From 7d9e146f76692fa6788977cf3e5fb3cb45307a00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mhaag-spl <5632822+MHaggis@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 13:17:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Cred Dump Update Based on feedback, updating analytic. --- .../endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml index 8e1a6810d5..198b71ca45 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ name: Windows Possible Credential Dumping id: e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2022-01-10' +version: 2 +date: '2022-01-27' author: Michael Haag, Splunk type: TTP datamodel: [] @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ description: 'The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous anal For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping.' search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN ("0x01000", - "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x1438", "0x143a", + "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x143a", "0x1438", "0x1000") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. -known_false_positives: False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess, filter based - on source image as needed. +known_false_positives: False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based + on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught. references: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump