020-04-02' description: This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Okta logs -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +id: 420eb1b8-2992-45d1-80cf-0b1b2759524d inputs: - app +name: Investigate Okta Activity by app search: eventtype=okta_log app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml index 4216491b2a..71e37f56e6 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml @@ -1,15 +1,18 @@ -name: Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address -id: 56aae066-d619-477c-93e3-3fb83b2d23c3 -version: 1 +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk date: '2020-04-02' description: This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address. how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Okta logs -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +id: 56aae066-d619-477c-93e3-3fb83b2d23c3 inputs: - user +name: Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address search: eventtype=okta_log src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml index bbfbd6efc7..aceca46294 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts -id: ed3fff45-cba6-4990-983f-6fac72bee659 -version: 1 +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk date: '2019-12-10' description: This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows @@ -9,12 +7,18 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting wi source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +id: ed3fff45-cba6-4990-983f-6fac72bee659 inputs: - dest +name: Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user - dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$' + dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` + | search dest=$dest$' tags: analytics_story: - Credential Dumping + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml index 05bb3ded2a..6106065511 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts -id: 990007ad-d798-4b29-ab2f-f0034144c937 -version: 1 +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk date: '2019-12-10' description: This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows @@ -9,13 +7,18 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +id: 990007ad-d798-4b29-ab2f-f0034144c937 inputs: - dest +name: Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user "(?[^\@]+)" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) - AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 - | rename new_user AS user ' + AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where + sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user ' tags: analytics_story: - Credential Dumping + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml index 0f80e0647b..8a6e9da72b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml @@ -1,14 +1,13 @@ -name: Investigate Previous Unseen User -id: 5de385bf-4f1e-404e-9b67-92d162ff8938ad -version: 1 +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk date: '2019-12-10' description: This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days. how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model. -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +id: 5de385bf-4f1e-404e-9b67-92d162ff8938ad inputs: - dest +name: Investigate Previous Unseen User search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from @@ -16,7 +15,12 @@ search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login >= relative_time(now(), "-30d") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` - | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$' + | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` + | search dest=$dest$' tags: analytics_story: - Credential Dumping + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml index 198e516d20..e4e621d899 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml @@ -1,23 +1,27 @@ -name: Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications -id: b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc -version: 1 +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk date: '2018-12-14' description: 'This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. ' how_to_implement: You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs. -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +id: b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc inputs: - dest -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain -| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` -| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` -| `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$ -| table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count -| sort count' +name: Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 + Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app + Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` + | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app + count | sort count' tags: analytics_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware - Lateral Movement - SamSam Ransomware + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml index 72238e20f3..79630768a9 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -name: Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd89 -version: 1 +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk date: '2017-10-20' description: This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and @@ -11,16 +9,21 @@ description: This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd89 inputs: - src_ip - dest_ip -search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval - cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > - 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, +name: Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header +search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ + | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length + > 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, "application"), "True", "False") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url' tags: analytics_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml index 942d9d7e76..b50c17f23f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml @@ -1,15 +1,18 @@ -name: Investigate User Activities In Okta -id: 24ff145d-4d16-420a-b047-480f2a51c403 -version: 1 +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk date: '2020-04-02' description: This search returns all okta events by a specific user how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Okta logs -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +id: 24ff145d-4d16-420a-b047-480f2a51c403 inputs: - user +name: Investigate User Activities In Okta search: eventtype=okta_log user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml index 7dec8c7e08..4d1ae50f35 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml @@ -1,17 +1,21 @@ -name: Investigate Web POSTs From src -id: f5c39fac-205c-4e07-9004-8fd61ea3431a -version: 1 +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk date: '2018-12-06' description: 'This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. ' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model. -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +id: f5c39fac-205c-4e07-9004-8fd61ea3431a inputs: - src +name: Investigate Web POSTs From src search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web - by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$' + by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search + http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$' tags: analytics_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml index 9da6ddaea5..57228b7eff 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml @@ -1,24 +1,35 @@ -name: Accept and assign event -id: 667b8d15-2564-4994-929d-bda2532341bf -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Accepts the event and starts the response plan process by assigning the event to the person executing the playbook and assigns them to this task and closes this step as completed. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - set status - playbooks: - - scm: local - playook: Accept event and assign owner -references: - - 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - This task is a default accept task and allows the analyst to start the response process and start the timer for mean time to detect (MTTD). This allows measurement of analyst review and acceptance of the task at hand. This can be superceded by assign other tasks to individuals (if the owner is coordinating processor). The event owner can accept the event, and then retask other sub-phase and/or task to other individuals or teams. This is considered a procedural or policy task. -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup +automation: + actions: + - set status + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: Accept event and assign owner + scm: local + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Accepts the event and starts the response plan process by assigning + the event to the person executing the playbook and assigns them to this task and + closes this step as completed. + + ' +id: 667b8d15-2564-4994-929d-bda2532341bf +name: Accept and assign event +references: +- 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: 'This task is a default accept task and allows the analyst to start the + response process and start the timer for mean time to detect (MTTD). This allows + measurement of analyst review and acceptance of the task at hand. This can be superceded + by assign other tasks to individuals (if the owner is coordinating processor). The + event owner can accept the event, and then retask other sub-phase and/or task to + other individuals or teams. This is considered a procedural or policy task. + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml index b1f1824785..1782b9fccb 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml @@ -1,34 +1,42 @@ -name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation -id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - - whois domain - - domain reputation - - hunt domain - playbooks: - - scm: - playbook: "" -references: - - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - These are domains that are not related to urls and should be separately reviewed. - 1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?) - a. search -> ```| stats ...``` - 1. Gather reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator) - 1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. - 1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator - a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info) - a. hange container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag -date: '2020-04-21' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - run query + - whois domain + - domain reputation + - hunt domain + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playbook: '' + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-04-21' +description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if + Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? + + ' +id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747 +name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation +references: +- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "These are domains that are not related to urls and should be separately\ + \ reviewed.\n1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence\ + \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ + \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ + \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ + \ reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\ + \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\ + \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\ + \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\ + \ APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ + \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ + \ Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. hange container and artifact severity\ + \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml index 8c713d11e4..91aa34c7c3 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml @@ -1,31 +1,43 @@ -name: Analyze email indicators and reputation -id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Validate email indicators existence, reputation, detonation and determine if Phish, Spam, Suspicious or Clean ? - Analyst should be reviewing SPF, DKIM, DMARC along with To: and Reply to: fields for non-matching data. Does the subject contain suspicious content. Is there a file or url? Does the x-origin-ip come from the same location and the sending domains? Does the email body seem too good to be true or create a sense of urgency? -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - 1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?) - a. search -> ```| stats ...``` - 1. Gather reputation, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator) - 1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. - 1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator - a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info) - a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag -date: '2020-04-21' -version: 1 author: ButterCup +automation: + actions: + - run query + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-04-21' +description: 'Validate email indicators existence, reputation, detonation and determine + if Phish, Spam, Suspicious or Clean ? + + Analyst should be reviewing SPF, DKIM, DMARC along with To: and Reply to: fields + for non-matching data. Does the subject contain suspicious content. Is there a file + or url? Does the x-origin-ip come from the same location and the sending domains? + Does the email body seem too good to be true or create a sense of urgency? + + ' +id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620 +name: Analyze email indicators and reputation +references: +- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\ + \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ + \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ + \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ + \ reputation, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note\ + \ (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators\ + \ and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search\ + \ engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT,\ + \ Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ + \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ + \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. Change container and artifact severity\ + \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml index 303f8ac568..0bf45a844b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml @@ -1,29 +1,37 @@ -name: Analyze host indicator and reputation -id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: "" -references: - - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - 1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?) - a. search -> ```| stats ...``` - 1. Gather repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator) - 1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. - 1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator - a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info) - a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup +automation: + actions: null + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: '' + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if + Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? + + ' +id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e +name: Analyze host indicator and reputation +references: +- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\ + \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ + \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ + \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ + \ repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\ + \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\ + \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\ + \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\ + \ APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ + \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ + \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. Change container and artifact severity\ + \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml index da5c3651db..8a1a5982a9 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml @@ -1,36 +1,44 @@ -name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation -id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - - whois ip - - geolocate ip - - ip reputation - - ip intelligence - - hunt ip - - lookup ip - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: "" -references: - - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - 1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?) - a. search -> ```| stats ...``` - 1. Gather repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator) - 1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. - 1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator - a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info) - a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - run query + - whois ip + - geolocate ip + - ip reputation + - ip intelligence + - hunt ip + - lookup ip + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: '' + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if + Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? + + ' +id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5 +name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation +references: +- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\ + \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ + \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ + \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ + \ repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\ + \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\ + \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\ + \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\ + \ APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ + \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ + \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. Change container and artifact severity\ + \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml index c301506212..b437a91635 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml @@ -1,43 +1,51 @@ -name: Analyze network indicators and reputation -id: 710b1249-88b4-4dfd-95cc-541cc688e1a3 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious? -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - - whois ip - - whois domain - - geolocate ip - - ip reputation - - domain reputation - - url reputation - - ip intelligence - - domain intelligence - - url intelligence - - hunt ip - - hunt domain - - hunt url - - detonate url - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: "" -references: - - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - 1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?) - a. search -> ```| stats ...``` - 1. Gather reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator) - 1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. - 1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator - a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info) - a. hange container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - run query + - whois ip + - whois domain + - geolocate ip + - ip reputation + - domain reputation + - url reputation + - ip intelligence + - domain intelligence + - url intelligence + - hunt ip + - hunt domain + - hunt url + - detonate url + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: '' + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if + Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious? + + ' +id: 710b1249-88b4-4dfd-95cc-541cc688e1a3 +name: Analyze network indicators and reputation +references: +- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence\ + \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ + \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ + \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ + \ reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\ + \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\ + \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\ + \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\ + \ APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ + \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ + \ Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. hange container and artifact severity\ + \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml index e9471f98c2..6831054fb5 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml @@ -1,26 +1,41 @@ -name: Analyze precursors to the event -id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed is normal activity. This analysis is provided by reviewing additional logs and sources to include ids's, siem, network logs, host and host application event logs and vulnerabiltiy information. This is not an exhaustive list, but a summary of the data available. Data available should be aligned the type of event and resources available to the customer. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. Depending the attack vector, use your siem or logging collector to find logs regarding the host, application and network connections surrounding the event detected. - 2. Identify evidence information that proves the incident occurred as detected or corraborates the event(s). - 3. Perform research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. -date: '2020-04-21' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: null + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-04-21' +description: 'Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed + is normal activity. This analysis is provided by reviewing additional logs and sources + to include ids''s, siem, network logs, host and host application event logs and + vulnerabiltiy information. This is not an exhaustive list, but a summary of the + data available. Data available should be aligned the type of event and resources + available to the customer. + + ' +id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 +name: Analyze precursors to the event +references: +- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Depending the attack vector, use your siem or logging collector to find + logs regarding the host, application and network connections surrounding the event + detected. + + 2. Identify evidence information that proves the incident occurred as detected or + corraborates the event(s). + + 3. Perform research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour + is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml index f9ba6f8916..66015b94a6 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml @@ -1,38 +1,46 @@ -name: Analyze url indicator and reputation -id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious? -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - whois domain - - domain reputation - - url reputation - - domain intelligence - - url intelligence - - hunt domain - - hunt url - - detonate url - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: "" -references: - - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - This should be TLD domain and url combinations analysis. - 1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?) - a. search -> ```| stats ...``` - 1. Gather reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator) - 1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. - 1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator - a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info) - a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - whois domain + - domain reputation + - url reputation + - domain intelligence + - url intelligence + - hunt domain + - hunt url + - detonate url + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: '' + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if + Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious? + + ' +id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35 +name: Analyze url indicator and reputation +references: +- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "This should be TLD domain and url combinations analysis.\n1. If Splunk\ + \ present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment.\ + \ Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months\ + \ increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for\ + \ each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather reputational, intelligence\ + \ and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)\n\ + 1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal\ + \ behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n\ + 1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious\ + \ and whether to tag to block indicator\n a. This should align to a severity change\ + \ (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n \ + \ a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with\ + \ blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml index cf320c64be..9f662b994b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml @@ -1,36 +1,50 @@ - -name: Conduct training -id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: Take training courses to gain relevant knowledge - Sharpen the saw. -automation: - is_note_required: false - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - action: - playbook: "" -references: - - "" -workflow: | - We do not rise to the level of our expectations. We fall to the level of our training. - @atc_project - > “The more that you read, the more things you will know. The more that you learn, the more places you’ll go.” ― Dr. Seuss - We assume that you already have a strong technical background in fundamental disciplines — Networking, Operating Systems, and Programming. - Here are some relevant training courses that will help you in the Incident Response activities: - 1. [Investigation Theory](https://chrissanders.org/training/investigationtheory/) by Chris Sanders. We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident Response team - 1. [SANS Digital Forensics & Incident Response](https://digital-forensics.sans.org/training/courses) trainings - * SEC450: Blue Team Fundamentals: Security Operations and Analysis - https://www.sans.org/course/blue-team-fundamentals-security-operations-analysis. We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident Response team - * SEC504: Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling - https://www.sans.org/course/hacker-techniques-exploits-incident-handling We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident Response team - * FOR500: Windows Forensic Analysis - https://www.sans.org/course/windows-forensic-analysis - * FOR508: Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting, and Digital Forensics - https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-incident-response-threat-hunting-training - * SEC503: Intrusion Detection In-Depth - https://www.sans.org/course/intrusion-detection-in-depth - * FOR572: Advanced Network Forensics: Threat Hunting, Analysis, and Incident Response - https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-network-forensics-threat-hunting-incident-response - * SEC560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking - https://www.sans.org/course/network-penetration-testing-ethical-hacking OR Offensive Security trainings mentioned below - * SEC599: Defeating Advanced Adversaries - Purple Team Tactics & Kill Chain Defenses - https://www.sans.org/course/defeating-advanced-adversaries-kill-chain-defenses - 1. [Offensive Security](https://www.offensive-security.com/courses-and-certifications/) trainings. We recommend [PWK](https://www.offensive-security.com/pwk-oscp/) by Offensive Security trainings are in the list because to fight a threat, you need to understand their motivation, tactics, and techniques. - The training above is a recommendation and certainly the size of the organization will depend on the amount of training possible. -date: '2020-07-17' -version: 1 author: ButterCup +automation: + action: null + is_note_required: false + playbook: '' + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-17' +description: Take training courses to gain relevant knowledge - Sharpen the saw. +id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968 +name: Conduct training +references: +- '' +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "We do not rise to the level of our expectations. We fall to the level of\ + \ our training. - @atc_project\n> \u201CThe more that you read, the more things\ + \ you will know. The more that you learn, the more places you\u2019ll go.\u201D\ + \ \u2015 Dr. Seuss\nWe assume that you already have a strong technical background\ + \ in fundamental disciplines \u2014 Networking, Operating Systems, and Programming.\n\ + Here are some relevant training courses that will help you in the Incident Response\ + \ activities:\n1. [Investigation Theory](https://chrissanders.org/training/investigationtheory/)\ + \ by Chris Sanders. We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every\ + \ member of your Incident Response team\n1. [SANS Digital Forensics & Incident Response](https://digital-forensics.sans.org/training/courses)\ + \ trainings\n * SEC450: Blue Team Fundamentals: Security Operations and Analysis\ + \ - https://www.sans.org/course/blue-team-fundamentals-security-operations-analysis.\ + \ We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident\ + \ Response team\n * SEC504: Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling\ + \ - https://www.sans.org/course/hacker-techniques-exploits-incident-handling We\ + \ recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident\ + \ Response team\n * FOR500: Windows Forensic Analysis - https://www.sans.org/course/windows-forensic-analysis\n\ + \ * FOR508: Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting, and Digital Forensics -\ + \ https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-incident-response-threat-hunting-training\n\ + \ * SEC503: Intrusion Detection In-Depth - https://www.sans.org/course/intrusion-detection-in-depth\n\ + \ * FOR572: Advanced Network Forensics: Threat Hunting, Analysis, and Incident\ + \ Response - https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-network-forensics-threat-hunting-incident-response\n\ + \ * SEC560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking - https://www.sans.org/course/network-penetration-testing-ethical-hacking\ + \ OR Offensive Security trainings mentioned below\n * SEC599: Defeating Advanced\ + \ Adversaries - Purple Team Tactics & Kill Chain Defenses - https://www.sans.org/course/defeating-advanced-adversaries-kill-chain-defenses\n\ + 1. [Offensive Security](https://www.offensive-security.com/courses-and-certifications/)\ + \ trainings. We recommend [PWK](https://www.offensive-security.com/pwk-oscp/) by\ + \ Offensive Security trainings are in the list because to fight a threat, you need\ + \ to understand their motivation, tactics, and techniques.\nThe training above is\ + \ a recommendation and certainly the size of the organization will depend on the\ + \ amount of training possible.\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml index 3f578f7229..e6229ae4c6 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml @@ -1,27 +1,38 @@ -name: Confirm incident +author: ButterCup +automation: + actions: + - update event + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event + scm: local + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Upon analysis, determination of incident status is either confirmation, + suspicious, false positive or authorized exception. Update the event metadata and + process event as determined. + + ' id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03 +name: Confirm incident +references: +- 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +- 3.2.5 Incident Documentation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null tags: nist: RS.RP -description: | - Upon analysis, determination of incident status is either confirmation, suspicious, false positive or authorized exception. Update the event metadata and process event as determined. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - update event - playbooks: - - scm: local - playook: Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event -references: - - 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - - 3.2.5 Incident Documentation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. Determine if confirmed, suspicious, a false positive, or authorized exception event - 2. Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event - 3. Proceed on the next task of prioritizing incident or lessons learned or escalate for additional investigation -date: '2020-07-30' + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response version: 1 -author: ButterCup +workflow: '1. Determine if confirmed, suspicious, a false positive, or authorized + exception event + + 2. Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event + + 3. Proceed on the next task of prioritizing incident or lessons learned or escalate + for additional investigation + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml index 9806a94f02..57d2e605c5 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml @@ -1,31 +1,38 @@ -name: Contain Incident -id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Use atomic indicators to block and contain malicious activity. Use host and network protection tools to block, pause, drop, or quarantine affected machines. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - block ip - - block domain - - block url - - block process - - terminate process - - quarantine host - - quarantine device - playbooks: - - scm: community - playook: quarantine device and block external network access -references: - - 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. Determine the appropriate containment technique either with soft block (localized blocking of a specific indictors) or hard block (regionalized blocking, quarantine whole hosts, net blocks, etc) techniques -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - block ip + - block domain + - block url + - block process + - terminate process + - quarantine host + - quarantine device + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: quarantine device and block external network access + scm: community + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Use atomic indicators to block and contain malicious activity. Use host + and network protection tools to block, pause, drop, or quarantine affected machines. + + ' +id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f +name: Contain Incident +references: +- 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Determine the appropriate containment technique either with soft block + (localized blocking of a specific indictors) or hard block (regionalized blocking, + quarantine whole hosts, net blocks, etc) techniques + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml index 60a501708f..0fdd40eda1 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml @@ -1,35 +1,43 @@ -name: Create follow-up report -id: 69d25415-408f-462a-899f-9bc8eef8c299 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Build an after actions report that discusses about what happened and a timeline. Provide what went well and what improvements can be made, information timeliness, steps or actions that might have delayed recovery, what information was shared or could have been shared, any corrective actions that would have prevent the incident, identify precursors and indicators should be watched for in the future or tools that could be used to mitigate future incidents. Conduct an Incident Review Meeting. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - update ticket - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - 1. Create a follow up report - a. Exactly what happened, and at what times? - b. How well did staff and management perform in dealing with the incident? - c. Were the documented procedures followed? Were they adequate? - d. What information was needed sooner? - e. Were any steps or actions taken that might have inhibited the recovery? - f. What would the staff and management do differently the next time a similar incident occurs? - g. How could information sharing with other organizations have been improved? - h. What corrective actions can prevent similar incidents in the future? - i. What precursors or indicators should be watched for in the future to detect similar incidents? - j. What additional tools or resources are needed to detect, analyze, and mitigate future incidents? - 2. Schedule and conduct a Incident Review Meeting with necessary leadership and incident response team -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - update ticket + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Build an after actions report that discusses about what happened and + a timeline. Provide what went well and what improvements can be made, information + timeliness, steps or actions that might have delayed recovery, what information + was shared or could have been shared, any corrective actions that would have prevent + the incident, identify precursors and indicators should be watched for in the future + or tools that could be used to mitigate future incidents. Conduct an Incident Review + Meeting. + + ' +id: 69d25415-408f-462a-899f-9bc8eef8c299 +name: Create follow-up report +references: +- 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "1. Create a follow up report\n a. Exactly what happened, and at what times?\n\ + \ b. How well did staff and management perform in dealing with the incident?\n\ + \ c. Were the documented procedures followed? Were they adequate?\n d. What information\ + \ was needed sooner?\n e. Were any steps or actions taken that might have inhibited\ + \ the recovery?\n f. What would the staff and management do differently the next\ + \ time a similar incident occurs?\n g. How could information sharing with other\ + \ organizations have been improved?\n h. What corrective actions can prevent similar\ + \ incidents in the future?\n i. What precursors or indicators should be watched\ + \ for in the future to detect similar incidents?\n j. What additional tools or\ + \ resources are needed to detect, analyze, and mitigate future incidents?\n2. Schedule\ + \ and conduct a Incident Review Meeting with necessary leadership and incident response\ + \ team\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml index 0abdc1d20c..697367d838 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml @@ -1,25 +1,35 @@ -name: Determine if an incident has occurred -id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed is normal activity. Knowledge of false positives detractors will support this assessment. The object of this step is to remove confirmation bias and validate the detection as a true positive and anomalous behavior. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - set status - playbooks: - - scm: local - playook: Accept event and assign owner -references: - - 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - Incident handlers are responsible for analyzing ambiguous, contradictory, and incomplete symptoms to determine what has happened. - The process here is to remove bias and support investigation based on indicators that validate compromise or violdation for continued investigation -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - set status + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: Accept event and assign owner + scm: local + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed + is normal activity. Knowledge of false positives detractors will support this assessment. + The object of this step is to remove confirmation bias and validate the detection + as a true positive and anomalous behavior. + + ' +id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 +name: Determine if an incident has occurred +references: +- 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: 'Incident handlers are responsible for analyzing ambiguous, contradictory, + and incomplete symptoms to determine what has happened. + + The process here is to remove bias and support investigation based on indicators + that validate compromise or violdation for continued investigation + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml index 58ff118934..03a3f6361e 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml @@ -1,40 +1,57 @@ -name: Determine Incident Prioritization -id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. Incidents targeting IT systems typically impact the business functionality that those systems provide, resulting in some type of negative impact to the users of those systems. - Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organizations information. - Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size of the incident and the type of resources it affects will determine the amount of time and resources that must be spent on recovering from that incident. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - update container - playbooks: - - scm: local - playook: Determine impact and effort -references: - - 3.2.6 Incident Prioritization - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - 1. Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. By determining, - a. None | No effect to the organization’s ability to provide all services to all users - b. Low | Minimal effect; the organization can still provide all critical services to all users but has lost efficiency - c. Medium | Organization has lost the ability to provide a critical service to a subset of system users - d. High | Organization is no longer able to provide some critical services to any users - 2. Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organization’s information. - a. None | No information was exfiltrated, changed, deleted, or otherwise compromised - b. Privacy Breach | Sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) of taxpayers, employees, beneficiaries, etc. was accessed or exfiltrated - c. Proprietary Breach | Unclassified proprietary information, such as protected critical infrastructure information (PCII), was accessed or exfiltrated - d. Integrity Loss | Sensitive or proprietary information was changed or deleted - 3. Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size of the incident and the type of resources it affects will determine the amount of time and resources that must be spent on recovering from that incident. - a. Regular | Time to recovery is predictable with existing resources - b. Supplemented | Time to recovery is predictable with additional resources - c. Extended | Time to recovery is unpredictable; additional resources and outside help are needed - d. Not Recoverable | Recovery from the incident is not possible (e.g., sensitive data exfiltrated and posted publicly); launch investigation -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - update container + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: Determine impact and effort + scm: local + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. Incidents targeting IT + systems typically impact the business functionality that those systems provide, + resulting in some type of negative impact to the users of those systems. + + Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect the confidentiality, + integrity, and availability of the organizations information. + + Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size of the incident and the type + of resources it affects will determine the amount of time and resources that must + be spent on recovering from that incident. + + ' +id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 +name: Determine Incident Prioritization +references: +- 3.2.6 Incident Prioritization - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "1. Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. By determining,\n a.\ + \ None | No effect to the organization\u2019s ability to provide all services\ + \ to all users\n b. Low | Minimal effect; the organization can still provide\ + \ all critical services to all users but has lost efficiency\n c. Medium | Organization\ + \ has lost the ability to provide a critical service to a subset of system users\n\ + \ d. High | Organization is no longer able to provide some critical services\ + \ to any users\n2. Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect\ + \ the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organization\u2019s information.\n\ + \ a. None | No information was exfiltrated, changed, deleted, or\ + \ otherwise compromised\n b. Privacy Breach | Sensitive personally identifiable\ + \ information (PII) of taxpayers, employees, beneficiaries, etc. was accessed or\ + \ exfiltrated\n c. Proprietary Breach | Unclassified proprietary information,\ + \ such as protected critical infrastructure information (PCII), was accessed or\ + \ exfiltrated\n d. Integrity Loss | Sensitive or proprietary information\ + \ was changed or deleted\n3. Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size\ + \ of the incident and the type of resources it affects will determine the amount\ + \ of time and resources that must be spent on recovering from that incident.\n \ + \ a. Regular | Time to recovery is predictable with existing resources\n\ + \ b. Supplemented | Time to recovery is predictable with additional resources\n\ + \ c. Extended | Time to recovery is unpredictable; additional resources\ + \ and outside help are needed\n d. Not Recoverable | Recovery from the incident\ + \ is not possible (e.g., sensitive data exfiltrated and posted publicly); launch\ + \ investigation\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml index 6058e1d971..7383cc660d 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml @@ -1,39 +1,59 @@ -name: Document and notify of incident -id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - At this point, incident responder should acquire, preserve, secure, and document all evidence to the incident. This process will be continual through the IR process. The incident responder should perform notification pursuant to the organizational incident response policy and outlined procedures. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - create ticket - - create incident - - create case - - send email - playbooks: - - scm: local - playook: Create case or merge with known case -references: - - 3.2.5 Document Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - - 3.2.7 Incident Notification - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - The reasond for reordering of the documentation of the incident was to align documentation and incident notification into the same process flow. - 1. The current status of the incident (new, in progress, forwarded for investigation, resolved, etc.) - 2. A summary of the incident - 3. Indicators related to the incident - 4. Other incidents related to this incident - 5. Actions taken by all incident handlers on this incident - 6. Chain of custody, if applicable - 7. Impact assessments related to the incident - 8. Contact information for other involved parties (e.g., system owners, system administrators) - 9. list of evidence gathered during the incident investigation - 10. Comments from incident handlers - 11. Next steps to be taken (e.g., rebuild the host, upgrade an application). -date: '2020-04-21' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - create ticket + - create incident + - create case + - send email + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: Create case or merge with known case + scm: local + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-04-21' +description: 'At this point, incident responder should acquire, preserve, secure, + and document all evidence to the incident. This process will be continual through + the IR process. The incident responder should perform notification pursuant to the + organizational incident response policy and outlined procedures. + + ' +id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a +name: Document and notify of incident +references: +- 3.2.5 Document Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +- 3.2.7 Incident Notification - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: 'The reasond for reordering of the documentation of the incident was to + align documentation and incident notification into the same process flow. + + 1. The current status of the incident (new, in progress, forwarded for investigation, + resolved, etc.) + + 2. A summary of the incident + + 3. Indicators related to the incident + + 4. Other incidents related to this incident + + 5. Actions taken by all incident handlers on this incident + + 6. Chain of custody, if applicable + + 7. Impact assessments related to the incident + + 8. Contact information for other involved parties (e.g., system owners, system administrators) + + 9. list of evidence gathered during the incident investigation + + 10. Comments from incident handlers + + 11. Next steps to be taken (e.g., rebuild the host, upgrade an application). + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml index 6fb5958c73..b39873f017 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml @@ -1,31 +1,50 @@ -name: Identify additional affected hosts -id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Use indictors developed from the detection and analysis to find additional hosts or potentially infected hosts. If found perform additional analysis to determine root cause analysis and any additional indictors. If this is mass infection event, immediate containment must be delayed until full understanding of the infection is achieved. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - - merge event - playbooks: - - scm: community - playook: Merge event with case -references: - - 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - - 3.3.2 Evidence Gathering and Handling - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - - NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, for additional information on preserving evidence -workflow: | - 1. For Host infections, use persistence mechanism, dropped filenames, paths, hashs, accessed or collected files, links, network communications, network ports and protocols, netwrok flow data points, etc - 2. For phishing infections, use email addresses, domains, urls, file hashes, x-origin-ip address, subject, etc - 3. For Command and Control, use host communication, ports and protocols, application, url patterns, dns queries, ping data, etc - 4. Escalate to incident management team, if a massive incident to support incident response. - 5. Ensure all known event information and root cause of the event is known before proceeding with containment -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - run query + - merge event + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: Merge event with case + scm: community + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Use indictors developed from the detection and analysis to find additional + hosts or potentially infected hosts. If found perform additional analysis to determine + root cause analysis and any additional indictors. If this is mass infection event, + immediate containment must be delayed until full understanding of the infection + is achieved. + + ' +id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c +name: Identify additional affected hosts +references: +- 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +- 3.3.2 Evidence Gathering and Handling - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +- NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, + for additional information on preserving evidence +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. For Host infections, use persistence mechanism, dropped filenames, paths, + hashs, accessed or collected files, links, network communications, network ports + and protocols, netwrok flow data points, etc + + 2. For phishing infections, use email addresses, domains, urls, file hashes, x-origin-ip + address, subject, etc + + 3. For Command and Control, use host communication, ports and protocols, application, + url patterns, dns queries, ping data, etc + + 4. Escalate to incident management team, if a massive incident to support incident + response. + + 5. Ensure all known event information and root cause of the event is known before + proceeding with containment + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml index 7818395e30..c895361fb4 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml @@ -1,28 +1,38 @@ -name: Identify vunlerabilities -id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Scan host(s) for vulnerabilities. Reverse engineer malware thru static and dynamic means to determine any zero day vulnerabilities. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - scan host - - scan hosts - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.3.3 Identifying the Attacking Hosts - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - - NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, for additional information on preserving evidence -workflow: | - 1. Scan host(s) with infection and determine any vulnerabilities that can remediate infection. (e.g. finding a SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability) - 2. Identify any common vulnerabilities among the hosts infected - 3. Reverse engineer malware for any zero day vulnerabilities. -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - scan host + - scan hosts + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Scan host(s) for vulnerabilities. Reverse engineer malware thru static + and dynamic means to determine any zero day vulnerabilities. + + ' +id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 +name: Identify vunlerabilities +references: +- 3.3.3 Identifying the Attacking Hosts - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf + - NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, + for additional information on preserving evidence +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Scan host(s) with infection and determine any vulnerabilities that can + remediate infection. (e.g. finding a SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution + Vulnerability) + + 2. Identify any common vulnerabilities among the hosts infected + + 3. Reverse engineer malware for any zero day vulnerabilities. + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml index 3a61431028..38eea56d8d 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml @@ -1,26 +1,35 @@ -name: Implement additional monitoring -id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Implement additional monitoring that reviews not only host/network containment success. Monitor network blocks for additional hosts that might not have been identified. Reassess containment as needed depending on any new information. If this is a mass infection, it's advised that a 24 no change process be implemented. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: "" -references: - - 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. Create additional monitoring for network and host detection for abnormal activity to ensure containment is effective. - 2. Re-investigate new hosts found but not on the containment list -date: '2020-04-21' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - run query + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: '' + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-04-21' +description: 'Implement additional monitoring that reviews not only host/network containment + success. Monitor network blocks for additional hosts that might not have been identified. + Reassess containment as needed depending on any new information. If this is a mass + infection, it''s advised that a 24 no change process be implemented. + + ' +id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c +name: Implement additional monitoring +references: +- 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Create additional monitoring for network and host detection for abnormal + activity to ensure containment is effective. + + 2. Re-investigate new hosts found but not on the containment list + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml index 453f458dec..dbe078be18 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml @@ -1,33 +1,45 @@ -name: Implement recovery monitoring -id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Newly recovered systems should have additional monitoring for any anomalies or newly created incidents. Adding single host to a previously infected list for a specified period will allow the incident responder to quickly assess a re-infection or subsequent new infection. At this stage in recovery, you should be unquarantining devices and removing any host blocks. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - - unblock ip - - unblock domain - - unblock url - - unblock hash - - unblock process - - unquarantine device - - unquarantine host - - remove tag - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - 1. Monitor restored systems for any new anomalies and ensure that operations have been returned to normal - 2. Begin to remove emergency blocks to permanent block and remediation alerts for infected systems returning the network (e.g. laptops that were unreachable during the incident) -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - run query + - unblock ip + - unblock domain + - unblock url + - unblock hash + - unblock process + - unquarantine device + - unquarantine host + - remove tag + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Newly recovered systems should have additional monitoring for any anomalies + or newly created incidents. Adding single host to a previously infected list for + a specified period will allow the incident responder to quickly assess a re-infection + or subsequent new infection. At this stage in recovery, you should be unquarantining + devices and removing any host blocks. + + ' +id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae +name: Implement recovery monitoring +references: +- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Monitor restored systems for any new anomalies and ensure that operations + have been returned to normal + + 2. Begin to remove emergency blocks to permanent block and remediation alerts for + infected systems returning the network (e.g. laptops that were unreachable during + the incident) + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml index f9c8bbac91..5b02738b99 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml @@ -1,22 +1,28 @@ -name: Make personnel report suspicious activity -id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - c -automation: - is_note_required: false - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - action: - playbook: -references: - - Organizational Acceptable Use Policy -workflow: | - Develop a simplified, company wide-known way to contact IR team in case of suspicious activity on the user system. - Make sure that the personnel is aware of it, can and will use it. -date: '2020-04-21' -version: 1 author: ButterCup +automation: + action: null + is_note_required: false + playbook: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-04-21' +description: 'c + + ' +id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057 +name: Make personnel report suspicious activity +references: +- Organizational Acceptable Use Policy +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: 'Develop a simplified, company wide-known way to contact IR team in case + of suspicious activity on the user system. + + Make sure that the personnel is aware of it, can and will use it. + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml index 4a287f788e..954d9eb8c8 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml @@ -1,44 +1,46 @@ -name: Malware Hunt and Contain -id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: Uses any presented filehash artifact sent to phantom and conducts a reputation check, hunts for additional systems, blocks file hash with <=10 positive detections and creates a ticket for follow up. Any hashes found with >10 positive hits, automatically blockes the hashes, disables user accounts, logs off the user, shuts down the system and finally creates a urgent ticket. author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false actions: - - file reputation - - hunt file - - get file - - block hash - - disable user - - logoff user - - shutdown system - - create ticket + - file reputation + - hunt file + - get file + - block hash + - disable user + - logoff user + - shutdown system + - create ticket + is_note_required: false playbooks: - - scm: community - playook: malware_hunt_and_contain -references: - - https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.json - - https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.py - - https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.png -workflow: | - 1. Gets file reputation for every hash presented and filters hashes with >10 OR <=10 and >5 for positive hits - 2. Get the files that match and hunt the file hashes and return the system(s)/user(s) that have these files present - 3. If >10 then block hash, disable users, logoff user, shutdown system and create a ticket - 4. IF <=10 but >5 block hash, and create a ticket - Ticket template: - Virus Detected on # devices - Hashes submitted with detections: (list hashes) - File was found on # of devices (list devices) - This impacts at least # users: (list users) - # of hashes were submitted for blocking: (list hashes) - # of users were forced to logoff: (list users) - # of user accounts were disabled: (list users) - # of systems were shutdown: (list systems) -version: 2 + - playook: malware_hunt_and_contain + scm: community + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes date: '2020-08-05' +description: Uses any presented filehash artifact sent to phantom and conducts a reputation + check, hunts for additional systems, blocks file hash with <=10 positive detections + and creates a ticket for follow up. Any hashes found with >10 positive hits, automatically + blockes the hashes, disables user accounts, logs off the user, shuts down the system + and finally creates a urgent ticket. +id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f +name: Malware Hunt and Contain +references: +- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.json +- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.py +- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.png +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 +workflow: "1. Gets file reputation for every hash presented and filters hashes with\ + \ >10 OR <=10 and >5 for positive hits\n2. Get the files that match and hunt the\ + \ file hashes and return the system(s)/user(s) that have these files present\n3.\ + \ If >10 then block hash, disable users, logoff user, shutdown system and create\ + \ a ticket\n4. IF <=10 but >5 block hash, and create a ticket\nTicket template:\n\ + \ Virus Detected on # devices\n Hashes submitted with detections: (list hashes)\n\ + \ File was found on # of devices (list devices)\n This impacts at least # users:\ + \ (list users)\n # of hashes were submitted for blocking: (list hashes)\n # of\ + \ users were forced to logoff: (list users)\n # of user accounts were disabled:\ + \ (list users)\n # of systems were shutdown: (list systems)\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml index 222be388f5..99987c19a5 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml @@ -1,33 +1,55 @@ -name: Mitigate or remediate any vulnerabilities -id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Apply mitigations or remediate any known affecting vulnerabilities that linked to the incidents. (e.g. SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability). Mitigations are controls that block and lower the risk, but don't remove the vulnerability. Remediation is patching and removing the risk known vulnerability from being exploited. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - patch host - - deploy patch - - run job - - execute program - - run script - - execute action - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. Apply remediations (e.g. patches) to infected and not infected hosts that pertain to the vulnerability found being used by the incident (remove the risk). Identify and fix any systems not accepting or validating the patch (e.g. needing reboots) as soon as possible. - 2. This may require scheduling due to business needs. In a mass incident, emergency change requests can be used to support patching. In single instance events, the risk to outage vs the risk to mitigate may be acceptable. If acceptable, then move remediations to lessons learned processing before closing out the request. Put in place, mitigations for at least detections and if possible protection rules to minimize impact while remediation is being scheduled. - 3. Apply mitigations such as IPS and host based firewall rules to mitigate (reduce the risk) of the vulnerability being exploited for at least detection to notify when occurring and if containment and eradication has failed. - 4. Monitor detections to ensure containment is working and determine when eradication is beginning to be effective. -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - patch host + - deploy patch + - run job + - execute program + - run script + - execute action + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Apply mitigations or remediate any known affecting vulnerabilities that + linked to the incidents. (e.g. SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution + Vulnerability). Mitigations are controls that block and lower the risk, but don''t + remove the vulnerability. Remediation is patching and removing the risk known vulnerability + from being exploited. + + ' +id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 +name: Mitigate or remediate any vulnerabilities +references: +- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Apply remediations (e.g. patches) to infected and not infected hosts + that pertain to the vulnerability found being used by the incident (remove the risk). + Identify and fix any systems not accepting or validating the patch (e.g. needing + reboots) as soon as possible. + + 2. This may require scheduling due to business needs. In a mass incident, emergency + change requests can be used to support patching. In single instance events, the + risk to outage vs the risk to mitigate may be acceptable. If acceptable, then move + remediations to lessons learned processing before closing out the request. Put + in place, mitigations for at least detections and if possible protection rules to + minimize impact while remediation is being scheduled. + + 3. Apply mitigations such as IPS and host based firewall rules to mitigate (reduce + the risk) of the vulnerability being exploited for at least detection to notify + when occurring and if containment and eradication has failed. + + 4. Monitor detections to ensure containment is working and determine when eradication + is beginning to be effective. + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml index 7f382ed2c9..67e8b52f6b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml @@ -1,19 +1,26 @@ -name: Practice Real World Events +author: ButterCup +automation: + action: null + is_note_required: false + playbook: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-17' +description: Practice in the real environment. Sharpen Response skills within your + organization by simulating real world with training exercises within your organization. id: 97d00b14-dd01-47e4-b7eb-0a82f4998c4e +name: Practice Real World Events +references: +- 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf tags: nist: RS.RP -description: Practice in the real environment. Sharpen Response skills within your organization by simulating real world with training exercises within your organization. -automation: - is_note_required: false - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - action: - playbook: -references: - - 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: Make sure that the response actions have been performed during an internal exercise by your Incident Response Team. - You need to make sure that when an Incident happens, the team understands the how and this is not the first time they have seen the tasks. This is best done by being able to execute the actual steps in **your environment**, i.e. blocking an IP address or a domain name. -date: '2020-07-17' + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response version: 1 -author: ButterCup +workflow: Make sure that the response actions have been performed during an internal + exercise by your Incident Response Team. You need to make sure that when an Incident + happens, the team understands the how and this is not the first time they have seen + the tasks. This is best done by being able to execute the actual steps in **your + environment**, i.e. blocking an IP address or a domain name. diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml index 17b6628d51..4120e4926c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml @@ -1,46 +1,98 @@ -name: Prepare for incident handling -id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - The lists in the workflow below provide examples of tools and resources available that may be of value during incident handling. These lists are intended to be a starting point for discussions about which tools and resources an organizations incident handlers need. -automation: - is_note_required: false - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - action: - playbook: "" -references: - - 3.1.1 Preparing to Handle Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - ## Incident Handler Communications and Facilities: - * Contact information for team members and others within and outside the organization (primary and backup contacts), such as law enforcement and other incident response teams; information may include phone numbers, email addresses, public encryption keys (in accordance with the encryption software described below), and instructions for verifying the contacts identity - * On-call information for other teams within the organization, including escalation information - * Incident reporting mechanisms, such as phone numbers, email addresses, online forms, and secure instant messaging systems that users can use to report suspected incidents; at least one mechanism should permit people to report incidents anonymously - * Issue tracking system for tracking incident information, status, etc. - * Smartphones to be carried by team members for off-hour support and onsite communications - * Encryption software to be used for communications among team members, within the organization and with external parties; for Federal agencies, software must use a FIPS-validated encryption algorithm20 - * War room for central communication and coordination; if a permanent war room is not necessary or practical, the team should create a procedure for procuring a temporary war room when needed - * Secure storage facility for securing evidence and other sensitive materials - ## Incident Analysis Hardware and Software - * Digital forensic workstations21 and/or backup devices to create disk images, preserve log files, and save other relevant incident data - * Laptops for activities such as analyzing data, sniffing packets, and writing reports - * Spare workstations, servers, and networking equipment, or the virtualized equivalents, which may be used for many purposes, such as restoring backups and trying out malware - * Blank removable media - * Portable printer to print copies of log files and other evidence from non-networked systems - * Packet sniffers and protocol analyzers to capture and analyze network traffic - * Digital forensic software to analyze disk images - * Removable media with trusted versions of programs to be used to gather evidence from systems - * Evidence gathering accessories, including hard-bound notebooks, digital cameras, audio recorders, chain of custody forms, evidence storage bags and tags, and evidence tape, to preserve evidence for possible legal actions - ## Incident Analysis Resources: - * Port lists, including commonly used ports and Trojan horse ports - * Documentation for OSs, applications, protocols, and intrusion detection and antivirus products Network diagrams and lists of critical assets, such as database servers - * Current baselines of expected network, system, and application activity - * Cryptographic hashes of critical files22 to speed incident analysis, verification, and eradication - ## Incident Mitigation Software: - * Access to images of clean OS and application installations for restoration and recovery purposes -date: '2020-07-17' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + action: null + is_note_required: false + playbook: '' + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-17' +description: 'The lists in the workflow below provide examples of tools and resources + available that may be of value during incident handling. These lists are intended + to be a starting point for discussions about which tools and resources an organizations + incident handlers need. + + ' +id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08 +name: Prepare for incident handling +references: +- 3.1.1 Preparing to Handle Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '## Incident Handler Communications and Facilities: + + * Contact information for team members and others within and outside the organization + (primary and backup contacts), such as law enforcement and other incident response + teams; information may include phone numbers, email addresses, public encryption + keys (in accordance with the encryption software described below), and instructions + for verifying the contacts identity + + * On-call information for other teams within the organization, including escalation + information + + * Incident reporting mechanisms, such as phone numbers, email addresses, online + forms, and secure instant messaging systems that users can use to report suspected + incidents; at least one mechanism should permit people to report incidents anonymously + + * Issue tracking system for tracking incident information, status, etc. + + * Smartphones to be carried by team members for off-hour support and onsite communications + + * Encryption software to be used for communications among team members, within the + organization and with external parties; for Federal agencies, software must use + a FIPS-validated encryption algorithm20 + + * War room for central communication and coordination; if a permanent war room is + not necessary or practical, the team should create a procedure for procuring a temporary + war room when needed + + * Secure storage facility for securing evidence and other sensitive materials + + ## Incident Analysis Hardware and Software + + * Digital forensic workstations21 and/or backup devices to create disk images, preserve + log files, and save other relevant incident data + + * Laptops for activities such as analyzing data, sniffing packets, and writing reports + + * Spare workstations, servers, and networking equipment, or the virtualized equivalents, + which may be used for many purposes, such as restoring backups and trying out malware + + * Blank removable media + + * Portable printer to print copies of log files and other evidence from non-networked + systems + + * Packet sniffers and protocol analyzers to capture and analyze network traffic + + * Digital forensic software to analyze disk images + + * Removable media with trusted versions of programs to be used to gather evidence + from systems + + * Evidence gathering accessories, including hard-bound notebooks, digital cameras, + audio recorders, chain of custody forms, evidence storage bags and tags, and evidence + tape, to preserve evidence for possible legal actions + + ## Incident Analysis Resources: + + * Port lists, including commonly used ports and Trojan horse ports + + * Documentation for OSs, applications, protocols, and intrusion detection and antivirus + products Network diagrams and lists of critical assets, such as database servers + + * Current baselines of expected network, system, and application activity + + * Cryptographic hashes of critical files22 to speed incident analysis, verification, + and eradication + + ## Incident Mitigation Software: + + * Access to images of clean OS and application installations for restoration and + recovery purposes + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml index 6724d6d5d4..6d2f2a32eb 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml @@ -1,26 +1,54 @@ -name: Preventing Incidents -id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: Keeping the number of incidents reasonably low is very important to protect the business processes of the organization. It is outside the scope of this document to provide specific advice on securing networks, systems, and applications. Although incident response teams are generally not responsible for securing resources, they are advocates of sound security practices. An incident response team should identify problems that the organization is otherwise not aware of and play a key role in risk assessment and training by identifying gaps. -automation: - is_note_required: false - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - action: - playbook: "" -references: - - 3.1.2 Prevent Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - The following: - * Risk Assessments. Periodic risk assessments of systems and applications should determine what allowing staff to emphasize monitoring and response activities for those resources. - * Host Security. All hosts should be hardened appropriately using standard configurations. In addition to keeping each host properly patched, hosts should be configured to follow the principle of least privilege—granting users only the privileges necessary for performing their authorized tasks. Hosts should have auditing enabled and should log significant security-related events. The security of hosts risks are posed by combinations of threats and vulnerabilities. - * Applicable threats, including organization-specific threats. Each risk should be prioritized, and the risks can be mitigated, transferred, or accepted until a reasonable overall level of risk is reached. Another benefit of conducting risk assessments regularly is that critical resources are identified, Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) expressed operating system and application configuration and their configurations should be continuously monitored. checklists to assist in securing hosts consistently and effectively. - * Network Security. The network perimeter should be configured to deny all activity that is not expressly permitted. This includes securing all connection points, such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and dedicated connections to other organizations. - * Malware Prevention. Software to detect and stop malware should be deployed throughout the organization. Malware protection should be deployed at the host level (e.g., server and workstation operating systems), the application server level (e.g., email server, web proxies), and the application - * User Awareness and Training. Users should be made aware of policies and procedures regarding appropriate use of networks, systems, and applications. Applicable lessons learned from previous incidents should also be shared with users so they can see how their actions could affect the organization. Improving user awareness regarding incidents should reduce the frequency of incidents. IT staff should be trained so that they can maintain their networks, systems, and applications in accordance with the organization’s security standards. -date: '2020-07-17' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + action: null + is_note_required: false + playbook: '' + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-17' +description: Keeping the number of incidents reasonably low is very important to protect + the business processes of the organization. It is outside the scope of this document + to provide specific advice on securing networks, systems, and applications. Although + incident response teams are generally not responsible for securing resources, they + are advocates of sound security practices. An incident response team should identify + problems that the organization is otherwise not aware of and play a key role in + risk assessment and training by identifying gaps. +id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503 +name: Preventing Incidents +references: +- 3.1.2 Prevent Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "The following:\n* Risk Assessments. Periodic risk assessments of systems\ + \ and applications should determine what allowing staff to emphasize monitoring\ + \ and response activities for those resources.\n* Host Security. All hosts should\ + \ be hardened appropriately using standard configurations. In addition to keeping\ + \ each host properly patched, hosts should be configured to follow the principle\ + \ of least privilege\u2014granting users only the privileges necessary for performing\ + \ their authorized tasks. Hosts should have auditing enabled and should log significant\ + \ security-related events. The security of hosts risks are posed by combinations\ + \ of threats and vulnerabilities.\n* Applicable threats, including organization-specific\ + \ threats. Each risk should be prioritized, and the risks can be mitigated, transferred,\ + \ or accepted until a reasonable overall level of risk is reached. Another benefit\ + \ of conducting risk assessments regularly is that critical resources are identified,\ + \ Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) expressed operating system and application\ + \ configuration and their configurations should be continuously monitored. checklists\ + \ to assist in securing hosts consistently and effectively.\n* Network Security.\ + \ The network perimeter should be configured to deny all activity that is not expressly\ + \ permitted. This includes securing all connection points, such as virtual private\ + \ networks (VPNs) and dedicated connections to other organizations.\n* Malware Prevention.\ + \ Software to detect and stop malware should be deployed throughout the organization.\ + \ Malware protection should be deployed at the host level (e.g., server and workstation\ + \ operating systems), the application server level (e.g., email server, web proxies),\ + \ and the application\n* User Awareness and Training. Users should be made aware\ + \ of policies and procedures regarding appropriate use of networks, systems, and\ + \ applications. Applicable lessons learned from previous incidents should also be\ + \ shared with users so they can see how their actions could affect the organization.\ + \ Improving user awareness regarding incidents should reduce the frequency of incidents.\ + \ IT staff should be trained so that they can maintain their networks, systems,\ + \ and applications in accordance with the organization\u2019s security standards.\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml index c77dca51b4..4b5b0b72b0 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml @@ -1,26 +1,35 @@ -name: Provide lessons learned tasks or changes -id: 43fc5e87-d819-460a-a740-de2066b18a29 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Create any tasks or service requests based on the recommendations of the review of the incident or with the process flow from alert detection to provide feedback from false positives. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - create ticket - playbooks: - - scm: local - playook: Create false-positve reduction service request -references: - - 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. Create service requests or documentation updates from the results of the review of the followup report and incident review meeting - 2. Create service request for updating alert detection from feedback from false positives -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - create ticket + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: Create false-positve reduction service request + scm: local + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Create any tasks or service requests based on the recommendations of + the review of the incident or with the process flow from alert detection to provide + feedback from false positives. + + ' +id: 43fc5e87-d819-460a-a740-de2066b18a29 +name: Provide lessons learned tasks or changes +references: +- 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Create service requests or documentation updates from the results of + the review of the followup report and incident review meeting + + 2. Create service request for updating alert detection from feedback from false + positives + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml index 5d51e24e37..f5723d6ffa 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml @@ -1,19 +1,24 @@ -name: Raise personnel awareness -id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: Raise personnel awareness regarding phishing, ransomware, social engineering, and other attacks that involve user interaction -automation: - is_note_required: false - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - action: - playbook: -references: - - https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017/ -workflow: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction. -date: '2020-07-17' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk, @atc_react +automation: + action: null + is_note_required: false + playbook: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-17' +description: Raise personnel awareness regarding phishing, ransomware, social engineering, + and other attacks that involve user interaction +id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4 +name: Raise personnel awareness +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017/ +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary + to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques + that involve user interaction. diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml index 2ac775f2cd..c5397b59ff 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml @@ -1,32 +1,46 @@ -name: Remove malicious content -id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Remove malicious content. There are multiple ways to accomplish this. Depending on the maturity and size of the incident, this can be as simple as re-imaging a single system to full remediation via a deployable package from your antivirus vendor or removal of offending file via your enterprise detection and response (EDR) tool. Network attacks external to your environment will need to be managed with the support of your ISP. Internal attacks should be segmented for containment and then removing offending systems or malicious content from those offending systems. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - create ticket - - deploy patch - - run script - - add tag - - execute action - - execute program - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. Determine the correct approach based on maturity and size of the incident - 2. Employ eradication and monitor the process to ensure the system does not get re-infected. Reinfection is an indication that your containment measures are inadequate to stop the incident. - 3. Apply any new gold image with up to date patches on re-imaged systems. -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - create ticket + - deploy patch + - run script + - add tag + - execute action + - execute program + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Remove malicious content. There are multiple ways to accomplish this. + Depending on the maturity and size of the incident, this can be as simple as re-imaging + a single system to full remediation via a deployable package from your antivirus + vendor or removal of offending file via your enterprise detection and response (EDR) + tool. Network attacks external to your environment will need to be managed with + the support of your ISP. Internal attacks should be segmented for containment and + then removing offending systems or malicious content from those offending systems. + + ' +id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 +name: Remove malicious content +references: +- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Determine the correct approach based on maturity and size of the incident + + 2. Employ eradication and monitor the process to ensure the system does not get + re-infected. Reinfection is an indication that your containment measures are inadequate + to stop the incident. + + 3. Apply any new gold image with up to date patches on re-imaged systems. + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml index 020147319c..8c01b2ab6e 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml @@ -1,28 +1,44 @@ -name: Restore systems to operational status -id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Depending on the sized of the incident, reimaging systems maybe a viable eradication and recovery process combined. Once restored to gold image (standardized corporate image) with immediate patching and updating of all known vulnerabilities. Create a service request for the Help Desk to re-image the host. Server or network equipment should be baselined and restored by the owning team. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - create ticket - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: Create a service request for re-image -references: - - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. Create a request for re-imaging system for eradication and recovery. Re-imaging will not be possible in a mass incident. - 2. For mass incidents, provide immediate patching and reporting of non-compliant patching or antivirus removal tools. Thorough forensic and reverse malware engineering will provide the necessary details to minimize complete recovery processes. - 3. Do not restore localized customer files (/home/user, or /User/), but only on a case by case basis and thorough review of the files being restored. - 4. If the eradication process isn't reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication is missing a persistence mechanism or containment has failed. -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - create ticket + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: Create a service request for re-image + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Depending on the sized of the incident, reimaging systems maybe a viable + eradication and recovery process combined. Once restored to gold image (standardized + corporate image) with immediate patching and updating of all known vulnerabilities. + Create a service request for the Help Desk to re-image the host. Server or network + equipment should be baselined and restored by the owning team. + + ' +id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 +name: Restore systems to operational status +references: +- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: '1. Create a request for re-imaging system for eradication and recovery. + Re-imaging will not be possible in a mass incident. + + 2. For mass incidents, provide immediate patching and reporting of non-compliant + patching or antivirus removal tools. Thorough forensic and reverse malware engineering + will provide the necessary details to minimize complete recovery processes. + + 3. Do not restore localized customer files (/home/user, or /User/), but + only on a case by case basis and thorough review of the files being restored. + + 4. If the eradication process isn''t reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication + is missing a persistence mechanism or containment has failed. + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml index 4834b07433..f7b6135117 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml @@ -1,24 +1,34 @@ -name: Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete -id: 3096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8372b712 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Investigate an email with a suspicious file attachment detected by Splunk Enterprise Security. Detonate the file attachment in a sandbox, gather network behavior from the sandbox results, and pivot on those network indicators with both external reputation queries and internal Splunk Common Information Model searches. After confirming the results with an analyst prompt, delete the email from the user's inbox, hopefully before they have opened it. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - set status - playbooks: - - scm: community - playook: suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete -references: - - "" -workflow: | - Synchronize the community playbook repository in Phantom, then open the playbook and follow the deployment notes to configure it for your environment. -date: '2019-06-03' -version: 1 author: Philip Royer, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - set status + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete + scm: community + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2019-06-03' +description: 'Investigate an email with a suspicious file attachment detected by Splunk + Enterprise Security. Detonate the file attachment in a sandbox, gather network behavior + from the sandbox results, and pivot on those network indicators with both external + reputation queries and internal Splunk Common Information Model searches. After + confirming the results with an analyst prompt, delete the email from the user''s + inbox, hopefully before they have opened it. + + ' +id: 3096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8372b712 +name: Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete +references: +- '' +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: 'Synchronize the community playbook repository in Phantom, then open the + playbook and follow the deployment notes to configure it for your environment. + + ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml index ce6ae40138..eddd244606 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml @@ -1,33 +1,44 @@ -name: Validate hosts eradicated -id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Confirm and acknowledge eradication steps are working as expected and number of infected host(s) is dropping. Validation here will allow the incident responder to move to recovery phase. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating new image creation date. (win - 'systeminfo | find Original'', linux - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer', macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest)) -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: -workflow: | - 1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating new image creation date. - a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original'' - b. linux - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer' - c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest)) - 2. If this host has been reinfected more than once, conduct a formal forensic review to ensure all malicious content has been removed. - 2. If mass incident follows steps 2-5, determine if the number of infected host is reducing - 3. Determine if the number of (re)infected host is increasing - 4. If the eradication process isn't reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication is missing an persistence mechanism or containment has failed - 5. If the eradication process shows new hosts are being infected, your containment process is failing and/or the incident has mutated. (e.g. polymorphic malware with a active vulnerability or actor changed tactics and is now using ping for command and control and uploaded new malware). If this occurs return to Detection and Analysis Phase and continue forensic analysis. -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - run query + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Confirm and acknowledge eradication steps are working as expected and + number of infected host(s) is dropping. Validation here will allow the incident + responder to move to recovery phase. If single instance, validate the reimage process + was completed by validating new image creation date. (win - ''systeminfo | find + Original'''', linux - ''ls -ld /var/log/installer'', macOS - /var/log/install.log.# + (oldest)) + + ' +id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 +name: Validate hosts eradicated +references: +- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +requirements: null +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating\ + \ new image creation date.\n a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original''\n b. linux\ + \ - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer'\n c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))\n\ + 2. If this host has been reinfected more than once, conduct a formal forensic review\ + \ to ensure all malicious content has been removed.\n2. If mass incident follows\ + \ steps 2-5, determine if the number of infected host is reducing\n3. Determine\ + \ if the number of (re)infected host is increasing\n4. If the eradication process\ + \ isn't reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication is missing an persistence\ + \ mechanism or containment has failed\n5. If the eradication process shows new hosts\ + \ are being infected, your containment process is failing and/or the incident has\ + \ mutated. (e.g. polymorphic malware with a active vulnerability or actor changed\ + \ tactics and is now using ping for command and control and uploaded new malware).\ + \ If this occurs return to Detection and Analysis Phase and continue forensic analysis.\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml index 8d09fd3da0..cf9b89a26a 100644 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml +++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml @@ -1,28 +1,34 @@ -name: Validate restored hosts -id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d -tags: - nist: - RS.RP -description: | - Validate each reimaged system was completed by validating new image creation date. ** win: systeminfo | find Original ** linux: ls -ld /var/log/installer ** macOS: /var/log/install.log.# (oldest date of entry). If more surgical, antivirus package or enterprise detection and response removal process has successfully completed and system is showing no signs of indicators of the incident. -automation: - role: - sla_type: minutes - sla: - is_note_required: false - actions: - - run query - playbooks: - - scm: - playook: -references: - - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -workflow: | - 1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating new image creation date - a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original'' - b. linux - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer' - c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest)) - 2. Review existing monitoring to ensure host is working as expected and within normal parameters -date: '2020-07-30' -version: 1 author: ButterCup, Splunk +automation: + actions: + - run query + is_note_required: false + playbooks: + - playook: null + scm: null + role: null + sla: null + sla_type: minutes +date: '2020-07-30' +description: 'Validate each reimaged system was completed by validating new image + creation date. ** win: systeminfo | find Original ** linux: ls -ld /var/log/installer + ** macOS: /var/log/install.log.# (oldest date of entry). If more surgical, antivirus + package or enterprise detection and response removal process has successfully completed + and system is showing no signs of indicators of the incident. + + ' +id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d +name: Validate restored hosts +references: +- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +tags: + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: "1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating\ + \ new image creation date\n a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original''\n b. linux\ + \ - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer'\n c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))\n\ + 2. Review existing monitoring to ensure host is working as expected and within normal\ + \ parameters\n" diff --git a/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml b/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml index 0700970e6f..ab0bd59274 100644 --- a/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml +++ b/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml @@ -1,29 +1,37 @@ -name: NIST 800-61r2 Response Plan -id: b974f8bb-2999-4480-94ef-8a90029b8759 -description: Response plan built for the NIST framework described in NIST 800-61r2 (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf) -is_note_required: false -tags: - analytics_story: all - nist: RS.RP -references: - - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_phase: - - preparation_nist: - - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a - name: Preparation - - detection_analysis: - - id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d - name: Detection and Analysis - - contain_eradicate_recover: - - id: 838ad8e8-1701-4829-be89-51a997fd9852 - name: Contain Eradicate Recover - - post_incident: - - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80 - name: Post Incident -workflow: Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes for their security operations teams. - With this as the template and then customizing the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for thier response procedures. - Response plans and response procedures are different in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns to the policy. - > Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc). -date: '2020-04-21' -version: 1 author: ButterCup +date: '2020-04-21' +description: Response plan built for the NIST framework described in NIST 800-61r2 + (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf) +id: b974f8bb-2999-4480-94ef-8a90029b8759 +is_note_required: false +name: NIST 800-61r2 Response Plan +references: +- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +response_phase: +- preparation_nist: + - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a + name: Preparation +- detection_analysis: + - id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d + name: Detection and Analysis +- contain_eradicate_recover: + - id: 838ad8e8-1701-4829-be89-51a997fd9852 + name: Contain Eradicate Recover +- post_incident: + - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80 + name: Post Incident +tags: + analytics_story: all + nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 1 +workflow: Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes + for their security operations teams. With this as the template and then customizing + the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for + thier response procedures. Response plans and response procedures are different + in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an + response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns + to the policy. > Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support + ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc). diff --git a/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml b/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml index 5af4051e9d..c1a4e69b75 100644 --- a/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml +++ b/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml @@ -1,35 +1,45 @@ -author: "ButterCup, Splunk" -date: "2020-04-21" +author: ButterCup, Splunk +date: '2020-04-21' description: NIST incident response process that follows PICERL (https://www.sans.org/media/score/504-incident-response-cycle.pdf) id: 8a7ea67a-dd53-468e-aeef-b75aed0a877c is_note_required: false -name: "NIST PICERL Response Plan" +name: NIST PICERL Response Plan references: - - "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf" - - "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/incident-handlers-handbook-33901" +- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf +- https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/incident-handlers-handbook-33901 response_phase: - - preparation: - - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a - name: Preparation - - identification: - - id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100 - name: Identification - - containment: - - id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c - name: Containment - - eradication: - - id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c - name: Eradication - - recovery: - - id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a - name: Recovery - - lessons_learned: - - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80 - name: "Post-Incident Activities" +- preparation: + - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a + name: Preparation +- identification: + - id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100 + name: Identification +- containment: + - id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c + name: Containment +- eradication: + - id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c + name: Eradication +- recovery: + - id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a + name: Recovery +- lessons_learned: + - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80 + name: Post-Incident Activities tags: analytics_story: - - "Credential Dumping" - - Ransomeware + - Credential Dumping + - Ransomeware nist: RS.RP + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response version: 1 -workflow: "Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes for their security operations teams. With this as the template and then customizing the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for thier response procedures. Response plans and response procedures are different in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns to the policy. Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc)." +workflow: Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes + for their security operations teams. With this as the template and then customizing + the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for + thier response procedures. Response plans and response procedures are different + in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an + response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns + to the policy. Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support + ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc). diff --git a/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml b/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml index d16e285c4e..74516d18e5 100644 --- a/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml +++ b/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml @@ -1,20 +1,25 @@ -name: Credential Dumping Attack -id: 570dd98e-6cab-443c-bdd8-3dbb5fe4188d -version: 2 -date: '2020-07-16' -description: This response workflow guide you through the investigation of a credential dumping attack. author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +date: '2020-07-16' +description: This response workflow guide you through the investigation of a credential + dumping attack. +id: 570dd98e-6cab-443c-bdd8-3dbb5fe4188d +name: Credential Dumping Attack response_phase: - - identification: - - id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79 - name: Process Chain Analysis - - id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e - name: Analyze Malicious File - - id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f - name: Malware Hunt and Contain - - containment: - - id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78 - name: Quarantaine Infected Host +- identification: + - id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79 + name: Process Chain Analysis + - id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e + name: Analyze Malicious File + - id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f + name: Malware Hunt and Contain +- containment: + - id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78 + name: Quarantaine Infected Host tags: analytics_story: Credential Dumping -workflow: This workbook provides you a guide on how to investigate credential dumping with some automation to make data collection easier. + product: + - Splunk Phantom +type: response +version: 2 +workflow: This workbook provides you a guide on how to investigate credential dumping + with some automation to make data collection easier. From b68e05685ed029fc1ca9ce017117b996408e5fc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 14:35:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 08/27] modified type for detections --- .../email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml | 2 +- ...ple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml | 2 +- detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml | 2 +- .../application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml | 2 +- .../application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml | 2 +- ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 2 +- ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 2 +- ...ws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 2 +- ...tect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 2 +- ..._network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 2 +- ...cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- ...oud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 2 +- ...ud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 2 +- ...te_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +- .../cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +- .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 +- ...detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml | 2 +- .../detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml | 2 +- .../high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +- ...aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...tect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml | 2 +- .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml | 2 +- .../detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml | 2 +- .../dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml | 2 +- ...c2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml | 2 +- .../extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...ell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- ...reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml | 2 +- .../suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml | 2 +- ...lt_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml | 2 +- .../attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- .../creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml | 2 +- .../credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml | 2 +- .../detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 2 +- .../detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml | 2 +- .../detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml | 2 +- ...rocesses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 2 +- .../detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml | 2 +- .../detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml | 2 +- ...ershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 2 +- .../malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml | 2 +- ...malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml | 2 +- .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml | 2 +- .../reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml | 2 +- .../shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...sa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- ...sa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +- ...a___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 2 +- ...sa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...__illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...agement_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- ...gement_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...vilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...egal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...g_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml | 2 +- ...ss_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ..._active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ..._recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...nd_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...econ_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ivilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...a___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml | 2 +- .../application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml | 2 +- .../application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml | 2 +- .../email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml | 2 +- .../application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml | 2 +- .../application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml | 2 +- ...ceiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml | 2 +- .../network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml | 2 +- .../detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml | 2 +- .../web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml | 2 +- .../detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml | 2 +- detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml | 2 +- detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml | 2 +- detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml | 2 +- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml | 2 +- detections/network/tor_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 2 +- 309 files changed, 309 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml index 0be790e7c2..b3a3215431 100644 --- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml +++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml index e4738abe18..3082bf18c3 100644 --- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml +++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml index 6a4964aee7..ea1d9a8c60 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml @@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml index 846376816a..89dca9a463 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml @@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml index 566ec807cb..873dc069ec 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml @@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml index 3551751ade..70852ff1f9 100644 --- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml +++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index c98c1f17f3..82bb5a1702 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: Cloud -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml index 31e13050b0..d13053cd1f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 40 security_domain: Cloud -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml index dcefe62507..2d85ec953b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml index 1a642c9b7e..a4fed0df8f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml index 9e5dd93b19..8c8c49c570 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 15 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml index ed01f5d9d5..911ad0d2e0 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml index 5445a5e027..6ad348c953 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml index ac747d803b..47c0f1bac3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 9ebcf4c74d..6b3615867a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml index a402699cce..10ac7a7566 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml index b1d0159e39..bfe1ccff7b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml index a5cf68bfaa..6551053f5e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml index 84face6d12..90e5d9bc40 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index fe71342506..ecb45bbe40 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 371d252ff3..e8f6b76514 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index 9b4d1687ec..9d4a2bb13b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index 6844f847ed..32d91a04c6 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index e3b3d077c4..4c230f6289 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -57,5 +57,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index dc681ada6d..5318335ff2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml index e487f1ed3a..4728709a0c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 30 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml index e5b7643f50..7d4e7594cb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml @@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml index ff4de79335..fc96b779c7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml @@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml index f4bb82af75..b4fdb12055 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml @@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index 9aada4bca1..ff8e64bd6f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml index 01816a5b41..a19b1d5bca 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml index f6282510e6..983b8eebed 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml index 786448cbc3..0125cbc90a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index 310f041a70..54edf60484 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml index a09199ef31..959f4438f2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -type: ESCU +type: batch references: [] known_false_positives: None name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml index 7ef4dcb70c..b0350e2dd1 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml index cc0d56a0bb..8dc034146f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml @@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml index 6c1402b84d..38cac25192 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml @@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml index 30146d37b1..db8f3d2d57 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml index 6e56015841..241e0ec268 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml index a1e0006fb7..24a82284d7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml index 78565e14c6..45bc1424eb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml index 1713026e6c..fe1899ed67 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml index 369dc6cc1e..e6f109db8d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml index 8bd3a6fc0c..ace3e83f47 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml index 717be1f122..38fc48a87c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml index 920f095128..0c17f9729b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml index 0c76eb70c8..1f03202df6 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 40 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index a683b8a332..8be22a0226 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml index 7aa2cac30f..8656647a11 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 4f869ee643..5d7d9cd1a0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index 0b5fa730e0..c95f47d4c9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index b79bf256eb..305502d129 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index b41eae382f..2ab91cc70c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index c758004df9..1fca26816a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml index 6ca4149c10..b5733747ea 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 1b5ef45525..b75c29e732 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml index 8e548691b2..9fbc63d58a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml @@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml index 8f1f358024..791342bce6 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml @@ -66,5 +66,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 15 security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml index 39ff87a6e7..642633e7ac 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml @@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml index d2fe54711b..98e53f8cca 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml index f7970b7ca7..972f12f659 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml index a42009f498..343d9398e1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml index 6d1f28ffa0..96df484aea 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml index 72fa3054a5..6a0a8cef6d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml index a0be04286b..25ef6f8212 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml @@ -70,5 +70,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml index 5c0109d25e..d2b2d654c1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml index e34a5d9ac0..8f307c7b49 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml @@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml index 0145ee0fc4..f940a99585 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index 8907b28613..b88d511dfc 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml index e6a6f48f65..e20f51bb0a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml @@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml index 6da03bb551..1fe05fbc5a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 031e273b88..3064059584 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml index 3716eb9fa8..1cf9d75e78 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml index 0400f1408c..5fd7e4b3fd 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index 405e5c552a..1066e0879b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index ea6efe265a..62e781ea65 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml index d07ad69e3d..a19d7050b7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml index 911df36f5c..0e9c8a92f9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml index cc3fff3411..402c03adb1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml @@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml index 86c8e7d368..4775b9e553 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml index 410bdd9f84..b58242148a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml index a86e84d2c9..f3a660b337 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 6 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml index 1bca72ed2e..77788d87f7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml index 7ef82cad94..8f27f532ca 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml index a0e62ef758..24deb4f510 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml @@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml index 28b61e103e..24f2f38c5f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml index 58e60fa368..9094b73286 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml index 7c342ecf6b..3201c0435a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml index 5a27cbfa09..59990fd6d7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml index df53386839..be0f06b215 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml index ffb2308c21..666ee9e234 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml index 6558a14289..3fd5f6302c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml index 5313a9de58..52b16a9d3d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml index 24b2611dea..86622fea54 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml index 3e8b335211..3dec2e4869 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml index 8456af0ab7..34721807d9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml index c2f37c4ed2..c2083e5e5d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml index 712ef9d99a..693fc0b676 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml index 0663888f64..3a5a669a05 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml index 3e171ce6ec..9cef0953b5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml index 4f48aad5de..f4e8c3dfc8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml index 4875d9e0d3..442b804b09 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml index 63901022b3..546f646420 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 6 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml index 6302591b71..a5c43325e6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 6 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml index e6c669923e..57cb55bb92 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 569f46c6d6..576e0884cd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml index 522710576f..18dc633877 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml index 2eca5cc0fa..0ae1b31cc1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml index c2635aaea1..e3054ec328 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml @@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml index b5ad136f95..bbb933793c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml index 51d1796170..84cd19606a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml index 60020f3c53..b95aa3fae8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml index 6858be4760..24aa9ae850 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml index 23817aeff3..8b93d6f519 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml index 91bcc9e672..517d3cc923 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml index 19d52b7160..70342ff50c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml index c403b66a75..50d148998c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml index 0473989d8b..9d55c62282 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml index 398a26605e..f7bf9541e6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml index 4d855d0e38..37c7440569 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml index 9279a5baec..50572cc0c0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml index 5105df5b8b..a63c0934ae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml index c7397568f2..be4bf11e85 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml index 190dd55b3f..0b6a053288 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml index c52e1462b5..f2c56ea04c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml index d3146a70c4..ab60cb1989 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml index 8690119b02..fa2b9b8a1d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml index 794d32c88a..edfb52a551 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml index f005ec4db8..2f6125666a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml index f2e1899160..98902652c2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml index 403a31998f..c6a7ef17f7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml index ae3c35d28f..254b752f84 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml index 296da3b451..66bb9686e5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml index cc192e5550..0d22359061 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml index 84d29cc4a1..55840b3939 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml index 70408c9727..d32084896d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml index c5caf51394..752b73b336 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml index 45c348bc19..57e7a5163e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml index 1d182c7181..2e97e97247 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml index c333e56c94..cf98d5e425 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml index f5436ed36d..bb5c5e9e84 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml index 152f1c15ff..b6b28a3bd2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml index 01eb1bf5fc..a4545cb286 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml index e72c322914..10dfcea5e0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml index 83954f0815..b4184a83ca 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml index a8b3d83d1b..503f3d0a72 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml index 200c626697..b247efc80f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml index f810de1820..036df21cec 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml index 72679a3a3e..0021b434f1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml index 2f6eb07522..3de408e98c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml index 1695100cc1..54360e5222 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml index fcc7105c7c..2e462fcb6a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml index 4642b77040..0db50962ad 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml index 9653639e18..f427b907f7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml @@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml index aa01bc3d8a..24449054c6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml index b3020029c0..e9f2d7399e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml index 7344015802..d08b0fb243 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml index c5971dea5e..4fa192140d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml index 93409aea4d..8867c2f48a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml index d39591da5b..507e36d10f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml index a1ab432e49..61579e5285 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml index 18f3bb801c..759639bdc1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml index 1c19e2bec7..208beac3dd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml index 19a7af0444..7ca598110c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml index 7180a3a3f0..7567428139 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml index c71fcd12e9..0ec9e2f3da 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml index 83de551b77..3755d3848a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml index 73aedc349b..d1b3490b24 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index a7b529d706..20e0b2aa80 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 2c15d21a0e..271795687f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -57,5 +57,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 2b787f072c..90446ad4df 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 8bc4ee3dd8..afc6c869c2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml index 4002328d02..038d0a5e13 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml @@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml index b72b432b63..afe047d601 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml index e18dbbad83..ed57562587 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml @@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml index 4882b9bf59..53f3ce9572 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml index dddf72a75a..3aaf01f9d8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml index efc6041973..8e823e8992 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml index 681d19d718..275d143783 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml index 047d28778c..1651ce1b02 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml @@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml index 603cdf2d05..8fb2ddf37e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml index ee648a4ae8..7fc22afd4b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml index bc9166ae1e..f0e3ee51c7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml index e2c53569e4..afb535ea80 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - ticket_options risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml index e7f5b813e1..ee9e229724 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - logon_type risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml index 73d5a2e4ba..0cdd233f34 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml @@ -68,5 +68,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 4e0df4a799..1a740d9a88 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 3108f60bf5..a78424efab 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index e07dd91688..61c3291e83 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 646fabb0f1..513957ac21 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 21f8403896..c24ed226de 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 679fc2a5c3..66afd7d3e3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 36260dcfd1..6713ef913d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index a0b91871b2..131460abd1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index f485fba61e..b40e37d56b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml index f4d4b6e8f6..96dffb7f12 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -57,5 +57,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 4714b73694..62fb8d6d3c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - dest_device_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml index f0d43db6c4..361368b0d7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml @@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml index baf88556f6..9d5f22295c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml @@ -75,5 +75,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 242fca9c04..72f23723fb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -62,5 +62,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 696abe8b15..159ab8250a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -65,5 +65,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 6167760a40..e92d54f59d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml index fe8e0fe659..e2dc8e94c8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml index bc3bb683c6..db9411b122 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index b41f3d12a9..d3e2839394 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 6ffcd379f5..84a7e74213 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 53319215c3..fe3a8d6be6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml index ee26a9e979..ef3b5a487e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 11160c5528..664a29c080 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 8f7f515161..0d993fd63e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 761c0ae7ef..949449240e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 6f7c296c7e..9eea1a6725 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index b31e8a5d26..516cd6ffd0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index eb40c39247..ce08bf5829 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 773be29708..2fb74878c3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 292f9c2290..23ba8d04d5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index a626cfc0ea..6c142076b1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml index 81248c09b2..72d0b2bb06 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml @@ -247,5 +247,5 @@ tags: - process_path risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml index 916c805465..17fbe782ae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml @@ -65,5 +65,5 @@ tags: - process_name risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml index cd19383736..f03f34bdfd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml index ddcd44c028..a052406fc5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml index 041dfaf6ab..a237251a0e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml index 5d2a1259b3..d73648cfbc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml index 9b51171451..24aa58b8f2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml index d6a76883f8..4b5fededa6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml index d378623fe0..fadc046961 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml index a7ac316d3b..8ac3bd9375 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml index 01e43735b5..cad5927a5d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml index fe583f0acb..33f738ca21 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml index 09364ccb02..5ed7947224 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml index cbf641bb8f..411482d0c3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml index f2700e63e1..2e11cc2ecf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml index ef8be4ae5f..75dced5aff 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml index 2aced7153b..9fd3de8bc1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml index cf6cf89024..c4cb475421 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml index 3cd12aa0b1..d5963ed6ff 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml index e62ea54246..4c5bb06777 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml index 78f278fcd4..3f4c71b6ee 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml index 4bfff3e8a9..5813b6f446 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml index cf3d07c4d0..4ebf7b2378 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml index 9ccca9c836..52249d762c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml index de15770e85..6b7e2fa92c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml index 1283f7a703..01c02c36cb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml @@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags: - UEBA for Security Cloud risk_severity: low security_domain: mail server -type: SSA +type: streaming version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml index da2006139d..20502d5345 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml index e2a7e1fc61..13d8d15280 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml index 30c2a56add..7a881838ae 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml index d567238c47..59c2c5e7d9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml index bd36ed2199..f4c5a1fd74 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml index 485b09994a..45c42a2ee4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml index fa34dd4d08..66e4c5e2a0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml index 9df6bf67f0..4a8c7e6d0f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index b691324ee6..8bf7b260a5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml index ec473ccf2d..2169bc5471 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml index e11a9c6671..bc7d1ee8c1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index 2d50e21f20..d2938ce1b1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml index 747d112a8b..cfae68d390 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml index 59cd0ed0c5..fac60dc1f3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml index 74276648f8..e8289afe14 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml index d398bfdbad..f169d084b0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml index 096706179a..8e87b4bbb9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml index 050331cf90..eaa0deb7e3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml index 2556bc305b..f476e6aaf0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml index 187dab7152..191aeff369 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml index 08c044f4eb..2dc40105d2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml index 80583693df..641864eb0e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml index f65bb3e968..e0956c50ba 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 5 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml index 1aa9748a46..272b9dcc3a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml index af8f59b9f9..ebecad16b1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml index 81560747a6..9ce48984c9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml index 74ad250522..7a4c4a8d99 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml index ba27d6d7a0..755e6e1ceb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml index f337f79a77..824d83b322 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml @@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml index 3c66362868..32c1ecfada 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml index 20a8d610bc..02a46ddc8a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml index 48b49585df..da2a6ac060 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml index b8da99abd4..d45f488cb3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml index 99933ce2ca..a464c99729 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml index 7d6990b200..a6c304658f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml index 61bd92bd97..20679c8362 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml index e1de4ebc6d..376f240dd2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml index 788e7450ed..7e3b5f3620 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml index d0d79d2d22..d0a0782bee 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml index 9cd24d64bb..6eaab1f346 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml index 34e844a759..3614d87ea3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index ecd10391b8..2d7002fbbc 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -70,5 +70,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml index 6365a452d6..afd2cff2bf 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml @@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml index e8863b85db..a2975c2f3e 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml index bd71087b74..d566276dfc 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml @@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml index 07a9225f6f..148a3a62ed 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml @@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml index 0e315b14fd..071793c609 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml index f65d87930f..75fe591e81 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml index 619837fe0c..31bebc0731 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml index 0c04541021..8fcbc0d809 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml index 99b1d56891..759565ea52 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml index b7d8230144..878a7546ee 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml @@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml index 8ff6dd3a8e..6d61903c98 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml index 45778fbe05..e45df9cfa5 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml index 7337653a73..26f9aedd28 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml @@ -65,5 +65,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml index 8b86a07f91..b9c8be8c1f 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml index 9d3b497547..b0335dca10 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml index 96d211213b..8089eaa93f 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml index 1f2bc1e7b4..982c7065e6 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml index 888de5a289..cd352d9610 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml @@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml index 2e87ee1d6f..c230afe231 100644 --- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml index 00a64f84f2..78c7882317 100644 --- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml +++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml index e36d970332..d667c4e10b 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml index 2a6c4d108f..a031ddb7eb 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml index 91eb6167bb..3dfdfdd9c1 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 From acaf6e2501374327d95406d36d38266edd3d49bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 15:41:56 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 09/27] added type batch to story --- stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml | 2 +- stories/asset_tracking.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_cryptomining.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml | 2 +- stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml | 2 +- stories/brand_monitoring.yml | 2 +- stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml | 2 +- stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml | 2 +- stories/collection_and_staging.yml | 2 +- stories/command_and_control.yml | 2 +- stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml | 2 +- stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml | 2 +- stories/credential_dumping.yml | 2 +- stories/data_exfiltration.yml | 2 +- stories/data_protection.yml | 2 +- stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml | 2 +- stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml | 2 +- stories/disabling_security_tools.yml | 2 +- stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml | 2 +- stories/dns_hijacking.yml | 2 +- stories/dynamic_dns.yml | 2 +- stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml | 2 +- stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml | 2 +- stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml | 2 +- stories/host_redirection.yml | 2 +- stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml | 2 +- stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/lateral_movement.yml | 2 +- stories/malicious_powershell.yml | 2 +- stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml | 2 +- stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml | 2 +- stories/monitor_for_updates.yml | 2 +- stories/netsh_abuse.yml | 2 +- stories/office_365_detections.yml | 2 +- stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml | 2 +- stories/phishing_payloads.yml | 2 +- ...oor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml | 2 +- stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml | 2 +- stories/ransomware.yml | 2 +- stories/ransomware_cloud.yml | 2 +- stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml | 2 +- stories/ransomware_samsam.yml | 2 +- stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml | 2 +- stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml | 2 +- stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml | 2 +- stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml | 2 +- stories/sql_injection.yml | 2 +- stories/sunburst_malware.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_emails.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml | 2 +- stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml | 2 +- stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 2 +- stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml | 2 +- stories/unusual_processes.yml | 2 +- stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml | 2 +- stories/web_fraud_detection.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_service_abuse.yml | 2 +- 85 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-) diff --git a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml index 47bc1383c7..763a7c8006 100644 --- a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml @@ -108,5 +108,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/asset_tracking.yml b/stories/asset_tracking.yml index 7cc4be14fe..e8f72ea895 100644 --- a/stories/asset_tracking.yml +++ b/stories/asset_tracking.yml @@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml index f451386399..711b723af7 100644 --- a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml +++ b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml index 3e003d7fb8..189311233f 100644 --- a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml +++ b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml index 9bb0c00104..30a52b42e1 100644 --- a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml index 683c138643..131dff54ce 100644 --- a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml +++ b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml @@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml index 336f5e705f..fe5291f2f9 100644 --- a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml +++ b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml index da49aa0e41..f7f69695f7 100644 --- a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml +++ b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml index 5c0e985202..7bef1d42d2 100644 --- a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml +++ b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml index 299d55e2e6..364f09a8c9 100644 --- a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml +++ b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml index 77ea0cdce1..e16a14bd56 100644 --- a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml +++ b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml index 2eb09048ad..45191a20ea 100644 --- a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml +++ b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml index 3b3cdb374c..c11f267ba6 100644 --- a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml +++ b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/command_and_control.yml b/stories/command_and_control.yml index f7669993e5..249404b4ad 100644 --- a/stories/command_and_control.yml +++ b/stories/command_and_control.yml @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml index 1244132f11..82fc4b1b80 100644 --- a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml +++ b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml index a6f4e8d1aa..b822595ece 100644 --- a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml +++ b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml @@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/stories/credential_dumping.yml index 440710e2a2..79380a1356 100644 --- a/stories/credential_dumping.yml +++ b/stories/credential_dumping.yml @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 diff --git a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml index a6e7e50ef8..f15159afb1 100644 --- a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml +++ b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml @@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/data_protection.yml b/stories/data_protection.yml index e479cc4f14..4ddd3e9a0e 100644 --- a/stories/data_protection.yml +++ b/stories/data_protection.yml @@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml index 8ad70b7360..688ae15b79 100644 --- a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml +++ b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml index 036555683d..da313421ee 100644 --- a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml +++ b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml index 3c10bfcf6f..c7af18a592 100644 --- a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml +++ b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml index 9172bbf597..dd361ddd0a 100644 --- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml +++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml index b42f767ec6..9e96addd59 100644 --- a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml +++ b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml @@ -67,5 +67,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml index 24eacb4e18..1da5a012a5 100644 --- a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml +++ b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml index 77f91f5807..795ef06ed5 100644 --- a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml +++ b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml index 9a44a5e87a..baea0dc099 100644 --- a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml index 67ba626620..f9d384c1dd 100644 --- a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml +++ b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml index b746f6a286..a8bd0a92da 100644 --- a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml +++ b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/host_redirection.yml b/stories/host_redirection.yml index e36f237f53..c1657c1c1f 100644 --- a/stories/host_redirection.yml +++ b/stories/host_redirection.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml index 1d48039efb..08933d5ce9 100644 --- a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml @@ -98,5 +98,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml index da179646ea..d917076d85 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml @@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml index eb435445b1..900c9c0163 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml @@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml index 9d2d8071cc..5c61bd24a2 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml @@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/lateral_movement.yml b/stories/lateral_movement.yml index ace138283a..88da07071e 100644 --- a/stories/lateral_movement.yml +++ b/stories/lateral_movement.yml @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml index 7fd4fa18c4..d9e26cd56f 100644 --- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml +++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml @@ -72,5 +72,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 4 diff --git a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml index ab533eb352..82843d3e83 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml @@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Compliance -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml index 3bd6d65ea1..ba32bc6f20 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Compliance -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml index 94b622ba33..13854f3812 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Compliance -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml index 034fa39c75..c555af3e1e 100644 --- a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/office_365_detections.yml b/stories/office_365_detections.yml index 6deb322a70..bb4c1aa772 100644 --- a/stories/office_365_detections.yml +++ b/stories/office_365_detections.yml @@ -17,5 +17,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml index 7fc6899bdb..8bff54c28d 100644 --- a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml +++ b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml index 5fbf82eb69..dc8135f94f 100644 --- a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml +++ b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml @@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml index b17dfbd3c2..b4cb728e9f 100644 --- a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml +++ b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml @@ -86,5 +86,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml index 9672ffec6d..b830e2cf09 100644 --- a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml +++ b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml @@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/ransomware.yml b/stories/ransomware.yml index 8f21d68773..fbcd8b1130 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml index b57a9a660e..b6c9d12af6 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml @@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml index d76e0cdba0..fb737b148f 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml index e80ec4bbc8..7a033729ae 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml @@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml index 3feb9cd99a..780b9c5b90 100644 --- a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml +++ b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml index f465066a3e..1fc5374087 100644 --- a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml +++ b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml @@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml index afc3d3c769..510758b832 100644 --- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml index 5396c9337e..007ede37e0 100644 --- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml +++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/sql_injection.yml b/stories/sql_injection.yml index 2b11009165..02a5263fcf 100644 --- a/stories/sql_injection.yml +++ b/stories/sql_injection.yml @@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml index 3132c2c1ad..d878c63544 100644 --- a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml +++ b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml @@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml index f41d8fd1d2..70e2ea22ee 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml index 669eaf96d4..e1bb91c04f 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml @@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml index 482bdeec65..b51c5e5b97 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml index db23133eff..bb584c23f0 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml index b1c2c73da3..726f589b69 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml index 372f7195ee..b39a8bf359 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml @@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml index 8b3f34ab31..67883c28f7 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml index ea09741066..24562f7a12 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml index 5e8795af33..5af3223ee0 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml index 9571ffb8bf..46010319d6 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml index 6dbb822469..bd3b6109aa 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml @@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml index 7db5cea4ca..145ff8ce4b 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml @@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml index 51a823a8df..343cd16dfe 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml @@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml index 086b991cec..d3dd543db3 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml index 21d3a5c0a8..e5bf69ddb5 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml index 3057a0a1e9..23f9eab99f 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml index 8a6e3747f2..ed69c68cb4 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml @@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml index 0b12ea3155..ccb4effebe 100644 --- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml +++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml index ec92648687..866a339299 100644 --- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml +++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml index 10ca204326..2567b4e1d3 100644 --- a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml +++ b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml @@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/unusual_processes.yml b/stories/unusual_processes.yml index 945f3c39ef..6ab158db54 100644 --- a/stories/unusual_processes.yml +++ b/stories/unusual_processes.yml @@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml index adf2c000a3..eeedca9a03 100644 --- a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml +++ b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml @@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml index 218c6362ff..8e6821294c 100644 --- a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml +++ b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml @@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Fraud Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml index fc63d52b18..af65a6c0bf 100644 --- a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml +++ b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml @@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml index 835bc5b9f0..6f95bbe38c 100644 --- a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml +++ b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml index 2650850964..78597aabca 100644 --- a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml @@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 1 diff --git a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml index e8df583cb7..50e6bb82ce 100644 --- a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml +++ b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml @@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml index b08ba06bb7..6905f8dd64 100644 --- a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml +++ b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml @@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml index c02011d9ad..58091a7529 100644 --- a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 2 diff --git a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml index 866912c427..82df332e46 100644 --- a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml @@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: ESCU +type: batch version: 3 From 7cb093cd0bb64250e7ec712202a80a3b6f9d6e68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 09:46:18 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 10/27] adding risk score values --- bin/validate.py | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py index 65d7adf312..7cf3f8c2af 100644 --- a/bin/validate.py +++ b/bin/validate.py @@ -137,11 +137,7 @@ def validate_standard_fields(object, uuids): if 'product' not in object['tags']: errors.append("ERROR: a `product` tag is required for object: %s" % object['name']) - # check detections have mitre_ids - if 'search' in object and 'known_false_positives' in object: - if 'mitre_attack_id' not in object['tags']: - errors.append("ERROR: a `mitre_attack_id` tag is required detection object: %s" % object['name']) - + # check risk score values for k,v in object['tags'].items(): if k == 'risk_score': From b4c31d718a42ba9d85894d3a4ea26953d93c0354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:10:05 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 11/27] fixing minor generate bug, since we added response type action --- bin/generate.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py index f6dca567ad..ad9675e75e 100644 --- a/bin/generate.py +++ b/bin/generate.py @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ def get_deployments(object, deployments): matched_deployments.append(deployment) continue - # Remove this check since deployment files are numbered and detections for Splunk Security Analytics for AWS will only get risk configs. + # Remove this check since deployment files are numbered and detections for Splunk Security Analytics for AWS will only get risk configs. # if 'product' in deployment['tags']: # if type(deployment['tags']['product']) is str: @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks): if 'analytics_story' in response_task['tags']: for story in response_task['tags']['analytics_story']: if 'type' in response_task.keys(): - if response_task['type'] == 'batch': + if response_task['type'] == 'response': task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') else: task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') From 1ec15cf0447c06fcc80971cd38ccb93cdd3bfc82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:18:16 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 12/27] renamed on all detections --- .../email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml | 2 +- ...ple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml | 2 +- detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml | 2 +- .../application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml | 2 +- .../application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml | 2 +- ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 2 +- ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 2 +- ...ws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 2 +- ...tect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 2 +- ..._network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 2 +- ...cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- ...oud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 2 +- ...ud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 2 +- ...te_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +- .../cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +- .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 +- ...detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml | 2 +- .../detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml | 2 +- .../high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +- ...aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...tect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml | 2 +- .../detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml | 2 +- .../dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml | 2 +- ...c2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml | 2 +- .../extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...ell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- ...reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml | 2 +- .../suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml | 2 +- ...lt_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml | 2 +- .../attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- .../creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml | 2 +- .../credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml | 2 +- .../detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 2 +- .../detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml | 2 +- .../detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml | 2 +- ...rocesses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 2 +- .../detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml | 2 +- .../detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml | 2 +- ...ershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 2 +- .../malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml | 2 +- ...malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml | 2 +- .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml | 2 +- .../reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml | 2 +- .../shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- ...sa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml | 2 +- .../application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml | 2 +- .../application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml | 2 +- .../email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml | 2 +- .../application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml | 2 +- .../application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml | 2 +- ...gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- ...ubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ...tes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- ...ure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ...s_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml | 2 +- ...ubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ...tes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml | 2 +- ...ceiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml | 2 +- .../network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml | 2 +- .../detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml | 2 +- .../web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml | 2 +- .../detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml | 2 +- detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml | 2 +- detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml | 2 +- detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml | 2 +- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml | 2 +- detections/network/tor_traffic.yml | 2 +- detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 2 +- 284 files changed, 284 insertions(+), 284 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml index b3a3215431..f2f3b9c9eb 100644 --- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml +++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_ | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Collection and Staging asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml index 3082bf18c3..dc775f27fb 100644 --- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml +++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalC city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml index ea1d9a8c60..f319c3286f 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.g as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml index 89dca9a463..3f5c18b5f4 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | sta src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml index 873dc069ec..11e8dbc419 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.c as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml index 70852ff1f9..357aed8043 100644 --- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml +++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability asset_type: Web Server cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index 82bb5a1702..312b821f20 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities asset_type: Cloud Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml index d13053cd1f..3189e815aa 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as o _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities asset_type: Cloud Instance diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml index 2d85ec953b..be26a72ed2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml index a4fed0df8f..08fe83186c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml index 8c8c49c570..17d0167a0a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel= Activity" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml index 911ad0d2e0..c7680d6b47 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath inpu eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ransomware Cloud asset_type: AWS Account automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml index 6ad348c953..3db17668bd 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-e values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ransomware Cloud asset_type: S3 Bucket automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml index 47c0f1bac3..c4877a20d3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetwor requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 6b3615867a..45f2938ade 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=f userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml index 10ac7a7566..1b116faa15 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml index bfe1ccff7b..5888f36ecd 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml index 6551053f5e..058f294763 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values( "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml index 90e5d9bc40..af807302db 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index ecb45bbe40..4de0e07318 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index e8f6b76514..d8a5564ef7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index 9d4a2bb13b..14a9bd46bb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index 32d91a04c6..33901073c2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index 4c230f6289..804268a60a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, value | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index 5318335ff2..e4668c9d82 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml index 4728709a0c..f6209cd9dc 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da Time Logging into AWS Console" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml index 7d4e7594cb..74193af0ea 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml index fc96b779c7..552a776e0c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml index b4fdb12055..2e2e22bba7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da Region" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index ff8e64bd6f..79d4b01aa9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | r %H:%M:%S") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities asset_type: GCP Storage Bucket cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml index a19b1d5bca..03aca91672 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPay | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities asset_type: GCP Storage Bucket cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml index 983b8eebed..36834556df 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities asset_type: S3 Bucket automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml index 0125cbc90a..8a5e0c258c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR r requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities asset_type: S3 Bucket automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index 54edf60484..901e7b33a4 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_s | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities asset_type: S3 Bucket cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml index 959f4438f2..97d1c1cd2e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket sp * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Security Hub Alerts asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml index b0350e2dd1..fc6b8e4734 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | r | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Security Hub Alerts asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml index 8dc034146f..ff8d07f46e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17 count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Command and Control diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml index 38cac25192..3f606f8a3e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=Dele path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities asset_type: S3 Bucket cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml index db8f3d2d57..5ef13dcb3b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=Azure values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 cis20: diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml index 241e0ec268..e20b2a5a5f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM data Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name("Compute")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation asset_type: AWS ECR container mitre_attack_id: diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml index 24a82284d7..45f175e462 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` signature="Set Company Information." Modifie status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml index 45bc1424eb..90a1882d45 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." | user status signature dest ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml index fe1899ed67..1338dd6400 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthentica values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml index e6f109db8d..d394762eee 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name="eDiscovery s lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml index ace3e83f47..be0336e5f4 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Paramete AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml index 38fc48a87c..f10c3c59b5 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath inpu as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml index 0c17f9729b..b3398452c8 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Paramete AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml index 1f03202df6..12d952d73a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities asset_type: AWS Instance diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index 8be22a0226..719bed8d1e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_ apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities asset_type: AWS Instance diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml index 8656647a11..0fa3fcd896 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket sp num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 5d7d9cd1a0..1371ddf7bb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index c95f47d4c9..2a51330c4a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index 305502d129..8eac869202 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index 2ab91cc70c..ea85851ba6 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index 1fca26816a..29e62606b6 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml index b5733747ea..773ea41fa0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS de by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking - Command and Control - Suspicious DNS Traffic diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index b75c29e732..920f268b46 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Network ACL Activity asset_type: Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml index 9fbc63d58a..ad137fa075 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=fa as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml index 791342bce6..b185be2cdb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search N user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml index 642633e7ac..f5013bbec5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Common Phishing Frameworks asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml index 98e53f8cca..837db579b5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type" "Answer Length" Count "First Time" "Last Time" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml index 972f12f659..1016f37f59 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values( Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - Detect Zerologon Attack asset_type: Windows diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml index 96df484aea..81fba34960 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml index 6a0a8cef6d..342a488ecd 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml index 25ef6f8212..9784918f82 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApi as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml index d2b2d654c1..eb66faff95 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_eve | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml index 8f307c7b49..4091497fa3 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_ | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml index f940a99585..4cdc36c42d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earl (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Data Protection asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index b88d511dfc..0868427b68 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Dynamic DNS asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml index e20f51bb0a..8fe03fd803 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count fro message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Data Protection - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Command and Control diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml index 1fe05fbc5a..325b570344 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking - Command and Control - Suspicious DNS Traffic diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 3064059584..896eb44ed5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_mod | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml index 1cf9d75e78..1328415b4e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as ear | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New Region" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities asset_type: AWS Instance diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml index 5fd7e4b3fd..30733708ab 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index 1066e0879b..18c333ae4b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining asset_type: AWS Instance cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 62e781ea65..b11af83f18 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities asset_type: AWS Instance diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml index a19d7050b7..2a79a42c73 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml index 0e9c8a92f9..071042bdef 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | s | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml index 402c03adb1..8774ced086 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_ "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - Orangeworm Attack Group diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml index 4775b9e553..1526f0ec32 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM data Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")` | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation asset_type: GCP GCR Container mitre_attack_id: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml index b58242148a..62df130be0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=c `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls asset_type: Domain Server cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml index f3a660b337..91172eae06 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml index 77788d87f7..cb0893230b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring asset_type: Endpoint kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml index 8f27f532ca..d561778edc 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ name: Open Redirect in Splunk Web references: [] search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter` tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability asset_type: Splunk Server cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml index 24deb4f510..04942260d5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_ OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml index 24f2f38c5f..8aa68f507e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Netsh Abuse asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml index 9094b73286..b947e40abb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - SamSam Ransomware diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml index 3201c0435a..d3e4722069 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Windows Persistence Techniques diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml index 59990fd6d7..4c8c5bea96 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Windows Persistence Techniques diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml index be0f06b215..9d3db6ff24 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml index 666ee9e234..ccb8b5efb8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml index 3fd5f6302c..3e4d630c65 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search client as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter` tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 asset_type: Splunk Server cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml index 52b16a9d3d..6f4002a10e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml index 86622fea54..5bee6c513a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.actio | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml index 3dec2e4869..328c46edda 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter` tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Collection and Staging asset_type: Windows cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml index 34721807d9..c2c57b8ffc 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation - Unusual Processes asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml index c2083e5e5d..de021aa280 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_tim | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Windows cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml index 693fc0b676..340410c62c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAG | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml index 3a5a669a05..f0d89483df 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml index 9cef0953b5..c7a25f3b91 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml index f4e8c3dfc8..eadeb4c2b1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\* | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Host Redirection asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml index 442b804b09..eb7bc16342 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml index 546f646420..6060c1b1f6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Disabling Security Tools asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml index a5c43325e6..a0f2a3a3ae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml index 57cb55bb92..6cbda381e3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Disabling Security Tools asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 576e0884cd..a52930f64e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml index 18dc633877..cd96de645d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime rex field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32* AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml index 0ae1b31cc1..2f458fdd69 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml index e3054ec328..a42a56d7a1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware - Ryuk Ransonware - Ransomware diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml index bbb933793c..e9124dea55 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware - Ransomware - Ryuk Ransomware diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml index 84cd19606a..af467e48f5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml index b95aa3fae8..9f161d1cd3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml index 24aa9ae850..b63dab014d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as f Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml index 8b93d6f519..ce903eba82 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml index 517d3cc923..dc0a05d2a5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml index 70342ff50c..e827ca844e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml index 50d148998c..7e5e824653 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml index 9d55c62282..c6e896086c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation - SamSam Ransomware - Ransomware diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml index f7bf9541e6..f420602358 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmS as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Lateral Movement asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml index 37c7440569..844e986ff4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName= LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Detect Zerologon Attack asset_type: Windows cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml index 50572cc0c0..e8e4b7b8e9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR G Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - Detect Zerologon Attack asset_type: Windows diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml index a63c0934ae..f59b709091 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml index be4bf11e85..b3c2e44e95 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml index 0b6a053288..51f340892b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml index f2c56ea04c..0221334b4b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=mshta.exe AND process_name!=mshta. rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml index ab60cb1989..5b58205fe8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml index fa2b9b8a1d..10f088bea5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Adm | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml index edfb52a551..5b9e1c2b55 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml index 2f6125666a..2be2e9fa47 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Unusual Processes asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml index 98902652c2..2ca354306e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml index c6a7ef17f7..d375dc3c1a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml index 254b752f84..affb6511ca 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Unusual Processes asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml index 66bb9686e5..f5459866ee 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml index 0d22359061..fc91a0fe0c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Suspicious Command-Line Executions asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml index 55840b3939..4fb6593430 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml index d32084896d..8a3dc3680b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml index 752b73b336..342f2ccac7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml index 57e7a5163e..8b94c6a383 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml index 2e97e97247..b8ae1876f6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime value | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml index cf98d5e425..563fe74065 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Proce Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: '' diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml index bb5c5e9e84..733a8d879c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_ Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Lateral Movement asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml index b6b28a3bd2..f3b3419074 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml index a4545cb286..9e8041caed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - Sunburst Malware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml index 10dfcea5e0..08ed4f2961 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml index b4184a83ca..a3e67723d2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "''"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml index 503f3d0a72..bf4f35075a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml index b247efc80f..759d43e0bf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml index 036df21cec..8c2d71c1bf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml index 0021b434f1..a8db6f3522 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_pid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Phishing Payloads asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml index 3de408e98c..d1b43912da 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml index 54360e5222..0babe53883 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Netsh Abuse - Disabling Security Tools - DHS Report TA18-074A diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml index 2e462fcb6a..254508329d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Service Abuse - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml index 0db50962ad..ef74d9e0df 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml index f427b907f7..5717404846 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - DHS Report TA18-074A diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml index 24449054c6..0cdb244754 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTim Registry.registry_key_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml index e9f2d7399e..5a2aa04fc0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ransomware - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml index d08b0fb243..61047233a0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Unusual Processes asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml index 4fa192140d..452cf9c9a5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime BY "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml index 8867c2f48a..4a7f607e67 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml index 507e36d10f..b723def98b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Service Abuse - DHS Report TA18-074A - Orangeworm Attack Group diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml index 61579e5285..4df4038a20 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - Sunburst Malware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml index 759639bdc1..918cac5c66 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Lateral Movement - Sunburst Malware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml index 208beac3dd..c8b8603bc8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml index 7ca598110c..431b251dcf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml index 7567428139..754350edd5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.actio by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml index 0ec9e2f3da..02f8b61983 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml index 3755d3848a..d78611ebe3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml index d1b3490b24..2135f0cf98 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index afc6c869c2..6c50bcbd39 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(ma ) | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events(); ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml index f0e3ee51c7..9d8da984c2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_eve | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(machine), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml index a052406fc5..8f770d977b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml index a237251a0e..2958264a27 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml index d73648cfbc..5e70da6104 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml index 24aa58b8f2..27af9723dd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=msbuild.exe OR process_name=msbuil rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml index 4b5fededa6..bea0086cb9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml index fadc046961..47f83a0198 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml index 8ac3bd9375..22de98ef5f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml index cad5927a5d..1417a47c4c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Disabling Security Tools - DHS Report TA18-074A diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml index 33f738ca21..ad1268e084 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation - Ransomware asset_type: '' diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml index 5ed7947224..84ed04e895 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime != "explorer.exe" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Collection and Staging asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml index 411482d0c3..1e88beec0b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Discovery Techniques asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml index 2e11cc2ecf..075da9711f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process_hash| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - Unusual Processes - Ransomware diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml index 75dced5aff..5b00bbd265 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Disabling Security Tools asset_type: '' automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml index 9fd3de8bc1..841ebbfaa6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - Unusual Processes - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml index c4cb475421..c1809c1f3e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - Unusual Processes - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml index d5963ed6ff..0b52b36cd0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process="*deletejournal*" AND process="*usn*" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml index 4c5bb06777..6c14df3f16 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml index 3f4c71b6ee..5dd2eaf50c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTim | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Sunburst Malware asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml index 5813b6f446..ea14a4af55 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineven dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter` tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml index 4ebf7b2378..e23063bfc3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml index 52249d762c..5a4c93c0e5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ references: [] search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml index 6b7e2fa92c..5e25730449 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earl "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml index 20502d5345..ba779ee687 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipi | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address "(?.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Suspicious Emails asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml index 13d8d15280..052b0604bd 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Collection and Staging asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml index 7a881838ae..7e57057de7 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) a brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring - Suspicious Emails asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml index 59c2c5e7d9..1191bb81ad 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from d search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as "Last Update Time", | table Host, "Update Status", Product, "Last Update Time" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Monitor for Updates asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml index f4c5a1fd74..e5be88cd97 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_ by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml index 45c42a2ee4..96939d20fb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Emails asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml index 66e4c5e2a0..0b5202b8c5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Suspicious Emails asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml index 4a8c7e6d0f..af40707f7c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data= as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index 8bf7b260a5..28bd134bb1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!= by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml index 2169bc5471..fb23111273 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list o src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml index 97e54f034d..8834fff93b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyA eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml index c57e1c1eca..ee51203950 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eve action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml index faa58d712b..437712762e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdent requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml index ff2c6c1461..ba946d2904 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionI requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml index 0bcfd840ab..83f097a0a7 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventNa | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml index c898c77276..080e4b245f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{} data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - GCP Cross Account Activity asset_type: GCP Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml index 342615feaa..f2665721ee 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout= data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - GCP Cross Account Activity asset_type: GCP Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml index 6f177179e9..d7a9364554 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permi data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - GCP Cross Account Activity asset_type: GCP Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml index 67985d4e8a..1a48acc7e6 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.Audi |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - GCP Cross Account Activity asset_type: GCP Account kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml index bc7d1ee8c1..37adf4603b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity asset_type: GCP Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index d2938ce1b1..413ed7e756 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp! as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity asset_type: GCP Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index 185f825d4a..fe3ecb853f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRe | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml index 42377b661f..7fff11e98d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | ta count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 80b1f6531e..38f6cd9fa3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourc objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index c509d656e9..684a590f64 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrole objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index 2bff8058f2..adb5dcef59 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseS = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index 328d91f879..3b914725ce 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sour src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml index 53e190a670..604bd4ef4c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml index 6541322b48..411af9ca96 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index ca217389bc..f7b65c99b8 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| se user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index 5d409fa81f..e317f69ed8 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| se user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index 9c02063a2a..bb7bc925d7 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index c314dfc0f5..a2f2545c43 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml index 10a15822bb..7c1bfa2c24 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml index 6b94cf8a0e..2ba0d56c96 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml index cfae68d390..81c324f49b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=Clu data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index cc4c387988..817d6f791f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=sys | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 28886209e1..30b5635af1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resou | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index 1a498bd5bd..e5847fab8d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=Clu src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index 0881af5018..1c3d612ab8 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.re data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index 88e1c2c1d5..f9518a66af 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSup data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml index fac60dc1f3..a6386f3c07 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml index e8289afe14..d80b2412bb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ references: - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml index f169d084b0..21b13143a0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ references: search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml index 8e87b4bbb9..8f1b6b2728 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ references: - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml index eaa0deb7e3..f14dedc7cf 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max( outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Phishing Payloads asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml index f476e6aaf0..a7152d772f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Proce Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml index 191aeff369..973138e485 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (? relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Service Abuse - Orangeworm Attack Group - Sunburst Malware diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml index 641864eb0e..f51b407e15 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_o | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml index e0956c50ba..7a25bed265 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware - Lateral Movement asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml index 272b9dcc3a..b1479661ed 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint count, null))) as stdev by "dest" | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*4), isOutlier=if((count > upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware - Ryuk Ransomware - Ransomware diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml index ebecad16b1..14fe6bf28a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer. host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Sunburst Malware asset_type: Windows cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml index 9ce48984c9..c5067ccb86 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml index 02a46ddc8a..d1c101507d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Collection and Staging asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml index da2a6ac060..ed30b4882e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest" | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DNS Amplification Attacks asset_type: DNS Servers cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml index d45f488cb3..8410fd7c14 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - Ransomware - Command and Control diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml index a464c99729..9025411078 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml index a6c304658f..f86378c8e7 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Use of Cleartext Protocols asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml index 20679c8362..2dfc224b23 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime OR Web.url = "*invoker*") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - JBoss Vulnerability - SamSam Ransomware asset_type: Web Server diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml index 376f240dd2..4b7e72d52e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ references: - https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/ search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 asset_type: Network cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml index 7e3b5f3620..ae202aff6e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - JBoss Vulnerability - SamSam Ransomware asset_type: Web Server diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml index d0a0782bee..ba509e06ce 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_ as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml index 6eaab1f346..640fd10dd8 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web wher + mvcount(split(url, "select%20top")) + mvcount(split(url, "union")) + mvcount(split(url, "xp_cmdshell")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SQL Injection asset_type: Database Server cis20: diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml index 3614d87ea3..8b17175e8a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Sunburst Malware cis20: - CIS 4 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index 2d7002fbbc..fcddb27b2d 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as a min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Data Protection - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - DNS Hijacking diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml index afd2cff2bf..7b95a6aafd 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","M action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml index a2975c2f3e..aa6664c5f7 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml index d566276dfc..d4e624dfcf 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware - DHS Report TA18-074A - Sunburst Malware diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml index 148a3a62ed..81a1babeeb 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="p src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml index 071793c609..a000876cb0 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRU AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml index 75fe591e81..32a6c39b62 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Data Exfiltration asset_type: Network cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml index 31bebc0731..b95a5e8c22 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml index 8fcbc0d809..019767c04a 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml index 759565ea52..4864991118 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Asset Tracking asset_type: Infrastructure cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml index 878a7546ee..1503f7d206 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml index 6d61903c98..742026113d 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 asset_type: Endpoint cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml index e45df9cfa5..dc4e3b6fdd 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge, as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Detect Zerologon Attack asset_type: Network cis20: diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml index 26f9aedd28..68c7227903 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_tim as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Command and Control diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml index b9c8be8c1f..2a1be60dd7 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Command and Control diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml index b0335dca10..93bd893b49 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware - Ryuk Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml index 8089eaa93f..117724ee23 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware - Ryuk Ransomware - Hidden Cobra Malware diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml index 982c7065e6..797fb5b144 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ null))) as stdev by src | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*2), isOutlier=if(count > upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Hidden Cobra Malware - Ransomware diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml index cd352d9610..cff80cd4fb 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Hidden Cobra Malware - Ransomware diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml index c230afe231..bb5ff72383 100644 --- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `tor_traffic_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - Ransomware - Command and Control diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml index 78c7882317..413c50b9d0 100644 --- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml +++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | wh cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability asset_type: Web Server cis20: diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml index d667c4e10b..66fa083ecf 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/l as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Web Fraud Detection asset_type: Account cis20: diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml index a031ddb7eb..ed33dd989b 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Web Fraud Detection asset_type: account cis20: diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml index 3dfdfdd9c1..ddebd70164 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/lo values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Web Fraud Detection asset_type: account cis20: From eef01502f3f2c61327c569b8c385b242a20ef62d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:18:57 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 13/27] renamed stories --- .../baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml | 2 +- ...e_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml | 2 +- ...loud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml | 2 +- .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 2 +- .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml | 2 +- ...loud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml | 2 +- ...baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml | 2 +- ..._aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- ...ws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- ...aseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml | 2 +- ..._of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml | 2 +- ...line_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml | 2 +- baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml | 2 +- baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml | 2 +- ..._list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...bited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml | 2 +- baselines/discover_dns_records.yml | 2 +- baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml | 2 +- baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml | 2 +- baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml | 2 +- ..._api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml | 2 +- ...iously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml | 2 +- ...een_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml | 2 +- ...seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml | 2 +- ...seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml | 2 +- baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml | 2 +- ..._cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml | 2 +- ...n_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml | 2 +- ...loud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml | 2 +- ...cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml | 2 +- ...usly_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml | 2 +- ...ously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml | 2 +- ...n_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml | 2 +- ...en_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml | 2 +- ...instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml | 2 +- ..._instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml | 2 +- ..._provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml | 2 +- ...d_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml | 2 +- .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml | 2 +- .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml | 2 +- ...previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml | 2 +- baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml | 2 +- .../previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml | 2 +- .../previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml | 2 +- ...viously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml | 2 +- ...eviously_seen_running_windows_services.yml | 2 +- ...y_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml | 2 +- ...sly_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml | 2 +- .../previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml | 2 +- ...ously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml | 2 +- ...iously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml | 2 +- ...usly_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml | 2 +- ...ously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml | 2 +- ...ady_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml | 2 +- ...te_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml | 2 +- bin/doc-gen.py | 4 +-- bin/generate.py | 34 +++++++++---------- bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 | 10 +++--- stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml | 2 +- stories/asset_tracking.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_cryptomining.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml | 2 +- ...aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml | 2 +- stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml | 2 +- stories/brand_monitoring.yml | 2 +- stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml | 2 +- stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml | 2 +- stories/collection_and_staging.yml | 2 +- stories/command_and_control.yml | 2 +- stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml | 2 +- ...lantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml | 2 +- stories/credential_dumping.yml | 2 +- stories/data_exfiltration.yml | 2 +- stories/data_protection.yml | 2 +- stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml | 2 +- stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml | 2 +- stories/disabling_security_tools.yml | 2 +- stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml | 2 +- stories/dns_hijacking.yml | 2 +- stories/dynamic_dns.yml | 2 +- .../emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml | 2 +- stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml | 2 +- stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml | 2 +- stories/host_redirection.yml | 2 +- stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml | 2 +- stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml | 2 +- ...netes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/lateral_movement.yml | 2 +- stories/malicious_powershell.yml | 2 +- stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml | 2 +- stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml | 2 +- stories/monitor_for_updates.yml | 2 +- stories/netsh_abuse.yml | 2 +- stories/office_365_detections.yml | 2 +- stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml | 2 +- stories/phishing_payloads.yml | 2 +- ...iated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml | 2 +- ...d_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml | 2 +- stories/ransomware.yml | 2 +- stories/ransomware_cloud.yml | 2 +- stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml | 2 +- stories/ransomware_samsam.yml | 2 +- .../router_and_infrastructure_security.yml | 2 +- .../spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml | 2 +- stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml | 2 +- ...nterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml | 2 +- stories/sql_injection.yml | 2 +- stories/sunburst_malware.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml | 2 +- ...icious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml | 2 +- .../suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml | 2 +- ...spicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml | 2 +- .../suspicious_command_line_executions.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_emails.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml | 2 +- ...suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml | 2 +- ...ed_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml | 2 +- ...oper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 2 +- stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml | 2 +- stories/unusual_processes.yml | 2 +- stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml | 2 +- stories/web_fraud_detection.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml | 2 +- ...s_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml | 2 +- stories/windows_service_abuse.yml | 2 +- 144 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-) diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml index 5a8ac4f66d..5ce3b64201 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity. stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring detections: - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml index cfec692249..f90f310ffc 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17 avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS Traffic diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml index d1f2df8633..73c4a543e9 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.use api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities deployments: - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index 4567ae5e5a..c348f25dee 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_C instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 dist=expon show_density=true' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml index acd4759a0d..6cbc1dc87b 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_C instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities deployments: diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml index b877ab587d..ae94e67620 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities deployments: - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml index 05c75ca235..961ed75064 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_tim user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - Ransomware - Suspicious Command-Line Executions diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml index ec67fb56f5..adbbc19159 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Command and Control - Hidden Cobra Malware - Suspicious DNS Traffic diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index 150678ac10..b2d96fe4ee 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_ru | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities detections: diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 62c3c11778..940c3de45e 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excess | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities detections: - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml index ba683ec22a..69bce5deb3 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity. avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity detections: - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml index 83260019dd..05dc63dfd7 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentit stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities detections: - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml index 8b05c09949..a291a1318c 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIde avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring detections: - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml index ad650af721..05e8af01ee 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - Disabling Security Tools - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' diff --git a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml index 8961582b92..145f272e1a 100644 --- a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml +++ b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Count of assets by category search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) by category | sort -count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Asset Tracking detections: - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address diff --git a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml index a692e761eb..fa531856a5 100644 --- a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml +++ b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search N [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring detections: - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts diff --git a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml index e4b743217b..c2bffe3968 100644 --- a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup a is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - SamSam Ransomware diff --git a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml index 7cf3eee981..4cdcf408e3 100644 --- a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml +++ b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T ci delim=" " answer | makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking detections: - DNS record changed diff --git a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml index 9214374287..fcfe8d6ed2 100644 --- a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml +++ b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ name: DNSTwist Domain Names search: '| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring - Suspicious Emails detections: diff --git a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml index 6dcce241b4..b22b82c3a8 100644 --- a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml +++ b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`netbackup` "Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | bucket _t span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution detections: - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups diff --git a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml index 2cbf322a96..a41169e6bd 100644 --- a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml +++ b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Monitor Unsuccessful Backups search: '`netbackup` "An error occurred, failed to backup." | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution detections: - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml index ab07bbf340..0b7b0829ea 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring detections: - Detect new API calls from user roles diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml index 566cd5d5c5..b75490ccfa 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId pa latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity detections: - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml index f225d38704..6183e22c3d 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml index 8b447a5064..f25b7b22a0 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml index 5534e51bbe..ebd29dc6dd 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities detections: - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml index 6d79826229..4ede3e699e 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Previously Seen AWS Regions search: '`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities detections: diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml index 5a14742bb1..fc6fca22c4 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml index 3d2f0f81dd..efc0b3a82c 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml index 1c1b5b820b..d56d63eca4 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: - Hourly Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml index 1979c97fd0..132de6a3bd 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee "-90d@d") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml index 8802720595..f58c2ffe08 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml index b21c9e1658..a2d6216129 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml index a596f29664..96857b1b6b 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml index f7290c8d76..02906d8c5d 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml index 3933d3359e..feee4361a8 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml index 7d33982a10..46a125102c 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml index 00183b280e..ea9d9ccb72 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml index 5d142216b6..5162d6d558 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml index a9c521cb75..0e6ed4a25d 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml index 6deb7d50b2..a3290c216e 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml index 3c808c0439..78dde9150b 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_ as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - Disabling Security Tools - Hidden Cobra Malware diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml index 1d7e760def..d645861c24 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestP as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining detections: - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml index e5b36d2d16..f99d1be6dd 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestP as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining detections: - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml index 4622e2a348..d7662e0c7f 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIden as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities detections: diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml index 45320b31c7..17f13510bd 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath out userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications detections: - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml index db35164f65..3f94137dbe 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Orangeworm Attack Group - Windows Service Abuse - Sunburst Malware diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml index fa7321544c..afd14e91cc 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (? relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Orangeworm Attack Group - Windows Service Abuse - Sunburst Malware diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml index bb9793ba8a..0c37e633b7 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earlie latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities detections: - Detect S3 access from a new IP diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml index f0dc9e2229..acd83237a8 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities detections: - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml index af42f4a7c2..f9b45f2ebb 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml index e1f5cb442b..abb22e831f 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities deployments: - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml index fd84e4f457..17810d14f2 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen m `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes deployments: - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml index 3df94bac68..5acc0a72ca 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen m lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes deployments: - Hourly Cache Updates diff --git a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml index 8bea8031df..47f5ab4190 100644 --- a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml +++ b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities detections: - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems diff --git a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml index 7c28c533f3..8fe19e31b9 100644 --- a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities detections: - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country diff --git a/bin/doc-gen.py b/bin/doc-gen.py index d2a288d6de..df97861c27 100644 --- a/bin/doc-gen.py +++ b/bin/doc-gen.py @@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ def prepare_content(stories, detections): sto_to_nists = {} sto_to_det = {} for detection in detections: - if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']: - for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']: + if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']: + for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']: if story in sto_to_det.keys(): sto_to_det[story].add(detection['name']) else: diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py index ad9675e75e..7c59709d12 100644 --- a/bin/generate.py +++ b/bin/generate.py @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ def generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, response_tasks, baselines, deploymen # we are duplicating the code block above for now and just changing variable names to make future # changes to this data structure separate from the mappings generation # @todo expose the JSON data structure for newer risk type - annotation_keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist', 'analytics_story'] + annotation_keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist', 'analytic_story'] savedsearch_annotations = {} for key in annotation_keys: if key == 'mitre_attack': @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ def generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, response_tasks, baselines, deploymen return output_path -def generate_analytics_story_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): +def generate_analytic_story_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): sto_det = map_detection_to_stories(detections) @@ -334,15 +334,15 @@ def get_deployments(object, deployments): matched_deployments = [] for deployment in deployments: - if 'analytics_story' in deployment['tags']: - if type(deployment['tags']['analytics_story']) is str: - if 'analytics_story' in object['tags']: - if deployment['tags']['analytics_story'] == object['tags']['analytics_story'] or deployment['tags']['analytics_story']=='all': + if 'analytic_story' in deployment['tags']: + if type(deployment['tags']['analytic_story']) is str: + if 'analytic_story' in object['tags']: + if deployment['tags']['analytic_story'] == object['tags']['analytic_story'] or deployment['tags']['analytic_story']=='all': matched_deployments.append(deployment) else: - for story in deployment['tags']['analytics_story']: - if story == object['tags']['analytics_story']: + for story in deployment['tags']['analytic_story']: + if story == object['tags']['analytic_story']: matched_deployments.append(deployment) continue @@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ def get_nes_fields(search, deployment): def map_detection_to_stories(detections): sto_det = {} for detection in detections: - if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']: - for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']: + if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']: + for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']: if 'type' in detection.keys(): if detection['type'] == 'batch': rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') @@ -449,8 +449,8 @@ def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks): sto_res = {} for response_task in response_tasks: if 'tags' in response_task: - if 'analytics_story' in response_task['tags']: - for story in response_task['tags']['analytics_story']: + if 'analytic_story' in response_task['tags']: + for story in response_task['tags']['analytic_story']: if 'type' in response_task.keys(): if response_task['type'] == 'response': task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') @@ -467,8 +467,8 @@ def map_baselines_to_stories(baselines): sto_bas = {} for baseline in baselines: if 'tags' in baseline: - if 'analytics_story' in baseline['tags']: - for story in baseline['tags']['analytics_story']: + if 'analytic_story' in baseline['tags']: + for story in baseline['tags']['analytic_story']: if 'type' in baseline.keys(): if baseline['type'] == 'batch': baseline_name = str('ESCU - ' + baseline['name']) @@ -502,8 +502,8 @@ def prepare_stories(stories, detections): sto_to_nists = {} sto_to_det = {} for detection in detections: - if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']: - for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']: + if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']: + for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']: if 'type' in detection.keys(): if detection['type'] == 'batch': rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') @@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ def main(args): detection_path = generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, response_tasks, baselines, deployments, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) stories = sorted(stories, key=lambda s: s['name']) - story_path = generate_analytics_story_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) + story_path = generate_analytic_story_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) use_case_lib_path = generate_use_case_library_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 index 2000e97f78..b3ae7a23bf 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 +++ b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 @@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = {{ detection.providing_technologies | tojso {% else %} action.escu.providing_technologies = [] {% endif %} -{% if detection.tags.analytics_story is defined %} -action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytics_story | tojson }} +{% if detection.tags.analytic_story is defined %} +action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} {% if detection.tags.risk_object is defined %} action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_object = {{ detection.tags.risk_object }} @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = {{ baseline.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ baseli description = {{ baseline.description }} action.escu.creation_date = {{ baseline.date }} action.escu.modification_date = {{ baseline.date }} -{% if baseline.tags.analytics_story is defined %} -action.escu.analytic_story = {{ baseline.tags.analytics_story | tojson }} +{% if baseline.tags.analytic_story is defined %} +action.escu.analytic_story = {{ baseline.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} {% else %} action.escu.analytic_story = [] {% endif %} @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ description = {{ response_task.description }} action.escu.creation_date = {{ response_task.date }} action.escu.modification_date = {{ response_task.date }} {% if response_task.tags is defined %} -action.escu.analytic_story = {{ response_task.tags.analytics_story | tojson }} +action.escu.analytic_story = {{ response_task.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} {% else %} action.escu.analytic_story = [] {% endif %} diff --git a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml index 763a7c8006..925517ef1b 100644 --- a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ narrative: 'In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakar references: - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf tags: - analytics_story: Apache Struts Vulnerability + analytic_story: Apache Struts Vulnerability category: - Vulnerability product: diff --git a/stories/asset_tracking.yml b/stories/asset_tracking.yml index e8f72ea895..9fc934adfa 100644 --- a/stories/asset_tracking.yml +++ b/stories/asset_tracking.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ narrative: This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understa references: - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/ tags: - analytics_story: Asset Tracking + analytic_story: Asset Tracking category: - Best Practices product: diff --git a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml index 711b723af7..5dad19998f 100644 --- a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml +++ b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ narrative: 'Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and references: - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/ tags: - analytics_story: AWS Cross Account Activity + analytic_story: AWS Cross Account Activity category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml index 189311233f..6f9871e4ff 100644 --- a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml +++ b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive busin references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf tags: - analytics_story: AWS Cryptomining + analytic_story: AWS Cryptomining category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml index 30a52b42e1..32ea10cbdc 100644 --- a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/ tags: - analytics_story: AWS Network ACL Activity + analytic_story: AWS Network ACL Activity category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml index 131dff54ce..219376c4fe 100644 --- a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml +++ b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ narrative: AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security references: - https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/ tags: - analytics_story: AWS Security Hub Alerts + analytic_story: AWS Security Hub Alerts category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml index fe5291f2f9..410b5001c1 100644 --- a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml +++ b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ narrative: 'Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geogr references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf tags: - analytics_story: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities + analytic_story: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml index f7f69695f7..03b4ba7f3e 100644 --- a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml +++ b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf - https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla tags: - analytics_story: AWS User Monitoring + analytic_story: AWS User Monitoring category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml index 7bef1d42d2..73c23c3fa8 100644 --- a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml +++ b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trig references: - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit tags: - analytics_story: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 + analytic_story: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml index 364f09a8c9..bb5215f727 100644 --- a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml +++ b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references: - https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/ - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/ tags: - analytics_story: Brand Monitoring + analytic_story: Brand Monitoring category: - Abuse product: diff --git a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml index e16a14bd56..c523a36726 100644 --- a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml +++ b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive busin references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Cloud Cryptomining + analytic_story: Cloud Cryptomining category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml index 45191a20ea..af4f121bed 100644 --- a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml +++ b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ references: - https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/ tags: - analytics_story: ColdRoot MacOS RAT + analytic_story: ColdRoot MacOS RAT category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml index c11f267ba6..1c48144669 100644 --- a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml +++ b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074 tags: - analytics_story: Collection and Staging + analytic_story: Collection and Staging category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/command_and_control.yml b/stories/command_and_control.yml index 249404b4ad..4a983de555 100644 --- a/stories/command_and_control.yml +++ b/stories/command_and_control.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control - https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware tags: - analytics_story: Command and Control + analytic_story: Command and Control category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml index 82fc4b1b80..5393312ef2 100644 --- a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml +++ b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/ - https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/ tags: - analytics_story: Common Phishing Frameworks + analytic_story: Common Phishing Frameworks category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml index b822595ece..9976e0ce69 100644 --- a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml +++ b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ narrative: Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customize references: - https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research tags: - analytics_story: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation + analytic_story: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/stories/credential_dumping.yml index 79380a1356..78c9e468cf 100644 --- a/stories/credential_dumping.yml +++ b/stories/credential_dumping.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003 - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html tags: - analytics_story: Credential Dumping + analytic_story: Credential Dumping category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml index f15159afb1..0b86437d78 100644 --- a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml +++ b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ narrative: Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data ove references: - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/ tags: - analytics_story: Data Exfiltration + analytic_story: Data Exfiltration category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/data_protection.yml b/stories/data_protection.yml index 4ddd3e9a0e..4d4537ef2b 100644 --- a/stories/data_protection.yml +++ b/stories/data_protection.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references: - https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022 - https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/ tags: - analytics_story: Data Protection + analytic_story: Data Protection category: - Abuse product: diff --git a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml index 688ae15b79..650ed69cfe 100644 --- a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml +++ b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ references: - https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472 tags: - analytics_story: Detect Zerologon Attack + analytic_story: Detect Zerologon Attack category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml index da313421ee..45f81ca262 100644 --- a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml +++ b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ narrative: 'The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significan references: - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A tags: - analytics_story: DHS Report TA18-074A + analytic_story: DHS Report TA18-074A category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml index c7af18a592..888d15df8f 100644 --- a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml +++ b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ references: - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/ - https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Disabling Security Tools + analytic_story: Disabling Security Tools category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml index dd361ddd0a..7d7ee8bb9b 100644 --- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml +++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references: - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A - https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/ tags: - analytics_story: DNS Amplification Attacks + analytic_story: DNS Amplification Attacks category: - Abuse product: diff --git a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml index 9e96addd59..6ad09af970 100644 --- a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml +++ b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ references: - http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/ - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html tags: - analytics_story: DNS Hijacking + analytic_story: DNS Hijacking category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml index 1da5a012a5..337a50fe56 100644 --- a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml +++ b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ references: - http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/ - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html tags: - analytics_story: Dynamic DNS + analytic_story: Dynamic DNS category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml index 795ef06ed5..2e11a7a9b8 100644 --- a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml +++ b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ references: - https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf - https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html tags: - analytics_story: 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' + analytic_story: 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml index baea0dc099..5a674d6517 100644 --- a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ references: - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254 - https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/ tags: - analytics_story: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 + analytic_story: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml index f9d384c1dd..3cc8653eea 100644 --- a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml +++ b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ narrative: 'Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources an references: - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts tags: - analytics_story: GCP Cross Account Activity + analytic_story: GCP Cross Account Activity category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml index a8bd0a92da..49af8b5e8c 100644 --- a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml +++ b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ references: - https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity - https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Hidden Cobra Malware + analytic_story: Hidden Cobra Malware category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/host_redirection.yml b/stories/host_redirection.yml index c1657c1c1f..e61f167857 100644 --- a/stories/host_redirection.yml +++ b/stories/host_redirection.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for references: - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/ tags: - analytics_story: Host Redirection + analytic_story: Host Redirection category: - Abuse product: diff --git a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml index 08933d5ce9..722b805462 100644 --- a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ narrative: 'This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targ references: - http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html tags: - analytics_story: JBoss Vulnerability + analytic_story: JBoss Vulnerability category: - Vulnerability product: diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml index d917076d85..e577b33523 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this or references: - https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research tags: - analytics_story: Kubernetes Scanning Activity + analytic_story: Kubernetes Scanning Activity category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml index 900c9c0163..e7b3c8649d 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this or references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html tags: - analytics_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity + analytic_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml index 5c61bd24a2..ba30d5b0a2 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this or references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html tags: - analytics_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity + analytic_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/lateral_movement.yml b/stories/lateral_movement.yml index 88da07071e..e7c9925659 100644 --- a/stories/lateral_movement.yml +++ b/stories/lateral_movement.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ narrative: "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html tags: - analytics_story: Lateral Movement + analytic_story: Lateral Movement category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml index d9e26cd56f..de3bd60db3 100644 --- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml +++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ references: - https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/ - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ tags: - analytics_story: Malicious PowerShell + analytic_story: Malicious PowerShell category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml index 82843d3e83..e94121d1e5 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ narrative: Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continui references: - https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/ tags: - analytics_story: Monitor Backup Solution + analytic_story: Monitor Backup Solution category: - Best Practices product: diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml index ba32bc6f20..603d684799 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ narrative: 'It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes runni references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ tags: - analytics_story: Monitor for Unauthorized Software + analytic_story: Monitor for Unauthorized Software category: - Best Practices product: diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml index 13854f3812..bf4106e8ae 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ narrative: 'It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patc references: - https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download tags: - analytics_story: Monitor for Updates + analytic_story: Monitor for Updates category: - Best Practices product: diff --git a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml index c555af3e1e..a2ed90a166 100644 --- a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references: - https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html - http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html tags: - analytics_story: Netsh Abuse + analytic_story: Netsh Abuse category: - Abuse product: diff --git a/stories/office_365_detections.yml b/stories/office_365_detections.yml index bb4c1aa772..8765eb9224 100644 --- a/stories/office_365_detections.yml +++ b/stories/office_365_detections.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ narrative: More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offerin references: - https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Office 365 Detections + analytic_story: Office 365 Detections category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml index 8bff54c28d..0e1ae49229 100644 --- a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml +++ b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references: - https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia - https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/ tags: - analytics_story: Orangeworm Attack Group + analytic_story: Orangeworm Attack Group category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml index dc8135f94f..ab92e3c207 100644 --- a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml +++ b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ narrative: 'Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dang references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html tags: - analytics_story: Phishing Payloads + analytic_story: Phishing Payloads category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml index b4cb728e9f..21a43250c8 100644 --- a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml +++ b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ references: - https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/ - http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html tags: - analytics_story: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns + analytic_story: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml index b830e2cf09..fd3ce3f980 100644 --- a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml +++ b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ narrative: A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protoco references: - http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/ tags: - analytics_story: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch + analytic_story: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch category: - Best Practices product: diff --git a/stories/ransomware.yml b/stories/ransomware.yml index fbcd8b1130..dad4d1e288 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references: - https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/ - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html tags: - analytics_story: Ransomware + analytic_story: Ransomware category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml index b6c9d12af6..de2089bd8c 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ references: - https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M tags: - analytics_story: Ransomware Cloud + analytic_story: Ransomware Cloud category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml index fb737b148f..3e636e1686 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a tags: - analytics_story: Ryuk Ransomware + analytic_story: Ryuk Ransomware category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml index 7a033729ae..e6aea499ea 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ references: - https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/ - https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html tags: - analytics_story: SamSam Ransomware + analytic_story: SamSam Ransomware category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml index 780b9c5b90..47ecf4076d 100644 --- a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml +++ b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html tags: - analytics_story: Router and Infrastructure Security + analytic_story: Router and Infrastructure Security category: - Best Practices product: diff --git a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml index 1fc5374087..00b7ba0fd4 100644 --- a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml +++ b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ narrative: Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs references: - https://meltdownattack.com/ tags: - analytics_story: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities + analytic_story: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities category: - Vulnerability product: diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml index 510758b832..53662f3f74 100644 --- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ references: - http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859 tags: - analytics_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability + analytic_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability category: - Vulnerability product: diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml index 007ede37e0..4807e85d84 100644 --- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml +++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ references: - https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/ tags: - analytics_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 + analytic_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 category: - Vulnerability product: diff --git a/stories/sql_injection.yml b/stories/sql_injection.yml index 02a5263fcf..52b09a1d3d 100644 --- a/stories/sql_injection.yml +++ b/stories/sql_injection.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ references: - https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html - https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html tags: - analytics_story: SQL Injection + analytic_story: SQL Injection category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml index d878c63544..869ed849a1 100644 --- a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml +++ b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ tags: - analytics_story: Sunburst Malware + analytic_story: Sunburst Malware category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml index 70e2ea22ee..268652ef8b 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, co references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml index e1bb91c04f..5f60a3eb37 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ narrative: It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS inf references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious AWS Login Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious AWS Login Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml index b51c5e5b97..86569fe6ee 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf - https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/ tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml index bb584c23f0..8ee7f07971 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ narrative: "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computin references: - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/ tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious AWS Traffic + analytic_story: Suspicious AWS Traffic category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml index 726f589b69..7be388e899 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references: - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/ - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml index b39a8bf359..5a7db31f81 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ narrative: Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governanc references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml index 67883c28f7..27f167ff85 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ narrative: 'Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate fr references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml index 24562f7a12..c2e8641e09 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf - https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud User Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious Cloud User Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml index 5af3223ee0..ffa5814210 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ references: - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Command-Line Executions + analytic_story: Suspicious Command-Line Executions category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml index 46010319d6..332b296baa 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references: - http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680 - https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454 tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious DNS Traffic + analytic_story: Suspicious DNS Traffic category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml index bd3b6109aa..d1b62ca288 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targe references: - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/ tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Emails + analytic_story: Suspicious Emails category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml index 145ff8ce4b..adcc888713 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ references: - https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/ tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml index 343cd16dfe..fec4699871 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/ - https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5 tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity + analytic_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml index d3dd543db3..0f3c99144a 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references: - https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing - https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Okta Activity + analytic_story: Suspicious Okta Activity category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml index e5bf69ddb5..d57f058e25 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/ - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112 tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities + analytic_story: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml index 23f9eab99f..1f78e018f2 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ references: - https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious WMI Use + analytic_story: Suspicious WMI Use category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml index ed69c68cb4..590aa186e0 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ references: - https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/ - https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/ tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes + analytic_story: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml index ccb4effebe..770f3951cd 100644 --- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml +++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/ tags: - analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution + analytic_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml index 866a339299..fffa8e0491 100644 --- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml +++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ - https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md tags: - analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild + analytic_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml index 2567b4e1d3..30c46ab776 100644 --- a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml +++ b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make references: - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf tags: - analytics_story: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications + analytic_story: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications category: - Cloud Security product: diff --git a/stories/unusual_processes.yml b/stories/unusual_processes.yml index 6ab158db54..f8c34c0d84 100644 --- a/stories/unusual_processes.yml +++ b/stories/unusual_processes.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references: - https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf - https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262 tags: - analytics_story: Unusual Processes + analytic_story: Unusual Processes category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml index eeedca9a03..6fdf0445e0 100644 --- a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml +++ b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ narrative: Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the references: - https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/ tags: - analytics_story: Use of Cleartext Protocols + analytic_story: Use of Cleartext Protocols category: - Best Practices product: diff --git a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml index 8e6821294c..797489f2ea 100644 --- a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml +++ b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ references: - https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud - https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718 tags: - analytics_story: Web Fraud Detection + analytic_story: Web Fraud Detection category: - Abuse product: diff --git a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml index af65a6c0bf..c87ad6d336 100644 --- a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml +++ b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ narrative: Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework references: - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion tags: - analytics_story: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics + analytic_story: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml index 6f95bbe38c..d3d53d19db 100644 --- a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml +++ b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ references: - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ - https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability tags: - analytics_story: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 + analytic_story: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml index 78597aabca..287ee84e39 100644 --- a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ references: - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/ - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042 tags: - analytics_story: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse + analytic_story: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse category: - Malware product: diff --git a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml index 50e6bb82ce..4dd7f63d53 100644 --- a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml +++ b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references: - https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/ - http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html tags: - analytics_story: Windows Log Manipulation + analytic_story: Windows Log Manipulation category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml index 6905f8dd64..eb70181272 100644 --- a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml +++ b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk tags: - analytics_story: Windows Persistence Techniques + analytic_story: Windows Persistence Techniques category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml index 58091a7529..e6940f832d 100644 --- a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ narrative: 'Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an ad references: - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/ tags: - analytics_story: Windows Privilege Escalation + analytic_story: Windows Privilege Escalation category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml index 82df332e46..733e722a79 100644 --- a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031 tags: - analytics_story: Windows Service Abuse + analytic_story: Windows Service Abuse category: - Malware product: From 9a7dee893cde744481e94ab02108d1390e26fe08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:19:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 14/27] renamed in response tasks --- response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml | 2 +- .../aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml | 2 +- .../aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml | 2 +- .../investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml | 2 +- .../investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml | 2 +- .../investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml | 2 +- .../investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml | 2 +- .../excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_email_info.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml | 2 +- ...et_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml | 2 +- .../get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_process_info.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml | 2 +- .../investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml | 2 +- .../investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml | 2 +- .../investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml | 2 +- response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml | 2 +- 69 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml b/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml index 7cf3185442..749a281a18 100644 --- a/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ inputs: name: All backup logs for host search: '| search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" dest=$dest$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml index 98e360c9f2..618eaee5c2 100644 --- a/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml +++ b/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |searc values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml index 801e0c7948..3c0bf1389c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSE as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Compute Instance - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml index 84643fa8c1..e60c8ed1fd 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml index 6212b5b0f2..60e16780bd 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ name: AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - AWS Network ACL Activity - Cloud Cryptomining diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml b/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml index 84e061a2d2..01c28e5d36 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: AWS Network ACL Details from ID search: '| search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS Traffic diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml b/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml index 0c105cfa85..a64ec34182 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time AR relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS Traffic diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml b/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml index b89fbbed02..06860f3d08 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |searc bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml index 6d2feea69e..aaace4b79f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: Perform a static and dynamic malware analysis for the malicious fil id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e name: Analyze Malicious File tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Hidden Cobra Malware - Lateral Movement diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml index ba63694607..006d965516 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail userIdentity.arn=$src_user$ | spath path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml index 3e69175bf5..6d1b37b112 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest= by _time, Authentication.dest, Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Account Monitoring and Controls - Apache Struts Vulnerability diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml index 8edf84043b..d0d68ca2e6 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Get Notable Info search: '| search `notable_by_id($event_id$)` | table time, rule_name, dest, dest_asset_id, dest_owner, priority, severity, owner, status_description' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - AWS Network ACL Activity - AWS User Monitoring diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml index 9a74f9ddef..9db3ed5b4c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_key_ AND Registry.dest=$dest$ by Registry.registry_path, Registry.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | sort _time | table _time, process_id, dest, action, registry_key_name, registry_path' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes product: diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml index 17bb44f90f..e75efdd52f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe by Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`]' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml index 9d64113807..f49c32d7c1 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=system risk_ob | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Account Monitoring and Controls - Apache Struts Vulnerability diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml index 54f0d181e6..79e8da9cde 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=user risk_obje | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Account Monitoring and Controls - Apache Struts Vulnerability diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml index 530c258dac..031ee2d936 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Get Update Logs For Endpoint search: '| from datamodel Updates.Updates | search (vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" OR vendor_product="OSX:Update" OR vendor_product="Linux:Update") dest=$dest$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - Ransomware diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml index c86af75e9b..f1e9a57e9d 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Get User Information from Identity Table search: '| `identities` | search identity=$user$ | table _time, identity, first, last, email, category, watchlist' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - AWS Network ACL Activity - Account Monitoring and Controls diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml index 326336493f..6809b901f3 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ inputs: name: Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint search: '| from datamodel Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities | search dest=$dest$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - DHS Report TA18-074A - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml index 4f25639ac4..34610db886 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datam as unique_ua_count by src_user, image_id, src, user_type | where unique_ua_count > 1' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml index 283ff7658f..170faf5739 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search dest=$dest$ | fields - _*' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml index 51f6044fca..0644c9022c 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search user=$src_user$ | fields - _*' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml index b0f17b1b1c..2797127b99 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search region=$region$ user=$src_user$ | fields - _*' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml index 9c51b7e746..51d0afe0ab 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ inputs: name: Investigate Web Activity From Host search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$dest$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring - DHS Report TA18-074A - Disabling Security Tools diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml index 13e42a991c..1d24aadc57 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ inputs: name: Investigate Web Activity From src ip search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$src_ip$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - Dynamic DNS - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml index e23a42a0e8..683b30aea7 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_ process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name | head 1 | fields - count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Collection and Staging - Command and Control diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml index eb00ca9075..c34e843dd7 100644 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: Quarantine the infected hosts in order to stop the malware from spr id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78 name: Quarantaine Infected Host tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ransomware product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml index 11985a057c..8df22b836f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml +++ b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ playbook: url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.json url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.py tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml index 2a6f974244..9800bdbde0 100644 --- a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml +++ b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ playbook: url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Common Phishing Frameworks product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml index 90147e1a3b..6ee46e3900 100644 --- a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml +++ b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ playbook: url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.json url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.py tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml index 168627faa0..6135ae18ee 100644 --- a/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml +++ b/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.reques user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml index 722ba15882..aef5ca129a 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml index fb6e01b1c2..0834657f80 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml index 80d8576c2c..2c90cd6481 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities - Command and Control diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml index e44f5bf29c..d11a37d7ce 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml index f62cf7aece..6201da7bdc 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Get Backup Logs For Endpoint search: '| search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ransomware - SamSam Ransomware product: diff --git a/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml b/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml index 21b5a50923..c3bfe3fbf9 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as la | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Common Phishing Frameworks product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml b/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml index e4efcf018b..674b861d5d 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Command and Control - DNS Hijacking diff --git a/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml b/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml index 741a0e6c64..a42f7b008f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_ | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Command and Control - Data Protection diff --git a/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml b/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml index 33b7ad04b6..3d926b688a 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup i as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities diff --git a/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml b/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml index 6f761f95c8..f46b534a8d 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities diff --git a/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml index 2ebc0ac3ec..3e7980027e 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ inputs: name: Get Email Info search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring - Suspicious Emails product: diff --git a/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml b/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml index 38b25aace1..d522b40bde 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ inputs: name: Get Emails From Specific Sender search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring - Suspicious Emails - Web Fraud Detection diff --git a/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml b/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml index 2b7ce4bcaf..03e1d288ec 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime All_Sessions.All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Asset Tracking product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml b/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml index edf40a1338..91b9be36ff 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Hidden Cobra Malware - Lateral Movement diff --git a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml index b2df57e9ab..7fb0ce4cc2 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml index 0ee8673e03..91ce50d68d 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml b/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml index 92179a3845..1bd04fc26b 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Get Notable History search: '| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity - AWS Cryptomining - AWS Network ACL Activity diff --git a/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml b/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml index 175e74f167..c057f9797f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail. as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml index 3222204252..168b37e231 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Collection and Staging - Command and Control - DHS Report TA18-074A diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml index b4e2296e69..2c532ae2ad 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes product: diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml index 0da0650ed8..3cb9d60fe6 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Collection and Staging - Command and Control diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml index c664c62cc4..b53d7cd8db 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) a Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Command and Control - DHS Report TA18-074A diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml index 50924b792d..3028da57f7 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) a count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Brand Monitoring - Command and Control diff --git a/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml b/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml index b188d2db36..ad8ae0458f 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCo EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Ransomware - Suspicious WMI Use product: diff --git a/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml b/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml index bc22f3435a..0037a709fc 100644 --- a/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml +++ b/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ name: Get Web Session Information via session id search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Web Fraud Detection product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml index 5a88e2eae3..a0b6362121 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| renam requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Cloud Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml index fa8e82752f..494c69a62d 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ name: Investigate AWS User Activities by user field search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities product: diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml index 50ac6f2a4a..1c7c9b6440 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs > 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search user=$user$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml index c9df6aae28..3ee19e85b5 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ inputs: name: Investigate Network Traffic From src ip search: '| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 product: diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml index 8b7af6c318..54e4d103aa 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ search: eventtype=okta_log app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml index 71e37f56e6..7ccd7c7067 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ search: eventtype=okta_log src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.c as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml index aceca46294..91a03da224 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackag dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml index 6106065511..60686023d6 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=use AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user ' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml index 8a6e9da72b..9155d639d7 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml index e4e621d899..1d8e9c3806 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware - Lateral Movement - SamSam Ransomware diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml index 79630768a9..db9b482aa9 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml index b50c17f23f..c8d1a3223a 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ search: eventtype=okta_log user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.count as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml index 4d1ae50f35..cef7a6b8f5 100644 --- a/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml +++ b/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from d by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$' tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability product: - Splunk Phantom From 004db3e8256bb975d0f21956d76bfe46f156b27c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:21:38 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 15/27] renaming analytic stories --- docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md | 2 +- docs/spec/baselines.md | 2 +- docs/spec/deployments.md | 2 +- docs/spec/detections.md | 2 +- docs/spec/response_tasks.md | 2 +- docs/spec/responses.md | 2 +- docs/spec/responses_phase.md | 2 +- docs/spec/stories.md | 2 +- response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml | 2 +- response_phases/containment.yml | 2 +- response_phases/detection_analysis.yml | 2 +- response_phases/eradication.yml | 2 +- response_phases/identification.yml | 2 +- response_phases/preparation.yml | 2 +- response_phases/recovery.yml | 2 +- spec/baselines.spec.json | 2 +- spec/deployments.spec.json | 2 +- spec/detections.spec.json | 2 +- spec/response_tasks.spec.json | 2 +- spec/responses.spec.json | 2 +- spec/responses_phase.spec.json | 2 +- spec/stories.spec.json | 2 +- 22 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md index 6e89f04806..622015ce22 100644 --- a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md +++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The default value is: ## tags Examples ```yaml -analytics_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities +analytic_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities custom_key: custom_value ``` diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.md b/docs/spec/baselines.md index 2ee3e87feb..4b120c367a 100644 --- a/docs/spec/baselines.md +++ b/docs/spec/baselines.md @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ The default value is: ### tags Examples ```yaml -analytics_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities +analytic_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities custom_key: custom_value ``` diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments.md b/docs/spec/deployments.md index e3d2c089fa..4d1597e99c 100644 --- a/docs/spec/deployments.md +++ b/docs/spec/deployments.md @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ The default value is: ### tags Examples ```yaml -analytics_story: credential_dumping +analytic_story: credential_dumping ``` diff --git a/docs/spec/detections.md b/docs/spec/detections.md index bb4b3b7b14..a07f254a09 100644 --- a/docs/spec/detections.md +++ b/docs/spec/detections.md @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ The default value is: ### tags Examples ```yaml -analytics_story: credential_dumping +analytic_story: credential_dumping kill_chain_phases: Action on Objectives mitre_attack_id: T1078.004 cis20: CIS 13 diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md index 1e5500835e..6ee8b796ed 100644 --- a/docs/spec/response_tasks.md +++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ The default value is: ### tags Examples ```yaml -analytics_story: credential_dumping +analytic_story: credential_dumping ``` diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.md b/docs/spec/responses.md index c42c8297f2..314ad93450 100644 --- a/docs/spec/responses.md +++ b/docs/spec/responses.md @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ The default value is: ### tags Examples ```yaml -analytics_story: credential_dumping +analytic_story: credential_dumping ``` diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md index 7d666beef8..09d1b3be2a 100644 --- a/docs/spec/responses_phase.md +++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ The default value is: ### tags Examples ```yaml -analytics_story: credential_dumping +analytic_story: credential_dumping ``` diff --git a/docs/spec/stories.md b/docs/spec/stories.md index e0a452500f..50b565a2fe 100644 --- a/docs/spec/stories.md +++ b/docs/spec/stories.md @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ The default value is: ### tags Examples ```yaml -analytics_story: credential_dumping +analytic_story: credential_dumping ``` diff --git a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml index bd8ae16868..26ef12572a 100644 --- a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml +++ b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ response_task: sla: null sla_type: minutes tags: - analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan nist: RS.RP product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_phases/containment.yml b/response_phases/containment.yml index 238e1c2b86..926130eb6f 100644 --- a/response_phases/containment.yml +++ b/response_phases/containment.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ response_task: sla: null sla_type: minutes tags: - analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan nist: RS.RP product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml index 93d1618e0e..d5a2f0c88a 100644 --- a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml +++ b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ response_task: sla: null sla_type: minutes tags: - analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan nist: RS.RP product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_phases/eradication.yml b/response_phases/eradication.yml index eeb45f3bd6..e2589529d9 100644 --- a/response_phases/eradication.yml +++ b/response_phases/eradication.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ response_task: sla: null sla_type: minutes tags: - analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan nist: RS.RP product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_phases/identification.yml b/response_phases/identification.yml index 3a015156fe..2298d00598 100644 --- a/response_phases/identification.yml +++ b/response_phases/identification.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ response_task: sla: null sla_type: minutes tags: - analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan nist: RS.RP product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_phases/preparation.yml b/response_phases/preparation.yml index 028ed74519..0e2f1fdaa9 100644 --- a/response_phases/preparation.yml +++ b/response_phases/preparation.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ response_task: sla: null sla_type: minutes tags: - analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan nist: RS.RP product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/response_phases/recovery.yml b/response_phases/recovery.yml index a1b57bbfaf..e449bdf1d9 100644 --- a/response_phases/recovery.yml +++ b/response_phases/recovery.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ response_task: sla: null sla_type: minutes tags: - analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan + analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan nist: RS.RP product: - Splunk Phantom diff --git a/spec/baselines.spec.json b/spec/baselines.spec.json index c13fc47497..e8f22a3df7 100644 --- a/spec/baselines.spec.json +++ b/spec/baselines.spec.json @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", "examples": [ { - "analytics_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities", + "analytic_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities", "custom_key": "custom_value" } ], diff --git a/spec/deployments.spec.json b/spec/deployments.spec.json index 7014cfd201..389c0bba89 100644 --- a/spec/deployments.spec.json +++ b/spec/deployments.spec.json @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", "examples": [ { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" + "analytic_story": "credential_dumping" } ], "minItems": 1, diff --git a/spec/detections.spec.json b/spec/detections.spec.json index 5379f1c41e..94ca4be9b5 100644 --- a/spec/detections.spec.json +++ b/spec/detections.spec.json @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", "examples": [ { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping", + "analytic_story": "credential_dumping", "kill_chain_phases": "Action on Objectives", "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "cis20": "CIS 13", diff --git a/spec/response_tasks.spec.json b/spec/response_tasks.spec.json index 0ee36596b3..dfe84471cd 100644 --- a/spec/response_tasks.spec.json +++ b/spec/response_tasks.spec.json @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", "examples": [ { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" + "analytic_story": "credential_dumping" } ], "minItems": 1, diff --git a/spec/responses.spec.json b/spec/responses.spec.json index 65cf69cb36..4beb6cf9a4 100644 --- a/spec/responses.spec.json +++ b/spec/responses.spec.json @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", "examples": [ { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" + "analytic_story": "credential_dumping" } ], "minItems": 1, diff --git a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json index 6cc1ccbc3f..4c46e46803 100644 --- a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json +++ b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", "examples": [ { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" + "analytic_story": "credential_dumping" } ], "minItems": 1, diff --git a/spec/stories.spec.json b/spec/stories.spec.json index 3eda58b394..f2384cbb81 100644 --- a/spec/stories.spec.json +++ b/spec/stories.spec.json @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.", "examples": [ { - "analytics_story": "credential_dumping" + "analytic_story": "credential_dumping" } ], "minItems": 1, From 2ae854b678c6788f9bc4a6d91cc12f33f7daf975 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:38:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 16/27] fixing gitlab CI job to adjust for new types --- .gitlab-ci.yml | 2 +- bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg | 2 +- bin/testing_coverage.py | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/.gitlab-ci.yml b/.gitlab-ci.yml index ba42cb9bc7..c8f383cff2 100644 --- a/.gitlab-ci.yml +++ b/.gitlab-ci.yml @@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ validate: script: - python3 bin/ssa_validate.py --skip-error detections/*/* - python3 bin/ssa_test.py --skip-error tests/*/* - - python3 bin/testing_coverage.py --type SSA --min-coverage 1.0 + - python3 bin/testing_coverage.py --type streaming --min-coverage 1.0 diff --git a/bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg b/bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg index c94bb338b0..ae73966523 100644 --- a/bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg +++ b/bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg @@ -14,6 +14,6 @@ coverage coverage - 80%% + 82% \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/testing_coverage.py b/bin/testing_coverage.py index 5ec6508ca0..655a00d224 100644 --- a/bin/testing_coverage.py +++ b/bin/testing_coverage.py @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ def main(args): type=float, default=0.0, help="Minimum coverage, script return error if target is not met") - parser.add_argument('--types', type=str, nargs="*", help="SSA, ESCU", default=["ESCU", "SSA"]) + parser.add_argument('--types', type=str, nargs="*", help="batch, streaming", default=["batch", "streaming"]) parsed = parser.parse_args(args) populate_coverage(parsed.types) print_results(parsed.types) From cbfc4ca303882010992e980438020e2fbaaa0408 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 20:03:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 17/27] skeleton --- bin/pretty_yaml.py | 72 +++++++++++++++++++ ...f_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml | 3 + ...cessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml | 1 + .../detect_new_local_admin_account.yml | 1 + ...ulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml | 6 ++ .../sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml | 2 + .../ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 1 + ...system_information_discovery_detection.yml | 3 + 8 files changed, 89 insertions(+) create mode 100755 bin/pretty_yaml.py diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py new file mode 100755 index 0000000000..68b575111e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +#!/bin/python +from os import path, walk +import argparse +import yaml +REPO_PATH = '/home/jhernandez/splunk/security_content/detections' + +def pretty_yaml_detections(): + +def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, objects): + + manifest_files = [] + types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "deprecated", "experimental", "network", "web"] + for t in types: + for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + t): + #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"): + for file in files: + if file.endswith(".yml"): + manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) + for manifest_file in manifest_files: + pretty_yaml = dict() + print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) + with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: + try: + object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + print(exc) + print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) + error = True + continue + + pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name'] + pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] + pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version'] + pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] + pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] + if 'how_to_implement' in object: + pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement'] + else: + pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = '' + pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type'] + pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search'] + pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] + if 'references' in object: + pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] + else: + pretty_yaml['references'] = [] + pretty_yaml['known_false_positives'] = object['known_false_positives'] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + + + #with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: + # documents = yaml.dump(object, file, default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False) + print(yaml.dump(pretty_yaml,default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False)) + +def main(args): + + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="keeps yamls in security_content sorted and pretty printed with custom sort keys") + parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo") + parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") + + # parse them + args = parser.parse_args() + REPO_PATH = args.path + VERBOSE = args.verbose + + pretty_yaml_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','baselines','response_tasks','responses','deployments'] + for pretty_yaml_object in pretty_yaml_objects: + pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object) + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main(sys.argv[1:]) + diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml index dc0a05d2a5..7ae87fbfbf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic* OR Processes.process_name=powershell* Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml index f59b709091..7107062d4a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ id: c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74 known_false_positives: It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts. name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint +references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.dest diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml index 10f088bea5..9b309dfac5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's bes to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives +how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732' name: Detect New Local Admin account references: [] search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml index 254508329d..d11acd61cc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml @@ -7,6 +7,12 @@ known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate. name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data +that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model +in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response +products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data +used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes +to the registry. references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml index b723def98b..dcd17bc503 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ known_false_positives: Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information +on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml index 0cdd233f34..1de5d11a12 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments t is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name name: First time seen command line argument - SSA +references: [] search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml index 1e88beec0b..ac25353a25 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ known_false_positives: Administrators debugging servers name: System Information Discovery Detection references: - https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*wmic* qfe*" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user From d0c9c92857a37f248d06711301c06ba7b14c55e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:11:24 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 18/27] added datamodel field and made all objects also pretty via new tool called pretty_yaml.py --- bin/pretty_yaml.py | 49 +++++++++------- ...itten_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml | 31 +++++----- ...h_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 24 ++++---- .../okta_account_lockout_events.yml | 24 ++++---- .../application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml | 22 +++---- .../okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml | 22 +++---- ...servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml | 29 +++++----- ...ormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 27 ++++----- ...normally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml | 27 ++++----- ...mber_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 21 +++---- ...mber_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 21 +++---- ...ctivity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 33 +++++------ ...g_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 25 ++++---- ...with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 25 ++++---- ...ntrol_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 25 ++++---- ...ws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 23 ++++---- ...alls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 33 +++++------ ...ance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 25 ++++---- ...ce_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 31 +++++----- ...e_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 33 +++++------ ...d_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 35 ++++++------ ...e_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 27 ++++----- ...ovisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 31 +++++----- ...sioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 31 +++++----- ...ning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 29 +++++----- ...isioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 31 +++++----- .../detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml | 32 ++++++----- ...ws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml | 36 ++++++------ ...console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 36 ++++++------ ..._console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml | 36 ++++++------ ...etect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 43 +++++++------- .../detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml | 27 ++++----- .../cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml | 23 ++++---- ...etect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml | 22 +++---- .../cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 29 +++++----- ...s_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 21 ++++--- ...ke_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml | 32 +++++------ ...blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml | 39 ++++++------- .../detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml | 35 ++++++------ ...of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml | 15 +++-- .../new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml | 25 ++++---- .../cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml | 25 ++++---- detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml | 23 ++++---- ...xcessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml | 23 ++++---- detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml | 23 ++++---- ...o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml | 15 +++-- .../o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml | 15 +++-- .../o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml | 15 +++-- ...ly_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml | 27 ++++----- ..._aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 27 ++++----- ..._high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml | 27 ++++----- ...ws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 27 ++++----- ...ovisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 31 +++++----- ...sioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 45 ++++++++------- ...ning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 31 +++++----- ...isioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 31 +++++----- ...nts_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml | 20 ++++--- ...ud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 23 ++++---- ...ct_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml | 21 +++---- ...pi_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml | 23 ++++---- ...to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 32 ++++++----- .../detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml | 29 +++++----- .../detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml | 21 +++---- ...katz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml | 23 ++++---- .../detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml | 29 +++++----- .../detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml | 30 +++++----- .../detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml | 39 ++++++------- .../detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml | 37 ++++++------ ...etect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml | 37 ++++++------ .../detect_usb_device_insertion.yml | 21 +++---- ...eb_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 19 ++++--- .../deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml | 35 ++++++------ ...s_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 18 +++--- ...e_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 29 +++++----- ...ce_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml | 27 ++++----- ...nce_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml | 27 ++++----- ...d_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 27 ++++----- ...ce_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 27 ++++----- ...n_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml | 23 ++++---- ...d_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml | 19 ++++--- .../first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 39 ++++++------- .../deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml | 29 +++++----- .../deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml | 25 ++++---- ...iple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 27 ++++----- .../monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml | 17 +++--- .../open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml | 17 +++--- .../osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml | 17 +++--- .../deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml | 27 ++++----- .../prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml | 19 ++++--- ...de_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 25 ++++---- .../remote_registry_key_modifications.yml | 29 +++++----- .../deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml | 27 ++++----- ...led_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 25 ++++---- ...lunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml | 23 ++++---- ...uspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml | 27 ++++----- .../deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml | 21 +++---- ...us_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml | 25 ++++---- .../uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml | 19 ++++--- .../unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml | 19 ++++--- .../unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml | 23 ++++---- .../windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml | 25 ++++---- .../windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml | 29 +++++----- .../windows_hosts_file_modification.yml | 21 +++---- .../access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml | 19 ++++--- ..._to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml | 31 +++++----- ...ution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 29 +++++----- .../attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml | 25 ++++---- ...dential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 23 ++++---- .../endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml | 23 ++++---- .../bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml | 23 ++++---- .../endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml | 21 +++---- .../endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml | 27 ++++----- ...ate_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml | 25 ++++---- ...or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml | 29 +++++----- .../create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml | 19 ++++--- .../endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml | 27 ++++----- ...f_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml | 23 ++++---- ...ping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml | 25 ++++---- ...ial_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml | 27 ++++----- .../endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml | 27 ++++----- ...ivity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml | 21 +++---- ...omputer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 17 +++--- ...redential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 21 +++---- ...cessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml | 23 ++++---- ...detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml | 25 ++++---- .../detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml | 29 +++++----- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml | 29 +++++----- .../detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml | 29 +++++----- .../detect_new_local_admin_account.yml | 24 ++++---- ...nterception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml | 18 +++--- ...system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 31 +++++----- ...ohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml | 29 +++++----- .../detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml | 31 +++++----- .../endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml | 25 ++++---- .../detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml | 29 +++++----- ..._cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml | 23 ++++---- .../disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml | 21 +++---- .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml | 29 +++++----- ...ution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml | 21 +++---- .../endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml | 25 ++++---- .../first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml | 35 ++++++------ ..._files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml | 27 ++++----- ...asting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml | 25 ++++---- ...connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 27 ++++----- ...s_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 25 ++++---- ...hell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml | 29 +++++----- ...ll_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 27 ++++----- ...nitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml | 21 +++---- .../nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml | 23 ++++---- .../overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml | 25 ++++---- ...eating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml | 29 +++++----- .../endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml | 27 ++++----- .../endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml | 23 ++++---- ...ulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml | 31 +++++----- ...istry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml | 27 ++++----- .../registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml | 29 +++++----- ...try_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml | 31 +++++----- .../remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml | 29 +++++----- .../rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml | 27 ++++----- .../endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml | 25 ++++---- .../endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml | 23 ++++---- .../sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml | 24 ++++---- ...eduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml | 25 ++++---- ...htasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml | 29 +++++----- .../schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml | 23 ++++---- .../endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml | 27 ++++----- .../endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml | 27 ++++----- ...nstallation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml | 25 ++++---- .../endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml | 23 ++++---- .../single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml | 29 +++++----- ...tolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 24 ++++---- ...en_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 24 ++++---- ...ntial_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...dential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 21 +++---- ...raction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml | 25 ++++---- ...dential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...l_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml | 22 ++++--- ...l_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml | 22 ++++--- ...al_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml | 23 ++++---- ...ial_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml | 22 ++++--- ...credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml | 25 ++++---- ...al_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml | 29 +++++----- ...ntial_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml | 27 +++++---- ...dential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml | 25 ++++---- .../endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml | 23 ++++---- .../endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml | 23 ++++---- .../ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 57 ++++++++----------- ...s_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 24 ++++---- ...count_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...egal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...s_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 27 +++++---- ...nd_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 27 +++++---- ...nd_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 24 ++++---- ...ivilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...d_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...rocess_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 25 ++++---- ...en_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...a___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml | 31 ++++------ ...are_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml | 25 ++++---- ..._opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 26 ++++----- ...roups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...e_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 26 ++++----- ...puters_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...ystem_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 24 ++++---- ...on_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...n_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...ores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...efensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ..._opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 25 ++++---- ...sses_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++---- ...ng_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...tting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...ng_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 22 +++---- ...em_process_running_unexpected_location.yml | 17 +++--- ...unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml | 27 ++++----- .../ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml | 29 +++++----- ...ous_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml | 29 +++++----- ...ious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml | 27 ++++----- .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml | 31 +++++----- .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml | 31 +++++----- .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml | 27 ++++----- .../suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml | 29 +++++----- .../endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml | 29 +++++----- .../endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml | 31 +++++----- .../endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml | 27 ++++----- ...spicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml | 25 ++++---- ...system_information_discovery_detection.yml | 23 ++++---- ...rocesses_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 21 +++---- .../endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml | 27 ++++----- .../endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml | 23 ++++---- .../unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml | 25 ++++---- detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml | 25 ++++---- .../wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml | 29 +++++----- detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml | 27 ++++----- .../endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml | 21 +++---- ...ndows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml | 27 ++++----- ..._permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml | 15 ++--- .../detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml | 23 ++++---- .../detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml | 23 ++++---- .../email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml | 24 ++++---- ...s_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml | 33 +++++------ .../monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml | 23 ++++---- .../no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml | 27 ++++----- ...pectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml | 21 +++---- .../suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml | 26 +++++---- ...suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml | 22 +++---- .../application/suspicious_java_classes.yml | 23 ++++---- ..._eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 23 ++++---- ...azon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml | 25 ++++---- .../aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml | 25 ++++---- .../aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml | 21 +++---- .../cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml | 23 ++++---- .../aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml | 23 ++++---- ...aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml | 17 +++--- ...counts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml | 29 +++++----- .../cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml | 27 ++++----- ...sk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml | 29 +++++----- .../cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml | 25 ++++---- ..._kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml | 21 +++---- .../gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 25 ++++---- ...ct_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 21 +++---- ..._detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml | 21 +++---- ...tes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 21 +++---- ...netes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 21 +++---- ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 21 +++---- ...es_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 23 ++++---- ...tive_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 21 +++---- ...e_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml | 21 +++---- ...s_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 21 +++---- ...tes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 21 +++---- ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 21 +++---- ..._azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 23 ++++---- .../kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml | 21 +++---- .../kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml | 21 +++---- ..._detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml | 21 +++---- ...ct_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 21 +++---- ...tes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 21 +++---- ...netes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 23 ++++---- ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 21 +++---- ...es_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 25 ++++---- .../child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml | 29 +++++----- .../detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml | 13 +++-- ...t_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml | 15 ++--- ...aron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml | 13 +++-- .../detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml | 24 ++++---- .../detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml | 25 ++++---- ...irst_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml | 21 +++---- .../macos___re_opened_applications.yml | 23 ++++---- .../processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml | 17 +++--- ...mote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml | 21 +++---- .../endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml | 29 +++++----- ...urst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml | 25 ++++---- .../wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml | 25 ++++---- .../wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml | 29 +++++----- .../network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml | 19 ++++--- .../network/dns_record_changed.yml | 28 ++++----- .../network/excessive_dns_failures.yml | 23 ++++---- ...e_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 33 +++++------ .../large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml | 23 ++++---- .../prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml | 25 ++++---- .../network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml | 23 ++++---- ...ls_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml | 21 +++---- ..._scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml | 21 +++---- .../web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml | 13 +++-- ...ious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml | 21 +++---- .../monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml | 17 +++--- .../web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml | 27 ++++----- .../experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml | 27 ++++----- ...connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 18 +++--- ...ct_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml | 43 +++++++------- .../detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml | 25 ++++---- .../network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml | 45 ++++++++------- .../detect_port_security_violation.yml | 31 +++++----- .../network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml | 19 ++++--- .../detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml | 17 +++--- ...ct_software_download_to_network_device.yml | 31 +++++----- .../network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml | 21 +++---- ...ect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml | 33 +++++------ ...t_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml | 27 ++++----- .../detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml | 27 ++++----- .../network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml | 29 +++++----- .../dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml | 25 ++++---- ...ry_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml | 19 ++++--- .../remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml | 21 +++---- .../remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml | 21 +++---- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml | 21 +++---- .../network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml | 25 ++++---- detections/network/tor_traffic.yml | 25 ++++---- .../unusually_long_content_type_length.yml | 23 ++++---- .../web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml | 21 +++---- .../web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml | 21 +++---- ...aud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 21 +++---- 338 files changed, 4394 insertions(+), 4131 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py index 68b575111e..d272cb5a4d 100755 --- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py +++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py @@ -1,24 +1,30 @@ #!/bin/python from os import path, walk +import sys import argparse import yaml -REPO_PATH = '/home/jhernandez/splunk/security_content/detections' +import re -def pretty_yaml_detections(): -def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, objects): +def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): + + + #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"): manifest_files = [] types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "deprecated", "experimental", "network", "web"] - for t in types: - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + t): - #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".yml"): - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) + if content_part == 'detections': + for t in types: + for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/' + t): + for file in files: + if file.endswith(".yml"): + manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) + for manifest_file in manifest_files: pretty_yaml = dict() - print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) + if VERBOSE: + print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) + with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: try: object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] @@ -32,29 +38,32 @@ def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, objects): pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version'] pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] + pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] + pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type'] + pretty_yaml['datamodel'] = object['datamodel'] pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] + pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search'] if 'how_to_implement' in object: pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement'] else: pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = '' - pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type'] - pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search'] - pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] + pretty_yaml['known_false_positives'] = object['known_false_positives'] if 'references' in object: pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] else: pretty_yaml['references'] = [] - pretty_yaml['known_false_positives'] = object['known_false_positives'] pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] - #with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: - # documents = yaml.dump(object, file, default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False) - print(yaml.dump(pretty_yaml,default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False)) + with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: + documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) + return len(manifest_files) def main(args): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="keeps yamls in security_content sorted and pretty printed with custom sort keys") + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="keeps yamls in security_content sorted and pretty printed with custom sort keys, \ + meant to run quitely for CI, use -v flag to make it bark") + parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo") parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") @@ -65,7 +74,9 @@ def main(args): pretty_yaml_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','baselines','response_tasks','responses','deployments'] for pretty_yaml_object in pretty_yaml_objects: - pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object) + touch_count = pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object) + if VERBOSE: + print("completed, we made {0} {1} pretty".format(touch_count, pretty_yaml_object)) if __name__ == "__main__": main(sys.argv[1:]) diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml index f2f3b9c9eb..1c41e653c6 100644 --- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml +++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml @@ -1,19 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Email files written outside of the Outlook directory +id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data - that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem - data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. - The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system - reads and writes. -id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx -known_false_positives: Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their - email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will - be detected by the search. -name: Email files written outside of the Outlook directory -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path @@ -21,6 +14,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_ by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` ' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem + data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response + products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. + The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system + reads and writes. +known_false_positives: Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their + email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will + be detected by the search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml index dc775f27fb..68212d5645 100644 --- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml +++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml @@ -1,21 +1,25 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP +id: 19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. -how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being - ingested in your Splunk deployment. -id: 19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552 -known_false_positives: A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users - may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too - low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro XXXXXXXXXXXXX to raise - the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search. -name: Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip_filter` ' +how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being + ingested in your Splunk deployment. +known_false_positives: A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users + may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too + low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro XXXXXXXXXXXXX to raise + the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity @@ -31,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml index f319c3286f..82a6c703a6 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml @@ -1,16 +1,20 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk -date: '2020-07-21' -description: Detect Okta user lockout events -how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being - ingested in your Splunk deployment. -id: 62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d -known_false_positives: None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine - if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized - actor. name: Okta Account Lockout Events +id: 62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d +version: 2 +date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' +description: Detect Okta user lockout events search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` ' +how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being + ingested in your Splunk deployment. +known_false_positives: None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine + if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized + actor. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity @@ -26,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml index 3f5c18b5f4..584477eebb 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml @@ -1,16 +1,20 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk -date: '2020-07-21' -description: Detect failed Okta SSO events -how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being - ingested in your Splunk deployment. -id: 371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5 -known_false_positives: There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from - accessing apps they should have access to. name: Okta Failed SSO Attempts +id: 371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5 +version: 2 +date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' +description: Detect failed Okta SSO events search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` ' +how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being + ingested in your Splunk deployment. +known_false_positives: There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from + accessing apps they should have access to. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity @@ -26,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml index 11e8dbc419..6805d5819e 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml @@ -1,22 +1,26 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities +id: 7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects logins from the same user from different states in a 24 hour period. +search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null + | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) + as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) + as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1' how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -id: 7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8 known_false_positives: Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint. -name: Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities -search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null - | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) - as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) - as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Okta Activity @@ -32,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml index 357aed8043..71200c379d 100644 --- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml +++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes +id: ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9 +version: 1 date: '2019-04-01' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity - Framework of Enterprise Security. -id: ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9 -known_false_positives: Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers - during maintenance or other administrative tasks. -name: Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category="web_server" AND (Processes.process="*whoami*" OR Processes.process="*ping*" OR Processes.process="*iptables*" OR Processes.process="*wget*" OR Processes.process="*service*" OR Processes.process="*curl*") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity + Framework of Enterprise Security. +known_false_positives: Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers + during maintenance or other administrative tasks. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index 312b821f20..22e02367e6 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed +id: ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf +version: 1 date: '2020-08-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must - run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability - density function. -id: ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf -known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure - are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter - out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a - human user. -name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed -references: [] search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` @@ -25,6 +20,14 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must + run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability + density function. +known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure + are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter + out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a + human user. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities @@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml index 3189e815aa..1a0d746484 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched +id: f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65 +version: 2 date: '2020-08-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must - run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability - density function. -id: f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65 -known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure - are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter - out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a - human user. -name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched -references: [] search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` @@ -25,6 +20,14 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as o eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must + run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability + density function. +known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure + are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter + out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a + human user. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 40 security_domain: Cloud -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml index be26a72ed2..0f65db13e6 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls +id: 0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-07' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must - run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to - create the probability density function. -id: 0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0 -known_false_positives: '' -name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls -references: [] search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, @@ -20,6 +18,11 @@ search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from -1), ":"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must + run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to + create the probability density function. +known_false_positives: '' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities @@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml index 08fe83186c..1095e9a7cf 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls +id: d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af +version: 1 date: '2020-09-07' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must - run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to - create the probability density function model. -id: d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af -known_false_positives: '' -name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls -references: [] search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval @@ -21,6 +19,11 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must + run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to + create the probability density function model. +known_false_positives: '' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities @@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml index 17d0167a0a..7e69adf812 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml @@ -1,21 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account +id: 21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b +version: 1 date: '2020-05-28' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Authentication description: This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account - Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic - locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously - Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age - out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing - the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro. -id: 21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b -known_false_positives: Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. - It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. - You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. -name: AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account -references: [] search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` @@ -26,6 +18,17 @@ search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel= Cross Account Activity","Previously Seen") | where status = "New Cross Account Activity" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account + Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic + locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously + Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age + out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing + the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro. +known_false_positives: Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. + It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. + You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities @@ -50,5 +53,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 15 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml index c7680d6b47..3a7692c67e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml @@ -1,18 +1,14 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk +name: AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA +id: c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e +version: 1 date: '2021-01-11' +author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of KMS keys which action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an identicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudtrail logs -id: c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e -known_false_positives: unknown -name: AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA -references: -- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/ -- https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt -- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath @@ -22,6 +18,13 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath inpu | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudtrail logs +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/ +- https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt +- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware Cloud @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml index 3db17668bd..a8a01ae4e9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk +name: AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 +id: 884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc +version: 1 date: '2021-01-11' +author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudtrail logs -id: 884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc -known_false_positives: bucket with S3 encryption -name: AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 -references: -- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/ -- https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt -- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption="aws:kms" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudtrail logs +known_false_positives: bucket with S3 encryption +references: +- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/ +- https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt +- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware Cloud @@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml index c4877a20d3..4330785494 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75 +version: 2 date: '2021-01-11' +author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75 -known_false_positives: It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports - open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed - in production environment. -name: AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry @@ -21,6 +17,13 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetwor requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +known_false_positives: It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports + open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed + in production environment. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 45f2938ade..33b25f0de6 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: AWS Network Access Control List Deleted +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75 +version: 2 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network - ACL. -name: AWS Network Access Control List Deleted -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network + ACL. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml index 1b116faa15..583086c3d2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml @@ -1,18 +1,11 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2020-09-04' -description: This search looks for new commands from each user role. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per - User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. - You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls - Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You - can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` - macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing - the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` -id: 2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f -known_false_positives: . name: Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles -references: [] +id: 2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f +version: 1 +date: '2020-09-04' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change +description: This search looks for new commands from each user role. search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | @@ -22,6 +15,16 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),"-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per + User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. + You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls + Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You + can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` + macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing + the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` +known_false_positives: . +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml index 5888f36ecd..ad3c3915c3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User +id: 37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs - Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create - of baseline of previously seen users. -id: 37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances - for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances - that this is the intended behavior. -name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | @@ -20,6 +16,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs + Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create + of baseline of previously seen users. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances + for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances + that this is the intended behavior. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml index 058f294763..06524b6337 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml @@ -1,20 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region +id: fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-02' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` - to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the - second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table - up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for - this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` - macro. -id: fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance - in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. -name: Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region -references: [] search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions @@ -23,6 +16,16 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values( | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` + to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the + second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table + up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for + this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` + macro. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance + in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml index af807302db..b91c12d76d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml @@ -1,20 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image +id: bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4 +version: 1 date: '2018-10-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also - enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` - to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional - filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` - macro. -id: bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4 -known_false_positives: After a new image is created, the first systems created with - that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was - created by a legitimate user. -name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image -references: [] search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` @@ -23,6 +15,17 @@ search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images + - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also + enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` + to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional + filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` + macro. +known_false_positives: After a new image is created, the first systems created with + that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was + created by a legitimate user. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index 4de0e07318..ec1232c365 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -1,19 +1,11 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2020-09-12' -description: Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance - Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. - You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance - Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also - provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` - macro. -id: c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda -known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using - a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that - they intended to create the system with the new instance type. name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type -references: [] +id: c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda +version: 1 +date: '2020-09-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change +description: Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` @@ -23,6 +15,17 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance + Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. + You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance + Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also + provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` + macro. +known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using + a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that + they intended to create the system with the new instance type. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index d8a5564ef7..aae7fc7feb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -1,17 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User +id: 7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-29' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. -how_to_implement: This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update - a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously - Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection - to properly work. -id: 7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances - when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is - modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. -name: Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 @@ -21,6 +16,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update + a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously + Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection + to properly work. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances + when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is + modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index 14a9bd46bb..623093bb0b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -1,8 +1,23 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City +id: e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f +version: 1 date: '2020-10-09' +author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change + where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success + by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | + `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | + lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, + enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | + eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity + > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | + table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic @@ -12,7 +27,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. -id: e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\ @@ -24,18 +38,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\ \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\ \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you." -name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City references: [] -search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change - where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success - by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | - `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | - lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, - enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | - eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity - > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | - table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities @@ -58,5 +61,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index 33901073c2..a805a550c9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -1,8 +1,23 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country +id: 94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-09' +author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change + where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success + by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | + `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) + | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country + OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | + where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) + OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src, + Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic @@ -12,7 +27,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. -id: 94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\ @@ -24,18 +38,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\ \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\ \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you." -name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country references: [] -search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change - where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success - by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | - `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) - | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country - OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | - where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) - OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src, - Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities @@ -58,5 +61,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index 804268a60a..d6b662bd2c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -1,8 +1,22 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address +id: f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-16' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) + as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) + All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command + | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources + src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data + | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) + OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) + | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic @@ -12,7 +26,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. -id: f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\ @@ -24,17 +37,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\ \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\ \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you." -name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address references: [] -search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) - as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) - All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command - | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources - src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data - | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) - OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) - | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities @@ -57,5 +60,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index e4668c9d82..c1574a9be7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -1,8 +1,23 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region +id: 5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-16' +author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change + where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success + by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | + `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) + | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT + firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where + enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) + OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) + | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic @@ -12,7 +27,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. -id: 5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\ @@ -24,18 +38,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\ \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\ \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you." -name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region references: [] -search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change - where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success - by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | - `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) - | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT - firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where - enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) - OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) - | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`' tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities @@ -58,5 +61,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml index f6209cd9dc..5330520d4e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml @@ -1,22 +1,15 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Detect AWS Console Login by New User +id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71 +version: 1 date: '2020-05-28' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version - 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates - to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users - in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously - seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection - searches) to refresh the baselines. -id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71 -known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this - activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user - activity is legitimate. -name: Detect AWS Console Login by New User search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) @@ -24,6 +17,17 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da "First Time Logging into AWS Console", "Previously Seen User") |where userStatus="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users + in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously + seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail + - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection + searches) to refresh the baselines. +known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this + activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user + activity is legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities @@ -47,5 +51,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 30 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml index 74193af0ea..ac6b0a8bd9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml @@ -1,24 +1,15 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City +id: 121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a +version: 1 date: '2020-10-07' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version - 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates - to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users - in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously - seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection - searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for - this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` - macro. -id: 121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a -known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this - activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user - activity is legitimate. -name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table @@ -29,6 +20,19 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCity = "New City" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users + in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously + seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail + - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection + searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for + this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` + macro. +known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this + activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user + activity is legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities @@ -55,5 +59,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml index 552a776e0c..b88168e79b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml @@ -1,24 +1,15 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country +id: 67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-07' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version - 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates - to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users - in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously - seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection - searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for - this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` - macro. -id: 67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6 -known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this - activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user - activity is legitimate. -name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table @@ -29,6 +20,19 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCountry = "New Country" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users + in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously + seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail + - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection + searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for + this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` + macro. +known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this + activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user + activity is legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities @@ -55,5 +59,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml index 2e2e22bba7..813670e2f3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml @@ -1,24 +1,15 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region +id: 9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-07' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version - 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates - to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users - in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously - seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection - searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for - this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` - macro. -id: 9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026 -known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this - activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user - activity is legitimate. -name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table @@ -29,6 +20,19 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userRegion = "New Region" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users + in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously + seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail + - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection + searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for + this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` + macro. +known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this + activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user + activity is legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities @@ -55,5 +59,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index 79d4b01aa9..047817dc25 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -1,26 +1,13 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP +id: ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-10' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. -how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, - setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and - logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). - In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable - storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These - logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically - show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches - or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes - past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) - stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine - any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. -id: ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022 -known_false_positives: GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs - are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will - be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two - hours. -name: Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status="\"200\"" | stats earliest(_time) @@ -32,6 +19,22 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | r >= relative_time(now(),"-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, + setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and + logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). + In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable + storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These + logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically + show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches + or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes + past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) + stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine + any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. +known_false_positives: GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs + are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will + be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two + hours. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities @@ -52,5 +55,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml index 03aca91672..05a2b746cc 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml @@ -1,17 +1,12 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets +id: f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-05' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. -how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, - setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and - logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). -id: f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible - that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. - That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" - group. -name: Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath @@ -21,6 +16,14 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPay | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, + setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and + logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). +known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible + that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. + That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" + group. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml index 36834556df..b72952640f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Detect New Open S3 buckets +id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4 +version: 2 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk. -id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4 -known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible - that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. - That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" - group. -name: Detect New Open S3 buckets -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw "(?{.+})" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI @@ -19,6 +16,12 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk. +known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible + that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. + That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" + group. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml index 8a5e0c258c..2144ea2cc2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI +id: 39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. -id: 39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22 -known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible - that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. - That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" - group. -name: Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp @@ -19,6 +17,12 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR r requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` ' +how_to_implement: '' +known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible + that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. + That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" + group. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities @@ -44,5 +48,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index 901e7b33a4..ddc1308ca9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -1,18 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect S3 access from a new IP +id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4 +version: 1 date: '2018-06-28' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access - logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket - Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen - remote IPs and bucket names. -id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4 -known_false_positives: S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make - a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking - for a new IP within the past hour -name: Detect S3 access from a new IP -references: [] search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) @@ -21,6 +15,15 @@ search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_s "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access + logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket + Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen + remote IPs and bucket names. +known_false_positives: S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make + a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking + for a new IP within the past hour +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml index 97d1c1cd2e..af2ca63234 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml @@ -1,19 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2021-01-26' name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222 version: 3 +date: '2021-01-26' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security - Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule - these searches according to the bucket span interval. -type: batch -references: [] -known_false_positives: None -name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance -references: [] search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity @@ -21,6 +14,12 @@ search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket sp | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security + Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule + these searches according to the bucket span interval. +known_false_positives: None +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Security Hub Alerts diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml index fc6b8e4734..ad6779e610 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml @@ -1,25 +1,23 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User +id: 2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222 +version: 3 date: '2021-01-26' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. -id: 2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222 +search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename + findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts + by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev + | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev + * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub - inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security + Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule + these searches according to the bucket span interval. known_false_positives: None -name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User references: [] -search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time -| stats count AS alerts by _time user -| eventstats avg(alerts) - as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev -| eval - threshold_value = 2 -| eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev - * threshold_value), 1, 0) -| search isOutlier=1 -| table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - AWS Security Hub Alerts @@ -34,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml index ff8d07f46e..12b6faa698 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml @@ -1,24 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS +id: ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53 +version: 1 date: '2018-05-07' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow - logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit - your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points - required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is - the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be - considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked - Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen - blocked outbound connections. -id: ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53 -known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` - and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators - roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number - of blocked outbound connections. -name: Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS -references: [] search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) @@ -37,6 +26,20 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17 | stats values(dest_ip) as "Blocked Destination IPs", values(interface_id) as "resourceId" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow + logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit + your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points + required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is + the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be + considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked + Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen + blocked outbound connections. +known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` + and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators + roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number + of blocked outbound connections. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -60,5 +63,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml index 3f606f8a3e..5eea45dfe0 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml @@ -1,22 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion +id: ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53 +version: 1 date: '2018-11-27' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit - your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data - points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. - The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from - the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best - when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search - once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. -id: ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53 -known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, - the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. -name: Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn @@ -31,6 +22,18 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=Dele table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit + your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data + points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. + The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from + the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best + when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search + once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. +known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, + the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities @@ -53,5 +56,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml index 5ef13dcb3b..9c1b8f633c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml @@ -1,16 +1,21 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: High Number of Login Failures from a single source +id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222 +version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. -id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222 -known_false_positives: unknown -name: High Number of Login Failures from a single source search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`' +how_to_implement: '' +known_false_positives: unknown +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections @@ -29,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml index e20b2a5a5f..8d84f2b0d7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: New container uploaded to AWS ECR +id: f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099 +version: 1 date: '2020-02-20' +author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize - the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -id: f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099 -known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or - users with access to container registry. -name: New container uploaded to AWS ECR -references: [] search: '| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.http_user_agent="AWS Internal" AND Compute.event_name="PutImage" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name("Compute")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize + the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. +known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or + users with access to container registry. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation @@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml index 45f175e462..f4007f9877 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml @@ -1,17 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP +id: c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. -how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search - works with o365:management:activity -id: c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e -known_false_positives: Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually - update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. -name: O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP -references: -- https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/ search: '`o365_management_activity` signature="Set Company Information." ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue "(?\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue "(?\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})" @@ -21,6 +17,13 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` signature="Set Company Information." Modifie as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added signature vendor_product vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search + works with o365:management:activity +known_false_positives: Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually + update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. +references: +- https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/ tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml index 90a1882d45..302c14c05d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: O365 Disable MFA +id: c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e +version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user -how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search - works with o365:management:activity -id: c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e -known_false_positives: Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA - or Strong Authentication -name: O365 Disable MFA -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation user status signature dest ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search + works with o365:management:activity +known_false_positives: Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA + or Strong Authentication +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/ tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml index 1338dd6400..69508d2f11 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert +id: d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9 +version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes -how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search - works with o365:management:activity -id: d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9 -known_false_positives: The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should - reduce the number of false positives. -name: O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/ search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=Failed | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search + works with o365:management:activity +known_false_positives: The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should + reduce the number of false positives. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/ tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections @@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml index d394762eee..659c8fc0f3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: O365 PST export alert +id: 5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc +version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content -how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search - works with o365:management:activity -id: 5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc -known_false_positives: PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the - sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. -name: O365 PST export alert -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/ search: '`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name="eDiscovery search started or exported" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search + works with o365:management:activity +known_false_positives: PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the + sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/ tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections @@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml index be0336e5f4..b0086b6ef7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml @@ -1,15 +1,20 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding +id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28 +version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. -id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28 -known_false_positives: unknown -name: O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`' +how_to_implement: '' +known_false_positives: unknown +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections @@ -31,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml index f10c3c59b5..c8a746f7af 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml @@ -1,15 +1,20 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation +id: b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7 +version: 1 date: '2020-12-15' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. -id: b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7 -known_false_positives: Service Accounts -name: O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`' +how_to_implement: '' +known_false_positives: Service Accounts +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections @@ -31,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml index b3398452c8..2b0a5ffbde 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml @@ -1,15 +1,20 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding +id: f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4 +version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. -id: f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4 -known_false_positives: unknown -name: O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`' +how_to_implement: '' +known_false_positives: unknown +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections @@ -31,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml index 12d952d73a..22ea96c9bb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User +id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4 -known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure - are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter - out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a - human user. -name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval @@ -21,6 +16,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m "-10m@m") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. +known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure + are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter + out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a + human user. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 40 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index 719bed8d1e..36d93256b0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK +id: dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -id: dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5 -known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure - are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter - out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a - human user. -name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. +known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure + are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter + out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a + human user. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml index 0fa3fcd896..05246e8a1c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-s3f3-d82362dffd75 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-s3f3-d82362dffd75 -known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure - are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter - out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted - on a human user. -name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev @@ -22,6 +17,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket sp total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated, num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure + are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter + out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted + on a human user. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 1371ddf7bb..5f4d1fe8cb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK +id: 1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -id: 1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e -known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure - are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter - out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a - human user. -name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. +known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure + are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter + out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a + human user. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index 2a51330c4a..edc6d91c55 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -1,15 +1,29 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City +id: 344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd +version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ' +search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress + | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation + sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) + as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv + | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, + City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv + | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime + >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath + output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, + src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -id: 344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\ @@ -21,18 +35,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal \ free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\ \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\ \ be much less valuable to you." -name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City references: [] -search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress - | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation - sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) - as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv - | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, - City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv - | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime - >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath - output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, - src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities @@ -51,5 +54,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index 8eac869202..555c5c4b05 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -1,28 +1,14 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country +id: ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0 +version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ' -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning - Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations - that have provisioned AWS resources. -id: ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0 -known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ - \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ - \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored\ - \ in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional\ - \ sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a\ - \ new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity.\ - \ If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there\ - \ should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free\ - \ version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\ - \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\ - \ be much less valuable to you." -name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, @@ -34,6 +20,23 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning + Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations + that have provisioned AWS resources. +known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ + \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ + \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored\ + \ in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional\ + \ sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a\ + \ new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity.\ + \ If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there\ + \ should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free\ + \ version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\ + \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\ + \ be much less valuable to you." +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities @@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index ea85851ba6..7e53b21702 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -1,15 +1,29 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address +id: 42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b +version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ' +search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* + OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) + as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country + | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) + as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country + | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) + as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime + >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] + | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table + _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -id: 42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\ @@ -21,18 +35,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\ \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\ \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you." -name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address references: [] -search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* - OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) - as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country - | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) - as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country - | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) - as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime - >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] - | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table - _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities @@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index 29e62606b6..be691c57dc 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -1,15 +1,29 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region +id: 7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253 +version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress + | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation + sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) + as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv + | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, + City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv + | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime + >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath + output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, + src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -id: 7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\ \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\ \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\ @@ -21,18 +35,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal \ version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\ \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\ \ be much less valuable to you." -name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region references: [] -search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress - | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation - sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) - as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv - | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, - City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv - | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime - >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath - output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, - src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml index 773ea41fa0..c086f3711a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml @@ -1,7 +1,16 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers +id: 74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest + dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY + by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 | + `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ' how_to_implement: 'This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\ @@ -15,14 +24,9 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and popu Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -id: 74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce known_false_positives: It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate. -name: Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest - dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY - by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 | - `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking @@ -47,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 920f268b46..c3f38d4493 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Peter Gael, Splunk +name: Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted +id: 021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-08' +author: Peter Gael, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing - the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. -id: 021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network - ACL. -name: Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing + the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network + ACL. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Network ACL Activity @@ -34,5 +37,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml index ad137fa075..0ea740245c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml @@ -1,11 +1,21 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect API activity from users without MFA +id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-w5ad-212bf5d1dac4 +version: 1 date: '2018-05-17' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. +search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false + | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity + as user]| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) + as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | + `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`' how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: @@ -29,19 +39,12 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-w5ad-212bf5d1dac4 known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS. -name: Detect API activity from users without MFA references: [] -search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false - | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity - as user]| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) - as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | - `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -59,5 +62,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml index b185be2cdb..aea98ef961 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml @@ -1,10 +1,21 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. +search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT + [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup + aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count + min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by + user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`' how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with @@ -30,19 +41,11 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55 known_false_positives: It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. -name: Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts references: [] -search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT - [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup - aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count - min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by - user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -66,5 +69,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 15 security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml index f5013bbec5..d5cb8fbd30 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml @@ -1,7 +1,22 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 +id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by + DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" + | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` + OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` + OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` + | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer + [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web + by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" + | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`' how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution\ \ datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the\ \ IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting\ @@ -16,21 +31,10 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Res \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\ \ to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\ \n" -id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa known_false_positives: If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains. -name: Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by - DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" - | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` - OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` - OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` - | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer - [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web - by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" - | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Common Phishing Frameworks @@ -54,5 +58,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml index 837db579b5..3fe5d5703d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml @@ -1,21 +1,15 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response +id: 05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from - your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, - this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding - the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section - of the protocol. -id: 05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9 -known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long - enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search - to help mitigate false positives. -name: Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` @@ -25,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Type" firstTime as "First Time" lastTime as "Last Time" count as Count | table "Source IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type" "Answer Length" Count "First Time" "Last Time" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from + your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, + this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding + the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section + of the protocol. +known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long + enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search + to help mitigate false positives. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious DNS Traffic @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml index 1016f37f59..cefe58f3d0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml @@ -1,25 +1,28 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images +id: 29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0 +version: 1 date: '2019-12-03' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. +search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) + as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll + ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename + Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`' how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -id: 29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0 known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whtelist. -name: Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images references: - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html -search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) - as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll - ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename - Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml index 343d9398e1..8f907ef3bd 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml @@ -1,7 +1,18 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 +id: 98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188 +version: 2 date: '2019-02-27' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. +search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex + field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" | where + privs="SeDebugPrivilege" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime + by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as "Enabled Privilege" + | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`' how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs @@ -9,19 +20,11 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also en on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes.' -id: 98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188 known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. -name: Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 references: [] -search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex - field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" | where - privs="SeDebugPrivilege" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime - by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as "Enabled Privilege" - | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`' tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml index 81fba34960..3078398031 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml @@ -1,18 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect new API calls from user roles +id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1 +version: 1 date: '2018-04-16' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user - roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen - user roles. -id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1 -known_false_positives: It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making - new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to - trigger. -name: Detect new API calls from user roles -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName @@ -23,6 +17,15 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A | table eventName userName] |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user + roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen + user roles. +known_false_positives: It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making + new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to + trigger. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml index 342a488ecd..9d1b2a0d30 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml @@ -1,27 +1,31 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect new user AWS Console Login +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to - create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update - previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how - often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75 -known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this - activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user - activity is legitimate. -name: Detect new user AWS Console Login search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to + create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update + previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how + often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this + activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user + activity is legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities @@ -40,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml index 9784918f82..f694c57e23 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml @@ -1,9 +1,28 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Detect Spike in AWS API Activity +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall + | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup + api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * + by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 + | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) + | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, + stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) + | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup + api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 + | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND + numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn + | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) + as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user + | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`' how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit @@ -30,24 +49,8 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55 known_false_positives: '' -name: Detect Spike in AWS API Activity references: [] -search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall - | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup - api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * - by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 - | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) - | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, - stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) - | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup - api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 - | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND - numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn - | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) - as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user - | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -70,5 +73,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml index eb66faff95..7f7a363d18 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -1,23 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53 +version: 1 date: '2018-05-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit - your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data - points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. - The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from - the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best - when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to - create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API - event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53 -known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` - and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. -name: Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) @@ -32,6 +22,19 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_eve userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit + your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data + points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. + The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from + the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best + when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to + create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API + event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. +known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` + and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -55,5 +58,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 20 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml index 4091497fa3..4eaefe70ff 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml @@ -1,24 +1,14 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Spike in Security Group Activity +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53 +version: 1 date: '2018-04-18' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit - your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data - points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. - The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from - the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best - when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once - to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove - API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53 -known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, - the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. -name: Detect Spike in Security Group Activity -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) @@ -33,6 +23,19 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_ userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit + your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data + points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. + The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from + the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best + when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once + to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove + API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. +known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, + the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -55,5 +58,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml index 4cdc36c42d..01a88312b2 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml @@ -1,27 +1,30 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect USB device insertion +id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5 +version: 1 date: '2017-11-27' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change_Analysis description: The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest + latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) + All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) + (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`| + `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5 known_false_positives: Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate. -name: Detect USB device insertion references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest - latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) - All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) - (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`| - `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Data Protection @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index 0868427b68..7e4f2f2753 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -1,6 +1,15 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers +id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Web description: This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) + as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status + | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` + | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`' how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being @@ -19,15 +28,9 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. Yo Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate.' -id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301 known_false_positives: It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate. -name: Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) - as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status - | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` - | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Dynamic DNS @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml index 8fe03fd803..4eedd37a75 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detection of DNS Tunnels +id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4 +version: 2 date: '2017-09-18' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries @@ -7,20 +12,6 @@ description: This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data - is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution - data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and - Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure - you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category - field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro - which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains - to reduce alert fatigue. -id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4 -known_false_positives: It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. - If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold - can also be modified to better suit your environment. -name: Detection of DNS Tunnels -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" @@ -35,6 +26,18 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count fro "DNS.src" as src "DNS.answer" as message | eval message=if(message=="unknown","", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data + is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution + data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and + Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure + you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category + field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro + which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains + to reduce alert fatigue. +known_false_positives: It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. + If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold + can also be modified to better suit your environment. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Data Protection @@ -56,5 +59,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml index 325b570344..6db07ee08f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml @@ -1,19 +1,23 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers +id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution + where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src + DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. -id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6 known_false_positives: Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate. -name: DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution - where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src - DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking @@ -41,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 896eb44ed5..7d3a2651e5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -1,19 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User +id: 56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By - User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or - remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -id: 56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances - when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is - modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. -name: EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user @@ -22,6 +16,15 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_mod "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By + User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or + remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances + when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is + modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml index 1328415b4e..63608de724 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75 +version: 1 date: '2018-02-23' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create - of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been - translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance - in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. -name: EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup @@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as ear "Instance Started in a New Region","Previously Seen Region") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New Region" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create + of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been + translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance + in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: risk_object_type: system risk_score: 10 security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml index 30733708ab..881591566e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI +id: 347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3 +version: 1 date: '2018-03-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support - search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. -id: 347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3 -known_false_positives: After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with - that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created - by a legitimate user. -name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId @@ -24,6 +19,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support + search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. +known_false_positives: After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with + that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created + by a legitimate user. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index 18c333ae4b..938ad04dc8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type +id: 65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad +version: 2 date: '2020-02-07' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" - support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. -id: 65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad -known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using - a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended - to create the system with the new instance type. -name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | fillnull value="m1.small" requestParameters.instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType @@ -24,6 +19,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" + support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. +known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using + a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended + to create the system with the new instance type. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index b11af83f18..7a6b6383da 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User +id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By - User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. -id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances - when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is - launching instances that this is the intended behavior. -name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv @@ -22,6 +17,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By + User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances + when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is + launching instances that this is the intended behavior. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml index 2a79a42c73..4d8fb16510 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension +id: ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a +version: 3 date: '2020-11-19' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data - that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model - in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 - of the Sysmon TA. -id: ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "* .*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model + in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 + of the Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml index 071042bdef..5cfa40eac7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups +id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. +search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats + latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` + | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), + "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. -id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440 known_false_positives: None identified -name: Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups references: [] -search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats - latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` - | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), - "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution @@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml index 8774ced086..713d6a3023 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml @@ -1,23 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: First time seen command line argument +id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-q138afaaqa39 +version: 5 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting - logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete - process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the - Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen - command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a - historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. - For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same - value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. -id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-q138afaaqa39 -known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to - execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program - is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` - macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name -name: First time seen command line argument -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name @@ -30,6 +19,20 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_ previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting + logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete + process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the + Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen + command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a + historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. + For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same + value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. +known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to + execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program + is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` + macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A @@ -56,5 +59,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml index 1526f0ec32..c4448def42 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: GCP GCR container uploaded +id: 4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b +version: 1 date: '2020-02-20' +author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. -how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), - then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. - You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the - `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -id: 4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b -known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or - users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a - Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload - creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. -name: GCP GCR container uploaded -references: [] search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")` | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), + then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. + You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the + `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. +known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or + users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a + Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload + creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation @@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml index 62df130be0..bc1a865ec9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Identify New User Accounts +id: 475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating - the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity - framework. -id: 475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89 -known_false_positives: If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, - this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate - appropriately. -name: Identify New User Accounts -references: [] search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, "Accounts created in last week") | search empStatus="Accounts created in last week"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating + the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity + framework. +known_false_positives: If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, + this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate + appropriately. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls @@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml index 91172eae06..ef0a48048e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments +id: 2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c +version: 6 date: '2021-01-19' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. @@ -7,22 +12,20 @@ description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 en default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c -known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line - options, but it's not common. -name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line + options, but it's not common. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 6 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml index cb0893230b..e1e0089036 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -1,7 +1,15 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse +id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa +version: 1 date: '2017-09-23' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) + as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`' how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. @@ -9,13 +17,8 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you m which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa known_false_positives: None at this time -name: Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) - as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring @@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml index d561778edc..1c39f5af86 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml @@ -1,13 +1,16 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Open Redirect in Splunk Web +id: d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-19' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. -how_to_implement: No extra steps needed to implement this search. -id: d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7 -known_false_positives: None identified -name: Open Redirect in Splunk Web -references: [] search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter` +how_to_implement: No extra steps needed to implement this search. +known_false_positives: None identified +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml index 04942260d5..a66512c03f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection +id: a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc +version: 1 date: '2019-01-29' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. +search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd + OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | + bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`' how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model -id: a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc known_false_positives: There are no known false positives. -name: Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection references: [] -search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd - OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | - bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT @@ -32,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml index 8aa68f507e..80b609a5f9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Processes created by netsh +id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e +version: 5 date: '2020-11-23' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network @@ -7,21 +12,19 @@ description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute vari proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs - with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. - If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e -known_false_positives: It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in - most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether - the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" - process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. -name: Processes created by netsh -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs + with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. + If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in + most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether + the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" + process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Netsh Abuse @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml index b947e40abb..21c560cb83 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml @@ -1,7 +1,16 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Prohibited Software On Endpoint +id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893 +version: 2 date: '2019-10-11' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response @@ -12,14 +21,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. -id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893 known_false_positives: None identified -name: Prohibited Software On Endpoint references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` - | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Monitor for Unauthorized Software @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml index d3e4722069..9de43f6de7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys +id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264x9f +version: 2 date: '2019-02-27' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264x9f -known_false_positives: None at the moment -name: Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process="*add*" Processes.process="*Hidden*" Processes.process="*REG_DWORD*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: None at the moment +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml index 4c8c5bea96..89e2c8c3ba 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2020-03-02' -description: This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` - data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, - such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for - this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the - registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. -id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e -known_false_positives: This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to - modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. name: Remote Registry Key modifications -references: [] +id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e +version: 3 +date: '2020-03-02' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' +description: This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="\\\\*" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` + data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, + such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for + this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the + registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. +known_false_positives: This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to + modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics @@ -34,5 +37,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml index 9d3db6ff24..43e8a4a5ec 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Remote WMI Command Attempt +id: 272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838 +version: 2 date: '2018-12-03' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to operate on remote systems. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI. -id: 272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838 -known_false_positives: Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from - remote systems. -name: Remote WMI Command Attempt -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe AND Processes.process= */node* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI. +known_false_positives: Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from + remote systems. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml index ccb8b5efb8..2fde684e32 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware +id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6 -known_false_positives: No known false positives -name: Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= "*create*" OR Processes.process= "*delete*") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: No known false positives +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml index 3e4d630c65..ef6d63259f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure +id: f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd +version: 1 date: '2018-06-14' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. -how_to_implement: The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary - for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting - your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. -id: f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd -known_false_positives: Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. - Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. -name: Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure -references: [] search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path="*raw/services/server/info/server-info" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter` +how_to_implement: The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary + for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting + your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. +known_false_positives: Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. + Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml index 6f4002a10e..714c5cb7b3 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Suspicious Changes to File Associations +id: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc +version: 4 date: '2020-07-22' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes - from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` - nodes. -id: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc -known_false_positives: There may be other processes in your environment that users - may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are - finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. -name: Suspicious Changes to File Associations -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe @@ -22,6 +17,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime as registry_path count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` ' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes + from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` + nodes. +known_false_positives: There may be other processes in your environment that users + may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are + finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml index 5bee6c513a..787647b4d6 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Suspicious File Write +id: 57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8 +version: 3 date: '2019-04-25' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) + as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` + | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or @@ -11,19 +21,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. -id: 57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8 known_false_positives: It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate. -name: Suspicious File Write references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) - as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` - | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml index 328c46edda..0e223b562a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Suspicious writes to System Volume Information +id: cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac +version: 2 date: '2020-07-22' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. -how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line - from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 - of the Sysmon TA. -id: cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac -known_false_positives: It is possible that other utilities or system processes may - legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include - exceptions as appropriate. -name: Suspicious writes to System Volume Information -references: [] search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\ Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter` +how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line + from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 + of the Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: It is possible that other utilities or system processes may + legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include + exceptions as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml index c2c57b8ffc..14b3437c32 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml @@ -1,7 +1,16 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Uncommon Processes On Endpoint +id: 29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7 +version: 4 date: '2020-07-22' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process + Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` ' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. @@ -10,14 +19,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. -id: 29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7 known_false_positives: None identified -name: Uncommon Processes On Endpoint references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process - Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml index de021aa280..4c1639f16c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS +id: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65 +version: 1 date: '2019-12-06' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. +search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) + as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 + | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` ' how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -id: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65 known_false_positives: Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. -name: Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf -search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) - as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 - | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml index 340410c62c..28ee3a06bf 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Unsuccessful Netbackup backups +id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f +version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from - your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central - server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you - can modify this search for your specific backup solution. -id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f -known_false_positives: None identified -name: Unsuccessful Netbackup backups -references: [] search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE | search MESSAGE="An error occurred, failed to backup." | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from + your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central + server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you + can modify this search for your specific backup solution. +known_false_positives: None identified +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution @@ -27,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml index f0d89483df..7897c13c49 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Windows connhost exe started forcefully +id: c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: 'The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. ' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are - using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which - you want to collect data. -id: c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769 -known_false_positives: This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see - any false positives for this detection -name: Windows connhost exe started forcefully -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process="*C:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are + using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which + you want to collect data. +known_false_positives: This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see + any false positives for this detection +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml index c7a25f3b91..2ad0bc5adc 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry +id: 23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are - using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which - you want to collect data. -id: 23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb -known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature on a Windows system since - it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable - it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro - to tune the search. -name: Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name="DisableAntiSpyware" AND Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are + using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which + you want to collect data. +known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature on a Windows system since + it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable + it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro + to tune the search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml index eadeb4c2b1..486c39c918 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Windows hosts file modification +id: 06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116 +version: 1 date: '2018-11-02' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path + Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\* + | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -id: 06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116 known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file. -name: Windows hosts file modification references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path - Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\* - | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Host Redirection @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml index eb7bc16342..0967d7da3f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation +id: fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 +version: 2 date: '2019-12-06' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. +search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* + | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, + TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| + `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ' how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -id: fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. -name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf -search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* - | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, - TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| - `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml index 6060c1b1f6..ffd25b3196 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk -date: '2020-11-03' -description: Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159 -known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a - certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically - be done on a large number of systems. name: Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store -references: [] +id: 6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159 +version: 6 +date: '2020-11-03' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint +description: Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*certutil* (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a + certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically + be done on a large number of systems. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Disabling Security Tools @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 6 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml index a0f2a3a3ae..a6c962b0ad 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass +id: c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d +version: 6 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be - ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name - from your endpoints. -id: c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d -known_false_positives: Administrators may attempt to change the default execution - policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" - or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should - be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. -name: Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\Microsoft\\Powershell\\1\\ShellIds\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_key_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_name=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_name=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be + ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name + from your endpoints. +known_false_positives: Administrators may attempt to change the default execution + policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" + or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should + be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 6 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml index 6cbda381e3..2010563f98 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml @@ -1,7 +1,19 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Attempt To Stop Security Service +id: c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process + min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes + where (Processes.process_name = net.exe OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe) Processes.process="* + stop *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description + | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which @@ -12,18 +24,9 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi use on the command line and surround with asterisks (*****), so that they work properly when searching the command line. The file should be updated with the names of any services you would like to monitor for attempts to stop the service., -id: c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910 known_false_positives: None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood. -name: Attempt To Stop Security Service references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process - min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes - where (Processes.process_name = net.exe OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe) Processes.process="* - stop *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user - | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description - | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Disabling Security Tools @@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index a52930f64e..6290a7598e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 4 date: '2019-12-02' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* @@ -17,6 +14,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml index cd96de645d..f72681e60c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml @@ -1,12 +1,22 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Batch File Write to System32 +id: 503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3 +version: 1 date: '2018-12-14' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name + values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_path + | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| + rex field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32* + AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -id: 503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3 known_false_positives: It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the @@ -14,14 +24,7 @@ known_false_positives: It is possible for this search to generate a notable even by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary. -name: Batch File Write to System32 references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name - values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_path - | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| - rex field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32* - AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml index 2f458fdd69..17ee356fc1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification +id: 809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2020-12-21' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -id: 809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. +known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml index a42a56d7a1..56133071a7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Common Ransomware Extensions +id: a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec +version: 4 date: '2020-11-09' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) + as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex + field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`' how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which @@ -20,17 +30,10 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activi Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -id: a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec known_false_positives: It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions. -name: Common Ransomware Extensions references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) - as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex - field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -54,5 +57,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml index e9124dea55..11e73c97a2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Common Ransomware Notes +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71 +version: 4 date: '2020-11-09' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from - your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically - populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or - via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is - typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71 -known_false_positives: It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with - the same name used by ransomware note files. -name: Common Ransomware Notes -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from + your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically + populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or + via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is + typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. +known_false_positives: It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with + the same name used by ransomware note files. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml index af467e48f5..a43674de22 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Create local admin accounts using net exe +id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e -known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. -name: Create local admin accounts using net exe -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe @@ -18,6 +14,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) OR Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml index 9f161d1cd3..128a464a6a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe +id: qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e +version: 5 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e -known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network - shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate. -name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processs.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network + shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005 tags: analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml index b63dab014d..47b9e1b152 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Create Remote Thread into LSASS +id: 67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc +version: 1 date: '2019-12-06' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. +search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime + max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename + Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`' how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -id: 67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc known_false_positives: Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise. -name: Create Remote Thread into LSASS references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf -search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime - max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename - Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml index ce903eba82..e58a150115 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml @@ -1,17 +1,12 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Creation of Shadow Copy +id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844 +version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844 -known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic - will create false positives. -name: Creation of Shadow Copy -references: -- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) OR (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe @@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic + will create false positives. +references: +- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml index 7ae87fbfbf..cc7132339a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell +id: 2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b +version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. -id: 2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b -known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy. -name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell -references: -- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic* OR Processes.process_name=powershell* Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy. +references: +- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml index e827ca844e..b4e8a94ba1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy +id: d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b +version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b -known_false_positives: unknown -name: Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy -references: -- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\security* @@ -18,6 +14,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml index 7e5e824653..ce9ee228aa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -date: '2019-12-10' -description: This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903 -known_false_positives: unknown name: Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy -references: -- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf +id: c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903 +version: 1 +date: '2019-12-10' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint +description: This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml index c6e896086c..4e8c5b41c6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Deleting Shadow Copies +id: b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e +version: 4 date: '2020-11-09' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e -known_false_positives: vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped - with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately - delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare. -name: Deleting Shadow Copies -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe @@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped + with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately + delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml index f420602358..d09fc8afda 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks +id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b +version: 5 date: '2020-10-15' +author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows - Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows. -id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b -known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be - detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate. -name: Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks -references: [] search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName="ANONYMOUS LOGON") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` ' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows + Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows. +known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be + detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Lateral Movement @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml index 844e986ff4..a535de9336 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account +id: 1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-18' +author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. +search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS + LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) + as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`' how_to_implement: This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -id: 1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645 known_false_positives: None thus far found -name: Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account references: - https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/ -search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS - LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) - as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Detect Zerologon Attack @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml index e8e4b7b8e9..9a363faaff 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml @@ -1,25 +1,28 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access +id: 2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996 +version: 3 date: '2019-12-03' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. +search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) + | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, + SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename + Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ' how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -id: 2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996 known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. -name: Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access references: [] -search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) - | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, - SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename - Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml index 7107062d4a..8acf77ae34 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml @@ -1,7 +1,18 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint +id: c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74 +version: 5 date: '2020-11-09' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where + nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.dest + All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| + `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search + count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`' how_to_implement: "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change`\ \ datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute\ \ successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts\ @@ -16,17 +27,9 @@ how_to_implement: "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Chan \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\ \ to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\ \n" -id: c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74 known_false_positives: It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts. -name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where - nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.dest - All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| - `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search - count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls @@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml index b3c2e44e95..23240dde73 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts +id: 95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. -how_to_implement: ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` - datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute - successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts - you want to monitor, according to your environment. -id: 95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd -known_false_positives: It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue - causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts. -name: Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`' +how_to_implement: ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` + datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute + successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts + you want to monitor, according to your environment. +known_false_positives: It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue + causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml index 51f340892b..0d39ba018d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -1,21 +1,15 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Detect mshta inline hta execution +id: a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 5 date: '2021-01-20' +author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit - this behavior, triggering a false positive. -name: Detect mshta inline hta execution -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mshta.exe @@ -23,6 +17,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit + this behavior, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml index 0221334b4b..1898433cad 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml @@ -1,26 +1,29 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Detect mshta renamed +id: 8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-20' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: 8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved - copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. -name: Detect mshta renamed -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=mshta.exe AND process_name!=mshta.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved + copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml index 5b58205fe8..6cf9a1b490 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line +id: 9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-20' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command @@ -7,23 +12,21 @@ description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (msht malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: 9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior - and will need to be filtered. -name: Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mshta.exe (Processes.process="*http://*" OR Processes.process="*https://*") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior + and will need to be filtered. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml index 9b309dfac5..41af42bf7e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml @@ -1,19 +1,23 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Detect New Local Admin account +id: b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d +version: 2 date: '2020-07-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. -id: b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d -known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best - to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service - request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not - "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives -how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732' -name: Detect New Local Admin account -references: [] search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows + TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732 +known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best + to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service + request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not + "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A @@ -38,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml index 5b9e1c2b55..b2952c9def 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe +id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f +version: 3 date: '2020-07-03' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: 'The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ' -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f -known_false_positives: unknown -name: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe -references: -- https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` @@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process)| where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: '' +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques @@ -36,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml index 2be2e9fa47..f18e9b8aee 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml @@ -1,19 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery +id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893 +version: 2 date: '2020-11-10' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically - populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or - endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually - generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated - via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893 -known_false_positives: It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands - used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these - commands. These can generate false positives. -name: Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.process_name @@ -21,6 +14,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically + populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or + endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually + generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated + via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. +known_false_positives: It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands + used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these + commands. These can generate false positives. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Unusual Processes @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml index 2ca354306e..dfb56898c6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe +id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664 +version: 5 date: '2020-11-10' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search - includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list - of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to - better suit your environment. -id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664 -known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately - execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify - the lookup file, as appropriate. -name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search + includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list + of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to + better suit your environment. +known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately + execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify + the lookup file, as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml index d375dc3c1a..98d5dd6152 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag +id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e +version: 3 date: '2020-11-10' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. @@ -8,23 +13,21 @@ description: This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `ac If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e -known_false_positives: Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems - and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the - first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this - event on a machine -name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*psexec* Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems + and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the + first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this + event on a machine +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml index affb6511ca..0b080dea3a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml @@ -1,7 +1,19 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Rare Executables +id: 44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac +version: 5 date: '2020-03-16' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as + dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime + from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name + as process | rex field=user "(?.*)\\\\(?.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| + `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes + by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name + as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches @@ -11,19 +23,10 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. -id: 44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac known_false_positives: Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. -name: Detect Rare Executables references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as - dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime - from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name - as process | rex field=user "(?.*)\\\\(?.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| - `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes - by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name - as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml index f5459866ee..2f5bba037a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution +id: 91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-20' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior @@ -7,17 +12,6 @@ description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inl The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: 91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit - this behavior, triggering a false positive. -name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe @@ -25,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit + this behavior, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity @@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml index fc91a0fe0c..ecaa3b975a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters +id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data - that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model - in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 - of the Sysmon TA. -id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e -known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior. -name: Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="cmd.exe" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model + in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 + of the Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml index 4fb6593430..a0efa6e435 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Disabling Remote User Account Control +id: bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c +version: 4 date: '2020-11-18' +author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA* + Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name + Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action + | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -id: bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c known_false_positives: This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence. -name: Disabling Remote User Account Control references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA* - Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name - Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action - | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml index 8a3dc3680b..142690b09e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -date: '2020-02-21' -description: Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: 8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184 -known_false_positives: None identified. name: Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL -references: -- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/ -- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817 +id: 8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184 +version: 1 +date: '2020-02-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint +description: Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/ +- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817 tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml index 342f2ccac7..ab663ac773 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Execution of File with Multiple Extensions +id: b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7 +version: 3 date: '2020-11-18' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data - that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model - in the processes node. -id: b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Execution of File with Multiple Extensions -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model + in the processes node. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml index 8b94c6a383..d757af0a1d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: File with Samsam Extension +id: 02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf +version: 1 date: '2018-12-14' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from - your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using - Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you - want to collect data. -id: 02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf -known_false_positives: Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, - you should investigate all results. -name: File with Samsam Extension -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` @@ -18,6 +14,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from + your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using + Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you + want to collect data. +known_false_positives: Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, + you should investigate all results. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml index b8ae1876f6..cb435cc225 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml @@ -1,21 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom +id: e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961 +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run - the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the - initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should - also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously - Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out - old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` - macro to adjust the time window. -id: e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961 -known_false_positives: A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. - Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any - malicious behavior is taken. -name: First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process @@ -26,6 +17,18 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime value OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run + the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the + initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should + also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously + Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out + old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` + macro to adjust the time window. +known_false_positives: A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. + Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any + malicious behavior is taken. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes @@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml index 563fe74065..933fef503a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe +id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f -known_false_positives: 'Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe - to interact with the files. ' -name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: 'Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe + to interact with the files. ' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml index 733a8d879c..bbc5a7289a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption +id: 5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027 +version: 3 date: '2020-10-16' +author: Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos -id: 5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027 -known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may - generate false positives -name: Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md -- https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos +known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may + generate false positives +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md +- https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity tags: analytic_story: - Lateral Movement @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml index f3b3419074..14d1bcfd2d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml @@ -1,21 +1,16 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window +id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db +version: 5 date: '2020-11-20' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it's overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Deprecated becaue hidden is not needed when download file with System.Net.WebClient. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db -known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line - options, but it's not common. -name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe @@ -23,6 +18,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line + options, but it's not common. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell @@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml index 9e8041caed..08ce427bed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command +id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19 +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes that have encoded the script within the command-line. Malware has been seen using this parameter, as it obfuscates the code and makes it relatively easy to pass a script on the command-line. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19 -known_false_positives: System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. -name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = powershell.exe (Processes.process=*-EncodedCommand* OR Processes.process=*-enc*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml index 08ed4f2961..dd46fafd75 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml @@ -1,26 +1,29 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass +id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39 +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39 -known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution - policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated - to ensure that it is legitimate. -name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="* bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution + policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated + to ensure that it is legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A @@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml index a3e67723d2..0970143462 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml @@ -1,17 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques +id: cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4 +version: 4 date: '2021-01-19' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4 -known_false_positives: These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, - but it is not common. -name: Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe @@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "''"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, + but it is not common. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml index bf4f35075a..8c00d1684e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml @@ -1,26 +1,29 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors +id: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc +version: 2 date: '2020-11-23' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND + Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by Registry.dest, + Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name + Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -id: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc known_false_positives: You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries. -name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND - Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by Registry.dest, - Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name - Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml index 759d43e0bf..742efeeb56 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml @@ -1,17 +1,26 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery +id: c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-25' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe + OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) + by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 known_false_positives: Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used. -name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md - https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104 @@ -20,12 +29,6 @@ references: - https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/ -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe - OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) - by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name - Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware @@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml index 8c2d71c1bf..5a672f6e56 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml @@ -1,18 +1,14 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Overwriting Accessibility Binaries +id: 13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are - using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which - you want to collect data. -id: 13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae -known_false_positives: Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that - these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle. -name: Overwriting Accessibility Binaries -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe* @@ -21,6 +17,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are + using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which + you want to collect data. +known_false_positives: Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that + these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml index a8db6f3522..b7c5fdc258 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml @@ -1,18 +1,12 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location +id: 5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26 +version: 4 date: '2021-01-28' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated - via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint - data sources, such as Sysmon. -id: 5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26 -known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results. - It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories. -name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/ -- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk" AND Filesystem.file_path="C:\\Temp*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name @@ -25,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_pid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated + via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint + data sources, such as Sysmon. +known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results. + It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/ +- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html tags: analytic_story: - Phishing Payloads @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml index d1b43912da..5ef4307415 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk -date: '2020-03-16' -description: This search looks for processes launched via WMI. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: 24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands - for legitimate purposes. name: Process Execution via WMI -references: [] +id: 24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac +version: 3 +date: '2020-03-16' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' +description: This search looks for processes launched via WMI. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = *WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands + for legitimate purposes. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml index 0babe53883..f6f41d97fb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk +name: Processes launching netsh +id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e +version: 3 date: '2020-07-10' +author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data - that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model -id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e -known_false_positives: Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside - of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run - commands. -name: Processes launching netsh -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*netsh* by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model +known_false_positives: Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside + of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run + commands. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Netsh Abuse @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml index d11acd61cc..104cd85e4b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml @@ -1,19 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys +id: 8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf +version: 5 date: '2020-11-26' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. -id: 8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf -known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly - manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. - It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate. -name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data -that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model -in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response -products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data -used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes -to the registry. -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes @@ -21,6 +14,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model + in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response + products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data + used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes + to the registry. +known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly + manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. + It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Service Abuse @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml index ef74d9e0df..d9c6f3255e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases +id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb +version: 3 date: '2020-11-26' +author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis - data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response products, - such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used - for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to - the registry. -id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb -known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases - for compatibility purposes for legacy applications -name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB* by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis + data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response products, + such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used + for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to + the registry. +known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases + for compatibility purposes for legacy applications +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml index 5717404846..184eca15cd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml @@ -1,18 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Registry Keys Used For Persistence +id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b +version: 5 date: '2020-11-27' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data - that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model - in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data - used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes - to the registry. -id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b -known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute on - system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. -name: Registry Keys Used For Persistence -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*currentversion\\run* @@ -23,6 +17,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*" OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh\\*) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model + in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response + products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data + used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes + to the registry. +known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute on + system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities @@ -51,5 +54,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml index 0cdb244754..078361448e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -1,27 +1,30 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation +id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e +version: 4 date: '2020-11-27' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data - that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model - in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data - used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes - to the registry. -id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e -known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon - system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. -name: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation -references: -- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_key_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model + in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response + products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data + used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes + to the registry. +known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon + system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. +references: +- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml index 5a2aa04fc0..5c0ad6b710 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI +id: d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da +version: 5 date: '2020-11-30' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da -known_false_positives: The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may - be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, - but it's relatively uncommon. -name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = wmic.exe Processes.process="*/node*" Processes.process="*process*" Processes.process="*call*" Processes.process="*create*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may + be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, + but it's relatively uncommon. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml index 61047233a0..44479d6762 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml @@ -1,25 +1,28 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal +id: 6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833 +version: 4 date: '2020-11-30' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833 -known_false_positives: While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling - a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process -name: RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = rundll32.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling + a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Unusual Processes @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml index 452cf9c9a5..d7466c1b3a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Ryuk Test Files Detected +id: 57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are - using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which - you want to collect data. -id: 57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3 -known_false_positives: If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might - trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs. -name: Ryuk Test Files Detected -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE "Filesystem.file_path"=C:\\*Ryuk* BY "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are + using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which + you want to collect data. +known_false_positives: If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might + trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml index 4a7f607e67..2ccc77bd08 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Samsam Test File Write +id: 493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e +version: 1 date: '2018-12-14' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are - using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which - you want to collect data. -id: 493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e -known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified. -name: Samsam Test File Write -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\windows\\system32\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are + using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which + you want to collect data. +known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml index dcd17bc503..76ed9d07f9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml @@ -1,21 +1,25 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services +id: f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. -id: f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d -known_false_positives: Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, - there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate - and investigate as appropriate. -name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information -on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process="* create *" OR Processes.process="* config *") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, + there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate + and investigate as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Service Abuse @@ -47,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml index 4df4038a20..d759ae4a42 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD +id: d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c +version: 5 date: '2020-12-17' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c -known_false_positives: Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely - done by admins as well -name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely + done by admins as well +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml index 918cac5c66..69c154b30d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Schtasks scheduling job on remote system +id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6 +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a job is being scheduled on a remote system. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6 -known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on remote systems, but this - activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to - validate and investigate as appropriate. -name: Schtasks scheduling job on remote system -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe Processes.process="*/create*" (Processes.process="* /s *" OR Processes.process="* /S *") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on remote systems, but this + activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to + validate and investigate as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Lateral Movement @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml index c8b8603bc8..fd1f4b8746 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Schtasks used for forcing a reboot +id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6 +version: 4 date: '2020-12-07' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting logs - with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using - Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6 -known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to - perform updates, maintenance, etc. -name: Schtasks used for forcing a reboot -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process="*/create *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting logs + with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using + Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to + perform updates, maintenance, etc. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml index 431b251dcf..05c5108822 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk -date: '2020-03-16' -description: This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts - for legitimate purposes. name: Script Execution via WMI -references: [] +id: aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589 +version: 3 +date: '2020-03-16' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' +description: This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "scrcons.exe" by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts + for legitimate purposes. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml index 754350edd5..c92d3b42f7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml @@ -1,25 +1,28 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Shim Database File Creation +id: 6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33 +version: 3 date: '2020-12-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are - using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which - you want to collect data. -id: 6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33 -known_false_positives: Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the - time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating - events, it may warrant further investigation. -name: Shim Database File Creation -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\AppPatch\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are + using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which + you want to collect data. +known_false_positives: Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the + time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating + events, it may warrant further investigation. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml index 02f8b61983..209718a88b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters +id: 404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3 +version: 4 date: '2020-11-23' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3 -known_false_positives: None identified -name: Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: None identified +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml index d78611ebe3..1974746428 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Short Lived Windows Accounts +id: b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d +version: 2 date: '2020-07-06' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Change description: This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. -how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management - Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More - information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/' -id: b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d -known_false_positives: It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an - account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. -name: Short Lived Windows Accounts -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h @@ -17,6 +14,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`' +how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management + Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More + information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/' +known_false_positives: It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an + account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: access -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml index 2135f0cf98..5771fc65d2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml @@ -1,16 +1,11 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2020-12-08' -description: This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4 -known_false_positives: Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate - this activity with your normal incident-response process. name: Single Letter Process On Endpoint -references: [] +id: a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4 +version: 3 +date: '2020-12-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint +description: This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` @@ -18,6 +13,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == ".exe", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate + this activity with your normal incident-response process. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 20e0b2aa80..d75be2bf48 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules +id: 759a653f-cb92-40f9-94c9-ec4e47b0f709 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection indicates use of Mimikatz modules that facilitate Pass-the-Token attack, Golden or Silver kerberos ticket attack, and Skeleton key attack. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules which apply stolen credentials. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 759a653f-cb92-40f9-94c9-ec4e47b0f709 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -22,6 +18,12 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz +- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275 tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -53,5 +55,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 271795687f..00d886c605 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,19 +1,14 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules +id: 270b482d-2af2-448f-9923-9cf005f61be4 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Stolen credentials are applied by methods such as user impersonation, credential injection, spoofing of authentication processes or getting hold of critical accounts. This detection indicates such activities carried out by PowerSploit exploit kit APIs. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that apply stolen credentials, - including the module for credential injection, token manipulation, user impersonation, - getting the system, and change of identities. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 270b482d-2af2-448f-9923-9cf005f61be4 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -26,6 +21,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -57,5 +57,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 90446ad4df..425c10cc6f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules +id: 5526d3a4-2497-4e8d-9d3c-7a34c9aace2f +version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that verify password strength, i.e., identify week accounts that would be easily compromised. -eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules which assess password strength. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 5526d3a4-2497-4e8d-9d3c-7a34c9aace2f -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -19,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -45,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 6c50bcbd39..3251782604 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA +id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03 +version: 1 date: 2020-6-04 +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting windows endpoint data that tracks process - activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints. -id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA -references: -- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) | eval process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), @@ -21,6 +19,11 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(ma /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System/)=true ) | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events(); ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting windows endpoint data that tracks process + activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml index 038d0a5e13..561517cd6b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml @@ -1,19 +1,15 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion + modules +id: 73e23834-c7ad-4860-bfd0-7d8ffe6527c2 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals is a collection of PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits. -eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for credential extraction - and conversion. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 73e23834-c7ad-4860-bfd0-7d8ffe6527c2 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion - modules -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -31,6 +27,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -54,5 +55,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml index afe047d601..3452551d87 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -1,17 +1,14 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules +id: 5d2172f0-8a7d-4ecd-aad9-2dcc95699e0d +version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals is a collection of PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits. -eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for credential extraction. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 5d2172f0-8a7d-4ecd-aad9-2dcc95699e0d -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -31,6 +28,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -54,5 +56,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml index ed57562587..9770eb3b8a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml @@ -1,20 +1,16 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option +id: 312582f2-5e91-42c1-a275-cd67f31373c8 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is a newer version of pwdump tool that extracts NTLM and LanMan password hashes from Windows. Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes from a system's registry. -eli5: This detection identifies one of the inevitable stages of FGdump in which CacheDump - is called. Note, CacheDump activity may also be embedded in other exploit tools. - For more details on FGdump stages see https://github.com/interference-security/kali-windows-binaries/tree/master/fgdump -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 312582f2-5e91-42c1-a275-cd67f31373c8 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option -references: [] search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -29,6 +25,10 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: [] tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -52,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml index 53f3ce9572..baef60bfb9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml @@ -1,20 +1,16 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option +id: 3c40b0ef-a03f-460a-9484-e4b9117cbb38 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is a newer version of pwdump tool that extracts NTLM and LanMan password hashes from Windows. Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes from a system's registry. -eli5: This detection identifies one of the stages of FGdump in which CacheDump is - called. Note, CacheDump activity may also be embedded in other exploit tools. For - more details on FGdump stages see https://github.com/interference-security/kali-windows-binaries/tree/master/fgdump -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 3c40b0ef-a03f-460a-9484-e4b9117cbb38 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option -references: [] search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -27,6 +23,10 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: [] tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -49,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml index 3aaf01f9d8..9106a02d17 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml @@ -1,19 +1,16 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and + DSInternals +id: e4f126b5-e6bc-4a5c-b1a8-d07bc6c4a49f +version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit and DSInternals are common exploit APIs offering PowerShell modules for various exploits of Windows and Active Directory environments. -eli5: This detection identifies triggering of the PowerSploit or DSInternals for extraction - of all accounts from a previously dumped ntds.dit credential store. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: e4f126b5-e6bc-4a5c-b1a8-d07bc6c4a49f -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and - DSInternals -references: [] search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -24,6 +21,10 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: [] tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -44,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml index 8e823e8992..81c422de0e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml @@ -1,19 +1,15 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options +id: 341975fa-4ad0-4f01-9acc-df4f69742db7 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. LaZagne is a tool that extracts various kinds of credentials from a local computer, including account passwords, domain passwords, browser passwords, etc. -eli5: This detection identifies the most common LaZagne invocation, in which it is - instructed to extract all available passwords and output them to a file. For more - details on LaZagne see https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 341975fa-4ad0-4f01-9acc-df4f69742db7 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options -references: [] search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -23,6 +19,10 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: [] tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -44,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml index 275d143783..77ee8f0bd3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,20 +1,14 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules +id: 966b635f-98e8-4aa4-9b49-47ed2cedcc85 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Mimikatz is a collection of tools and modules commonly employed in Windows exploits. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules when they are specified directly - in a command line. This is less common use of Mimikatz, as most demos show interactive - use of this tool. Nevertheless, specifying Mimikatz modules in a command line is - possible and enables scripted/programmed attacks. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 966b635f-98e8-4aa4-9b49-47ed2cedcc85 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -29,6 +23,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -49,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml index 1651ce1b02..f699d745c6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml @@ -1,22 +1,15 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel +id: c20bb8ec-e1b0-4640-b0ef-3a4c54f8c112 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential material directly from memory and process dumps. -eli5: This detection spots when native Microsoft debuggers ask for something inside - the kernel (via ForceV1) while retrieving credentials. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: c20bb8ec-e1b0-4640-b0ef-3a4c54f8c112 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative - of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this - is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through - code, not analyze its crash dumps. -name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel -references: -- https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -31,6 +24,14 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative + of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this + is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through + code, not analyze its crash dumps. +references: +- https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29 tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -53,5 +54,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml index 8fb2ddf37e..50df426de3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml @@ -1,21 +1,15 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option +id: adc51a77-90c9-4358-b43c-f10dd1a27d05 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential material directly from memory and process dumps. -eli5: This detects use of -z command line option which specifies location of the credentials - dump file to native Microsoft debuggers. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: adc51a77-90c9-4358-b43c-f10dd1a27d05 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative - of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this - is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through - code, not analyze its crash dumps. -name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option -references: [] search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -27,6 +21,13 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative + of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this + is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through + code, not analyze its crash dumps. +references: [] tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -48,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml index 7fc22afd4b..6e6641f8f9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,17 +1,14 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules +id: 5f1186a4-e681-446e-851c-dc9574ad28eb +version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit is a collection of Microsoft PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for credential extraction. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 5f1186a4-e681-446e-851c-dc9574ad28eb -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -27,6 +24,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -47,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml index 9d8da984c2..7423d70cf7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA +id: 76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e +version: 1 date: '2020-09-15' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This search detects the memory of lsass.exe being dumped for offline credential theft attack. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event - Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) - on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml). -id: 76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA -references: -- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event, "_tenant"), "string", null), machine=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -19,6 +15,13 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_eve where process_name LIKE "%rundll32.exe%" AND match_regex(process, /(?i)comsvcs.dll[,\s]+MiniDump/)=true | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(machine), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event + Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) + on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml). +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml index afb535ea80..b5113e1907 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Xiao Lin, Splunk +name: Detect Kerberoasting - SSA +id: dabdd6d7-3e10-42be-8711-4e124f7a3850 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' +author: Xiao Lin, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests -how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated - from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2 -id: dabdd6d7-3e10-42be-8711-4e124f7a3850 -known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may - generate false positives -name: Detect Kerberoasting - SSA -references: -- Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"), EventCode=map_get(input_event, "event_code"), TicketOptions=map_get(input_event, "ticket_options"), TicketEncryptionType=map_get(input_event, "ticket_encryption_type"), @@ -19,6 +16,12 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_ | where first_time_EventCode_TicketOptions_TicketEncryptionType_ServiceName_ServiceID | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, body="TBD", entities="TBD" | select start_time, end_time, entities, body | into write_ssa_detected_events(); ' +how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated + from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2 +known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may + generate false positives +references: +- Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss tags: cis20: - CIS 8 @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - ticket_options risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml index ee9e229724..884b36a52e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Xiao Lin, Splunk +name: Detect Pass the Hash - SSA +id: 7cd8b9fa-6b0c-424f-92a6-9c5287a72f5f +version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' +author: Xiao Lin, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts using Pass-the-Hash technique. -how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated - from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2 -id: 7cd8b9fa-6b0c-424f-92a6-9c5287a72f5f -known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be - detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate. -name: Detect Pass the Hash - SSA -references: -- Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"), EventCode=map_get(input_event, "event_code"), LogonType=map_get(input_event, "logon_type"), LogonProcess=map_get(input_event, "logon_process"), ComputerName=map_get(input_event, @@ -19,6 +16,12 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_ | where first_time_EventCode_LogonProcess_ComputerName | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, body="TBD", entities="TBD" | select start_time, end_time, entities, body | into write_ssa_detected_events(); ' +how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated + from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2 +known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be + detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate. +references: +- Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss tags: cis20: - CIS 3 @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - logon_type risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml index 1de5d11a12..e47a5fe238 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml @@ -1,44 +1,35 @@ +name: First time seen command line argument - SSA +id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23 +version: 2 +date: 2021-2-1 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk -date: '2021-2-1' +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. This is an implementation on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel. -id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23 -how_to_implement: "You must be populating the endpoint data model for SSA and specifically the process_name and the process fields" -eli5: "The subsearch returns all events where `cmd.exe` was used with a `/c` parameter - in the command-line arguments to execute other commands/programs. It appends the - historical data to those results in the lookup file. Next, it recalculates the `firstTime` - and `lastTime` field for command-line execution and outputs this data to the lookup - file to update the local cache. It returns only those events that have first been - seen in the past one hour. This is combined with the main search to return the time, - user, destination, process, parent process, and value of the command-line argument." +search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, + "_time"), "string", null)) | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), + "string", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", + null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), + cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line), + cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, + "GUID"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\s)+\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, + "\\PATH"), /* replaces " \\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" + */ cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), + /* replaces "C:\\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */ cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, + /\d+/, "N") | where process_name="cmd.exe" AND match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", + ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true | select cmd_line, cmd_line_norm, timestamp, dest_device_id, + dest_user_id | first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line_norm"] | where first_time_cmd_line_norm + | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, + dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be populating the endpoint data model for SSA and specifically + the process_name and the process fields known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name -name: First time seen command line argument - SSA references: [] -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() -| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) -| eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), - dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), - process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), - cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line), - cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, "GUID"), - cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\s)+\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), /* replaces " \\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */ - cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), /* replaces "C:\\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */ - cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N") -| where process_name="cmd.exe" AND - match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true -| select cmd_line, cmd_line_norm, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id -| first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line_norm"] -| where first_time_cmd_line_norm -| eval start_time = timestamp, - end_time = timestamp, - entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), - body = "TBD" -| into write_ssa_detected_events();' tags: cis20: - CIS 3 @@ -69,5 +60,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 1a740d9a88..34e34e23c2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules +id: 01fc7d91-eb0c-478e-8633-e4fa4904463a +version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping into http and RDP sessions, etc. -eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly - access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping - into http and RDP sessions, etc. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 01fc7d91-eb0c-478e-8633-e4fa4904463a -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -26,6 +21,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -50,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml index a78424efab..53dbc1aac0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules +id: 20fba62a-fa5b-46cc-b39f-473fa248fee2 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create accounts illegaly. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that create accounts illegaly. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 20fba62a-fa5b-46cc-b39f-473fa248fee2 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -19,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -40,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 61c3291e83..5648763d5f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules +id: 3e0f9962-9989-445f-878c-939443326b63 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable accounts illegaly. -eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable - accounts illegaly. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 3e0f9962-9989-445f-878c-939443326b63 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -21,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -43,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 513957ac21..8b506ee660 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules +id: 4ddb3b0d-f95f-4ae2-b4e8-663296453a7b +version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event logs. -eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event logs. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 4ddb3b0d-f95f-4ae2-b4e8-663296453a7b -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -20,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -41,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index c24ed226de..c4c7e2f564 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -1,17 +1,13 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -date: '2020-11-09' -description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management - of Active Directoty elements and policies. -eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management - of Active Directoty elements and policies. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: a587ca9f-c138-47b4-ba51-699f319b8cc5 -known_false_positives: None identified. name: Illegal Management of Active Directory Elements and Policies via DSInternals modules -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals +id: a587ca9f-c138-47b4-ba51-699f319b8cc5 +version: 1 +date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' +description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management + of Active Directoty elements and policies. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -23,6 +19,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -46,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 66afd7d3e3..1ce01c8b13 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,17 +1,13 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -date: '2020-11-09' -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal - management of computers and Active Directory elements. -eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal - management of computers and Active Directory elements. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 75760c11-7d48-4968-b828-013b299e8f6d -known_false_positives: None identified. name: Illegal Management of Computers and Active Directory Elements via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit +id: 75760c11-7d48-4968-b828-013b299e8f6d +version: 1 +date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' +description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal + management of computers and Active Directory elements. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -24,6 +20,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -47,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 6713ef913d..b454f8d158 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules +id: 88c10ee9-fe72-4bce-b343-5b129044b991 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly elevate general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable manipulation of registry, task scheduling, persistent WMI, access to OS objects under desired identities. -eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly elevate - general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable registry manipulation, task - scheduling, persistent WMI, access to OS objects under desired identities. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 88c10ee9-fe72-4bce-b343-5b129044b991 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -25,6 +20,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -48,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 131460abd1..bb05e7652e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules +id: 2f873b1f-6352-4844-b7b9-b419f09a42c7 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege elevation. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege elevation. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 2f873b1f-6352-4844-b7b9-b419f09a42c7 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -20,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -42,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index b40e37d56b..16cb01f101 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules +id: aaf3adf1-73e1-4477-b4ee-3771898964f1 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control over services and processes, including the authentication service. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control over services - and processes, including the authentication service. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: aaf3adf1-73e1-4477-b4ee-3771898964f1 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -24,6 +20,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -47,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 96dffb7f12..a807811eb6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,20 +1,14 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules +id: 0e910e5b-309d-4bc3-8af2-0030c02aa353 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services, injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands, modifying access to service objects, etc. -eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal - control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services, - injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands, - modifying access to service objects, etc. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 0e910e5b-309d-4bc3-8af2-0030c02aa353 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -34,6 +28,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -57,5 +56,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 62fb8d6d3c..7666d455d5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules +id: d405af5d-99f1-45af-8dfb-b8f98b764247 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-04' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitate access probing with admin credentials as well as probing access to system services. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that probe use of admin - credentials as well as access to system services. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: d405af5d-99f1-45af-8dfb-b8f98b764247 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -22,6 +18,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -44,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - dest_device_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml index 361368b0d7..f80c64dcfe 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml @@ -1,25 +1,14 @@ -author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - SSA +id: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94 +version: 1 date: 2020-7-13 +author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. This is a SPL2 implementation of the rule `Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe` by @bpatel. -eli5: Obtaining access to the Command-Line Interface (CLI) is typically a primary - attacker goal. Once an attacker has obtained the ability to execute code on a target - system, they will often further manipulate the system via commands passed to the - CLI. It is also unusual for many applications to spawn a command shell during normal - operation, while it is often observed if an application has been compromised in - some way. As such, it is often beneficial to look for cmd.exe being executed by - processes that are often targeted for exploitation, or that would not spawn cmd.exe - in any other circumstances. A lookup file is provided to easily modify the processes - that are being watched for execution of cmd.exe. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon logs. This search has been modified - to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP. -id: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94 -known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately - execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify - the lookup file, as appropriate. -name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - SSA search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) @@ -36,6 +25,12 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body="TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon logs. This search has been modified + to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP. +known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately + execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify + the lookup file, as appropriate. +references: [] tags: cis20: - CIS 8 @@ -56,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml index 9d5f22295c..253069bd8e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml @@ -1,18 +1,14 @@ -author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +name: Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship +id: e03aa905-6549-4e34-b304-7a922185b2c4 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-13' +author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applications not typically used by system administrators. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to find rare parent/child relationships. The list of application has been extracted from https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries -how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. -id: e03aa905-6549-4e34-b304-7a922185b2c4 -known_false_positives: 'Some custom tools used by admins could be used rarely to launch - remotely applications. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when - it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline. - - ' -name: Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship -references: [] search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) | eval parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)), parent_process_name=mvindex(split(parent_process, @@ -52,6 +48,13 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. +known_false_positives: 'Some custom tools used by admins could be used rarely to launch + remotely applications. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when + it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline. + + ' +references: [] tags: cis20: - CIS 8 @@ -75,5 +78,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 72f23723fb..eb30b3a24b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,22 +1,15 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules +id: 3d8bd7f3-1061-4ac7-9225-6764cc0684d7 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover opportunities for malicious access and persistence. Some examples include access to admin accounts, weak access control policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data to exfiltrate, registry locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities, as well as services and system files that can be compromised. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover access and - persistence opportunities, including access to admin accounts, weak access control - policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data to exfiltrate, registry - locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities, as well as - services and system files that can be compromised. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 3d8bd7f3-1061-4ac7-9225-6764cc0684d7 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -36,6 +29,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -62,5 +60,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 159ab8250a..407061f458 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules +id: 63422f8e-766c-468f-8133-2ba6795e263b +version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover accounts, groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover accounts, - groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 63422f8e-766c-468f-8133-2ba6795e263b -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -42,6 +38,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -65,5 +66,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index e92d54f59d..c2438624ad 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules +id: 1bce67aa-3fc4-4886-9089-67f0bfebbef6 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts and groups and access to them. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts - and groups and access to them. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 1bce67aa-3fc4-4886-9089-67f0bfebbef6 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -21,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -44,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml index e2dc8e94c8..9cff7f42d9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,19 +1,14 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit + modules +id: db08ac40-ee14-43e9-9a75-dddd059ef812 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance and access to elements of Active Directory infrastructure, such as domain identifiers, AD sites and forests, and trust relations. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance and - access to Active Directory infrastructure - identifiers, sites, forests and trust - relations. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: db08ac40-ee14-43e9-9a75-dddd059ef812 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit - modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -33,6 +28,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -58,5 +58,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml index db9411b122..60026e7e39 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules +id: fe1c4c5a-09f3-4b43-8129-560a7f38a08b +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover computers, servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover computers, - servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: fe1c4c5a-09f3-4b43-8129-560a7f38a08b -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -25,6 +21,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -48,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index d3e2839394..bda6177eb0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules +id: 48664505-7d22-44ee-87d2-4c8a5bdc3d14 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers and servers and access to them. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers - and servers and access to them. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 48664505-7d22-44ee-87d2-4c8a5bdc3d14 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -20,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -41,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 84a7e74213..0604166ce0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules +id: c1d33ad9-1727-4f9f-a474-4adbe4fed68a +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover and access operating system elements, such as processes, services, registry locations, security packages and files. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover and access - system resources, such as processes, services, registry locations, security packages - and files. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: c1d33ad9-1727-4f9f-a474-4adbe4fed68a -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -28,6 +23,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -56,5 +56,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index fe3a8d6be6..0e60b19ad1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules +id: c97b6eb9-1d8b-4017-bbbb-2af7fc17bc3f +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to network shares. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to - network shares. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: c97b6eb9-1d8b-4017-bbbb-2af7fc17bc3f -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -20,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -43,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml index ef3b5a487e..7cd66cf817 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules +id: 6b7ca431-6b1e-4b40-9589-21cb368e369e +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover and access network and distributed file system shares. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover and access - network and distributed file system shares. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 6b7ca431-6b1e-4b40-9589-21cb368e369e -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -25,6 +21,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -48,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 664a29c080..02d8d9ffeb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules +id: 525d32fd-65dd-4732-9b72-3cfc7ddddbd2 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance of connectivity. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance of connectivity. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 525d32fd-65dd-4732-9b72-3cfc7ddddbd2 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -25,6 +22,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -48,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 0d993fd63e..0b61c5b6d9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules +id: 5facee5b-79e4-47ab-b0e6-c625acc0554f +version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and use of CryptoAPI services by Mimikatz modules. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for reconnaissance of credential - stores and use of CryptoAPIs for malicious purposes. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 5facee5b-79e4-47ab-b0e6-c625acc0554f -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -23,6 +19,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -49,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 949449240e..8a02f41b5d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules +id: 24b4e659-63a2-4e7b-89ac-87dd659c7110 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of presence of defensive tools. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that assess presence of - defensive tools on a compromised host. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 24b4e659-63a2-4e7b-89ac-87dd659c7110 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -20,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -42,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 9eea1a6725..db276efaed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules +id: b9b4492c-2af8-449b-beb4-b1b78d963321 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of privilege escalation opportunities. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that assess privilege escalation - opportunities. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: b9b4492c-2af8-449b-beb4-b1b78d963321 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -20,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -43,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 516cd6ffd0..f588d390af 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,21 +1,16 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules +id: fc5c1cbd-7494-4314-aad2-458d6fd4fada +version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process or service hijacking opportunities via Microsoft Detours compatibility. Microsoft Detours is an open source library for intercepting, monitoring and instrumenting binary functions on Microsoft Windows. Detours intercepts Win32 functions by re-writing the in-memory code for target functions. The Detours package also contains utilities to attach arbitrary DLLs and data segments called payloads to any Win32 binary. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process or - service hijacking opportunities. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: fc5c1cbd-7494-4314-aad2-458d6fd4fada -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Detours search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -25,6 +20,12 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz +- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Detours tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -48,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index ce08bf5829..c7a76525d4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules +id: 0243d37c-57c1-4182-bfd1-39b212255fc8 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to services and processes. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to - services and processes. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 0243d37c-57c1-4182-bfd1-39b212255fc8 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -21,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -44,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - dest_user_id risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 2fb74878c3..40f872a226 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules +id: d5ef590f-9bde-49eb-9c63-2f5b62a65b9c +version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInternals modules. -eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that set credentials illegaly. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: d5ef590f-9bde-49eb-9c63-2f5b62a65b9c -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -25,6 +22,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -51,5 +53,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 23ba8d04d5..803e852839 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules +id: c8b84699-7652-4363-910f-efd1ca82f780 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimikatz modules. -eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules that set credentials illegaly. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: c8b84699-7652-4363-910f-efd1ca82f780 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -20,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -43,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 6c142076b1..f032996f9e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules +id: 07b2a501-f967-4ddc-9f56-2dce46dfce44 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' +author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerSploit modules. -eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that set credentials illegaly. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -id: 07b2a501-f967-4ddc-9f56-2dce46dfce44 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -19,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, + including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit tags: asset_type: Windows cis20: @@ -42,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - _time risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml index 72d0b2bb06..0d56f8d6dd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ -author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location - SSA +id: 28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f +version: 1 date: '2020-08-25' +author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes run inside C:\\Windows\System32 or C:\\Windows\SysWOW64 The list of system processes has been extracted from https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml -how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. -id: 28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f -known_false_positives: None -name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location - SSA -references: [] search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), user=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", @@ -227,6 +227,9 @@ search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map union $cond_6 | where process_path!="c:\\windows\\system32" AND process_path!="c:\\windows\\syswow64" | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device, user), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. +known_false_positives: None +references: [] tags: cis20: - CIS 8 @@ -247,5 +250,3 @@ tags: - process_path risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml index 17fbe782ae..65dbac3963 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +name: More than usual number of LOLBAS applications in short time period - SSA +id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-25' +author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine. -how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. -id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93 -known_false_positives: 'Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS - applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the - beginning when it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline. - - ' -name: More than usual number of LOLBAS applications in short time period - SSA -references: -- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -46,6 +41,14 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_ev as timestamp | adaptive_threshold algorithm="quantile" value="lolbas_counter" entity="device" window=2419200000L | where label AND quantile>0.99 | eval start_time = window_start, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. +known_false_positives: 'Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS + applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the + beginning when it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline. + + ' +references: +- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries tags: cis20: - CIS 8 @@ -65,5 +68,3 @@ tags: - process_name risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml index f03f34bdfd..543471ae02 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -1,20 +1,14 @@ -author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +name: Unusually Long Command Line - SSA +id: 58f43aba-1775-445e-b19c-be2b87d83ae3 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-06' +author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. This detection is inspired on Unusually Long Command Line authored by Rico Valdez. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command - lines. -id: 58f43aba-1775-445e-b19c-be2b87d83ae3 -known_false_positives: This detection may flag suspiciously long command lines when - there is not sufficient evidence (samples) for a given process that this detection - is tracking; or when there is high variability in the length of the command line - for the tracked process. Also, some legitimate applications may use long command - lines. Such is the case of Ansible, that encodes Powershell scripts using long base64. - Attackers may use this technique to obfuscate their payloads. -name: Unusually Long Command Line - SSA -references: [] search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) | eval cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", @@ -29,6 +23,15 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(ma "cmd_line"] | where first_time_dest_device_id_cmd_line | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command + lines. +known_false_positives: This detection may flag suspiciously long command lines when + there is not sufficient evidence (samples) for a given process that this detection + is tracking; or when there is high variability in the length of the command line + for the tracked process. Also, some legitimate applications may use long command + lines. Such is the case of Ansible, that encodes Powershell scripts using long base64. + Attackers may use this technique to obfuscate their payloads. +references: [] tags: cis20: - CIS 8 @@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - process risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml index 8f770d977b..b2ef1aed8b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml @@ -1,27 +1,30 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename +id: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved - copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. -name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename -references: -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved + copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution tags: analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml index 2958264a27..28d61d3d73 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage +id: 9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: 9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming - from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM. -name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage -references: -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming + from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM. +references: +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution tags: analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml index 5e70da6104..2d29fea916 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml @@ -1,28 +1,31 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Suspicious msbuild path +id: f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, - triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better - understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will - need to be filtered on. -name: Suspicious msbuild path -references: -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework*\\v*\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, + triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better + understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will + need to be filtered on. +references: +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md tags: analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml index 27af9723dd..0966bfc877 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml @@ -1,26 +1,29 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename +id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved - copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive. -name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename -references: -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md -- https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/ search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=msbuild.exe OR process_name=msbuild.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved + copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md +- https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/ tags: analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml index bea0086cb9..9e52dff8c0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Suspicious MSBuild Spawn +id: a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using @@ -7,22 +12,20 @@ description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit - this behavior, triggering a false positive. -name: Suspicious MSBuild Spawn -references: -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit + this behavior, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md tags: analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml index 47f83a0198..f7b2fc4896 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml @@ -1,20 +1,14 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Suspicious mshta child process +id: 60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: 60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit - this behavior, triggering a false positive. -name: Suspicious mshta child process -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe @@ -25,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit + this behavior, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity @@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml index 22de98ef5f..1b05083c24 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml @@ -1,26 +1,29 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Suspicious mshta spawn +id: 4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-20' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: 4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit - this behavior, triggering a false positive. -name: Suspicious mshta spawn -references: -- https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND Processes.process_name=mshta.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit + this behavior, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml index 1417a47c4c..5c2f9a78c2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml @@ -1,20 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Suspicious Reg exe Process +id: a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0 +version: 4 date: '2020-07-22' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0 -known_false_positives: It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that - exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified - to filter them out. -name: Suspicious Reg exe Process -references: -- https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name @@ -25,6 +18,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that + exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified + to filter them out. +references: +- https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001 tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics @@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml index ad1268e084..67fdb5c3d5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage +id: 2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f +version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, or system event logs. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f -known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event - log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. -name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = wevtutil.exe Processes.process="*cl*" (Processes.process="*System*" @@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event + log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml index 84ed04e895..7a644f0ed4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin +id: b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb +version: 4 date: '2020-07-22' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into - the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. -id: b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb -known_false_positives: Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions - of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to - it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate. -name: Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = "*$Recycle.Bin*" @@ -20,6 +16,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != "explorer.exe" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into + the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. +known_false_positives: Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions + of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to + it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml index ac25353a25..65349ac57d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: System Information Discovery Detection +id: 8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-12' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. -id: 8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72 -known_false_positives: Administrators debugging servers -name: System Information Discovery Detection -references: -- https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*wmic* qfe*" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user @@ -18,6 +15,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime > 2 | stats values(process) min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Administrators debugging servers +references: +- https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation tags: analytic_story: - Discovery Techniques @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml index 075da9711f..41de7d0b97 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations +id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d +version: 5 date: '2020-12-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for system processes that normally run out of C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\Windows\SysWOW64 that are not run from that location. This can indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest details - about process execution from your hosts. Specifically, this search requires the - process name and the full path to the process executable. -id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d -known_false_positives: None identified -name: System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\System32*" Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64*" by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_hash| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest details + about process execution from your hosts. Specifically, this search requires the + process name and the full path to the process executable. +known_false_positives: None identified +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml index 5b00bbd265..612e561052 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver +id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f +version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, - update this macro to filter out false positives. -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f -known_false_positives: '' -name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name @@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, + update this macro to filter out false positives. +known_false_positives: '' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Disabling Security Tools @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml index 841ebbfaa6..f14c3a2d3e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Unusually Long Command Line +id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f +version: 5 date: '2020-12-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f -known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications start with long command lines. -name: Unusually Long Command Line -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| @@ -18,6 +15,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications start with long command lines. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions @@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml index c1809c1f3e..b65af97359 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml @@ -1,8 +1,20 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK +id: 57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941 +version: 1 date: '2019-05-08' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name + Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| + `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown + | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(processlen)" as isOutlier + | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process + processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK @@ -13,7 +25,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command line as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment. -id: 57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941 known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. @@ -22,15 +33,7 @@ known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications use long command lines for i the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model. -name: Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name - Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| - `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown - | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(processlen)" as isOutlier - | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process - processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions @@ -50,5 +53,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml index 0b52b36cd0..e304703539 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: USN Journal Deletion +id: b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3 +version: 2 date: '2018-12-03' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3 -known_false_positives: None identified -name: USN Journal Deletion -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process="*deletejournal*" AND process="*usn*" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: None identified +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation @@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml index 6c14df3f16..5b2044f40f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml @@ -1,25 +1,28 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups +id: cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-22' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -id: cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/ -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process="*delete*" AND (Processes.process="*catalog*" OR Processes.process="*systemstatebackup*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. +known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/ +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml index 5dd2eaf50c..cf4bc7270b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml @@ -1,21 +1,16 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Windows AdFind Exe +id: bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f +version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: 'This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If - you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -id: bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f -known_false_positives: administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate - reasons -name: Windows AdFind Exe -references: -- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ -- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=*-f* OR Processes.process=*-b*) AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=*-gcb* @@ -23,6 +18,14 @@ search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTim Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter` ' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If + you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate + reasons +references: +- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html tags: analytic_story: - Sunburst Malware @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml index ea14a4af55..32fcf12fce 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Windows Event Log Cleared +id: ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a +version: 4 date: '2020-07-06' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for Windows events that indicate one of the Windows event logs has been purged. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - Windows event logs from your hosts. -id: ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a -known_false_positives: It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared - by Administrators. -name: Windows Event Log Cleared -references: [] search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter` +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + Windows event logs from your hosts. +known_false_positives: It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared + by Administrators. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml index e23063bfc3..272c7aaea8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped +id: 69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are - using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which - you want to collect data. -id: 69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6 -known_false_positives: SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause - major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives - have been identified. -name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE ("Processes.process_name"="net*.exe" "Processes.process"="*stop \"samss\"*") BY "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are + using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which + you want to collect data. +known_false_positives: SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause + major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives + have been identified. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml index 5a4c93c0e5..4f8be08104 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml @@ -1,17 +1,20 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon +id: ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9 +version: 2 date: '2020-12-08' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. +search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, + EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. -id: ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9 known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. -name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon references: [] -search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, - EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml index 5e25730449..83288a1a8c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect New Login Attempts to Routers +id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Authentication description: The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network - router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You - must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating - to routing infrastructure. -id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1 -known_false_positives: Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections -name: Detect New Login Attempts to Routers -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network + router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You + must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating + to routing infrastructure. +known_false_positives: Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security @@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml index 01c02c36cb..5f7014e4f9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: Xiao Lin, Splunk +name: Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA +id: 4b237388-dfa1-41a6-91d4-4de2d598376f +version: 1 date: '2020-08-25' +author: Xiao Lin, Splunk +type: streaming +datamodel: '' description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open attachment, click links or trigger third party service. This detect uses Natural Language Processing (NLP) approach to analyze an email message's content (Sender, Subject and Body) @@ -13,14 +18,6 @@ description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open a which returns the probability of a phishing email. Current implementation assumes the email is fed to DSP in JSON format contains at least email's sender, subject and its message body, including reply content, if any. -how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject - and its message body. -id: 4b237388-dfa1-41a6-91d4-4de2d598376f -known_false_positives: Because of imbalance of anomaly data in training, the model - will less likely report false positive. Instead, the model is more prone to false - negative. Current best recall score is ~85% -name: Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA -references: [] search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get(input_event, "From"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Subject"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Content"), "string", " "), " "), @@ -41,6 +38,12 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get path="s3://smle-experiments/models/phishing_email" | eval probability = mvindex(ml_out, 0) | where probability > 0.5 | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, entities="TBD", body="TBD" | select probability, body, entities, start_time, end_time | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject + and its message body. +known_false_positives: Because of imbalance of anomaly data in training, the model + will less likely report false positive. Instead, the model is more prone to false + negative. Current best recall score is ~85% +references: [] tags: cis20: - CIS 8 @@ -55,5 +58,3 @@ tags: - UEBA for Security Cloud risk_severity: low security_domain: mail server -type: streaming -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml index ba779ee687..3279520ac2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml @@ -1,8 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces +id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8 +version: 2 date: '2017-09-19' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Email description: Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) + as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email + where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` + | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio + >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address "(?.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`' how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's\ \ address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data\ \ model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to\ @@ -16,15 +27,8 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender \ will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\ \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\ \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox." -id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8 known_false_positives: None at this time -name: Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) - as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email - where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` - | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio - >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address "(?.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -41,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml index 052b0604bd..bb0038362c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml @@ -1,21 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts +id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and - populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized - as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold - and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. - The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation - you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number - of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378 -known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the - deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these - values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. -name: Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) @@ -30,6 +22,17 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and + populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized + as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold + and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. + The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation + you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number + of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. +known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the + deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these + values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging @@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml index 7e57057de7..c30af1e322 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Monitor Email For Brand Abuse +id: b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8 +version: 2 date: '2018-01-05' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Email description: This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -how_to_implement: You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's - address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will - be checked for. -id: b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8 -known_false_positives: None at this time -name: Monitor Email For Brand Abuse -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` @@ -17,6 +14,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) a temp=split(src_user, "@") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`' +how_to_implement: You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's + address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU + - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will + be checked for. +known_false_positives: None at this time +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring @@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml index 1191bb81ad..242f56fcba 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml @@ -1,20 +1,15 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: No Windows Updates in a time frame +id: 1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f +version: 1 date: '2017-09-15' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Updates description: This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' - data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events - or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you - wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to - properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can - populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. -id: 1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f -known_false_positives: None identified -name: No Windows Updates in a time frame -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status @@ -22,6 +17,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from d <= relative_time(now(), "-60d@d"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as "Last Update Time", | table Host, "Update Status", Product, "Last Update Time" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' + data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events + or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you + wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to + properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can + populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. +known_false_positives: None identified +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Monitor for Updates @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml index e5be88cd97..b1cedc16e1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems +id: 354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea +version: 1 date: '2017-01-07' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Vulnerabilities description: The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. -how_to_implement: The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner - data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. -id: 354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea -known_false_positives: It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting - that the patches have been applied. -name: Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5753" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5715" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5754" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`' +how_to_implement: The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner + data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. +known_false_positives: It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting + that the patches have been applied. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml index 96939d20fb..8d99063ded 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml @@ -1,17 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly +id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: UEBA description: This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated - with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." - Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. -id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8 -known_false_positives: This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is - seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step - is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a - legitimate sender. -name: Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model @@ -20,6 +16,14 @@ search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated + with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." + Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. +known_false_positives: This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is + seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step + is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a + legitimate sender. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Emails @@ -37,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml index 0b5202b8c5..c78141c273 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions +id: 473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Email description: This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, + All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | + `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` + | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ' how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's\ \ address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data\ \ model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also\ @@ -14,14 +24,8 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender \ gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\ \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\ \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox." -id: 473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084 known_false_positives: None identified -name: Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, - All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | - `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` - | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -43,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml index af40707f7c..cf31dfc9a9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Suspicious Java Classes +id: if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491 +version: 1 date: '2018-12-06' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. -how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data - from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application - servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using - network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. -id: if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491 -known_false_positives: There are no known false positives. -name: Suspicious Java Classes -references: [] search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`' +how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data + from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application + servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using + network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. +known_false_positives: There are no known false positives. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability @@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index 28bd134bb1..e4190cc8ea 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection +id: 294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a +version: 1 date: '2020-04-15' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch - EKS Logs inputs. -id: 294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a -known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, - UA and source IPs will provide context. -name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS Security Scanner" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch + EKS Logs inputs. +known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, + UA and source IPs will provide context. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity @@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml index fb23111273..15e8598bfb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection +id: dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002 +version: 1 date: '2020-04-15' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch - EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` - macro to filter out the false positives. -id: dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002 -known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, - UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context. -name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI="/api/v1/pods" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch + EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` + macro to filter out the false positives. +known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, + UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml index 8834fff93b..a2ec0facbe 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: aws detect attach to role policy +id: 88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudwatch logs -id: 88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1 -known_false_positives: Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can - be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). - The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege - policies or even newly created policies. -name: aws detect attach to role policy -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudwatch logs +known_false_positives: Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can + be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). + The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege + policies or even newly created policies. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity @@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml index ee51203950..17363677d4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: aws detect permanent key creation +id: 12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudwatch logs -id: 12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01 -known_false_positives: Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is - a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context. -name: aws detect permanent key creation -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey "userIdentity.type"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudwatch logs +known_false_positives: Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is + a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity @@ -27,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml index 437712762e..3687b0d7ac 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: aws detect role creation +id: 5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad +version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudwatch logs -id: 5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad -known_false_positives: CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search - can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general - AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases. -name: aws detect role creation -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudwatch logs +known_false_positives: CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search + can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general + AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml index ba946d2904..e3767be52d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: aws detect sts assume role abuse +id: 8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudtrail logs -id: 8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662 -known_false_positives: Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism - to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted - to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. -name: aws detect sts assume role abuse -references: [] search: '`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudtrail logs +known_false_positives: Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism + to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted + to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity @@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml index 83f097a0a7..b5782424bb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: aws detect sts get session token abuse +id: 85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. +search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName + | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn + userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -id: 85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551 known_false_positives: Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used. -name: aws detect sts get session token abuse references: [] -search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName - | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn - userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity @@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml index 080e4b245f..358053810d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml @@ -1,19 +1,13 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project +id: 27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb +version: 1 date: '2020-10-09' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message - logs -id: 27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb -known_false_positives: Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum - number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior - within organization -name: GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project -references: -- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit -- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok -- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin @@ -21,6 +15,15 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{} data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message + logs +known_false_positives: Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum + number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior + within organization +references: +- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit +- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok +- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles tags: analytic_story: - GCP Cross Account Activity @@ -34,5 +37,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml index f2665721ee..a1c0dbad31 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: GCP Detect gcploit framework +id: a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-08' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message - logs -id: a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52 -known_false_positives: Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match - with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account - may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects -name: GCP Detect gcploit framework -references: -- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit -- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message + logs +known_false_positives: Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match + with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account + may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects +references: +- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit +- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok tags: analytic_story: - GCP Cross Account Activity @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml index d7a9364554..4ed52576c3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml @@ -1,25 +1,28 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account +id: 2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba +version: 1 date: '2020-10-09' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message - logs -id: 2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba -known_false_positives: High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however - it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false - positives. -name: GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account -references: -- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit -- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok -- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message + logs +known_false_positives: High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however + it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false + positives. +references: +- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit +- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok +- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference tags: analytic_story: - GCP Cross Account Activity @@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml index 1a48acc7e6..c7fb7f77a2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: gcp detect oauth token abuse +id: a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-01' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message - logs -id: a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972 -known_false_positives: GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are - access policies in place along with audit logs. -name: gcp detect oauth token abuse -references: -- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1 -- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message + logs +known_false_positives: GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are + access policies in place along with audit logs. +references: +- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1 +- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2 tags: analytic_story: - GCP Cross Account Activity @@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml index 37adf4603b..b1e002951e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -1,17 +1,20 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection +id: 19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-17' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods -how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), - then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. -id: 19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842 -known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, - User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context. -name: GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), + then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. +known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, + User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index 413ed7e756..e49171ebac 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection +id: db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26 +version: 1 date: '2020-04-15' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster -how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), - then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. - You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection - to filter out FPs. -id: db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26 -known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, - User Agent and source IPs will provide context. -name: GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 "data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision"=forbid "data.protoPayload.status.message"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="system:anonymous" @@ -20,6 +16,13 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp! as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), + then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. + You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection + to filter out FPs. +known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, + User Agent and source IPs will provide context. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity @@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index fe3ecb853f..9ce356d05e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -1,17 +1,20 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod +id: 5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6 +version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudwatch logs -id: 5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6 -known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst - must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. -name: Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudwatch logs +known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst + must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -23,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml index 7fff11e98d..4f723b39d7 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account +id: de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8 +version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudwatch logs -id: de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8 -known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations - can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -name: Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudwatch logs +known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations + can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 38f6cd9fa3..2f8ddb9a85 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access +id: 7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c +version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk - App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -id: 7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c -known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user - and object context can provide guidance for detection. -name: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk + App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user + and object context can provide guidance for detection. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index 684a590f64..15ad781918 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access +id: b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569 +version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudwatch logs. -id: b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569 -known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, - however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ' -name: Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudwatch logs. +known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, + however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index adb5dcef59..552cbac70a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access +id: a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5 +version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudwatch logs. -id: a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5 -known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent - issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -name: Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudwatch logs. +known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent + issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index 3b914725ce..9be9a9eea4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls +id: 042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2 +version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudwatch logs. -id: 042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2 -known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, - verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious - IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -name: Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls -references: [] search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudwatch logs. +known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, + verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious + IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml index 604bd4ef4c..f48d2d1228 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace +id: 55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72 +version: 1 date: '2020-05-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb -how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure - Kube-Audit data diagnostics -id: 55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72 -known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst - must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. -name: Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace -references: [] search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure + Kube-Audit data diagnostics +known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst + must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml index 411af9ca96..daecbadc5f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account +id: 47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e +version: 1 date: '2020-05-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure - Kube-Audit data diagnostics -id: 47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e -known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations - can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -name: Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account -references: [] search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure + Kube-Audit data diagnostics +known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations + can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index f7b65c99b8..c107196f39 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access +id: 1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8 +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure - Kube-Audit data diagnostics -id: 1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8 -known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user - and object context can provide guidance for detection. -name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access -references: [] search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure + Kube-Audit data diagnostics +known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user + and object context can provide guidance for detection. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index e317f69ed8..bbb4c2e527 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access +id: f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure - Kube-Audit data diagnostics -id: f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c -known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, - however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ' -name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access -references: [] search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure + Kube-Audit data diagnostics +known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, + however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index bb7bc925d7..5196ff3f46 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access +id: 019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514 +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status -how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure - Kube-Audit data diagnostics -id: 019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514 -known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent - issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -name: Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access -references: [] search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure + Kube-Audit data diagnostics +known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent + issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index a2f2545c43..816d17d06c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls +id: 4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5 +version: 1 date: '2020-05-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure - Kube-Audit data diagnostics -id: 4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5 -known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, - verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs - and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -name: Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls -references: [] search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure + Kube-Audit data diagnostics +known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, + verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs + and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -27,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml index 7c1bfa2c24..789f6aab81 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint +id: 86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure -how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure - Kube-Audit data diagnostics -id: 86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d -known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source - IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. -name: Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint -references: [] search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure + Kube-Audit data diagnostics +known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source + IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity @@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml index 2ba0d56c96..ee3aca11b0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint +id: c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a +version: 1 date: '2020-05-19' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure -how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure - Kube-Audit data diagnostics -id: c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a -known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source - IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. -name: Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint -references: [] search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure + Kube-Audit data diagnostics +known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source + IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity @@ -26,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml index 81c324f49b..ffa22e5fe4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account +id: 99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-11' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with - pubsub messaging service logs -id: 99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340 -known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations - can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -name: Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with + pubsub messaging service logs +known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations + can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index 817d6f791f..1547e991b5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod +id: 7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f +version: 1 date: '2020-07-10' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub - messaging service logs -id: 7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f -known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst - must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. -name: Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub + messaging service logs +known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst + must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 30b5635af1..1e5916fc60 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access +id: bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a +version: 1 date: '2020-07-11' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with - pubsub messaging service logs. -id: bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a -known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user - and object context can provide guidance for detection. -name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with + pubsub messaging service logs. +known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user + and object context can provide guidance for detection. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index e5847fab8d..f56f529ef5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access +id: a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-11' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub - messaging servicelogs. -id: a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30 -known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, - however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious - use. ' -name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1 | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub + messaging servicelogs. +known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, + however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious + use. ' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity @@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index 1c3d612ab8..a9d8488fa6 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access +id: 7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b +version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub - messaging service logs. -id: 7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b -known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent - issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -name: Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub + messaging service logs. +known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent + issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -27,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index f9518a66af..434aa486ed 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls +id: a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-11' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub - messaging logs. -id: a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557 -known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, - source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential - malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such - as configmaps or secrets -name: Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls -references: [] search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub + messaging logs. +known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, + source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential + malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such + as configmaps or secrets +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -26,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml index a6386f3c07..ba15ba0c80 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml @@ -1,26 +1,29 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Child Processes of Spoolsv exe +id: aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df +version: 3 date: '2020-03-16' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro - to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. -id: aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df -known_false_positives: Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children - of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added - as exclusions in the search. -name: Child Processes of Spoolsv exe -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro + to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. +known_false_positives: Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children + of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added + as exclusions in the search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml index d80b2412bb..8a9a7fd6d6 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml @@ -1,16 +1,19 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 +id: 93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-27' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`' how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -id: 93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4 known_false_positives: unknown -name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 references: - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit -search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml index 21b13143a0..482a5c3282 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault +id: 10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d +version: 1 date: '2021-01-29' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime + max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`' how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host -id: 10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d known_false_positives: If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. -name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault references: - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit -search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime - max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 @@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml index 8f1b6b2728..139a6d7071 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml @@ -1,16 +1,19 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery +id: 1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a +version: 1 date: '2021-01-28' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`' how_to_implement: OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -id: 1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a known_false_positives: unknown -name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery references: - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit -search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 @@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml index f14dedc7cf..b4e8c7514c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file +id: a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity - from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated - via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint - data sources, such as Sysmon. -id: a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893 -known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files - to the disk. -name: Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id @@ -26,6 +23,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max( file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter` ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity + from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated + via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint + data sources, such as Sysmon. +known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files + to the disk. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Phishing Payloads @@ -46,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml index a7152d772f..f4a70da9ea 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detection of tools built by NirSoft +id: 1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -id: 1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6 -known_false_positives: While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You - should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. -name: Detection of tools built by NirSoft -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You + should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml index 973138e485..a7b7d63200 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service +id: 823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808 +version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. +search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?[-\(\)\s\w]+) + service entered the (?\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services + service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen + > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time + dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`' how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running @@ -11,16 +21,9 @@ how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. -id: 823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808 known_false_positives: A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process. -name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service references: [] -search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?[-\(\)\s\w]+) - service entered the (?\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services - service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen - > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time - dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Windows Service Abuse @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml index 2dc40105d2..5688d2c7f4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml @@ -1,13 +1,23 @@ -author: Jamie Windley, Splunk +name: MacOS - Re-opened Applications +id: 40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b +version: 1 date: '2020-02-07' +author: Jamie Windley, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) + as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime + max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*com.apple.loginwindow*" + by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`' how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model. -id: 40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b known_false_positives: At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed @@ -15,14 +25,7 @@ known_false_positives: At this stage, there are no known false positives. During In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list. -name: MacOS - Re-opened Applications references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) - as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime - max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*com.apple.loginwindow*" - by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest - | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`' tags: asset_type: Endpoint cis20: @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml index f51b407e15..ef60bf5b43 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Processes Tapping Keyboard Events +id: 2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec +version: 1 date: '2019-01-25' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input +search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps + | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| + dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`' how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model. -id: 2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec known_false_positives: There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment. -name: Processes Tapping Keyboard Events references: [] -search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps - | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| - dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - ColdRoot MacOS RAT @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml index 7a25bed265..f886104b2e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml @@ -1,9 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Remote Desktop Process Running On System +id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a +version: 5 date: '2020-07-21' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Endpoint description: This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe + AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user + Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly @@ -12,15 +22,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`. -id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a known_false_positives: Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. -name: Remote Desktop Process Running On System references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe - AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user - Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 5 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml index b1479661ed..362df726e5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml @@ -1,18 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Spike in File Writes +id: fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae +version: 3 date: '2020-03-16' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host -how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint - file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection - and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. - The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads - and writes to the file system. -id: fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae -known_false_positives: It is important to understand that if you happen to install - any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can - expect to see a large increase of file modifications. -name: Spike in File Writes -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time @@ -20,6 +14,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint "-1d@d"), count,null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ' +how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint + file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection + and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. + The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads + and writes to the file system. +known_false_positives: It is important to understand that if you happen to install + any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can + expect to see a large increase of file modifications. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml index 14fe6bf28a..39a1058908 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event +id: 701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787 +version: 1 date: '2020-12-14' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. -how_to_implement: This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver - loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll - is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. - We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. -id: 701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787 -known_false_positives: unknown -name: Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event -references: -- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html search: '(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` ' +how_to_implement: This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver + loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll + is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. + We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html tags: analytic_story: - Sunburst Malware @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml index c5067ccb86..1b9f4fe828 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk -date: '2018-10-23' -description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the - Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on - the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -id: 71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions - for legitimate purposes. name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription -references: [] +id: 71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d +version: 1 +date: '2018-10-23' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' +description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the + Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on + the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions + for legitimate purposes. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml index 6fb5bcaadd..1163296152 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk -date: '2018-10-23' -description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the - Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on - the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -id: 38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83 -known_false_positives: Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions - for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these - that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to - create exceptions for other legitimate events. name: WMI Temporary Event Subscription -references: [] +id: 38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83 +version: 1 +date: '2018-10-23' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' +description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. search: '`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = ''wsmprovhost.exe''" AND query!="SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA ''AntiVirusProduct'' OR TargetInstance ISA ''FirewallProduct'' OR TargetInstance ISA ''AntiSpywareProduct''" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the + Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on + the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. +known_false_positives: Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions + for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these + that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to + create exceptions for other legitimate events. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml index 08906661e9..06fc67ecdd 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +name: Detect ARP Poisoning +id: b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac +version: 1 date: '2020-08-11' +author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. +search: '`cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection" + | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime + max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| + `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`' how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -id: b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely). -name: Detect ARP Poisoning references: [] -search: '`cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection" - | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime - max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| - `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml index 62485fe52b..3f5593e5d3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml @@ -1,8 +1,21 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: DNS record changed +id: 44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. +search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer + | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) + as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution + where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query + | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] + | makemv delim=" " answer | makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer + | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | + eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`' how_to_implement: "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that\ \ DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that\ \ the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search\ @@ -16,19 +29,10 @@ how_to_implement: "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure \ when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to\ \ active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\ \n" -id: 44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065 known_false_positives: Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate. -name: DNS record changed -search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer - | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) - as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution - where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query - | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] - | makemv delim=" " answer | makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer - | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | - eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking @@ -53,5 +57,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml index bc8c0ed2d5..d03a705cc0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Excessive DNS Failures +id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data - is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1 -known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please - investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized - to better suit your environment. -name: Excessive DNS Failures -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.reply_code"!="No Error" "DNS.reply_code"!="NoError" DNS.reply_code!="unknown" NOT "DNS.query"="*.arpa" "DNS.query"="*.*" @@ -17,6 +14,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data + is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please + investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized + to better suit your environment. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious DNS Traffic @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml index d1c101507d..6bd14858a3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml @@ -1,21 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server +id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and - populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized - as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold - and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. - The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation - you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number - of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368 -known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the - deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these - values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. -name: Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) @@ -30,6 +22,17 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and + populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized + as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold + and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. + The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation + you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number + of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. +known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the + deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these + values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging @@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml index ed30b4882e..5eae7a35b1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries +id: 8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb +version: 1 date: '2017-09-20' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data - is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -id: 8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb -known_false_positives: Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it - is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify - the threshold in the search to better suit your environment. -name: Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest" | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data + is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +known_false_positives: Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it + is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify + the threshold in the search to better suit your environment. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DNS Amplification Attacks @@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml index 8410fd7c14..5f48155296 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed +id: ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. -how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data - from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed - into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' - taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model - be populated. -id: ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479 -known_false_positives: None identified -name: Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`' +how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data + from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed + into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' + taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model + be populated. +known_false_positives: None identified +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch @@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml index 9025411078..1f3f48b8d3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml @@ -1,19 +1,16 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Protocol or Port Mismatch +id: 54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. -how_to_implement: Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect - network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo - Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, - and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. -id: 54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3 -known_false_positives: None identified -name: Protocol or Port Mismatch -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 @@ -22,6 +19,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`' +how_to_implement: Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect + network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo + Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, + and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. +known_false_positives: None identified +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml index f86378c8e7..5decad1d46 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Protocols passing authentication in cleartext +id: 6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9 +version: 2 date: '2020-11-04' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for cleartext protocols at risk of leaking credentials. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet, POP3, IMAP, and non-anonymous FTP sessions. While some of these protocols can be used over SSL, they typically run on different assigned ports in those cases. -how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and - populating the Network_Traffic data model. -id: 6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9 -known_false_positives: Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, - this is rare. -name: Protocols passing authentication in cleartext -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.transport="tcp" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port="23" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="143" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="110" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port="21" AND All_Traffic.user != "anonymous")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and + populating the Network_Traffic data model. +known_false_positives: Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, + this is rare. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Use of Cleartext Protocols @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml index 2dfc224b23..15159d0297 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers +id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-23' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Web description: This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic - that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. -id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681 -known_false_positives: It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs - containing the suspicious paths. -name: Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD") AND (Web.url="*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*" OR Web.url="*web-console*" OR Web.url="*jmx-console*" OR Web.url = "*invoker*") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic + that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. +known_false_positives: It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs + containing the suspicious paths. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - JBoss Vulnerability @@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml index 4b7e72d52e..22a0ab522c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -1,7 +1,13 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 +id: 810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-02' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices +search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`' how_to_implement: To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, @@ -9,14 +15,11 @@ how_to_implement: To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using th traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;). -id: 810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 known_false_positives: unknown -name: Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 references: - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/ - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254 - https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/ -search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml index ae202aff6e..0930f90f6d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers +id: c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d +version: 1 date: '2017-09-23' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Web description: This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. -how_to_implement: You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data - that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, - and populating the Web data model -id: c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d -known_false_positives: No known false positives for this detection. -name: Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url="*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data + that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, + and populating the Web data model +known_false_positives: No known false positives for this detection. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - JBoss Vulnerability @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml index ba509e06ce..57e84ac655 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse +id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-23' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Web description: This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) + as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`' how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301 known_false_positives: None at this time -name: Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) - as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring @@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml index 640fd10dd8..3336635cb9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml @@ -1,17 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: SQL Injection with Long URLs +id: e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Web description: This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring - network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating - the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security - assets table. -id: e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9 -known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or - long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. - Please investigate as appropriate. -name: SQL Injection with Long URLs -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` @@ -26,6 +21,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web wher "full%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "select")) + mvcount(split(url, "distinct")) + mvcount(split(url, "select%20top")) + mvcount(split(url, "union")) + mvcount(split(url, "xp_cmdshell")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring + network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating + the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security + assets table. +known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or + long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. + Please investigate as appropriate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - SQL Injection @@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml index 8b17175e8a..56c297d8f6 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: John Stoner, Splunk +name: Supernova Webshell +id: 2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-06' +author: John Stoner, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Web description: This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring - web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and - populating/mapped to the Web data model. -id: 2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1 -known_false_positives: There might be false positives associted with this detection - since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. -name: Supernova Webshell -references: -- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html -- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring + web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and + populating/mapped to the Web data model. +known_false_positives: There might be false positives associted with this detection + since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. +references: +- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html +- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/ tags: analytic_story: - Sunburst Malware @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index fcddb27b2d..0ee6aac84b 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -1,11 +1,19 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers +id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f +version: 3 date: '2021-01-14' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer + min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`' how_to_implement: 'First, you''ll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is @@ -31,14 +39,10 @@ how_to_implement: 'First, you''ll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f known_false_positives: Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified. -name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer - min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Data Protection @@ -70,5 +74,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml index 7b95a6aafd..785935f4fa 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml @@ -1,26 +1,13 @@ -author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats +id: c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' +author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. -how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network - devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security - measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for - more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk - (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco - network devices. -id: c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2 -known_false_positives: None currently known -name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats -references: -- https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf -- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html -- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html -- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html -- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html -- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html -- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html -- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html search: '`cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","MAC_AND_IP_THEFT","PAK_DROP") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac @@ -30,6 +17,22 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","M src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network + devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security + measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for + more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk + (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco + network devices. +known_false_positives: None currently known +references: +- https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf +- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html +- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html +- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html +- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html +- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html +- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html +- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html tags: analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security @@ -54,5 +57,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml index aa6664c5f7..f1ce107730 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml @@ -1,9 +1,21 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets +id: e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419 +version: 2 date: '2018-06-01' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime + latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from + datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category + !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes + > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` + | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`' how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able @@ -13,7 +25,6 @@ how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model' -id: e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419 known_false_positives: ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are @@ -21,15 +32,7 @@ known_false_positives: ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubl of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. -name: Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime - latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from - datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category - !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes - > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` - | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Command and Control @@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml index d4e624dfcf..06dd673e14 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml @@ -1,29 +1,15 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk +name: Detect Outbound SMB Traffic +id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. -how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that - you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good - understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish - internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs - that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located - in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating - this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. - This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating - the Network_Traffic data model' -id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378 -known_false_positives: It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic - is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets - and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the - lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR - blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be - investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications - of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. -name: Detect Outbound SMB Traffic -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port @@ -33,6 +19,23 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`' +how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that + you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good + understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish + internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs + that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located + in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating + this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. + This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating + the Network_Traffic data model' +known_false_positives: It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic + is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets + and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the + lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR + blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be + investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications + of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware @@ -53,5 +56,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml index 81a1babeeb..5d2cc4360a 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +name: Detect Port Security Violation +id: 2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' +author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure @@ -10,24 +15,22 @@ description: By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. -how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network - devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable - for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) - and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires - that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) - is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -id: 2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24 -known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if you have - malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically - connect physical devices to the network. -name: Detect Port Security Violation -references: [] search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation") OR (facility="PORT_SECURITY" mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION" OR mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network + devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable + for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) + and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires + that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) + is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if you have + malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically + connect physical devices to the network. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security @@ -53,5 +56,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml index a000876cb0..faca7f14f9 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ -author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server +id: 6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-11' +author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). +search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT" + | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) + AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| + `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`' how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -id: 6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079 known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface. -name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server references: [] -search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT" - | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) - AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| - `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security @@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml index 32a6c39b62..872addfb3b 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration +id: 82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. +search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)" + | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip + dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place. -id: 82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 known_false_positives: Unknown -name: Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration references: - https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/ - https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/ -search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)" - | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip - dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Data Exfiltration @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml index b95a5e8c22..2795d49284 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml @@ -1,22 +1,15 @@ -author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +name: Detect Software Download To Network Device +id: cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' +author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -how_to_implement: This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP - ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router - or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse - a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically - an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is - also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address - (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. -id: cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8 -known_false_positives: This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software - downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. -name: Detect Software Download To Network Device -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) @@ -24,6 +17,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP + ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router + or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse + a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically + an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is + also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address + (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. +known_false_positives: This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software + downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security @@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml index 019767c04a..ad5e1d565a 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml @@ -1,10 +1,20 @@ -author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +name: Detect Traffic Mirroring +id: 42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' +author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. +search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" + mnemonic="SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START") OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD" + command="monitor session*") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime + count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`' how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) @@ -12,16 +22,9 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. -id: 42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990 known_false_positives: This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators. -name: Detect Traffic Mirroring references: [] -search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" - mnemonic="SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START") OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD" - command="monitor session*") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime - count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Router and Infrastructure Security @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml index 4864991118..7e8deb16ac 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml @@ -1,29 +1,32 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address +id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-13' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Sessions description: By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. -how_to_implement: This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise - Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv - file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized - organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried - systems have their MAC address populated. -id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4 -known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives. Please - consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may - be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the - system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity - framework with the proper information. -name: Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`' +how_to_implement: This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise + Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv + file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized + organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried + systems have their MAC address populated. +known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives. Please + consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may + be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the + system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity + framework with the proper information. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Asset Tracking @@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml index 1503f7d206..8e90004f05 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk -date: '2020-07-28' -description: This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We - are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size - via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with - configurations for your Splunk environment. -id: babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -known_false_positives: unknown name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream -references: -- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ +id: babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 +version: 1 +date: '2020-07-28' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' +description: This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. search: '`stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We + are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size + via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with + configurations for your Splunk environment. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ tags: analytic_story: - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 @@ -32,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml index 742026113d..46f7d0bc13 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk -date: '2020-07-28' -description: This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek - data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY - records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The - Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. -id: c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -known_false_positives: unknown name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek -references: -- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ +id: c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 +version: 1 +date: '2020-07-28' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution +description: This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek + data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY + records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The + Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ tags: analytic_story: - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 @@ -34,5 +37,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: endpoint -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml index dc4e3b6fdd..a960699e2c 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml @@ -1,23 +1,26 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Detect Zerologon via Zeek +id: bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-15' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should - also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations - (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app - via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. -id: bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002 -known_false_positives: unknown -name: Detect Zerologon via Zeek -references: -- https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon -- https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472 -- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472 search: '`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerReqChallenge")) as challenge count(eval(operation=="NetrServerAuthenticate3")) as authcount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerPasswordSet2")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should + also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations + (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app + via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon +- https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472 +- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472 tags: analytic_story: - Detect Zerologon Attack @@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml index 68c7227903..b24c834649 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml @@ -1,7 +1,19 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK +id: 85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9 +version: 2 date: '2020-01-22' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time + max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution + by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval + query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(query_length)" + as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time + query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ' how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your @@ -30,19 +42,10 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -id: 85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9 known_false_positives: If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. -name: DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time - max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution - by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval - query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(query_length)" - as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time - query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware @@ -65,5 +68,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml index 2a1be60dd7..0b23c44fb3 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation +id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5 +version: 3 date: '2021-01-18' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Resolution description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that - DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5 -known_false_positives: It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. -name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` ' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that + DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +known_false_positives: It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml index 93bd893b49..88c8c819d7 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml @@ -1,21 +1,24 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce +id: a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. -how_to_implement: You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the - Network_Traffic data model. -id: a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923 -known_false_positives: RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from - all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. -name: Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the + Network_Traffic data model. +known_false_positives: RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from + all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml index 117724ee23..e3afcb3232 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml @@ -1,10 +1,20 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Remote Desktop Network Traffic +id: 272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-07' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND + All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source + by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating @@ -14,15 +24,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to identify sys to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. -id: 272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3 known_false_positives: Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. -name: Remote Desktop Network Traffic references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND - All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source - by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware @@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml index 797fb5b144..5683922f41 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: SMB Traffic Spike +id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. -how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs - and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. -id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378 -known_false_positives: A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause - this analytic to trigger. -name: SMB Traffic Spike -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats @@ -17,6 +15,11 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_ count, null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ' +how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs + and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. +known_false_positives: A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause + this analytic to trigger. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml index cff80cd4fb..94f891d77e 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml @@ -1,7 +1,19 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK +id: d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828 +version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) + as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where + All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by + _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, + "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 + | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | + table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ' how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your @@ -24,20 +36,11 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`' -id: d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828 known_false_positives: If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results -name: SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK references: [] -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) - as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where - All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by - _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, - "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 - | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | - table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ' tags: analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -58,5 +61,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml index bb5ff72383..441dc1f906 100644 --- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: TOR Traffic +id: ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45 +version: 2 date: '2020-07-22' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: Network_Traffic description: This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. -how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data - from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed - into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' - taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model - be populated. -id: ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45 -known_false_positives: None at this time -name: TOR Traffic -references: [] search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `tor_traffic_filter`' +how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data + from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed + into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' + taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model + be populated. +known_false_positives: None at this time +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch @@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml index 413c50b9d0..11a0c2a5ca 100644 --- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml +++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Unusually Long Content-Type Length +id: 57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7 +version: 1 date: '2017-10-13' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. -how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. - You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream - deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. -id: 57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7 -known_false_positives: Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length - greater than 100 characters. -name: Unusually Long Content-Type Length -references: [] search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`' +how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. + You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream + deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. +known_false_positives: Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length + greater than 100 characters. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Apache Struts Vulnerability @@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml index 66fa083ecf..d85ae0fe76 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ -author: Jim Apger, Splunk +name: Web Fraud - Account Harvesting +id: 31337aaa-941d-4ada-81ac-q2a17be5bf0d +version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' +author: Jim Apger, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. +search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/" + | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" + | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?.*)" | stats dc(Username) + as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> + 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`' how_to_implement: We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) @@ -10,7 +20,6 @@ how_to_implement: We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the emai reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. -id: 31337aaa-941d-4ada-81ac-q2a17be5bf0d known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to @@ -22,15 +31,9 @@ known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usu for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated. -name: Web Fraud - Account Harvesting references: - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/ - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/ -search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/" - | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" - | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?.*)" | stats dc(Username) - as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> - 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Web Fraud Detection @@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml index ed33dd989b..1a945257d5 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml @@ -1,9 +1,19 @@ -author: Jim Apger, Splunk +name: Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed +id: 31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a +version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' +author: Jim Apger, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. +search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" + | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where + TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as + ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) + | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`' how_to_implement: Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks @@ -12,21 +22,14 @@ how_to_implement: Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data f such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -id: 31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. -name: Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed references: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/ -search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" - | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where - TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as - ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) - | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Web Fraud Detection @@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml index ddebd70164..8ee30a4e83 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml @@ -1,27 +1,30 @@ -author: Jim Apger, Splunk +name: Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts +id: 31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3 +version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' +author: Jim Apger, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: '' description: This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. +search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | + rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data + "login\[password\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames + values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 + | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`' how_to_implement: We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -id: 31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3 known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. -name: Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts references: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/ -search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | - rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data - "login\[password\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames - values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 - | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`' tags: analytic_story: - Web Fraud Detection @@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: threat -type: batch -version: 1 From e87fe6564ef1cc1898d55e8d2fc30ee556f545d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:14:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 19/27] added ci job to make yamls pretty on release --- .circleci/config.yml | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/.circleci/config.yml b/.circleci/config.yml index a67ad414e2..711c24dc80 100644 --- a/.circleci/config.yml +++ b/.circleci/config.yml @@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ jobs: cd security-content source venv/bin/activate python bin/doc-gen.py --path . --output docs -v + - run: + name: make yamls pretty + command: | + cd security-content + source venv/bin/activate + python bin/pretty_yaml.py --path . -v - run: name: get cti repo for mitre-maps command: | @@ -283,6 +289,7 @@ jobs: git config --global push.default simple git add package/* git add docs/* + git add detections/* git commit --allow-empty -m "updating docs and package bits [ci skip]" # Push quietly to prevent showing the token in log git push https://${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/splunk/security-content.git ${CIRCLE_BRANCH} From b58843ca9f7770f9539796a4e7a1bcd5d42e593c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:35:58 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 20/27] added datamodels as an array --- .../email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml | 3 ++- ...le_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml | 2 +- detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml | 2 +- .../application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml | 2 +- .../application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml | 3 ++- detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 3 ++- detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml | 3 ++- ...bnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 3 ++- ...bnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 3 ++- ...s_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 3 ++- ...ect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 2 +- ...aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 2 +- ...network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 2 +- .../cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 3 ++- ...loud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 3 ++- ...ud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 3 ++- ...d_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 3 ++- ...e_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 3 ++- .../cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 3 ++- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 3 ++- .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 3 ++- .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 3 ++- .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 3 ++- detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml | 3 ++- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml | 3 ++- .../detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 3 ++- .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml | 3 ++- detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 +- ...etect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml | 2 +- .../detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml | 2 +- .../high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml | 2 +- ...abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +- ...ws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +- .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml | 3 ++- .../deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml | 2 +- .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...ect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml | 2 +- .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml | 3 ++- .../detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml | 3 ++- ...dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 3 ++- .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml | 2 +- ...2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +- .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +- .../execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml | 3 ++- .../extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml | 2 +- ...ll_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml | 3 ++- ...eg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml | 3 ++- .../scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 3 ++- .../deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml | 2 +- .../suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml | 2 +- detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml | 3 ++- detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml | 3 ++- ...t_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml | 3 ++- .../attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml | 3 ++- .../creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml | 3 ++- .../credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml | 3 ++- .../detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml | 2 +- .../detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 2 +- .../detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 2 +- .../detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml | 2 +- .../detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml | 3 ++- ...ocesses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 3 ++- .../detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml | 3 ++- .../detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml | 2 +- ...rshell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 3 ++- .../malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 3 ++- .../malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml | 3 ++- ...alicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml | 3 ++- .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml | 3 ++- .../reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml | 2 +- .../shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml | 3 ++- .../ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...a___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...sa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- ...a___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +- ...___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 2 +- ...a___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ..._illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...gement_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ement_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...llegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...gal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ..._access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml | 2 +- ...s_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...nd_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...sa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...d_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...con_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...vilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- ...___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- ...ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +- .../ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml | 3 ++- .../system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml | 3 ++- detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml | 2 +- .../application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml | 3 ++- .../experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml | 2 +- .../application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml | 3 ++- .../email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml | 3 ++- .../experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml | 3 ++- .../application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml | 3 ++- .../application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml | 3 ++- .../application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml | 3 ++- .../application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml | 3 ++- .../experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml | 2 +- ...cp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 2 +- ...bernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ...es_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- ...re_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ..._azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml | 2 +- .../kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml | 2 +- ...bernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 2 +- ...es_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +- .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml | 2 +- .../detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml | 3 ++- .../endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml | 3 ++- detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml | 2 +- .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml | 2 +- detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml | 3 ++- detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml | 3 ++- ...eiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 3 ++- .../experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml | 3 ++- .../network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml | 3 ++- detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml | 3 ++- .../network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml | 3 ++- .../detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml | 3 ++- .../experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml | 2 +- .../web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml | 3 ++- .../experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml | 3 ++- detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml | 3 ++- detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml | 3 ++- .../detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 3 ++- .../network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml | 2 +- .../network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml | 3 ++- .../network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml | 2 +- detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml | 2 +- detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml | 3 ++- .../network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/tor_traffic.yml | 3 ++- detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml | 2 +- detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml | 2 +- .../web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 2 +- 337 files changed, 473 insertions(+), 337 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml index 1c41e653c6..cf6aed99a7 100644 --- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml +++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml index 68212d5645..c5d3cf32e1 100644 --- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml +++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml index 82a6c703a6..0740c2cf38 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Detect Okta user lockout events search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml index 584477eebb..8b5426dcc9 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Detect failed Okta SSO events search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml index 6805d5819e..80a5e47e0b 100644 --- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml +++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects logins from the same user from different states in a 24 hour period. search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml index 71200c379d..b9cceaa60a 100644 --- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml +++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-04-01' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index 22e02367e6..c8df0ab4a6 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml index 1a0d746484..707441011f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-08-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml index 0f65db13e6..c1ff376df3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-07' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml index 1095e9a7cf..d0d3e0896f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-07' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml index 7e69adf812..031dc0314f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-28' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Authentication +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml index 3a7692c67e..a4908609fa 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-11' author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of KMS keys which action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an identicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml index a8a01ae4e9..4d6aa650a2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-11' author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption="aws:kms" diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml index 4330785494..d7139b27ac 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2021-01-11' author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR. search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 33b25f0de6..8e46d7d836 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2021-01-12' author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml index 583086c3d2..6df67d5086 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-04' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for new commands from each user role. search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml index ad3c3915c3..3d7badf4fb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml index 06524b6337..978fde7bf0 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-02' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml index b91c12d76d..d0929d8ea7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-10-12' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index ec1232c365..4aeac30448 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-12' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index aae7fc7feb..aa780adff6 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-29' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index 623093bb0b..8c643b706c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-09' author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index a805a550c9..fbb48af47f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-09' author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index d6b662bd2c..e509bcbc4a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-16' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index c1574a9be7..20f142f9ab 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-16' author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml index 5330520d4e..0aafdb8a6d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-28' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Authentication +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml index ac6b0a8bd9..f1da78bdcd 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-07' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Authentication +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml index b88168e79b..49329e47c4 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-07' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Authentication +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml index 813670e2f3..965ab4d574 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-07' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Authentication +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index 047817dc25..d5a702a1cb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-10' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml index 05a2b746cc..cb8dfcf3fe 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-05' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml index b72952640f..7de7edd00e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2021-01-12' author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml index 2144ea2cc2..83af071e38 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index ddc1308ca9..3cf6e5e656 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-06-28' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml index af2ca63234..63666bec2c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2021-01-26' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml index ad6779e610..a2cbabf3fe 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2021-01-26' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml index 12b6faa698..fbc6eef691 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-05-07' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml index 5eea45dfe0..e43dd157f8 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-11-27' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml index 9c1b8f633c..549076642f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml index 8d84f2b0d7..0ce8471f56 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-02-20' author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml index f4007f9877..068ee74a67 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml index 302c14c05d..6f2bafe120 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." | stats diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml index 69508d2f11..7bed02ff02 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml index 659c8fc0f3..ff9b4fdc02 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml index b0086b6ef7..0b68dd9f0f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml index c8a746f7af..7c149be71d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-15' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml index 2b0a5ffbde..11df462b65 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml index 22ea96c9bb..04a951ed8e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index 36d93256b0..1f65472313 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Jason Brewer, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml index 05246e8a1c..3a96f41ae8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 5f4d1fe8cb..da395bc609 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Jason Brewer, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index edc6d91c55..cd02a37e25 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index 555c5c4b05..97a40cd24b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index 7e53b21702..d143b96e1c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index be691c57dc..ed27f7f87a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml index c086f3711a..20ba2b6cd7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index c3f38d4493..5dad492a18 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-08' author: Peter Gael, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml index 0ea740245c..4946cd844b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-05-17' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml index aea98ef961..8fe8f9abfb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml index d5cb8fbd30..5119da220a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml index 3fe5d5703d..a8027e9689 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml index cefe58f3d0..e7185bc1ba 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-12-03' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml index 8f907ef3bd..545349814a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2019-02-27' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml index 3078398031..6fb8d2bae1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-04-16' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml index 9d1b2a0d30..d3b28f5d3b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml index f694c57e23..963b8cf9df 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml index 7f7a363d18..5af6a6f8a9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-05-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml index 4eaefe70ff..5ef191c32c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-04-18' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml index 01a88312b2..de91cb7658 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-11-27' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change_Analysis +datamodel: +- Change_Analysis description: The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index 7e4f2f2753..6159f55813 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Web +datamodel: +- Web description: This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml index 4eedd37a75..026ff56776 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2017-09-18' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml index 6db07ee08f..f469b44e0f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 7d3a2651e5..007b8365b1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml index 63608de724..650c4b7ded 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-02-23' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml index 881591566e..f3f035632a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-03-12' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index 938ad04dc8..96f2384d72 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-02-07' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 7a6b6383da..9174162343 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml index 4d8fb16510..e55b5629a0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-11-19' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml index 5cfa40eac7..f6f4bd3b06 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml index 713d6a3023..4346379bcd 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml index c4448def42..7285447e7e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-02-20' author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml index bc1a865ec9..d061e8349b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml index ef0a48048e..f25d7f22f3 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 6 date: '2021-01-19' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml index e1e0089036..192b397281 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-23' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml index 1c39f5af86..4de972c878 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-19' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter` diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml index a66512c03f..67af959905 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-01-29' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml index 80b609a5f9..6194f8d3d8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-11-23' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml index 21c560cb83..1a6704e33a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2019-10-11' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml index 9de43f6de7..b2c90e57cd 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2019-02-27' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml index 89e2c8c3ba..47303fd553 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-03-02' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml index 43e8a4a5ec..69fb12d968 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2018-12-03' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to operate on remote systems. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml index 2fde684e32..2890ec3d5d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml index ef6d63259f..41267e544d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-06-14' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml index 714c5cb7b3..5fd3eea554 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-22' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml index 787647b4d6..e45332c7ac 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2019-04-25' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml index 0e223b562a..6008e6015c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-22' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\ diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml index 14b3437c32..fd10c518ef 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-22' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml index 4c1639f16c..605f07b9ca 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-12-06' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml index 28ee3a06bf..9ba02a3e78 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml index 7897c13c49..b0918d7154 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: 'The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml index 2ad0bc5adc..bb43cc26ce 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml index 486c39c918..3d6f01dce7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-11-02' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml index 0967d7da3f..8e56001e02 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2019-12-06' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml index ffd25b3196..6b85704d5b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 6 date: '2020-11-03' author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*certutil* diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml index a6c962b0ad..a3db88ef9d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 6 date: '2020-11-06' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml index 2010563f98..aeda81bccd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 6290a7598e..073111e911 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2019-12-02' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml index f72681e60c..831414fdba 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-12-14' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml index 17ee356fc1..9677362866 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-21' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml index 56133071a7..ff222a7ad4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-11-09' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml index 11e73c97a2..0c5b056f77 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-11-09' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml index a43674de22..a5ce2ba435 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml index 128a464a6a..e6a41509ee 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml index 47b9e1b152..f169cc8f10 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-12-06' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml index e58a150115..c5d3e7bf3a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml index cc7132339a..4beda2d029 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml index b4e8a94ba1..19a4843bc4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml index ce9ee228aa..120f0c6a62 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml index 4e8c5b41c6..30bc424e63 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-11-09' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml index d09fc8afda..059103aaf6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-10-15' author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml index a535de9336..acc30daf08 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-18' author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml index 9a363faaff..731bfccaa9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2019-12-03' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml index 8acf77ae34..042c679c5f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-11-09' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml index 23240dde73..d2cc17c408 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml index 0d39ba018d..1418a13549 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2021-01-20' author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml index 1898433cad..eb067a7225 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-20' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml index 6cf9a1b490..7d03e42ed7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-20' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml index 41af42bf7e..0cb8e5f687 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-08' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml index b2952c9def..6c2692c202 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-03' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: 'The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ' diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml index f18e9b8aee..4792f6e0dc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-11-10' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml index dfb56898c6..509d2c5873 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-11-10' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml index 98d5dd6152..1750a7346a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-11-10' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml index 0b080dea3a..e3bb2315b3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-03-16' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml index 2f5bba037a..0bf9d3d37a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-20' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml index ecaa3b975a..d2323a96f4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml index a0efa6e435..51ba8ec145 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-11-18' author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml index 142690b09e..0bae24dffb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-02-21' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml index ab663ac773..633473b006 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-11-18' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml index d757af0a1d..1f28151793 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-12-14' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml index cb435cc225..ed2f96bb2f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml index 933fef503a..04875404b5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml index bbc5a7289a..68e3409ef1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-10-16' author: Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml index 14d1bcfd2d..1ca64442d6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-11-20' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it's overriding diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml index 08ce427bed..ae5c7cde68 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes that have encoded the script within the command-line. Malware has been seen using this parameter, as it obfuscates the code and makes it relatively easy to pass a script on the command-line. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml index dd46fafd75..ce4c1b25d8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml index 0970143462..84b9ad0d70 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2021-01-19' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml index 8c00d1684e..2f6f28ea94 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-11-23' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml index 742efeeb56..86d04768fb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-25' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml index 5a672f6e56..f7d474c40e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml index b7c5fdc258..59f617e43c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2021-01-28' author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml index 5ef4307415..1de8f1b1ed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-03-16' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for processes launched via WMI. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml index f6f41d97fb..885bcbb14d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-10' author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml index 104cd85e4b..19210a288e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-11-26' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml index d9c6f3255e..84e1cd7d5d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-11-26' author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml index 184eca15cd..86e78d56ed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-11-27' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml index 078361448e..54b17c7d6d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-11-27' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml index 5c0ad6b710..8730f187a9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-11-30' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml index 44479d6762..365530006f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-11-30' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml index d7466c1b3a..2b3e7386f4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml index 2ccc77bd08..19c7c97446 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-12-14' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml index 76ed9d07f9..1d634d0a46 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml index d759ae4a42..6041f950c7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-12-17' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml index 69c154b30d..445e44861c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a job is being scheduled on a remote system. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml index fd1f4b8746..c6c443a99e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-12-07' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml index 05c5108822..f871561958 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-03-16' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml index c92d3b42f7..942141552a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-12-08' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml index 209718a88b..0ab6149713 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-11-23' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml index 1974746428..01b6224326 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-06' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Change +datamodel: +- Change description: This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml index 5771fc65d2..b9e1602470 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-12-08' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index d75be2bf48..86fc6419ed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection indicates use of Mimikatz modules that facilitate Pass-the-Token attack, Golden or Silver kerberos ticket attack, and Skeleton key attack. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 00d886c605..76033240cc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Stolen credentials are applied by methods such as user impersonation, credential injection, spoofing of authentication processes or getting hold of critical accounts. This detection indicates such activities carried out by PowerSploit exploit diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 425c10cc6f..a9fbfe364a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that verify password strength, i.e., identify week accounts that would be easily compromised. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 3251782604..0d8fc65ffd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: 2020-6-04 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml index 561517cd6b..10669bcbc2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml index 3452551d87..99d03f526a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml index 9770eb3b8a..9c8372ab3e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml index baef60bfb9..deb6c19961 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml index 9106a02d17..312e52193e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml index 81c422de0e..e2bdad87a2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. LaZagne is diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml index 77ee8f0bd3..e0596efb21 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Mimikatz diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml index f699d745c6..319a629ae4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml index 50df426de3..f01749197a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-18' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml index 6e6641f8f9..dd77c7a10e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml index 7423d70cf7..a216a7dac2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-15' author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects the memory of lsass.exe being dumped for offline credential theft attack. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event, diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml index b5113e1907..c69e765be1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' author: Xiao Lin, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"), diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml index 884b36a52e..5c8e01cdc4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' author: Xiao Lin, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts using Pass-the-Hash technique. search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"), diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml index e47a5fe238..13dbb48ce4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: 2021-2-1 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. This is an implementation on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 34e34e23c2..932ff82f8b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping into http and RDP sessions, etc. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 53dbc1aac0..7295c87e80 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create accounts illegaly. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 5648763d5f..708b8caa17 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable accounts illegaly. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 8b506ee660..801c3a48a3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event logs. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index c4c7e2f564..9cae8d5559 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management of Active Directoty elements and policies. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 1ce01c8b13..b10f0022d7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal management of computers and Active Directory elements. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml index b454f8d158..5fca5d3491 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly elevate general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable manipulation of registry, task scheduling, persistent WMI, access to OS objects under desired identities. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index bb05e7652e..dfc7caecd4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege elevation. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 16cb01f101..e48c0e2dc7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control over services and processes, including the authentication service. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml index a807811eb6..f4873171d8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-09' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services, injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands, diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 7666d455d5..49aabffa48 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-04' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitate access probing with admin credentials as well as probing access to system services. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml index f80c64dcfe..51185fe9cb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: 2020-7-13 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. This is a SPL2 implementation of the rule `Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe` diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml index 253069bd8e..cae920db5c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-13' author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applications not typically used by system administrators. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to find rare parent/child relationships. The list of application has diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml index eb30b3a24b..c9e5137bbb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover opportunities for malicious access and persistence. Some examples include access to admin accounts, weak access control policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 407061f458..3b17eac833 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover accounts, groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index c2438624ad..2f883249b5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts and groups and access to them. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 9cff7f42d9..79294b6bc3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance and access to elements of Active Directory infrastructure, such as domain identifiers, AD sites and forests, and trust relations. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 60026e7e39..85e186cde5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover computers, servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index bda6177eb0..8cd9d7b26b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers and servers and access to them. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 0604166ce0..943a54c3d8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover and access operating system elements, such as processes, services, registry locations, security packages and files. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 0e60b19ad1..9e5d48b30b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to network shares. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 7cd66cf817..585c65b3ab 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover and access network and distributed file system shares. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 02d8d9ffeb..fb6b7dc776 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance of connectivity. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 0b61c5b6d9..9acc663a70 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and use of CryptoAPI services by Mimikatz modules. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml index 8a02f41b5d..c4c33b45d7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of presence of defensive tools. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml index db276efaed..0bbbbd47da 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of privilege escalation opportunities. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index f588d390af..131c82ca42 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-05' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process or service hijacking opportunities via Microsoft Detours compatibility. Microsoft Detours is an open source library for intercepting, monitoring and instrumenting diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index c7a76525d4..f6f89efba7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to services and processes. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml index 40f872a226..d59251a5a9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInternals modules. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml index 803e852839..7e48a5013d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimikatz modules. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml index f032996f9e..b06a294d1c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-03' author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerSploit modules. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml index 0d56f8d6dd..7dae442017 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-25' author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml index 65dbac3963..c12189596e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-25' author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml index 543471ae02..60b3d22433 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-06' author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. This diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml index b2ef1aed8b..4252a742a7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml index 28d61d3d73..24cdd929a4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml index 2d29fea916..21360144b3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml index 0966bfc877..d1144fcfc8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml index 9e52dff8c0..76fea9f03c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml index f7b2fc4896..5a9df018d5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml index 1b05083c24..1b379e204f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-20' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml index 5c2f9a78c2..0ac5e11eae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-22' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml index 67fdb5c3d5..d38a7b7e54 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, or system event logs. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml index 7a644f0ed4..6336a4a2c5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-22' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml index 65349ac57d..7ccc22413b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-12' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml index 41de7d0b97..7d96db24b9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-12-08' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for system processes that normally run out of C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\Windows\SysWOW64 that are not run from that location. This can indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml index 612e561052..051223669f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml index f14c3a2d3e..f7d114d917 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-12-08' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml index b65af97359..458754720a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-05-08' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml index e304703539..b0a5d88e99 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2018-12-03' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml index 5b2044f40f..5c47434d89 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-22' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml index cf4bc7270b..d83a5319bc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-16' author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: 'This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml index 32fcf12fce..4551e47785 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-06' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for Windows events that indicate one of the Windows event logs has been purged. search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineventlog_system` diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml index 272c7aaea8..b0e0e01abf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml index 4f8be08104..bdf3982186 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-12-08' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`' diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml index 83288a1a8c..dcb8aa1b6b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Authentication +datamodel: +- Authentication description: The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml index 5f7014e4f9..9fc137905b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-25' author: Xiao Lin, Splunk type: streaming -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open attachment, click links or trigger third party service. This detect uses Natural Language Processing (NLP) approach to analyze an email message's content (Sender, Subject and Body) diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml index 3279520ac2..b13ccb80ee 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2017-09-19' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Email +datamodel: +- Email description: Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml index bb0038362c..e829ed6c99 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml index c30af1e322..b90a8c2d05 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2018-01-05' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Email +datamodel: +- Email description: This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml index 242f56fcba..260866e37a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-15' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Updates +datamodel: +- Updates description: This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml index b1cedc16e1..e68543b314 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-01-07' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Vulnerabilities +datamodel: +- Vulnerabilities description: The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml index 8d99063ded..55ce9bdb67 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: UEBA +datamodel: +- UEBA description: This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml index c78141c273..a5ddc04ec4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Email +datamodel: +- Email description: This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml index cf31dfc9a9..20b9f4c9a4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-12-06' author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index e4190cc8ea..17fc6b562d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-04-15' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml index 15e8598bfb..7ec567a60c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-04-15' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml index a2ec0facbe..ec33f24fd2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml index 17363677d4..80b079210e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml index 3687b0d7ac..1841b3f6e5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml index e3767be52d..99799e92b2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml index b5782424bb..a3c5eb90ee 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-27' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml index 358053810d..417e2f1a2c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-09' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml index a1c0dbad31..7d112319e1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-08' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml index 4ed52576c3..e6f2d562b9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-09' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml index c7fb7f77a2..78040c1056 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-01' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml index b1e002951e..09d4e4b55d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-17' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index e49171ebac..87ac299a8f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-04-15' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index 9ce356d05e..6db594f667 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml index 4f723b39d7..eb823b8f5b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 2f8ddb9a85..53741c5860 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index 15ad781918..26deca7fd1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index 552cbac70a..36a83160fb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index 9be9a9eea4..ff8cba3f9e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml index f48d2d1228..df72e536e1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-26' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml index daecbadc5f..be00530427 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-26' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index c107196f39..de93ee2c4f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index bbb4c2e527..fe1a6e62b9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index 5196ff3f46..c46ac27650 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index 816d17d06c..2fa956e69c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-26' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml index 789f6aab81..3c337e5e26 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml index ee3aca11b0..287d0e96a1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-05-19' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml index ffa22e5fe4..acfbad5842 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-11' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index 1547e991b5..df859c23a8 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-10' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 1e5916fc60..4c37d551b2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-11' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index f56f529ef5..aa3b1e3cac 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-11' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index a9d8488fa6..a05269a924 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-06-23' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index 434aa486ed..7123237ecf 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-11' author: Rod Soto, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml index ba15ba0c80..21247f7933 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-03-16' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml index 8a9a7fd6d6..42553d4a4b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-27' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`' how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml index 482a5c3282..523180408b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-29' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`' diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml index 139a6d7071..bdaa20f495 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-28' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`' how_to_implement: OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml index b4e8c7514c..ed9e9b713a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml index f4a70da9ea..739c1d5904 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml index a7b7d63200..4e96c879de 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?[-\(\)\s\w]+) diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml index 5688d2c7f4..20dfa8b493 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-02-07' author: Jamie Windley, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml index ef60bf5b43..d94c514f67 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2019-01-25' author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml index f886104b2e..c00b9a83c9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5 date: '2020-07-21' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Endpoint +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml index 362df726e5..d8cdca1bb4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-03-16' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml index 39a1058908..fac0c15d6f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-12-14' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml index 1b9f4fe828..a35567f023 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-10-23' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml index 1163296152..6ba11f0709 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-10-23' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. search: '`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = ''wsmprovhost.exe''" diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml index 06fc67ecdd..0be208ae0e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-11' author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml index 3f5593e5d3..4815f3310d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml index d03a705cc0..b000a4f436 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml index 6bd14858a3..3f274315f2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml index 5eae7a35b1..2cd258a8fe 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-20' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml index 5f48155296..cae48f8216 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml index 1f3f48b8d3..2b8ef78736 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml index 5decad1d46..5c54766ef7 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-11-04' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for cleartext protocols at risk of leaking credentials. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet, POP3, IMAP, and non-anonymous FTP sessions. While some of these protocols can be used over SSL, they typically diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml index 15159d0297..3c334a6a2e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-23' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Web +datamodel: +- Web description: This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml index 22a0ab522c..f93c6322cc 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-02' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`' diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml index 0930f90f6d..71bd1b6b3c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-23' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Web +datamodel: +- Web description: This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml index 57e84ac655..d00edff771 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-23' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Web +datamodel: +- Web description: This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml index 3336635cb9..7007b3a0a9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Web +datamodel: +- Web description: This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml index 56c297d8f6..fc8f34a6dd 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-01-06' author: John Stoner, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Web +datamodel: +- Web description: This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index 0ee6aac84b..324507d7ff 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2021-01-14' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml index 785935f4fa..39240a442e 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml index f1ce107730..5d1824035c 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2018-06-01' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml index 06dd673e14..f501f5e6ab 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml index 5d2cc4360a..7d38351e33 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml index faca7f14f9..c3acdc47d9 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-08-11' author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml index 872addfb3b..862cb13a89 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-21' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)" diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml index 2795d49284..33db59428f 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml index ad5e1d565a..f270c9a423 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-10-28' author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml index 7e8deb16ac..b71232d79f 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-09-13' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Sessions +datamodel: +- Network_Sessions description: By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml index 8e90004f05..0d9fa88013 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-28' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. search: '`stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns" | append [search `stream_tcp` diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml index 46f7d0bc13..7a7e2410f9 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-07-28' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml index a960699e2c..4a09aa0491 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2020-09-15' author: Shannon Davis, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC search: '`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml index b24c834649..ec6b240ebd 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-01-22' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml index 0b23c44fb3..932d7bbc4c 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2021-01-18' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Resolution +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml index 88c8c819d7..b202102997 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml index e3afcb3232..4114cd1ea1 100644 --- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-07' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml index 5683922f41..313ae164cb 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml index 94f891d77e..9121b5469f 100644 --- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' author: Rico Valdez, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml index 441dc1f906..cc8a33a88f 100644 --- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2 date: '2020-07-22' author: David Dorsey, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: Network_Traffic +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml index 11a0c2a5ca..a8cba96a7e 100644 --- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml +++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2017-10-13' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml index d85ae0fe76..01cad47d36 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' author: Jim Apger, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/" diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml index 1a945257d5..9a82fac2eb 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' author: Jim Apger, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml index 8ee30a4e83..e80e2f4b1f 100644 --- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' author: Jim Apger, Splunk type: batch -datamodel: '' +datamodel: [] description: This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data From 70615c6a09e9dc6a929e36661fe9d6613aed8a92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:36:23 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 21/27] updated spec to include known datamodels --- spec/detections.spec.json | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/spec/detections.spec.json b/spec/detections.spec.json index 94ca4be9b5..14b619fcf2 100644 --- a/spec/detections.spec.json +++ b/spec/detections.spec.json @@ -138,6 +138,34 @@ }, "type": "string" }, + "datamodel": { + "$id": "#/properties/datamodel", + "default": "", + "description": "datamodel used in the search", + "examples": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "items": { + "enum": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic", + "Authentication", + "Change", + "Change_Analysis", + "Email", + "Endpoint", + "Network_Resolution", + "Network_Sessions", + "Network_Traffic", + "UEBA", + "Updates", + "Vulnerabilities", + "Web" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, "version": { "$id": "#/properties/version", "default": 0, From d6f8c42d236f3aa337d9be19b81da0b8b4128cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:25:21 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 22/27] processing baselines now with datamodels --- .../baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml | 18 ++-- ...e_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml | 18 ++-- ...loud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml | 29 +++--- .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 29 +++--- .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml | 29 +++--- ...loud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml | 31 +++--- ...baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml | 22 +++-- .../baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml | 21 ++-- ..._aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 18 ++-- ...ws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 18 ++-- ...aseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml | 18 ++-- ..._of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml | 18 ++-- ...line_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml | 18 ++-- baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml | 23 +++-- baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml | 16 ++-- ...ount_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml | 17 ++-- ..._list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml | 18 ++-- ...bited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml | 14 +-- baselines/discover_dns_records.yml | 21 ++-- baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml | 16 ++-- ...ystems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml | 17 ++-- ...stems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml | 19 ++-- .../identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml | 17 ++-- baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml | 16 ++-- baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml | 16 ++-- ..._api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml | 18 ++-- ...iously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml | 20 ++-- ...een_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml | 23 +++-- ...seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml | 23 +++-- ...seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml | 18 ++-- baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml | 16 ++-- ..._cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml | 17 ++-- ...n_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml | 17 ++-- ...loud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml | 17 ++-- ...cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml | 17 ++-- ...usly_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml | 17 ++-- ...ously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml | 15 +-- ...n_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml | 17 ++-- ...en_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml | 15 +-- ...instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml | 17 ++-- ..._instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml | 19 ++-- ..._provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml | 17 ++-- ...d_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml | 17 ++-- .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml | 17 ++-- .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml | 17 ++-- ...previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml | 19 ++-- baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml | 18 ++-- .../previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml | 20 ++-- .../previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml | 18 ++-- ...viously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml | 18 ++-- ...eviously_seen_running_windows_services.yml | 18 ++-- ...y_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml | 18 ++-- ...sly_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml | 18 ++-- .../previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml | 20 ++-- ...ously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml | 23 +++-- ...iously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml | 23 +++-- ...usly_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml | 19 ++-- ...ously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml | 19 ++-- ...ady_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml | 18 ++-- ...te_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml | 20 ++-- .../windows_updates_install_failures.yml | 14 +-- .../windows_updates_install_successes.yml | 14 +-- bin/pretty_yaml.py | 95 +++++++++++++++---- spec/baselines.spec.json | 28 ++++++ 64 files changed, 768 insertions(+), 523 deletions(-) diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml index 5ce3b64201..c29df505a0 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml @@ -1,19 +1,23 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Baseline of API Calls per User ARN +id: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63 +version: 1 date: '2018-04-09' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63 -name: Baseline of API Calls per User ARN search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml index f90f310ffc..ecd04d8b11 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS +id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63 +version: 1 date: '2018-05-07' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow - logs.`. -id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63 -name: Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip @@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17 as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow + logs.`. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -29,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml index 73c4a543e9..f11949b56a 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml @@ -1,11 +1,25 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User +id: 1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb +version: 1 date: '2020-09-07' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window. +search: '| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown + All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` + | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval + DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek + <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls) + as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction + api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm + show_density=true' how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users @@ -15,16 +29,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you wil 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. -id: 1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb -name: Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User -search: '| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown - All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` - | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval - DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek - <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls) - as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction - api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm - show_density=true' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities @@ -36,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index c348f25dee..b122c9c1c1 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -1,11 +1,25 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed +id: a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-25' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window. +search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted + AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time + span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, + (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 + | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek + <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction + instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 + dist=expon show_density=true' how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users @@ -17,16 +31,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you wi re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.' -id: a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549 -name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed -search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted - AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time - span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, - (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 - | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek - <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction - instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 - dist=expon show_density=true' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities @@ -39,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml index 6cbc1dc87b..4534c2fdf0 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -1,11 +1,25 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched +id: b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc +version: 1 date: '2020-08-14' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window. +search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) + AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time + span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, + (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 + | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek + <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction + instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 + dist=expon show_density=true' how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users @@ -17,16 +31,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you wi re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.' -id: b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc -name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched -search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) - AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time - span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, - (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 - | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek - <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction - instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 - dist=expon show_density=true' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -39,5 +44,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml index ae94e67620..fe20e6b2dc 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml @@ -1,20 +1,15 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User +id: 67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a +version: 1 date: '2020-09-07' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. -how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will - need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is - installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users - in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the - MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes - in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past - 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer - period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically - re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. -id: 67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a -name: Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval @@ -24,6 +19,16 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true' +how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will + need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is + installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users + in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the + MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes + in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past + 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer + period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically + re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities @@ -35,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml index 961ed75064..929bf94c16 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml @@ -1,10 +1,20 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK +id: d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459 +version: 1 date: '2019-05-08' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time + max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest + Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search + user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| + eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number @@ -15,13 +25,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoin a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. -id: d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459 -name: Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time - max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest - Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search - user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| - eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns @@ -36,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml index adbbc19159..5862243550 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml @@ -1,10 +1,20 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK +id: c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba +version: 1 date: '2019-05-08' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution + by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` + | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type + into dns_query_pdfmodel' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any @@ -13,12 +23,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. -id: c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba -name: Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution - by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` - | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type - into dns_query_pdfmodel' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Command and Control @@ -30,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index b2d96fe4ee..89b19ba4ec 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -1,10 +1,18 @@ -author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK +id: fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba +version: 1 date: '2019-11-14' +author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window. +search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` + | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | + fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1' how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\ @@ -19,11 +27,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.' -id: fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba -name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK -search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` - | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | - fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -34,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 940c3de45e..2ae61114e3 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -1,11 +1,19 @@ -author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK +id: b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab +version: 1 date: '2019-11-14' +author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window. +search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` + | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user + | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1' how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\ @@ -20,11 +28,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.' -id: b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab -name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK -search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` - | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user - | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities @@ -34,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml index 69bce5deb3..40fdcb8dc9 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml @@ -1,20 +1,24 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN +id: fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63 +version: 1 date: '2018-05-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. -id: fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63 -name: Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity @@ -24,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml index 05dc63dfd7..23c168289d 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml @@ -1,19 +1,23 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN +id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63eq3783fd63 +version: 1 date: '2018-07-17' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63eq3783fd63 -name: Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities @@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml index a291a1318c..78c5e7356a 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml @@ -1,20 +1,24 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN +id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63 +version: 1 date: '2018-04-17' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63 -name: Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -24,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml index 05e8af01ee..bf066b6b19 100644 --- a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml @@ -1,11 +1,22 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK +id: df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9 +version: 1 date: '2019-05-08' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic + where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb + by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval + DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction + count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, @@ -19,13 +30,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Netwo which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. -id: df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9 -name: Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic - where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb - by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval - DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction - count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A @@ -41,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml index 145f272e1a..ceabf9c8ca 100644 --- a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml +++ b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml @@ -1,16 +1,20 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Count of assets by category +id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-13' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that belong to those categories. +search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) + by category | sort -count' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must first leverage the Assets and Identity framework in Enterprise Security to populate your assets_by_str.csv file which should then be mapped to the Identity_Management data model. The Identity_Management data model will contain a list of known authorized company assets. Ensure that all inventoried systems are constantly vetted and updated. -id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9 -name: Count of assets by category -search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) - by category | sort -count' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Asset Tracking @@ -20,5 +24,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml b/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml index df6840a21d..0a8511f52f 100644 --- a/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml +++ b/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports +id: 9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f +version: 1 date: '2017-09-13' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network - traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. -id: 9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f -name: Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network + traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. +references: [] tags: product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml index fa531856a5..c7d9285e4a 100644 --- a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml +++ b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml @@ -1,18 +1,22 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Create a list of approved AWS service accounts +id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b1-5f6f-63ga3789fd43 +version: 2 date: '2018-12-03' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file. +search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT + [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity + | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count' how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the service account entires in `aws_service_accounts.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. Please remove the entries of service accounts that are not legitimate. -id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b1-5f6f-63ga3789fd43 -name: Create a list of approved AWS service accounts -search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT - [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity - | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -22,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml index c2bffe3968..e24ce8914c 100644 --- a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml @@ -1,15 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security +id: 251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce +version: 1 date: '2017-09-15' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints. -how_to_implement: This search should be run on each new install of ESCU. -id: 251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce -name: Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security search: '| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count' +how_to_implement: This search should be run on each new install of ESCU. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -21,5 +25,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml index 4cdcf408e3..80821f7d93 100644 --- a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml +++ b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Discover DNS records +id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3 +version: 1 date: '2019-02-14' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Network_Resolution description: The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv` finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS - logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the - cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated - with the domains owned by your corporation -id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3 -name: Discover DNS records search: '| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain, "\*", "")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) @@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ search: '| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T ci where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv delim=" " answer | makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS + logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the + cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated + with the domains owned by your corporation +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking @@ -27,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml index fcfe8d6ed2..9b2212d511 100644 --- a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml +++ b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml @@ -1,15 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: DNSTwist Domain Names +id: 19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f +version: 2 date: '2018-10-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches. +search: '| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true" + | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\_SA\_CIM**. -id: 19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f -name: DNSTwist Domain Names -search: '| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true" - | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring @@ -22,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml index 076fb32988..6e90a11fc0 100644 --- a/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml +++ b/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic +id: 5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a +version: 1 date: '2017-09-15' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic - and populate the Network_Traffic data model. -id: 5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a -name: Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic + and populate the Network_Traffic data model. +references: [] tags: product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml index 22992acd1b..91daa4eb10 100644 --- a/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml +++ b/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml @@ -1,19 +1,22 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic +id: baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-15' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Network_Traffic description: This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic - and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote - desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it. -id: baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608 -name: Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic + and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote + desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it. +references: [] tags: product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml index 15d1e1dfb2..f1ba95bb24 100644 --- a/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml +++ b/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop +id: 063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8 +version: 1 date: '2019-04-01' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint - data that records process activity. -id: 063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8 -name: Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="*mstsc.exe*" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint + data that records process activity. +references: [] tags: product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml index b22b82c3a8..d9a0ebaecc 100644 --- a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml +++ b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml @@ -1,15 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Monitor Successful Backups +id: b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e +version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your - backup logs. -id: b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e -name: Monitor Successful Backups search: '`netbackup` "Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your + backup logs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution @@ -19,5 +23,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml index a41169e6bd..0ea3dcac07 100644 --- a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml +++ b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml @@ -1,14 +1,18 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Monitor Unsuccessful Backups +id: b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures happen in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your - backup logs. -id: b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56 -name: Monitor Unsuccessful Backups search: '`netbackup` "An error occurred, failed to backup." | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your + backup logs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Monitor Backup Solution @@ -18,5 +22,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml index 0b7b0829ea..6e2fed12ec 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -1,19 +1,23 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail +id: fc0edc95-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63da3289fd03 +version: 1 date: '2018-04-16' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role. +search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole + | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName + | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count' how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. -id: fc0edc95-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63da3289fd03 -name: Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail -search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole - | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName - | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring @@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml index b75490ccfa..7c067846c4 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml @@ -1,19 +1,23 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity +id: 1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2 +version: 1 date: '2018-06-04' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, - a lookup file created by this support search. -id: 1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2 -name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=* | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, + a lookup file created by this support search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cross Account Activity @@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml index 6183e22c3d..82c4ee7c50 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial +id: 82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf +version: 1 date: '2020-08-15' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file. -how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version - 5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates - to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries - in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this - support search. -id: 82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf -name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` @@ -17,6 +16,12 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries + in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this + support search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities @@ -28,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml index f25b7b22a0..af68491886 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update +id: dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-15' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file. -how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version - 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates - to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries - in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this - support search. -id: dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3 -name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` @@ -18,6 +17,12 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries + in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this + support search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities @@ -29,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml index ebd29dc6dd..60d6b7aa8a 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml @@ -1,17 +1,21 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources +id: ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee +version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee -name: Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities @@ -24,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml index 4ede3e699e..1df505e38b 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml @@ -1,16 +1,20 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Previously Seen AWS Regions +id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63 +version: 1 date: '2018-01-08' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days +search: '`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) + as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count' how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63 -name: Previously Seen AWS Regions -search: '`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) - as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -21,5 +25,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml index fc6fca22c4..f853de53bf 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml @@ -1,18 +1,23 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial +id: 69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-03' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. -id: 69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4 -name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities @@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml index efc0b3a82c..00fca81f4d 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update +id: c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e +version: 1 date: '2020-09-03' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. -id: c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e -name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` @@ -15,6 +17,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities @@ -26,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml index d56d63eca4..e309c2e0df 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml @@ -1,15 +1,20 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial +id: dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-15' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the proper TAs installed. -id: dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8 -name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs + and have the proper TAs installed. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -21,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml index 132de6a3bd..334686f861 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update +id: 6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f +version: 1 date: '2020-08-15' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the proper TAs installed. -id: 6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f -name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t @@ -13,6 +15,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "-90d@d") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs + and have the proper TAs installed. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml index f58c2ffe08..af3ac8e571 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml @@ -1,17 +1,22 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial +id: 7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated -id: 7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410 -name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where image_id != "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs + and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -23,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml index a2d6216129..dd1c48d763 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml @@ -1,10 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update +id: 6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs -id: 6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184 -name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` @@ -13,6 +16,8 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml index 96857b1b6b..93dd8ad01e 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml @@ -1,16 +1,21 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial +id: 3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be +version: 1 date: 2020-9-03 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -id: 3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be -name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs + and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -22,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml index 02906d8c5d..d8d5642f1c 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml @@ -1,10 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update +id: 7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c +version: 1 date: 2020-9-03 +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs -id: 7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c -name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != @@ -13,6 +16,8 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml index feee4361a8..7dd2f703ef 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml @@ -1,16 +1,21 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial +id: f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-29' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated. -id: f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5 -name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs + and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities @@ -22,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml index 46a125102c..c1b8b7fea0 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml @@ -1,12 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update +id: 534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d +version: 1 date: '2020-07-29' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -id: 534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d -name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` @@ -15,6 +16,10 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities @@ -26,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml index ea9d9ccb72..452b894a83 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml @@ -1,13 +1,15 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial +id: 4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-19' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. -id: 4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7 -name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` @@ -15,6 +17,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities @@ -29,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml index 5162d6d558..b7d5627ac8 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml @@ -1,15 +1,17 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update +id: 9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-20' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud - provider. -id: 9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3 -name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` @@ -20,6 +22,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud + provider. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities @@ -34,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml index 0e6ed4a25d..c4d47d8c07 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml @@ -1,18 +1,23 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial +id: b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-02' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -id: b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40 -name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs + and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml index a3290c216e..d7e15257bd 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml @@ -1,13 +1,15 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update +id: 512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-02' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Change description: This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -id: 512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4 -name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions @@ -16,6 +18,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs + and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining @@ -27,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml index 78dde9150b..bc4759a0de 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -1,18 +1,23 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Previously seen command line arguments +id: 56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3 +version: 2 date: '2019-03-01' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe + AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -id: 56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3 -name: Previously seen command line arguments -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe - AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A @@ -31,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml index d645861c24..5617881387 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml @@ -1,15 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen EC2 AMIs +id: bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9 +version: 1 date: '2018-03-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9 -name: Previously Seen EC2 AMIs search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -19,5 +23,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml index f99d1be6dd..f7d824b7bc 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml @@ -1,15 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2018-03-08' -description: This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45 name: Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types +id: b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45 +version: 1 +date: '2018-03-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] +description: This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value="m1.small" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -19,5 +23,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml index d7662e0c7f..ac11dca07c 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml @@ -1,15 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User +id: 6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad +version: 1 date: '2018-03-15' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: 6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad -name: Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Cryptomining @@ -20,5 +24,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml index 17f13510bd..ab0ee91c62 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml @@ -1,15 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User +id: 4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb +version: 1 date: '2018-04-05' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -id: 4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb -name: Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications @@ -19,5 +23,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml index 3f94137dbe..bc6496cf54 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml @@ -1,15 +1,19 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial +id: 64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394 +version: 3 date: '2020-06-23' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise. -how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, - you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. - Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. -id: 64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394 -name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services' +how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, + you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. + Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Orangeworm Attack Group @@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml index afd14e91cc..9fada7ff36 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml @@ -1,20 +1,24 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update +id: 2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c +version: 3 date: '2020-06-23' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached. -how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, - you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. - Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. -id: 2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c -name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services' +how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, + you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. + Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Orangeworm Attack Group @@ -28,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml index 0c37e633b7..e233c7e139 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml @@ -1,18 +1,22 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP +id: fc0edc15-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63qa1281fd03 +version: 1 date: '2018-06-28' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200" +search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earliest + latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip + | stats count' how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. -id: fc0edc15-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63qa1281fd03 -name: Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP -search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earliest - latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip - | stats count' +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities @@ -22,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml index acd83237a8..64061c014f 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -1,20 +1,24 @@ -author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +name: Previously seen users in CloudTrail +id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03 +version: 1 date: '2018-04-30' +author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, - which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. -id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03 -name: Previously seen users in CloudTrail search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, + which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities @@ -27,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml index f9b45f2ebb..7eec7f5fc1 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml @@ -1,21 +1,26 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial +id: 0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5 +version: 1 date: '2020-05-28' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days. -how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version - 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates - to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries - in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this - support search. -id: 0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5 -name: Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries + in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this + support search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities @@ -30,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml index abb22e831f..a8b2d902c0 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml @@ -1,21 +1,26 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update +id: 66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322 +version: 1 date: '2020-05-28' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Authentication description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. -how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version - 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates - to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries - in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this - support search. -id: 66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322 -name: Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries + in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this + support search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities @@ -30,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml index 17810d14f2..18f30dcfe6 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml @@ -1,18 +1,23 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial +id: 60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. -id: 60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b -name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes @@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml index 5acc0a72ca..b24f5b9a95 100644 --- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml @@ -1,15 +1,16 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update +id: 80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. -id: 80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee -name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| @@ -18,6 +19,10 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen m as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes @@ -29,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml index 47f5ab4190..d2fb1acb11 100644 --- a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml +++ b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml @@ -1,20 +1,24 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch +id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61 +version: 1 date: '2018-01-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown. -how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line - from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 - of the Sysmon TA. -id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61 -name: Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry AND (All_Changes.object_path="HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\QualityCompat*") by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`' +how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line + from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 + of the Sysmon TA. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities @@ -24,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml index 8fe19e31b9..ff05c11dae 100644 --- a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -1,22 +1,26 @@ -author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +name: Update previously seen users in CloudTrail +id: 06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031 +version: 1 date: '2018-04-30' +author: Jason Brewer, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, - which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. -id: 06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031 -name: Update previously seen users in CloudTrail search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, + which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities @@ -29,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml b/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml index 8e439ff3ad..8eae1f6a7e 100644 --- a/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml +++ b/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml @@ -1,18 +1,20 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Windows Updates Install Failures +id: 6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-14' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs -id: 6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7 -name: Windows Updates Install Failures search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" AND Updates.status=failure by _time span=1d' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs +references: [] tags: product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml b/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml index 44f338641b..e9ec9b9ae9 100644 --- a/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml +++ b/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml @@ -1,18 +1,20 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Windows Updates Install Successes +id: 6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d +version: 1 date: '2017-09-14' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs -id: 6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d -name: Windows Updates Install Successes search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" AND Updates.status=installed by _time span=1d' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs +references: [] tags: product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py index d272cb5a4d..158d34a91f 100755 --- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py +++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ import argparse import yaml import re +def parse_data_models_from_search(search): + match = re.search(r'from\sdatamodel\s?=\s?([^\s.]*)', search) + if match is not None: + return match.group(1) + return False -def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): - - - #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"): - +def pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): manifest_files = [] types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "deprecated", "experimental", "network", "web"] - if content_part == 'detections': - for t in types: - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/' + t): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".yml"): - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) - + for t in types: + for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/' + t): + for file in files: + if file.endswith(".yml"): + manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) + for manifest_file in manifest_files: pretty_yaml = dict() if VERBOSE: @@ -57,7 +57,63 @@ def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) - return len(manifest_files) + + return manifest_files + +def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): + manifest_files = [] + for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'): + for file in files: + if file.endswith(".yml"): + manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) + + for manifest_file in manifest_files: + pretty_yaml = dict() + if VERBOSE: + print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) + + with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: + try: + object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + print(exc) + print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) + error = True + continue + + pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name'] + pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] + pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version'] + pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] + pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] + pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type'] + pretty_yaml['datamodel'] = object['datamodel'] + pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] + pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search'] + if 'how_to_implement' in object: + pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement'] + else: + pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = '' + if 'references' in object: + pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] + else: + pretty_yaml['references'] = [] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + + with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: + documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) + + return manifest_files + +def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): + #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"): + manifest_files = [] + if content_part == 'detections': + manifest_files = pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) + elif content_part == 'baselines': + manifest_files = pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) + + return len(manifest_files) def main(args): @@ -66,18 +122,23 @@ def main(args): parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo") parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") - + # parse them args = parser.parse_args() REPO_PATH = args.path VERBOSE = args.verbose - + output = [] pretty_yaml_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','baselines','response_tasks','responses','deployments'] for pretty_yaml_object in pretty_yaml_objects: touch_count = pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object) if VERBOSE: - print("completed, we made {0} {1} pretty".format(touch_count, pretty_yaml_object)) + output.append("made {0} {1} pretty".format(touch_count, pretty_yaml_object)) + + for o in output: + print(o) + + print("finished successfully!") + if __name__ == "__main__": main(sys.argv[1:]) - diff --git a/spec/baselines.spec.json b/spec/baselines.spec.json index e8f22a3df7..d072456c6b 100644 --- a/spec/baselines.spec.json +++ b/spec/baselines.spec.json @@ -82,6 +82,34 @@ "type": "object", "uniqueItems": true }, + "datamodel": { + "$id": "#/properties/datamodel", + "default": "", + "description": "datamodel used in the search", + "examples": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "items": { + "enum": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic", + "Authentication", + "Change", + "Change_Analysis", + "Email", + "Endpoint", + "Network_Resolution", + "Network_Sessions", + "Network_Traffic", + "UEBA", + "Updates", + "Vulnerabilities", + "Web" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, "version": { "$id": "#/properties/version", "default": 0, From c0ece8d9c0806a426952ca748c617410b0e054a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:30:54 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 23/27] added deployments for pretty printing --- bin/pretty_yaml.py | 83 +++++++++++++++++++ ...rise_security_deployment_configuration.yml | 11 +-- deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml | 18 ++-- deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml | 20 ++--- deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml | 4 +- ..._access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml | 6 +- .../16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml | 6 +- .../20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml | 7 +- .../21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml | 7 +- .../30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml | 5 +- .../31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml | 7 +- 11 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py index 158d34a91f..7c274a4bb6 100755 --- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py +++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py @@ -105,6 +105,87 @@ def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): return manifest_files +def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): + manifest_files = [] + for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'): + for file in files: + if file.endswith(".yml"): + manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) + + for manifest_file in manifest_files: + pretty_yaml = dict() + if VERBOSE: + print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) + + with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: + try: + object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + print(exc) + print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) + error = True + continue + + pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name'] + pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] + pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version'] + pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] + pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] + pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type'] + pretty_yaml['datamodel'] = object['datamodel'] + pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] + pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search'] + if 'how_to_implement' in object: + pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement'] + else: + pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = '' + if 'references' in object: + pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] + else: + pretty_yaml['references'] = [] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + + with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: + documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) + + return manifest_files + +def pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): + manifest_files = [] + for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'): + for file in files: + if file.endswith(".yml"): + manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) + + for manifest_file in manifest_files: + pretty_yaml = dict() + if VERBOSE: + print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) + + with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: + try: + object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + print(exc) + print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) + error = True + continue + + pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name'] + pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] + pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] + pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] + pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] + pretty_yaml['scheduling'] = object['scheduling'] + if 'alert_action' in object: + pretty_yaml['alert_action'] = object['alert_action'] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + + with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: + documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) + + return manifest_files + def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"): manifest_files = [] @@ -112,6 +193,8 @@ def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): manifest_files = pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) elif content_part == 'baselines': manifest_files = pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) + elif content_part == 'deployments': + manifest_files = pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) return len(manifest_files) diff --git a/deployments/10_enterprise_security_deployment_configuration.yml b/deployments/10_enterprise_security_deployment_configuration.yml index 69abc643fa..e61026ba57 100644 --- a/deployments/10_enterprise_security_deployment_configuration.yml +++ b/deployments/10_enterprise_security_deployment_configuration.yml @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ name: Enterprise Security deployment configuration id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46f212 date: '2020-04-27' -description: This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are used for detection author: Bhavin Patel +description: This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are + used for detection scheduling: - cron_schedule: '0 * * * *' + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * earliest_time: -70m@m latest_time: -10m@m schedule_window: auto @@ -13,8 +14,8 @@ alert_action: rule_description: '%description%' rule_title: '%name%' nes_fields: - - user - - dest - - src + - user + - dest + - src tags: analytics_story: all diff --git a/deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml index 669772a8e8..a0e0b55c3a 100644 --- a/deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml +++ b/deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml @@ -1,22 +1,22 @@ name: Detect ARP Poisoning deployment configuration id: e1d5b4dc-4cf3-404f-905c-b478bbb20474 date: '2020-08-14' -description: This configuration file applies to the Detect ARP Poisoning detection author: Mikael Bjerkeland +description: This configuration file applies to the Detect ARP Poisoning detection scheduling: - cron_schedule: '59 * * * *' + cron_schedule: 59 * * * * earliest_time: -70m@m latest_time: -10m@m schedule_window: auto alert_action: notable: - rule_description: 'ARP Poisoning has been detected on interface $src_interface$ on host $orig_host$. - This may be an indication of a MITM attack.' - rule_title: 'ARP Poisoning Detected on $orig_host$' + rule_description: ARP Poisoning has been detected on interface $src_interface$ + on host $orig_host$. This may be an indication of a MITM attack. + rule_title: ARP Poisoning Detected on $orig_host$ nes_fields: - - src_interface - - firstTime - - lastTime - - count + - src_interface + - firstTime + - lastTime + - count tags: detection_name: Detect ARP Poisoning diff --git a/deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml b/deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml index a01cdc431d..c1d0771fec 100644 --- a/deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml +++ b/deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml @@ -1,23 +1,23 @@ name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server deployment configuration id: 6e4e20ac-e719-4ebe-a52d-d672cd451dbb date: '2020-08-14' -description: This configuration file applies to the Detect Rogue DHCP Server detection author: Mikael Bjerkeland +description: This configuration file applies to the Detect Rogue DHCP Server detection scheduling: - cron_schedule: '59 * * * *' + cron_schedule: 59 * * * * earliest_time: -70m@m latest_time: -10m@m schedule_window: auto alert_action: notable: - rule_description: 'DHCP Snooping has detected a Rogue DHCP Server on $orig_host$ from $src_mac$. - This may be an indication of a MITM attack.' - rule_title: 'Rogue DHCP Server Detected on $orig_host$' + rule_description: DHCP Snooping has detected a Rogue DHCP Server on $orig_host$ + from $src_mac$. This may be an indication of a MITM attack. + rule_title: Rogue DHCP Server Detected on $orig_host$ nes_fields: - - src_mac - - firstTime - - lastTime - - count - - message_type + - src_mac + - firstTime + - lastTime + - count + - message_type tags: detection_name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server diff --git a/deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml b/deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml index 1e11c21ec5..5fa4d76e28 100644 --- a/deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml +++ b/deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Credential Dumping Story id: 52f52a7c-078f-4413-84da-388b61ccac26 date: '2021-01-13' -description: Example for a deployment for a specific Analytics Story author: Patrick Bareiss +description: Example for a deployment for a specific Analytics Story scheduling: - cron_schedule: '0 * * * *' + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * earliest_time: -40m@m latest_time: -10m@m schedule_window: auto diff --git a/deployments/15_detection_access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/deployments/15_detection_access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml index 33c04ec26d..166bd03f81 100644 --- a/deployments/15_detection_access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml +++ b/deployments/15_detection_access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation Deployment id: 974c422f-db3f-4538-8f2a-ee5bf8eec0fa date: '2021-01-13' -description: Example for a deployment for a specific Detection author: Patrick Bareiss +description: Example for a deployment for a specific Detection scheduling: - cron_schedule: '0 * * * *' + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * earliest_time: -30m@m latest_time: now schedule_window: auto @@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ alert_action: rule_description: '%description%' rule_title: '%name% Notable' nes_fields: - - dest + - dest tags: detection_name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation diff --git a/deployments/16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml b/deployments/16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml index 12f5d6b71f..0956e70bd7 100644 --- a/deployments/16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml +++ b/deployments/16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ name: Enterprise Security config for Splunk Security Analytics for AWS customers id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46f211 date: '2021-01-20' -description: This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are used in the Splunk Security Analytics for AWS product. NOTE - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS searches do not need notable configurations author: Bhavin Patel +description: This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are + used in the Splunk Security Analytics for AWS product. NOTE - Splunk Security Analytics + for AWS searches do not need notable configurations scheduling: - cron_schedule: '0 * * * *' + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * earliest_time: -70m@m latest_time: -10m@m schedule_window: auto diff --git a/deployments/20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml b/deployments/20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml index fdeaf254f2..54c51d4bc8 100644 --- a/deployments/20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml +++ b/deployments/20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml @@ -1,13 +1,14 @@ name: Baseline Cache Hourly Updates id: 1030c701-2acf-4b1a-9970-46c7145caf2d date: '2020-06-24' -description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Hourly Cache Updates author: Bhavin Patel +description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments + Hourly Cache Updates scheduling: - cron_schedule: '55 * * * *' + cron_schedule: 55 * * * * earliest_time: -70m@m latest_time: -10m@m schedule_window: auto tags: deployments: - - Hourly Cache Updates + - Hourly Cache Updates diff --git a/deployments/21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml b/deployments/21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml index 755c430ee2..e5ff4a68ee 100644 --- a/deployments/21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml +++ b/deployments/21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml @@ -1,13 +1,14 @@ name: Baseline Cache Daily Updates id: 9541d6f8-fa58-4d48-bb44-6720e39b7b0d date: '2020-08-18' -description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Daily Cache Updates author: David Dorsey +description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments + Daily Cache Updates scheduling: - cron_schedule: '10 0 * * *' + cron_schedule: 10 0 * * * earliest_time: -1450m@m latest_time: -10m@m schedule_window: auto tags: deployments: - - Daily Cache Updates + - Daily Cache Updates diff --git a/deployments/30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml b/deployments/30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml index ff2abce7bc..3991fd8909 100644 --- a/deployments/30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml +++ b/deployments/30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml @@ -1,8 +1,9 @@ name: 90 Day Baseline Searches id: 6eac9f8b-a35d-4b64-b57f-e5ecde43be6b date: '2020-06-24' -description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Long Running Baseline author: Bhavin Patel +description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments + Long Running Baseline scheduling: cron_schedule: 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * earliest_time: -90d@d @@ -10,4 +11,4 @@ scheduling: schedule_window: auto tags: deployments: - - 90 Day Baseline + - 90 Day Baseline diff --git a/deployments/31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml b/deployments/31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml index 9b1f444dfb..cc3d7b76bc 100644 --- a/deployments/31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml +++ b/deployments/31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml @@ -1,13 +1,14 @@ name: Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback id: 4b329568-bcff-49fa-8c85-92e95f0f270d date: '2020-09-07' -description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback author: David Dorsey +description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments + Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback scheduling: - cron_schedule: '0 2 * * 0' + cron_schedule: 0 2 * * 0 earliest_time: -90d@d latest_time: -1d@d schedule_window: auto tags: deployments: - - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback + - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback From 1e812855fe6b91964f85f9fc76ff06cb5091ecc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:52:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 24/27] added stories --- bin/pretty_yaml.py | 43 ++++++++++++++++++- stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml | 10 ++--- stories/asset_tracking.yml | 10 ++--- stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml | 10 ++--- stories/aws_cryptomining.yml | 10 ++--- stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml | 10 ++--- stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml | 10 ++--- ...aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml | 10 ++--- stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml | 10 ++--- stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml | 10 ++--- stories/brand_monitoring.yml | 10 ++--- stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml | 10 ++--- stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml | 10 ++--- stories/collection_and_staging.yml | 10 ++--- stories/command_and_control.yml | 10 ++--- stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml | 10 ++--- ...lantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml | 10 ++--- stories/credential_dumping.yml | 10 ++--- stories/data_exfiltration.yml | 12 +++--- stories/data_protection.yml | 10 ++--- stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml | 10 ++--- stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml | 10 ++--- stories/disabling_security_tools.yml | 10 ++--- stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml | 10 ++--- stories/dns_hijacking.yml | 10 ++--- stories/dynamic_dns.yml | 10 ++--- .../emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml | 10 ++--- stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml | 10 ++--- stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml | 10 ++--- stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml | 10 ++--- stories/host_redirection.yml | 10 ++--- stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml | 10 ++--- stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml | 10 ++--- ...netes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml | 10 ++--- .../kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml | 10 ++--- stories/lateral_movement.yml | 10 ++--- stories/malicious_powershell.yml | 10 ++--- stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml | 10 ++--- stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml | 10 ++--- stories/monitor_for_updates.yml | 10 ++--- stories/netsh_abuse.yml | 10 ++--- stories/office_365_detections.yml | 12 +++--- stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml | 10 ++--- stories/phishing_payloads.yml | 10 ++--- ...iated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml | 10 ++--- ...d_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml | 10 ++--- stories/ransomware.yml | 10 ++--- stories/ransomware_cloud.yml | 10 ++--- stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml | 10 ++--- stories/ransomware_samsam.yml | 10 ++--- .../router_and_infrastructure_security.yml | 10 ++--- .../spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml | 10 ++--- stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml | 10 ++--- ...nterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml | 10 ++--- stories/sql_injection.yml | 10 ++--- stories/sunburst_malware.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml | 10 ++--- ...icious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml | 10 ++--- .../suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml | 10 ++--- ...spicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml | 10 ++--- .../suspicious_command_line_executions.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_emails.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml | 10 ++--- ...suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml | 10 ++--- stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml | 10 ++--- ...ed_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml | 10 ++--- ...oper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 10 ++--- stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml | 10 ++--- stories/unusual_processes.yml | 10 ++--- stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml | 10 ++--- stories/web_fraud_detection.yml | 10 ++--- stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml | 10 ++--- stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml | 10 ++--- ...s_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml | 10 ++--- stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml | 10 ++--- stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml | 10 ++--- stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml | 10 ++--- stories/windows_service_abuse.yml | 10 ++--- 86 files changed, 469 insertions(+), 428 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py index 7c274a4bb6..6dffdceace 100755 --- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py +++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py @@ -186,6 +186,46 @@ def pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): return manifest_files +def pretty_yaml_stories(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): + manifest_files = [] + for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'): + for file in files: + if file.endswith(".yml"): + manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) + + for manifest_file in manifest_files: + pretty_yaml = dict() + if VERBOSE: + print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) + + with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: + try: + object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + print(exc) + print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) + error = True + continue + + pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name'] + pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] + pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version'] + pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] + pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] + pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type'] + pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] + pretty_yaml['narrative'] = object['narrative'] + if 'references' in object: + pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] + else: + pretty_yaml['references'] = [] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + + with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: + documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) + + return manifest_files + def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"): manifest_files = [] @@ -195,7 +235,8 @@ def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): manifest_files = pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) elif content_part == 'deployments': manifest_files = pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) - + elif content_part == 'stories': + manifest_files = pretty_yaml_stories(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) return len(manifest_files) def main(args): diff --git a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml index 925517ef1b..844472655f 100644 --- a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Apache Struts Vulnerability +id: 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e +version: 1 date: '2018-12-06' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. -id: 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e -name: Apache Struts Vulnerability narrative: 'In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months @@ -108,5 +110,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/asset_tracking.yml b/stories/asset_tracking.yml index 9fc934adfa..29b5fa430d 100644 --- a/stories/asset_tracking.yml +++ b/stories/asset_tracking.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Asset Tracking +id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-13' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. -id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77 -name: Asset Tracking narrative: This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business @@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml index 5dad19998f..330ee1e9d3 100644 --- a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml +++ b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: AWS Cross Account Activity +id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a +version: 1 date: '2018-06-04' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a -name: AWS Cross Account Activity narrative: 'Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS''s Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each @@ -36,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml index 6f9871e4ff..9918332ce9 100644 --- a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml +++ b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: AWS Cryptomining +id: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750 +version: 1 date: '2018-03-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. -id: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750 -name: AWS Cryptomining narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it''s par for the course that ambitious, @@ -41,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml index 32ea10cbdc..3c57640b70 100644 --- a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: AWS Network ACL Activity +id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4 +version: 2 date: '2018-05-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. -id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4 -name: AWS Network ACL Activity narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company @@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml index 219376c4fe..bb176264b0 100644 --- a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml +++ b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: AWS Security Hub Alerts +id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a +version: 1 date: '2020-08-04' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS -id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a -name: AWS Security Hub Alerts narrative: AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon @@ -20,5 +22,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml index 410b5001c1..509a1fe352 100644 --- a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml +++ b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities +id: 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f +version: 1 date: '2018-03-16' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. -id: 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f -name: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities narrative: 'Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where @@ -30,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml index 03b4ba7f3e..b5ca874a7a 100644 --- a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml +++ b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: AWS User Monitoring +id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3 +version: 1 date: '2018-03-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. -id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3 -name: AWS User Monitoring narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it''s all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable @@ -37,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml index 73c23c3fa8..d66edc4d0e 100644 --- a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml +++ b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml @@ -1,13 +1,15 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 +id: 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe +version: 1 date: '2021-01-27' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host. -id: 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe -name: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 narrative: A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing @@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml index bb5215f727..e6554d0edf 100644 --- a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml +++ b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Brand Monitoring +id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78 +version: 1 date: '2017-12-19' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. -id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78 -name: Brand Monitoring narrative: 'While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and @@ -36,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml index c523a36726..9c1c197a1d 100644 --- a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml +++ b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Cloud Cryptomining +id: 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a +version: 1 date: '2019-10-02' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. -id: 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a -name: Cloud Cryptomining narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it''s par for the course that ambitious, @@ -41,5 +43,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml index af4f121bed..b1ea322c59 100644 --- a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml +++ b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml @@ -1,12 +1,14 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: ColdRoot MacOS RAT +id: bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390 +version: 1 date: '2019-01-09' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. -id: bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390 -name: ColdRoot MacOS RAT narrative: 'Conventional wisdom holds that Apple''s MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this @@ -44,5 +46,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml index 1c48144669..3557fd8bb6 100644 --- a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml +++ b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Collection and Staging +id: 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a +version: 1 date: '2020-02-03' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: 'Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. ' -id: 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a -name: Collection and Staging narrative: "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from\ \ a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses,\ \ confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important\ @@ -29,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/command_and_control.yml b/stories/command_and_control.yml index 4a983de555..cf7241d118 100644 --- a/stories/command_and_control.yml +++ b/stories/command_and_control.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Command and Control +id: 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8 +version: 1 date: '2018-06-01' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. -id: 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8 -name: Command and Control narrative: 'Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. @@ -34,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml index 5393312ef2..b103fa3d8e 100644 --- a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml +++ b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk +name: Common Phishing Frameworks +id: 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61 +version: 1 date: '2019-04-29' +author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk +type: batch description: 'Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. ' -id: 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61 -name: Common Phishing Frameworks narrative: 'As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), @@ -35,5 +37,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml index 9976e0ce69..23abd5d6ae 100644 --- a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml +++ b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation +id: aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246 +version: 1 date: '2020-02-20' +author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container @@ -7,8 +11,6 @@ description: Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry. -id: aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246 -name: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation narrative: Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, @@ -26,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/stories/credential_dumping.yml index 78c9e468cf..a78c4523b4 100644 --- a/stories/credential_dumping.yml +++ b/stories/credential_dumping.yml @@ -1,12 +1,14 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Credential Dumping +id: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a +version: 3 date: '2020-02-04' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. -id: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a -name: Credential Dumping narrative: 'Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking @@ -34,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 3 diff --git a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml index 0b86437d78..e97d584d9f 100644 --- a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml +++ b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk -date: '2020-10-21' -description: The stealing of data by an adversary. -id: 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 name: Data Exfiltration +id: 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 +version: 1 +date: '2020-10-21' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch +description: The stealing of data by an adversary. narrative: Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer @@ -20,5 +22,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/data_protection.yml b/stories/data_protection.yml index 4d4537ef2b..fdac1f2174 100644 --- a/stories/data_protection.yml +++ b/stories/data_protection.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Data Protection +id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-14' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. -id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33 -name: Data Protection narrative: Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations @@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml index 650ed69cfe..0d4c72e47b 100644 --- a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml +++ b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk +name: Detect Zerologon Attack +id: 5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-18' +author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk +type: batch description: Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now @@ -7,8 +11,6 @@ description: Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-114 searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier. -id: 5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4 -name: Detect Zerologon Attack narrative: This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers @@ -34,5 +36,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml index 45f81ca262..012190d978 100644 --- a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml +++ b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: DHS Report TA18-074A +id: 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef +version: 2 date: '2020-01-22' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. -id: 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef -name: DHS Report TA18-074A narrative: 'The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \ @@ -38,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml index 888d15df8f..aebcad8523 100644 --- a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml +++ b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Disabling Security Tools +id: fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1 +version: 2 date: '2020-02-04' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. -id: fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1 -name: Disabling Security Tools narrative: Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This @@ -28,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml index 7d7ee8bb9b..23bdb70021 100644 --- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml +++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: DNS Amplification Attacks +id: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700 +version: 1 date: '2016-09-13' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. -id: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700 -name: DNS Amplification Attacks narrative: 'The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification @@ -35,5 +37,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml index 6ad09af970..f40dcee71c 100644 --- a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml +++ b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: DNS Hijacking +id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221 +version: 1 date: '2020-02-04' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. -id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221 -name: DNS Hijacking narrative: 'Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections @@ -67,5 +69,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml index 337a50fe56..f8e0211fda 100644 --- a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml +++ b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Dynamic DNS +id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221 +version: 2 date: '2018-09-06' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. -id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221 -name: Dynamic DNS narrative: Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or @@ -30,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml index 2e11a7a9b8..48163971c5 100644 --- a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml +++ b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' +id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52 +version: 1 date: '2020-01-27' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. -id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52 -name: 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' narrative: 'The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), @@ -37,5 +39,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml index 5a674d6517..3aa77c4f47 100644 --- a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -1,13 +1,15 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 +id: 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-02' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise. -id: 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -name: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 narrative: A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using @@ -28,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml index 3cc8653eea..7e18c2dea7 100644 --- a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml +++ b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: GCP Cross Account Activity +id: 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-01' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch description: Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -id: 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6 -name: GCP Cross Account Activity narrative: 'Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each @@ -36,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml index 49af8b5e8c..89c203de60 100644 --- a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml +++ b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Hidden Cobra Malware +id: baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335 +version: 2 date: '2020-01-22' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. -id: baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335 -name: Hidden Cobra Malware narrative: 'North Korea''s government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group''s activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously @@ -45,5 +47,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/host_redirection.yml b/stories/host_redirection.yml index e61f167857..60001712fc 100644 --- a/stories/host_redirection.yml +++ b/stories/host_redirection.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Host Redirection +id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-14' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website. -id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4 -name: Host Redirection narrative: Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) @@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml index 722b805462..e68a18c5cb 100644 --- a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: JBoss Vulnerability +id: 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd +version: 1 date: '2017-09-14' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. -id: 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd -name: JBoss Vulnerability narrative: 'This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with @@ -98,5 +100,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml index e577b33523..0476024cf5 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Scanning Activity +id: a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09 +version: 1 date: '2020-04-15' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch description: This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. -id: a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09 -name: Kubernetes Scanning Activity narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect @@ -20,5 +22,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml index e7b3c8649d..911a57fa06 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity +id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch description: This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. -id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea -name: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches @@ -20,5 +22,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml index ba30d5b0a2..57ccb792f3 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity +id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ew +version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch description: This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces. -id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ew -name: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches @@ -19,5 +21,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/lateral_movement.yml b/stories/lateral_movement.yml index e7c9925659..2cc361ff75 100644 --- a/stories/lateral_movement.yml +++ b/stories/lateral_movement.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Lateral Movement +id: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad +version: 2 date: '2020-02-04' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts. -id: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad -name: Lateral Movement narrative: "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to\ \ expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement.\ \ Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because\ @@ -40,5 +42,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml index de3bd60db3..f84830edcf 100644 --- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml +++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Malicious PowerShell +id: 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc +version: 4 date: '2017-08-23' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. -id: 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc -name: Malicious PowerShell narrative: 'The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these @@ -72,5 +74,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 4 diff --git a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml index e94121d1e5..73dac99808 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Monitor Backup Solution +id: abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d +version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. -id: abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d -name: Monitor Backup Solution narrative: Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. @@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Compliance -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml index 603d684799..a458d94c24 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Monitor for Unauthorized Software +id: 8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae +version: 1 date: '2017-09-15' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: 'Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. ' -id: 8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae -name: Monitor for Unauthorized Software narrative: 'It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within @@ -28,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Compliance -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml index bf4106e8ae..ba145b98e1 100644 --- a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml +++ b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Monitor for Updates +id: 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-15' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. -id: 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8 -name: Monitor for Updates narrative: 'It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important @@ -29,5 +31,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Compliance -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml index a2ed90a166..316cb9eb52 100644 --- a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Netsh Abuse +id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65 +version: 1 date: '2017-01-05' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. -id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65 -name: Netsh Abuse narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you @@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/office_365_detections.yml b/stories/office_365_detections.yml index 8765eb9224..9b3ab16118 100644 --- a/stories/office_365_detections.yml +++ b/stories/office_365_detections.yml @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -date: '2020-12-16' -description: This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. -id: 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9 name: Office 365 Detections +id: 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9 +version: 1 +date: '2020-12-16' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +description: This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. narrative: More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks. @@ -17,5 +19,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml index 0e1ae49229..2caa4a5fa2 100644 --- a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml +++ b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Orangeworm Attack Group +id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52 +version: 2 date: '2020-01-22' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. -id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52 -name: Orangeworm Attack Group narrative: 'In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with @@ -39,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml index ab92e3c207..bb02015adf 100644 --- a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml +++ b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk +name: Phishing Payloads +id: 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27 +version: 1 date: '2019-04-29' +author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. -id: 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27 -name: Phishing Payloads narrative: 'Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \ @@ -52,5 +54,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml index 21a43250c8..fc38055e4b 100644 --- a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml +++ b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense +name: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns +id: 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E +version: 1 date: '2020-01-22' +author: iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense +type: batch description: Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. -id: 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E -name: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns narrative: 'This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\ iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon @@ -86,5 +88,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml index fd3ce3f980..88c140a3ba 100644 --- a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml +++ b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch +id: 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-11' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. -id: 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218 -name: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch narrative: A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. @@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/ransomware.yml b/stories/ransomware.yml index dad4d1e288..d2d5ad8bb4 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Ransomware +id: cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756 +version: 1 date: '2020-02-04' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. -id: cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756 -name: Ransomware narrative: Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect @@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml index de2089bd8c..e9a2af5f6b 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Ransomware Cloud +id: f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2 +version: 1 date: '2020-10-27' +author: Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. -id: f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2 -name: Ransomware Cloud narrative: Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect @@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml index 3e636e1686..5fe0d2eb11 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +name: Ryuk Ransomware +id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35 +version: 1 date: '2020-11-06' +author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +type: batch description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. -id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35 -name: Ryuk Ransomware narrative: "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A)\ \ on October 28th called \u201CRansomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and\ \ Public Health Sector.\u201D This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and\ @@ -33,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml index e6aea499ea..bd3542f193 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: SamSam Ransomware +id: c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604 +version: 1 date: '2018-12-13' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. -id: c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604 -name: SamSam Ransomware narrative: 'The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost @@ -53,5 +55,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml index 47ecf4076d..346b45a98f 100644 --- a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml +++ b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Router and Infrastructure Security +id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. -id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77 -name: Router and Infrastructure Security narrative: 'Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon @@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml index 00b7ba0fd4..4ec8887f14 100644 --- a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml +++ b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities +id: 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2 +version: 1 date: '2018-01-08' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story. -id: 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2 -name: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities narrative: Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still @@ -19,5 +21,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml index 53662f3f74..0ff703097d 100644 --- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml +++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability +id: 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-19' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains. -id: 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1 -name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability narrative: 'This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\ @@ -43,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml index 4807e85d84..29aa754be9 100644 --- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml +++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 +id: 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400 +version: 1 date: '2018-06-14' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users. -id: 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400 -name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 narrative: 'Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). @@ -38,5 +40,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/sql_injection.yml b/stories/sql_injection.yml index 52b09a1d3d..25b2df4022 100644 --- a/stories/sql_injection.yml +++ b/stories/sql_injection.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: SQL Injection +id: 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-19' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. -id: 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3 -name: SQL Injection narrative: 'It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\ @@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml index 869ed849a1..69bc44d62b 100644 --- a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml +++ b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +name: Sunburst Malware +id: 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2 +version: 1 date: '2020-12-14' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch description: Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. -id: 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2 -name: Sunburst Malware narrative: This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component @@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml index 268652ef8b..2b03ecafab 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml @@ -1,12 +1,14 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities +id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3 +version: 1 date: '2018-02-09' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. -id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3 -name: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to @@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml index 5f60a3eb37..0c66b7088f 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Suspicious AWS Login Activities +id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3 +version: 1 date: '2019-05-01' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: 'Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. ' -id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3 -name: Suspicious AWS Login Activities narrative: It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can @@ -21,5 +23,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml index 86569fe6ee..535981278a 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities +id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3 +version: 2 date: '2018-07-24' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3 -name: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities narrative: 'As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ @@ -30,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml index 8ee7f07971..d415be8ab2 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Suspicious AWS Traffic +id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3 +version: 1 date: '2018-05-07' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). -id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3 -name: Suspicious AWS Traffic narrative: "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing\ \ service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container,\ \ the environment resembles a physical network. \\\nAmazon's VPC service enables\ @@ -31,5 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml index 7be388e899..a9c61c3c41 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities +id: 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c +version: 1 date: '2020-06-04' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: 'Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. ' -id: 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c -name: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities narrative: 'It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary @@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml index 5a7db31f81..d766a1f889 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities +id: 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce +version: 1 date: '2020-08-25' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -id: 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce -name: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities narrative: Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are @@ -21,5 +23,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml index 27f167ff85..90f7a30d6a 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities +id: 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86 +version: 1 date: '2018-08-20' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -id: 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86 -name: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities narrative: 'Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments @@ -30,5 +32,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml index c2e8641e09..98bbade3b0 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Suspicious Cloud User Activities +id: 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39 +version: 1 date: '2020-09-04' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. -id: 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39 -name: Suspicious Cloud User Activities narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it''s all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable @@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml index ffa5814210..1cd363a106 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Suspicious Command-Line Executions +id: f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7 +version: 2 date: '2020-02-03' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. -id: f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7 -name: Suspicious Command-Line Executions narrative: The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access @@ -28,5 +30,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml index 332b296baa..487bc98f77 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Suspicious DNS Traffic +id: 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-18' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. -id: 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56 -name: Suspicious DNS Traffic narrative: Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One @@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml index d1b62ca288..e8dc840e5c 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Suspicious Emails +id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55 +version: 1 date: '2020-01-27' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. -id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55 -name: Suspicious Emails narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk @@ -32,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml index adcc888713..e225c52526 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities +id: 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 +version: 1 date: '2020-08-05' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -id: 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -name: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities narrative: Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates @@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml index fec4699871..d92c079083 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Suspicious MSHTA Activity +id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55 +version: 2 date: '2021-01-20' +author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55 -name: Suspicious MSHTA Activity narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility @@ -39,5 +41,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml index 0f3c99144a..5e255e2fe3 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml @@ -1,12 +1,14 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Suspicious Okta Activity +id: 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b +version: 1 date: '2020-04-02' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. -id: 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b -name: Suspicious Okta Activity narrative: 'Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are @@ -36,5 +38,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml index d57f058e25..ebc24e9a20 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities +id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55 +version: 1 date: '2018-05-31' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. -id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55 -name: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities narrative: "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking\ \ target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively\ \ more common is registry modification.\\\n The registry is a key component of the\ @@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml index 1f78e018f2..af0c505ffc 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml @@ -1,12 +1,14 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Suspicious WMI Use +id: c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5 +version: 2 date: '2018-10-23' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. -id: c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5 -name: Suspicious WMI Use narrative: 'WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning @@ -33,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml index 590aa186e0..fae67cd19b 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes +id: aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258 +version: 1 date: '2020-04-13' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. -id: aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258 -name: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes narrative: 'Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny @@ -26,5 +28,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml index 770f3951cd..6a16527344 100644 --- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml +++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +id: 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-12' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code. -id: 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution narrative: 'Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, @@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml index fffa8e0491..251f8b5bc8 100644 --- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml +++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk +name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild +id: be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-21' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code. -id: be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project @@ -46,5 +48,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml index 30c46ab776..d58c8c9214 100644 --- a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml +++ b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications +id: 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0 +version: 1 date: '2018-04-09' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation. -id: 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0 -name: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications narrative: "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications.\ \ The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities.\ \ So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment\ @@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/unusual_processes.yml b/stories/unusual_processes.yml index f8c34c0d84..128a66c667 100644 --- a/stories/unusual_processes.yml +++ b/stories/unusual_processes.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Unusual Processes +id: f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6 +version: 2 date: '2020-02-04' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. -id: f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6 -name: Unusual Processes narrative: 'Being able to profile a host''s processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\ @@ -32,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml index 6fdf0445e0..b6e205332f 100644 --- a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml +++ b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Use of Cleartext Protocols +id: 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21 +version: 1 date: '2017-09-15' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. -id: 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21 -name: Use of Cleartext Protocols narrative: Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information @@ -22,5 +24,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml index 797489f2ea..a0bdff5e92 100644 --- a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml +++ b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Jim Apger, Splunk +name: Web Fraud Detection +id: 31337aaa-bc22-4752-b599-ef112dq1dq7a +version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' +author: Jim Apger, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets. -id: 31337aaa-bc22-4752-b599-ef112dq1dq7a -name: Web Fraud Detection narrative: 'The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes @@ -49,5 +51,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Fraud Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml index c87ad6d336..3f9b2ca5f2 100644 --- a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml +++ b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics +id: 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064 +version: 1 date: '2018-05-31' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: 'Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others ' -id: 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064 -name: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics narrative: Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable @@ -21,5 +23,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml index d3d53d19db..8a4296c821 100644 --- a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml +++ b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ -author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +name: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 +id: 36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 +version: 1 date: '2020-07-28' +author: Shannon Davis, Splunk +type: batch description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker @@ -7,8 +11,6 @@ description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discover leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit. -id: 36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -name: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 narrative: When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS @@ -33,5 +35,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml index 287ee84e39..f1436b70df 100644 --- a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse +id: 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d +version: 1 date: '2018-01-26' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. -id: 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d -name: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse narrative: "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious\ \ code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage\ \ file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific\ @@ -43,5 +45,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 1 diff --git a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml index 4dd7f63d53..1fe8857921 100644 --- a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml +++ b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Windows Log Manipulation +id: b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835 +version: 2 date: '2017-09-12' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. -id: b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835 -name: Windows Log Manipulation narrative: 'Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still @@ -32,5 +34,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Security Monitoring -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml index eb70181272..43d49de5d5 100644 --- a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml +++ b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +name: Windows Persistence Techniques +id: 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9 +version: 2 date: '2018-05-31' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. -id: 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9 -name: Windows Persistence Techniques narrative: Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This @@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml index e6940f832d..ebc3787d94 100644 --- a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk +name: Windows Privilege Escalation +id: 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5 +version: 2 date: '2020-02-04' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. -id: 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5 -name: Windows Privilege Escalation narrative: 'Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such @@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 2 diff --git a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml index 733e722a79..1baa5e434c 100644 --- a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +name: Windows Service Abuse +id: 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2 +version: 3 date: '2017-11-02' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: batch description: Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. -id: 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2 -name: Windows Service Abuse narrative: The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to @@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: batch -version: 3 From cd4dcd9e0cbf5f741f50c393f6f7f48159b5be66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 11:52:25 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 25/27] sorted tags --- bin/pretty_yaml.py | 10 +++++----- ...ike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py index 6dffdceace..f0424f3dec 100755 --- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py +++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] else: pretty_yaml['references'] = [] - pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())} with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] else: pretty_yaml['references'] = [] - pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())} with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] else: pretty_yaml['references'] = [] - pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())} with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): pretty_yaml['scheduling'] = object['scheduling'] if 'alert_action' in object: pretty_yaml['alert_action'] = object['alert_action'] - pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())} with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_stories(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] else: pretty_yaml['references'] = [] - pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags'] + pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())} with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml index 63666bec2c..f5081516f4 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml @@ -24,8 +24,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS Security Hub Alerts asset_type: AWS Instance + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json nist: - DE.DP - DE.AE @@ -34,6 +37,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud security_domain: network - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json From 7615d5ec8153bf0a25f16690b080fcbbe94f0a0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 12:27:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 26/27] fixing merge conflicts --- bin/validate.py | 2 - ...itten_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml | 2 +- ..._access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml | 31 ++++++----- .../aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml | 39 +++++++------ ...365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml | 37 +++++++------ .../cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml | 41 ++++++++------ .../cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml | 33 ++++++----- .../cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml | 31 ++++++----- .../detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml | 18 ++---- .../prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml | 2 +- .../remote_registry_key_modifications.yml | 2 +- .../deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml | 2 +- .../windows_hosts_file_modification.yml | 2 +- .../certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml | 19 +++++-- .../endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml | 2 +- .../creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml | 37 +++++++------ .../endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml | 44 ++++++++------- ...system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 2 +- ...ct_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml | 44 ++++++++------- ...2_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml | 55 +++++++++++-------- ..._application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml | 40 ++++++++------ ..._application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml | 40 ++++++++------ .../disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml | 29 +++++----- .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml | 49 ++++++++++------- .../dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml | 39 +++++++------ ...nitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml | 44 ++++++++------- ...eating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml | 2 +- ...ulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml | 2 +- ...istry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml | 2 +- .../registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml | 2 +- ...try_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml | 2 +- ...ious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml | 48 +++++++++------- .../suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml | 44 ++++++++------- .../endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml | 41 ++++++++------ .../endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml | 42 ++++++++------ ...undll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml | 39 +++++++------ .../detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml | 2 +- stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml | 30 ++++++---- stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml | 2 +- stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml | 49 +++++++++-------- stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml | 43 ++++++++------- stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml | 28 ++++++---- ...oper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 54 +++++++++--------- 46 files changed, 628 insertions(+), 496 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py index 7cf3f8c2af..2ecc721ef7 100644 --- a/bin/validate.py +++ b/bin/validate.py @@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ def validate_objects(REPO_PATH, objects, verbose): validation_errors, uuids = validate_standard_fields(object, uuids) errors = errors + validation_errors - if verbose: - print("validating object {0}".format(object['name'])) for object in objects['detections']: if object['type'] == 'batch': errors = errors + validate_detection_search(object, objects['macros']) diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml index cf6aed99a7..680c012412 100644 --- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml +++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. + product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. known_false_positives: Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml index 9ac60556e2..172243d7b9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml @@ -1,38 +1,43 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal +id: bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider. +search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime + max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn + requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress + userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs -id: bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 known_false_positives: Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks. -name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal references: - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps -search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime - max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn - requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress - userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`' tags: analytics_story: - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: AWS Federated Account - mitre_attack_id: - - T1078 - security_domain: threat automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json -type: ESCU -version: 1 + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 + security_domain: threat + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml index 8a7321ae2c..3ec805678d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml @@ -1,34 +1,39 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: AWS SAML Update identity provider +id: 2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This - search works with cloudtrail logs. -id: 2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily - be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored. -name: AWS SAML Update identity provider -references: -- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a -- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html -- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf -- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This + search works with cloudtrail logs. +known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily + be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored. +references: +- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a +- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html +- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf +- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps tags: analytics_story: - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: AWS Federated Account - mitre_attack_id: - - T1078 - security_domain: threat automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json -type: ESCU -version: 1 + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 + security_domain: threat + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml index 4f393bbcb6..c278872e88 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml @@ -1,34 +1,39 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User +id: b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search - works with o365:management:activity -id: b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, - however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential - abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User -references: -- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf -- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user." | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search + works with o365:management:activity +known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, + however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential + abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. +references: +- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf +- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a tags: analytics_story: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 + automated_detection_testing: passed + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objective mitre_attack_id: - T1136.003 security_domain: threat - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json -type: ESCU -version: 1 + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml index 88e3123ed8..1419f19b87 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml @@ -1,37 +1,42 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: O365 Added Service Principal +id: 1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search - works with o365:management:activity -id: 1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, - however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential - abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -name: O365 Added Service Principal -references: -- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf -- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a -- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html -- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature="Add service principal credentials." | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress signature | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search + works with o365:management:activity +known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, + however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential + abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. +references: +- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf +- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a +- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html +- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory tags: analytics_story: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 + automated_detection_testing: passed + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objective mitre_attack_id: - T1136.003 security_domain: threat - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json -type: ESCU -version: 1 + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml index 2195e7caf8..b1a5a048ff 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml @@ -1,32 +1,37 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors +id: 8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. -how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search - works with o365:management:activity -id: 8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may - indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. -name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors -references: -- https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/ search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search + works with o365:management:activity +known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may + indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. +references: +- https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/ tags: analytics_story: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 + automated_detection_testing: passed + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objective mitre_attack_id: - T1556 security_domain: threat - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json -type: ESCU -version: 1 + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml index 949f8a081e..02fcec7fb7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml @@ -1,36 +1,41 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Splunk +name: O365 New Federated Domain Added +id: e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 +version: 1 date: '2021-01-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. +search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="Add-FederatedDomain" + | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) + as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId + UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity. -id: e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. -name: O365 New Federated Domain Added references: - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/ -search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="Add-FederatedDomain" - | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) - as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId - UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`' tags: analytics_story: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 + automated_detection_testing: passed + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objective mitre_attack_id: - T1136.003 security_domain: threat - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json -type: ESCU -version: 1 + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml index 23d883f0fa..65b460710f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml @@ -20,30 +20,22 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, whic with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be - part of a whtelist. + part of a whitelist. references: - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html -search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) - as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll - ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename - Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`' - -known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be - part of a whitelist. tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - Detect Zerologon Attack - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003.001 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives asset_type: Windows cis20: - CIS 6 - CIS 8 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.001 nist: - DE.AE - DE.CM diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml index 1a6704e33a..d1b4ad4cef 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data + product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml index 47303fd553..34afa2b49b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` - data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, + data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml index e45332c7ac..1645800eae 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.actio | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically - populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or + populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml index 3d6f01dce7..fb19326498 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. + product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml index 18539c0bf7..0d1391b15f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml @@ -2,28 +2,35 @@ name: Certutil exe certificate extraction id: 337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 version: 1 date: '2021-01-26' +author: Rod Soto, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS. -type: ESCU -references: [] -author: Rod Soto, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = "* -exportPFX *" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`' +how_to_implement: '' known_false_positives: Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services. +references: [] tags: analytics_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse - kill_chain_phases: - - Installation - security_domain: endpoint asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Installation + security_domain: endpoint + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml index 0c5b056f77..a5804398ae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically - populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or + populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. known_false_positives: It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml index c8a7c97941..1974528a2d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml @@ -2,43 +2,48 @@ name: Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr id: b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd version: 1 date: '2020-02-03' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a prcoess dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. +search: '`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | + stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, + process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`' how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -type: ESCU +known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, + but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/ - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -search: '`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | - stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, - process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`' -known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, - but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. tags: analytics_story: - Credential Dumping - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003.001 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Windows + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 6 - CIS 8 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.001 nist: - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Windows - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml index 3be7e04420..1da256b8b4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml @@ -2,16 +2,12 @@ name: Creation of Shadow Copy id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844 version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' -description: Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create - a shadow copy. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU -references: -- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow + copy. search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe @@ -19,22 +15,32 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`' -known_false_positives: Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic - will create false positives. +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create + false positives. +references: +- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003.003 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.003 nist: - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml index 4792f6e0dc..c1e2159084 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically - populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or + populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml index 1a7ab59f8b..0a94eee911 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass id: 070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 version: 1 date: '2021-01-28' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. @@ -12,39 +16,41 @@ description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll" is not required to load scrobj. "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon execution. ' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by modifying/removing the !=regsv32.exe. -type: ESCU -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ -- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5 -author: Michael Haag, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe) Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by modifying/removing the !=regsv32.exe. known_false_positives: Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ +- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5 tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.010 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.010 nist: - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml index 179bbb3187..6772947b00 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml @@ -2,46 +2,53 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack id: 4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8 version: 1 date: '2021-02-04' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and - ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique - will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module - loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify - script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, - but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively - found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any - network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. + ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This + particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, + the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During + investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will + spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. + Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During + investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. + It's possible other files are on disk. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe + Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process + Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll + or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe - Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.user Processes.process_name - Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`' -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive. tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.011 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.011 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml index 6e28a0a422..1859bb79e2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi id: 61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a version: 1 date: '2021-02-04' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, @@ -11,38 +15,40 @@ description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe + Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process + Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi + triggering a false positive. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe - Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process - Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`' -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi - triggering a false positive. tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.011 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.011 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml index de2b4b6ce6..88868557b3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup id: 71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183 version: 1 date: '2021-02-04' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module @@ -11,38 +15,40 @@ description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe + Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process + Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, + triggering a false positive. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe - Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process - Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`' -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, - triggering a false positive. tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.011 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.011 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml index 51ba8ec145..42a31fc477 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. + product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. known_false_positives: This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml index cfaeb84754..f91f46fca9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml @@ -16,33 +16,30 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU +known_false_positives: None identified. references: - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/ - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817 -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe - Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name - Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`' -known_false_positives: None identified. tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003.001 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 - CIS 16 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.001 nist: - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml index cbb385c1ca..c4e5ef46a8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml @@ -2,45 +2,52 @@ name: Dump LSASS via procdump id: 3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 version: 1 date: '2021-02-01' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: 'Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This - query does not monitor for the internal name (OriginalFileName=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. - Modify the query as needed.\ + query does not monitor for the internal name (OriginalFileName=procdump) of the + PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a - Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command - line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump -author: Michael Haag, Splunk + Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on + the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) + into lsass.exe.' search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=procdump.exe (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump tags: analytics_story: - Credential Dumping - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003.001 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 - CIS 16 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.001 nist: - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml index c42b56ca30..28aaf15aab 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ name: Dump LSASS via procdump Rename id: 21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 version: 1 date: '2021-02-01' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: 'Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and @@ -11,36 +14,38 @@ description: 'Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass proces Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump -author: Michael Haag, Splunk search: '`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump tags: analytics_story: - Credential Dumping - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003.001 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 - CIS 16 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.001 nist: - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml index 2f6f28ea94..28370f53e5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. + product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. known_false_positives: You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml index 3c704fc6b8..ba50e98c0c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Ntdsutil export ntds id: da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 version: 1 date: '2021-01-28' +author: Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: 'Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of @@ -13,39 +17,41 @@ description: 'Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Di This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. -type: ESCU -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11) -- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf -- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html -author: Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. known_false_positives: Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11) +- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf +- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html tags: analytics_story: - Credential Dumping - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003.003 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.003 nist: - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml index 59f617e43c..929bdc172f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` ' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated - via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint + via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml index 19210a288e..75a4f307c7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data + product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml index 84e1cd7d5d..08e0a43252 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis - data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response products, + data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml index 86e78d56ed..4fd1b76902 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data + product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute on diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml index 12bbaf97e6..3eb1f7ebcb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTim how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response - products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data + product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml index 677419eeef..e41ea39c18 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml @@ -2,23 +2,14 @@ name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path id: 62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 version: 1 date: '2021-01-28' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint - data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" - field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions - found to be used by legitimate processes. -type: ESCU -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ -- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5 -- https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718 -author: Michael Haag, Splunk search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\temp*) @@ -26,22 +17,37 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions + found to be used by legitimate processes. known_false_positives: Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ +- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5 +- https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718 tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.010 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.010 nist: - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml index 0067f2f862..ef19ce9a25 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver id: 8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159 version: 1 date: '2021-02-09' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being @@ -9,10 +13,18 @@ description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterser capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe + Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process + Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +known_false_positives: This is likely to produce false positives and will require + some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, + or filtering based on parent process names. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md @@ -21,30 +33,24 @@ references: - https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/ - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe - Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process - Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id - | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`' -known_false_positives: This is likely to produce false positives and will require - some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, - or filtering based on parent process names. tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.011 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.011 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml index 7e7dddf7c9..183b52f1db 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml @@ -2,44 +2,49 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 Rename id: 7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114 version: 1 date: '2021-02-04' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the OriginalFileName from Sysmon, or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -type: ESCU -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 -author: Michael Haag, Splunk search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE NOT process_name=rundll32.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 8 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives mitre_attack_id: - T1218.011 - T1036.003 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - cis20: - - CIS 8 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml index da2b73b2cd..95ccd4dd0d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 StartW id: 9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7 version: 1 date: '2021-02-04' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: +- Endpoint description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with CobaltStrike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 @@ -11,10 +15,17 @@ description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL func execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of CobaltStrike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe + Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process + Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -type: ESCU +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start + as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md @@ -22,29 +33,24 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe - Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process - Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id - | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`' -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start - as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed. tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.011 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.011 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml index d9e5f073b7..e2abb78438 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -2,45 +2,50 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments id: e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4 version: 1 date: '2021-02-09' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch +datamodel: [] description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including CobaltStrike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (process_name=rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE) + | regex CommandLine="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime + max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name, + OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -type: ESCU +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved + copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (process_name=rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE) - | regex CommandLine="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime - max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name, - OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter`' -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved - copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.011 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.011 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM security_domain: endpoint - asset_type: Endpoint - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - automated_detection_testing: passed + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml index ed9e9b713a..2ae04051cd 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max( != "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter` ' how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated - via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint + via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk. diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml index d8cdca1bb4..5a61580b9d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint > upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ' how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection - and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. + and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system. known_false_positives: It is important to understand that if you happen to install diff --git a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml index 97ccec4b9d..73cff1e571 100644 --- a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml @@ -2,24 +2,30 @@ name: Cloud Federated Credential Abuse id: cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d version: 1 date: '2021-01-26' -description: This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. - These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those - servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. - Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order - to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either - hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. -narrative: This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of - Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated - directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) - related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches. author: Rod Soto, Splunk -type: ESCU +type: batch +description: This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated + credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers + specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active + Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 + tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud + and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then + attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. +narrative: This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses + the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate + the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, + certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed + in specific cloud environment detection searches. references: - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a tags: analytics_story: Cloud Federated Credential Abuse - usecase: Security Monitoring category: - Cloud Security + usecase: Security Monitoring + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml index e225c52526..ab82ae33e8 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ narrative: Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibi on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses. references: -- https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security +- https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/ tags: analytic_story: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml index af642fb260..bf10152d8e 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml @@ -7,35 +7,34 @@ type: batch description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions - via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta - suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution - of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ + via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) + with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility + to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, + or VBScript.\ The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\ - - Triage\ - Validate execution \ - 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further - PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\ - + + Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName + of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 + or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\ + 1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\ - - Situational Awareness\ - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of - Script code by MSHTA.exe.\ - 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ + Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious + behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\ - 1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is - MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ + 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an + Office Application?\ - 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ - - Retrieval of script code\ - The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.' -author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk -type: ESCU + 1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard + application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ + + 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote + IP or domain.\ + + Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed + script code is benign or malicious.' references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ - https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/ @@ -43,6 +42,10 @@ references: - https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5 tags: analytics_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection category: - Adversary Tactics + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml index 89aaa298eb..fb1a5987fe 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml @@ -2,32 +2,37 @@ name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity id: b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 version: 1 date: '2021-01-29' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: batch description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions +narrative: One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" - using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used - by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. - The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). - The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that - may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. - Validate execution - Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. - Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. - Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of - Script code by regsvr32.exe. - Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? - Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. - Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. - Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.' -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -type: ESCU + using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely + used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension + of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches + in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate + that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate + execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe + and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, + it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. + Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious + behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent + process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? + Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from + non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation + of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script + code is benign or malicious. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ tags: analytics_story: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection category: - - Adversary Tactics \ No newline at end of file + - Adversary Tactics + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml index 727dd2bd7d..3834c54dd1 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml @@ -2,21 +2,29 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity id: 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694 version: 1 date: '2021-02-03' -description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code. -narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions - via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. - The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. - Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. - The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that - may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -type: ESCU +type: batch +description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe + to execute arbitrary malicious code. +narrative: One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions + via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great + example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by + ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading + default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk + that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist + with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The + searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that + may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 tags: analytics_story: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection category: - - Adversary Tactics \ No newline at end of file + - Adversary Tactics + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml index e143c961b3..7e7ba69a53 100644 --- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml +++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml @@ -6,46 +6,46 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: batch description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted +narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\ The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows - for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and - execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is - used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses - that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\ + for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute + the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this + way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are + configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\ The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\ - + Triage\ Validate execution\ - 1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further - PE metadata.\ - + 1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe + and further PE metadata.\ + 1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\ - + Situational Awareness\ - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of - Script code by MSBuild.exe.\ - - 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ - - 1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is - MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ - - 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ - + The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators + related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\ + + 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an + Office Application?\ + + 1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard + application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ + + 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote + IP or domain.\ + Retrieval of script code\ - + The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.' -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -type: ESCU references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md @@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ references: - https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md tags: analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection category: - - Adversary Tactics \ No newline at end of file + - Adversary Tactics + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud From 6094970bb56089869efa1d311d505761a253e338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: divious1 Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 12:32:25 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 27/27] updated analytics story tag --- .../cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml | 2 +- detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml | 2 +- .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml | 2 +- .../detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml | 2 +- .../detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml | 2 +- .../detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml | 2 +- .../suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml | 2 +- 21 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml index 172243d7b9..1a5234bb90 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references: - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: AWS Federated Account automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml index 3ec805678d..fdefa32002 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references: - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: AWS Federated Account automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml index c278872e88..d3fb9a40cb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ references: - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml index 1419f19b87..feb1dfc3ea 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml index b1a5a048ff..ce4f398b72 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it ma references: - https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/ tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml index 02fcec7fb7..21eb289874 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ references: - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/ tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml index bcbff6d389..2311ab170e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. references: [] tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Windows cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml index 0d1391b15f..d92b1af1ae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ known_false_positives: Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or expo during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services. references: [] tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml index 1974528a2d..0cf5fe9399 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/ - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml index 0a94eee911..8fe28bc168 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5 tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml index 6772947b00..cbce008255 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml index 1859bb79e2..b1c6165425 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml index 88868557b3..ba2468553e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml index c4e5ef46a8..d1e67bcf07 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ references: - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml index 28aaf15aab..44ee9b9808 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references: - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml index ba50e98c0c..ce423c9ec8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ references: - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml index e41ea39c18..74371474eb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references: - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5 - https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718 tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml index ef19ce9a25..69fadc40c4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/ - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml index 183b52f1db..2e8b52dbde 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml index 95ccd4dd0d..8c28c112ef 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml index e2abb78438..ac70a88905 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/ - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/ tags: - analytics_story: + analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed