From af0fa08d34057541fb8f04c3afb497d141895bf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 15:03:53 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 001/132] storyandfirstsearchcloudfederatedcredentialabuse

---
 .../certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml   | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
 stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml  | 25 ++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
 create mode 100644 stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ee4c1ffb67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+name: Certutil exe certificate extraction
+id: 337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
+date: '2021-01-26'
+description: This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation
+  or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication
+  tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.
+type: ESCU
+references: []
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+search: 'source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" app="C:\\Windows\\System32\\certutil.exe"
+   CommandLine="certutil.exe  -exportPFX powershellcert.pfx" | table User app CommandLine process_current_directory
+   | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is
+   uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns
+   targeting Federated services.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Windows Persistence Techniques
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1552.004
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: n/a
+  dataset:
+  - TBU
diff --git a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..97ccec4b9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+name: Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+id: cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d
+version: 1
+date: '2021-01-26'
+description: This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials.
+ These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those
+ servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services.
+ Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order
+ to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either
+ hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
+narrative: This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of
+ Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated
+ directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure)
+ related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+tags:
+  analytics_story: Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+  category:
+  - Cloud Security

From 5e0de647001e014ead1670cab25b80dcf1d754c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 13:53:28 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 002/132] search update

---
 ...ws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 18 +++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index 7f05f630eb..9e85618864 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -9,19 +9,15 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
 type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance 
-| rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*) 
-| rename instance as dest 
+search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance 
 | bucket span=4h _time 
-| stats count AS alerts by _time dest 
-| eventstats avg(alerts)
-    as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev 
-| eval
-    threshold_value = 4
-| eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev
-    * threshold_value), 1, 0) 
+| stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest 
+| eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev 
+| eval threshold_value = 3 
+| eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) 
 | search isOutlier=1 
-| table _time dest alerts|`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`'
+| table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg
+| `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`'
 known_false_positives: None
 tags:
   analytics_story:

From f446cc2f8ac80422940fefb94a0ae0ba653bb3d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 13:54:49 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 003/132] test file

---
 ...aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml

diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9f8379c96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance
+  file: cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: security_hub_ec2_spike.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json
+    sourcetype: aws:securityhub:finding
+    source: aws_securityhub_finding

From 5facbf0cf89fa1cd868093fa49bcfb174dcdf0c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 16:59:56 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 004/132] awssamlaccessbyprovideruserandprincipal

---
 ..._access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml

diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d9d9125dd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2021-01-26'
+description: This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS.
+ This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially
+ in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudtrail logs
+id: bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as
+  accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress
+  user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches
+  can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.
+name: AWS SAML access by provider user and principal
+references:
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
+search: sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" Assumerolewithsaml | spath "requestParameters.principalArn" | search "requestParameters.principalArn"=*
+   | spath "requestParameters.roleArn" | search "requestParameters.roleArn"=* | spath "requestParameters.roleSessionName"
+   | search "requestParameters.roleSessionName"=* | spath recipientAccountId | search recipientAccountId=*
+   | spath "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.arn" | search "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.arn"=*
+   | spath "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.assumedRoleId" | search "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.assumedRoleId"=*
+   | spath "responseElements.issuer" | search "responseElements.issuer"=* | spath sourceIPAddress | search sourceIPAddress=*
+   | spath userAgent | search userAgent=*
+   | table requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent
+   |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`'
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+  asset_type: AWS Federated Account
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: n/a
+  dataset:
+  - TBU
+type: ESCU
+version: 1

From b233d1a1fc453007c242531314747c5426c33488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 14:07:19 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 005/132] minor

---
 ...r.yml => detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml} | 0
 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 rename detections/cloud/{detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml => detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml} (100%)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
similarity index 100%
rename from detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
rename to detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml

From 1b799d788c95581aeb6a0ac1bece4e8398856025 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 15:46:36 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 006/132] user test file draft

---
 ...pike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml

diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd0c2d1241
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User
+  file: cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: security_hub_ec2_spike.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json
+    sourcetype: aws:securityhub:finding
+    source: aws_securityhub_finding

From d0a48bcb2f844435ee8c6711dc1a0b08a911fe83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 18:47:16 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 007/132] awssamlupdateidentityprovider

---
 .../aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml     | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml

diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..81dd39dec1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2021-01-26'
+description: This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely
+  as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudtrail logs.
+id: 2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
+name: AWS SAML access by provider user and principal
+references:
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
+search: sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" eventtype=aws_cloudtrail_iam_change federation | spath eventSource | search eventSource="iam.amazonaws.com"
+  | spath eventName | search eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | spath "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn" | search "*"
+  | spath "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn" | search "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn"="*" | spath "userIdentity.accessKeyId" | search "userIdentity.accessKeyId"=* | spath "userIdentity.principalId" | search "userIdentity.principalId"="*"   | table  eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId
+  |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`'
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+  asset_type: AWS Federated Account
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: n/a
+  dataset:
+  - TBU
+type: ESCU
+version: 1

From 43ac587efbc08de14db788ea414380975a941c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 20:30:37 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 008/132] o365ssologonerrors

---
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml | 31 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9f3f1bd6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2021-01-26'
+description: This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors
+  may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+id: 8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password
+  obtained via credential access attack.
+name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
+references:
+- https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/
+search: sourcetype="o365:management:activity"  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory ActorIpAddress=* UserAgent=* LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired
+  | spath UserId | search UserId="*" | table ActorIpAddress UserAgent LogonError UserId
+  |stats count by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId
+  | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`'
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Office 365 Detections
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+  asset_type: Office 365
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objective
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1556
+  security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: n/a
+  dataset:
+  - TBU
+type: ESCU
+version: 1

From 645e87f4618e31fcc727c0f2fb8faca72bbe90a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 21:18:15 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 009/132] o365addapproleassignmentgrantuser

---
 ..._access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml |  2 +-
 ...365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml

diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
index d9d9125dd7..e8a59351cd 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ known_false_positives: Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or
   accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress
   user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches
   can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.
-name: AWS SAML access by provider user and principal
+name: aws saml access by provider user and principal
 references:
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9160156fd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2021-01-26'
+description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+id: b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely,
+  as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
+name: o365 add app role assignment grant user
+references:
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+search: sourcetype="o365:management:activity"  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | spath Operation | search Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user."
+  | table ActorIpAddress Actor{}.ID Actor{}.Type dest ResultStatus
+  | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`'
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Office 365 Detections
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+  asset_type: Office 365
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objective
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1136
+  security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: n/a
+  dataset:
+  - TBU
+type: ESCU
+version: 1

From e841476a3268ae21c62e245e1f9a8ac840d1862e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 21:30:39 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 010/132] o365addedserviceprincipal

---
 .../cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml    | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..138b036362
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2021-01-26'
+description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+id: 1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely,
+  as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
+name: o365 add app role assignment grant user
+references:
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
+- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
+search: sourcetype="o365:management:activity"  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature="Add service principal credentials."
+  | spath "Actor{}.ID" | search "Actor{}.ID"="*" | spath "ModifiedProperties{}.Name" | search "ModifiedProperties{}.Name"="TargetId.ServicePrincipalNames"
+  | spath "ExtendedProperties{}.Value" | search "ExtendedProperties{}.Value"=ServicePrincipal | spath "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue" | search "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue"="*"
+  | spath "Target{}.ID" | search "Target{}.ID"="*" | table ActorIpAddress Actor{}.ID signature ModifiedProperties{}.Name ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue Target{}.ID
+  | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`'
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Office 365 Detections
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+  asset_type: Office 365
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objective
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1136
+  security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: n/a
+  dataset:
+  - TBU
+type: ESCU
+version: 1

From 4c14ca7e2c62ab436f6ddc8c45474d20256a9082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 21:43:48 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 011/132] o365newfederedateddomainadded

---
 .../cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fb26bd8e87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2021-01-26'
+description: This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+id: e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely,
+  as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.
+name: o365 add app role assignment grant user
+references:
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
+- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
+- https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/
+search: sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange | spath Operation | search Operation="Add-FederatedDomain"
+  | spath "Parameters{}.Value" | search "Parameters{}.Value"="*"| table ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey Parameters{}.Value
+  | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`'
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Office 365 Detections
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
+  asset_type: Office 365
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objective
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1136
+  security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: n/a
+  dataset:
+  - TBU
+type: ESCU
+version: 1

From 1d4e14ad93be1988ebb1de787b3a6eede4e650c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 18:51:06 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 012/132] macro fixes

---
 ...ct_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 6 +++---
 .../detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml    | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index 9e85618864..489352502b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance
 id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
-version: 2
-date: '2020-07-21'
+version: 3
+date: '2021-01-26'
 description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
 type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance 
+search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance 
 | bucket span=4h _time 
 | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest 
 | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev 
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
index af0649ef3f..ee12d07776 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User
 id: 2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
-version: 2
-date: '2020-07-21'
+version: 3
+date: '2021-01-26'
 description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
 type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time 
+search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time 
 | stats count AS alerts by _time user 
 | eventstats avg(alerts)
     as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev 

From edeaa89c7d0cad95dc9bc85698b4724ffcb4222d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 18:53:01 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 013/132] macros for all

---
 macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml b/macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml
index b362424495..2f19f0c2aa 100644
--- a/macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml
+++ b/macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-definition: sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose"
+definition: sourcetype="aws:securityhub:finding"
 description: customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype).
   Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
-name: aws_securityhub_firehose
+name: aws_securityhub_finding

From ec76d28b6026a2d3559bc498d07ce4839007478e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 19:28:03 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 014/132] rename

---
 .../{aws_securityhub_firehose.yml => aws_securityhub_finding.yml} | 0
 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 rename macros/{aws_securityhub_firehose.yml => aws_securityhub_finding.yml} (100%)

diff --git a/macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml b/macros/aws_securityhub_finding.yml
similarity index 100%
rename from macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml
rename to macros/aws_securityhub_finding.yml

From 30bb53bfbcb44e83065441be6adf56b414c250cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-57-117>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 03:30:48 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 015/132] Added detection testing service results inDetect
 Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance

---
 ...s_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 27 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index 489352502b..b7a125bd2e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -2,22 +2,22 @@ name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance
 id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
 version: 3
 date: '2021-01-26'
-description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
+description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts
+  for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub
-  inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security
+  Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule
+  these searches according to the bucket span interval.
 type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance 
-| bucket span=4h _time 
-| stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest 
-| eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev 
-| eval threshold_value = 3 
-| eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) 
-| search isOutlier=1 
-| table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg
-| `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`'
+search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h
+  _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account)
+  as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity
+  by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev
+  | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev
+  * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types
+  vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`'
 known_false_positives: None
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -29,3 +29,6 @@ tags:
   - DE.AE
   security_domain: network
   asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json

From c35446dcc907919b097a8feb9191e5541a5c871e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:19:32 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 016/132] fix

---
 detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
index fb26bd8e87..1146d000e9 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-26'
 description: This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
-  works with o365:management:activity
+  works with o365:management:activity.
 id: e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely,
   as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.

From b5befe9b5de3aa338c02f714217280e68635109f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rod Soto <rsoto@splunk.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 14:00:36 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 017/132] tagsonsearchescloudfederated

---
 detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml  | 3 ++-
 .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml      | 2 ++
 detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml       | 1 +
 detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml                | 1 +
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml   | 1 +
 8 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
index 9160156fd8..a6afb6dc12 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1136
+  - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
   automated_detection_testing: n/a
   dataset:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
index 138b036362..0691b9c7f5 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1136
+  - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
   automated_detection_testing: n/a
   dataset:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
index 1146d000e9..9bcc518cac 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1136
+  - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
   automated_detection_testing: n/a
   dataset:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
index af7bfefbcb..8919cd6651 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
@@ -20,11 +20,12 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(
   Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`'
 known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be
-  part of a whtelist.
+  part of a whitelist.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003.001
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
index df72bec23d..656f6b8130 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used
   in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you
   may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
 tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003.001
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
index 57cf51b81b..e4e25dc322 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Unusual Processes
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1204.002
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
index 0f4c970998..60bf02eef5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Unusual Processes
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
index 049395f3af..c06120593d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
+  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1546.012
   kill_chain_phases:

From 177dc4eb96c926756604de4f9d0271572902a2b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 14:36:52 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 018/132] ntdsutil export NTDS.dit

Broke out ntdsutil.exe from creation_of_shadow_copy to allow for better filtering and specific monitoring/alerting.
---
 .../endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml      |  9 ++--
 detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml  | 49 +++++++++++++++++++
 tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml  | 12 +++++
 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
index 9f27e6a9f9..dac83e296a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: Creation of Shadow Copy
 id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844
 version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
-description: Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic has been used to create
+description: Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create
   a shadow copy.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
@@ -13,14 +13,13 @@ references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe
-  Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) OR (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe
   Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe
   Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user
   Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic
+known_false_positives: Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic
   will create false positives.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -38,4 +37,4 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
-  - hhttps://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe06b599cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: Ntdsutil Export NTDS
+id: da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
+date: '2021-01-28'
+description: Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit,
+  typically used for offline password cracking.
+  It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations
+  of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. 
+  Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \
+  
+  ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \
+  
+  This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database.
+  A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html
+author: Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe
+  Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user
+  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
+  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_dump_ntds_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot
+  with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Credential Dumping
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.003
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  - CIS 16
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0454c467c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: NTdsutil export ntds dit Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: NTdsutil to export ntds dit from Directory Services
+  file: endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog

From 4576b9f72bc81e04fd5b9cb6aeef2b792a408f01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 14:43:33 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 019/132] Update ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml

---
 detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
index fe06b599cc..9da67e95e4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-name: Ntdsutil Export NTDS
+name: Ntdsutil export ntds
 id: da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user
   Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_dump_ntds_filter`'
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`'
 known_false_positives: Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot
   with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.
 tags:

From c445ef14b9a9c128fe6401cbdc9afc8e5bb07b80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-210-193>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 22:07:24 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 020/132] Added detection testing service results inNTdsutil to
 export ntds dit from Directory Services

---
 detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml | 24 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
index 9da67e95e4..3c704fc6b8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
@@ -2,16 +2,17 @@ name: Ntdsutil export ntds
 id: da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
-description: Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit,
-  typically used for offline password cracking.
-  It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations
-  of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. 
-  Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \
-  
+description: 'Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory
+  database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used
+  in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of
+  more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical
+  command used to dump ntds.dit \
+
   ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \
-  
-  This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database.
-  A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.
+
+  This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the
+  Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database
+  will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
@@ -29,8 +30,8 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot
-  with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.
+known_false_positives: Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with
+  ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -47,3 +48,4 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From 1aa02ceb6fdb25871786aa97a26734be050fbbb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 15:10:37 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 021/132] update ymls to remove validation errors

---
 .../aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml     | 7 ++-----
 detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml     | 7 ++-----
 .../cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml      | 7 ++-----
 detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml          | 7 ++-----
 detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml       | 5 +----
 detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml       | 7 ++-----
 6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
index e8a59351cd..2cab991c65 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ known_false_positives: Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or
   accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress
   user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches
   can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.
-name: aws saml access by provider user and principal
+name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal
 references:
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
-search: sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" Assumerolewithsaml | spath "requestParameters.principalArn" | search "requestParameters.principalArn"=*
+search: '`cloudtrail` Assumerolewithsaml | spath "requestParameters.principalArn" | search "requestParameters.principalArn"=*
    | spath "requestParameters.roleArn" | search "requestParameters.roleArn"=* | spath "requestParameters.roleSessionName"
    | search "requestParameters.roleSessionName"=* | spath recipientAccountId | search recipientAccountId=*
    | spath "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.arn" | search "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.arn"=*
@@ -32,8 +32,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: n/a
-  dataset:
-  - TBU
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
index 81dd39dec1..723ffcad85 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. Thi
   search works with cloudtrail logs.
 id: 2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
-name: AWS SAML access by provider user and principal
+name: AWS SAML Update identity provider
 references:
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
-search: sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" eventtype=aws_cloudtrail_iam_change federation | spath eventSource | search eventSource="iam.amazonaws.com"
+search: '`cloudtrail` federation | spath eventSource | search eventSource="iam.amazonaws.com"
   | spath eventName | search eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | spath "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn" | search "*"
   | spath "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn" | search "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn"="*" | spath "userIdentity.accessKeyId" | search "userIdentity.accessKeyId"=* | spath "userIdentity.principalId" | search "userIdentity.principalId"="*"   | table  eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId
   |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`'
@@ -23,8 +23,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: n/a
-  dataset:
-  - TBU
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
index a6afb6dc12..a068606501 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This sear
 id: b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely,
   as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
-name: o365 add app role assignment grant user
+name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
-search: sourcetype="o365:management:activity"  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | spath Operation | search Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user."
+search: '`o365_management_activity`  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | spath Operation | search Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user."
   | table ActorIpAddress Actor{}.ID Actor{}.Type dest ResultStatus
   | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`'
 tags:
@@ -23,8 +23,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: n/a
-  dataset:
-  - TBU
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
index 0691b9c7f5..560614244b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This sear
 id: 1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely,
   as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
-name: o365 add app role assignment grant user
+name: O365 Added Service Principal
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
-search: sourcetype="o365:management:activity"  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature="Add service principal credentials."
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature="Add service principal credentials."
   | spath "Actor{}.ID" | search "Actor{}.ID"="*" | spath "ModifiedProperties{}.Name" | search "ModifiedProperties{}.Name"="TargetId.ServicePrincipalNames"
   | spath "ExtendedProperties{}.Value" | search "ExtendedProperties{}.Value"=ServicePrincipal | spath "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue" | search "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue"="*"
   | spath "Target{}.ID" | search "Target{}.ID"="*" | table ActorIpAddress Actor{}.ID signature ModifiedProperties{}.Name ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue Target{}.ID
@@ -27,8 +27,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: n/a
-  dataset:
-  - TBU
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
index c9f3f1bd6e..3b872406e7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it ma
 name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
 references:
 - https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/
-search: sourcetype="o365:management:activity"  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory ActorIpAddress=* UserAgent=* LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory ActorIpAddress=* UserAgent=* LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired
   | spath UserId | search UserId="*" | table ActorIpAddress UserAgent LogonError UserId
   |stats count by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId
   | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`'
@@ -24,8 +24,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1556
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: n/a
-  dataset:
-  - TBU
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
index 9bcc518cac..3e3724b4d0 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
@@ -6,14 +6,14 @@ how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This sear
 id: e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely,
   as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.
-name: o365 add app role assignment grant user
+name: O365 New Federated Domain Added
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/
-search: sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange | spath Operation | search Operation="Add-FederatedDomain"
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange | spath Operation | search Operation="Add-FederatedDomain"
   | spath "Parameters{}.Value" | search "Parameters{}.Value"="*"| table ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey Parameters{}.Value
   | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`'
 tags:
@@ -26,8 +26,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: n/a
-  dataset:
-  - TBU
 type: ESCU
 version: 1

From 3d5d188dd7f0b0d4e627fce46d927fdeec46073c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 10:58:53 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 022/132] Regsvr32 Story and Analytics

First batch of Regsvr32
---
 ...ct_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml | 47 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...ious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml | 45 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml   | 43 +++++++++++++++++
 stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml         |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml      | 40 ++++++++++++++++
 ...gsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml | 12 +++++
 ...suspicious_regsvr32_register_path.test.yml | 12 +++++
 .../suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml       | 12 +++++
 8 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
 create mode 100644 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_path.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4844275e01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+name: Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
+id: 070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
+date: '2021-01-28'
+description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. 
+  Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking
+  and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems.
+  Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is
+  often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack.
+  
+  Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). 
+  Be cautious to modify the query to look for `scrobj.dll`, the `.dll` is not required to load scrobj.
+  `scrobj.dll` will be loaded by `regsvr32.exe` upon execution. '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by modifying/removing the !=regsv32.exe.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe)
+  Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user
+  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
+  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.010
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  - CIS 16
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..565b7be728
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path
+id: 62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
+date: '2021-01-28'
+description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code
+  by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. 
+  Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external).
+  Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by  legitimate processes.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
+- https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe
+ (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\temp*)
+ (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx)
+  by Processes.dest Processes.user
+  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
+  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.010
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  - CIS 16
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1c77af5142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Rename
+id: 0b8e6e18-6259-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
+date: '2021-01-29'
+description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of regsvr32.exe executing.
+  regsvr32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
+  C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate regsvr32.exe
+  executing and what content it is loading. 
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed regsvr32.exe may be used. Review
+  paths of the renamed instance.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=REGSVR32.EXE OR process_name!=regsvr32.exe)
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
+  parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
+  rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+  `suspicious_regsvr32_rename_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of regsvr32, triggering a false positive.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.010
+  - T1036.003
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
index d08c86333a..77ed2d3710 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2021-01-20'
 description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe
   process to execute malicious code.
-narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions
+narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
   via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta
   suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution
   of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96a6848639
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
+id: b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
+date: '2021-01-29'
+description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe
+  process to execute malicious code.
+narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
+  via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo"
+  using the `scrobj.dll` dll to load `.sct` scriptlets. This technique is still widely used
+  by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. 
+  The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt for example). 
+
+  The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. 
+  
+  Triage \
+  Validate execution \
+  1. Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further
+  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.
+  2. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. \
+  Situational Awareness \
+  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
+  Script code by regsvr32.exe. \
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
+  2. Module loads. Are the known regsvr32.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
+  regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs?
+  3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
+  Retrieval of script code \
+  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
+tags:
+  analytics_story: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+  category:
+  - Adversary Tactics
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c975e940bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Detect Regsvr32 Appication Control Bypass Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Detect regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
+  file: endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_path.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f283e20e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_path.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Detect Regsvr32 Register Path Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Detect regsvr32 Registering DLLs from non-standard paths
+  file: endpoint/detect_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c105746de6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Suspicious regsvr32 rename
+tests:
+- name: Detect renamed regsvr32 execution
+  file: endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From 921bd3aec657c99031cda97ad2041f788c897491 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 11:03:01 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 023/132] Update suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml

---
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml | 17 +----------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index 96a6848639..e1a5dcc862 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -11,22 +11,7 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt for example). 
 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. 
-  
-  Triage \
-  Validate execution \
-  1. Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.
-  2. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. \
-  Situational Awareness \
-  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by regsvr32.exe. \
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
-  2. Module loads. Are the known regsvr32.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
-  regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs?
-  3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
-  Retrieval of script code \
-  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU
 references:

From 26e9acd0b868ba8a80e60fcfed3cc76b96c3f2c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 11:07:33 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 024/132] Update suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml

---
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index e1a5dcc862..af8dcdb77a 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@ description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the re
   process to execute malicious code.
 narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
   via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo"
-  using the `scrobj.dll` dll to load `.sct` scriptlets. This technique is still widely used
+  using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used
   by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. 
   The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt for example). 
-
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
   may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk

From 4fc95b6dd24cf57a62d448cf403ec23cc2756c68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 11:15:35 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 025/132] regsvr32

---
 .../endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml | 6 +++---
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml                    | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
index 4844275e01..1b88c7334a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious
   Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking
   and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems.
   Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is
-  often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack.
+  often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack. \
   
   Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). 
-  Be cautious to modify the query to look for `scrobj.dll`, the `.dll` is not required to load scrobj.
-  `scrobj.dll` will be loaded by `regsvr32.exe` upon execution. '
+  Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll" is not required to load scrobj.
+  "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon execution. '
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index af8dcdb77a..cc922fe190 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -21,4 +21,4 @@ tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
+  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file

From b6bb7f86a80fd1d3772f1f9ecd53326fa149b323 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-108-83>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 18:38:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 026/132] Added detection testing service results inDetect
 regsvr32 Application Control Bypass

---
 ...ct_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml | 27 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
index 1b88c7334a..1a7ab59f8b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@ name: Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
 id: 070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
-description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. 
+description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code.
   Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking
   and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems.
   Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is
   often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack. \
-  
-  Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). 
-  Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll" is not required to load scrobj.
-  "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon execution. '
+
+  Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal
+  or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll"
+  is not required to load scrobj. "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon
+  execution. '
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
@@ -23,12 +24,13 @@ references:
 - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe)
-  Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user
-  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
-  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe
+  OR Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe) Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest
+  Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Limited false positives related to third party software registering
+  .DLL's.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
@@ -44,4 +46,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
\ No newline at end of file
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From 3551039f097799a9d9e41ce2826cb8962fc30351 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 11:48:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 027/132] register suspicious path rename

---
 ....yml => suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml} | 0
 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 rename tests/endpoint/{suspicious_regsvr32_register_path.test.yml => suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml} (100%)

diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml
similarity index 100%
rename from tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_path.test.yml
rename to tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml

From 781572a7d63e4707c5b991271cb715f7216a63c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 13:34:40 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 028/132] Update
 suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml

---
 .../suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml     | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml
index 7f283e20e9..0735471a9d 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-name: Detect Regsvr32 Register Path Unit Test
+name: Detect Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path Unit Test
 tests:
 - name: Detect regsvr32 Registering DLLs from non-standard paths
-  file: endpoint/detect_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
+  file: endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
   earliest_time: '-24h'
   latest_time: 'now'

From 3def2593d4718a9be9b1661730245b6599247208 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-213-182>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 20:55:42 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 029/132] Added detection testing service results inDetect
 regsvr32 Registering DLLs from non-standard paths

---
 ...ious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml | 28 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
index 565b7be728..677419eeef 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
@@ -2,14 +2,15 @@ name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path
 id: 62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
-description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code
-  by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. 
-  Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external).
-  Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.'
+description: Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code
+  by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating,
+  look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review
+  additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by  legitimate processes.
+  field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions
+  found to be used by  legitimate processes.
 type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
@@ -20,13 +21,13 @@ references:
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe
- (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\temp*)
- (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx)
-  by Processes.dest Processes.user
-  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
-  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.
+  (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\temp*)
+  (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest
+  Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified
+  paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
@@ -42,4 +43,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
\ No newline at end of file
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From a0c2a1bcd6fd5a17e71f3e9fbe676f62c73a528e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 14:23:02 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 030/132] Update suspicious_mshta_activity.yml

---
 stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml | 28 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
index 77ed2d3710..39968b78a8 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
@@ -10,21 +10,27 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
+  may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
   
-  Triage \
+  Triage\
   Validate execution \
   1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.
-  2. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA. \
-  Situational Awareness \
+  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+  
+  1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
+  
+  Situational Awareness\
   The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by MSHTA.exe. \
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
-  2. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
-  MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?
-  3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
-  Retrieval of script code \
+  Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
+
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
+
+  1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
+  MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
+
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
+  
+  Retrieval of script code\
   The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU

From ef829b6f9a3625969d9ed72ea62d0a7a916deac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 14:57:05 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 031/132] Regsvr32 rename fix

Fixes
---
 .../endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml   |  2 +-
 ...oper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 38 ++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
index 1c77af5142..53432e4aa5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=REGSVR32.EXE OR process_name!=regsvr32.exe)
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=REGSVR32.EXE NOT process_name=regsvr32.exe)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
index 355aa38376..9afa461d44 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
@@ -7,30 +7,40 @@ description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the ms
 narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted 
   Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform
   used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project
-  files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
+  files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
 
   The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows
   for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and
   execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is
   used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses
-  that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
+  that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code. \
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\
   
-  Triage \
-  Validate execution \
+  Triage\
+
+  Validate execution\
+
   1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further
-  PE metadata.
-  2. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.
-  Situational Awareness \
+  PE metadata.\
+  
+  1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\
+  
+  Situational Awareness\
+
   The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by MSBuild.exe. \
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
-  2. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
-  MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?
-  3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
-  Retrieval of script code \
+  Script code by MSBuild.exe.\
+  
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
+  
+  1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
+  MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
+  
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
+  
+  Retrieval of script code\
+  
   The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU

From 99c9958701c75ca164b29a89c2a767ae1de22426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P4T12ICK <pbareib@splunk.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 17:04:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 032/132] fixed Spl

---
 ...s_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml | 13 ++++---------
 .../cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml     |  6 +++---
 .../o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml     |  5 +++--
 detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml   |  6 +++---
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml       |  7 ++++---
 .../cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml       |  5 +++--
 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
index 2cab991c65..498561dd8e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
@@ -16,15 +16,10 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
-search: '`cloudtrail` Assumerolewithsaml | spath "requestParameters.principalArn" | search "requestParameters.principalArn"=*
-   | spath "requestParameters.roleArn" | search "requestParameters.roleArn"=* | spath "requestParameters.roleSessionName"
-   | search "requestParameters.roleSessionName"=* | spath recipientAccountId | search recipientAccountId=*
-   | spath "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.arn" | search "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.arn"=*
-   | spath "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.assumedRoleId" | search "responseElements.assumedRoleUser.assumedRoleId"=*
-   | spath "responseElements.issuer" | search "responseElements.issuer"=* | spath sourceIPAddress | search sourceIPAddress=*
-   | spath userAgent | search userAgent=*
-   | table requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent
-   |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`'
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
index 723ffcad85..54dbed56ff 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
-search: '`cloudtrail` federation | spath eventSource | search eventSource="iam.amazonaws.com"
-  | spath eventName | search eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | spath "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn" | search "*"
-  | spath "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn" | search "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn"="*" | spath "userIdentity.accessKeyId" | search "userIdentity.accessKeyId"=* | spath "userIdentity.principalId" | search "userIdentity.principalId"="*"   | table  eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
index a068606501..317c6d170a 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
-search: '`o365_management_activity`  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | spath Operation | search Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user."
-  | table ActorIpAddress Actor{}.ID Actor{}.Type dest ResultStatus
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user."
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
index 560614244b..b6ed8a4626 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature="Add service principal credentials."
-  | spath "Actor{}.ID" | search "Actor{}.ID"="*" | spath "ModifiedProperties{}.Name" | search "ModifiedProperties{}.Name"="TargetId.ServicePrincipalNames"
-  | spath "ExtendedProperties{}.Value" | search "ExtendedProperties{}.Value"=ServicePrincipal | spath "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue" | search "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue"="*"
-  | spath "Target{}.ID" | search "Target{}.ID"="*" | table ActorIpAddress Actor{}.ID signature ModifiedProperties{}.Name ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue Target{}.ID
+  | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name
+  values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress signature
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
index 3b872406e7..95e835d54b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
@@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it ma
 name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
 references:
 - https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/
-search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory ActorIpAddress=* UserAgent=* LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired
-  | spath UserId | search UserId="*" | table ActorIpAddress UserAgent LogonError UserId
-  |stats count by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId
+search: '`o365_management_activity`  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId
+  | where count > 5
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
index 3e3724b4d0..f1c3e31fdd 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/
-search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange | spath Operation | search Operation="Add-FederatedDomain"
-  | spath "Parameters{}.Value" | search "Parameters{}.Value"="*"| table ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey Parameters{}.Value
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="Add-FederatedDomain"
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:

From 99501707257a218e76fab4f1573716c2252693db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P4T12ICK <pbareib@splunk.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 17:31:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 033/132] update

---
 .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tests/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml
index 5f88dcf0de..97f58b4519 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious location Unit Test
 tests:
-- name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location 
-  file: endpoint/process_creating_lnk_in_suspicious_location.yml
+- name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
+  file: endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
   earliest_time: '-24h'
   latest_time: 'now'

From ee7e2d7d96b2cb56624fbdda21673511889771c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 10:43:55 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 034/132] Update suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml

---
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
index 53432e4aa5..5063f10400 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=REGSVR32.EXE NOT process_name=regsvr32.exe)
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=REGSVR32.EXE OR process_name=regsvr32.exe)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|

From 935968b0634fd67bba48a49a07479af183c84591 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales <icorrales@splunk.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 10:37:22 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 035/132] Fixed SSA with cmd line norm

---
 .../endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml    | 14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index c164f2ffd8..0bc478eb95 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: First time seen command line argument - SSA
 id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23
-version: 1
-date: '2020-6-25'
+version: 2
+date: '2021-2-1'
 description: "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter
   to execute a command that has not previously been seen. 
 This is an implementation on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel."
@@ -13,12 +13,14 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
        dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
        process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null))
+       cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line, /\w:\\[^\s]+/, "PATH"),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N")
 | where process_name="cmd.exe" AND
         match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true
-| select cmd_line, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id
-| first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line"]
-| where first_time_cmd_line
+| select cmd_line, cmd_line_norm, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id
+| first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line_norm"]
+| where first_time_cmd_line_norm
 | eval start_time = timestamp,
        end_time = timestamp,
        entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id),

From 0a92fadf76479e08e9f6ed0a212f1e748e09f808 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 12:37:36 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 036/132] dump lsass via procdump

---
 .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml      | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml | 12 +++++
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f5a4ee079
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+name: Dump LSASS via procdump
+id: 3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-01'
+description: Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. 
+  -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect
+  and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe.
+  Modify the query as needed.\
+
+  During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, 
+  there will always be a -accepteula on the command line.
+  Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=procdump.exe
+  (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*ls* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`'
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Credential Dumping
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40d26e48fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Dump LSASS via procdump Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Dump LSASS via procdump
+  file: endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog

From 33ff45c0ed2198163b674f9f3fd0a7d54f785c65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 12:39:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 037/132] Update dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml

---
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
index 1f5a4ee079..fdad5cd019 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ references:
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=procdump.exe
-  (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*ls* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
+  (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`'
 known_false_positives: None identified.

From 7325dc53406701ded4a0c9e3160b26c676d4b213 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-169-152>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 19:59:30 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 038/132] Added detection testing service results inDump LSASS
 via procdump

---
 .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml      | 20 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
index fdad5cd019..296bc33cea 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
@@ -2,14 +2,15 @@ name: Dump LSASS via procdump
 id: 3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-01'
-description: Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. 
-  -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect
-  and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe.
+description: 'Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for
+  both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump
+  file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This
+  query does not monitor for the internal name (procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe.
   Modify the query as needed.\
 
-  During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, 
-  there will always be a -accepteula on the command line.
-  Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.
+  During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a
+  Sysinternals utility has been ran, there will always be a -accepteula on the command
+  line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
@@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ references:
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=procdump.exe
-  (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`'
+  (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by
+  Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`'
 known_false_positives: None identified.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -42,3 +43,4 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From 3d7047ece0a2e51c966d5c6b3491bc70cb0da106 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 13:04:12 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 039/132] Update dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml

---
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
index 296bc33cea..f0693948f9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2021-02-01'
 description: 'Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for
   both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump
   file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This
-  query does not monitor for the internal name (procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe.
+  query does not monitor for the internal name (OriginalFileName=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe.
   Modify the query as needed.\
 
   During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a

From 16c0021d56fe130ad59fc1be2481e59ecebd17b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales <icorrales@splunk.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 13:44:48 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 040/132] updated testing data file and made test assertion
 more tight

---
 tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
index ea90453dab..4df1563bb6 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: First time seen command line argument - SSA Unit Test
 tests:
   - name: First time seen command line argument
     file: endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
-    pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+    pass_condition: '@count_eq(3)'
     description: Test detection of first time seen command
     attack_data:
       - file_name: first_time_seen_commandline.json

From 24355708a1c700ff729ea6bcc2a39b6e1155ebd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P4T12ICK <pbareib@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 10:13:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 041/132] added detection tests

---
 ...l_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml | 13 +++++++++++++
 .../aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml      | 13 +++++++++++++
 ...o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml | 12 ++++++++++++
 tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml   | 12 ++++++++++++
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml  | 12 ++++++++++++
 .../cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml  | 12 ++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tests/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml

diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ab99ac7fed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal
+  file: cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json
+    sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail
+    source: aws_cloudtrail
+    update_timestamp: True
diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e5bc38378
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+name: AWS SAML Update identity provider Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: AWS SAML Update identity provider
+  file: cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json
+    sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail
+    source: aws_cloudtrail
+    update_timestamp: True
diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e1738fb4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
+  file: cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: o365_management_activity.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json
+    sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity'
+    source: 'o365'
diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b2ee0440f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: O365 Added Service Principal Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: O365 Added Service Principal
+  file: cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: o365_management_activity.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json
+    sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity'
+    source: 'o365'
diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3546060cfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
+  file: cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: o365_management_activity.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json
+    sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity'
+    source: 'o365'
diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80dae8a119
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: O365 New Federated Domain Added Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: O365 New Federated Domain Added
+  file: cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: o365_management_activity.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/oo365_new_federated_domain.json
+    sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity'
+    source: 'o365'

From 44d6c32803916db3380c03734e9af01bfa14503d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-140-106>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 09:37:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 042/132] Added detection testing service results inAWS SAML
 Update identity provider

---
 .../aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml     | 19 +++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
index 54dbed56ff..8a7321ae2c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-26'
-description: This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely
-  as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.
+description: This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates
+  to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter
+  compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider
+  set by attacker.
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
   search works with cloudtrail logs.
 id: 2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
+known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily
+  be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
 name: AWS SAML Update identity provider
 references:
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn
+  userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId
+  userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -23,5 +27,8 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1

From 82c6321c5fdbba500f3e713714a7f485b2399cb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-140-106>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 09:38:07 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 043/132] Added detection testing service results inAWS SAML
 Access by Provider User and Principal

---
 ..._access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml | 27 ++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
index 498561dd8e..9ac60556e2 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,28 @@
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-26'
-description: This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS.
- This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially
- in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.
+description: This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider,
+  user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to
+  detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated
+  environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
   search works with cloudtrail logs
 id: bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as
-  accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress
-  user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches
-  can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.
+known_false_positives: Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries
+  are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions
+  looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress
+  user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential
+  access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect
+  these attacks.
 name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal
 references:
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn
+  requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress
+  userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -27,5 +31,8 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1

From ba5b0875f427d4179bc82a6b9d35078e89fe3717 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-82-35>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 09:47:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 044/132] Added detection testing service results inO365 Add
 App Role Assignment Grant User

---
 ...o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
index 317c6d170a..4f393bbcb6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-26'
-description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.
+description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting
+  about an specific event related to its creation.
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
   works with o365:management:activity
 id: b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely,
-  as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
+known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious,
+  however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential
+  abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
 name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
-search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user."
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app
+  role assignment grant to user." | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by
+  ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -24,5 +27,8 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1

From ccf8872c46581325f7fe78cb4f86fea0ef284f6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-240-46>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 10:13:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 045/132] Added detection testing service results inO365
 Excessive SSO logon errors

---
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml   | 17 ++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
index 95e835d54b..2195e7caf8 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-26'
-description: This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors
-  may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.
+description: This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO)
+  logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password
+  or single sign on token hijack or reuse.
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
   works with o365:management:activity
 id: 8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password
-  obtained via credential access attack.
+known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may
+  indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.
 name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
 references:
 - https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/
 search: '`o365_management_activity`  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId
-  | where count > 5
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress
+  UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -25,5 +25,8 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1556
   security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1

From 37bdc899157098bb4bac99cb291290edfe84e017 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-240-46>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 10:13:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 046/132] Added detection testing service results inO365 Added
 Service Principal

---
 .../cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml    | 20 ++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
index b6ed8a4626..88e3123ed8 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-26'
-description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.
+description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting
+  about an specific event related to its creation.
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
   works with o365:management:activity
 id: 1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely,
-  as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
+known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious,
+  however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential
+  abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
 name: O365 Added Service Principal
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
-search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature="Add service principal credentials."
-  | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name
-  values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress signature
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature="Add service
+  principal credentials." | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID)
+  as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue)
+  as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress
+  signature | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -27,5 +30,8 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1

From fff2e32a35961345acdf63b0afabacf51145de64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P4T12ICK <pbareib@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 13:23:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 047/132] updated test file

---
 tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
index 80dae8a119..fe66213299 100644
--- a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
+++ b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests:
 - name: O365 New Federated Domain Added
   file: cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  earliest_time: '-7d'
   latest_time: 'now'
   attack_data:
   - file_name: o365_management_activity.json
     data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/oo365_new_federated_domain.json
     sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity'
-    source: 'o365'
+    source: 'exchange'

From 0dc3a302fde1982cb8e8b02ca85fc237126ce299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P4T12ICK <pbareib@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 14:19:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 048/132] small bug

---
 tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
index fe66213299..3737d44222 100644
--- a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
+++ b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ tests:
     data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/oo365_new_federated_domain.json
     sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity'
     source: 'exchange'
+    update_timestamp: True

From b18c30584ff1518e7d1673b88d5402ac5d3375e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P4T12ICK <pbareib@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:06:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 049/132] fix for testing

---
 tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
index 3737d44222..7eb063af41 100644
--- a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
+++ b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ tests:
   latest_time: 'now'
   attack_data:
   - file_name: o365_management_activity.json
-    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/oo365_new_federated_domain.json
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json
     sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity'
     source: 'exchange'
     update_timestamp: True

From c0edc68533d478b94182e977247b66cedb93530c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-217-130>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 14:26:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 050/132] Added detection testing service results inO365 New
 Federated Domain Added

---
 .../cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml       | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
index f1c3e31fdd..949f8a081e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@ description: This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
   works with o365:management:activity.
 id: e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely,
-  as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.
+known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious,
+  however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential
+  abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.
 name: O365 New Federated Domain Added
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
@@ -14,8 +15,9 @@ references:
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="Add-FederatedDomain"
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value)
+  as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId
+  UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -27,5 +29,8 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1

From 055c9ec2584fb7faa4bfb24b5e060e3aa1838ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 12:54:27 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 051/132] updated type to use batch or streaming instead of
 product name

---
 .../email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml    | 2 +-
 ...ple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 2 +-
 detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml             | 2 +-
 .../application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml       | 2 +-
 .../application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml   | 2 +-
 ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 2 +-
 ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 2 +-
 ...ws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 2 +-
 ...tect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 2 +-
 ..._network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 2 +-
 ...cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +-
 ...oud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 2 +-
 ...ud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 2 +-
 ...te_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml       | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml             | 2 +-
 ...detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 2 +-
 .../detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml         | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml      | 2 +-
 .../high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml                           | 2 +-
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml                      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml      | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml          | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml   | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml        | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml      | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml   | 2 +-
 ...aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml    | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml   | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml    | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml      | 2 +-
 ...tect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml  | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml           | 2 +-
 .../detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml              | 2 +-
 .../dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml        | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml         | 2 +-
 ...c2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml        | 2 +-
 .../execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml          | 2 +-
 .../extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml            | 2 +-
 ...ell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml       | 2 +-
 ...reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml            | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml     | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml  | 2 +-
 ...lt_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml        | 2 +-
 .../attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml        | 2 +-
 .../credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml                  | 2 +-
 .../detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml        | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml                    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml          | 2 +-
 .../detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml     | 2 +-
 ...rocesses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 2 +-
 .../detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml    | 2 +-
 .../detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml              | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml  | 2 +-
 ...ershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 2 +-
 .../malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml  | 2 +-
 ...malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml      | 2 +-
 .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml               | 2 +-
 .../reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml     | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml                  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml             | 2 +-
 .../shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml  | 2 +-
 ...sa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...sa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +-
 ...a___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml   | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml   | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml    | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml     | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml   | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml    | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml                  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml          | 2 +-
 ...sa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml  | 2 +-
 ...__illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 ...agement_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...gement_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...vilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml  | 2 +-
 ...illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...egal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...g_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml  | 2 +-
 ...ss_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ..._active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ..._recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml      | 2 +-
 ...nd_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml      | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml        | 2 +-
 ...econ_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml     | 2 +-
 ...ivilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...a___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml        | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml  | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml                  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml               | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml  | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml                    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml                      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml               | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml      | 2 +-
 .../application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml        | 2 +-
 .../experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml  | 2 +-
 .../application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml       | 2 +-
 .../email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml      | 2 +-
 .../experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml  | 2 +-
 .../application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml          | 2 +-
 .../application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml | 2 +-
 .../application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml      | 2 +-
 .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml          | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml      | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml            | 2 +-
 .../gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml  | 2 +-
 ...gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml  | 2 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml         | 2 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml             | 2 +-
 ...ubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml       | 2 +-
 ...tes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml    | 2 +-
 ...ure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml   | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml   | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml     | 2 +-
 ...s_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml  | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml             | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml    | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml    | 2 +-
 ...ubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml       | 2 +-
 ...tes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml          | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml            | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml      | 2 +-
 ...ceiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 2 +-
 .../experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml   | 2 +-
 .../network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml       | 2 +-
 .../web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml              | 2 +-
 .../detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml     | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml           | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml       | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml         | 2 +-
 .../network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml                        | 2 +-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/network/tor_traffic.yml                              | 2 +-
 detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 2 +-
 334 files changed, 334 insertions(+), 334 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
index 72f7d62648..0d7a357497 100644
--- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
+++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
   reads and writes.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path)
diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
index 7e1aee1fb3..eac9a0223f 100644
--- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for
   users originating from the same ip address.
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
index fd98d502a5..f1d34102e0 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-07-21'
 description: Detect Okta user lockout events
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
index c86ba9b53c..b652887ef6 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-07-21'
 description: Detect failed Okta SSO events
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats  min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage,
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
index fa99bb296a..3d1c326a11 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search detects logins from the same user from different states
   a 24 hour period.
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null
   | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city)
diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
index 9c37ecd7fb..13ceace112 100644
--- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
+++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity
   Framework of Enterprise Security.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index 1f3fe92088..0bdda08d0b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud insta
   previously created and alerts on any outliers. 
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search
  `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index 5c2f23adaa..6e0ff07208 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instanc
   previously created and alerts on any outliers.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search
  `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
index fb209ffccc..12affd7747 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
   run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to
   create the probability density function.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
index 95e5e21722..0a56017ef9 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
   run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to
   create the probability density function model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
index 7efc31a0ca..a7d885f748 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age
   out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
   the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
index 0d70d67878..10d63f3cd7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
@@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags:
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
index 86d3a1d318..8aa4ad4c53 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
index 6a0f81f147..7be2dd2a61 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACL
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 40a9a9a53b..dbeee66296 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanism
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
index baeec7bf0e..e093ebd4fa 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window`
   macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
   the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 629c0c6d36..49563bb1f3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs
   Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create
   of baseline of previously seen users.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime,
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
index a25498761a..3fd7155256 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for
   this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
index 46f32353e5..fa51a72e73 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional
   filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 64bedd2548..080b467f85 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also
   provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index c310f1290d..2ba725f196 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search has a dependency on other searches to create and u
   a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously
   Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection
   to properly work.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime,
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index b255668a85..d5ef91e812 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index 37808e4598..8f84898792 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index 4f2875fc30..6044e42ede 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 55f8dca6b2..d72ec12c6e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
index 854bbf4d48..80850d1c40 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (vers
   IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update`
   hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches)
   to refresh the baselines.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
index d00f89e65c..c56eaf22e5 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (vers
   IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update`
   hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches)
   to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
index a431b99676..102fa22c87 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (vers
   to refresh the baselines. You
   can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
index afde87e13f..46ce22ec97 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (vers
   to refresh the baselines. You
   can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index ab57ad4e4b..a765e5fe76 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-08-10'
 description: This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously
   unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket.
 how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs.  These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour.  It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *).  A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message`
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
index 50987b2983..a3d35e8ddc 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-05'
 description: This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket.
 how_to_implement: 'This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
index 660b47d619..d88a00c678 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2021-01-12'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public
   S3 bucket.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
index c9facc4ed6..d5f3c20bf7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public
   S3 bucket over the aws cli.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index 39ac7b5ee1..f73c0f52be 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket
   Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen
   remote IPs and bucket names.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index 7f05f630eb..50f2ef1b9e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub aler
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub
   inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance 
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
index 31735b8276..ac9d7f4198 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked
   Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen
   blocked outbound connections.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
index 37291f9163..5ad603f0f3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best
   when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search
   once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
index af0649ef3f..55bccf4a61 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub aler
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub
   inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time 
diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
index 04d49c1634..1561b67555 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222
 version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 description: This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed  record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory
   | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError
diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
index 8dbb7808cf..712b92f26f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize
   the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
index f7f7620d2e..f9f01c5ef7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
index c86ae36f31..63f366bc4e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags:
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
index 884eef6232..e35dd8550d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
index aca38d6a56..ece1b17711 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
index 25134d8980..cac147ffaf 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 description: This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple
   mailboxes to the same destination.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters
   | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
index ffe0176a0d..8482fcee80 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-15'
 description: This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from
   another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters
   | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
index 09df22b713..c4ddfd60a5 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 description: This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to
   the same destination.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters
   | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
index 68b19e161f..cc69f41eaa 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully l
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index c51e21ff40..988d43d369 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully l
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter`
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
index 6424cd86fe..c3d0873d90 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high nu
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. 
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index 4b3ec25530..5e2ac4fb07 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully t
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter`
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index a533496b7f..14e7c0c938 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index fc2879c6b9..71cb995b18 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index 8e6e67d3d9..a6c35670e2 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run*
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index c4d0a4c992..ccee2959d2 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
index 2472b1f58d..b3a9f09931 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and popu
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest
   dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 629964de7e..8c981622d9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanism
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by
   customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Peter Gael, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn  |
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
index 11fe53acc1..bb5c8533bd 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
index 89740af552..73f2a7b165 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
index 2398a3cddd..e56db2c8c4 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Res
   \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\
   \ to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\
   \n"
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
index cb10f9672b..04edbb4da3 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data
   this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding
   the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section
   of the protocol.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
index af7bfefbcb..d70639f01f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, whic
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
index df72bec23d..0958605b99 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also en
   on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/.
   Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators"
   to be able to look for the right group membership changes.'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
index 1540ae1f92..1ad2fff35c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user
   roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen
   user roles.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
index 8879b9c41b..0744be6ba8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update
   previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how
   often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. 
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats
   earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
index 024bbc6312..1eef974f4b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
index 93aca93ef1..f030ba0423 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to
   create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API
   event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events`
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
index d131c86cfe..01d7652719 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once
   to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove
   API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls`
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
index f5da48a4e2..88f48e52c5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows
   minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework
   to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise
   Security Assets and Identity Framework.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index f54409a169..67d5930b21 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. Yo
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`
   Deprecated because duplicate.'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
index 381cfd8f74..5e9d0c9f47 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS
   field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro
   which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains
   to reduce alert fatigue.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count  from
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
index 6d3cf7e2f7..79a3c10041 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure
   DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that
   your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise
   Security.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index e8ed080ce9..373512912f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By
   User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or
   remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls`
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 7f1a983db7..75c427dabf 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create
   of baseline of previously seen regions.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
index a295dcb93f..ce1fe1e359 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support
   search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 6aebf95a70..c9e5a2b3f4 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"
   support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 55bcbd1cf8..d057eb07c7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By
   User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
index 68ae5a4620..0a813c27d3 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
   of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 98d9b617c6..815f1878de 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain
   you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you
   backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful
   backup, other than the default of seven days.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
index 3209dd61d3..7a51b5416e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list.
   For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same
   value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
index 2c4b21a42d..bac1633316 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or late
   then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
   You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the
   `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
index bf41341710..5208e353a0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This detection search will help profile user accounts in your envir
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating
   the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity
   framework.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities  | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800,
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
index 640a6e97e5..4d309da69c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 6176c2b120..447c72a9b0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you m
   which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search
   "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that
   will be checked for.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
index ed789747a8..ec9ec061f1 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2017-09-19'
 description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859,
   the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability.
 how_to_implement: No extra steps needed to implement this search.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
index 1f690d96a4..bdd591a891 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must
   be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery
   data populate the Alerts data model
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
index 49a42fd229..5d06c723df 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute vari
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs
   with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints.
   If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
index b402bc90bb..ded959b9c9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited",
   which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search <code>Add Prohibited
   Processes to Enterprise Security</code>.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
index 781a143121..280a27fed5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
index 119f1105e0..78e204c898 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `
   such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for
   this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the
   registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
index e8517957e2..576a09541b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
index 9935ab3bdb..21a0ec187d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
index f7cc9124d7..f5c81ea636 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE
 how_to_implement: The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary
   for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting
   your Splunk systems will reduce false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
index df2bc38889..6bec2aa83c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting
   on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes
   from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry`
   nodes.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
index 9b4a6d61cd..f7bf133f1e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored.
   This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to
   monitor.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
index 76e5bdeaf1..fb40dd6147 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folde
 how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line
   from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
   of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
index 57cf51b81b..4aa8e76c03 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments.
   Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that
   are uncommon in your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
index b859415e57..2e82d0fd63 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, whi
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 92f94a59a8..6085d162c8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data
   your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central
   server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you
   can modify this search for your specific backup solution.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
index baef5608b0..56e1f8f78e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system act
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
index 5cf387faaf..228402ec2f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system act
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
index 67ea4db373..1d00816c32 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
   reads and writes.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
index ed0fc17aba..fe6e4eafe2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, w
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
index b44a84c732..07a51d04ad 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
index 4bdf35e8e0..72e7664a92 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be
   ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name
   from your endpoints.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
index 09fd05ff4f..ff7ac15f85 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi
   use on the command line and surround with asterisks (*****), so that they work properly
   when searching the command line. The file should be updated with the names of any
   services you would like to monitor for attempts to stop the service.,
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index 030f1e0232..87d761fbe5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
index 7351f5db1e..acd69814af 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
index e0a1fe6c70..817c0e4be2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
index da77ff7675..2ac5dc2772 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activi
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
index 19faa3b1d2..d8a111c0bd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity f
   populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
   via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is
   typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
index 2fdfd241dc..c57a58cabe 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
index c63a5de23d..3566c3b0fa 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
index 94db3d8e12..cfbe6e8324 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, whi
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
index 9f27e6a9f9..ded117f0cd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
index e4a1570b99..1405be238e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow
   copy.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
index 2ee2c1d029..a2e1dd2a85 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
index d6891fa516..d7a281a271 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
index 577db5492e..3942ff0fd5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
index 8b735df584..aec2b5d4ee 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windo
   Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows
   Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
index 0bcab5ef91..51cd395bbf 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires audit computer account management to be e
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
index 1bad92dbd3..4423a45a5b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, whic
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
index f99fd34165..b9a113edf4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Chan
   \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\
   \ to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\
   \n"
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
index 2f9e622ac0..0ad9892b1e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change
   datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute
   successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts
   you want to monitor, according to your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 414d02c1e3..a6983ef573 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
index 8a0442f6c9..bb2974d0de 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
index 3a57d4fa7f..188d8bb349 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (msht
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
index dece28c383..f814764ac9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-08'
 description: This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated
   to local administrators.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
index b27260d533..84d7159f68 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-07-03'
 description: 'The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is
   detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for
   privilege escalation. '
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
index 3acc761759..dcd5ad4c5e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from
   endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually
   generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated
   via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
index 70843ce6c3..dea9e35beb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list
   of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to
   better suit your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
index 95fb5a7a2c..26a39de64d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
index 0f4c970998..59deabcf95 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list
   value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling
   to better suit your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 194a204078..ddb94c73d3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inl
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
index 5d981e2785..a7f80b21a6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
   of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
index 27b1a12a56..e163951290 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry
   modifications.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
index a95e490715..b1f09f2453 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
 - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
index 583414d64b..f9ccbee735 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: This search looks for processes launched from files that have doubl
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
index 3fc94422ab..d7c2c5a323 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity f
   your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using
   Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you
   want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
index 17bf6db3ce..3c62c6a118 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out
   old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`
   macro to adjust the time window.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
index d42c148b37..61b7d1bde4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM
   keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the
   `previously_seen_windows_service_window` macro to adjust the time window.
   Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 |
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
index fca1569cef..4ea19b7ca0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
index 29541c0336..5995a610fc 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service pr
   name requests
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md
 - https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
index 43392d1336..2bdb9e51c8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
index ac7aebd11d..26896db71a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
index 2dd7302b37..883e5d2a31 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
index 76f06b3dc0..9ab136c2cf 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
index b5bf730dbd..238a99537a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry
   modifications.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
index 05b3db139b..f8ae5a6266 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-li
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md
 - https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
index ce24129f8c..272df950b9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
index ae7c7211d4..d67a2edd1f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
   via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
   data sources, such as Sysmon.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk"
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
index ad68010807..23ed3870dd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
index 1f2397e669..fad8084c94 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a com
   executing commands via the command line.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
index 90b15bb425..774025357b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-11-26'
 description: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows
   services and their configurations.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
index 51e4bcfbc2..a9d425afd9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the C
   such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used
   for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to
   the registry.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
index bc486e1190..984cd3fb52 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
   used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
   to the registry.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
index 049395f3af..28dabcf573 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
   used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
   to the registry.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
index df8ab52e44..bd1d504bd7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
index a7d04547be..5b21356ec2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
index 7d6363e5be..4bc58555ed 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
index 3908a5cae9..c38fc9f6fb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
index 05d618c672..7d8637b7b6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or
   modification of a Windows service.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
index fbc4146c75..7ee777a4c1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
index b3e5c247f6..68a91e75e7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
index 04cb8c6246..66c1ca1bd4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-l
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting logs
   with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using
   Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 69de98ce68..7cda9ac9be 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
index 9e9c14e34d..d039871b36 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
index 6b23449e1d..b9ada8bee8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
index 230328d096..7b86b02bd8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a sho
 how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management
   Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs.  More
   information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
index d0f669641e..7d6b7d9650 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 3a277f3db7..45d865785f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of in
 references: 
    - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index a4d98d908f..16281abb97 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: Stolen credentials are applied by methods such as user impersonatio
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index f0c9285536..1e4a1a0340 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that verify pa
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index d1edada072..e481059ee7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an expo
   of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting windows endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints.
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 references: ['https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml']
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
index 34fbeb3b19..2ad648f3b1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 0ceec5a47e..ef6252e182 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
index f26fb9107f..7894e285b7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
   Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes from a system's registry. 
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: []
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
index d553a1c287..c8f4f50aab 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
   Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes from a system's registry. 
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: []
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
index 51adcf6a30..c61390584a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
   PowerSploit and DSInternals are common exploit APIs offering PowerShell modules for various exploits of Windows and Active Directory environments.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: []
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
index 6c4ccfadc5..36bbbd605e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
   LaZagne is a tool that extracts various kinds of credentials from a local computer, including account passwords, domain passwords, browser passwords, etc.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: []
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
index a0c1fb08ee..a7658474ce 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
index 905e04ef41..b332480fda 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
   memory and process dumps.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: [https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29]
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
index 2f85ddfdbb..3d53934538 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
   memory and process dumps.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: []
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
index 22f38fcaf7..7b8b1bd9fa 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential ma
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
index 82e92a35ac..11d2773f01 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-09-15'
 description: This search detects the memory of lsass.exe being dumped for offline credential theft attack.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including Windows command line logging.
   You can see how we test this with [Event Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml).
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 references: ['https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf']
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
index 5aeb1bf935..4855805989 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service pr
   name requests
 how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated
   from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 references: [Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss]
 author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
index 5d9be08f39..a46f46d447 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windo
   Security Event logs to detect potential attempts using Pass-the-Hash technique.
 how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated
   from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 references: [Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss]
 author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index c164f2ffd8..2480f802d1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` param
 This is an implementation on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel."
 how_to_implement: "You must be populating the endpoint data model for SSA and specifically the process_name and the process fields"
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
 | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index b51852f95d..8225e826e4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enabl
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6ec710832f..fbd14dbdf9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index b231b28199..0b2d7dab11 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 4cfbb27758..513ad3f9f5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delet
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 2df76e9031..cf2ae7f987 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal ma
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6faf38595e..f593cdb674 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enabl
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 1429023e6e..b7f5e95089 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illeg
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 7c09cd1509..4829d1bbb9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privi
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 073c7640fc..54f7cf3293 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal contr
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index b49d52660d..ccedd63de5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enabl
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 4fde4e1318..8a62ff6eba 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitat
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
index eb5c2f83f9..6263088194 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This is a SPL2 implementation of the rule `Detect Prohibited Applications Spawni
 how_to_implement: "You must be ingesting sysmon logs. 
 This search has been modified to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP."
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
 | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
index a1b93715cd..fe7fad1256 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applicatio
   The list of application has been extracted from https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries
 how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
 references: []
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 76676e1841..55dbf666f6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index aa48c598d7..8feb499e09 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discov
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 04b0a2bd86..d0a12be52c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 398dc25c07..dfc38511ae 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconna
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 98b8898290..6c35f1b557 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discov
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 2659c08edd..5a7dbade26 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 7eb01c48bd..c44fce6b6b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discov
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 0615cc686d..4635692845 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 28fb7059e8..96028bbd02 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discov
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 22a11f6be0..53c6e9117f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconna
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 2e6d2f0e5a..f584bd5306 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and u
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index b309edf014..6c5359a74d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 0f3dac4eb6..bfa01cb4ea 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 95b7f51c73..10324929f9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of in
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Detours
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index e8e4ed3185..96af33ada5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index e184d9252f..78143d07cd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInte
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index ceff64a664..79400ba5b5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimika
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 87746e0c08..d87b15f8ff 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerS
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
 references: 
 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
index 9f66e81256..70c9a33310 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system co
   and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
 how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
 references: []
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
           | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
index a8e52c4c1d..fadc448f76 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description:
   over a window of time, by building profiles per machine.
 how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
 references: [https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries]
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
index 5a8d03134e..c16cee3109 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of maliciou
   This detection is inspired on Unusually Long Command Line authored by Rico Valdez.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command lines.
 references: []
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
index 6ec574c916..bdbf22aef9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
index 6aa74baac1..c87917e85d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe u
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
index 1b99bd0d80..a0090bc79c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
index f827194f4c..c78dea9325 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
index 49a37d6b5a..ca5c8a0d38 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
index bf483827dd..1061cbdb7b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
index 334f896bd6..733fda808d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
index b1539438c7..93c02fc2c3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
index a6435e94c8..6f3403e592 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
index c2fe0b625d..b1738c36b2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other th
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into
   the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
index f387a25d9b..6de558d311 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-12'
 description: Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand
   configurations of the system to further exploit it.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
index 61ac0e2803..de39a1c68c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search looks for system processes that normally run out of C:\
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest details
   about process execution from your hosts. Specifically, this search requires the
   process name and the full path to the process executable.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
index ab71a6d9a4..db287196e7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro,
   update this macro to filter out false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
index 701fc5e8f8..74e34bec15 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
index dea463a213..8dc7b5a1b6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command line
   as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search
   is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild
   the model with the latest data available in your environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
index 03259d6828..d98771ec20 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
index 3999fe577e..5b60149e3a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup A
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
 - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
index a3f6d71055..55e43e4cfd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
   - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
   - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
index 80d29d1d26..a6144b059e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for Windows events that indicate one of the Windo
   event logs has been purged.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   Windows event logs from your hosts.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineventlog_system`
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
index 0135e3d661..431366242b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system act
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
index 4a57b90630..299e33ac34 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting
   data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate
   alerts for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation,
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
index f1a47e286b..d1e9d04d96 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the net
   router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You
   must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating
   to routing infrastructure.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
index 9aa9b1f21d..3fb2e5ce0a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open a
 how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject and its
   message body.
 references: [ ]
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get(input_event, "From"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Subject"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Content"), "string", " "), "                                                                                                                                "), _time=map_get(input_event, "_time")
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
index cf550ea395..7caf0d619a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender
   \ will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\
   \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\
   \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox."
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient)
   as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
index 3ed9919343..447a7e1941 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic
   The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation
   you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number
   of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
index aa409d05fa..0930e60dce 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender'
   address (src_user) must be populated.  You also need to have run the search "ESCU
   - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will
   be checked for.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
index 679b7cd72e..80a4e8e36d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'U
   wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to
   properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can
   populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
index 199d0e1fca..1c4dd0ca37 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to t
   Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities.
 how_to_implement: The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner
   data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
index 670696c514..60625c205e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of thei
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated
   with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called  "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel."
   Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
index 7871c2c057..64bca3f968 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender
   \ gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\
   \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\
   \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox."
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user,
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
index f490f00a6e..8c701efc2b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application
   servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using
   network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)"
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index fc1e9a0b87..51dcc66687 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via us
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch
   EKS Logs inputs.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
index 3c9a9fcb39..ae9d75e509 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch
   EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection`
   macro to filter out the false positives.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
index 6ad2d36501..f999f3d9b9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
     - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
index 5637090c3d..18c1c089da 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
@@ -17,5 +17,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
     - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
index 20e485d0c8..ab40d18708 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
     - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
index aef85a6e15..64e6bb2ade 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
     - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
index c00cbfcd07..6bada0375f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
     - T1550
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
index 2bf308813d..f7cab22be4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
index d247bb8014..abc20c672b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
index 8495c184eb..b53d7f62ad 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
index fa55c444ec..cff2815c66 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
index 502146513c..c5ef84b3f9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via us
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods
 how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later),
   then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`'
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index 3ef4ab6319..57a1111700 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or late
   then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
   You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection
   to filter out FPs.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index 70c6e10b56..e467b28181 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 4e924129c4..dba4b5dc32 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index 3609f8f322..cdcd732181 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index f961ab7ed4..ec9bd03358 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 78d5a034cf..f59a59778e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index cce8135a08..5ab4387546 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
index 3defb5fe1b..4b7ff017f2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
index 27735f6ce3..25b4f5194e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index d506228c52..675dc0626a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index 0201873217..e984209cc6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index f13081df0e..a4921f92ea 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index f2a3fc18e2..d98c373dc5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 4dad0447e8..f177f56f03 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Reconnaissance
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 0957b1d0ed..284ed6f2b6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ tags:
   mitre_attack_id:
     - T1526
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 77d64ee061..a24e704f01 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index cd214b7b56..50366c9235 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index abcc7efa8e..d1e886915e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index fdaabb5bcc..37db4556df 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 3fce1bf564..04d40a843a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index ab67a869ef..4ff9bf1879 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
     - Lateral Movement
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
index 5e1cb995bf..a18983c8f4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro
   to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
index 2d61882308..12b5fd5f62 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
   via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
   data sources, such as Sysmon.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
index 7ae4dacf1d..fa1378bef9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
index 39decd6c57..9b6b8dcde5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest p
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be
   deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data
   populate the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Jamie Windley, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
index 7b6754c43a..13263244f4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must
   be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery
   data populate the Alerts data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
index 1530b23673..2db7bb5698 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security
   Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv
   file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
index ec80b049b5..b6ab4b681d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpo
   and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads
   and writes to the file system.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
index f02513eaf0..d8ad9814f8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: 'The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.Bus
 how_to_implement: This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon
   config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally,
   you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
index c81d99bcbf..b0450766ac 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscript
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
   Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on
   the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consumer>[^;|^$]+)"
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
index f4ba067c63..ee8d0be050 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscript
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
   Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on
   the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?<query>[^;|^$]+)"
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
index 6ae72d7a99..5d5c1ec73b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo
   The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
   (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
   parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 search: '`cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection"
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
index 41d7d2f2fd..a34201b777 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure
   \ when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to\
   \ active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\
   \n"
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer
   | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
index bcf9f1b92b..6f02f157c8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of
   responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data
   is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
index 960f47a9a9..9bc2f145c1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic
   The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation
   you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number
   of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
index 416473dfdd..f29d7a7dcd 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastruct
   for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data
   is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
index d5ebc31e78..c834714490 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action'
   taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model
   be populated.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
index f4238b9dd7..477e76ccc8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: Running this search properly requires a technology that can in
   network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo
   Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection,
   and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
index b9b741640f..a73f94827c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search looks for cleartext protocols at risk of leaking creden
   run on different assigned ports in those cases.
 how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and
   populating the Network_Traffic data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
index 9cc94a66ce..caa7af4ccb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers
   JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic
   that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 33a6ca285c..9ae1faa6ad 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may no
 you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it.  I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare
 mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using
 (hsqldb;).'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/
 - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
index ba130244e6..d831f3db39 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to ex
 how_to_implement: You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data
   that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream,
   and populating the Web data model
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 0386c2f7fb..eb16863b3b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be acc
   by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such
   as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain
   Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
index c1ea6ac2ea..0a5d002c2d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitori
   network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating
   the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security
   assets table.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
index f5c5c08e6d..4d07bff1d0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBU
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring
   web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped 
   to the Web data model. 
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
   - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html
   - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index ce570976d5..1450dd90ae 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'First, you''ll need to ingest data from your DNS operations.
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer
   min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
index 7429341313..f7d72e2ef9 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo
   The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
   (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
   parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: 
 - https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf
 - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
index 18c8d30a1f..7084eaf82f 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend
   More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata.
   This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating
   the Network_Traffic data model'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
index d0d81b20ab..20a78e6c02 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend
   this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata.
   This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating
   the Network_Traffic data model'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app="smb") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action="blocked" OR All_Traffic.dest_category="internal" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
index 0628b422df..33dbfb3502 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo
   The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
   (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
   parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation") 
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
index afd91c41ed..dd5a59e0a7 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo
   The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
   (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
   parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT" 
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
index 66196167ef..702374ae38 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk.
   These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito.  You can go
   further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove
   or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/
 - https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
index 66f19a7867..c6f2e9c0a7 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
 description: Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.
 how_to_implement: This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
index c35150a815..142af05efd 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo
   (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
   parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on.
   Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP")
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
index 2b744a5089..7cda3dc73d 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with
   file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized
   organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried
   systems have their MAC address populated.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
index bf9a722f49..cc643529d9 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP.
   We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB
   in size via stream:tcp.  Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp')
   with configurations for your Splunk environment.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
index 66b9f2b7f9..9165f63e4b 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk.
   SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via
   bro:conn:json.  The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use
   for this search.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
index 8cc7f5e728..2ce9029ec5 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk.
   when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app
   via bro:rpc:json.  These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.
 description: This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon
 - https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
index 9d8d04261f..a782408d0d 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
index 701e72bd21..1021fef07a 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the sta
   standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that
   DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
index c69a0c7bd5..3cc6018a65 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters a
   average traffic.
 how_to_implement: You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the
   Network_Traffic data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
index bd3f499b43..fa4cb04db3 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to identify sys
   to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system
   depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework.  This
   can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
index a95f6ede1b..6d3d92dbf3 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block
   traffic connections.
 how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs
   and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic 
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
index 8255d8122b..01d2ca9a32 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found
   here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip)
diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
index c05ee864cd..2d0c12525c 100644
--- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action'
   taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model
   be populated.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
index be724f2a1a..f359848778 100644
--- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
+++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type ht
 how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP.
   You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream
   deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
index e3a7425763..ac6ef5a15b 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the emai
   reasons.  After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account
   creations per email domain.  Common data sources used for this detection are customized
   Apache logs or Splunk Stream.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
index af980c23eb..af72b43bc6 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data f
   such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover,
   etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized
   IIS, and Splunk Stream.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
index d04e6668fc..216b13c48a 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the valu
   or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text
   password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs,
   customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references:
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)

From 25a0f1fa56b21806d97d2cf192d17bdbf199c3ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 12:54:43 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 052/132] updated valudate.py to use the new type

---
 bin/validate.py | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py
index 7c3696e8d2..93a69fa717 100644
--- a/bin/validate.py
+++ b/bin/validate.py
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ def validate_objects(REPO_PATH, objects, verbose):
     if verbose:
         print("validating object {0}".format(object['name']))
     for object in objects['detections']:
-        if object['type'] == 'ESCU':
+        if object['type'] == 'batch':
             errors = errors + validate_detection_search(object, objects['macros'])
 
     for object in objects['baselines']:

From 1d629678a627e47171249431ced7eb60b14890d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 12:54:55 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 053/132] updated spec to respect the new type change

---
 spec/detections.spec.json | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/spec/detections.spec.json b/spec/detections.spec.json
index 9fe66a1f61..5379f1c41e 100644
--- a/spec/detections.spec.json
+++ b/spec/detections.spec.json
@@ -127,13 +127,12 @@
       "default": "",
       "description": "type of detection",
       "examples": [
-        "ESCU"
+        "streaming"
       ],
       "items": {
         "enum": [
-          "ESCU",
-          "SSE",
-          "RBA"
+          "batch",
+          "streaming"
         ],
         "type": "string"
       },

From 83382be5f68c1d4484f14681a053b84f963e3fc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:13:39 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 054/132] updating spec doc

---
 docs/spec/README.md                           |  49 ++
 docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md      |  22 +
 docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md        |  22 +
 docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md |  26 +
 .../baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md  |  24 +
 docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md          |  22 +
 .../baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md  |  22 +
 docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md      |  24 +
 .../spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md |  15 +
 docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md        |  47 ++
 docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md     |  22 +
 docs/spec/baselines.md                        | 282 ++++++++
 docs/spec/baselines.spec.json                 | 107 ---
 docs/spec/baselines.spec.md                   | 283 --------
 docs/spec/deployments-default.md              |  15 +
 ...oyments-properties-alert_action-default.md |  15 +
 ...s-alert_action-properties-email-default.md |  15 +
 ...ion-properties-email-properties-message.md |  22 +
 ...ion-properties-email-properties-subject.md |  22 +
 ...t_action-properties-email-properties-to.md |  22 +
 ...roperties-alert_action-properties-email.md | 120 ++++
 ...s-alert_action-properties-index-default.md |  15 +
 ...action-properties-index-properties-name.md |  22 +
 ...roperties-alert_action-properties-index.md |  66 ++
 ...alert_action-properties-notable-default.md |  15 +
 ...ies-notable-properties-rule_description.md |  22 +
 ...roperties-notable-properties-rule_title.md |  22 +
 ...perties-alert_action-properties-notable.md |  93 +++
 .../deployments-properties-alert_action.md    | 153 ++++
 ...ployments-properties-scheduling-default.md |  15 +
 ...ies-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md |  22 +
 ...ies-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md |  22 +
 ...rties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md |  22 +
 ...s-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md |  22 +
 .../spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md | 147 ++++
 docs/spec/deployments.md                      | 258 +++++++
 docs/spec/deployments.spec.json               | 264 -------
 docs/spec/deployments.spec.md                 | 656 ------------------
 ...ctions-properties-known_false_positives.md |  24 +
 ...-properties-references-the-items-schema.md |  23 +
 docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md |  31 +
 docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md |  24 +
 docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md       |  22 +
 docs/spec/detections.md                       | 384 ++++++++++
 docs/spec/detections.spec.json                | 157 -----
 docs/spec/detections.spec.md                  | 380 ----------
 docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md                  |  15 +
 docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md                  |  15 +
 ...lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md |  31 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md    |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md   |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md   |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md      |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md        |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md    |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md   |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md   |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md          |  22 +
 docs/spec/lookups.md                          | 321 +++++++++
 docs/spec/lookups.spec.json                   |  88 ---
 docs/spec/lookups.spec.md                     | 282 --------
 .../spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md |  15 +
 docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md      |  21 +
 docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md     |  22 +
 docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md    |  22 +
 docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md           |  22 +
 docs/spec/macros.md                           | 123 ++++
 docs/spec/macros.spec.json                    |  43 --
 docs/spec/macros.spec.md                      | 131 ----
 docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md           |  15 +
 ...nse_tasks-properties-automation-default.md |  15 +
 .../response_tasks-properties-automation.md   |  62 ++
 docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md    |  27 +
 .../response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md     |  40 ++
 docs/spec/response_tasks.md                   | 395 +++++++++++
 docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json            | 159 -----
 docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md              | 437 ------------
 docs/spec/responses-default.md                |  15 +
 .../responses-properties-is_note_required.md  |  27 +
 ...onses-properties-response_phase-default.md |  15 +
 .../responses-properties-response_phase.md    |  51 ++
 docs/spec/responses.md                        | 340 +++++++++
 docs/spec/responses.spec.json                 | 117 ----
 docs/spec/responses.spec.md                   | 270 -------
 docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md          |  15 +
 ..._phase-properties-response_task-default.md |  15 +
 ...esponses_phase-properties-response_task.md |  57 ++
 docs/spec/responses_phase.md                  | 389 +++++++++++
 docs/spec/stories-default.md                  |  15 +
 docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md     |  26 +
 docs/spec/stories.md                          | 287 ++++++++
 docs/spec/stories.spec.json                   | 106 ---
 docs/spec/stories.spec.md                     | 283 --------
 spec/responses_phase.spec.json                |  36 +-
 95 files changed, 4881 insertions(+), 3783 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/README.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines.spec.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/spec/baselines.spec.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-default.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-default.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-default.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-default.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-default.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-default.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments.spec.json
 delete mode 100644 docs/spec/deployments.spec.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-known_false_positives.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md
 create mode 100644 docs/spec/detections.md
 delete mode 100644 docs/spec/detections.spec.json
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diff --git a/docs/spec/README.md b/docs/spec/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7c4e1f7821
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# README
+
+## Top-level Schemas
+
+*   [Analytics Story Schema](./stories.md "schema analytics story") – `http://example.com/example.json`
+
+*   [Baseline Schema](./baselines.md "schema for baselines") – `http://example.com/example.json`
+
+*   [Deployment Schema](./deployments.md "schema for deployment") – `http://example.com/example.json`
+
+*   [Detection Schema](./detections.md "schema for detections") – `http://example.com/example.json`
+
+*   [Lookup Manifest](./lookups.md "A object that defines a lookup file and its properties") – `https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json`
+
+*   [Macro Manifest](./macros.md "An object that defines the parameters for a Splunk Macro") – `https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json`
+
+*   [Response Schema](./response_tasks.md "schema for response task") – `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json`
+
+*   [Response Schema](./responses.md "schema for response") – `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response.spec.json`
+
+*   [Response Schema](./responses_phase.md "schema for phase") – `http://example.com/example.json`
+
+## Other Schemas
+
+### Objects
+
+*   [Untitled object in Baseline Schema](./baselines-properties-tags.md "An array of key value pairs for tagging") – `#/properties/tags#/properties/tags`
+
+*   [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-alert_action.md "Set alert action parameter for search") – `#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action`
+
+*   [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md "By enabling it, an email is sent with the results") – `#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email`
+
+*   [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md "By enabling it, the results are stored in another index") – `#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index`
+
+*   [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md "By enabling it, a notable is generated") – `#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable`
+
+*   [Untitled object in Deployment Schema](./deployments-properties-scheduling.md "allows to set scheduling parameter") – `#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling`
+
+*   [Untitled object in Response Schema](./response_tasks-properties-automation.md "An array of key value pairs for defining actions and playbooks") – `#/properties/automation#/properties/automation`
+
+### Arrays
+
+*   [Untitled array in Detection Schema](./detections-properties-references.md "A list of references for this detection") – `#/properties/references#/properties/references`
+
+*   [Untitled array in Macro Manifest](./macros-properties-arguments.md "A list of the arguments being passed to this macro") – `https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments`
+
+*   [Untitled array in Response Schema](./responses-properties-response_phase.md "Response divided into phases") – `#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase`
+
+*   [Untitled array in Response Schema](./responses_phase-properties-response_task.md "Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed") – `#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task`
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25b1c05002
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+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-author.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/author#/properties/author
+```
+
+Author of the baseline
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## author Type
+
+`string`
+
+## author Examples
+
+```yaml
+Bahvin Patel, Splunk
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f91effacdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-date.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/date#/properties/date
+```
+
+date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## date Type
+
+`string`
+
+## date Examples
+
+```yaml
+'2019-12-06'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e61031299b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-description.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/description#/properties/description
+```
+
+A detailed description of the baseline
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## description Type
+
+`string`
+
+## description Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and
+  creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest)
+  we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the
+  last 30 days
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0bac7d7e11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement
+```
+
+information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## how_to_implement Type
+
+`string`
+
+## how_to_implement Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes
+  EventCode 10 for lsass.exe.
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ac191b7fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-id.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/id#/properties/id
+```
+
+UUID as unique identifier
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## id Type
+
+`string`
+
+## id Examples
+
+```yaml
+fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..46e7b91cba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Name of baseline Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/name#/properties/name
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## name Type
+
+`string` ([Name of baseline](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md))
+
+## name Examples
+
+```yaml
+Previously Seen AWS Regions
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dae22b4ca4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-search.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Untitled string in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/search#/properties/search
+```
+
+The Splunk search for the baseline
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## search Type
+
+`string`
+
+## search Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as
+  latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6338be86cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/tags#/properties/tags/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e89f04806
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Untitled object in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/tags#/properties/tags
+```
+
+An array of key value pairs for tagging
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## tags Type
+
+`object` ([Details](baselines-properties-tags.md))
+
+## tags Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+## tags Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+## tags Examples
+
+```yaml
+analytics_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities
+custom_key: custom_value
+
+```
+
+# tags Properties
+
+| Property              | Type | Required | Nullable    | Defined by |
+| :-------------------- | :--- | :------- | :---------- | :--------- |
+| Additional Properties | Any  | Optional | can be null |            |
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d241c5920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-version.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled integer in Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/version#/properties/version
+```
+
+version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json*](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## version Type
+
+`integer`
+
+## version Examples
+
+```yaml
+1
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.md b/docs/spec/baselines.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2ee3e87feb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+# Baseline Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+http://example.com/example.json
+```
+
+schema for baselines
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                  |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [baselines.spec.json](../../out/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Baseline Schema Type
+
+`object` ([Baseline Schema](baselines.md))
+
+# Baseline Schema Properties
+
+| Property                              | Type      | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                               |
+| :------------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [author](#author)                     | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")                               |
+| [date](#date)                         | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")                                     |
+| [description](#description)           | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")                |
+| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement") |
+| [id](#id)                             | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")                                           |
+| [name](#name)                         | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")                         |
+| [search](#search)                     | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search")                               |
+| [tags](#tags)                         | `object`  | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")                                     |
+| [version](#version)                   | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")                            |
+| Additional Properties                 | Any       | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                          |
+
+## author
+
+Author of the baseline
+
+`author`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")
+
+### author Type
+
+`string`
+
+### author Examples
+
+```yaml
+Bahvin Patel, Splunk
+
+```
+
+## date
+
+date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
+
+`date`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")
+
+### date Type
+
+`string`
+
+### date Examples
+
+```yaml
+'2019-12-06'
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+A detailed description of the baseline
+
+`description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and
+  creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest)
+  we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the
+  last 30 days
+
+```
+
+## how_to_implement
+
+information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.
+
+`how_to_implement`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement")
+
+### how_to_implement Type
+
+`string`
+
+### how_to_implement Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes
+  EventCode 10 for lsass.exe.
+
+```
+
+## id
+
+UUID as unique identifier
+
+`id`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")
+
+### id Type
+
+`string`
+
+### id Examples
+
+```yaml
+fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string` ([Name of baseline](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string` ([Name of baseline](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md))
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+Previously Seen AWS Regions
+
+```
+
+## search
+
+The Splunk search for the baseline
+
+`search`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search")
+
+### search Type
+
+`string`
+
+### search Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as
+  latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv
+
+```
+
+## tags
+
+An array of key value pairs for tagging
+
+`tags`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](baselines-properties-tags.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")
+
+### tags Type
+
+`object` ([Details](baselines-properties-tags.md))
+
+### tags Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+### tags Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### tags Examples
+
+```yaml
+analytics_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities
+custom_key: custom_value
+
+```
+
+## version
+
+version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
+
+`version`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")
+
+### version Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### version Examples
+
+```yaml
+1
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.spec.json b/docs/spec/baselines.spec.json
deleted file mode 100644
index c13fc47497..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/baselines.spec.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$id": "http://example.com/example.json",
-  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema",
-  "additionalProperties": true,
-  "description": "schema for baselines",
-  "properties": {
-    "author": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/author",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Author of the baseline",
-      "examples": [
-        "Bahvin Patel, Splunk"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "date": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/date",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd",
-      "examples": [
-        "2019-12-06"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "description": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/description",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "A detailed description of the baseline ",
-      "examples": [
-        "This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "how_to_implement": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/how_to_implement",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.",
-      "examples": [
-        "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "id": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/id",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "UUID as unique identifier",
-      "examples": [
-        "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "name": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/name",
-      "default": "",
-      "examples": [
-        "Previously Seen AWS Regions"
-      ],
-      "title": "Name of baseline",
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "search": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/search",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "The Splunk search for the baseline",
-      "examples": [
-        "cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "tags": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/tags",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "analytics_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities",
-          "custom_key": "custom_value"
-        }
-      ],
-      "minItems": 1,
-      "type": "object",
-      "uniqueItems": true
-    },
-    "version": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/version",
-      "default": 0,
-      "description": "version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ...",
-      "examples": [
-        1
-      ],
-      "type": "integer"
-    }
-  },
-  "required": [
-    "name",
-    "id",
-    "version",
-    "date",
-    "description",
-    "author",
-    "search",
-    "tags"
-  ],
-  "title": "Baseline Schema",
-  "type": "object"
-}
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.spec.md b/docs/spec/baselines.spec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fc66502080..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/baselines.spec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
-
-# Baseline Schema Schema
-
-```
-http://example.com/example.json
-```
-
-schema for baselines
-
-| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In |
-|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
-| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted |  |
-
-# Baseline Schema Properties
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by |
-|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------|
-| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional  | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| [search](#search) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required**  | No | `{}` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required**  | No | `0` | Baseline Schema (this schema) |
-| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties |
-
-## author
-
-Author of the baseline
-
-`author`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### author Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### author Example
-
-```json
-"Bahvin Patel, Splunk"
-```
-
-
-## date
-
-date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
-
-`date`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### date Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### date Example
-
-```json
-"2019-12-06"
-```
-
-
-## description
-
-A detailed description of the baseline 
-
-`description`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### description Example
-
-```json
-"This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days"
-```
-
-
-## how_to_implement
-
-information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.
-
-`how_to_implement`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### how_to_implement Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### how_to_implement Example
-
-```json
-"This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe."
-```
-
-
-## id
-
-UUID as unique identifier
-
-`id`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### id Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### id Example
-
-```json
-"fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63"
-```
-
-
-## name
-### Name of baseline
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### name Example
-
-```json
-"Previously Seen AWS Regions"
-```
-
-
-## search
-
-The Splunk search for the baseline
-
-`search`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### search Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### search Example
-
-```json
-"cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv"
-```
-
-
-## tags
-
-An array of key value pairs for tagging
-
-`tags`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### tags Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required |
-|----------|------|----------|
-
-
-
-
-### tags Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "analytics_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities",
-  "custom_key": "custom_value"
-}
-```
-
-
-## version
-
-version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
-
-`version`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `integer`
-* default: `0`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### version Type
-
-
-`integer`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### version Example
-
-```json
-1
-```
-
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a7b518209
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+http://example.com/example.json#/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55e2308c13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c8b32006bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e01fa30a39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message
+```
+
+message of email
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## message Type
+
+`string`
+
+## message Examples
+
+```yaml
+Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e72fd29af3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject
+```
+
+Subject of email
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## subject Type
+
+`string`
+
+## subject Examples
+
+```yaml
+Splunk Alert $name$
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0bef21838f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to
+```
+
+Recipient of email
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## to Type
+
+`string`
+
+## to Examples
+
+```yaml
+test@test.com
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..070e95ee64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email
+```
+
+By enabling it, an email is sent with the results
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## email Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md))
+
+## email Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+## email Examples
+
+```yaml
+message: Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%
+subject: Splunk Alert $name$
+to: test@test.com
+
+```
+
+# email Properties
+
+| Property              | Type     | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
+| :-------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [message](#message)   | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message") |
+| [subject](#subject)   | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject") |
+| [to](#to)             | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to")                |
+| Additional Properties | Any      | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
+
+## message
+
+message of email
+
+`message`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-message.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message")
+
+### message Type
+
+`string`
+
+### message Examples
+
+```yaml
+Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%
+
+```
+
+## subject
+
+Subject of email
+
+`subject`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-subject.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject")
+
+### subject Type
+
+`string`
+
+### subject Examples
+
+```yaml
+Splunk Alert $name$
+
+```
+
+## to
+
+Recipient of email
+
+`to`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email-properties-to.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to")
+
+### to Type
+
+`string`
+
+### to Examples
+
+```yaml
+test@test.com
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0acb5762ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be9a681a97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name
+```
+
+Name of the index
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## name Type
+
+`string`
+
+## name Examples
+
+```yaml
+asx
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..edc5070f0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index
+```
+
+By enabling it, the results are stored in another index
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## index Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md))
+
+## index Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+## index Examples
+
+```yaml
+name: asx
+
+```
+
+# index Properties
+
+| Property              | Type     | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
+| :-------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [name](#name)         | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name") |
+| Additional Properties | Any      | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
+
+## name
+
+Name of the index
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index-properties-name.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string`
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+asx
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..84226f6fc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..23882cd515
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description
+```
+
+Rule description of the notable event
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## rule_description Type
+
+`string`
+
+## rule_description Examples
+
+```yaml
+'%description%'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d5eb151c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title
+```
+
+Rule title of the notable event
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## rule_title Type
+
+`string`
+
+## rule_title Examples
+
+```yaml
+'%name%'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d117f24ef9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable
+```
+
+By enabling it, a notable is generated
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## notable Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md))
+
+## notable Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+## notable Examples
+
+```yaml
+rule_description: '%description%'
+rule_title: '%name%'
+
+```
+
+# notable Properties
+
+| Property                              | Type     | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+| :------------------------------------ | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [rule_description](#rule_description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description") |
+| [rule_title](#rule_title)             | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title")                   |
+| Additional Properties                 | Any      | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
+
+## rule_description
+
+Rule description of the notable event
+
+`rule_description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_description.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description")
+
+### rule_description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### rule_description Examples
+
+```yaml
+'%description%'
+
+```
+
+## rule_title
+
+Rule title of the notable event
+
+`rule_title`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable-properties-rule_title.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title")
+
+### rule_title Type
+
+`string`
+
+### rule_title Examples
+
+```yaml
+'%name%'
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f5fa09670a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-alert_action.md
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action
+```
+
+Set alert action parameter for search
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## alert_action Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action.md))
+
+## alert_action Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+## alert_action Examples
+
+```yaml
+email:
+  message: Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%
+  subject: Splunk Alert $name$
+  to: test@test.com
+index:
+  name: asx
+notable:
+  rule_description: '%description%'
+  rule_title: '%name%'
+
+```
+
+# alert_action Properties
+
+| Property              | Type     | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                                                                                |
+| :-------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [email](#email)       | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email")       |
+| [index](#index)       | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index")       |
+| [notable](#notable)   | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable") |
+| Additional Properties | Any      | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                                                                           |
+
+## email
+
+By enabling it, an email is sent with the results
+
+`email`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email#/properties/alert_action/properties/email")
+
+### email Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-email.md))
+
+### email Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### email Examples
+
+```yaml
+message: Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%
+subject: Splunk Alert $name$
+to: test@test.com
+
+```
+
+## index
+
+By enabling it, the results are stored in another index
+
+`index`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index#/properties/alert_action/properties/index")
+
+### index Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-index.md))
+
+### index Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### index Examples
+
+```yaml
+name: asx
+
+```
+
+## notable
+
+By enabling it, a notable is generated
+
+`notable`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable")
+
+### notable Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action-properties-notable.md))
+
+### notable Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### notable Examples
+
+```yaml
+rule_description: '%description%'
+rule_title: '%name%'
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-default.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f39294b0a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52cbbfae51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule
+```
+
+Cron schedule to schedule the Splunk searches.
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## cron_schedule Type
+
+`string`
+
+## cron_schedule Examples
+
+```yaml
+'*/10 * * * *'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5808ddd97f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time
+```
+
+earliest time of search
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## earliest_time Type
+
+`string`
+
+## earliest_time Examples
+
+```yaml
+'-10m'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..566141825e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time
+```
+
+latest time of search
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## latest_time Type
+
+`string`
+
+## latest_time Examples
+
+```yaml
+now
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41aad873d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window
+```
+
+schedule window for search
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## schedule_window Type
+
+`string`
+
+## schedule_window Examples
+
+```yaml
+auto
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf64fb3727
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments-properties-scheduling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+# Untitled object in Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling
+```
+
+allows to set scheduling parameter
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                       |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json*](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## scheduling Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-scheduling.md))
+
+## scheduling Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+## scheduling Examples
+
+```yaml
+cron_schedule: '*/10 * * * *'
+earliest_time: '-10m'
+latest_time: now
+schedule_window: auto
+
+```
+
+# scheduling Properties
+
+| Property                            | Type     | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                                                                                                  |
+| :---------------------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [cron_schedule](#cron_schedule)     | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule")       |
+| [earliest_time](#earliest_time)     | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time")       |
+| [latest_time](#latest_time)         | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time")             |
+| [schedule_window](#schedule_window) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window") |
+| Additional Properties               | Any      | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                                                                                             |
+
+## cron_schedule
+
+Cron schedule to schedule the Splunk searches.
+
+`cron_schedule`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-cron_schedule.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule")
+
+### cron_schedule Type
+
+`string`
+
+### cron_schedule Examples
+
+```yaml
+'*/10 * * * *'
+
+```
+
+## earliest_time
+
+earliest time of search
+
+`earliest_time`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-earliest_time.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time")
+
+### earliest_time Type
+
+`string`
+
+### earliest_time Examples
+
+```yaml
+'-10m'
+
+```
+
+## latest_time
+
+latest time of search
+
+`latest_time`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-latest_time.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time")
+
+### latest_time Type
+
+`string`
+
+### latest_time Examples
+
+```yaml
+now
+
+```
+
+## schedule_window
+
+schedule window for search
+
+`schedule_window`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling-properties-schedule_window.md "#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window")
+
+### schedule_window Type
+
+`string`
+
+### schedule_window Examples
+
+```yaml
+auto
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments.md b/docs/spec/deployments.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e3d2c089fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments.md
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+# Deployment Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+http://example.com/example.json
+```
+
+schema for deployment
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                      |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [deployments.spec.json](../../out/deployments.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Deployment Schema Type
+
+`object` ([Deployment Schema](deployments.md))
+
+## Deployment Schema Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+# Deployment Schema Properties
+
+| Property                      | Type     | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                       |
+| :---------------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [alert_action](#alert_action) | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action.md "#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action") |
+| [date](#date)                 | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")                         |
+| [description](#description)   | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")    |
+| [id](#id)                     | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")                               |
+| [name](#name)                 | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")                         |
+| [scheduling](#scheduling)     | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling.md "#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling")       |
+| [tags](#tags)                 | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")                         |
+| Additional Properties         | Any      | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                  |
+
+## alert_action
+
+Set alert action parameter for search
+
+`alert_action`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-alert_action.md "#/properties/alert_action#/properties/alert_action")
+
+### alert_action Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-alert_action.md))
+
+### alert_action Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### alert_action Examples
+
+```yaml
+email:
+  message: Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%
+  subject: Splunk Alert $name$
+  to: test@test.com
+index:
+  name: asx
+notable:
+  rule_description: '%description%'
+  rule_title: '%name%'
+
+```
+
+## date
+
+date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
+
+`date`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")
+
+### date Type
+
+`string`
+
+### date Examples
+
+```yaml
+'2019-12-06'
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+description of the deployment configuration
+
+`description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  This deployment configuration provides a standard scheduling policy over all
+  rules.
+
+```
+
+## id
+
+uuid as unique identifier
+
+`id`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")
+
+### id Type
+
+`string`
+
+### id Examples
+
+```yaml
+fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+Name of deployment configuration
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string`
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+Deployment Configuration all Detections
+
+```
+
+## scheduling
+
+allows to set scheduling parameter
+
+`scheduling`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-scheduling.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-scheduling.md "#/properties/scheduling#/properties/scheduling")
+
+### scheduling Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-scheduling.md))
+
+### scheduling Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### scheduling Examples
+
+```yaml
+cron_schedule: '*/10 * * * *'
+earliest_time: '-10m'
+latest_time: now
+schedule_window: auto
+
+```
+
+## tags
+
+An array of key value pairs for tagging
+
+`tags`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](deployments-properties-tags.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Deployment Schema](deployments-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")
+
+### tags Type
+
+`object` ([Details](deployments-properties-tags.md))
+
+### tags Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+### tags Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### tags Examples
+
+```yaml
+analytics_story: credential_dumping
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments.spec.json b/docs/spec/deployments.spec.json
deleted file mode 100644
index c417cc0bf3..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/deployments.spec.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$id": "http://example.com/example.json",
-  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema",
-  "additionalProperties": true,
-  "default": {},
-  "description": "schema for deployment",
-  "properties": {
-    "alert_action": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/alert_action",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "Set alert action parameter for search",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "email": {
-            "message": "Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%",
-            "subject": "Splunk Alert $name$",
-            "to": "test@test.com"
-          },
-          "index": {
-            "name": "asx"
-          },
-          "notable": {
-            "rule_description": "%description%",
-            "rule_title": "%name%"
-          }
-        }
-      ],
-      "properties": {
-        "email": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email",
-          "additionalProperties": true,
-          "default": {},
-          "description": "By enabling it, an email is sent with the results",
-          "examples": [
-            {
-              "message": "Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%",
-              "subject": "Splunk Alert $name$",
-              "to": "test@test.com"
-            }
-          ],
-          "properties": {
-            "message": {
-              "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/message",
-              "default": "",
-              "description": "message of email",
-              "examples": [
-                "Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%"
-              ],
-              "type": "string"
-            },
-            "subject": {
-              "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/subject",
-              "default": "",
-              "description": "Subject of email",
-              "examples": [
-                "Splunk Alert $name$"
-              ],
-              "type": "string"
-            },
-            "to": {
-              "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/email/properties/to",
-              "default": "",
-              "description": "Recipient of email",
-              "examples": [
-                "test@test.com"
-              ],
-              "type": "string"
-            }
-          },
-          "required": [
-            "to",
-            "subject",
-            "message"
-          ],
-          "type": "object"
-        },
-        "index": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index",
-          "additionalProperties": true,
-          "default": {},
-          "description": "By enabling it, the results are stored in another index",
-          "examples": [
-            {
-              "name": "asx"
-            }
-          ],
-          "properties": {
-            "name": {
-              "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/index/properties/name",
-              "default": "",
-              "description": "Name of the index",
-              "examples": [
-                "asx"
-              ],
-              "type": "string"
-            }
-          },
-          "required": [
-            "name"
-          ],
-          "type": "object"
-        },
-        "notable": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable",
-          "additionalProperties": true,
-          "default": {},
-          "description": "By enabling it, a notable is generated",
-          "examples": [
-            {
-              "rule_description": "%description%",
-              "rule_title": "%name%"
-            }
-          ],
-          "properties": {
-            "rule_description": {
-              "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_description",
-              "default": "",
-              "description": "Rule description of the notable event",
-              "examples": [
-                "%description%"
-              ],
-              "type": "string"
-            },
-            "rule_title": {
-              "$id": "#/properties/alert_action/properties/notable/properties/rule_title",
-              "default": "",
-              "description": "Rule title of the notable event",
-              "examples": [
-                "%name%"
-              ],
-              "type": "string"
-            }
-          },
-          "required": [
-            "rule_title",
-            "rule_description"
-          ],
-          "type": "object"
-        }
-      },
-      "type": "object"
-    },
-    "date": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/date",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd",
-      "examples": [
-        "2019-12-06"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "description": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/description",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "description of the deployment configuration",
-      "examples": [
-        "This deployment configuration provides a standard scheduling policy over all rules."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "id": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/id",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "uuid as unique identifier",
-      "examples": [
-        "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "name": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/name",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Name of deployment configuration",
-      "examples": [
-        "Deployment Configuration all Detections"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "scheduling": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/scheduling",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "allows to set scheduling parameter",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "cron_schedule": "*/10 * * * *",
-          "earliest_time": "-10m",
-          "latest_time": "now",
-          "schedule_window": "auto"
-        }
-      ],
-      "properties": {
-        "cron_schedule": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/scheduling/properties/cron_schedule",
-          "default": "",
-          "description": "Cron schedule to schedule the Splunk searches.",
-          "examples": [
-            "*/10 * * * *"
-          ],
-          "type": "string"
-        },
-        "earliest_time": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/scheduling/properties/earliest_time",
-          "default": "",
-          "description": "earliest time of search",
-          "examples": [
-            "-10m"
-          ],
-          "type": "string"
-        },
-        "latest_time": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/scheduling/properties/latest_time",
-          "default": "",
-          "description": "latest time of search",
-          "examples": [
-            "now"
-          ],
-          "type": "string"
-        },
-        "schedule_window": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/scheduling/properties/schedule_window",
-          "default": "",
-          "description": "schedule window for search",
-          "examples": [
-            "auto"
-          ],
-          "type": "string"
-        }
-      },
-      "required": [
-        "cron_schedule",
-        "earliest_time",
-        "latest_time"
-      ],
-      "type": "object"
-    },
-    "tags": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/tags",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
-        }
-      ],
-      "minItems": 1,
-      "type": "object",
-      "uniqueItems": true
-    }
-  },
-  "required": [
-    "name",
-    "id",
-    "date",
-    "description",
-    "scheduling",
-    "alert_action",
-    "tags"
-  ],
-  "title": "Deployment Schema",
-  "type": "object"
-}
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments.spec.md b/docs/spec/deployments.spec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8d86ed47ff..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/deployments.spec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,656 +0,0 @@
-
-# Deployment Schema Schema
-
-```
-http://example.com/example.json
-```
-
-schema for deployment
-
-| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In |
-|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
-| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted |  |
-
-# Deployment Schema Properties
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by |
-|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------|
-| [alert_action](#alert_action) | `object` | **Required**  | No | `{}` | Deployment Schema (this schema) |
-| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Deployment Schema (this schema) |
-| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Deployment Schema (this schema) |
-| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Deployment Schema (this schema) |
-| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Deployment Schema (this schema) |
-| [scheduling](#scheduling) | `object` | **Required**  | No | `{}` | Deployment Schema (this schema) |
-| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required**  | No | `{}` | Deployment Schema (this schema) |
-| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties |
-
-## alert_action
-
-Set alert action parameter for search
-
-`alert_action`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### alert_action Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Default |
-|----------|------|----------|---------|
-| `email`| object | Optional | `{}` |
-| `index`| object | Optional | `{}` |
-| `notable`| object | Optional | `{}` |
-
-
-
-#### email
-
-By enabling it, an email is sent with the results
-
-`email`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-
-
-##### email Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Default |
-|----------|------|----------|---------|
-| `message`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-| `subject`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-| `to`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-
-
-
-#### message
-
-message of email
-
-`message`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### message Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### message Example
-
-```json
-Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### subject
-
-Subject of email
-
-`subject`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### subject Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### subject Example
-
-```json
-Splunk Alert $name$
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### to
-
-Recipient of email
-
-`to`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### to Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### to Example
-
-```json
-test@test.com
-```
-
-
-
-
-
-##### email Example
-
-```json
-[object Object]
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### index
-
-By enabling it, the results are stored in another index
-
-`index`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-
-
-##### index Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Default |
-|----------|------|----------|---------|
-| `name`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-
-
-
-#### name
-
-Name of the index
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### name Example
-
-```json
-asx
-```
-
-
-
-
-
-##### index Example
-
-```json
-[object Object]
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### notable
-
-By enabling it, a notable is generated
-
-`notable`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-
-
-##### notable Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Default |
-|----------|------|----------|---------|
-| `rule_description`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-| `rule_title`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-
-
-
-#### rule_description
-
-Rule description of the notable event
-
-`rule_description`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### rule_description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### rule_description Example
-
-```json
-%description%
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### rule_title
-
-Rule title of the notable event
-
-`rule_title`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### rule_title Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### rule_title Example
-
-```json
-%name%
-```
-
-
-
-
-
-##### notable Example
-
-```json
-[object Object]
-```
-
-
-
-
-
-### alert_action Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "email": {
-    "message": "Splunk Alert $name$ triggered %fields%",
-    "subject": "Splunk Alert $name$",
-    "to": "test@test.com"
-  },
-  "index": {
-    "name": "asx"
-  },
-  "notable": {
-    "rule_description": "%description%",
-    "rule_title": "%name%"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-
-## date
-
-date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
-
-`date`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### date Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### date Example
-
-```json
-"2019-12-06"
-```
-
-
-## description
-
-description of the deployment configuration
-
-`description`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### description Example
-
-```json
-"This deployment configuration provides a standard scheduling policy over all rules."
-```
-
-
-## id
-
-uuid as unique identifier
-
-`id`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### id Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### id Example
-
-```json
-"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-```
-
-
-## name
-
-Name of deployment configuration
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### name Example
-
-```json
-"Deployment Configuration all Detections"
-```
-
-
-## scheduling
-
-allows to set scheduling parameter
-
-`scheduling`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### scheduling Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Default |
-|----------|------|----------|---------|
-| `cron_schedule`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-| `earliest_time`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-| `latest_time`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-| `schedule_window`| string | Optional | `""` |
-
-
-
-#### cron_schedule
-
-Cron schedule to schedule the Splunk searches.
-
-`cron_schedule`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### cron_schedule Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### cron_schedule Example
-
-```json
-*/10 * * * *
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### earliest_time
-
-earliest time of search
-
-`earliest_time`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### earliest_time Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### earliest_time Example
-
-```json
--10m
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### latest_time
-
-latest time of search
-
-`latest_time`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### latest_time Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### latest_time Example
-
-```json
-now
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### schedule_window
-
-schedule window for search
-
-`schedule_window`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### schedule_window Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### schedule_window Example
-
-```json
-auto
-```
-
-
-
-
-
-### scheduling Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "cron_schedule": "*/10 * * * *",
-  "earliest_time": "-10m",
-  "latest_time": "now",
-  "schedule_window": "auto"
-}
-```
-
-
-## tags
-
-An array of key value pairs for tagging
-
-`tags`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### tags Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required |
-|----------|------|----------|
-
-
-
-
-### tags Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
-}
-```
-
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-known_false_positives.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-known_false_positives.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae7c1bafbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-known_false_positives.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Untitled string in Detection Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/knwon_false_positives#/properties/known_false_positives
+```
+
+known false postives
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                     |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## known_false_positives Type
+
+`string`
+
+## known_false_positives Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory
+  dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c184428f27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# The Items Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/references/items#/properties/references/items
+```
+
+An explanation about the purpose of this instance.
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                     |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## items Type
+
+`string` ([The Items Schema](detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md))
+
+## items Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..07618fc3f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-references.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Untitled array in Detection Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/references#/properties/references
+```
+
+A list of references for this detection
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                     |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## references Type
+
+`string[]` ([The Items Schema](detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md))
+
+## references Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+[]
+```
+
+## references Examples
+
+```yaml
+- >-
+  https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..226980c0e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-type-items.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Untitled string in Detection Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/type#/properties/type/items
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                     |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## items Type
+
+`string`
+
+## items Constraints
+
+**enum**: the value of this property must be equal to one of the following values:
+
+| Value         | Explanation |
+| :------------ | :---------- |
+| `"batch"`     |             |
+| `"streaming"` |             |
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md b/docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98c36f20ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/detections-properties-type.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Detection Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/type#/properties/type
+```
+
+type of detection
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                     |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [detections.spec.json*](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## type Type
+
+`string`
+
+## type Examples
+
+```yaml
+streaming
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections.md b/docs/spec/detections.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bb4b3b7b14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/detections.md
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+# Detection Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+http://example.com/example.json
+```
+
+schema for detections
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                    |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [detections.spec.json](../../out/detections.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Detection Schema Type
+
+`object` ([Detection Schema](detections.md))
+
+# Detection Schema Properties
+
+| Property                                        | Type      | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                                                |
+| :---------------------------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [author](#author)                               | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")                                              |
+| [date](#date)                                   | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")                                                    |
+| [description](#description)                     | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")                               |
+| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement)           | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement")                |
+| [id](#id)                                       | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")                                                          |
+| [known_false_positives](#known_false_positives) | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-known_false_positives.md "#/properties/knwon_false_positives#/properties/known_false_positives") |
+| [name](#name)                                   | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-name-of-detection.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")                                       |
+| [references](#references)                       | `array`   | Optional | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references")                                  |
+| [search](#search)                               | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search")                                              |
+| [tags](#tags)                                   | `object`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")                                                    |
+| [type](#type)                                   | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-type.md "#/properties/type#/properties/type")                                                    |
+| [version](#version)                             | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Detection Schema](detections-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")                                           |
+| Additional Properties                           | Any       | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                                           |
+
+## author
+
+Author of the detection
+
+`author`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")
+
+### author Type
+
+`string`
+
+### author Examples
+
+```yaml
+Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+
+```
+
+## date
+
+date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
+
+`date`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")
+
+### date Type
+
+`string`
+
+### date Examples
+
+```yaml
+'2019-12-06'
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+A detailed description of the detection
+
+`description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  dbgcore.dll is a specifc DLL for Windows core debugging. It is used to obtain
+  a memory dump of a process. This search detects the usage of this DLL for
+  creating a memory dump of LSASS process. Memory dumps of the LSASS process can
+  be created with tools such as Windows Task Manager or procdump.
+
+```
+
+## how_to_implement
+
+information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.
+
+`how_to_implement`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement")
+
+### how_to_implement Type
+
+`string`
+
+### how_to_implement Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes
+  EventCode 10 for lsass.exe.
+
+```
+
+## id
+
+UUID as unique identifier
+
+`id`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")
+
+### id Type
+
+`string`
+
+### id Examples
+
+```yaml
+fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
+
+```
+
+## known_false_positives
+
+known false postives
+
+`known_false_positives`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-known_false_positives.md "#/properties/knwon_false_positives#/properties/known_false_positives")
+
+### known_false_positives Type
+
+`string`
+
+### known_false_positives Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory
+  dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string` ([Name of detection](detections-properties-name-of-detection.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-name-of-detection.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string` ([Name of detection](detections-properties-name-of-detection.md))
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation
+
+```
+
+## references
+
+A list of references for this detection
+
+`references`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string[]` ([The Items Schema](detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references")
+
+### references Type
+
+`string[]` ([The Items Schema](detections-properties-references-the-items-schema.md))
+
+### references Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+[]
+```
+
+### references Examples
+
+```yaml
+- >-
+  https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+
+```
+
+## search
+
+The Splunk search for the detection
+
+`search`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search")
+
+### search Type
+
+`string`
+
+### search Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR
+  CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as
+  lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage,
+  SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest |
+  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |
+  `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter`
+
+```
+
+## tags
+
+An array of key value pairs for tagging
+
+`tags`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](detections-properties-tags.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")
+
+### tags Type
+
+`object` ([Details](detections-properties-tags.md))
+
+### tags Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+### tags Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### tags Examples
+
+```yaml
+analytics_story: credential_dumping
+kill_chain_phases: Action on Objectives
+mitre_attack_id: T1078.004
+cis20: CIS 13
+nist: DE.DP
+security domain: network
+asset_type: AWS Instance
+risk_object: user
+risk_object_type: network_artifacts
+risk score: '60'
+custom_key: custom_value
+
+```
+
+## type
+
+type of detection
+
+`type`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-type.md "#/properties/type#/properties/type")
+
+### type Type
+
+`string`
+
+### type Examples
+
+```yaml
+streaming
+
+```
+
+## version
+
+version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
+
+`version`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Detection Schema](detections-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")
+
+### version Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### version Examples
+
+```yaml
+2
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections.spec.json b/docs/spec/detections.spec.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f9fc25482..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/detections.spec.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$id": "http://example.com/example.json",
-  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema",
-  "additionalProperties": true,
-  "description": "schema for detections",
-  "properties": {
-    "author": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/author",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Author of the detection",
-      "examples": [
-        "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "date": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/date",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd",
-      "examples": [
-        "2019-12-06"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "description": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/description",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "A detailed description of the detection",
-      "examples": [
-        "dbgcore.dll is a specifc DLL for Windows core debugging. It is used to obtain a memory dump of a process. This search detects the usage of this DLL for creating a memory dump of LSASS process. Memory dumps of the LSASS process can be created with tools such as Windows Task Manager or procdump."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "how_to_implement": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/how_to_implement",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.",
-      "examples": [
-        "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "id": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/id",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "UUID as unique identifier",
-      "examples": [
-        "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "known_false_positives": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/knwon_false_positives",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "known false postives",
-      "examples": [
-        "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "name": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/name",
-      "default": "",
-      "examples": [
-        "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation"
-      ],
-      "title": "Name of detection",
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "references": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/references",
-      "additionalItems": true,
-      "default": [],
-      "description": "A list of references for this detection",
-      "examples": [
-        [
-          "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"
-        ]
-      ],
-      "items": {
-        "$id": "#/properties/references/items",
-        "default": "",
-        "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.",
-        "examples": [
-          "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"
-        ],
-        "title": "The Items Schema",
-        "type": "string"
-      },
-      "type": "array"
-    },
-    "search": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/search",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "The Splunk search for the detection",
-      "examples": [
-        "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter`"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "tags": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/tags",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping",
-          "custom_key": "custom_value"
-        }
-      ],
-      "minItems": 1,
-      "type": "object",
-      "uniqueItems": true
-    },
-    "type": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/type",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "type of detection",
-      "examples": [
-        "ESCU"
-      ],
-      "items": {
-        "enum": [
-          "ESCU",
-          "SSE",
-          "RBA"
-        ],
-        "type": "string"
-      },
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "version": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/version",
-      "default": 0,
-      "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...",
-      "examples": [
-        2
-      ],
-      "type": "integer"
-    }
-  },
-  "required": [
-    "name",
-    "id",
-    "version",
-    "date",
-    "description",
-    "type",
-    "author",
-    "search",
-    "known_false_positives",
-    "tags"
-  ],
-  "title": "Detection Schema",
-  "type": "object"
-}
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections.spec.md b/docs/spec/detections.spec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 74c9176a96..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/detections.spec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,380 +0,0 @@
-
-# Detection Schema Schema
-
-```
-http://example.com/example.json
-```
-
-schema for detections
-
-| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In |
-|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
-| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted |  |
-
-# Detection Schema Properties
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by |
-|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------|
-| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [known_false_positives](#known_false_positives) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [references](#references) | `string[]` | Optional  | No | `[]` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [search](#search) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required**  | No | `{}` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [type](#type) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required**  | No | `0` | Detection Schema (this schema) |
-| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties |
-
-## author
-
-Author of the detection
-
-`author`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### author Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### author Example
-
-```json
-"Patrick Bareiss, Splunk"
-```
-
-
-## date
-
-date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
-
-`date`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### date Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### date Example
-
-```json
-"2019-12-06"
-```
-
-
-## description
-
-A detailed description of the detection
-
-`description`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### description Example
-
-```json
-"dbgcore.dll is a specifc DLL for Windows core debugging. It is used to obtain a memory dump of a process. This search detects the usage of this DLL for creating a memory dump of LSASS process. Memory dumps of the LSASS process can be created with tools such as Windows Task Manager or procdump."
-```
-
-
-## how_to_implement
-
-information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.
-
-`how_to_implement`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### how_to_implement Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### how_to_implement Example
-
-```json
-"This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe."
-```
-
-
-## id
-
-UUID as unique identifier
-
-`id`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### id Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### id Example
-
-```json
-"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-```
-
-
-## known_false_positives
-
-known false postives
-
-`known_false_positives`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### known_false_positives Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### known_false_positives Example
-
-```json
-"Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual."
-```
-
-
-## name
-### Name of detection
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### name Example
-
-```json
-"Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation"
-```
-
-
-## references
-
-A list of references for this detection
-
-`references`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string[]`
-
-* default: `[]`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### references Type
-
-
-Array type: `string[]`
-
-All items must be of the type:
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-  
-An explanation about the purpose of this instance.
-
-
-
-
-
-### references Example
-
-```json
-[
-  "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"
-]
-```
-
-
-## search
-
-The Splunk search for the detection
-
-`search`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### search Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### search Example
-
-```json
-"`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter`"
-```
-
-
-## tags
-
-An array of key value pairs for tagging
-
-`tags`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### tags Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required |
-|----------|------|----------|
-
-
-
-
-### tags Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "analytics_story": "credential_dumping",
-  "custom_key": "custom_value"
-}
-```
-
-
-## type
-
-type of detection
-
-`type`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### type Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### type Example
-
-```json
-"ESCU"
-```
-
-
-## version
-
-version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
-
-`version`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `integer`
-* default: `0`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### version Type
-
-
-`integer`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### version Example
-
-```json
-2
-```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md b/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78403ade45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-0.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/oneOf/0
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## 0 Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md b/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b493c4f17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-oneof-1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/oneOf/1
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## 1 Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b067278e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/case_sensitive_match
+```
+
+What the macro is intended to filter
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## case_sensitive_match Type
+
+`string`
+
+## case_sensitive_match Constraints
+
+**enum**: the value of this property must be equal to one of the following values:
+
+| Value     | Explanation |
+| :-------- | :---------- |
+| `"true"`  |             |
+| `"false"` |             |
+
+## case_sensitive_match Examples
+
+```yaml
+'true'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b7028b4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-collection.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/collection
+```
+
+Name of the collection to use for this lookup
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## collection Type
+
+`string`
+
+## collection Examples
+
+```yaml
+prohibited_apps_launching_cmd
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..46369bbdda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-default_match.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/default_match
+```
+
+The default value if no match is found
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default_match Type
+
+`string`
+
+## default_match Examples
+
+```yaml
+'true'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e9fc0cfe11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-description.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/description
+```
+
+The description of this lookup
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## description Type
+
+`string`
+
+## description Examples
+
+```yaml
+This lookup contains file names that exist in the Windows\System32 directory
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e0a699ee17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-fields_list.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/fields_list
+```
+
+A comma and space separated list of field names
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## fields_list Type
+
+`string`
+
+## fields_list Examples
+
+```yaml
+_key, dest, process_name
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80584c0215
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filename.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filename
+```
+
+The name of the file to use for this lookup
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## filename Type
+
+`string`
+
+## filename Examples
+
+```yaml
+prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ad1a68ff22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-filter.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filter
+```
+
+Use this attribute to improve search performance when working with significantly large KV
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## filter Type
+
+`string`
+
+## filter Examples
+
+```yaml
+dest="SPLK_*"
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ca467f6a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-match_type.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/match_type
+```
+
+A comma and space-delimited list of \<match_type>(\<field_name>) specification to allow for non-exact matching
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## match_type Type
+
+`string`
+
+## match_type Examples
+
+```yaml
+WILDCARD(process)
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..652395498b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-max_matches.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled integer in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/max_matches
+```
+
+The maximum number of possible matches for each input lookup value
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## max_matches Type
+
+`integer`
+
+## max_matches Examples
+
+```yaml
+'100'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e950b97fbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-min_matches.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled integer in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/min_matches
+```
+
+Minimum number of possible matches for each input lookup value
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## min_matches Type
+
+`integer`
+
+## min_matches Examples
+
+```yaml
+'1'
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ca27b5144c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups-properties-name.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/name
+```
+
+The name of the lookup to be used in searches
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json*](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## name Type
+
+`string`
+
+## name Examples
+
+```yaml
+isWindowsSystemFile_lookup
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups.md b/docs/spec/lookups.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79b6e284e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/lookups.md
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+# Lookup Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json
+```
+
+A object that defines a lookup file and its properties.
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                              |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [lookups.spec.json](../../out/lookups.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Lookup Manifest Type
+
+`object` ([Lookup Manifest](lookups.md))
+
+one (and only one) of
+
+*   [Untitled undefined type in Lookup Manifest](lookups-oneof-0.md "check type definition")
+
+*   [Untitled undefined type in Lookup Manifest](lookups-oneof-1.md "check type definition")
+
+# Lookup Manifest Properties
+
+| Property                                      | Type      | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                                                           |
+| :-------------------------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [case_sensitive_match](#case_sensitive_match) | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/case_sensitive_match") |
+| [collection](#collection)                     | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-collection.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/collection")                     |
+| [default_match](#default_match)               | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-default_match.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/default_match")               |
+| [description](#description)                   | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-description.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/description")                   |
+| [fields_list](#fields_list)                   | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-fields_list.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/fields_list")                   |
+| [filename](#filename)                         | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-filename.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filename")                         |
+| [filter](#filter)                             | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-filter.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filter")                             |
+| [match_type](#match_type)                     | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-match_type.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/match_type")                     |
+| [max_matches](#max_matches)                   | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-max_matches.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/max_matches")                   |
+| [min_matches](#min_matches)                   | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-min_matches.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/min_matches")                   |
+| [name](#name)                                 | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-name.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/name")                                 |
+
+## case_sensitive_match
+
+What the macro is intended to filter
+
+`case_sensitive_match`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-case_sensitive_match.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/case_sensitive_match")
+
+### case_sensitive_match Type
+
+`string`
+
+### case_sensitive_match Constraints
+
+**enum**: the value of this property must be equal to one of the following values:
+
+| Value     | Explanation |
+| :-------- | :---------- |
+| `"true"`  |             |
+| `"false"` |             |
+
+### case_sensitive_match Examples
+
+```yaml
+'true'
+
+```
+
+## collection
+
+Name of the collection to use for this lookup
+
+`collection`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-collection.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/collection")
+
+### collection Type
+
+`string`
+
+### collection Examples
+
+```yaml
+prohibited_apps_launching_cmd
+
+```
+
+## default_match
+
+The default value if no match is found
+
+`default_match`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-default_match.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/default_match")
+
+### default_match Type
+
+`string`
+
+### default_match Examples
+
+```yaml
+'true'
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+The description of this lookup
+
+`description`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-description.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+This lookup contains file names that exist in the Windows\System32 directory
+
+```
+
+## fields_list
+
+A comma and space separated list of field names
+
+`fields_list`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-fields_list.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/fields_list")
+
+### fields_list Type
+
+`string`
+
+### fields_list Examples
+
+```yaml
+_key, dest, process_name
+
+```
+
+## filename
+
+The name of the file to use for this lookup
+
+`filename`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-filename.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filename")
+
+### filename Type
+
+`string`
+
+### filename Examples
+
+```yaml
+prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv
+
+```
+
+## filter
+
+Use this attribute to improve search performance when working with significantly large KV
+
+`filter`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-filter.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/filter")
+
+### filter Type
+
+`string`
+
+### filter Examples
+
+```yaml
+dest="SPLK_*"
+
+```
+
+## match_type
+
+A comma and space-delimited list of \<match_type>(\<field_name>) specification to allow for non-exact matching
+
+`match_type`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-match_type.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/match_type")
+
+### match_type Type
+
+`string`
+
+### match_type Examples
+
+```yaml
+WILDCARD(process)
+
+```
+
+## max_matches
+
+The maximum number of possible matches for each input lookup value
+
+`max_matches`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-max_matches.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/max_matches")
+
+### max_matches Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### max_matches Examples
+
+```yaml
+'100'
+
+```
+
+## min_matches
+
+Minimum number of possible matches for each input lookup value
+
+`min_matches`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-min_matches.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/min_matches")
+
+### min_matches Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### min_matches Examples
+
+```yaml
+'1'
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+The name of the lookup to be used in searches
+
+`name`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Lookup Manifest](lookups-properties-name.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string`
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+isWindowsSystemFile_lookup
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups.spec.json b/docs/spec/lookups.spec.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c85720259..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/lookups.spec.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$id": "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json",
-  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
-  "description": "A object that defines a lookup file and its properties.",
-  "oneOf": [
-    {
-      "required": [
-        "collection"
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "required": [
-        "filename"
-      ]
-    }
-  ],
-  "properties": {
-    "case_sensitive_match": {
-      "description": "What the macro is intended to filter",
-      "enum": [
-        "true",
-        "false"
-      ],
-      "examples": [
-        "true"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "collection": {
-      "description": "Name of the collection to use for this lookup",
-      "examples": [
-        "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "default_match": {
-      "description": "The default value if no match is found",
-      "examples": [
-        "true"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "description": {
-      "description": "The description of this lookup",
-      "examples": [
-        "This lookup contains file names that exist in the Windows\\System32 directory"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "filename": {
-      "description": "The name of the file to use for this lookup",
-      "examples": [
-        "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "match_type": {
-      "description": "A comma and space-delimited list of <match_type>(<field_name>) specification to allow for non-exact matching",
-      "examples": [
-        "WILDCARD(process)"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "max_matches": {
-      "description": "The maximum number of possible matches for each input lookup value",
-      "examples": [
-        "100"
-      ],
-      "type": "integer"
-    },
-    "min_matches": {
-      "description": "Minimum number of possible matches for each input lookup value",
-      "examples": [
-        "1"
-      ],
-      "type": "integer"
-    },
-    "name": {
-      "description": "The name of the lookup to be used in searches",
-      "examples": [
-        "isWindowsSystemFile_lookup"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    }
-  },
-  "title": "Lookup Manifest",
-  "type": "object"
-}
diff --git a/docs/spec/lookups.spec.md b/docs/spec/lookups.spec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 38f87220d1..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/lookups.spec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
-
-# Lookup Manifest Schema
-
-```
-https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/lookups.json
-```
-
-A object that defines a lookup file and its properties.
-
-| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In |
-|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
-| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted |  |
-
-# Lookup Manifest Properties
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by |
-|----------|------|----------|----------|------------|
-| [case_sensitive_match](#case_sensitive_match) | `enum` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| [collection](#collection) | `string` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| [default_match](#default_match) | `string` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| [description](#description) | `string` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| [filename](#filename) | `string` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| [match_type](#match_type) | `string` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| [max_matches](#max_matches) | `integer` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| [min_matches](#min_matches) | `integer` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| [name](#name) | `string` | Optional  | No | Lookup Manifest (this schema) |
-| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties |
-
-## case_sensitive_match
-
-What the macro is intended to filter
-
-`case_sensitive_match`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `enum`
-* defined in this schema
-
-The value of this property **must** be equal to one of the [known values below](#case_sensitive_match-known-values).
-
-### case_sensitive_match Known Values
-| Value | Description |
-|-------|-------------|
-| `true` |  |
-| `false` |  |
-
-
-
-### case_sensitive_match Example
-
-```json
-"true"
-```
-
-
-## collection
-
-Name of the collection to use for this lookup
-
-`collection`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### collection Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### collection Example
-
-```json
-"prohibited_apps_launching_cmd"
-```
-
-
-## default_match
-
-The default value if no match is found
-
-`default_match`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### default_match Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### default_match Example
-
-```json
-"true"
-```
-
-
-## description
-
-The description of this lookup
-
-`description`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### description Example
-
-```json
-"This lookup contains file names that exist in the Windows\\System32 directory"
-```
-
-
-## filename
-
-The name of the file to use for this lookup
-
-`filename`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### filename Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### filename Example
-
-```json
-"prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv"
-```
-
-
-## match_type
-
-A comma and space-delimited list of <match_type>(<field_name>) specification to allow for non-exact matching
-
-`match_type`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### match_type Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### match_type Example
-
-```json
-"WILDCARD(process)"
-```
-
-
-## max_matches
-
-The maximum number of possible matches for each input lookup value
-
-`max_matches`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `integer`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### max_matches Type
-
-
-`integer`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### max_matches Example
-
-```json
-"100"
-```
-
-
-## min_matches
-
-Minimum number of possible matches for each input lookup value
-
-`min_matches`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `integer`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### min_matches Type
-
-
-`integer`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### min_matches Example
-
-```json
-"1"
-```
-
-
-## name
-
-The name of the lookup to be used in searches
-
-`name`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### name Example
-
-```json
-"isWindowsSystemFile_lookup"
-```
-
-
-
-**One** of the following *conditions* need to be fulfilled.
-
-
-#### Condition 1
-
-
-
-#### Condition 2
-
-
diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..34f73377e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments-items.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled string in Macro Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments/items
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## items Type
+
+`string`
diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1334acd3c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-arguments.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Untitled array in Macro Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments
+```
+
+A list of the arguments being passed to this macro
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## arguments Type
+
+`string[]`
+
+## arguments Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `0`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..128ea17364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-definition.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Macro Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/definition
+```
+
+The macro definition
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## definition Type
+
+`string`
+
+## definition Examples
+
+```yaml
+(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e5f8aed632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-description.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Macro Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/description
+```
+
+What the macro is intended to filter
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## description Type
+
+`string`
+
+## description Examples
+
+```yaml
+Use this macro to filter out known good objects
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md b/docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..484c1e4e3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/macros-properties-name.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Untitled string in Macro Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/name
+```
+
+The name of the macro
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [macros.spec.json*](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## name Type
+
+`string`
+
+## name Examples
+
+```yaml
+detection_search_output_filter
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/macros.md b/docs/spec/macros.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3cb8dc57b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/macros.md
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# Macro Manifest Schema
+
+```txt
+https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json
+```
+
+An object that defines the parameters for a Splunk Macro
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                            |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [macros.spec.json](../../out/macros.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Macro Manifest Type
+
+`object` ([Macro Manifest](macros.md))
+
+# Macro Manifest Properties
+
+| Property                    | Type     | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                                      |
+| :-------------------------- | :------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [arguments](#arguments)     | `array`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-arguments.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments")     |
+| [definition](#definition)   | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-definition.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/definition")   |
+| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-description.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/description") |
+| [name](#name)               | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-name.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/name")               |
+
+## arguments
+
+A list of the arguments being passed to this macro
+
+`arguments`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string[]`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-arguments.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/arguments")
+
+### arguments Type
+
+`string[]`
+
+### arguments Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `0`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+## definition
+
+The macro definition
+
+`definition`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-definition.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/definition")
+
+### definition Type
+
+`string`
+
+### definition Examples
+
+```yaml
+(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+What the macro is intended to filter
+
+`description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-description.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+Use this macro to filter out known good objects
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+The name of the macro
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Macro Manifest](macros-properties-name.md "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string`
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+detection_search_output_filter
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/macros.spec.json b/docs/spec/macros.spec.json
deleted file mode 100644
index cd0f5cafe1..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/macros.spec.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$id": "https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json",
-  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
-  "description": "An object that defines the parameters for a Splunk Macro",
-  "properties": {
-    "arguments": {
-      "description": "A list of the arguments being passed to this macro",
-      "items": {
-        "type": "string"
-      },
-      "minItems": 0,
-      "type": "array",
-      "uniqueItems": true
-    },
-    "definition": {
-      "description": "The macro definition",
-      "examples": [
-        "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "description": {
-      "description": "What the macro is intended to filter",
-      "examples": [
-        "Use this macro to filter out known good objects"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "name": {
-      "description": "The name of the macro",
-      "examples": [
-        "detection_search_output_filter"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    }
-  },
-  "required": [
-    "name",
-    "description"
-  ],
-  "title": "Macro Manifest",
-  "type": "object"
-}
diff --git a/docs/spec/macros.spec.md b/docs/spec/macros.spec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f39fdeffe4..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/macros.spec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-
-# Macro Manifest Schema
-
-```
-https://api.splunkresearch.com/schemas/macros.json
-```
-
-An object that defines the parameters for a Splunk Macro
-
-| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In |
-|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
-| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted |  |
-
-# Macro Manifest Properties
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by |
-|----------|------|----------|----------|------------|
-| [arguments](#arguments) | `string[]` | Optional  | No | Macro Manifest (this schema) |
-| [definition](#definition) | `string` | Optional  | No | Macro Manifest (this schema) |
-| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required**  | No | Macro Manifest (this schema) |
-| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required**  | No | Macro Manifest (this schema) |
-| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties |
-
-## arguments
-
-A list of the arguments being passed to this macro
-
-`arguments`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string[]`
-* at least `0` items in the array
-* defined in this schema
-
-### arguments Type
-
-
-Array type: `string[]`
-
-All items must be of the type:
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-## definition
-
-The macro definition
-
-`definition`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### definition Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### definition Example
-
-```json
-"(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)"
-```
-
-
-## description
-
-What the macro is intended to filter
-
-`description`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### description Example
-
-```json
-"Use this macro to filter out known good objects"
-```
-
-
-## name
-
-The name of the macro
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### name Example
-
-```json
-"detection_search_output_filter"
-```
-
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..31296217d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json#/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation-default.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b2cdd45428
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/automation#/properties/automation/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdd1eb66d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-automation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Untitled object in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/automation#/properties/automation
+```
+
+An array of key value pairs for defining actions and playbooks
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## automation Type
+
+`object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-automation.md))
+
+## automation Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+## automation Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{
+  "is_note_required": false,
+  "sla_type": "minutes",
+  "sla": "",
+  "role": "",
+  "action": [],
+  "playbooks": []
+}
+```
+
+## automation Examples
+
+```yaml
+is_note_required: false
+sla_type: minutes
+sla: 30
+action:
+  - run_query
+playbooks:
+  - scm: local
+    playbook: automate something
+  - scm: local
+    playbook: automate something else
+
+```
+
+# automation Properties
+
+| Property              | Type | Required | Nullable    | Defined by |
+| :-------------------- | :--- | :------- | :---------- | :--------- |
+| Additional Properties | Any  | Optional | can be null |            |
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9de4e3e98f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Untitled integer in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/sla#/properties/sla
+```
+
+Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## sla Type
+
+`integer`
+
+## sla Examples
+
+```yaml
+5
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+30
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..28319602eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Untitled string in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type
+```
+
+Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc)
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                             |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [response_tasks.spec.json*](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## sla_type Type
+
+`string`
+
+## sla_type Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+"minutes"
+```
+
+## sla_type Examples
+
+```yaml
+minutes
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+hours
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+days
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e5500835e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+# Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json
+```
+
+schema for response task
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                            |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [response_tasks.spec.json](../../out/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Response Schema Type
+
+`object` ([Response Schema](response_tasks.md))
+
+## Response Schema Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+# Response Schema Properties
+
+| Property                    | Type      | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                     |
+| :-------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [author](#author)           | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")                |
+| [date](#date)               | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")                      |
+| [description](#description) | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") |
+| [id](#id)                   | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")                            |
+| [name](#name)               | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")                      |
+| [sla](#sla)                 | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla")                         |
+| [sla_type](#sla_type)       | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type")          |
+| [automation](#automation)   | `object`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-automation.md "#/properties/automation#/properties/automation")    |
+| [tags](#tags)               | `object`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")                      |
+| [version](#version)         | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")             |
+| [references](#references)   | `array`   | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references")    |
+| Additional Properties       | Any       | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                |
+
+## author
+
+Author of the response task
+
+`author`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")
+
+### author Type
+
+`string`
+
+### author Examples
+
+```yaml
+ButterCup, Splunk
+
+```
+
+## date
+
+date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
+
+`date`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")
+
+### date Type
+
+`string`
+
+### date Examples
+
+```yaml
+'2019-12-06'
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+Description of response task
+
+`description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+Response example.
+
+```
+
+## id
+
+UUID as unique identifier
+
+`id`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")
+
+### id Type
+
+`string`
+
+### id Examples
+
+```yaml
+fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+Name of response task
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string`
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+Response Example
+
+```
+
+## sla
+
+Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase
+
+`sla`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla")
+
+### sla Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### sla Examples
+
+```yaml
+5
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+30
+
+```
+
+## sla_type
+
+Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc)
+
+`sla_type`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type")
+
+### sla_type Type
+
+`string`
+
+### sla_type Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+"minutes"
+```
+
+### sla_type Examples
+
+```yaml
+minutes
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+hours
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+days
+
+```
+
+## automation
+
+An array of key value pairs for defining actions and playbooks
+
+`automation`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-automation.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-automation.md "#/properties/automation#/properties/automation")
+
+### automation Type
+
+`object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-automation.md))
+
+### automation Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+### automation Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{
+  "is_note_required": false,
+  "sla_type": "minutes",
+  "sla": "",
+  "role": "",
+  "action": [],
+  "playbooks": []
+}
+```
+
+### automation Examples
+
+```yaml
+is_note_required: false
+sla_type: minutes
+sla: 30
+action:
+  - run_query
+playbooks:
+  - scm: local
+    playbook: automate something
+  - scm: local
+    playbook: automate something else
+
+```
+
+## tags
+
+An array of key value pairs for tagging
+
+`tags`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-tags.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")
+
+### tags Type
+
+`object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-tags.md))
+
+### tags Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+### tags Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### tags Examples
+
+```yaml
+analytics_story: credential_dumping
+
+```
+
+## version
+
+version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
+
+`version`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")
+
+### version Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### version Examples
+
+```yaml
+1
+
+```
+
+## references
+
+A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation)
+
+`references`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](response_tasks-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references")
+
+### references Type
+
+`string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](response_tasks-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md))
+
+### references Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+[]
+```
+
+### references Examples
+
+```yaml
+- Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Alarm Triage Overview pages 146-148
+- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json b/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 257e12f5fb..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$id": "http://example.com/example.json",
-  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema",
-  "additionalProperties": true,
-  "default": {},
-  "description": "schema for response tasks",
-  "properties": {
-    "author": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/author",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Author of response task",
-      "examples": [
-        "Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "dashboard": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/dashboard",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Name of dashboard used as response task",
-      "examples": [
-        "process_chain_analysis.json"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "date": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/date",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd",
-      "examples": [
-        "2019-12-06"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "description": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/description",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Description of response task",
-      "examples": [
-        "Response Task example description"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "how_to_implement": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/how_to_implement",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.",
-      "examples": [
-        "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "id": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/id",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "UUID as unique identifier",
-      "examples": [
-        "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "inputs": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/inputs",
-      "default": [],
-      "description": "Inputs used from the response task",
-      "examples": [
-        [
-          "lookup_file"
-        ]
-      ],
-      "type": "array"
-    },
-    "name": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/name",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Namo fo response task",
-      "examples": [
-        "Response Tas Example"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "playbook": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/playbook",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "A phantom playbook as response task",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "name": "lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json",
-          "url_json": "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json",
-          "url_python": "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py"
-        }
-      ],
-      "properties": {
-        "name": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/playbook/properties/name",
-          "default": "",
-          "description": "Name of Phantom Playbook",
-          "examples": [
-            "lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json"
-          ],
-          "type": "string"
-        },
-        "url_json": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/playbook/properties/url_json",
-          "default": "",
-          "description": "URL for phantom playbook json file",
-          "examples": [
-            "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json"
-          ],
-          "type": "string"
-        },
-        "url_python": {
-          "$id": "#/properties/playbook/properties/url_python",
-          "default": "",
-          "description": "URL for phantom playbook python file",
-          "examples": [
-            "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py"
-          ],
-          "type": "string"
-        }
-      },
-      "required": [
-        "name",
-        "url_json",
-        "url_python"
-      ],
-      "type": "object"
-    },
-    "search": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/search",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Search as response task",
-      "examples": [
-        "`sysmon` EventCode=1 | search [| inputlookup %lookup_file% ] | stats count by dest user process_name"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "version": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/version",
-      "default": 0,
-      "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...",
-      "examples": [
-        3
-      ],
-      "type": "integer"
-    }
-  },
-  "required": [
-    "name",
-    "id",
-    "version",
-    "date",
-    "description",
-    "author"
-  ],
-  "title": "Response Task Schema",
-  "type": "object"
-}
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index be14942e11..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,437 +0,0 @@
-
-# Response Task Schema Schema
-
-```
-http://example.com/example.json
-```
-
-schema for response tasks
-
-| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In |
-|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
-| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted |  |
-
-# Response Task Schema Properties
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by |
-|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------|
-| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [dashboard](#dashboard) | `string` | Optional  | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional  | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [inputs](#inputs) | `array` | Optional  | No | `[]` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [playbook](#playbook) | `object` | Optional  | No | `{}` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [search](#search) | `string` | Optional  | No | `""` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required**  | No | `0` | Response Task Schema (this schema) |
-| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties |
-
-## author
-
-Author of response task
-
-`author`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### author Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### author Example
-
-```json
-"Patrick Bareiß, Splunk"
-```
-
-
-## dashboard
-
-Name of dashboard used as response task
-
-`dashboard`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### dashboard Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### dashboard Example
-
-```json
-"process_chain_analysis.json"
-```
-
-
-## date
-
-date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
-
-`date`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### date Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### date Example
-
-```json
-"2019-12-06"
-```
-
-
-## description
-
-Description of response task
-
-`description`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### description Example
-
-```json
-"Response Task example description"
-```
-
-
-## how_to_implement
-
-information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.
-
-`how_to_implement`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### how_to_implement Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### how_to_implement Example
-
-```json
-"This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe."
-```
-
-
-## id
-
-UUID as unique identifier
-
-`id`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### id Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### id Example
-
-```json
-"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-```
-
-
-## inputs
-
-Inputs used from the response task
-
-`inputs`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `array`
-
-* default: `[]`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### inputs Type
-
-
-Array type: `array`
-
-
-
-
-### inputs Example
-
-```json
-[
-  "lookup_file"
-]
-```
-
-
-## name
-
-Namo fo response task
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### name Example
-
-```json
-"Response Tas Example"
-```
-
-
-## playbook
-
-A phantom playbook as response task
-
-`playbook`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### playbook Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Default |
-|----------|------|----------|---------|
-| `name`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-| `url_json`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-| `url_python`| string | **Required** | `""` |
-
-
-
-#### name
-
-Name of Phantom Playbook
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### name Example
-
-```json
-lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### url_json
-
-URL for phantom playbook json file
-
-`url_json`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### url_json Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### url_json Example
-
-```json
-https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json
-```
-
-
-
-
-#### url_python
-
-URL for phantom playbook python file
-
-`url_python`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-
-
-##### url_python Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-##### url_python Example
-
-```json
-https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py
-```
-
-
-
-
-
-### playbook Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "name": "lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json",
-  "url_json": "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json",
-  "url_python": "https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py"
-}
-```
-
-
-## search
-
-Search as response task
-
-`search`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### search Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### search Example
-
-```json
-"`sysmon` EventCode=1 | search [| inputlookup %lookup_file% ] | stats count by dest user process_name"
-```
-
-
-## version
-
-version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
-
-`version`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `integer`
-* default: `0`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### version Type
-
-
-`integer`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### version Example
-
-```json
-3
-```
-
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses-default.md b/docs/spec/responses-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3478b338bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response.spec.json#/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses.spec.json*](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses-properties-is_note_required.md b/docs/spec/responses-properties-is_note_required.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..26aed247e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses-properties-is_note_required.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Untitled boolean in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/is_note_required#/properties/is_note_required
+```
+
+Global assignment for notes being required for tasks, can be individually set in the task
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses.spec.json*](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## is_note_required Type
+
+`boolean`
+
+## is_note_required Examples
+
+```yaml
+true
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+false
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase-default.md b/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e773e97379
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses.spec.json*](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase.md b/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdd06286c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses-properties-response_phase.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Untitled array in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase
+```
+
+Response divided into phases. These will used to referenced known response_phase parameters
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                   |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses.spec.json*](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## response_phase Type
+
+`array`
+
+## response_phase Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+## response_phase Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+## response_phase Examples
+
+```yaml
+preparation:
+  - id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b
+    name: Preparation NIST
+identification:
+  - id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892
+    name: Detection and Analysis
+  - id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0
+    name: Analysis
+
+```
+
+# response_phase Properties
+
+| Property              | Type | Required | Nullable    | Defined by |
+| :-------------------- | :--- | :------- | :---------- | :--------- |
+| Additional Properties | Any  | Optional | can be null |            |
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.md b/docs/spec/responses.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c42c8297f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses.md
@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+# Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response.spec.json
+```
+
+schema for response
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                  |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses.spec.json](../../out/responses.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Response Schema Type
+
+`object` ([Response Schema](responses.md))
+
+## Response Schema Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+# Response Schema Properties
+
+| Property                              | Type      | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                               |
+| :------------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [author](#author)                     | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")                               |
+| [date](#date)                         | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")                                     |
+| [description](#description)           | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")                |
+| [id](#id)                             | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")                                           |
+| [name](#name)                         | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")                                     |
+| [response_phase](#response_phase)     | `array`   | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-response_phase.md "#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase")      |
+| [tags](#tags)                         | `object`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")                                     |
+| [version](#version)                   | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")                            |
+| [is_note_required](#is_note_required) | `boolean` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-is_note_required.md "#/properties/is_note_required#/properties/is_note_required") |
+| [references](#references)             | `array`   | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references")                   |
+| Additional Properties                 | Any       | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                          |
+
+## author
+
+Author of the response
+
+`author`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")
+
+### author Type
+
+`string`
+
+### author Examples
+
+```yaml
+Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk
+
+```
+
+## date
+
+date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
+
+`date`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")
+
+### date Type
+
+`string`
+
+### date Examples
+
+```yaml
+'2019-12-06'
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+Description of response
+
+`description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+Response example.
+
+```
+
+## id
+
+UUID as unique identifier
+
+`id`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")
+
+### id Type
+
+`string`
+
+### id Examples
+
+```yaml
+fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+Name of response
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string`
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+Response Example
+
+```
+
+## response_phase
+
+Response divided into phases. These will used to referenced known response_phase parameters
+
+`response_phase`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `array`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-response_phase.md "#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase")
+
+### response_phase Type
+
+`array`
+
+### response_phase Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+### response_phase Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### response_phase Examples
+
+```yaml
+preparation:
+  - id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b
+    name: Preparation NIST
+identification:
+  - id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892
+    name: Detection and Analysis
+  - id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0
+    name: Analysis
+
+```
+
+## tags
+
+An array of key value pairs for tagging
+
+`tags`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](responses-properties-tags.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")
+
+### tags Type
+
+`object` ([Details](responses-properties-tags.md))
+
+### tags Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+### tags Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### tags Examples
+
+```yaml
+analytics_story: credential_dumping
+
+```
+
+## version
+
+version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
+
+`version`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")
+
+### version Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### version Examples
+
+```yaml
+1
+
+```
+
+## is_note_required
+
+Global assignment for notes being required for tasks, can be individually set in the task
+
+`is_note_required`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `boolean`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-is_note_required.md "#/properties/is_note_required#/properties/is_note_required")
+
+### is_note_required Type
+
+`boolean`
+
+### is_note_required Examples
+
+```yaml
+true
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+false
+
+```
+
+## references
+
+A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation)
+
+`references`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](responses-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references")
+
+### references Type
+
+`string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](responses-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md))
+
+### references Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+[]
+```
+
+### references Examples
+
+```yaml
+- Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Alarm Triage Overview pages 146-148
+- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.spec.json b/docs/spec/responses.spec.json
deleted file mode 100644
index f14d63f109..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/responses.spec.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$id": "http://example.com/example.json",
-  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema",
-  "additionalProperties": true,
-  "default": {},
-  "description": "schema for response",
-  "properties": {
-    "author": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/author",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Author of the response",
-      "examples": [
-        "Rico Valdez, Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "date": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/date",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...",
-      "examples": [
-        "2019-12-06"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "description": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/description",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Description of response",
-      "examples": [
-        "Response example."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "id": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/id",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "UUID as unique identifier",
-      "examples": [
-        "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "name": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/name",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Name of response",
-      "examples": [
-        "Response Example"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "response_tasks": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/response_tasks",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "Response tasks divided into phases",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "another_phase": [
-            {
-              "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b",
-              "name": "Another investigation"
-            }
-          ],
-          "identification": [
-            {
-              "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892",
-              "name": "Investigate Indicator of Compromise Hash"
-            },
-            {
-              "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0",
-              "name": "Investigate Domains"
-            }
-          ]
-        }
-      ],
-      "minItems": 1,
-      "type": "array"
-    },
-    "tags": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/tags",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
-        }
-      ],
-      "minItems": 1,
-      "type": "object",
-      "uniqueItems": true
-    },
-    "version": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/version",
-      "default": 0,
-      "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...",
-      "examples": [
-        1
-      ],
-      "type": "integer"
-    }
-  },
-  "required": [
-    "name",
-    "id",
-    "version",
-    "date",
-    "description",
-    "author",
-    "response_tasks",
-    "tags"
-  ],
-  "title": "Response Schema",
-  "type": "object"
-}
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.spec.md b/docs/spec/responses.spec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 55779a8dfa..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/responses.spec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,270 +0,0 @@
-
-# Response Schema Schema
-
-```
-http://example.com/example.json
-```
-
-schema for response
-
-| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In |
-|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
-| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted |  |
-
-# Response Schema Properties
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by |
-|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------|
-| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) |
-| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) |
-| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) |
-| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) |
-| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Response Schema (this schema) |
-| [response_tasks](#response_tasks) | `array` | **Required**  | No | `{}` | Response Schema (this schema) |
-| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required**  | No | `{}` | Response Schema (this schema) |
-| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required**  | No | `0` | Response Schema (this schema) |
-| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties |
-
-## author
-
-Author of the response
-
-`author`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### author Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### author Example
-
-```json
-"Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk"
-```
-
-
-## date
-
-version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
-
-`date`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### date Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### date Example
-
-```json
-"2019-12-06"
-```
-
-
-## description
-
-Description of response
-
-`description`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### description Example
-
-```json
-"Response example."
-```
-
-
-## id
-
-UUID as unique identifier
-
-`id`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### id Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### id Example
-
-```json
-"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-```
-
-
-## name
-
-Name of response
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### name Example
-
-```json
-"Response Example"
-```
-
-
-## response_tasks
-
-Response tasks divided into phases
-
-`response_tasks`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `array`
-* at least `1` items in the array
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### response_tasks Type
-
-
-Array type: `array`
-
-
-
-
-### response_tasks Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "another_phase": [
-    {
-      "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b",
-      "name": "Another investigation"
-    }
-  ],
-  "identification": [
-    {
-      "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892",
-      "name": "Investigate Indicator of Compromise Hash"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0",
-      "name": "Investigate Domains"
-    }
-  ]
-}
-```
-
-
-## tags
-
-An array of key value pairs for tagging
-
-`tags`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### tags Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required |
-|----------|------|----------|
-
-
-
-
-### tags Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
-}
-```
-
-
-## version
-
-version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
-
-`version`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `integer`
-* default: `0`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### version Type
-
-
-`integer`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### version Example
-
-```json
-1
-```
-
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c1576f1e4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+http://example.com/example.json#/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses_phase.spec.json*](../../out/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task-default.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ede2dfaf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses_phase.spec.json*](../../out/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..780e4b3d5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase-properties-response_task.md
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Untitled array in Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task
+```
+
+Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed. These will used to referenced known response_task parameters. Order is as positioned and with unique name.
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses_phase.spec.json*](../../out/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## response_task Type
+
+`array`
+
+## response_task Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+## response_task Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+## response_task Examples
+
+```yaml
+id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b
+name: Prepare for Incident Handling
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892
+name: Preventing Incidents
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0
+name: Practice
+
+```
+
+# response_task Properties
+
+| Property              | Type | Required | Nullable    | Defined by |
+| :-------------------- | :--- | :------- | :---------- | :--------- |
+| Additional Properties | Any  | Optional | can be null |            |
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7d666beef8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+# Response Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+http://example.com/example.json
+```
+
+schema for phase
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                                              |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [responses_phase.spec.json](../../out/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Response Schema Type
+
+`object` ([Response Schema](responses_phase.md))
+
+## Response Schema Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+# Response Schema Properties
+
+| Property                        | Type      | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                            |
+| :------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [author](#author)               | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")                      |
+| [date](#date)                   | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")                            |
+| [description](#description)     | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")       |
+| [id](#id)                       | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")                                  |
+| [name](#name)                   | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")                            |
+| [response_task](#response_task) | `array`   | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-response_task.md "#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task") |
+| [tags](#tags)                   | `object`  | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")                            |
+| [version](#version)             | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")                   |
+| [sla](#sla)                     | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla")                               |
+| [sla_type](#sla_type)           | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type")                |
+| [references](#references)       | `array`   | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references")          |
+| Additional Properties           | Any       | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                       |
+
+## author
+
+Author of the phase
+
+`author`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")
+
+### author Type
+
+`string`
+
+### author Examples
+
+```yaml
+Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk
+
+```
+
+## date
+
+date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
+
+`date`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")
+
+### date Type
+
+`string`
+
+### date Examples
+
+```yaml
+'2019-12-06'
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+Description of phase
+
+`description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+Response phase descripion.
+
+```
+
+## id
+
+UUID as unique identifier
+
+`id`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")
+
+### id Type
+
+`string`
+
+### id Examples
+
+```yaml
+fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+Name of phase
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string`
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+Preparation
+
+```
+
+## response_task
+
+Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed. These will used to referenced known response_task parameters. Order is as positioned and with unique name.
+
+`response_task`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `array`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-response_task.md "#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task")
+
+### response_task Type
+
+`array`
+
+### response_task Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+### response_task Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### response_task Examples
+
+```yaml
+id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b
+name: Prepare for Incident Handling
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892
+name: Preventing Incidents
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0
+name: Practice
+
+```
+
+## tags
+
+An array of key value pairs for tagging
+
+`tags`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](responses_phase-properties-tags.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")
+
+### tags Type
+
+`object` ([Details](responses_phase-properties-tags.md))
+
+### tags Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed.
+
+### tags Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### tags Examples
+
+```yaml
+analytics_story: credential_dumping
+
+```
+
+## version
+
+version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
+
+`version`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")
+
+### version Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### version Examples
+
+```yaml
+1
+
+```
+
+## sla
+
+Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase
+
+`sla`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla")
+
+### sla Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### sla Examples
+
+```yaml
+5
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+30
+
+```
+
+## sla_type
+
+Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc)
+
+`sla_type`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type")
+
+### sla_type Type
+
+`string`
+
+### sla_type Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+"minutes"
+```
+
+### sla_type Examples
+
+```yaml
+minutes
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+hours
+
+```
+
+```yaml
+days
+
+```
+
+## references
+
+A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation)
+
+`references`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string[]` ([3.1 Preparation](responses_phase-properties-references-31-preparation.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references")
+
+### references Type
+
+`string[]` ([3.1 Preparation](responses_phase-properties-references-31-preparation.md))
+
+### references Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+[]
+```
+
+### references Examples
+
+```yaml
+https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/stories-default.md b/docs/spec/stories-default.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9abc854a40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/stories-default.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Untitled undefined type in Analytics Story Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+http://example.com/example.json#/default
+```
+
+
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [stories.spec.json*](../../out/stories.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## default Type
+
+unknown
diff --git a/docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md b/docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cc4532dd7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/stories-properties-narrative.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Untitled string in Analytics Story Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+#/properties/narrative#/properties/narrative
+```
+
+narrative of the analytics story
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable            | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                               |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :---------------------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | Unknown identifiability | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [stories.spec.json*](../../out/stories.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## narrative Type
+
+`string`
+
+## narrative Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted, is a
+  common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text,
+  an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on
+  their own systems.
+
+```
diff --git a/docs/spec/stories.md b/docs/spec/stories.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e0a452500f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/spec/stories.md
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+# Analytics Story Schema Schema
+
+```txt
+http://example.com/example.json
+```
+
+schema analytics story
+
+| Abstract            | Extensible | Status         | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In                                                              |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Can be instantiated | No         | Unknown status | No           | Forbidden         | Allowed               | none                | [stories.spec.json](../../out/stories.spec.json "open original schema") |
+
+## Analytics Story Schema Type
+
+`object` ([Analytics Story Schema](stories.md))
+
+## Analytics Story Schema Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+# Analytics Story Schema Properties
+
+| Property                    | Type      | Required | Nullable       | Defined by                                                                                                     |
+| :-------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [author](#author)           | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")                |
+| [date](#date)               | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")                      |
+| [description](#description) | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") |
+| [id](#id)                   | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")                            |
+| [name](#name)               | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")                      |
+| [narrative](#narrative)     | `string`  | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-narrative.md "#/properties/narrative#/properties/narrative")       |
+| [search](#search)           | `string`  | Optional | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search")                |
+| [tags](#tags)               | `object`  | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")                      |
+| [version](#version)         | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")             |
+| Additional Properties       | Any       | Optional | can be null    |                                                                                                                |
+
+## author
+
+Author of the analytics story
+
+`author`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author")
+
+### author Type
+
+`string`
+
+### author Examples
+
+```yaml
+Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk
+
+```
+
+## date
+
+date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
+
+`date`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date")
+
+### date Type
+
+`string`
+
+### date Examples
+
+```yaml
+'2019-12-06'
+
+```
+
+## description
+
+description of the analytics story
+
+`description`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description")
+
+### description Type
+
+`string`
+
+### description Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique where
+  attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords.
+
+```
+
+## id
+
+UUID as unique identifier
+
+`id`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id")
+
+### id Type
+
+`string`
+
+### id Examples
+
+```yaml
+fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
+
+```
+
+## name
+
+Name of the Analytics Story
+
+`name`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name")
+
+### name Type
+
+`string`
+
+### name Examples
+
+```yaml
+Credential Dumping
+
+```
+
+## narrative
+
+narrative of the analytics story
+
+`narrative`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-narrative.md "#/properties/narrative#/properties/narrative")
+
+### narrative Type
+
+`string`
+
+### narrative Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted, is a
+  common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text,
+  an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on
+  their own systems.
+
+```
+
+## search
+
+An additional Splunk search, which uses the result of the detections
+
+`search`
+
+*   is optional
+
+*   Type: `string`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search")
+
+### search Type
+
+`string`
+
+### search Examples
+
+```yaml
+>-
+  index=asx mitre_id=t1003 | stats values(source) as detections values(process)
+  as processes values(user) as users values(_time) as time count by dest
+
+```
+
+## tags
+
+An explanation about the purpose of this instance.
+
+`tags`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `object` ([Details](stories-properties-tags.md))
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags")
+
+### tags Type
+
+`object` ([Details](stories-properties-tags.md))
+
+### tags Constraints
+
+**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1`
+
+### tags Default Value
+
+The default value is:
+
+```json
+{}
+```
+
+### tags Examples
+
+```yaml
+analytics_story: credential_dumping
+
+```
+
+## version
+
+version of analytics story, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
+
+`version`
+
+*   is required
+
+*   Type: `integer`
+
+*   cannot be null
+
+*   defined in: [Analytics Story Schema](stories-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version")
+
+### version Type
+
+`integer`
+
+### version Examples
+
+```yaml
+1
+
+```
+
+## Additional Properties
+
+Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema
diff --git a/docs/spec/stories.spec.json b/docs/spec/stories.spec.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 3eda58b394..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/stories.spec.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$id": "http://example.com/example.json",
-  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema",
-  "additionalProperties": true,
-  "default": {},
-  "description": "schema analytics story",
-  "properties": {
-    "author": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/author",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Author of the analytics story",
-      "examples": [
-        "Rico Valdez, Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "date": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/date",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd",
-      "examples": [
-        "2019-12-06"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "description": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/description",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "description of the analytics story",
-      "examples": [
-        "Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique where attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "id": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/id",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "UUID as unique identifier",
-      "examples": [
-        "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "name": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/name",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "Name of the Analytics Story",
-      "examples": [
-        "Credential Dumping"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "narrative": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/narrative",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "narrative of the analytics story",
-      "examples": [
-        "gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted, is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems."
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "search": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/search",
-      "default": "",
-      "description": "An additional Splunk search, which uses the result of the detections",
-      "examples": [
-        "index=asx mitre_id=t1003 | stats values(source) as detections values(process) as processes values(user) as users values(_time) as time count by dest"
-      ],
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "tags": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/tags",
-      "additionalProperties": true,
-      "default": {},
-      "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.",
-      "examples": [
-        {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
-        }
-      ],
-      "minItems": 1,
-      "type": "object"
-    },
-    "version": {
-      "$id": "#/properties/version",
-      "default": 0,
-      "description": "version of analytics story, e.g. 1 or 2 ...",
-      "examples": [
-        1
-      ],
-      "type": "integer"
-    }
-  },
-  "required": [
-    "name",
-    "id",
-    "version",
-    "date",
-    "description",
-    "narrative",
-    "author",
-    "tags"
-  ],
-  "title": "Analytics Story Schema",
-  "type": "object"
-}
diff --git a/docs/spec/stories.spec.md b/docs/spec/stories.spec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 722c1ac936..0000000000
--- a/docs/spec/stories.spec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
-
-# Analytics Story Schema Schema
-
-```
-http://example.com/example.json
-```
-
-schema analytics story
-
-| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Defined In |
-|----------|------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
-| Can be instantiated | No | Experimental | No | Forbidden | Permitted |  |
-
-# Analytics Story Schema Properties
-
-| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Default | Defined by |
-|----------|------|----------|----------|---------|------------|
-| [author](#author) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| [date](#date) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| [description](#description) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| [id](#id) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| [name](#name) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| [narrative](#narrative) | `string` | **Required**  | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| [search](#search) | `string` | Optional  | No | `""` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| [tags](#tags) | `object` | **Required**  | No | `{}` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| [version](#version) | `integer` | **Required**  | No | `0` | Analytics Story Schema (this schema) |
-| `*` | any | Additional | Yes | this schema *allows* additional properties |
-
-## author
-
-Author of the analytics story
-
-`author`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### author Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### author Example
-
-```json
-"Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk"
-```
-
-
-## date
-
-date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd
-
-`date`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### date Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### date Example
-
-```json
-"2019-12-06"
-```
-
-
-## description
-
-description of the analytics story
-
-`description`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### description Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### description Example
-
-```json
-"Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique where attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords."
-```
-
-
-## id
-
-UUID as unique identifier
-
-`id`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### id Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### id Example
-
-```json
-"fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717"
-```
-
-
-## name
-
-Name of the Analytics Story
-
-`name`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### name Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### name Example
-
-```json
-"Credential Dumping"
-```
-
-
-## narrative
-
-narrative of the analytics story
-
-`narrative`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### narrative Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### narrative Example
-
-```json
-"gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted, is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems."
-```
-
-
-## search
-
-An additional Splunk search, which uses the result of the detections
-
-`search`
-
-* is optional
-* type: `string`
-* default: `""`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### search Type
-
-
-`string`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### search Example
-
-```json
-"index=asx mitre_id=t1003 | stats values(source) as detections values(process) as processes values(user) as users values(_time) as time count by dest"
-```
-
-
-## tags
-
-An explanation about the purpose of this instance.
-
-`tags`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `object`
-* default: `{}`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### tags Type
-
-
-`object` with following properties:
-
-
-| Property | Type | Required |
-|----------|------|----------|
-
-
-
-
-### tags Example
-
-```json
-{
-  "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
-}
-```
-
-
-## version
-
-version of analytics story, e.g. 1 or 2 ...
-
-`version`
-
-* is **required**
-* type: `integer`
-* default: `0`
-* defined in this schema
-
-### version Type
-
-
-`integer`
-
-
-
-
-
-
-### version Example
-
-```json
-1
-```
-
diff --git a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json
index cc57305c5c..6cc1ccbc3f 100644
--- a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json
+++ b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
       "default": "",
       "description": "Author of the phase",
       "examples": [
-        "Rico Valdez, Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk"
+        "Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk"
       ],
       "type": "string"
     },
@@ -57,18 +57,16 @@
       "description": "Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed. These will used to referenced known response_task parameters. Order is as positioned and with unique name.",
       "examples": [
         {
-            {
-              "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b",
-              "name": "Prepare for Incident Handling"
-            },
-            {
-              "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892",
-              "name": "Preventing Incidents"
-            },
-            {
-              "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0",
-              "name": "Practice"
-            }
+          "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b",
+          "name": "Prepare for Incident Handling"
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892",
+          "name": "Preventing Incidents"
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0",
+          "name": "Practice"
         }
       ],
       "minItems": 1,
@@ -97,7 +95,7 @@
       ],
       "type": "integer"
     },
-    "sla":{
+    "sla": {
       "$id": "#/properties/sla",
       "default": null,
       "description": "Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase",
@@ -107,7 +105,7 @@
       ],
       "type": "integer"
     },
-    "sla_type":{
+    "sla_type": {
       "$id": "#/properties/sla_type",
       "default": "minutes",
       "description": "Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc)",
@@ -124,9 +122,7 @@
       "default": [],
       "description": "A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation)",
       "examples": [
-        [
-          "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf"
-        ]
+        "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf"
       ],
       "items": {
         "$id": "#/properties/references/items",
@@ -139,7 +135,7 @@
         "type": "string"
       },
       "type": "array"
-    },
+    }
   },
   "required": [
     "name",
@@ -149,7 +145,7 @@
     "description",
     "author",
     "response_task",
-    "tags",
+    "tags"
   ],
   "title": "Response Schema",
   "type": "object"

From 782f762059914655386b1af14a93e91d0c8fa28b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:23:32 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 055/132] fixed up generate to use type batch

---
 bin/generate.py | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py
index 3027958dfd..f7df009658 100644
--- a/bin/generate.py
+++ b/bin/generate.py
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ def generate_workbench_panels(response_tasks, stories, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PAT
                 j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH),
                                      trim_blocks=True)
                 template = j2_env.get_template('panel.j2')
-                file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml 
+                file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml
                 output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, file_path)
                 response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace(">","&gt;")
                 response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace("<","&lt;")
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ def main(args):
     detections = sorted(detections, key=lambda d: d['name'])
 
     # only use ESCU detections to the configurations
-    detections = [object for object in detections if object["type"].lower() == "escu"]
+    detections = [object for object in detections if object["type"].lower() == "batch"]
 
     response_tasks = sorted(response_tasks, key=lambda i: i['name'])
     baselines = sorted(baselines, key=lambda b: b['name'])

From 8b5aef2b1b0784ca6cf6e926652575d42344d297 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:58:48 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 056/132] fixing templates to use the ESCU name prefix

---
 bin/generate.py                       | 12 ++++++++----
 bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 |  6 +++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py
index f7df009658..18bedf8937 100644
--- a/bin/generate.py
+++ b/bin/generate.py
@@ -431,7 +431,8 @@ def map_detection_to_stories(detections):
         if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']:
             for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']:
                 if 'type' in detection.keys():
-                    rule_name = str(detection['type'] + ' - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule')
+                    if detection['type'] == 'batch':
+                        rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule')
                 else:
                     rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule')
                 if not (story in sto_det):
@@ -448,7 +449,8 @@ def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks):
             if 'analytics_story' in response_task['tags']:
                 for story in response_task['tags']['analytics_story']:
                     if 'type' in response_task.keys():
-                        task_name = str(response_task['type'] + ' - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task' )
+                        if response_task['type'] == 'batch':
+                            task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task')
                     else:
                         task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task')
                     if not (story in sto_res):
@@ -465,7 +467,8 @@ def map_baselines_to_stories(baselines):
             if 'analytics_story' in baseline['tags']:
                 for story in baseline['tags']['analytics_story']:
                     if 'type' in baseline.keys():
-                        baseline_name = str(baseline['type'] + ' - ' + baseline['name'])
+                        if baseline['type'] == 'batch':
+                            baseline_name = str('ESCU - ' + baseline['name'])
                     else:
                         baseline_name = str('ESCU - ' + baseline['name'])
                     if not (story in sto_bas):
@@ -499,7 +502,8 @@ def prepare_stories(stories, detections):
         if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']:
             for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']:
                 if 'type' in detection.keys():
-                    rule_name = str(detection['type'] + ' - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule')
+                    if detection['type'] == 'batch':
+                        rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule')
                 else:
                     rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule')
 
diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2
index 39c670f201..2000e97f78 100644
--- a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2
+++ b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 ### ESCU DETECTIONS ###
 
 {% for detection in detections %}
-[{{ detection.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ detection.name }} - Rule]
+[ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = {{ detection.description }}
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None
 action.escu.creation_date = {{ detection.date }}
 action.escu.modification_date = {{ detection.date }}
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = {{ detection.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ detection.name }} - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 {% if detection.product is defined %}
 action.escu.product = {{ detection.product | tojson }}
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ cron_schedule = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.cron_schedule }}
 dispatch.earliest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.earliest_time }}
 dispatch.latest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.latest_time }}
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = {{ detection.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ detection.name }} - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {{ detection.savedsearch_annotations | tojson }}
 {% if detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window is defined %}
 schedule_window = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window }}

From 63ec24ad568d7e411ff044bc419d62d5bb2e4e08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales <icorrales@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:01:30 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 057/132] Improved regex to handle paths

- changed regex for paths
- updated unit test & data
---
 detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 2 +-
 tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index 0bc478eb95..968255de4f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
        dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
        process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
        cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line, /\w:\\[^\s]+/, "PATH"),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"),
        cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N")
 | where process_name="cmd.exe" AND
         match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
index 4df1563bb6..08b4193fe6 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: First time seen command line argument - SSA Unit Test
 tests:
   - name: First time seen command line argument
     file: endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
-    pass_condition: '@count_eq(3)'
+    pass_condition: '@count_eq(4)'
     description: Test detection of first time seen command
     attack_data:
       - file_name: first_time_seen_commandline.json

From dcee4c561586699f29d7fa2924fbcb0b13b82d36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales <icorrales@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 16:07:04 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 058/132] handling GUIDS

---
 detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index 968255de4f..d4aaef6f34 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
        dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
        process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"),
+       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
+       cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, "GUID"),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"),
        cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N")
 | where process_name="cmd.exe" AND
         match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true

From 61615abcc6743c525628e09668ad3dcf1d7e7c70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales <icorrales@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:50:38 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 059/132] regex to handle path corner case

---
 detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 1 +
 tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index d4aaef6f34..494fbd7335 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
        cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
        cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line),
        cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, "GUID"),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\s)+\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"),
        cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"),
        cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N")
 | where process_name="cmd.exe" AND
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
index 08b4193fe6..32a98b2508 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: First time seen command line argument - SSA Unit Test
 tests:
   - name: First time seen command line argument
     file: endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
-    pass_condition: '@count_eq(4)'
+    pass_condition: '@count_eq(5)'
     description: Test detection of first time seen command
     attack_data:
       - file_name: first_time_seen_commandline.json

From 497714f09bfc47db1452b71b82a416d6fee76d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales <icorrales@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 22:13:05 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 060/132] added more test corner cases

---
 tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
index 32a98b2508..4ff36e792f 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: First time seen command line argument - SSA Unit Test
 tests:
   - name: First time seen command line argument
     file: endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
-    pass_condition: '@count_eq(5)'
+    pass_condition: '@count_eq(6)'
     description: Test detection of first time seen command
     attack_data:
       - file_name: first_time_seen_commandline.json

From 5ae82a2490f5a579f1c49037d7bae5d1b75c9942 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales <icorrales@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 22:15:43 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 061/132] added comments to regexes

---
 detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index 494fbd7335..a29d5cb874 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
        cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
        cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line),
        cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, "GUID"),
-       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\s)+\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"),
-       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\s)+\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), /* replaces " \\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), /* replaces "C:\\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */
        cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N")
 | where process_name="cmd.exe" AND
         match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true

From 9712b4b0d07630edb5a69fee8c375dd958d52ae3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 14:03:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 062/132] Bump azure-mgmt-compute from 18.1.0 to 18.2.0

Bumps [azure-mgmt-compute](https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-python) from 18.1.0 to 18.2.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-python/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-python/compare/azure-mgmt-compute_18.1.0...azure-mgmt-compute_18.2.0)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
---
 automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
index 0ee3ae800f..44e893c2c0 100644
--- a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
+++ b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ attrs==20.3.0
 azure-common==1.1.26
 azure-core==1.10.0
 azure-identity==1.5.0
-azure-mgmt-compute==18.1.0
+azure-mgmt-compute==18.2.0
 azure-mgmt-core==1.2.2
 azure-mgmt-network==17.1.0
 azure-mgmt-resource==15.0.0

From 7f8652b85bae96ae611b03cb713d1eaafff26e0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P4T12ICK <pbareib@splunk.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 15:44:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 063/132] bug fix

---
 detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml | 2 +-
 macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml              | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
index d42c148b37..f14f09f3de 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 |
     rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" |
     where state="running" |
     lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen |
-    where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_window`") |
+    where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) |
     table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`'
 known_false_positives: A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify
   that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.
diff --git a/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml b/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml
index a2f195faec..7306ffe3a3 100644
--- a/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml
+++ b/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 description: Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services
 definition: '"-70m@m"'
-name: previously_seen_windows_service_window
+name: previously_seen_windows_services_window

From 623c8fee33cf352f318e7a06b7dc7e4b355feea6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P4T12ICK <pbareib@splunk.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 17:03:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 064/132] moved to experimental

---
 ...first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml |  0
 ..._time_seen_running_windows_service.test.yml | 18 ------------------
 2 files changed, 18 deletions(-)
 rename detections/{ => experimental}/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml (100%)
 delete mode 100644 tests/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
similarity index 100%
rename from detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
rename to detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.test.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3aaa4683f0..0000000000
--- a/tests/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.test.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service Unit Test
-tests:
-- name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service
-  file: endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
-  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
-  latest_time: 'now'
-  baselines:
-  - name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
-    file: baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
-    pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-    earliest_time: '-24h'
-    latest_time: '-70m@m'
-  attack_data:
-  - file_name: windows-system.log
-    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/first_time_windows_service/windows-system.log
-    source: WinEventLog:System
-    sourcetype: WinEventLog

From d138f4ea8c879c2cfa7b341a57b3a87d4e330191 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 09:58:51 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 065/132] procdump rename

renamed procdump query using sysmon
---
 .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml      |  2 +-
 .../dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml        | 45 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.test.yml   | 12 +++++
 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
index f0693948f9..cbb385c1ca 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: 'Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks fo
   Modify the query as needed.\
 
   During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a
-  Sysinternals utility has been ran, there will always be a -accepteula on the command
+  Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command
   line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d80dce4745
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+name: Dump LSASS via procdump Rename 
+id: 21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-01'
+description: 'Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process.
+  This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump
+  file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. 
+  Modify the query as needed.\
+
+  During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a
+  Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command
+  line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump  process_name!=procdump*.exe  EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* 
+  | rename Computer as dest 
+  |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`'
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Credential Dumping
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd04f46735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Dump lsass via procdump rename Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Dump lsass via procdump rename
+  file: endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From be729ae9bbeed144800ded31461ed161511a35d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-43-9>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 17:29:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 066/132] Added detection testing service results inDump lsass
 via procdump rename

---
 .../dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml        | 25 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
index d80dce4745..c42b56ca30 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
-name: Dump LSASS via procdump Rename 
+name: Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
 id: 21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-01'
 description: 'Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process.
-  This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump
-  file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. 
-  Modify the query as needed.\
+  This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and
+  -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and
+  should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\
 
   During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a
-  Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command
-  line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.'
+  Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on
+  the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection)
+  into lsass.exe.'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
@@ -19,12 +20,11 @@ references:
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump  process_name!=procdump*.exe  EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* 
-  | rename Computer as dest 
-  |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
-  | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`'
+search: '`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump  process_name!=procdump*.exe  EventID=1
+  (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as
+  dest |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name,
+  process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`'
 known_false_positives: None identified.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -43,3 +43,4 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From dd6286bd0458645d67ab34c32cf8d83c4e2d5756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 14:57:59 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 067/132] Creation of lsass dump with taskmgr

---
 .../creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml   | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...eation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml | 12 ++++++
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c149a63748
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+name: Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr
+id: b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd
+version: 1
+date: '2020-02-03'
+description: Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a prcoess dump of lsass.exe.
+  Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. 
+  The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. 
+how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which
+  includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. 
+  This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`.
+  We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
+  (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
+  with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
+  macro designed to filter out known false positives.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename
+  | rename Computer as dest 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes,
+  but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Credential Dumping
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 6
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Windows
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f01f2a6d7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Creation of lsass dump with taskmgr Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Creation of lsass dump with taskmgr
+  file: endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog

From df2cd4195951a8d1765c45a16d59c6e77ddc8f66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 14:10:14 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 068/132] remove security hub  for user test file since there
 is not data yet

---
 ...pike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml | 12 ------------
 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml

diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index dd0c2d1241..0000000000
--- a/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.test.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User Unit Test
-tests:
-- name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User
-  file: cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
-  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
-  latest_time: 'now'
-  attack_data:
-  - file_name: security_hub_ec2_spike.json
-    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json
-    sourcetype: aws:securityhub:finding
-    source: aws_securityhub_finding

From 1890a844063ace9799b20e9dece7da3b0905629b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-217-20>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 22:20:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 069/132] Added detection testing service results inCreation of
 lsass dump with taskmgr

---
 .../creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml   | 30 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
index c149a63748..76f78da476 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
@@ -2,26 +2,25 @@ name: Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr
 id: b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd
 version: 1
 date: '2020-02-03'
-description: Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a prcoess dump of lsass.exe.
-  Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. 
-  The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. 
+description: Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating
+  a prcoess dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification
+  will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp,
+  cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass
+  (2).dmp.
 how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which
-  includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. 
-  This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`.
-  We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
-  (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
-  with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
-  macro designed to filter out known false positives.
+  includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an
+  input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific
+  configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace
+  the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search
+  also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
 type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename
-  | rename Computer as dest 
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
-  | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`'
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp |
+  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category,
+  process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`'
 known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes,
   but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
 tags:
@@ -40,3 +39,4 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From fc8ee105c4a83219dcbbbadaf8feb17adbaed6d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 15:37:08 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 070/132] Update creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml

---
 detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
index 76f78da476..c8a7c97941 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, w
   also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
 type: ESCU
 references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp |

From e14fade976ceb25b0bfb35c1499b0e2c2dd02dce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 21:42:46 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 071/132] adding product tag to all detections

---
 ...itten_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml |  30 +-
 ...h_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml |  28 +-
 .../okta_account_lockout_events.yml           |  26 +-
 .../application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml  |  27 +-
 .../okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml |  30 +-
 ...servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml |  28 +-
 ...ormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml |  64 +-
 ...normally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml |  65 +-
 ...mber_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml |  33 +-
 ...mber_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml |  33 +-
 ...ctivity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml |  42 +-
 ...g_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml |  10 +-
 ...with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml |  10 +-
 ...ntrol_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml |  42 +-
 ...ws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml |  40 +-
 ...alls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml |  39 +-
 ...ance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml |  33 +-
 ...ce_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml |  35 +-
 ...e_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml |  33 +-
 ...d_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml |  33 +-
 ...e_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml |  37 +-
 ...ovisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml |  59 +-
 ...sioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml |  59 +-
 ...ning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml |  57 +-
 ...isioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml |  59 +-
 .../detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml  |  46 +-
 ...ws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml |  48 +-
 ...console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml |  48 +-
 ..._console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml |  48 +-
 ...etect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml |  78 +-
 .../detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml   |  49 +-
 .../cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml      |  40 +-
 ...etect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml |  40 +-
 .../cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml  |  35 +-
 ...s_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml |  47 +-
 ...blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml |  36 +-
 .../detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml    |  34 +-
 ..._spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml |  43 +-
 ...of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml |  37 +-
 .../new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml     |  20 +-
 .../cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml  |  10 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml         |  10 +-
 ...xcessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml |  10 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml    |  10 +-
 ...o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml |  32 +-
 .../o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml     |  32 +-
 .../o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml |  32 +-
 ...ly_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml |  37 +-
 ..._aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml |  39 +-
 ..._high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml |  33 +-
 ...ws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml |  33 +-
 ...ovisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml |  51 +-
 ...sioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml |  47 +-
 ...ning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml |  41 +-
 ...isioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml |  45 +-
 ...nts_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml |  28 +-
 ...ud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml |  40 +-
 ...ct_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml |  35 +-
 ...pi_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml |  38 +-
 ...to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml |  32 +-
 .../detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml   |  34 +-
 .../detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml   |  31 +-
 ...katz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml |  32 +-
 .../detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml  |  34 +-
 .../detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml     |  34 +-
 .../detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml      |  32 +-
 .../detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml  |  40 +-
 ...etect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml |  35 +-
 .../detect_usb_device_insertion.yml           |  24 +-
 ...eb_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml |  30 +-
 .../deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml   |  33 +-
 ...s_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml |  28 +-
 ...e_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml |  37 +-
 ...ce_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml |  34 +-
 ...nce_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml |  25 +-
 ...d_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml |  25 +-
 ...ce_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml |  29 +-
 ...n_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml |  26 +-
 ...d_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml |  18 +-
 .../first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml |  36 +-
 .../deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml |  26 +-
 .../deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml |  26 +-
 ...iple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml |  37 +-
 .../monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml           |  18 +-
 .../open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml           |  24 +-
 .../osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml     |  24 +-
 .../deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml |  41 +-
 .../prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml       |  22 +-
 ...de_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml |  26 +-
 .../remote_registry_key_modifications.yml     |  24 +-
 .../deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml |  28 +-
 ...led_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml |  29 +-
 ...lunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml |  24 +-
 ...uspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml |  30 +-
 .../deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml      |  34 +-
 ...us_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml |  26 +-
 .../uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml        |  26 +-
 .../unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml        |  31 +-
 .../unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml        |  18 +-
 .../windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml       |  58 +-
 .../windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml        |  44 +-
 .../windows_hosts_file_modification.yml       |  26 +-
 .../access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml |  36 +-
 ..._to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml |  38 +-
 ...ution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml |  42 +-
 .../attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml      |  36 +-
 ...dential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml |  44 +-
 .../bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml |  36 +-
 .../endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml      |  34 +-
 ...ate_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml |  36 +-
 ...or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml |  34 +-
 .../create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml       |  36 +-
 .../endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml      |  36 +-
 ...f_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml |  34 +-
 ...ping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml |  34 +-
 ...ial_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml       |  36 +-
 ...ivity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml |  34 +-
 ...omputer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml |  46 +-
 ...redential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml |  38 +-
 ...cessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml |  32 +-
 ...detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml |  32 +-
 .../detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml     |  51 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml  |  38 +-
 .../detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml      |  34 +-
 .../detect_new_local_admin_account.yml        |  46 +-
 ...nterception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml |  32 +-
 ...system_network_configuration_discovery.yml |  36 +-
 ...ohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml |  36 +-
 .../detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml    |  38 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml      |  42 +-
 .../detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml  |  34 +-
 ..._cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml |  32 +-
 .../disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml   |  34 +-
 ...ution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml |  32 +-
 .../endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml   |  30 +-
 .../first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml |  36 +-
 ..._files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml |  36 +-
 ...asting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml |  36 +-
 ...connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml |  36 +-
 ...s_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml |  34 +-
 ...hell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml |  38 +-
 ...ll_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml |  36 +-
 ...nitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml |  34 +-
 .../nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml         |  34 +-
 .../overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml    |  34 +-
 ...eating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml |  46 +-
 .../endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml    |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml    |  36 +-
 ...ulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml |  36 +-
 ...istry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml |  34 +-
 .../registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml    |  34 +-
 ...try_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml |  34 +-
 .../remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml  |  36 +-
 .../rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml         |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml     |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml       |  32 +-
 .../sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml  |  36 +-
 ...eduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml |  39 +-
 ...htasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml |  38 +-
 .../schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml    |  36 +-
 .../endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml     |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml  |  38 +-
 ...nstallation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml |  32 +-
 .../single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml     |  34 +-
 ...tolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  95 +-
 ...en_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 102 +--
 ...ntial_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml |  79 +-
 ...dential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml |  78 +-
 ...raction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml |  98 +-
 ...dential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml | 102 +--
 ...l_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml |  92 +-
 ...l_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml |  86 +-
 ...al_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml |  73 +-
 ...ial_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml |  74 +-
 ...credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml |  89 +-
 ...al_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml |  92 +-
 ...ntial_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml |  84 +-
 ...dential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml |  86 +-
 ...detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml |  67 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml   |  56 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml       |  56 +-
 .../ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml        |  95 +-
 ...s_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  87 +-
 ...count_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  69 +-
 ...enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml |  73 +-
 ...egal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  70 +-
 ...s_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml |  79 +-
 ...nd_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  82 +-
 ...nd_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  83 +-
 ...ivilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  73 +-
 ...d_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  84 +-
 ...rocess_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 102 +--
 ...en_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  77 +-
 ...a___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml | 107 +--
 ...are_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml | 192 ++--
 ..._opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 112 ++-
 ...roups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 132 ++-
 ...e_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  77 +-
 ...infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 108 ++-
 ...puters_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  88 +-
 ...and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  71 +-
 ...ystem_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 103 +--
 ...on_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  75 +-
 ...and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  87 +-
 ...n_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  89 +-
 ...ores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  87 +-
 ...efensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  73 +-
 ..._opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  75 +-
 ...service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  77 +-
 ...sses_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  76 +-
 ...ng_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml |  93 +-
 ...tting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml |  74 +-
 ...ng_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml |  73 +-
 ...em_process_running_unexpected_location.yml | 855 +++++-------------
 ...unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml | 177 ++--
 .../ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml     |  82 +-
 ...ous_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml |  34 +-
 ...ious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml      |  49 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml    |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml     |  34 +-
 .../suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml        |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml       |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml   |  38 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml    |  34 +-
 ...spicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml |  34 +-
 ...system_information_discovery_detection.yml |  22 +-
 ...rocesses_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml |  32 +-
 .../endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml  |  34 +-
 .../endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml  |  28 +-
 .../unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml    |  36 +-
 detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml  |  32 +-
 .../wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml         |  34 +-
 detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml    |  78 +-
 .../endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml    |  36 +-
 ...ndows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml |  36 +-
 ..._permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml |  36 +-
 .../detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml  |  22 +-
 .../detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml         |  81 +-
 .../email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml |  22 +-
 ...s_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml |  30 +-
 .../monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml         |  22 +-
 .../no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml    |  18 +-
 ...pectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml |  23 +-
 .../suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml        |  32 +-
 ...suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml |  26 +-
 .../application/suspicious_java_classes.yml   |  22 +-
 ..._eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml |  20 +-
 ...azon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml |  20 +-
 .../aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml      |  34 +-
 .../aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml     |  34 +-
 .../cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml        |  36 +-
 .../aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml      |  34 +-
 ...aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml |  34 +-
 ...counts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml |  35 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml    |  30 +-
 ...sk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml |  34 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml    |  31 +-
 ..._kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml |  23 +-
 .../gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml |  20 +-
 ...ct_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml |  29 +-
 ..._detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml |  31 +-
 ...tes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml |  30 +-
 ...netes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml |  30 +-
 ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml |  31 +-
 ...es_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml |  30 +-
 ...tive_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml |  31 +-
 ...e_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml |  25 +-
 ...s_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml |  30 +-
 ...tes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml |  30 +-
 ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml |  30 +-
 ..._azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml |  38 +-
 .../kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml |  30 +-
 .../kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml     |  32 +-
 ..._detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml |  33 +-
 ...ct_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml |  31 +-
 ...tes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml |  31 +-
 ...netes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml |  31 +-
 ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml |  33 +-
 ...es_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml |  32 +-
 .../child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml        |  30 +-
 .../detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml    |  38 +-
 ...t_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml |  44 +-
 ...aron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml |  38 +-
 .../detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml |  30 +-
 .../detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml   |  28 +-
 ...irst_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml |  61 +-
 .../macos___re_opened_applications.yml        |  34 +-
 .../processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml     |  28 +-
 ...mote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml |  26 +-
 .../endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml         |  26 +-
 ...urst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml |  50 +-
 .../wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml      |  28 +-
 .../wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml      |  32 +-
 .../network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml          |  59 +-
 .../network/dns_record_changed.yml            |  30 +-
 .../network/excessive_dns_failures.yml        |  30 +-
 ...e_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml |  30 +-
 .../large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml       |  32 +-
 .../prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml    |  28 +-
 .../network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml     |  26 +-
 ...ls_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml |  26 +-
 ..._scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml |  24 +-
 .../web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml  |  46 +-
 ...ious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml |  22 +-
 .../monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml   |  22 +-
 .../web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml      |  30 +-
 .../experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml   |  48 +-
 ...connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml |  38 +-
 ...ct_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml |  61 +-
 .../detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml    |  40 +-
 .../network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml   |  40 +-
 .../detect_port_security_violation.yml        |  70 +-
 .../network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml      |  58 +-
 .../detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml        |  48 +-
 ...ct_software_download_to_network_device.yml |  53 +-
 .../network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml      |  56 +-
 ...ect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml |  32 +-
 ...t_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml |  45 +-
 .../detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml    |  48 +-
 .../network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml     |  46 +-
 .../dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml      |  30 +-
 ...ry_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml |  32 +-
 .../remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml     |  30 +-
 .../remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml        |  34 +-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml      |  46 +-
 .../network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml      |  32 +-
 detections/network/tor_traffic.yml            |  26 +-
 .../unusually_long_content_type_length.yml    |  24 +-
 .../web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml    |  40 +-
 .../web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml |  30 +-
 ...aud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml |  22 +-
 337 files changed, 7991 insertions(+), 7271 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
index 72f7d62648..0be790e7c2 100644
--- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
+++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Email files written outside of the Outlook directory
-id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email
   files created outside the normal Outlook directory.
@@ -10,9 +8,12 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
   reads and writes.
-type: ESCU
+id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx
+known_false_positives: Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their
+  email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will
+  be detected by the search.
+name: Email files written outside of the Outlook directory
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
   where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path
@@ -20,17 +21,20 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_
   by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their
-  email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will
-  be detected by the search.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Collection and Staging
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1114.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1114.001
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
index 7e1aee1fb3..e4738abe18 100644
--- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,35 @@
-name: Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP
-id: 19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple
   users originating from the same ip address.
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-type: ESCU
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: 19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552
+known_false_positives: A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users
+  may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too
+  low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro XXXXXXXXXXXXX to raise
+  the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.
+name: Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP
 search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users
   values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state,
   city  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |  search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip_filter` '
-known_false_positives: A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users
-  may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too
-  low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro XXXXXXXXXXXXX to raise
-  the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.001
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
index fd98d502a5..6a4964aee7 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,30 @@
-name: Okta Account Lockout Events
-id: 62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: Detect Okta user lockout events
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-type: ESCU
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country
-  as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
-  as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` '
+id: 62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d
 known_false_positives: None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine
   if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized
   actor.
+name: Okta Account Lockout Events
+search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country
+  as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
+  as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.001
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
index c86ba9b53c..846376816a 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,30 @@
-name: Okta Failed SSO Attempts
-id: 371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: Detect failed Okta SSO events
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-type: ESCU
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats  min(_time)
-  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage,
-  src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` '
+id: 371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5
 known_false_positives: There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from
   accessing apps they should have access to.
+name: Okta Failed SSO Attempts
+search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats  min(_time)
+  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage,
+  src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.001
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
index fa99bb296a..566ec807cb 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
@@ -1,32 +1,36 @@
-name: Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities
-id: 7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search detects logins from the same user from different states in
   a 24 hour period.
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-type: ESCU
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null
-  | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city)
-  as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state)
-  as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1'
+id: 7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8
 known_false_positives: Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and
   loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should
   *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also
   relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also
   possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from
   a remote VPN endpoint.
+name: Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities
+search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null
+  | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city)
+  as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state)
+  as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.001
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
index 9c37ecd7fb..3551751ade 100644
--- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
+++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes
-id: ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-01'
 description: This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as
   web servers.
@@ -10,27 +8,33 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity
   Framework of Enterprise Security.
-type: ESCU
+id: ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9
+known_false_positives: Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers
+  during maintenance or other administrative tasks.
+name: Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category="web_server"
   AND (Processes.process="*whoami*" OR Processes.process="*ping*" OR Processes.process="*iptables*"
   OR Processes.process="*wget*" OR Processes.process="*service*" OR Processes.process="*curl*")
   by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers
-  during maintenance or other administrative tasks.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1082
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Web Server
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1082
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Web Server
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index 1f3fe92088..c98c1f17f3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -1,49 +1,51 @@
-name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
-id: ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-21'
-description: This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour
-  block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model
-  previously created and alerts on any outliers. 
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search
- `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where
-   All_Changes.action=deleted
-   AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance
-   by All_Changes.user _time span=1h
-   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
-   | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1)
-   | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1]
-   | where cardinality >=16
-   | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)" as isOutlier
-   | where isOutlier=1
-   | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0)
-   | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold
-   | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id
-   | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`'
+date: '2020-08-21'
+description: This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances
+  for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then
+  applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
+  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability
+  density function.
+id: ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf
 known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure
   are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
   out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
   human user.
+name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
+references: []
+search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success
+  AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval
+  DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1]
+  | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005
+  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval
+  expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) |
+  eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold |
+  table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold,
+  object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
+  asset_type: Cloud Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: Cloud
-  asset_type: Cloud Instance
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: Cloud
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index 5c2f23adaa..31e13050b0 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -1,51 +1,52 @@
-name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched
-id: f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65
-version: 2
-date: '2020-08-21'
-description: This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour
-  block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model
-  previously created and alerts on any outliers.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search
- `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where
-   (All_Changes.action=created)
-   AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance
-   by All_Changes.user _time span=1h
-   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
-   | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1)
-   | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1]
-   | where cardinality >=16
-   | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier
-   | where isOutlier=1
-   | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0)
-   | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold
-   | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id
-   | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`'
+date: '2020-08-21'
+description: This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances
+  for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then
+  applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
+  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability
+  density function.
+id: f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65
 known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
   are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
   out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
   human user.
+name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched
+references: []
+search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id
+  from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success
+  AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval
+  DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1]
+  | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005
+  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval
+  expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) |
+  eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table
+  _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold,
+  object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
+  asset_type: Cloud Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: Cloud
-  asset_type: Cloud Instance
-  risk_score: 40
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 40
+  security_domain: Cloud
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
index fb209ffccc..dcefe62507 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls
-id: 0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-07'
 description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your
   cloud infrastructure environment by a user.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
   run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to
   create the probability density function.
-type: ESCU
+id: 0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0
+known_false_positives: ''
+name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time
   span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time,
@@ -21,27 +20,31 @@ search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from
   -1), ":"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold
   = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls,
   expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`'
-known_false_positives: ''
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  risk_score: 25
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 25
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
index 95e5e21722..1a642c9b7e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls
-id: d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-07'
 description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your
   cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
   run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to
   create the probability density function model.
-type: ESCU
+id: d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af
+known_false_positives: ''
+name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as
   command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success
   by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval
@@ -22,27 +21,31 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command)
   > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls
   - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls,
   expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`'
-known_false_positives: ''
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 25
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 25
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
index 7efc31a0ca..9e5dd93b19 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-name: AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
-id: 21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-05-28'
 description: This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different
-  account is requested for the first time.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel.
+  account is requested for the first time.  This search is deprecated and have been
+  translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
   provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account
   Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic
@@ -11,9 +10,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age
   out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
   the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.
-type: ESCU
+id: 21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b
+known_false_positives: Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior.
+  It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before.
+  You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.
+name: AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user
   Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
@@ -24,27 +26,29 @@ search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=
   Cross Account Activity","Previously Seen") |  where status = "New Cross Account
   Activity" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior.
-  It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before.
-  You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - PR.AC
   - PR.DS
   - DE.AE
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 15
-  risk_object_type: user
-  risk_object: user
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 15
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
index 0d70d67878..ed01f5d9d5 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
@@ -26,11 +26,15 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ransomware Cloud
   asset_type: AWS Account
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1486
-  security_domain: threat
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1486
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
index 86d3a1d318..5445a5e027 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
@@ -21,11 +21,15 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ransomware Cloud
   asset_type: S3 Bucket
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1486
-  security_domain: threat
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1486
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
index 6a0f81f147..ac747d803b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
-name: AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-11'
 description: The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs
   were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-type: ESCU
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75
+known_false_positives: It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports
+  open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed
+  in production environment.
+name: AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry
   requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1
   | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry
@@ -20,26 +21,29 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetwor
   requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to
   requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports
-  open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed
-  in production environment.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1562.007
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 11
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.007
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: userName
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 40a9a9a53b..9ebcf4c74d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: AWS Network Access Control List Deleted
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms
   used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker
@@ -10,32 +8,38 @@ description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanism
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-type: ESCU
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network
+  ACL.
+name: AWS Network Access Control List Deleted
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false
   | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName
   userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network
-  ACL.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1562.007
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 11
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.007
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: userName
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
index baeec7bf0e..a402699cce 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles
-id: 2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-04'
 description: This search looks for new commands from each user role.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
@@ -11,9 +9,10 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window`
   macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
   the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`
-type: ESCU
+id: 2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f
+known_false_positives: .
+name: Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user,
   All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |
@@ -23,23 +22,27 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d
   OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),"-24h@h") | table firstTime, user,
   object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`'
-known_false_positives: .
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
-  nist:
-  - ID.AM
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078
-  product:
-  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 25
-  risk_object_type: user
-  risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  nist:
+  - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 25
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 629c0c6d36..b1d0159e39 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
-name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User
-id: 37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-21'
 description: This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have
   not created them before.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs
   Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create
   of baseline of previously seen users.
-type: ESCU
+id: 37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances
+  for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances
+  that this is the intended behavior.
+name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime,
   latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region |
@@ -19,25 +20,27 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs
   | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h")
   | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances
-  for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances
-  that this is the intended behavior.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
-  risk_score: 20
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
index a25498761a..a5cf68bfaa 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region
-id: fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-02'
 description: This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is
   created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file
@@ -12,9 +10,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for
   this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+id: fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance
+  in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
+name: Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
   as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region,
   All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions
@@ -23,27 +23,30 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(
   | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(),
   "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance
-  in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 12
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1535
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 12
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
-  risk_score: 20
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
index 46f32353e5..84face6d12 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image
-id: bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-12'
 description: This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously
   unseen image IDs.
@@ -11,9 +9,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional
   filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+id: bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4
+known_false_positives: After a new image is created, the first systems created with
+  that image will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the image being used was
+  created by a legitimate user.
+name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
   as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id,
   All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")`
@@ -22,23 +23,25 @@ search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime
   | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage)
   OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user,
   image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`'
-known_false_positives: After a new image is created, the first systems created with
-  that image will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the image being used was
-  created by a legitimate user.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
-  risk_score: 20
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 64bedd2548..fe71342506 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type
-id: c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-12'
 description: Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
@@ -10,9 +8,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also
   provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
+id: c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda
+known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using
+  a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that
+  they intended to create the system with the new instance type.
+name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
   as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type,
   All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")`
@@ -22,23 +23,25 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values
   | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(),
   "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using
-  a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that
-  they intended to create the system with the new instance type.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
-  risk_score: 20
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index c310f1290d..371d252ff3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User
-id: 7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-29'
 description: This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have
   not previously modified them.
@@ -8,9 +6,12 @@ how_to_implement: This search has a dependency on other searches to create and u
   a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously
   Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection
   to properly work.
-type: ESCU
+id: 7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances
+  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
+  modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
+name: Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime,
   latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command)
   as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2
@@ -20,25 +21,27 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs
   enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser)
   OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime user command
   object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances
-  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
-  modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.004
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.004
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index b255668a85..9b4d1687ec 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City
-id: e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-09'
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates
@@ -14,19 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
-  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
-  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
-  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) |
-  lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen,
-  enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 |
-  eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity
-  > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) |
-  table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
+id: e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -38,22 +24,39 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
+name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City
+references: []
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
+  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
+  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
+  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) |
+  lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen,
+  enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 |
+  eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity
+  > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) |
+  table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
-  nist:
-  - ID.AM
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078
-  product:
-  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: user
-  risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  nist:
+  - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index 37808e4598..6844f847ed 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country
-id: 94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-09'
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or
@@ -14,19 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
-  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
-  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
-  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country)
-  | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country
-  OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data |
-  where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry)
-  OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src,
-  Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
+id: 94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -38,22 +24,39 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
+name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country
+references: []
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
+  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
+  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
+  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country)
+  | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country
+  OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data |
+  where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry)
+  OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src,
+  Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
-  nist:
-  - ID.AM
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078
-  product:
-  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
-  risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  nist:
+  - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index 4f2875fc30..e3b3d077c4 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address
-id: f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-16'
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs
@@ -14,18 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id)
-  as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created)
-  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command
-  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
-  src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data
-  | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc)
-  OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`)
-  | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
+id: f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -37,22 +24,38 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
+name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address
+references: []
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id)
+  as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created)
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
+  src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data
+  | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc)
+  OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`)
+  | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
-  nist:
-  - ID.AM
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078
-  product:
-  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
-  risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  nist:
+  - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 55f8dca6b2..dc681ada6d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region
-id: 5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-16'
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates
@@ -14,19 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
-  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
-  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
-  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region)
-  | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT
-  firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where
-  enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion)
-  OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`)
-  | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
+id: 5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -38,22 +24,39 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
+name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region
+references: []
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
+  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
+  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
+  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region)
+  | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT
+  firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where
+  enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion)
+  OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`)
+  | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
-  nist:
-  - ID.AM
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078
-  product:
-  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
-  risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  nist:
+  - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
index 854bbf4d48..e487f1ed3a 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect AWS Console Login by New User
-id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-05-28'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
@@ -9,12 +7,16 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login eve
   the last hour
 how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
   5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen
-  IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update`
-  hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches)
-  to refresh the baselines.
-type: ESCU
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
+  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
+  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
+  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
+  searches) to refresh the baselines.
+id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+name: Detect AWS Console Login by New User
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
   | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime)
@@ -22,26 +24,28 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   "First Time Logging into AWS Console", "Previously Seen User") |where userStatus="First
   Time Logging into AWS Console" |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`'
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 30
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 30
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
index d00f89e65c..e5b7643f50 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
-id: 121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-07'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
@@ -9,12 +7,18 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login eve
   the last hour
 how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
   5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen
-  IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update`
-  hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches)
-  to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
+  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
+  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
+  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
+  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
+  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`
+  macro.
+id: 121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
   | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table
@@ -25,29 +29,31 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCity = "New City" AND
   userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user City  userStatus userCity  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`'
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1535
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
index a431b99676..ff4de79335 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
-id: 67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-07'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
@@ -9,14 +7,18 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login eve
   the last hour
 how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
   5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen
-  IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update`
-  hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches)
-  to refresh the baselines. You
-  can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
+  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
+  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
+  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
+  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
+  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
   | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table
@@ -27,29 +29,31 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCountry = "New Country"
   AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user Country  userStatus userCountry  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`'
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1535
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
index afde87e13f..f4bb82af75 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
-id: 9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-07'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
@@ -9,14 +7,18 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login eve
   the last hour
 how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
   5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen
-  IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update`
-  hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches)
-  to refresh the baselines. You
-  can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
+  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
+  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
+  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
+  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
+  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`
   macro.
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
   | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table
@@ -27,29 +29,31 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userRegion = "New
   Region" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user Region  userStatus userRegion  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`'
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1535
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
   product:
   - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index ab57ad4e4b..9aada4bca1 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -1,48 +1,56 @@
-name: Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP
-id: ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-10'
-description: This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously
-  unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket.
-how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs.  These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour.  It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *).  A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message`
-| multikv
-| rename sc_status_ as status
-| rename cs_object_ as bucket_name
-| rename c_ip_ as remote_ip
-| rename cs_uri_ as request_uri
-| rename cs_method_ as operation
-| search status="\"200\""
-| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri
-| table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri
-| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv
-| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri
-| outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv
-| eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),"-70m@m"), 1, 0)
-| where newIP=1
-| eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S")
-| eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S")
-| table  first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri
-| `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`'
-known_false_positives: GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it),
-  as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking
-  for a new IP within the past two hours.
+date: '2020-08-10'
+description: This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or
+  previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage
+  bucket.
+how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform,
+  setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and
+  logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).
+  In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable
+  storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs.  These
+  logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically
+  show up by 15 minutes past the hour.  It is recommended to configure any saved searches
+  or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes
+  past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *).  A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv)
+  stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine
+  any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.
+id: ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022
+known_false_positives: GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs
+  are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will
+  be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two
+  hours.
+name: Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP
+references: []
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename
+  cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri
+  | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status="\"200\"" | stats earliest(_time)
+  as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri
+  | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup
+  append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime)
+  as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri
+  | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime
+  >= relative_time(now(),"-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,"%m/%d/%y
+  %H:%M:%S") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | table  first_time
+  last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
+  asset_type: GCP Storage Bucket
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
+  - CIS 14
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1530
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
-  - CIS 14
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - PR.AC
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: GCP Storage Bucket
\ No newline at end of file
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
index 50987b2983..01816a5b41 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,44 @@
-name: Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets
-id: f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-05'
-description: This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket.
-how_to_implement: 'This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).'
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions
-| spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action
-| spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail
-| spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{}
-| spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp
-| spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName
-| spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role
-| spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member
-| search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD)
-| table  _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member
-| search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`'
+date: '2020-08-05'
+description: This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public
+  GCP Storage bucket.
+how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform,
+  setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and
+  logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).
+id: f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
 known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
   that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
   That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers"
   group.
+name: Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets
+references: []
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions
+  | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action
+  | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath
+  output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath
+  output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName
+  path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role
+  | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member
+  | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table  _time, bucketName, src, user,
+  location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
+  asset_type: GCP Storage Bucket
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1530
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - PR.AC
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: GCP Storage Bucket
\ No newline at end of file
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
index 660b47d619..f6282510e6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
-name: Detect New Open S3 buckets
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public
   S3 bucket.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk.
-type: ESCU
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
+  That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users"
+  group.
+name: Detect New Open S3 buckets
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw
   "(?<json_field>{.+})" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{}
   | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI
@@ -17,28 +19,30 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex
   max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission
   bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` '
-known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
-  that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
-  That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users"
-  group.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
+  asset_type: S3 Bucket
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1530
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - PR.AC
   - DE.CM
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: S3 Bucket
-  risk_score: 20
-  risk_object_type: system
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: src
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+  risk_object_type: system
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
index c9facc4ed6..786448cbc3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-name: Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI
-id: 39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public
   S3 bucket over the aws cli.
-type: ESCU
+id: 39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
+  That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users"
+  group.
+name: Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI
 references: []
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp
   IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write
   IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp
@@ -17,28 +19,30 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR r
   requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write
   requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` '
-known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
-  that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
-  That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users"
-  group.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
+  asset_type: S3 Bucket
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1530
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - PR.AC
   - DE.CM
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: S3 Bucket
-  risk_score: 20
-  risk_object_type: system
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: src
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
+  risk_object_type: system
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index 39ac7b5ee1..310f041a70 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect S3 access from a new IP
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-28'
 description: This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously
   unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.
@@ -9,9 +7,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket
   Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen
   remote IPs and bucket names.
-type: ESCU
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4
+known_false_positives: S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make
+  a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking
+  for a new IP within the past hour
+name: Detect S3 access from a new IP
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200
   | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip
   | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime)
@@ -20,26 +21,28 @@ search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_s
   "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip
   | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`'
-known_false_positives: S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make
-  a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking
-  for a new IP within the past hour
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
+  asset_type: S3 Bucket
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
+  - CIS 14
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1530
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
-  - CIS 14
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - PR.AC
   - DE.CM
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: S3 Bucket
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: system
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: src_ip
-
+  risk_object_type: system
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index 7f05f630eb..6d292d73b5 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,34 @@
-name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
-version: 2
-date: '2020-07-21'
-description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub
-  inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance 
-| rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*) 
-| rename instance as dest 
-| bucket span=4h _time 
-| stats count AS alerts by _time dest 
-| eventstats avg(alerts)
-    as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev 
-| eval
-    threshold_value = 4
-| eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev
-    * threshold_value), 1, 0) 
-| search isOutlier=1 
-| table _time dest alerts|`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`'
+date: '2020-07-21'
+description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts
+  for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security
+  Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule
+  these searches according to the bucket span interval.
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
 known_false_positives: None
+name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance
+references: []
+search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance |
+  rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*) | rename instance
+  as dest | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time dest | eventstats
+  avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval
+  threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev
+  * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts|`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 13
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
index 31735b8276..cc0d56a0bb 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS
-id: ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-07'
 description: This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections
   originating from within your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file
@@ -14,9 +12,13 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked
   Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen
   blocked outbound connections.
-type: ESCU
+id: ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53
+known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold`
+  and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators
+  roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number
+  of blocked outbound connections.
+name: Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12
   OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)  [search  `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow`
   action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16)
@@ -35,28 +37,28 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17
   | stats values(dest_ip) as "Blocked Destination IPs", values(interface_id) as "resourceId"
   count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip
   | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`'
-known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold`
-  and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators
-  roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number
-  of blocked outbound connections.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
   - Command and Control
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 11
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   - Command and Control
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 11
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 20
-  risk_object_type: system
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: src_ip
-
-
+  risk_object_type: system
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
index 37291f9163..6c1402b84d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion
-id: ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-11-27'
 description: This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to
   deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file
@@ -14,9 +12,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best
   when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search
   once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.
-type: ESCU
+id: ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53
+known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`,
+  the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
+name: Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket
   | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
   s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn
@@ -31,23 +31,27 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=Dele
   table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName
   path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count
   as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`,
-  the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1530
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: S3 Bucket
   cis20:
   - CIS 13
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1530
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: S3 Bucket
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
index af0649ef3f..91adc1541f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
@@ -1,32 +1,33 @@
-name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User
-id: 2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
-version: 2
-date: '2020-07-21'
-description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub
-  inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time 
-| stats count AS alerts by _time user 
-| eventstats avg(alerts)
-    as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev 
-| eval
-    threshold_value = 2
-| eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev
-    * threshold_value), 1, 0) 
-| search isOutlier=1 
-| table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`'
+date: '2020-07-21'
+description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts
+  for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security
+  Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule
+  these searches according to the bucket span interval.
+id: 2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
 known_false_positives: None
+name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User
+references: []
+search: '`aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename
+  findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts
+  by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev
+  | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev
+  * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 13
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
index 04d49c1634..30146d37b1 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,33 @@
-name: High Number of Login Failures from a single source
-id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222
-version: 1
-date: '2020-12-16'
-description: This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.
-type: ESCU
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed  record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory
-  | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError
-  values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent
-  by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`'
+date: '2020-12-16'
+description: This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure
+  Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value
+  of 5 as suited for your environment.
+id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222
 known_false_positives: unknown
+name: High Number of Login Failures from a single source
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed  record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon
+  app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user)
+  as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method
+  values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type
+  Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1110.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Office 365
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1110.001
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Office 365
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
index 8dbb7808cf..6e56015841 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: New container uploaded to AWS ECR
-id: f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-20'
 description: This searches show information on uploaded containers including source
   user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time
@@ -9,20 +7,26 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize
   the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099
+known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or
+  users with access to container registry.
+name: New container uploaded to AWS ECR
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute
   where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.http_user_agent="AWS Internal"
   AND Compute.event_name="PutImage" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src
   Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name("Compute")`
   | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or
-  users with access to container registry.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
-  security_domain: threat
   asset_type: AWS ECR container
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1525
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: threat
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
index f7f7620d2e..a1e0006fb7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
@@ -25,13 +25,17 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1562.007
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
index c86ae36f31..78565e14c6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
@@ -18,13 +18,17 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1556
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
index 884eef6232..1713026e6c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
@@ -19,13 +19,17 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Not Applicable
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1110
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
index aca38d6a56..369dc6cc1e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
@@ -19,13 +19,17 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1114
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
index 25134d8980..8bd3a6fc0c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,35 @@
-name: O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding
-id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-16'
 description: This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple
   mailboxes to the same destination.
-type: ESCU
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters
   | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user)
   AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user)
   AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`'
-known_false_positives: unknown
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1114.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1114.003
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Office 365
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
index ffe0176a0d..717be1f122 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,35 @@
-name: O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation
-id: b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-15'
 description: This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from
   another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.
-type: ESCU
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+id: b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7
+known_false_positives: Service Accounts
+name: O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters
   | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess
   OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time)
   as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Service Accounts
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1114.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1114.002
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Office 365
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
index 09df22b713..920f095128 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,35 @@
-name: O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding
-id: f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-16'
 description: This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to
   the same destination.
-type: ESCU
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+id: f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters
   | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user)
   AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user)
   AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user
   > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`'
-known_false_positives: unknown
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1114.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1114.003
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Office 365
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
index 68b19e161f..0c76eb70c8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches
-  an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel 
+  an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
+  translated to use the latest Change Datamodel
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-type: ESCU
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4
+known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
+  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
+  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
+  human user.
+name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time
   | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched)
   as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval
@@ -18,25 +21,27 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m
   "-10m@m") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg)
   / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away,
   total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
-  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
-  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
-  human user.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 40
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: userName
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 40
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index c51e21ff40..a683b8a332 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,43 @@
-name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
-id: dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5
-version: 2
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches
-  an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
+  translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter`
-  | bucket span=10m _time  | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user  |
-  apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as
-  isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1'
+id: dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5
 known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
   are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
   out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
   human user.
+name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
+references: []
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter`
+  | bucket span=10m _time  | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user  |
+  apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as
+  isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: src_usr
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
index 6424cd86fe..7aa2cac30f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-s3f3-d82362dffd75
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number
-  of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This
+  search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. 
-type: ESCU
+  inputs.
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-s3f3-d82362dffd75
+known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure
+  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
+  out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted
+  on a human user.
+name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m
   _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated)
   as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev
@@ -19,21 +22,23 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket sp
   total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated,
   num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev |
   `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure
-  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
-  out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted
-  on a human user.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index 4b3ec25530..4f869ee643 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -1,34 +1,39 @@
-name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
-id: 1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e
-version: 2
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates
-  an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
+  translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter`
-  | bucket span=10m _time  | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user  |
-  apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)"
-  as isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1'
+id: 1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e
 known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
   are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
   out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
   human user.
+name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
+references: []
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter`
+  | bucket span=10m _time  | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user  |
+  apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)"
+  as isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index a533496b7f..0b5fa730e0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,15 @@
-name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City
-id: 344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-16'
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   cities.  Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with
-  "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. '
+  "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the
+  latest Change Datamodel. '
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
-  | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
-  sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
-  as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
-  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
-  City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
-  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime
-  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath
-  output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
-  src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`'
+id: 344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -34,17 +21,35 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\
   \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\
   \ be much less valuable to you."
+name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City
+references: []
+search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
+  | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
+  sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
+  as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
+  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
+  City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
+  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime
+  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath
+  output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
+  src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1535
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1535
   nist:
   - ID.AM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 25
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 25
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index fc2879c6b9..b79bf256eb 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,15 @@
-name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country
-id: ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-16'
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins
-  with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. '
+  with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use
+  the latest Change Datamodel. '
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
-  | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) |
-  iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime,
-  latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup
-  append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as
-  firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country |
-  outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
-  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime
-  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] |
-  spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time,
-  user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`'
+id: ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored\
@@ -35,14 +21,33 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\
   \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\
   \ be much less valuable to you."
+name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country
+references: []
+search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
+  | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) |
+  iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime,
+  latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup
+  append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as
+  firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country |
+  outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
+  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime
+  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] |
+  spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time,
+  user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1535
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1535
   nist:
   - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index 8e6e67d3d9..b41eae382f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,15 @@
-name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address
-id: 42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-16'
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins
-  with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. '
+  with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use
+  the latest Change Datamodel. '
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run*
-  OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time)
-  as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country
-  | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
-  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
-  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime
-  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress]
-  | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table
-  _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`'
+id: 42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -34,12 +21,30 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
+name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address
+references: []
+search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run*
+  OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time)
+  as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country
+  | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
+  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country
+  | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
+  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime
+  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress]
+  | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table
+  _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
   nist:
   - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index c4d0a4c992..c758004df9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,15 @@
-name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region
-id: 7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-16'
 description: This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning
-  activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
+  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
-  | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
-  sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
-  as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
-  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
-  City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
-  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime
-  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath
-  output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
-  src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`'
+id: 7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -34,14 +21,32 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\
   \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\
   \ be much less valuable to you."
+name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region
+references: []
+search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
+  | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
+  sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
+  as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
+  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
+  City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
+  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime
+  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath
+  output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
+  src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1535
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1535
   nist:
   - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
index 2472b1f58d..6ca4149c10 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers
-id: 74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected
   to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.
@@ -17,31 +15,37 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and popu
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce
+known_false_positives: It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers
+  that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.
+name: Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest
   dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY
   by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 |
   `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` '
-known_false_positives: It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers
-  that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Host Redirection
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1048.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 13
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1048.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 629964de7e..1b5ef45525 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -1,34 +1,38 @@
-name: Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted
-id: 021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983
-version: 1
+author: Peter Gael, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-08'
 description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms
   used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker
-  has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can
-  delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search
-  will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs.
-  Deprecated because it's a duplicate
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
-  cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by
-  customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.
-type: ESCU
+  has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete
+  a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query
+  the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's
+  a duplicate
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
+  the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.
+id: 021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network
+  ACL.
+name: Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted
 references: []
-author: Peter Gael, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn  |
   stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage)
   values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Network ACL Activity
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 11
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
index 11fe53acc1..8e548691b2 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect API activity from users without MFA
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-w5ad-212bf5d1dac4
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-17'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logged into the
   AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication.
@@ -31,30 +29,35 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false
-  | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity
-  as user]| stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName)
-  as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`'
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-w5ad-212bf5d1dac4
 known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
   do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts,
   if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune
   the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment
   using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS.
+name: Detect API activity from users without MFA
+references: []
+search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false
+  | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity
+  as user]| stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName)
+  as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - PR.AC
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
index 89740af552..8f1f358024 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
-name: Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts
   that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns
   event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service
-  is detected, grouped by users.
-  Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.
+  is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite
+  hard.
 how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with
@@ -32,26 +30,27 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55
+known_false_positives: It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service
+  accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv`
+  file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv`
+  table with that entry.
+name: Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT
   [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup
   aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by
   user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service
-  accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv`
-  file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv`
-  table with that entry.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
   nist:
@@ -59,8 +58,13 @@ tags:
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
   - ID.AM
-  security_domain: access
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 15
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 15
+  security_domain: access
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
index 2398a3cddd..39ff87a6e7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2
-id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging
   EvilGinx tools to mimic websites.
@@ -18,8 +16,11 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Res
   \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\
   \ to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\
   \n"
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa
+known_false_positives: If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv
+  file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file
+  to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains.
+name: Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by
   DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$"
@@ -30,25 +31,28 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web
   by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$"
   | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`'
-known_false_positives: If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv
-  file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file
-  to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Common Phishing Frameworks
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1566.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 7
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1566.003
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
   - PR.IP
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
index cb10f9672b..d2fe54711b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,21 @@
-name: Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response
-id: 05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating
   the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission
   for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can
-  often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic.
-  Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.
+  often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because
+  this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from
   your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically,
   this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding
   the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section
   of the protocol.
-type: ESCU
+id: 05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9
+known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long
+  enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search
+  to help mitigate false positives.
+name: Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND
   DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type |  `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
@@ -24,25 +25,28 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Type" firstTime as "First Time" lastTime as "Last Time" count as Count | table "Source
   IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type"  "Answer Length" Count "First
   Time" "Last Time" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long
-  enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search
-  to help mitigate false positives.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1048.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 13
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1048.003
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
index af7bfefbcb..f7970b7ca7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,44 @@
-name: Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
-id: 29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-03'
 description: This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping
-  with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.
+  with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon
+  Event Code.
 how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which
   includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named
   `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: 29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0
+known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be
+  part of a whtelist.
+name: Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
 references:
 - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId)
   as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll
   ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename
   Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be
-  part of a whtelist.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
index df72bec23d..a42009f498 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703
-id: 98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2019-02-27'
 description: This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with
   credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.
@@ -11,31 +9,37 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also en
   on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/.
   Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators"
   to be able to look for the right group membership changes.'
-type: ESCU
+id: 98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188
+known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by
+  administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated
+  in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you
+  may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
+name: Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex
   field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?<privs>\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" | where
   privs="SeDebugPrivilege" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
   by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as "Enabled Privilege"
   | rename Process_Name as process |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`'
-known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by
-  administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated
-  in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you
-  may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
 tags:
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - PR.IP
   - PR.AC
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-  asset_type: Windows
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
index 1540ae1f92..6d1f28ffa0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect new API calls from user roles
-id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-16'
 description: This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before
   or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`.
@@ -9,9 +7,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user
   roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen
   user roles.
-type: ESCU
+id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1
+known_false_positives: It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making
+  new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to
+  trigger.
+name: Detect new API calls from user roles
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
   [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success  userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
   | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName
@@ -22,22 +23,23 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A
   | table eventName userName]  |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time)
   as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)`
   | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making
-  new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to
-  trigger.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.004
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.004
   nist:
   - ID.AM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-
-
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
index 8879b9c41b..72fa3054a5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect new user AWS Console Login
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
@@ -12,29 +10,35 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to
   create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update
   previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how
-  often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. 
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats
-  earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t
-  previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime)
-  as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"),
-  "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
-  where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console"  | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`'
+  often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75
 known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
   activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
   activity is legitimate.
+name: Detect new user AWS Console Login
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats
+  earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t
+  previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime
+  max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),
+  "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+  where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console"  | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
index 024bbc6312..a0be04286b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
-name: Detect Spike in AWS API Activity
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your
   AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest
-  data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change
+  Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
@@ -31,9 +30,10 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55
+known_false_positives: ''
+name: Detect Spike in AWS API Activity
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall
   | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
   api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as *
@@ -48,23 +48,27 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApi
   | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName)
   as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user
   | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`'
-known_false_positives: ''
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
index 93aca93ef1..5c0109d25e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-name: Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-21'
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related
-  to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated
+  and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
@@ -14,9 +13,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to
   create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API
   event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
-type: ESCU
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53
+known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold`
+  and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.
+name: Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events`
   | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
   network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*)
@@ -31,27 +32,28 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_eve
   userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn
   | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName)
   as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`'
-known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold`
-  and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1562.007
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 11
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.007
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 20
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-
-
-
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
index d131c86cfe..e34a5d9ac0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
-name: Detect Spike in Security Group Activity
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-18'
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related
   to security groups in your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file
-  that factors in the latest data.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  that factors in the latest data.  This search is deprecated and have been translated
+  to use the latest Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
@@ -15,9 +14,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once
   to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove
   API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
-type: ESCU
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53
+known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`,
+  the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
+name: Detect Spike in Security Group Activity
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls`
   | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
   security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*)
@@ -32,25 +33,27 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_
   userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn
   | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName)
   as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`,
-  the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078.004
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-
-
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
index f5da48a4e2..0145ee0fc4 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect USB device insertion
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-11-27'
 description: The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663
   for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID
@@ -14,26 +12,32 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows
   minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework
   to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise
   Security Assets and Identity Framework.
-type: ESCU
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5
+known_false_positives: Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify
+  and investigate as appropriate.
+name: Detect USB device insertion
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest
   latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes)
   All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656)
   (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`|
   `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)`  | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify
-  and investigate as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Data Protection
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index f54409a169..8907b28613 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers
-id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.
 how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You
@@ -21,28 +19,34 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. Yo
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`
   Deprecated because duplicate.'
-type: ESCU
+id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301
+known_false_positives: It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated
+  and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate.
+name: Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time)
   as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic`
   | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated
-  and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Dynamic DNS
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1071.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1071.001
   nist:
   - PR.IP
   - DE.DP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
index 381cfd8f74..e6a6f48f65 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detection of DNS Tunnels
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-18'
 description: This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of
   the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential
@@ -8,8 +6,7 @@ description: This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum
   originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a
   method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of
   security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS
-  traffic.
-  Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same.
+  traffic. Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data
   is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution
   data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and
@@ -18,9 +15,12 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS
   field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro
   which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains
   to reduce alert fatigue.
-type: ESCU
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4
+known_false_positives: It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior.
+  If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold
+  can also be modified to better suit your environment.
+name: Detection of DNS Tunnels
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count  from
   datamodel=Network_Resolution  where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT
   (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa"
@@ -35,23 +35,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count  fro
   "DNS.src" as src  "DNS.answer" as message | eval message=if(message=="unknown","",
   message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats
   sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior.
-  If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold
-  can also be modified to better suit your environment.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Data Protection
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1048.003
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 13
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Command and Control
   - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 13
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1048.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
index 6d3cf7e2f7..6da03bb551 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers
-id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers.
   Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and
@@ -9,33 +7,39 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure
   DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that
   your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise
   Security.
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6
+known_false_positives: Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate,
+  verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.
+name: DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src
   DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate,
-  verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Host Redirection
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1071.004
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1071.004
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
   - PR.IP
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index e8ed080ce9..031e273b88 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,19 @@
-name: EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User
-id: 56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have
-  not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated
+  to use the latest Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By
   User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or
   remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-type: ESCU
+id: 56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances
+  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
+  modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
+name: EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls`
   errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user
@@ -20,22 +22,23 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_mod
   "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId
   | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances
-  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
-  modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.004
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.004
   nist:
   - ID.AM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 5
-  risk_object_type: user
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: user
-
-
+  risk_object_type: user
+  risk_score: 5
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 7f1a983db7..3716eb9fa8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-02-23'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started
   in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file
@@ -8,10 +6,13 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is starte
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create
-  of baseline of previously seen regions.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-type: ESCU
+  of baseline of previously seen regions.  This search is deprecated and have been
+  translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance
+  in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
+name: EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest
   latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv
   | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup
@@ -19,24 +20,27 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as ear
   "Instance Started in a New Region","Previously Seen Region") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)`
   | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New
   Region" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance
-  in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 12
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1535
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 12
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
-  security_domain: network
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
-  risk_score: 10
-  risk_object_type: system
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   risk_object: src
-
+  risk_object_type: system
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
index a295dcb93f..0400f1408c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
-name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI
-id: 347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-12'
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen
-  AMIs.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  AMIs.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change
+  Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support
   search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.
-type: ESCU
+id: 347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3
+known_false_positives: After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with
+  that AMI will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the AMI being used was created
+  by a legitimate user.
+name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
   errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId
@@ -22,15 +24,18 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn
   as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime,
   lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`'
-known_false_positives: After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with
-  that AMI will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the AMI being used was created
-  by a legitimate user.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
   nist:
   - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 6aebf95a70..405e5c552a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
-name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type
-id: 65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-07'
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen
-  instance types.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  instance types.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest
+  Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"
   support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.
-type: ESCU
+id: 65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad
+known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using
+  a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended
+  to create the system with the new instance type.
+name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
   errorCode=success | fillnull value="m1.small" requestParameters.instanceType | stats
   earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType
@@ -22,15 +24,18 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType
   as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table
   _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using
-  a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended
-  to create the system with the new instance type.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
   nist:
   - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 55bcbd1cf8..ea6efe265a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
-name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User
-id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not
-  created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+  created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the
+  latest Change Datamodel.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By
   User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.
-type: ESCU
+id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances
+  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
+  launching instances that this is the intended behavior.
+name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
   errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv
@@ -20,18 +22,21 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType
   as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn
   as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances
-  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
-  launching instances that this is the intended behavior.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.004
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.004
   nist:
   - ID.AM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: AWS Instance
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
index 68ae5a4620..d07ad69e3d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension
-id: ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-19'
 description: This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five
   spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the
@@ -9,28 +7,34 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
   of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+id: ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path)
   as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process = "*     .*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process
   Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1036.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1036.003
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   - PR.PT
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 98d9b617c6..911df36f5c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups
-id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed
   a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring.
@@ -10,20 +8,26 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain
   you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you
   backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful
   backup, other than the default of seven days.
-type: ESCU
+id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats
   latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)`
   | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(),
   "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 10
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
index 3209dd61d3..cc3fff3411 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: First time seen command line argument
-id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-q138afaaqa39
-version: 5
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter
   to execute a command that has not previously been seen.
@@ -13,9 +11,13 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list.
   For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same
   value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.
-type: ESCU
+id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-q138afaaqa39
+known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to
+  execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program
+  is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter`
+  macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
+name: First time seen command line argument
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe
   Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
@@ -28,10 +30,6 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_
   previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),
   "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to
-  execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program
-  is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter`
-  macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -39,18 +37,24 @@ tags:
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059.001
-  - T1059.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.001
+  - T1059.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
index 2c4b21a42d..86c8e7d368 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: GCP GCR container uploaded
-id: 4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-20'
 description: This search show information on uploaded containers including source
   user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination
@@ -9,21 +7,27 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or late
   then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
   You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the
   `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage
-  where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account
-  Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg
-  Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")`  | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` '
+id: 4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b
 known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or
   users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a
   Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload
   creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path.
+name: GCP GCR container uploaded
+references: []
+search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage
+  where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account
+  Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg
+  Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")`  | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
-  security_domain: threat
   asset_type: GCP GCR Container
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1525
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: threat
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
index bf41341710..410bdd9f84 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Identify New User Accounts
-id: 475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment
   by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the
@@ -8,24 +6,30 @@ description: This detection search will help profile user accounts in your envir
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating
   the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity
   framework.
-type: ESCU
+id: 475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89
+known_false_positives: If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly,
+  this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate
+  appropriately.
+name: Identify New User Accounts
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities  | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800,
   "Accounts created in last week") | search empStatus="Accounts created in last week"|
   `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity
   empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`'
-known_false_positives: If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly,
-  this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate
-  appropriately.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.002
+  asset_type: Domain Server
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.002
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-  asset_type: Domain Server
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
index 640a6e97e5..a86e84d2c9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -1,46 +1,49 @@
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments
-id: 2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c
-version: 6
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-19'
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded
   command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the
   process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user.
   This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the
   default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and
-  passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line.
-  Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
+  passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost
+  the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c
+known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
+  options, but it's not common.
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
-  search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec*
-  | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
-  options, but it's not common.
+  search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.001
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 6
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 6176c2b120..1bca72ed2e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse
-id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-23'
 description: This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains
   that you want to have monitored for abuse.
@@ -11,18 +9,24 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you m
   which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search
   "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that
   will be checked for.
-type: ESCU
+id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa
+known_false_positives: None at this time
+name: Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time)
   as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None at this time
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Delivery
   - Actions on Objectives
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
index ed789747a8..7ef82cad94 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,23 @@
-name: Open Redirect in Splunk Web
-id: d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-19'
 description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859,
   the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability.
 how_to_implement: No extra steps needed to implement this search.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`
+id: d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7
 known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Open Redirect in Splunk Web
+references: []
+search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Splunk Server
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 4
   - CIS 18
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
   nist:
   - ID.RA
   - RS.MI
@@ -26,5 +25,10 @@ tags:
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Splunk Server
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
index 1f690d96a4..a0e62ef758 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection
-id: a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2019-01-29'
 description: This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack.
 how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
@@ -8,25 +6,31 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must
   be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery
   data populate the Alerts data model
-type: ESCU
+id: a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc
+known_false_positives: There are no known false positives.
+name: Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd
   OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path |
   bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There are no known false positives.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 4
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  - Command and Control
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.CM
   - PR.PT
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
index 49a42fd229..28b61e103e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Processes created by netsh
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e
-version: 5
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-23'
 description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various
   commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting
@@ -8,32 +6,39 @@ description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute vari
   configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence
   proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search,
   we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via
-  the command line.
-  Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type.
+  the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs
   with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints.
   If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
-  where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`'
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e
 known_false_positives: It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in
   most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether
-  the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.
+  the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe"
+  process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.
+name: Processes created by netsh
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
+  as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Netsh Abuse
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1562.004
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.004
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
index b402bc90bb..58e60fa368 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Prohibited Software On Endpoint
-id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-10-11'
 description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked
   as prohibited.
@@ -14,27 +12,33 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited",
   which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search <code>Add Prohibited
   Processes to Enterprise Security</code>.
-type: ESCU
+id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Prohibited Software On Endpoint
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Monitor for Unauthorized Software
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - SamSam Ransomware
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 2
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   - Command and Control
   - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 2
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
index 781a143121..7c342ecf6b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264x9f
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-02-27'
 description: The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory
   using the reg add command.
@@ -9,28 +7,34 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264x9f
+known_false_positives: None at the moment
+name: Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process="*add*" Processes.process="*Hidden*"
   Processes.process="*REG_DWORD*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None at the moment
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1564.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: ''
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1564.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: ''
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
index 119f1105e0..5a27cbfa09 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Remote Registry Key modifications
-id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-03-02'
 description: This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint`
@@ -8,27 +6,33 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `
   such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for
   this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the
   registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.
-type: ESCU
+id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e
+known_false_positives: This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to
+  modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.
+name: Remote Registry Key modifications
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
   as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where  Registry.registry_path="\\\\*"  by
   Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to
-  modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
index e8517957e2..df53386839 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Remote WMI Command Attempt
-id: 272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-03'
 description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to operate
   on remote systems.
@@ -9,31 +7,37 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.
-type: ESCU
+id: 272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838
+known_false_positives: Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from
+  remote systems.
+name: Remote WMI Command Attempt
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe  AND
   Processes.process= */node* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from
-  remote systems.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1047
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1047
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
index 9935ab3bdb..ffb2308c21 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,39 @@
-name: Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware
-id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware
-  were created or deleted.
-  Deprecated because we already have a similar detection
+  were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6
+known_false_positives: No known false positives
+name: Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= "*create*"  OR Processes.process=
   "*delete*") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user |
   `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`'
-known_false_positives: No known false positives
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1053.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.005
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
index f7cc9124d7..6558a14289 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,30 @@
-name: Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure
-id: f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-14'
 description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409,
   a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug.
 how_to_implement: The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary
   for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting
   your Splunk systems will reduce false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd
+known_false_positives: Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request.
+  Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.
+name: Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1
   uri_path="*raw/services/server/info/server-info" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server
   as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri)
   as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter`
-known_false_positives: Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request.
-  Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Splunk Server
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 4
   - CIS 18
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
   nist:
   - ID.RA
   - RS.MI
@@ -33,5 +32,10 @@ tags:
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Splunk Server
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
index df2bc38889..5313a9de58 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious Changes to File Associations
-id: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc
-version: 4
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows
   file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine
@@ -9,9 +7,12 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting
   on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes
   from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry`
   nodes.
-type: ESCU
+id: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc
+known_false_positives: There may be other processes in your environment that users
+  may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are
+  finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
+name: Suspicious Changes to File Associations
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name)
   as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe
@@ -21,23 +22,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   as registry_path count  FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts*
   by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table
   process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` '
-known_false_positives: There may be other processes in your environment that users
-  may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are
-  finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1546.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1546.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   - PR.PT
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
index 9b4a6d61cd..24b2611dea 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
-name: Suspicious File Write
-id: 57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-25'
 description: The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to
-  malicious activity. 
+  malicious activity.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically
   populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
@@ -13,28 +11,34 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored.
   This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to
   monitor.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
-  as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
-  | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`'
+id: 57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8
 known_false_positives: It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the
   same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should
   be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and
   the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity
   is legitimate.
+name: Suspicious File Write
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
+  as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
+  | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
index 76e5bdeaf1..3e8b335211 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
@@ -1,30 +1,34 @@
-name: Suspicious writes to System Volume Information
-id: cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder
   by something other than the System process.
 how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line
   from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
   of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+id: cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac
+known_false_positives: It is possible that other utilities or system processes may
+  legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include
+  exceptions as appropriate.
+name: Suspicious writes to System Volume Information
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\
   Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest,
   Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`
-known_false_positives: It is possible that other utilities or system processes may
-  legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include
-  exceptions as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Collection and Staging
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1036
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1036
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
index 57cf51b81b..8456af0ab7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Uncommon Processes On Endpoint
-id: 29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked
   as uncommon.
@@ -12,26 +10,32 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments.
   Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that
   are uncommon in your environment.
-type: ESCU
+id: 29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Uncommon Processes On Endpoint
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process
   Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` '
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Unusual Processes
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1204.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 2
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1204.002
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
index b859415e57..c2f37c4ed2 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,40 @@
-name: Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
-id: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-06'
-description: This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy.
+description: This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because
+  too noisy.
 how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which
   includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`.
   We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65
+known_false_positives: Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason.
+  But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.
+name: Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1
   | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason.
-  But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 92f94a59a8..712ef9d99a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Unsuccessful Netbackup backups
-id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then
   failed.
@@ -8,20 +6,26 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data
   your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central
   server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you
   can modify this search for your specific backup solution.
-type: ESCU
+id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Unsuccessful Netbackup backups
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE
   | search MESSAGE="An error occurred, failed to backup." | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)`
   | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature
   | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 10
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
index baef5608b0..0663888f64 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
@@ -1,37 +1,41 @@
-name: Windows connhost exe started forcefully
-id: c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-06'
-description: 'The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1.
-This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware.
-DEPRECATED
-This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk.
-'
+description: 'The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe)
+  executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows
+  OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually
+  seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized
+  this is not specific to Ryuk. '
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+id: c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769
+known_false_positives: This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see
+  any false positives for this detection
+name: Windows connhost exe started forcefully
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process="*C:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*"
-  by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process="*C:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe*
+  0xffffffff *-ForceV1*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`'
 tags:
-  mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1059.003
   analytics_story:
-    - Ryuk Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-    - Delivery
-  cis20:
-    - CIS 8
-  nist:
-    - PR.PT
-    - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
+  - Ryuk Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.003
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
index 5cf387faaf..3e171ce6ec 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,40 @@
-name: Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry
-id: 23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-06'
-description: The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. 
-  This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. 
+description: The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable.
+  This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+id: 23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb
+known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature on a Windows system since
+  it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
+  it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
+  to tune the search.
+name: Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name="DisableAntiSpyware" AND
-  Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
-  | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature on a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. 
-  Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name="DisableAntiSpyware"
+  AND Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest Registry.user
+  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`'
 tags:
-  mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1562.001
   analytics_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.001
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
index 67ea4db373..4f48aad5de 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,43 @@
-name: Windows hosts file modification
-id: 06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-11-02'
 description: The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints
-  across your environment. 
+  across your environment.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem
   data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
   products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
   reads and writes.
-type: ESCU
+id: 06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116
+known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to
+  add entries to this file.
+name: Windows hosts file modification
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem  by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
   Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\*
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to
-  add entries to this file.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Host Redirection
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
   nist:
   - PR.IP
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AC
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
index ed0fc17aba..4875d9e0d3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation
-id: fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
-version: 2
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-06'
 description: Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.
 how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which
@@ -9,30 +7,36 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, w
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
+known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes,
+  but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
+name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll*
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage,
   TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes,
-  but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
   - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
index b44a84c732..63901022b3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store
-id: 6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159
-version: 6
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-03'
 description: Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
@@ -8,35 +6,41 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159
+known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a
+  certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically
+  be done on a large number of systems.
+name: Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store
 references: []
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*certutil*
   (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a
-  certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically
-  be done on a large number of systems.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1553.004
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1553.004
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 6
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
index 4bdf35e8e0..6302591b71 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
-id: c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d
-version: 6
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-06'
 description: Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values
   "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts.
@@ -8,35 +6,41 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be
   ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name
   from your endpoints.
-type: ESCU
+id: c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d
+known_false_positives: Administrators may attempt to change the default execution
+  policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted"
+  or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should
+  be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.
+name: Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
 references: []
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\Microsoft\\Powershell\\1\\ShellIds\\Microsoft.PowerShell*
   Registry.registry_key_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_name=Unrestricted
   OR Registry.registry_value_name=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
   Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators may attempt to change the default execution
-  policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted"
-  or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should
-  be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.001
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 6
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
index 09fd05ff4f..e6c669923e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Attempt To Stop Security Service
-id: c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the
   endpoint.
@@ -14,9 +12,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi
   use on the command line and surround with asterisks (*****), so that they work properly
   when searching the command line. The file should be updated with the names of any
   services you would like to monitor for attempts to stop the service.,
-type: ESCU
+id: c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910
+known_false_positives: None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services
+  should be identified and understood.
+name: Attempt To Stop Security Service
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where (Processes.process_name = net.exe OR  Processes.process_name = sc.exe) Processes.process="*
@@ -24,26 +24,30 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description
   | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services
-  should be identified and understood.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1562.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.001
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index 030f1e0232..569f46c6d6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
-id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911
-version: 4
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-02'
 description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export
   of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
@@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
 references: []
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=reg.exe
   OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security*
@@ -18,22 +17,27 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*)
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.002
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
index 7351f5db1e..522710576f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Batch File Write to System32
-id: 503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-14'
 description: The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system
   directory tree.
@@ -8,15 +6,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name
-  values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_path
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32*
-  AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`'
+id: 503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3
 known_false_positives: It is possible for this search to generate a notable event
   for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not
   the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the
@@ -24,20 +14,34 @@ known_false_positives: It is possible for this search to generate a notable even
   by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You
   should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions,
   as necessary.
+name: Batch File Write to System32
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name
+  values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_path
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32*
+  AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1204.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1204.002
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
index e0a1fe6c70..2eca5cc0fa 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification
-id: 809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-21'
 description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the
   built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware
@@ -8,31 +6,37 @@ description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.
-type: ESCU
+id: 809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
+name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe
   Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1490
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - PR.IP
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1490
+  nist:
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
index da77ff7675..c2635aaea1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Common Ransomware Extensions
-id: a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-09'
 description: The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used
   by Ransomware
@@ -22,33 +20,39 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activi
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+id: a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec
+known_false_positives: It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions
+  to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number
+  of files created with these extensions.
+name: Common Ransomware Extensions
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex
   field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions
-  to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number
-  of files created with these extensions.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransonware
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1485
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1485
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
index 19faa3b1d2..b5ad136f95 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Common Ransomware Notes
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-09'
 description: The search looks for files created with names matching those typically
   used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.
@@ -9,32 +7,38 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity f
   populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
   via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is
   typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.
-type: ESCU
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with
+  the same name used by ransomware note files.
+name: Common Ransomware Notes
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes`
   | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with
-  the same name used by ransomware note files.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1485
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1485
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
index 2fdfd241dc..51d1796170 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Create local admin accounts using net exe
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e
-version: 4
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using
   net.exe.
@@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e
+known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.
+name: Create local admin accounts using net exe
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as
   user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe
@@ -19,23 +18,28 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user)
   OR Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1136.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - PR.PT
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1136.001
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
index c63a5de23d..60020f3c53 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe
-id: qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e
-version: 5
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using
   net.exe.
@@ -9,32 +7,38 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e
+known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network
+  shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.
+name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as
   user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processs.process_name=net.exe
   OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) by Processes.process Processes.process_name
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network
-  shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1070.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1070.005
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
index 94db3d8e12..6858be4760 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Create Remote Thread into LSASS
-id: 67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-06'
 description: Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.
 how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which
@@ -9,30 +7,36 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, whi
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: 67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc
+known_false_positives: Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate
+  an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.
+name: Create Remote Thread into LSASS
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename
   Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate
-  an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
index 9f27e6a9f9..23817aeff3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Creation of Shadow Copy
-id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic has been used to create
   a shadow copy.
@@ -8,10 +6,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844
+known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic
+  will create false positives.
+name: Creation of Shadow Copy
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe
   Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) OR (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe
@@ -20,22 +20,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic
-  will create false positives.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - hhttps://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.003
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
index e4a1570b99..91bcc9e672 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,37 @@
-name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
-id: 2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow
   copy.
-type: ESCU
+id: 2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b
+known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.
+name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic*
   OR Processes.process_name=powershell* Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.003
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
index 2ee2c1d029..19d52b7160 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy
-id: d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow
   copy.
@@ -8,10 +6,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
   (Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\security*
@@ -19,21 +18,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` '
-known_false_positives: unknown
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.003
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
index d6891fa516..c403b66a75 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -1,37 +1,41 @@
-name: Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy
-id: c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
   Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest
   Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter` '
-known_false_positives: unknown
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.003
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
index 577db5492e..0473989d8b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Deleting Shadow Copies
-id: b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-09'
 description: The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy
   Service.  Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation.  This
@@ -9,9 +7,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e
+known_false_positives: vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped
+  with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately
+  delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.
+name: Deleting Shadow Copies
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe
@@ -19,27 +20,30 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`'
-known_false_positives: vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped
-  with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately
-  delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1490
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 10
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1490
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
index 8b735df584..398a26605e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,43 @@
-name: Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks
-id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b
-version: 5
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-15'
 description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows
   Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows
   Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.
-type: ESCU
+id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b
+known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be
+  detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
+name: Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp
   WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName="ANONYMOUS LOGON") OR (Logon_Type=9
   Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be
-  detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Lateral Movement
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1550.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1550.002
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
index 0bcab5ef91..4d855d0e38 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,39 @@
-name: Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account
-id: 1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-18'
-description: This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.
-how_to_implement: This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742.
-  We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
-  (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition
-  with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
-  macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+description: This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode
+  4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.
+how_to_implement: This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled
+  on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you
+  specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.)
+  for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your
+  Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter
+  out known false positives.
+id: 1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645
+known_false_positives: None thus far found
+name: Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account
 references:
 - https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS LOGON" LogonType=3
-| stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user
-| `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None thus far found
+search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS
+  LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName)
+  as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1210
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1210
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
index 1bad92dbd3..9279a5baec 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access
-id: 2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996
-version: 3
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-03'
 description: This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential
   dumping.
@@ -10,36 +8,42 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, whic
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: 2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996
+known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass
+  for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those
+  cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need
+  to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
+name: Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access
 references: []
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage,
   SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename
   Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` '
-known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass
-  for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those
-  cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need
-  to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - PR.IP
   - PR.AC
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
index f99fd34165..5105df5b8b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint
-id: c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74
-version: 5
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-09'
 description: This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number
   of account lockouts in a short period.
@@ -18,28 +16,34 @@ how_to_implement: "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Chan
   \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\
   \ to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\
   \n"
-type: ESCU
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could
+  cause a large number of account lockouts.
+name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where
   nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.dest
   All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`|
   `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search
   count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could
-  cause a large number of account lockouts.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.002
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - PR.IP
-  security_domain: access
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.002
+  nist:
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: access
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
index 2f9e622ac0..c7397568f2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts
-id: 95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively
   high number of times in a short period.
@@ -8,28 +6,34 @@ how_to_implement: ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change
   datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute
   successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts
   you want to monitor, according to your environment.
-type: ESCU
+id: 95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd
+known_false_positives: It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue
+  causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.
+name: Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management
   All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
   |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue
-  causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078.003
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - PR.IP
-  security_domain: access
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.003
+  nist:
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: access
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 414d02c1e3..190dd55b3f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -1,45 +1,48 @@
-name: Detect mshta inline hta execution
-id: a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 5
+author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-20'
-description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline
-  protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported
-  options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will 
-  return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for 
-  these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" 
-  and its parent process.
+description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol
+  handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when
+  invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first
+  time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions,
+  as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+id: a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+name: Detect mshta inline hta execution
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
-author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mshta.exe
-  (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user
-  Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*)
+  by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
+  `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
index 8a0442f6c9..c52e1462b5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
@@ -1,41 +1,45 @@
-name: Detect mshta renamed
-id: 8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-20'
 description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing.
   Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This
-  analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate
-  mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content 
-  and validation it is the real mshta. 
+  analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta
+  binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and
+  validation it is the real mshta.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+id: 8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.
+name: Detect mshta renamed
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=mshta.exe AND process_name!=mshta.exe)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
index 3a57d4fa7f..d3146a70c4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line
-id: 9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-20'
 description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe)
   utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to
@@ -12,34 +10,40 @@ description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (msht
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+id: 9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior
+  and will need to be filtered.
+name: Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mshta.exe
   (Processes.process="*http://*" OR Processes.process="*https://*") by Processes.user
   Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior
-  and will need to be filtered.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
index dece28c383..8690119b02 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
@@ -1,37 +1,41 @@
-name: Detect New Local Admin account
-id: b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-08'
 description: This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated
   to local administrators.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators)
-  | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`'
+id: b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d
 known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best
   to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service
   request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not
   "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives
+name: Detect New Local Admin account
+references: []
+search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators)
+  | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1136.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  - Command and Control
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - PR.AC
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: access
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1136.001
+  nist:
+  - PR.AC
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: access
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
index b27260d533..794d32c88a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
-name: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f
-version: 3
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-03'
 description: 'The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is
   detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for
   privilege escalation. '
-type: ESCU
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe
 references:
 - https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
@@ -16,21 +15,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process)|
   where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`'
-known_false_positives: unknown
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1574.009
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1574.009
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
index 3acc761759..f005ec4db8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery
-id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-10'
 description: This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network
   configuration discovery on the endpoint.
@@ -10,9 +8,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from
   endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually
   generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated
   via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.
-type: ESCU
+id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893
+known_false_positives: It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands
+  used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these
+  commands. These can generate false positives.
+name: Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.process_name
@@ -20,25 +21,28 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools`
   | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime
   lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands
-  used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these
-  commands. These can generate false positives.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Unusual Processes
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1016
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 2
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   - Command and Control
   - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 2
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1016
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
index 70843ce6c3..f2e1899160 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe
-id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664
-version: 5
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-10'
 description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that
   is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.
@@ -9,34 +7,40 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list
   of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to
   better suit your environment.
-type: ESCU
+id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664
+known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately
+  execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify
+  the lookup file, as appropriate.
+name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
   Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately
-  execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify
-  the lookup file, as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
index 95fb5a7a2c..403a31998f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-10'
 description: This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula`
   flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you
@@ -15,33 +13,39 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e
+known_false_positives: Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems
+  and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the
+  first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this
+  event on a machine
+name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process=*psexec* Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.process_name
   Processes.dest  Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`|
   `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems
-  and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the
-  first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this
-  event on a machine
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1021.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1021.002
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
index 0f4c970998..ae3c35d28f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,22 @@
-name: Detect Rare Executables
-id: 44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac
-version: 5
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-03-16'
 description: This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems
   running them, and the users who initiated each process.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model
-  with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two
-  lookup files for allowed processes.  These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv`
-  and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list,
-  add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from
-  the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list
-  value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling
-  to better suit your environment.
-type: ESCU
+  with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches
+  two lookup files for allowed processes.  These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv`
+  and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow
+  list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an
+  entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to
+  set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter
+  and search scheduling to better suit your environment.
+id: 44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your
+  environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`
+  to filter them out of your search results.
+name: Detect Rare Executables
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as
   dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
   from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name  | rename Processes.process_name
@@ -23,24 +24,27 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest)
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name
   as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your
-  environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`
-  to filter them out of your search results.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Unusual Processes
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 2
+  - CIS 8
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   - Command and Control
   - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 2
-  - CIS 8
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.PT
   - PR.DS
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 194a204078..296da3b451 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
-id: 91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-20'
 description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline
   protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported
@@ -12,12 +10,14 @@ description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inl
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+id: 91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
@@ -25,22 +25,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
index 5d981e2785..cc192e5550 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e
-version: 4
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe
   processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first
@@ -10,31 +8,37 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
   of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.
+name: Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.parent_process_name="cmd.exe" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe
   OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
index 27b1a12a56..84d29cc4a1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Disabling Remote User Account Control
-id: bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-18'
 description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the
   enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).
@@ -10,31 +8,37 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry
   modifications.
-type: ESCU
+id: bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c
+known_false_positives: This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement
+  a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.
+name: Disabling Remote User Account Control
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA*
   Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name
   Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement
-  a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1548.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1548.002
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
index a95e490715..70408c9727 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,42 @@
-name: Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
-id: 8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-21'
 description: Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
 references:
 - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
 - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
   Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
index 583414d64b..c5caf51394 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Execution of File with Multiple Extensions
-id: b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-18'
 description: This search looks for processes launched from files that have double
   extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension
@@ -9,32 +7,38 @@ description: This search looks for processes launched from files that have doubl
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node.
-type: ESCU
+id: b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Execution of File with Multiple Extensions
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe
   OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process
   = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by
   Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1036.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1036.003
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   - PR.PT
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
index 3fc94422ab..45c348bc19 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: File with Samsam Extension
-id: 02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-14'
 description: The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam
   ransomware attack.
@@ -8,9 +6,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity f
   your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using
   Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you
   want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+id: 02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf
+known_false_positives: Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations,
+  you should investigate all results.
+name: File with Samsam Extension
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
@@ -18,20 +18,24 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_extension=.stubbin
   OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos
   OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations,
-  you should investigate all results.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
index 17bf6db3ce..1d182c7181 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
-id: e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-05-20'
 description: This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us
   that has not previously been seen.
@@ -12,9 +10,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out
   old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`
   macro to adjust the time window.
-type: ESCU
+id: e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961
+known_false_positives: A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone.
+  Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any
+  malicious behavior is taken.
+name: First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name)
   as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id
   values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process
@@ -25,25 +26,28 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime value
   OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`")
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name,
   parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`'
-known_false_positives: A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone.
-  Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any
-  malicious behavior is taken.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1068
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1068
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
index fca1569cef..c333e56c94 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f
-version: 4
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific
   as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file.  The
@@ -11,30 +9,36 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f
+known_false_positives: 'Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe
+  to interact with the files. '
+name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe
   (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` '
-known_false_positives: 'Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe
-  to interact with the files. '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1222.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: ''
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1222.001
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
index 29541c0336..f5436ed36d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,40 @@
-name: Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption
-id: 5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027
-version: 3
+author: Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-16'
 description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal
   name requests
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos
-type: ESCU
+id: 5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027
+known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may
+  generate false positives
+name: Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md
 - https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity
-author: Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id,
   Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may
-  generate false positives
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Lateral Movement
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1558.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1558.003
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
index 43392d1336..152f1c15ff 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window
-id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db
-version: 5
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-20'
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters to
   modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the
@@ -13,9 +11,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db
+known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
+  options, but it's not common.
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
@@ -23,27 +23,31 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
-  options, but it's not common.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.001
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
index ac7aebd11d..01eb1bf5fc 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
-id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes that have encoded the script
   within the command-line. Malware has been seen using this parameter, as it obfuscates
@@ -10,35 +8,41 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19
+known_false_positives: System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = powershell.exe
   (Processes.process=*-EncodedCommand* OR Processes.process=*-enc*) by Processes.user
   Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
   Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`'
-known_false_positives: System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1027
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1027
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
index 2dd7302b37..e72c322914 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass
-id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39
-version: 4
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used
   to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed
@@ -11,36 +9,42 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39
+known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution
+  policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated
+  to ensure that it is legitimate.
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as
   process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="*
   bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution
-  policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated
-  to ensure that it is legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.001
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
index 76f06b3dc0..83954f0815 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques
-id: cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-19'
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that
   have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.
@@ -9,9 +7,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4
+known_false_positives: These characters might be legitimately on the command-line,
+  but it is not common.
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
@@ -20,26 +20,30 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1)
   + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "''"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter`
   | search num_obfuscation > 10 '
-known_false_positives: These characters might be legitimately on the command-line,
-  but it is not common.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1059.001
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
index b5bf730dbd..a8b3d83d1b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
-id: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-23'
 description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications
   to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this
@@ -13,33 +11,39 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry
   modifications.
-type: ESCU
+id: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc
+known_false_positives: You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry
+  entries.
+name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND
   Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by Registry.dest,
   Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
   Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`'
-known_false_positives: You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry
-  entries.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1547.010
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 5
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1547.010
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - PR.AC
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
index 05b3db139b..200c626697 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery
-id: c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-25'
 description: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line
   arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain
@@ -10,7 +8,10 @@ description: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-li
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+id: c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes,
+  otherwise, rarely used.
+name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md
 - https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104
@@ -19,29 +20,32 @@ references:
 - https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html
 - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/
 - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe
   OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*)
   by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes,
-  otherwise, rarely used.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1482
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1482
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
index ce24129f8c..f810de1820 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Overwriting Accessibility Binaries
-id: 13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched
   with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace
@@ -10,9 +8,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+id: 13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae
+known_false_positives: Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that
+  these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
+name: Overwriting Accessibility Binaries
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe*
@@ -21,22 +21,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe*)
   by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that
-  these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1546.008
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1546.008
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
index ae7c7211d4..72679a3a3e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location 
-id: 5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26
-version: 4
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-28'
-description: This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. 
-  This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
+description: This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*`
+  or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
   via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
   data sources, such as Sysmon.
-type: ESCU
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+id: 5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26
+known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results.
+  It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
+name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk"
   AND Filesystem.file_path="C:\\Temp*"  by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name
@@ -22,27 +25,28 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_pid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path,
   process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` '
-known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results.
-  It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
-references: 
-  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
-  - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Phishing Payloads
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1566.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1566.002
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
index ad68010807..2f6eb07522 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,43 @@
-name: Process Execution via WMI
-id: 24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-03-16'
 description: This search looks for processes launched via WMI.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands
+  for legitimate purposes.
+name: Process Execution via WMI
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.parent_process_name = *WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest
   Processes.process_name  | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands
-  for legitimate purposes.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1047
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1047
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
index 1f2397e669..1695100cc1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Processes launching netsh
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e
-version: 3
+author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-10'
 description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line
   scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify
@@ -10,33 +8,39 @@ description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a com
   executing commands via the command line.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-type: ESCU
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e
+known_false_positives: Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside
+  of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run
+  commands.
+name: Processes launching netsh
 references: []
-author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process=*netsh* by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside
-  of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run
-  commands.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Netsh Abuse
   - Disabling Security Tools
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1562.004
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.004
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
index 90b15bb425..fcc7105c7c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
-name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys
-id: 8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf
-version: 5
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-26'
 description: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows
   services and their configurations.
-type: ESCU
+id: 8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf
+known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly
+  manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior.
+  It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
+name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name)
   as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
@@ -14,29 +15,32 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly
-  manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior.
-  It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1574.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1574.011
   nist:
   - PR.IP
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.AT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
index 51e4bcfbc2..4642b77040 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases
-id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-26'
 description: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility
   shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
@@ -9,31 +7,37 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the C
   such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used
   for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to
   the registry.
-type: ESCU
+id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb
+known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases
+  for compatibility purposes for legacy applications
+name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
   as registry_key_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
   where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB*
   by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases
-  for compatibility purposes for legacy applications
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1546.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1546.011
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
index bc486e1190..9653639e18 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Registry Keys Used For Persistence
-id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b
-version: 5
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-27'
 description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used
   to launch an application or service at system startup.
@@ -10,9 +8,11 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
   used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
   to the registry.
-type: ESCU
+id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b
+known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute on
+  system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
+name: Registry Keys Used For Persistence
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
   as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*currentversion\\run*
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr
   NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*" OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh\\*)
   by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute on
-  system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
@@ -34,18 +32,24 @@ tags:
   - Ransomware
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1547.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1547.001
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
index 049395f3af..aa01bc3d8a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation
-id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-27'
 description: This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used
   to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are
@@ -12,33 +10,39 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
   used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
   to the registry.
-type: ESCU
+id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e
+known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon
+  system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
+name: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation
 references:
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows
   NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_key_name=GlobalFlag
   OR Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) by Registry.dest  Registry.user Registry.registry_path
   Registry.registry_key_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon
-  system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1546.012
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1546.012
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
index df8ab52e44..b3020029c0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI
-id: d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da
-version: 5
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-30'
 description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn
   a process on a remote system.
@@ -9,36 +7,42 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da
+known_false_positives: The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may
+  be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration,
+  but it's relatively uncommon.
+name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = wmic.exe Processes.process="*/node*" Processes.process="*process*"
   Processes.process="*call*" Processes.process="*create*"   by Processes.process_name
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`'
-known_false_positives: The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may
-  be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration,
-  but it's relatively uncommon.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ransomware
   - Suspicious WMI Use
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1047
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1047
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
index a7d04547be..7344015802 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal
-id: 6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-30'
 description: This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may
   abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice
@@ -12,30 +10,36 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833
+known_false_positives: While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling
+  a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process
+name: RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = rundll32.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`'
-known_false_positives: While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling
-  a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Unusual Processes
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
index 7d6363e5be..c5971dea5e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Ryuk Test Files Detected
-id: 57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-06'
 description: The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any
   folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.
@@ -8,29 +6,35 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+id: 57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3
+known_false_positives: If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might
+  trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.
+name: Ryuk Test Files Detected
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE "Filesystem.file_path"=C:\\*Ryuk*
   BY "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`'
-known_false_positives: If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might
-  trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.
 tags:
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1486
   analytics_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1486
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
index 3908a5cae9..93409aea4d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Samsam Test File Write
-id: 493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-14'
 description: The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system
   directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.
@@ -8,29 +6,35 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+id: 493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e
+known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified.
+name: Samsam Test File Write
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name)
   as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\windows\\system32\\test.txt
   by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`'
-known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified.
 tags:
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1486
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1486
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
index 05d618c672..d39591da5b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,19 @@
-name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services
-id: f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d
-version: 4
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or
   modification of a Windows service.
-type: ESCU
+id: f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d
+known_false_positives: Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However,
+  there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate
+  and investigate as appropriate.
+name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process="* create *" OR Processes.process="*
   config *") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However,
-  there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate
-  and investigate as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
@@ -24,22 +22,28 @@ tags:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Disabling Security Tools
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1543.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1543.003
   nist:
   - PR.IP
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.AT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
index fbc4146c75..a1ab432e49 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,43 @@
-name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD
-id: d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c
-version: 5
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-17'
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
-  that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, 
-  and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. 
+  that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with
+  the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c
+known_false_positives: Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely
+  done by admins as well
+name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe
   (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely done by admins as well
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1053.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 3
-  nist:
-  - PR.IP
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.005
+  nist:
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
index b3e5c247f6..18f3bb801c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Schtasks scheduling job on remote system
-id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate a job is being scheduled on a remote system.
@@ -9,32 +7,38 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6
+known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on remote systems, but this
+  activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to
+  validate and investigate as appropriate.
+name: Schtasks scheduling job on remote system
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe
   Processes.process="*/create*" (Processes.process="* /s *" OR Processes.process="*
   /S *") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on remote systems, but this
-  activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to
-  validate and investigate as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Lateral Movement
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1053.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 3
-  nist:
-  - PR.IP
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.005
+  nist:
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
index 04cb8c6246..1c19e2bec7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
@@ -1,37 +1,41 @@
-name: Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
-id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6
-version: 4
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-07'
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting logs
   with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using
   Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6
+known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to
+  perform updates, maintenance, etc.
+name: Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process="*/create
   *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to
-  perform updates, maintenance, etc.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1053.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 3
-  nist:
-  - PR.IP
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.005
+  nist:
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 69de98ce68..19a7af0444 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,43 @@
-name: Script Execution via WMI
-id: aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-03-16'
 description: This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts
+  for legitimate purposes.
+name: Script Execution via WMI
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = "scrcons.exe" by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name  |
   `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts
-  for legitimate purposes.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1047
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1047
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
index 9e9c14e34d..7180a3a3f0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Shim Database File Creation
-id: 6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-08'
 description: This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories.
   The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According
@@ -11,30 +9,36 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+id: 6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33
+known_false_positives: Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the
+  time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating
+  events, it may warrant further investigation.
+name: Shim Database File Creation
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
   values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path  min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\AppPatch\\Custom*
   by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the
-  time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating
-  events, it may warrant further investigation.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1546.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1546.011
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
index 6b23449e1d..c71fcd12e9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters
-id: 404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-23'
 description: This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently
   create a shim database.  The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database
@@ -12,28 +10,34 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1546.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1546.011
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
index 230328d096..83de551b77 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-name: Short Lived Windows Accounts
-id: b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-06'
 description: This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short
   time period.
 how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management
   Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs.  More
   information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/'
-type: ESCU
+id: b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d
+known_false_positives: It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an
+  account in a short time period.  Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.
+name: Short Lived Windows Accounts
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as
   result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h
@@ -17,21 +17,25 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id)
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726
   | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count
   user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an
-  account in a short time period.  Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1136.001
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
-  nist:
-  - PR.IP
-  security_domain: access
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1136.001
+  nist:
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: access
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
index d0f669641e..73aedc349b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Single Letter Process On Endpoint
-id: a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-08'
 description: This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
@@ -8,9 +6,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4
+known_false_positives: Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate
+  this activity with your normal incident-response process.
+name: Single Letter Process On Endpoint
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user,
   Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
@@ -18,22 +18,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == ".exe", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5
   AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name
   | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate
-  this activity with your normal incident-response process.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1204.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 2
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1204.002
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 3a277f3db7..a7b529d706 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,60 +1,57 @@
-name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules
-id: 759a653f-cb92-40f9-94c9-ec4e47b0f709
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-03'
-description: This detection indicates use of Mimikatz modules that facilitate Pass-the-Token attack, Golden or Silver kerberos ticket attack, and Skeleton key attack.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-   - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-   - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-03'
+description: This detection indicates use of Mimikatz modules that facilitate Pass-the-Token
+  attack, Golden or Silver kerberos ticket attack, and Skeleton key attack.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules which apply stolen credentials.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 759a653f-cb92-40f9-94c9-ec4e47b0f709
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND (
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::ptt/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::golden/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::silver/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::skeleton/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::ptt/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)kerberos::golden/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::silver/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::skeleton/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules which apply stolen credentials."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1055
-    - T1068
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
-    - T1134
-    - T1543
-    - T1547
-    - T1548
-    - T1554
-    - T1556
-    - T1558
+  - T1055
+  - T1068
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
+  - T1134
+  - T1543
+  - T1547
+  - T1548
+  - T1554
+  - T1556
+  - T1558
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index a4d98d908f..2c15d21a0e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,63 +1,61 @@
-name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules
-id: 270b482d-2af2-448f-9923-9cf005f61be4
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-03'
-description: Stolen credentials are applied by methods such as user impersonation, credential injection, spoofing of authentication processes or getting hold of critical accounts.
-  This detection indicates such activities carried out by PowerSploit exploit kit APIs. 
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-03'
+description: Stolen credentials are applied by methods such as user impersonation,
+  credential injection, spoofing of authentication processes or getting hold of critical
+  accounts. This detection indicates such activities carried out by PowerSploit exploit
+  kit APIs.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that apply stolen credentials,
+  including the module for credential injection, token manipulation, user impersonation,
+  getting the system, and change of identities.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 270b482d-2af2-448f-9923-9cf005f61be4
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-CredentialInjection/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-TokenManipulation/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-UserImpersonation/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-System/)=true OR 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-RevertToSelf/)=true  
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-CredentialInjection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Invoke-TokenManipulation/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-UserImpersonation/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-System/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-RevertToSelf/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that apply stolen credentials, 
- including the module for credential injection, token manipulation, user impersonation, getting the system, and change of identities."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1055
-    - T1068
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
-    - T1134
-    - T1543
-    - T1547
-    - T1548
-    - T1554
-    - T1556
-    - T1558
+  - T1055
+  - T1068
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
+  - T1134
+  - T1543
+  - T1547
+  - T1548
+  - T1554
+  - T1556
+  - T1558
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index f0c9285536..2b787f072c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,52 +1,49 @@
-name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules
-id: 5526d3a4-2497-4e8d-9d3c-7a34c9aace2f
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-03'
-description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that verify password strength, i.e., identify week accounts that would be easily compromised.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-03'
+description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that verify password
+  strength, i.e., identify week accounts that would be easily compromised.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules which assess password strength.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 5526d3a4-2497-4e8d-9d3c-7a34c9aace2f
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND ( 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Test-PasswordQuality/)=true 
-        )    
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Test-PasswordQuality/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules which assess password strength."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
-    - T1087
-    - T1201
-    - T1552
-    - T1555
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
+  - T1087
+  - T1201
+  - T1552
+  - T1555
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows 
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index d1edada072..8bc4ee3dd8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -1,57 +1,49 @@
-name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA
-id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03
-version: 1
-date: '2020-6-04'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+date: 2020-6-04
 description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export
   of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting windows endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints.
-type: SSA
-references: ['https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml']
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-search: '
-| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
-| eval process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
-       dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)
-| where process_name="cmd.exe" OR process_name="reg.exe"
-| where cmd_line != null  AND 
-        match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)save\s+/)=true AND
-        ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\Security/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\SAM/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\System/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System/)=true 
-        )
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-end_time = timestamp,
-entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id),
-body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();
-'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting windows endpoint data that tracks process
+  activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints.
+id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03
 known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA
+references:
+- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)) | eval process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_name"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string",
+  null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)
+  | where process_name="cmd.exe" OR process_name="reg.exe" | where cmd_line != null  AND
+  match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)save\s+/)=true AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\Security/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\SAM/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\System/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System/)=true
+  ) | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id,
+  dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  required_fields:
-    - process_name
-    - _time
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
index 34fbeb3b19..4002328d02 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
@@ -1,62 +1,58 @@
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion modules
-id: 73e23834-c7ad-4860-bfd0-7d8ffe6527c2
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-21'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  DSInternals is a collection of PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-21'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals
+  is a collection of PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for credential extraction
+  and conversion.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 73e23834-c7ad-4860-bfd0-7d8ffe6527c2
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion
+  modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND ( 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-KerberosKey/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-LMHash/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-NTHash/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-OrgIdHash/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-UnicodePassword/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_path"), "string", null), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"),
+  "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-KerberosKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)ConvertTo-LMHash/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-NTHash/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-OrgIdHash/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)ConvertTo-UnicodePassword/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for credential extraction and conversion."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - _time
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - process_name
-    - parent_process_name
-    - _time
-    - process_path
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 0ceec5a47e..b72b432b63 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,66 +1,58 @@
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules
-id: 5d2172f0-8a7d-4ecd-aad9-2dcc95699e0d
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-21'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  DSInternals is a collection of PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-21'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals
+  is a collection of PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for credential extraction.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 5d2172f0-8a7d-4ecd-aad9-2dcc95699e0d
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND (           
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBBackupKey/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBDomainController/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBKdsRootKey/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADKeyCredential/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADReplAccount/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADReplBackupKey/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADSIAccount/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-AzureADUserEx/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-BootKey/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-LsaBackupKey/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-LsaPolicyInformation/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-SamPasswordPolicy/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_path"), "string", null), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"),
+  "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBBackupKey/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBDomainController/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-ADDBKdsRootKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADKeyCredential/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-ADReplAccount/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADReplBackupKey/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADSIAccount/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-AzureADUserEx/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-BootKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-LsaBackupKey/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-LsaPolicyInformation/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-SamPasswordPolicy/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for credential extraction."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - _time
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - process_name
-    - parent_process_name
-    - _time
-    - process_path
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
index f26fb9107f..e18dbbad83 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
@@ -1,58 +1,56 @@
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option
-id: 312582f2-5e91-42c1-a275-cd67f31373c8
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-18'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  FGdump is a newer version of pwdump tool that extracts NTLM and LanMan password hashes from Windows. 
-  Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes from a system's registry. 
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: []
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-18'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is
+  a newer version of pwdump tool that extracts NTLM and LanMan password hashes from
+  Windows. Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes
+  from a system's registry.
+eli5: This detection identifies one of the inevitable stages of FGdump in which CacheDump
+  is called. Note, CacheDump activity may also be embedded in other exploit tools.
+  For more details on FGdump stages see https://github.com/interference-security/kali-windows-binaries/tree/master/fgdump
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 312582f2-5e91-42c1-a275-cd67f31373c8
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option
+references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null),
-       parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND process_name != null AND parent_process_name != null AND
-        match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)System32\\services.exe/)=true AND
-        match_regex(process_name, /(?i)cachedump\d{0,2}.exe/)=true AND
-        match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\Temp/)=true AND
-        match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-s/)=true 
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"),
+  "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"),
+  "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND process_name != null AND parent_process_name
+  != null AND match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)System32\\services.exe/)=true
+  AND match_regex(process_name, /(?i)cachedump\d{0,2}.exe/)=true AND match_regex(process_path,
+  /(?i)\\Temp/)=true AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-s/)=true
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies one of the inevitable stages of FGdump in which CacheDump is called.
-  Note, CacheDump activity may also be embedded in other exploit tools.
-  For more details on FGdump stages see https://github.com/interference-security/kali-windows-binaries/tree/master/fgdump"
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - _time
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - process_name
-    - parent_process_name
-    - _time
-    - process_path
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
index d553a1c287..4882b9bf59 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
@@ -1,55 +1,53 @@
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option
-id: 3c40b0ef-a03f-460a-9484-e4b9117cbb38
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-18'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  FGdump is a newer version of pwdump tool that extracts NTLM and LanMan password hashes from Windows. 
-  Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes from a system's registry. 
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: []
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-18'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is
+  a newer version of pwdump tool that extracts NTLM and LanMan password hashes from
+  Windows. Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes
+  from a system's registry.
+eli5: This detection identifies one of the stages of FGdump in which CacheDump is
+  called. Note, CacheDump activity may also be embedded in other exploit tools. For
+  more details on FGdump stages see https://github.com/interference-security/kali-windows-binaries/tree/master/fgdump
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 3c40b0ef-a03f-460a-9484-e4b9117cbb38
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option
+references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND process_name != null AND process_path != null AND
-        match_regex(process_name, /(?i)cachedump\d{0,2}.exe/)=true AND
-        match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\Temp/)=true AND
-        match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-v/)=true 
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"),
+  "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND process_name != null AND process_path
+  != null AND match_regex(process_name, /(?i)cachedump\d{0,2}.exe/)=true AND match_regex(process_path,
+  /(?i)\\Temp/)=true AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-v/)=true
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies one of the stages of FGdump in which CacheDump is called.
-  Note, CacheDump activity may also be embedded in other exploit tools.
-  For more details on FGdump stages see https://github.com/interference-security/kali-windows-binaries/tree/master/fgdump"
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - _time
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - process_name
-    - _time
-    - process_path
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
index 51adcf6a30..dddf72a75a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
@@ -1,47 +1,48 @@
-name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and DSInternals
-id: e4f126b5-e6bc-4a5c-b1a8-d07bc6c4a49f
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-18'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  PowerSploit and DSInternals are common exploit APIs offering PowerShell modules for various exploits of Windows and Active Directory environments.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: []
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-18'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit
+  and DSInternals are common exploit APIs offering PowerShell modules for various
+  exploits of Windows and Active Directory environments.
+eli5: This detection identifies triggering of the PowerSploit or DSInternals for extraction
+  of all accounts from a previously dumped ntds.dit credential store.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: e4f126b5-e6bc-4a5c-b1a8-d07bc6c4a49f
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and
+  DSInternals
+references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBAccount/)=true AND
-        match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-dbpath[\s;:\.\|]+/)=true
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBAccount/)=true AND match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)\-dbpath[\s;:\.\|]+/)=true
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies triggering of the PowerSploit or DSInternals for extraction of all accounts from a previously dumped ntds.dit credential store."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.IP
-    - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
index 6c4ccfadc5..efc6041973 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
@@ -1,48 +1,48 @@
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options
-id: 341975fa-4ad0-4f01-9acc-df4f69742db7
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-18'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  LaZagne is a tool that extracts various kinds of credentials from a local computer, including account passwords, domain passwords, browser passwords, etc.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: []
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-18'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. LaZagne is
+  a tool that extracts various kinds of credentials from a local computer, including
+  account passwords, domain passwords, browser passwords, etc.
+eli5: This detection identifies the most common LaZagne invocation, in which it is
+  instructed to extract all available passwords and output them to a file. For more
+  details on LaZagne see https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 341975fa-4ad0-4f01-9acc-df4f69742db7
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options
+references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)all\s+\-oA\s+\-output/)=true  
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)all\s+\-oA\s+\-output/)=true
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies the most common LaZagne invocation, in which it is instructed to extract all available passwords and output them to a file.
-  For more details on LaZagne see https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne"
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
-    - T1555
+  - T1003
+  - T1555
   nist:
-    - PR.IP
-    - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
index a0c1fb08ee..681d19d718 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,58 +1,53 @@
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules
-id: 966b635f-98e8-4aa4-9b49-47ed2cedcc85
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-21'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  Mimikatz is a collection of tools and modules commonly employed in Windows exploits.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-21'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Mimikatz
+  is a collection of tools and modules commonly employed in Windows exploits.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules when they are specified directly
+  in a command line. This is less common use of Mimikatz, as most demos show interactive
+  use of this tool. Nevertheless, specifying Mimikatz modules in a command line is
+  possible and enables scripted/programmed attacks.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 966b635f-98e8-4aa4-9b49-47ed2cedcc85
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND (
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)CRYPTO::Certificates/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)CRYPTO::keys/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::list/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::tgt/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::sam/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::secrets/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::cache/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::lsa/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::trust/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::backupkeys/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)CRYPTO::Certificates/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)CRYPTO::keys/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::list/)=true OR
+  match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::tgt/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::sam/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::secrets/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::cache/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::lsa/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::trust/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::backupkeys/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules when they are specified directly in a command line. This is less common use of Mimikatz, as most demos show interactive use of this tool.
-Nevertheless, specifying Mimikatz modules in a command line is possible and enables scripted/programmed attacks."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
index 905e04ef41..047d28778c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
@@ -1,57 +1,57 @@
-name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel
-id: c20bb8ec-e1b0-4640-b0ef-3a4c54f8c112
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-18'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  Native Microsoft debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential material directly from
-  memory and process dumps.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: [https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29]
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-18'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft
+  debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential
+  material directly from memory and process dumps.
+eli5: This detection spots when native Microsoft debuggers ask for something inside
+  the kernel (via ForceV1) while retrieving credentials.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: c20bb8ec-e1b0-4640-b0ef-3a4c54f8c112
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative
+  of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this
+  is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through
+  code, not analyze its crash dumps.
+name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel
+references:
+- https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND parent_process_name != null AND process_name != null  AND  
-          ( match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)ntkd\.exe/)=true OR
-            match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)livekd\.exe/)=true
-          ) AND
-          match_regex(process_name, /(?i)conhost\.exe/)=true AND
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)0xffffffff/)=true AND
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-ForceV1/)=true
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_name"), "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "parent_process_name"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND parent_process_name
+  != null AND process_name != null  AND ( match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)ntkd\.exe/)=true
+  OR match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)livekd\.exe/)=true ) AND match_regex(process_name,
+  /(?i)conhost\.exe/)=true AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)0xffffffff/)=true AND match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)\-ForceV1/)=true
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection spots when native Microsoft debuggers ask for something inside the kernel (via ForceV1) while retrieving credentials."
-known_false_positives:
-  "Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. 
-   Note, even for developers this is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through code, not analyze its crash dumps."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.IP
-    - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: medium
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - process_name
-    - parent_process_name
-    - _time
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
index 2f85ddfdbb..603cdf2d05 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
@@ -1,54 +1,52 @@
-name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option
-id: adc51a77-90c9-4358-b43c-f10dd1a27d05
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-18'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  Native Microsoft debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential material directly from
-  memory and process dumps.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: []
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-18'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft
+  debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential
+  material directly from memory and process dumps.
+eli5: This detects use of -z command line option which specifies location of the credentials
+  dump file to native Microsoft debuggers.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: adc51a77-90c9-4358-b43c-f10dd1a27d05
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative
+  of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this
+  is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through
+  code, not analyze its crash dumps.
+name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option
+references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND process_name != null AND 
-          ( 
-            match_regex(process_name, /^(?i)ntkd\.exe/)=true OR
-            match_regex(process_name, /^(?i)kd\.exe/)=true 
-          ) AND 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-z\s+/)=true
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_name"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND process_name != null
+  AND ( match_regex(process_name, /^(?i)ntkd\.exe/)=true OR match_regex(process_name,
+  /^(?i)kd\.exe/)=true ) AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-z\s+/)=true
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detects use of -z command line option which specifies location of the credentials dump file to native Microsoft debuggers."
-known_false_positives:
-  "Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. 
-   Note, even for developers this is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through code, not analyze its crash dumps."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: medium
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - process_name
-    - _time
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
index 22f38fcaf7..ee648a4ae8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,57 +1,51 @@
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules
-id: 5f1186a4-e681-446e-851c-dc9574ad28eb
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-21'
-description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material 
-  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve 
-  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. 
-  PowerSploit is a collection of Microsoft PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-21'
+description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
+  from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
+  decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit
+  is a collection of Microsoft PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for credential extraction.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 5f1186a4-e681-446e-851c-dc9574ad28eb
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ApplicationHost/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-CachedGPPPassword/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-GPPAutologon/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-GPPPassword/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-RegistryAutoLogon/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-SiteListPassword/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-SPNTicket/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Request-SPNTicket/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-VaultCredential/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-Kerberoast/)=true       
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ApplicationHost/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-CachedGPPPassword/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-GPPAutologon/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-GPPPassword/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-RegistryAutoLogon/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-SiteListPassword/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-SPNTicket/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Request-SPNTicket/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-VaultCredential/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Invoke-Kerberoast/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for credential extraction."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
+  - CIS 16
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1003
+  - T1003
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
index 82e92a35ac..bc9166ae1e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
@@ -1,45 +1,46 @@
-name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA
-id: 76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e
-version: 1
-date: '2020-09-15'
-description: This search detects the memory of lsass.exe being dumped for offline credential theft attack.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including Windows command line logging.
-  You can see how we test this with [Event Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml).
-type: SSA
-references: ['https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf']
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event, "_tenant"), "string", null),
-machine=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
-process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)),
-timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null))
-| where process_name LIKE "%rundll32.exe%"
-AND match_regex(process, /(?i)comsvcs.dll[,\s]+MiniDump/)=true
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend(machine),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+date: '2020-09-15'
+description: This search detects the memory of lsass.exe being dumped for offline
+  credential theft attack.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event
+  Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a)
+  on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml).
+id: 76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e
 known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA
+references:
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_tenant"), "string", null), machine=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string",
+  null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)) |
+  where process_name LIKE "%rundll32.exe%" AND match_regex(process, /(?i)comsvcs.dll[,\s]+MiniDump/)=true
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(machine),
+  body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.003
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - _tenant
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  required_fields:
-    - process_name
-    - _tenant
-    - _time
-    - dest_device_id
-    - process
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
index 5aeb1bf935..e2c53569e4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
@@ -1,40 +1,44 @@
-name: Detect Kerberoasting - SSA
-id: dabdd6d7-3e10-42be-8711-4e124f7a3850
-version: 1
+author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-21'
 description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal
   name requests
 how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated
   from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2
-type: SSA
-references: [Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss]
-author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
-search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"), EventCode=map_get(input_event, "event_code"), TicketOptions=map_get(input_event, "ticket_options"), TicketEncryptionType=map_get(input_event, "ticket_encryption_type"), ServiceName=map_get(input_event, "service_name"), ServiceID=map_get(input_event, "service_id")
-| where EventCode="4769" AND TicketOptions="0x40810000" AND TicketEncryptionType="0x17"
-| first_time_event input_columns=["EventCode","TicketOptions","TicketEncryptionType","ServiceName","ServiceID"]
-| where first_time_EventCode_TicketOptions_TicketEncryptionType_ServiceName_ServiceID
-| eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, body="TBD", entities="TBD"
-| select start_time, end_time, entities, body 
-| into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
+id: dabdd6d7-3e10-42be-8711-4e124f7a3850
 known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may
   generate false positives
+name: Detect Kerberoasting - SSA
+references:
+- Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss
+search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"),
+  EventCode=map_get(input_event, "event_code"), TicketOptions=map_get(input_event,
+  "ticket_options"), TicketEncryptionType=map_get(input_event, "ticket_encryption_type"),
+  ServiceName=map_get(input_event, "service_name"), ServiceID=map_get(input_event,
+  "service_id") | where EventCode="4769" AND TicketOptions="0x40810000" AND TicketEncryptionType="0x17"
+  | first_time_event input_columns=["EventCode","TicketOptions","TicketEncryptionType","ServiceName","ServiceID"]
+  | where first_time_EventCode_TicketOptions_TicketEncryptionType_ServiceName_ServiceID
+  | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, body="TBD", entities="TBD" | select start_time,
+  end_time, entities, body | into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
 tags:
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1558.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1558.003
   nist:
   - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  risk_severity: low
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
   required_fields:
-    - service_name
-    - _time
-    - event_code
-    - ticket_encryption_type
-    - service_id
-    - ticket_options
\ No newline at end of file
+  - service_name
+  - _time
+  - event_code
+  - ticket_encryption_type
+  - service_id
+  - ticket_options
+  risk_severity: low
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
index 5d9be08f39..e7f5b813e1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
@@ -1,44 +1,48 @@
-name: Detect Pass the Hash - SSA
-id: 7cd8b9fa-6b0c-424f-92a6-9c5287a72f5f
-version: 1
+author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-21'
 description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows
   Security Event logs to detect potential attempts using Pass-the-Hash technique.
 how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated
   from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2
-type: SSA
-references: [Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss]
-author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
-search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"), EventCode=map_get(input_event, "event_code"), LogonType=map_get(input_event, "logon_type"), LogonProcess=map_get(input_event, "logon_process"), ComputerName=map_get(input_event, "dest_ip_primary_artifact"), AccountName=map_get(input_event, "dest_user_primary_artifact")
-| where (LogonType="3" AND LogonProcess="NtLmSsp" AND AccountName IS NOT NULL) OR (LogonType="9" AND LogonProcess="seclogo")
-| first_time_event input_columns=["EventCode","LogonProcess","ComputerName"]
-| where first_time_EventCode_LogonProcess_ComputerName
-| eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, body="TBD", entities="TBD"
-| select start_time, end_time, entities, body 
-| into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
+id: 7cd8b9fa-6b0c-424f-92a6-9c5287a72f5f
 known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be
   detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
+name: Detect Pass the Hash - SSA
+references:
+- Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss
+search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"),
+  EventCode=map_get(input_event, "event_code"), LogonType=map_get(input_event, "logon_type"),
+  LogonProcess=map_get(input_event, "logon_process"), ComputerName=map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_ip_primary_artifact"), AccountName=map_get(input_event, "dest_user_primary_artifact")
+  | where (LogonType="3" AND LogonProcess="NtLmSsp" AND AccountName IS NOT NULL) OR
+  (LogonType="9" AND LogonProcess="seclogo") | first_time_event input_columns=["EventCode","LogonProcess","ComputerName"]
+  | where first_time_EventCode_LogonProcess_ComputerName | eval start_time=_time,
+  end_time=_time, body="TBD", entities="TBD" | select start_time, end_time, entities,
+  body | into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
 tags:
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1550.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1550.002
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  risk_severity: low
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
   required_fields:
-    - logon_process
-    - dest_user_primary_artifact
-    - _time
-    - event_code
-    - dest_ip_primary_artifact
-    - logon_type
\ No newline at end of file
+  - logon_process
+  - dest_user_primary_artifact
+  - _time
+  - event_code
+  - dest_ip_primary_artifact
+  - logon_type
+  risk_severity: low
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index c164f2ffd8..8e084d054f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -1,64 +1,61 @@
-name: First time seen command line argument - SSA
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23
-version: 1
-date: '2020-6-25'
-description: "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter
-  to execute a command that has not previously been seen. 
-This is an implementation on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel."
-how_to_implement: "You must be populating the endpoint data model for SSA and specifically the process_name and the process fields"
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-type: SSA
-search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
-| eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
-       dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null))
-| where process_name="cmd.exe" AND
-        match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true
-| select cmd_line, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id
-| first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line"]
-| where first_time_cmd_line
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "The subsearch returns all events where `cmd.exe` was used with a `/c` parameter
+date: 2020-6-25
+description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter
+  to execute a command that has not previously been seen. This is an implementation
+  on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel.
+eli5: The subsearch returns all events where `cmd.exe` was used with a `/c` parameter
   in the command-line arguments to execute other commands/programs. It appends the
   historical data to those results in the lookup file. Next, it recalculates the `firstTime`
   and `lastTime` field for command-line execution and outputs this data to the lookup
   file to update the local cache. It returns only those events that have first been
   seen in the past one hour. This is combined with the main search to return the time,
-  user, destination, process, parent process, and value of the command-line argument."
-known_false_positives: "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to
+  user, destination, process, parent process, and value of the command-line argument.
+how_to_implement: You must be populating the endpoint data model for SSA and specifically
+  the process_name and the process fields
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23
+known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to
   execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program
-  is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name"
+  is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter`
+  macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
+name: First time seen command line argument - SSA
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)) | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"),
+  "string", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string",
+  null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
+  cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)) | where process_name="cmd.exe"
+  AND match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true | select cmd_line,
+  timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id | first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line"]
+  | where first_time_cmd_line | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp,
+  entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
   cis20:
-    - CIS 3
-    - CIS 8
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 8
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Command and Control
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack:
-    - Execution
-    - Scripting
-    - Persistence
-    - Command-Line Interface
+  - Execution
+  - Scripting
+  - Persistence
+  - Command-Line Interface
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1059
-    - T1117
-    - T1202
+  - T1059
+  - T1117
+  - T1202
   nist:
-    - PR.PT
-    - DE.CM
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-  required_fields:
-    - process_name
-    - _time
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index b51852f95d..4e0df4a799 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,55 +1,54 @@
-name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules
-id: 01fc7d91-eb0c-478e-8633-e4fa4904463a
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping into http and RDP sessions, etc."
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly
+  access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping
+  into http and RDP sessions, etc.
+eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly
+  access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping
+  into http and RDP sessions, etc.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 01fc7d91-eb0c-478e-8633-e4fa4904463a
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-HttpStatus/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Keystrokes/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-MicrophoneAudio/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetRDPSession/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-TimedScreenshot/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WebConfig/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-HttpStatus/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-Keystrokes/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-MicrophoneAudio/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetRDPSession/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-TimedScreenshot/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WebConfig/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping into http and RDP sessions, etc."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1021
-    - T1113
-    - T1123
-    - T1563
+  - T1021
+  - T1113
+  - T1123
+  - T1563
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6ec710832f..3108f60bf5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,47 +1,44 @@
-name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules
-id: 20fba62a-fa5b-46cc-b39f-473fa248fee2
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create accounts illegaly.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create accounts
+  illegaly.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that create accounts illegaly.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 20fba62a-fa5b-46cc-b39f-473fa248fee2
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)New-DomainUser/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)New-DomainUser/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that create accounts illegaly."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1585
+  - T1585
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index b231b28199..e07dd91688 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,48 +1,47 @@
-name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules
-id: 3e0f9962-9989-445f-878c-939443326b63
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable accounts illegaly.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable
+  accounts illegaly.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable
+  accounts illegaly.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 3e0f9962-9989-445f-878c-939443326b63
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND (           
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Disable-ADDBAccount/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Enable-ADDBAccount/)=true 
-        ) 
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Disable-ADDBAccount/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Enable-ADDBAccount/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable accounts illegaly."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 4cfbb27758..646fabb0f1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,47 +1,45 @@
-name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules
-id: 4ddb3b0d-f95f-4ae2-b4e8-663296453a7b
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event logs."
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event
+  logs.
+eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event logs.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 4ddb3b0d-f95f-4ae2-b4e8-663296453a7b
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND (
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)event::drop/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)event::clear/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)event::drop/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)event::clear/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event logs."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1070
+  - T1070
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 2df76e9031..21f8403896 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,51 +1,50 @@
-name: Illegal Management of Active Directory Elements and Policies via DSInternals modules
-id: a587ca9f-c138-47b4-ba51-699f319b8cc5
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management of Active Directoty elements and policies.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management
+  of Active Directoty elements and policies.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management
+  of Active Directoty elements and policies.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: a587ca9f-c138-47b4-ba51-699f319b8cc5
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Management of Active Directory Elements and Policies via DSInternals
+  modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND ( 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Remove-ADDBObject/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBDomainController/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-LsaPolicyInformation/)=true           
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Remove-ADDBObject/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Set-ADDBDomainController/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-LsaPolicyInformation/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management of Active Directoty elements and policies."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1098
-    - T1207
-    - T1484
+  - T1098
+  - T1207
+  - T1484
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6faf38595e..679fc2a5c3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,53 +1,51 @@
-name: Illegal Management of Computers and Active Directory Elements via PowerSploit modules
-id: 75760c11-7d48-4968-b828-013b299e8f6d
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal management of computers and Active Directory elements."
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
+  management of computers and Active Directory elements.
+eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
+  management of computers and Active Directory elements.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 75760c11-7d48-4968-b828-013b299e8f6d
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Management of Computers and Active Directory Elements via PowerSploit
+  modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-DomainObject/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADObject/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-DomainObjectOwner/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-MasterBootRecord/)=true  
-        )
- 
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-DomainObject/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Set-ADObject/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-DomainObjectOwner/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-MasterBootRecord/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal management of computers and Active Directory elements."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1098
-    - T1207
-    - T1484
+  - T1098
+  - T1207
+  - T1484
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 1429023e6e..36260dcfd1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,53 +1,52 @@
-name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules
-id: 88c10ee9-fe72-4bce-b343-5b129044b991
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly elevate general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable manipulation of registry, task scheduling, persistent WMI, access to OS objects under desired identities."
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly
+  elevate general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable manipulation of registry,
+  task scheduling, persistent WMI, access to OS objects under desired identities.
+eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly elevate
+  general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable registry manipulation, task
+  scheduling, persistent WMI,  access to OS objects under desired identities.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 88c10ee9-fe72-4bce-b343-5b129044b991
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-DomainObjectAcl/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ObjectAcl/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Enable-Privilege/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)New-ElevatedPersistenceOption/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)New-UserPersistenceOption/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-DomainObjectAcl/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Add-ObjectAcl/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Enable-Privilege/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)New-ElevatedPersistenceOption/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)New-UserPersistenceOption/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly elevate general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable registry manipulation, task scheduling, persistent WMI,  access to OS objects under desired identities."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1053
-    - T1134
-    - T1548
+  - T1053
+  - T1134
+  - T1548
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 7c09cd1509..a0b91871b2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,49 +1,46 @@
-name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules
-id: 2f873b1f-6352-4844-b7b9-b419f09a42c7 
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege elevation.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege
+  elevation.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege elevation.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 2f873b1f-6352-4844-b7b9-b419f09a42c7
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)privilege::debug/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)token::elevate/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)privilege::debug/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)token::elevate/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege elevation."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1134
-    - T1548
+  - T1134
+  - T1548
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 073c7640fc..f485fba61e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,55 +1,51 @@
-name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules
-id: aaf3adf1-73e1-4477-b4ee-3771898964f1
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control over services and processes, including the authentication service.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control
+  over services and processes, including the authentication service.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control over services
+  and processes, including the authentication service.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: aaf3adf1-73e1-4477-b4ee-3771898964f1
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)process::start/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::\+/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::\-/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::start/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::stop/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::suspend/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::memssp/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)process::start/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)service::\+/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::\-/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)service::start/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::stop/)=true OR
+  match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::suspend/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::memssp/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control over services and processes, including the authentication service."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1055
-    - T1106
-    - T1569
+  - T1055
+  - T1106
+  - T1569
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index b49d52660d..f4d4b6e8f6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,63 +1,61 @@
-name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules
-id: 0e910e5b-309d-4bc3-8af2-0030c02aa353
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services, injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands, modifying access to service objects, etc."
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-09'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
+  control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services,
+  injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands,
+  modifying access to service objects, etc.
+eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
+  control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services,
+  injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands,
+  modifying access to service objects, etc.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 0e910e5b-309d-4bc3-8af2-0030c02aa353
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Install-SSP/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-CriticalProcess/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Install-ServiceBinary/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Restore-ServiceBinary/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Write-ServiceBinary/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ServiceBinaryPath/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-DllInjection/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ServiceAbuse/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-Shellcode/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-WScriptUACBypass/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-WmiCommand/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Write-HijackDll/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ServiceDacl/)=true 
-        )
- 
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Install-SSP/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Set-CriticalProcess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Install-ServiceBinary/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Restore-ServiceBinary/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Write-ServiceBinary/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ServiceBinaryPath/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Invoke-DllInjection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ServiceAbuse/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-Shellcode/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-WScriptUACBypass/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-WmiCommand/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Write-HijackDll/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ServiceDacl/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services, injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands, modifying access to service objects, etc."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1055
-    - T1106
-    - T1569
+  - T1055
+  - T1106
+  - T1569
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 4fde4e1318..4714b73694 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,51 +1,48 @@
-name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules
-id: d405af5d-99f1-45af-8dfb-b8f98b764247
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-04'
-description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitate access probing with admin credentials as well as probing access to system services.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-04'
+description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitate
+  access probing with admin credentials as well as probing access to system services.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that probe use of admin
+  credentials as well as access to system services.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: d405af5d-99f1-45af-8dfb-b8f98b764247
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-             match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Test-AdminAccess/)=true OR
-             match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess/)=true OR
-             match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Test-ServiceDaclPermission/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Test-AdminAccess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Test-ServiceDaclPermission/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that probe use of admin credentials as well as access to system services."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_user_id
-    - dest_device_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_user_id
+  - dest_device_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
index eb5c2f83f9..f0d43db6c4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
@@ -1,71 +1,60 @@
-name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - SSA
-id: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94
-version: 1
-date: '2020-7-13'
-description: "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that
-is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.
-This is a SPL2 implementation of the rule `Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe` by @bpatel."
-how_to_implement: "You must be ingesting sysmon logs. 
-This search has been modified to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP."
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-type: SSA
+date: 2020-7-13
+description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that
+  is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. This is
+  a SPL2 implementation of the rule `Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe`
+  by @bpatel.
+eli5: Obtaining access to the Command-Line Interface (CLI) is typically a primary
+  attacker goal. Once an attacker has obtained the ability to execute code on a target
+  system, they will often further manipulate the system via commands passed to the
+  CLI. It is also unusual for many applications to spawn a command shell during normal
+  operation, while it is often observed if an application has been compromised in
+  some way. As such, it is often beneficial to look for cmd.exe being executed by
+  processes that are often targeted for exploitation, or that would not spawn cmd.exe
+  in any other circumstances. A lookup file is provided to easily modify the processes
+  that are being watched for execution of cmd.exe.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon logs. This search has been modified
+  to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP.
+id: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94
+known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately
+  execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify
+  the lookup file, as appropriate.
+name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - SSA
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
-| eval process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)),
-dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
-dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
+  | eval process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
+  parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null)), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
+  dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)
 
-| where process_name="cmd.exe"
-| rex field=parent_process "(?<field0>[^\\\\]+)$"
-| where field0="winword.exe" OR
-        field0="excel.exe" OR
-        field0="outlook.exe" OR
-        field0="powerpnt.exe" OR
-        field0="visio.exe" OR
-        field0="mspub.exe" OR
-        field0="acrobat.exe" OR
-        field0="acrord32.exe" OR
-        field0="chrome.exe" OR
-        field0="iexplore.exe" OR
-        field0="opera.exe" OR
-        field0="firefox.exe" OR
-        field0="java.exe" OR
-        field0="powershell.exe"
+  | where process_name="cmd.exe" | rex field=parent_process "(?<field0>[^\\\\]+)$"
+  | where field0="winword.exe" OR field0="excel.exe" OR field0="outlook.exe" OR field0="powerpnt.exe"
+  OR field0="visio.exe" OR field0="mspub.exe" OR field0="acrobat.exe" OR field0="acrord32.exe"
+  OR field0="chrome.exe" OR field0="iexplore.exe" OR field0="opera.exe" OR field0="firefox.exe"
+  OR field0="java.exe" OR field0="powershell.exe"
 
-| eval start_time=timestamp,
-end_time=timestamp,
-entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id),
-body="TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "Obtaining access to the Command-Line Interface (CLI) is typically a primary
-         attacker goal. Once an attacker has obtained the ability to execute code on a target
-         system, they will often further manipulate the system via commands passed to the
-         CLI. It is also unusual for many applications to spawn a command shell during normal
-         operation, while it is often observed if an application has been compromised in
-         some way. As such, it is often beneficial to look for cmd.exe being executed by
-         processes that are often targeted for exploitation, or that would not spawn cmd.exe
-         in any other circumstances. A lookup file is provided to easily modify the processes
-         that are being watched for execution of cmd.exe."
-known_false_positives: "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately
-                          execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify
-                          the lookup file, as appropriate."
+  | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id,
+  dest_user_id), body="TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
   cis20:
-    - CIS 8
+  - CIS 8
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Exploitation
+  - Exploitation
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1059
+  - T1059
   nist:
-    - PR.PT
-    - DE.CM
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-  required_fields:
-    - process_name
-    - parent_process_name
-    - _time
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
index a1b93715cd..baf88556f6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
@@ -1,131 +1,79 @@
-name: Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship
-id: e03aa905-6549-4e34-b304-7a922185b2c4
-version: 1
+author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-13'
 description: An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applications
-  not typically used by system administrators.
-  This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to find rare parent/child
-  relationships.
-  The list of application has been extracted from https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries
+  not typically used by system administrators. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming
+  ML DSP plugin to find rare parent/child relationships. The list of application has
+  been extracted from https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries
 how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
-references: []
-type: SSA
-author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
-| eval parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)),
-parent_process_name=mvindex(split(parent_process, "\\"), -1),
-process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)),
-dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
-dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)
-| where parent_process_name!=null
-| select parent_process_name, process_name, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id
-| conditional_anomaly conditional="parent_process_name" target="process_name"
-| rename output as input
-| where input < 1
-| adaptive_threshold algorithm="quantile" entity="parent_process_name" window=604800000L
-| where label AND quantile<0.1 AND (process_name="powershell.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="regsvcs.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="ftp.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="dfsvc.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="rasautou.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="schtasks.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="xwizard.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="findstr.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="esentutl.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="cscript.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="reg.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="csc.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="atbroker.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="print.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="pcwrun.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="vbc.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="rpcping.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="wsreset.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="ilasm.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="certutil.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="replace.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="mshta.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="bitsadmin.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="wscript.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="ieexec.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="cmd.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="runscripthelper.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="makecab.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="forfiles.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="desktopimgdownldr.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="control.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="msbuild.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="register-cimprovider.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="tttracer.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="ie4uinit.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="sc.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="bash.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="hh.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="cmstp.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="mmc.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="jsc.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="scriptrunner.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="odbcconf.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="extexport.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="msdt.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="diskshadow.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="extrac32.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="eventvwr.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="mavinject.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="regasm.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="gpscript.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="rundll32.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="regsvr32.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="regedit.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="msiexec.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="gfxdownloadwrapper.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="presentationhost.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="regini.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="wmic.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="runonce.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="syncappvpublishingserver.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="verclsid.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="psr.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="infdefaultinstall.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="explorer.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="expand.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="installutil.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="netsh.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="wab.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="dnscmd.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="at.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="pcalua.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="cmdkey.exe" OR
-                                      process_name="msconfig.exe")
+id: e03aa905-6549-4e34-b304-7a922185b2c4
+known_false_positives: 'Some custom tools used by admins could be used rarely to launch
+  remotely applications. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when
+  it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-end_time = timestamp,
-entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id),
-body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-known_false_positives: > 
- Some custom tools used by admins could be used rarely to launch remotely applications.
- This might trigger false positives at the beginning when it hasn't collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
+  '
+name: Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship
+references: []
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)) | eval parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "parent_process_name"), "string", null)), parent_process_name=mvindex(split(parent_process,
+  "\\"), -1), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string",
+  null)), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
+  dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null) | where
+  parent_process_name!=null | select parent_process_name, process_name, timestamp,
+  dest_device_id, dest_user_id | conditional_anomaly conditional="parent_process_name"
+  target="process_name" | rename output as input | where input < 1 | adaptive_threshold
+  algorithm="quantile" entity="parent_process_name" window=604800000L | where label
+  AND quantile<0.1 AND (process_name="powershell.exe" OR process_name="regsvcs.exe"
+  OR process_name="ftp.exe" OR process_name="dfsvc.exe" OR process_name="rasautou.exe"
+  OR process_name="schtasks.exe" OR process_name="xwizard.exe" OR process_name="findstr.exe"
+  OR process_name="esentutl.exe" OR process_name="cscript.exe" OR process_name="reg.exe"
+  OR process_name="csc.exe" OR process_name="atbroker.exe" OR process_name="print.exe"
+  OR process_name="pcwrun.exe" OR process_name="vbc.exe" OR process_name="rpcping.exe"
+  OR process_name="wsreset.exe" OR process_name="ilasm.exe" OR process_name="certutil.exe"
+  OR process_name="replace.exe" OR process_name="mshta.exe" OR process_name="bitsadmin.exe"
+  OR process_name="wscript.exe" OR process_name="ieexec.exe" OR process_name="cmd.exe"
+  OR process_name="microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe" OR process_name="runscripthelper.exe"
+  OR process_name="makecab.exe" OR process_name="forfiles.exe" OR process_name="desktopimgdownldr.exe"
+  OR process_name="control.exe" OR process_name="msbuild.exe" OR process_name="register-cimprovider.exe"
+  OR process_name="tttracer.exe" OR process_name="ie4uinit.exe" OR process_name="sc.exe"
+  OR process_name="bash.exe" OR process_name="hh.exe" OR process_name="cmstp.exe"
+  OR process_name="mmc.exe" OR process_name="jsc.exe" OR process_name="scriptrunner.exe"
+  OR process_name="odbcconf.exe" OR process_name="extexport.exe" OR process_name="msdt.exe"
+  OR process_name="diskshadow.exe" OR process_name="extrac32.exe" OR process_name="eventvwr.exe"
+  OR process_name="mavinject.exe" OR process_name="regasm.exe" OR process_name="gpscript.exe"
+  OR process_name="rundll32.exe" OR process_name="regsvr32.exe" OR process_name="regedit.exe"
+  OR process_name="msiexec.exe" OR process_name="gfxdownloadwrapper.exe" OR process_name="presentationhost.exe"
+  OR process_name="regini.exe" OR process_name="wmic.exe" OR process_name="runonce.exe"
+  OR process_name="syncappvpublishingserver.exe" OR process_name="verclsid.exe" OR
+  process_name="psr.exe" OR process_name="infdefaultinstall.exe" OR process_name="explorer.exe"
+  OR process_name="expand.exe" OR process_name="installutil.exe" OR process_name="netsh.exe"
+  OR process_name="wab.exe" OR process_name="dnscmd.exe" OR process_name="at.exe"
+  OR process_name="pcalua.exe" OR process_name="cmdkey.exe" OR process_name="msconfig.exe")
+
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id,
+  dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1203
-    - T1059
-    - T1053
-    - T1072
-  kill_chain_phases:
-    - Exploitation
   cis20:
-   - CIS 8
+  - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_technique_id:
+  - T1203
+  - T1059
+  - T1053
+  - T1072
   nist:
-    - PR.PT
-    - DE.CM
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-  required_fields:
-    - process_name
-    - parent_process_name
-    - _time
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 76676e1841..242fca9c04 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,68 +1,66 @@
-name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules
-id: 3d8bd7f3-1061-4ac7-9225-6764cc0684d7
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-05'
-description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover opportunities for malicious access and persistence. Some examples include access to admin accounts, weak access control policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data to exfiltrate, registry locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities, as well as services and system files that can be compromised.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-05'
+description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover opportunities
+  for malicious access and persistence. Some examples include access to admin accounts,
+  weak access control policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data
+  to exfiltrate, registry locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities,
+  as well as services and system files that can be compromised.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover access and
+  persistence opportunities, including access to admin accounts, weak access control
+  policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data to exfiltrate, registry
+  locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities, as well as
+  services and system files that can be compromised.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 3d8bd7f3-1061-4ac7-9225-6764cc0684d7
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-LocalAdminAccess/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-InterestingDomainAcl/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ACLScanner/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-PathDLLHijack/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ProcessDLLHijack/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainObjectAcl/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ObjectAcl/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainPolicy/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiablePath/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiableRegistryAutoRun/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiableScheduledTaskFile/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiableService/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiableServiceFile/)=true OR 
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-PathAcl/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-UnattendedInstallFile/)=true OR
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-UnquotedService/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-LocalAdminAccess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Find-InterestingDomainAcl/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ACLScanner/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-PathDLLHijack/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Find-ProcessDLLHijack/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainObjectAcl/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ObjectAcl/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainPolicy/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiablePath/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-ModifiableRegistryAutoRun/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiableScheduledTaskFile/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiableService/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-ModifiableServiceFile/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-PathAcl/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-UnattendedInstallFile/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-UnquotedService/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover access and persistence opportunities, including access to admin accounts, weak access control policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data to exfiltrate, registry locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities, as well as services and system files that can be compromised."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1053
-    - T1068
-    - T1078
-    - T1543
-    - T1547
-    - T1574
+  - T1053
+  - T1068
+  - T1078
+  - T1543
+  - T1547
+  - T1574
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index aa48c598d7..696abe8b15 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,85 +1,69 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules
-id: 63422f8e-766c-468f-8133-2ba6795e263b
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-05'
-description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover accounts, groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-05'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
+  accounts, groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover accounts,
+  groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 63422f8e-766c-468f-8133-2ba6795e263b
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainLocalGroupMember/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainUserEvent/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-EventHunter/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainUserLocation/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-UserHunter/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainForeignGroupMember/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ForeignGroup/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainForeignUser/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ForeignUser/)=true OR 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPO/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGPO/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-GPOComputerAdmin/)=true OR 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGPOGroup/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-GPOLocation/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGroup/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGroup/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGroupMember/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGroupMember/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ManagedSecurityGroups/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainOU/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetOU/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainUser/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetUser/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainUserEvent/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-UserEvent/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetLocalGroup/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetLocalGroupMember/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetLoggedon/)=true OR 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-RegLoggedOn/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-LastLoggedOn/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainLocalGroupMember/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainUserEvent/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-EventHunter/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Find-DomainUserLocation/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-UserHunter/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainForeignGroupMember/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Find-ForeignGroup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainForeignUser/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ForeignUser/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPO/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGPO/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-GPOComputerAdmin/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGPOGroup/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Find-GPOLocation/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGroup/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGroup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGroupMember/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGroupMember/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ManagedSecurityGroups/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainOU/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetOU/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainUser/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetUser/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainUserEvent/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-UserEvent/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetLocalGroup/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetLocalGroupMember/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-NetLoggedon/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-RegLoggedOn/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-LastLoggedOn/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover accounts, groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1078
-    - T1087
-    - T1484
+  - T1078
+  - T1087
+  - T1484
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 04b0a2bd86..6167760a40 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,51 +1,48 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules
-id: 1bce67aa-3fc4-4886-9089-67f0bfebbef6
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-05'
-description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts and groups and access to them.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-05'
+description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts
+  and groups and access to them.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts
+  and groups and access to them.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 1bce67aa-3fc4-4886-9089-67f0bfebbef6
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)net::user/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)net::group/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)net::user/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)net::group/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts and groups and access to them."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1078
-    - T1087
-    - T1484
+  - T1078
+  - T1087
+  - T1484
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 398dc25c07..fe8e0fe659 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,68 +1,62 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit modules
-id: db08ac40-ee14-43e9-9a75-dddd059ef812
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-06'
-description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance and access to elements of Active Directory infrastructure, such as domain identifiers, AD sites and forests, and trust relations.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-06'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance
+  and access to elements of Active Directory infrastructure, such as domain identifiers,
+  AD sites and forests, and trust relations.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance and
+  access to Active Directory infrastructure - identifiers, sites, forests and trust
+  relations.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: db08ac40-ee14-43e9-9a75-dddd059ef812
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit
+  modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainSID/)=true OR          
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainSite/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetSite/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainSubnet/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetSubnet/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainTrust/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetDomainTrust/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainTrustMapping/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-MapDomainTrust/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Forest/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForest/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ForestDomain/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForestDomain/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ForestGlobalCatalog/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForestCatalog/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ForestTrust/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForestTrust/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainSID/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-DomainSite/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetSite/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-DomainSubnet/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetSubnet/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainTrust/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetDomainTrust/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainTrustMapping/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Invoke-MapDomainTrust/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Forest/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForest/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ForestDomain/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForestDomain/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-ForestGlobalCatalog/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForestCatalog/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ForestTrust/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForestTrust/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance and access to Active Directory infrastructure - identifiers, sites, forests and trust relations."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1199
-    - T1482
-    - T1590
-    - T1591
-    - T1595
+  - T1199
+  - T1482
+  - T1590
+  - T1591
+  - T1595
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 98b8898290..bc3bb683c6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,58 +1,52 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules
-id: fe1c4c5a-09f3-4b43-8129-560a7f38a08b
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-06'
-description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover computers, servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-06'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
+  computers, servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover computers,
+  servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: fe1c4c5a-09f3-4b43-8129-560a7f38a08b
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ComputerDetail/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Domain/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetDomain/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainComputer/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetComputer/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainController/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetDomainController/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainFileServer/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetFileServer/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ComputerDetail/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-Domain/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetDomain/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-DomainComputer/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetComputer/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainController/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-NetDomainController/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainFileServer/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetFileServer/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover computers, servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1592
-    - T1590
-    - T1087
+  - T1592
+  - T1590
+  - T1087
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 2659c08edd..b41f3d12a9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,48 +1,45 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules
-id: 48664505-7d22-44ee-87d2-4c8a5bdc3d14
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-06'
-description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers and servers and access to them.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-06'
+description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers
+  and servers and access to them.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers
+  and servers and access to them.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 48664505-7d22-44ee-87d2-4c8a5bdc3d14
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)net::ServerInfo/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)net::ServerInfo/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers and servers and access to them."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1592
+  - T1592
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 7eb01c48bd..6ffcd379f5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,65 +1,60 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules
-id: c1d33ad9-1727-4f9f-a474-4adbe4fed68a
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-06'
-description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover and access operating system elements, such as processes, services, registry locations, security packages and files.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-06'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
+  and access operating system elements, such as processes, services, registry locations,
+  security packages and files.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover and access
+  system resources, such as processes, services, registry locations, security packages
+  and files.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: c1d33ad9-1727-4f9f-a474-4adbe4fed68a
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainProcess/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ProcessHunter/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ServiceDetail/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIProcess/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetProcess/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-SecurityPackage/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainObject/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADObject/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegMountedDrive/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-RegistryMountedDrive/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainProcess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Invoke-ProcessHunter/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ServiceDetail/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIProcess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetProcess/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-SecurityPackage/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainObject/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADObject/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegMountedDrive/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-RegistryMountedDrive/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover and access system resources, such as processes, services, registry locations, security packages and files."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1007
-    - T1012
-    - T1046
-    - T1047
-    - T1057
-    - T1083
-    - T1518
-    - T1592.002
+  - T1007
+  - T1012
+  - T1046
+  - T1047
+  - T1057
+  - T1083
+  - T1518
+  - T1592.002
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 0615cc686d..53319215c3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,50 +1,47 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules
-id: c97b6eb9-1d8b-4017-bbbb-2af7fc17bc3f
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-06'
-description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to network shares.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-06'
+description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access
+  to network shares.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to
+  network shares.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: c97b6eb9-1d8b-4017-bbbb-2af7fc17bc3f
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)net::share/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)net::share/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to network shares."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1021.002
-    - T1135
-    - T1039
+  - T1021.002
+  - T1135
+  - T1039
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 28fb7059e8..ee26a9e979 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,57 +1,52 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules
-id: 6b7ca431-6b1e-4b40-9589-21cb368e369e
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-06'
-description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover and access network and distributed file system shares.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-06'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
+  and access network and distributed file system shares.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover and access
+  network and distributed file system shares.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 6b7ca431-6b1e-4b40-9589-21cb368e369e
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainShare/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ShareFinder/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-InterestingDomainShareFile/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-FileFinder/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-InterestingFile/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainDFSShare/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DFSshare/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetShare/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainShare/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Invoke-ShareFinder/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-InterestingDomainShareFile/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-FileFinder/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Find-InterestingFile/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainDFSShare/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DFSshare/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetShare/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover and access network and distributed file system shares."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1021.002
-    - T1135
-    - T1039
+  - T1021.002
+  - T1135
+  - T1039
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 22a11f6be0..11160c5528 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,59 +1,52 @@
-name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules
-id: 525d32fd-65dd-4732-9b72-3cfc7ddddbd2
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-06'
-description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance of connectivity.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-06'
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance
+  of connectivity.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance of connectivity.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 525d32fd-65dd-4732-9b72-3cfc7ddddbd2
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainDNSRecord/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DNSRecord/)=true OR 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainDNSZone/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DNSZone/)=true OR 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ReverseDnsLookup/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-CachedRDPConnection/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegProxy/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Proxy/)=true OR
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-Portscan/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainDNSRecord/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-DNSRecord/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainDNSZone/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DNSZone/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ReverseDnsLookup/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Get-CachedRDPConnection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegProxy/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Proxy/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-Portscan/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance of connectivity."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1021.002
-    - T1135
-    - T1039
+  - T1021.002
+  - T1135
+  - T1039
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 2e6d2f0e5a..8f7f515161 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,56 +1,53 @@
-name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules
-id: 5facee5b-79e4-47ab-b0e6-c625acc0554f
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-03'
-description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and use of CryptoAPI services by Mimikatz modules. 
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-03'
+description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and use
+  of CryptoAPI services by Mimikatz modules.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for reconnaissance of credential
+  stores and use of CryptoAPIs for malicious purposes.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 5facee5b-79e4-47ab-b0e6-c625acc0554f
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND (
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::capi/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::cng/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::providers/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::stores/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::sc/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::capi/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)crypto::cng/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::providers/)=true OR
+  match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::stores/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::sc/)=true
+  )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for reconnaissance of credential stores and use of CryptoAPIs for malicious purposes."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1589.001
-    - T1590.001
-    - T1590.003
-    - T1068
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
+  - T1589.001
+  - T1590.001
+  - T1590.003
+  - T1068
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index b309edf014..761c0ae7ef 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,49 +1,46 @@
-name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules
-id: 24b4e659-63a2-4e7b-89ac-87dd659c7110
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-05'
-description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of presence of defensive tools.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-05'
+description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of
+  presence of defensive tools.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that assess presence of
+  defensive tools on a compromised host.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 24b4e659-63a2-4e7b-89ac-87dd659c7110
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-AVSignature/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-AVSignature/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that assess presence of defensive tools on a compromised host."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1595.002
-    - T1592.002
+  - T1595.002
+  - T1592.002
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 0f3dac4eb6..6f7c296c7e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,50 +1,47 @@
-name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules
-id: b9b4492c-2af8-449b-beb4-b1b78d963321
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-05'
-description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of privilege escalation opportunities.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-05'
+description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of
+  privilege escalation opportunities.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that assess privilege escalation
+  opportunities.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: b9b4492c-2af8-449b-beb4-b1b78d963321
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-PrivescAudit/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-PrivescAudit/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that assess privilege escalation opportunities."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1068
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
+  - T1068
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 95b7f51c73..b31e8a5d26 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,51 +1,52 @@
-name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules
-id: fc5c1cbd-7494-4314-aad2-458d6fd4fada
-version: 1
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-05'
-description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process or service hijacking opportunities via Microsoft Detours compatibility. Microsoft Detours is an open source library for intercepting, monitoring and instrumenting binary functions on Microsoft Windows. Detours intercepts Win32 functions by re-writing the in-memory code for target functions. The Detours package also contains utilities to attach arbitrary DLLs and data segments called payloads to any Win32 binary.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
+description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process
+  or service hijacking opportunities via Microsoft Detours compatibility. Microsoft
+  Detours is an open source library for intercepting, monitoring and instrumenting
+  binary functions on Microsoft Windows. Detours intercepts Win32 functions by re-writing
+  the in-memory code for target functions. The Detours package also contains utilities
+  to attach arbitrary DLLs and data segments called payloads to any Win32 binary.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process or
+  service hijacking opportunities.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: fc5c1cbd-7494-4314-aad2-458d6fd4fada
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules
+references:
 - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Detours
-type: SSA
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-          match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::detours/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::detours/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process or service hijacking opportunities."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1543
-    - T1055
-    - T1574
+  - T1543
+  - T1055
+  - T1574
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
- 
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index e8e4ed3185..eb40c39247 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,50 +1,48 @@
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules
-id: 0243d37c-57c1-4182-bfd1-39b212255fc8
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-06'
-description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to services and processes.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-06'
+description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access
+  to services and processes.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to
+  services and processes.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 0243d37c-57c1-4182-bfd1-39b212255fc8
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND (
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)process::list/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::list/)=true 
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)process::list/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)service::list/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to services and processes."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - process
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1007
-    - T1046
-    - T1057
+  - T1007
+  - T1046
+  - T1057
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - process
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index e184d9252f..773be29708 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,60 +1,55 @@
-name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules
-id: d5ef590f-9bde-49eb-9c63-2f5b62a65b9c
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-03'
-description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInternals modules. 
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-03'
+description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInternals
+  modules.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that set credentials illegaly.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: d5ef590f-9bde-49eb-9c63-2f5b62a65b9c
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND ( 
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ADDBSidHistory/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ADReplNgcKey/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBAccountPassword/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBAccountPasswordHash/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBBootKey/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-SamAccountPasswordHash/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-AzureADUserEx/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_path"), "string", null), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"),
+  "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ADDBSidHistory/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ADReplNgcKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBAccountPassword/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBAccountPasswordHash/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)Set-ADDBBootKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-SamAccountPasswordHash/)=true
+  OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-AzureADUserEx/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that set credentials illegaly."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1068
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
+  - T1068
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - _time
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - process_name
-    - parent_process_name
-    - _time
-    - process_path
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index ceff64a664..292f9c2290 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,49 +1,47 @@
-name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules
-id: c8b84699-7652-4363-910f-efd1ca82f780
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-03'
-description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimikatz modules. 
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-03'
+description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimikatz
+  modules.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules that set credentials illegaly.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: c8b84699-7652-4363-910f-efd1ca82f780
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND (
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::addsid/)=true OR
-           match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)CRYPTO::scauth/)=true
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::addsid/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)CRYPTO::scauth/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules that set credentials illegaly."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1068
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
+  - T1068
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 87746e0c08..a626cfc0ea 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,49 +1,46 @@
-name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules
-id: 07b2a501-f967-4ddc-9f56-2dce46dfce44
-version: 1
-date: '2020-11-03'
-description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerSploit modules. 
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-references: 
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
-type: SSA
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+date: '2020-11-03'
+description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerSploit
+  modules.
+eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that set credentials illegaly.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+id: 07b2a501-f967-4ddc-9f56-2dce46dfce44
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line != null AND
-        ( 
-            match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-DomainUserPassword/)=true             
-        )
+  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null) | where cmd_line
+  != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-DomainUserPassword/)=true )
 
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), 
-                            ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-eli5: "This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that set credentials illegaly."
-known_false_positives:
-  "None identified."
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
-    - CIS 16
-    - CIS 20
+  - CIS 16
+  - CIS 20
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1068
-    - T1078
-    - T1098
+  - T1068
+  - T1078
+  - T1098
   nist:
-    - PR.AC
-    - PR.IP
+  - PR.AC
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
-    - _time
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
index 9f66e81256..81248c09b2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
@@ -1,620 +1,251 @@
-name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location - SSA
-id: 28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f
-version: 1
+author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-25'
-description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command without overriding original,
-  or they might try to avoid some detection running the process from a different folder.
-  This detection checks that a list of system processes run inside C:\\Windows\System32 or C:\\Windows\SysWOW64
-  The list of system processes has been extracted from https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv
+description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command
+  without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the
+  process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes
+  run inside C:\\Windows\System32 or C:\\Windows\SysWOW64 The list of system processes
+  has been extracted from https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv
   and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
 how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
-references: []
-type: SSA
-author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-          | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
-          user=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
-          timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-          process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)),
-          process_path=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null));
-
-$cond_1 = | from $ssa_input
-| where process_name="arp.exe" OR
-        process_name="adaptertroubleshooter.exe" OR
-        process_name="applicationframehost.exe" OR
-        process_name="atbroker.exe" OR
-        process_name="authhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="autoworkplace.exe" OR
-        process_name="axinstui.exe" OR
-        process_name="backgroundtransferhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="bdehdcfg.exe" OR
-        process_name="bdeuisrv.exe" OR
-        process_name="bdeunlockwizard.exe" OR
-        process_name="bitlockerdeviceencryption.exe" OR
-        process_name="bitlockerwizard.exe" OR
-        process_name="bitlockerwizardelev.exe" OR
-        process_name="bytecodegenerator.exe" OR
-        process_name="camerasettingsuihost.exe" OR
-        process_name="castsrv.exe" OR
-        process_name="certenrollctrl.exe" OR
-        process_name="checknetisolation.exe" OR
-        process_name="clipup.exe" OR
-        process_name="cloudexperiencehostbroker.exe" OR
-        process_name="cloudnotifications.exe" OR
-        process_name="cloudstoragewizard.exe" OR
-        process_name="compmgmtlauncher.exe" OR
-        process_name="compattelrunner.exe" OR
-        process_name="computerdefaults.exe" OR
-        process_name="credentialuibroker.exe" OR
-        process_name="dfdwiz.exe" OR
-        process_name="dwwin.exe" OR
-        process_name="dataexchangehost.exe" OR
-        process_name="defrag.exe" OR
-        process_name="devicedisplayobjectprovider.exe" OR
-        process_name="deviceeject.exe" OR
-        process_name="deviceenroller.exe" OR
-        process_name="devicepairingwizard.exe" OR
-        process_name="deviceproperties.exe" OR
-        process_name="disksnapshot.exe" OR
-        process_name="dism.exe" OR
-        process_name="displayswitch.exe" OR
-        process_name="dmnotificationbroker.exe" OR
-        process_name="dmomacpmo.exe" OR
-        process_name="dpiscaling.exe" OR
-        process_name="dsmusertask.exe" OR
-        process_name="dxpserver.exe" OR
-        process_name="edpcleanup.exe" OR
-        process_name="eosnotify.exe" OR
-        process_name="eap3host.exe" OR
-        process_name="easpoliciesbrokerhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="easeofaccessdialog.exe" OR
-        process_name="ehstorauthn.exe" OR
-        process_name="fxscover.exe" OR
-        process_name="fxssvc.exe" OR
-        process_name="fxsunatd.exe" OR
-        process_name="filehistory.exe" OR
-        process_name="fondue.exe" OR
-        process_name="gamepanel.exe" OR
-        process_name="genvalobj.exe" OR
-        process_name="gettingstarted.exe" OR
-        process_name="hostname.exe" OR
-        process_name="icsentitlementhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="infdefaultinstall.exe" OR
-        process_name="installagent.exe" OR
-        process_name="languagecomponentsinstallercomhandler.exe" OR
-        process_name="launchtm.exe" OR
-        process_name="launchwinapp.exe" OR
-        process_name="legacynetuxhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="licensemanagershellext.exe" OR
-        process_name="licensingui.exe" OR
-        process_name="locationnotificationwindows.exe" OR
-        process_name="locationnotifications.exe" OR
-        process_name="locator.exe" OR
-        process_name="lockapphost.exe" OR
-        process_name="lockscreencontentserver.exe" OR
-        process_name="logonui.exe" OR
-        process_name="lsaiso.exe" OR
-        process_name="mdeserver.exe" OR
-        process_name="mdmagent.exe" OR
-        process_name="mdmappinstaller.exe" OR
-        process_name="mrinfo.exe" OR
-        process_name="mrt.exe" OR
-        process_name="mschedexe.exe" OR
-        process_name="magnify.exe" OR
-        process_name="mbaeparsertask.exe" OR
-        process_name="mdres.exe" OR
-        process_name="mdsched.exe" OR
-        process_name="migautoplay.exe" OR
-        process_name="mpsigstub.exe" OR
-        process_name="msspellcheckinghost.exe" OR
-        process_name="muiunattend.exe" OR
-        process_name="multidigimon.exe" OR
-        process_name="musnotification.exe" OR
-        process_name="musnotificationux.exe" OR
-        process_name="napstat.exe" OR
-        process_name="netstat.exe" OR
-        process_name="narrator.exe" OR
-        process_name="netcfgnotifyobjecthost.exe" OR
-        process_name="netevtfwdr.exe" OR
-        process_name="netproj.exe" OR
-        process_name="netplwiz.exe" OR
-        process_name="networkuxbroker.exe";
-
-$cond_2 = | from $ssa_input
-| where process_name="openwith.exe" OR
-        process_name="optionalfeatures.exe" OR
-        process_name="pathping.exe" OR
-        process_name="ping.exe" OR
-        process_name="passwordonwakesettingflyout.exe" OR
-        process_name="pickerhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="pkgmgr.exe" OR
-        process_name="pnpunattend.exe" OR
-        process_name="pnputil.exe" OR
-        process_name="presentationhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="presentationsettings.exe" OR
-        process_name="printbrmui.exe" OR
-        process_name="printdialoghost.exe" OR
-        process_name="printdialoghost3d.exe" OR
-        process_name="printisolationhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="proximityuxhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="rdspnf.exe" OR
-        process_name="rmactivate.exe" OR
-        process_name="rmactivate_isv.exe" OR
-        process_name="rmactivate_ssp.exe" OR
-        process_name="rmactivate_ssp_isv.exe" OR
-        process_name="route.exe" OR
-        process_name="rdpsa.exe" OR
-        process_name="rdpsaproxy.exe" OR
-        process_name="rdpsauachelper.exe" OR
-        process_name="reagentc.exe" OR
-        process_name="recoverydrive.exe" OR
-        process_name="register-cimprovider.exe" OR
-        process_name="registeriepkeys.exe" OR
-        process_name="relpost.exe" OR
-        process_name="remoteposworker.exe" OR
-        process_name="rmclient.exe" OR
-        process_name="robocopy.exe" OR
-        process_name="rpcping.exe" OR
-        process_name="runlegacycplelevated.exe" OR
-        process_name="runtimebroker.exe" OR
-        process_name="sihclient.exe" OR
-        process_name="searchfilterhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="searchindexer.exe" OR
-        process_name="searchprotocolhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="secedit.exe" OR
-        process_name="sensordataservice.exe" OR
-        process_name="setieinstalleddate.exe" OR
-        process_name="settingsynchost.exe" OR
-        process_name="slidetoshutdown.exe" OR
-        process_name="smartscreensettings.exe" OR
-        process_name="sndvol.exe" OR
-        process_name="snippingtool.exe" OR
-        process_name="soundrecorder.exe" OR
-        process_name="spaceagent.exe" OR
-        process_name="sppextcomobj.exe" OR
-        process_name="srtasks.exe" OR
-        process_name="stikynot.exe" OR
-        process_name="synchost.exe" OR
-        process_name="sysreseterr.exe" OR
-        process_name="systempropertiesadvanced.exe" OR
-        process_name="systempropertiescomputername.exe" OR
-        process_name="systempropertiesdataexecutionprevention.exe" OR
-        process_name="systempropertieshardware.exe" OR
-        process_name="systempropertiesperformance.exe" OR
-        process_name="systempropertiesprotection.exe" OR
-        process_name="systempropertiesremote.exe" OR
-        process_name="systemsettingsadminflows.exe" OR
-        process_name="systemsettingsbroker.exe" OR
-        process_name="systemsettingsremovedevice.exe" OR
-        process_name="tcpsvcs.exe" OR
-        process_name="tracert.exe" OR
-        process_name="tstheme.exe" OR
-        process_name="tswbprxy.exe" OR
-        process_name="tapiunattend.exe" OR
-        process_name="taskmgr.exe" OR
-        process_name="thumbnailextractionhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="tokenbrokercookies.exe" OR
-        process_name="tpminit.exe" OR
-        process_name="tswpfwrp.exe" OR
-        process_name="ui0detect.exe" OR
-        process_name="upgraderesultsui.exe" OR
-        process_name="useraccountbroker.exe" OR
-        process_name="useraccountcontrolsettings.exe" OR
-        process_name="usoclient.exe" OR
-        process_name="utilman.exe" OR
-        process_name="vssvc.exe" OR
-        process_name="vaultcmd.exe" OR
-        process_name="vaultsysui.exe" OR
-        process_name="wfs.exe" OR
-        process_name="wmpdmc.exe" OR
-        process_name="wpdshextautoplay.exe" OR
-        process_name="wscollect.exe" OR
-        process_name="wsmanhttpconfig.exe" OR
-        process_name="wsreset.exe" OR
-        process_name="wudfhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="wwahost.exe" OR
-        process_name="wallpaperhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="webcache.exe" OR
-        process_name="werfault.exe" OR
-        process_name="werfaultsecure.exe" OR
-        process_name="winsat.exe" OR
-        process_name="windows.media.backgroundplayback.exe" OR
-        process_name="windowsactiondialog.exe" OR
-        process_name="windowsanytimeupgrade.exe" OR
-        process_name="windowsanytimeupgraderesults.exe";
-
-$cond_3 = | from $ssa_input
-| where process_name="windowsanytimeupgradeui.exe" OR
-        process_name="windowsupdateelevatedinstaller.exe" OR
-        process_name="workfolders.exe" OR
-        process_name="wpcmon.exe" OR
-        process_name="acu.exe" OR
-        process_name="aitagent.exe" OR
-        process_name="aitstatic.exe" OR
-        process_name="alg.exe" OR
-        process_name="appidcertstorecheck.exe" OR
-        process_name="appidpolicyconverter.exe" OR
-        process_name="at.exe" OR
-        process_name="attrib.exe" OR
-        process_name="audiodg.exe" OR
-        process_name="auditpol.exe" OR
-        process_name="autochk.exe" OR
-        process_name="autoconv.exe" OR
-        process_name="autofmt.exe" OR
-        process_name="baaupdate.exe" OR
-        process_name="backgroundtaskhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="bcastdvr.exe" OR
-        process_name="bcdboot.exe" OR
-        process_name="bcdedit.exe" OR
-        process_name="bdechangepin.exe" OR
-        process_name="bdeunlock.exe" OR
-        process_name="bitsadmin.exe" OR
-        process_name="bootcfg.exe" OR
-        process_name="bootim.exe" OR
-        process_name="bootsect.exe" OR
-        process_name="bridgeunattend.exe" OR
-        process_name="browser_broker.exe" OR
-        process_name="bthudtask.exe" OR
-        process_name="cacls.exe" OR
-        process_name="calc.exe" OR
-        process_name="cdpreference.exe" OR
-        process_name="certreq.exe" OR
-        process_name="certutil.exe" OR
-        process_name="change.exe" OR
-        process_name="changepk.exe" OR
-        process_name="charmap.exe" OR
-        process_name="chglogon.exe" OR
-        process_name="chgport.exe" OR
-        process_name="chgusr.exe" OR
-        process_name="chkdsk.exe" OR
-        process_name="chkntfs.exe" OR
-        process_name="choice.exe" OR
-        process_name="cipher.exe" OR
-        process_name="cleanmgr.exe" OR
-        process_name="cliconfg.exe" OR
-        process_name="clip.exe" OR
-        process_name="cmd.exe" OR
-        process_name="cmdkey.exe" OR
-        process_name="cmdl32.exe" OR
-        process_name="cmmon32.exe" OR
-        process_name="cmstp.exe" OR
-        process_name="cofire.exe" OR
-        process_name="colorcpl.exe" OR
-        process_name="comp.exe" OR
-        process_name="compact.exe" OR
-        process_name="conhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="consent.exe" OR
-        process_name="control.exe" OR
-        process_name="convert.exe" OR
-        process_name="credwiz.exe" OR
-        process_name="cscript.exe" OR
-        process_name="csrss.exe" OR
-        process_name="ctfmon.exe" OR
-        process_name="cttune.exe" OR
-        process_name="cttunesvr.exe" OR
-        process_name="dashost.exe" OR
-        process_name="dccw.exe" OR
-        process_name="dcomcnfg.exe" OR
-        process_name="ddodiag.exe" OR
-        process_name="dfrgui.exe" OR
-        process_name="dialer.exe" OR
-        process_name="diantz.exe" OR
-        process_name="dinotify.exe" OR
-        process_name="diskpart.exe" OR
-        process_name="diskperf.exe" OR
-        process_name="diskraid.exe" OR
-        process_name="dispdiag.exe" OR
-        process_name="djoin.exe" OR
-        process_name="dllhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="dllhst3g.exe" OR
-        process_name="dmcertinst.exe" OR
-        process_name="dmcfghost.exe" OR
-        process_name="dmclient.exe" OR
-        process_name="dnscacheugc.exe" OR
-        process_name="doskey.exe" OR
-        process_name="dpapimig.exe" OR
-        process_name="dpnsvr.exe" OR
-        process_name="driverquery.exe" OR
-        process_name="drvcfg.exe" OR
-        process_name="drvinst.exe" OR
-        process_name="dsregcmd.exe" OR
-        process_name="dstokenclean.exe" OR
-        process_name="dvdplay.exe" OR
-        process_name="dvdupgrd.exe" OR
-        process_name="dwm.exe" OR
-        process_name="dxdiag.exe" OR
-        process_name="easinvoker.exe" OR
-        process_name="efsui.exe";
-
-$cond_4 = | from $ssa_input
-| where process_name="embeddedapplauncher.exe" OR
-        process_name="esentutl.exe" OR
-        process_name="eudcedit.exe" OR
-        process_name="eventcreate.exe" OR
-        process_name="eventvwr.exe" OR
-        process_name="expand.exe" OR
-        process_name="extrac32.exe" OR
-        process_name="fc.exe" OR
-        process_name="fhmanagew.exe" OR
-        process_name="find.exe" OR
-        process_name="findstr.exe" OR
-        process_name="finger.exe" OR
-        process_name="fixmapi.exe" OR
-        process_name="fltmc.exe" OR
-        process_name="fodhelper.exe" OR
-        process_name="fontdrvhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="fontview.exe" OR
-        process_name="forfiles.exe" OR
-        process_name="fsavailux.exe" OR
-        process_name="fsquirt.exe" OR
-        process_name="fsutil.exe" OR
-        process_name="ftp.exe" OR
-        process_name="fvenotify.exe" OR
-        process_name="fveprompt.exe" OR
-        process_name="getmac.exe" OR
-        process_name="gpresult.exe" OR
-        process_name="gpscript.exe" OR
-        process_name="gpupdate.exe" OR
-        process_name="grpconv.exe" OR
-        process_name="hdwwiz.exe" OR
-        process_name="help.exe" OR
-        process_name="hwrcomp.exe" OR
-        process_name="hwrreg.exe" OR
-        process_name="icacls.exe" OR
-        process_name="icardagt.exe" OR
-        process_name="icsunattend.exe" OR
-        process_name="ie4uinit.exe" OR
-        process_name="ieunatt.exe" OR
-        process_name="ieetwcollector.exe" OR
-        process_name="iexpress.exe" OR
-        process_name="immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe" OR
-        process_name="ipconfig.exe" OR
-        process_name="irftp.exe" OR
-        process_name="iscsicli.exe" OR
-        process_name="iscsicpl.exe" OR
-        process_name="isoburn.exe" OR
-        process_name="klist.exe" OR
-        process_name="ksetup.exe" OR
-        process_name="ktmutil.exe" OR
-        process_name="label.exe" OR
-        process_name="licensingdiag.exe" OR
-        process_name="lodctr.exe" OR
-        process_name="logagent.exe" OR
-        process_name="logman.exe" OR
-        process_name="logoff.exe" OR
-        process_name="lpkinstall.exe" OR
-        process_name="lpksetup.exe" OR
-        process_name="lpremove.exe" OR
-        process_name="lsass.exe" OR
-        process_name="lsm.exe" OR
-        process_name="makecab.exe" OR
-        process_name="manage-bde.exe" OR
-        process_name="mblctr.exe" OR
-        process_name="mcbuilder.exe" OR
-        process_name="mctadmin.exe" OR
-        process_name="mfpmp.exe" OR
-        process_name="mmc.exe" OR
-        process_name="mobsync.exe" OR
-        process_name="mountvol.exe" OR
-        process_name="mpnotify.exe" OR
-        process_name="msconfig.exe" OR
-        process_name="msdt.exe" OR
-        process_name="msdtc.exe" OR
-        process_name="msfeedssync.exe" OR
-        process_name="msg.exe" OR
-        process_name="mshta.exe" OR
-        process_name="msiexec.exe" OR
-        process_name="msinfo32.exe" OR
-        process_name="mspaint.exe" OR
-        process_name="msra.exe" OR
-        process_name="mstsc.exe" OR
-        process_name="mtstocom.exe" OR
-        process_name="nbtstat.exe" OR
-        process_name="ndadmin.exe" OR
-        process_name="net.exe" OR
-        process_name="net1.exe" OR
-        process_name="netbtugc.exe" OR
-        process_name="netcfg.exe" OR
-        process_name="netiougc.exe" OR
-        process_name="netsh.exe" OR
-        process_name="newdev.exe" OR
-        process_name="nltest.exe" OR
-        process_name="notepad.exe" OR
-        process_name="nslookup.exe" OR
-        process_name="ntoskrnl.exe" OR
-        process_name="ntprint.exe" OR
-        process_name="ocsetup.exe" OR
-        process_name="odbcad32.exe" OR
-        process_name="odbcconf.exe" OR
-        process_name="omadmclient.exe" OR
-        process_name="omadmprc.exe";
-
-$cond_5 = | from $ssa_input
-| where process_name="openfiles.exe" OR
-        process_name="osk.exe" OR
-        process_name="p2phost.exe" OR
-        process_name="pcalua.exe" OR
-        process_name="pcaui.exe" OR
-        process_name="pcawrk.exe" OR
-        process_name="pcwrun.exe" OR
-        process_name="perfmon.exe" OR
-        process_name="phoneactivate.exe" OR
-        process_name="plasrv.exe" OR
-        process_name="poqexec.exe" OR
-        process_name="powercfg.exe" OR
-        process_name="prevhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="print.exe" OR
-        process_name="printfilterpipelinesvc.exe" OR
-        process_name="printui.exe" OR
-        process_name="proquota.exe" OR
-        process_name="provtool.exe" OR
-        process_name="psr.exe" OR
-        process_name="pwlauncher.exe" OR
-        process_name="qappsrv.exe" OR
-        process_name="qprocess.exe" OR
-        process_name="query.exe" OR
-        process_name="quser.exe" OR
-        process_name="qwinsta.exe" OR
-        process_name="rasautou.exe" OR
-        process_name="rasdial.exe" OR
-        process_name="raserver.exe" OR
-        process_name="rasphone.exe" OR
-        process_name="rdpclip.exe" OR
-        process_name="rdpinput.exe" OR
-        process_name="rdrleakdiag.exe" OR
-        process_name="recdisc.exe" OR
-        process_name="recover.exe" OR
-        process_name="reg.exe" OR
-        process_name="regedt32.exe" OR
-        process_name="regini.exe" OR
-        process_name="regsvr32.exe" OR
-        process_name="rekeywiz.exe" OR
-        process_name="relog.exe" OR
-        process_name="repair-bde.exe" OR
-        process_name="replace.exe" OR
-        process_name="reset.exe" OR
-        process_name="resmon.exe" OR
-        process_name="rmttpmvscmgrsvr.exe" OR
-        process_name="rrinstaller.exe" OR
-        process_name="rstrui.exe" OR
-        process_name="runas.exe" OR
-        process_name="rundll32.exe" OR
-        process_name="runonce.exe" OR
-        process_name="rwinsta.exe" OR
-        process_name="sbunattend.exe" OR
-        process_name="sc.exe" OR
-        process_name="schtasks.exe" OR
-        process_name="sdbinst.exe" OR
-        process_name="sdchange.exe" OR
-        process_name="sdclt.exe" OR
-        process_name="sdiagnhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="secinit.exe" OR
-        process_name="services.exe" OR
-        process_name="sessionmsg.exe" OR
-        process_name="sethc.exe" OR
-        process_name="setspn.exe" OR
-        process_name="setupcl.exe" OR
-        process_name="setupugc.exe" OR
-        process_name="setx.exe" OR
-        process_name="sfc.exe" OR
-        process_name="shadow.exe" OR
-        process_name="shrpubw.exe" OR
-        process_name="shutdown.exe" OR
-        process_name="sigverif.exe" OR
-        process_name="sihost.exe" OR
-        process_name="slui.exe" OR
-        process_name="smss.exe" OR
-        process_name="snmptrap.exe" OR
-        process_name="sort.exe" OR
-        process_name="spinstall.exe" OR
-        process_name="spoolsv.exe" OR
-        process_name="sppsvc.exe" OR
-        process_name="spreview.exe" OR
-        process_name="srdelayed.exe" OR
-        process_name="subst.exe" OR
-        process_name="svchost.exe" OR
-        process_name="sxstrace.exe" OR
-        process_name="syskey.exe" OR
-        process_name="systeminfo.exe" OR
-        process_name="systemreset.exe" OR
-        process_name="systray.exe" OR
-        process_name="tabcal.exe" OR
-        process_name="takeown.exe" OR
-        process_name="taskeng.exe" OR
-        process_name="taskhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="taskhostw.exe" OR
-        process_name="taskkill.exe" OR
-        process_name="tasklist.exe" OR
-        process_name="taskmgr.exe" OR
-        process_name="tcmsetup.exe" OR
-        process_name="timeout.exe" OR
-        process_name="tpmvscmgr.exe" OR
-        process_name="tpmvscmgrsvr.exe";
-
-$cond_6 = | from $ssa_input
-| where process_name="tracerpt.exe" OR
-        process_name="tscon.exe" OR
-        process_name="tsdiscon.exe" OR
-        process_name="tskill.exe" OR
-        process_name="typeperf.exe" OR
-        process_name="tzsync.exe" OR
-        process_name="tzutil.exe" OR
-        process_name="ucsvc.exe" OR
-        process_name="unlodctr.exe" OR
-        process_name="unregmp2.exe" OR
-        process_name="upnpcont.exe" OR
-        process_name="userinit.exe" OR
-        process_name="vds.exe" OR
-        process_name="vdsldr.exe" OR
-        process_name="verclsid.exe" OR
-        process_name="verifier.exe" OR
-        process_name="verifiergui.exe" OR
-        process_name="vmicsvc.exe" OR
-        process_name="vssadmin.exe" OR
-        process_name="w32tm.exe" OR
-        process_name="waitfor.exe" OR
-        process_name="wbadmin.exe" OR
-        process_name="wbengine.exe" OR
-        process_name="wecutil.exe" OR
-        process_name="wermgr.exe" OR
-        process_name="wevtutil.exe" OR
-        process_name="wextract.exe" OR
-        process_name="where.exe" OR
-        process_name="whoami.exe" OR
-        process_name="wiaacmgr.exe" OR
-        process_name="wiawow64.exe" OR
-        process_name="wifitask.exe" OR
-        process_name="wimserv.exe" OR
-        process_name="wininit.exe" OR
-        process_name="winload.exe" OR
-        process_name="winlogon.exe" OR
-        process_name="winresume.exe" OR
-        process_name="winrs.exe" OR
-        process_name="winrshost.exe" OR
-        process_name="winver.exe" OR
-        process_name="wisptis.exe" OR
-        process_name="wkspbroker.exe" OR
-        process_name="wksprt.exe" OR
-        process_name="wlanext.exe" OR
-        process_name="wlrmdr.exe" OR
-        process_name="wowreg32.exe" OR
-        process_name="wpnpinst.exe" OR
-        process_name="wpr.exe" OR
-        process_name="write.exe" OR
-        process_name="wscript.exe" OR
-        process_name="wsmprovhost.exe" OR
-        process_name="wsqmcons.exe" OR
-        process_name="wuapihost.exe" OR
-        process_name="wuapp.exe" OR
-        process_name="wuauclt.exe" OR
-        process_name="wusa.exe" OR
-        process_name="xcopy.exe" OR
-        process_name="xpsrchvw.exe" OR
-        process_name="xwizard.exe";
-
-        | from $cond_1 | union $cond_2 | union $cond_3 | union $cond_4 | union $cond_5 | union $cond_6
-        | where process_path!="c:\\windows\\system32" AND process_path!="c:\\windows\\syswow64"
-        | eval start_time = timestamp,
-               end_time = timestamp,
-               entities = mvappend(device, user),
-               body = "TBD"
-        | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+id: 28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f
 known_false_positives: None
+name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location - SSA
+references: []
+search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_device_id"), "string", null), user=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"),
+  "string", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string",
+  null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string",
+  null)), process_path=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null));
+
+  $cond_1 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name="arp.exe" OR process_name="adaptertroubleshooter.exe"
+  OR process_name="applicationframehost.exe" OR process_name="atbroker.exe" OR process_name="authhost.exe"
+  OR process_name="autoworkplace.exe" OR process_name="axinstui.exe" OR process_name="backgroundtransferhost.exe"
+  OR process_name="bdehdcfg.exe" OR process_name="bdeuisrv.exe" OR process_name="bdeunlockwizard.exe"
+  OR process_name="bitlockerdeviceencryption.exe" OR process_name="bitlockerwizard.exe"
+  OR process_name="bitlockerwizardelev.exe" OR process_name="bytecodegenerator.exe"
+  OR process_name="camerasettingsuihost.exe" OR process_name="castsrv.exe" OR process_name="certenrollctrl.exe"
+  OR process_name="checknetisolation.exe" OR process_name="clipup.exe" OR process_name="cloudexperiencehostbroker.exe"
+  OR process_name="cloudnotifications.exe" OR process_name="cloudstoragewizard.exe"
+  OR process_name="compmgmtlauncher.exe" OR process_name="compattelrunner.exe" OR
+  process_name="computerdefaults.exe" OR process_name="credentialuibroker.exe" OR
+  process_name="dfdwiz.exe" OR process_name="dwwin.exe" OR process_name="dataexchangehost.exe"
+  OR process_name="defrag.exe" OR process_name="devicedisplayobjectprovider.exe" OR
+  process_name="deviceeject.exe" OR process_name="deviceenroller.exe" OR process_name="devicepairingwizard.exe"
+  OR process_name="deviceproperties.exe" OR process_name="disksnapshot.exe" OR process_name="dism.exe"
+  OR process_name="displayswitch.exe" OR process_name="dmnotificationbroker.exe" OR
+  process_name="dmomacpmo.exe" OR process_name="dpiscaling.exe" OR process_name="dsmusertask.exe"
+  OR process_name="dxpserver.exe" OR process_name="edpcleanup.exe" OR process_name="eosnotify.exe"
+  OR process_name="eap3host.exe" OR process_name="easpoliciesbrokerhost.exe" OR process_name="easeofaccessdialog.exe"
+  OR process_name="ehstorauthn.exe" OR process_name="fxscover.exe" OR process_name="fxssvc.exe"
+  OR process_name="fxsunatd.exe" OR process_name="filehistory.exe" OR process_name="fondue.exe"
+  OR process_name="gamepanel.exe" OR process_name="genvalobj.exe" OR process_name="gettingstarted.exe"
+  OR process_name="hostname.exe" OR process_name="icsentitlementhost.exe" OR process_name="infdefaultinstall.exe"
+  OR process_name="installagent.exe" OR process_name="languagecomponentsinstallercomhandler.exe"
+  OR process_name="launchtm.exe" OR process_name="launchwinapp.exe" OR process_name="legacynetuxhost.exe"
+  OR process_name="licensemanagershellext.exe" OR process_name="licensingui.exe" OR
+  process_name="locationnotificationwindows.exe" OR process_name="locationnotifications.exe"
+  OR process_name="locator.exe" OR process_name="lockapphost.exe" OR process_name="lockscreencontentserver.exe"
+  OR process_name="logonui.exe" OR process_name="lsaiso.exe" OR process_name="mdeserver.exe"
+  OR process_name="mdmagent.exe" OR process_name="mdmappinstaller.exe" OR process_name="mrinfo.exe"
+  OR process_name="mrt.exe" OR process_name="mschedexe.exe" OR process_name="magnify.exe"
+  OR process_name="mbaeparsertask.exe" OR process_name="mdres.exe" OR process_name="mdsched.exe"
+  OR process_name="migautoplay.exe" OR process_name="mpsigstub.exe" OR process_name="msspellcheckinghost.exe"
+  OR process_name="muiunattend.exe" OR process_name="multidigimon.exe" OR process_name="musnotification.exe"
+  OR process_name="musnotificationux.exe" OR process_name="napstat.exe" OR process_name="netstat.exe"
+  OR process_name="narrator.exe" OR process_name="netcfgnotifyobjecthost.exe" OR process_name="netevtfwdr.exe"
+  OR process_name="netproj.exe" OR process_name="netplwiz.exe" OR process_name="networkuxbroker.exe";
+
+  $cond_2 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name="openwith.exe" OR process_name="optionalfeatures.exe"
+  OR process_name="pathping.exe" OR process_name="ping.exe" OR process_name="passwordonwakesettingflyout.exe"
+  OR process_name="pickerhost.exe" OR process_name="pkgmgr.exe" OR process_name="pnpunattend.exe"
+  OR process_name="pnputil.exe" OR process_name="presentationhost.exe" OR process_name="presentationsettings.exe"
+  OR process_name="printbrmui.exe" OR process_name="printdialoghost.exe" OR process_name="printdialoghost3d.exe"
+  OR process_name="printisolationhost.exe" OR process_name="proximityuxhost.exe" OR
+  process_name="rdspnf.exe" OR process_name="rmactivate.exe" OR process_name="rmactivate_isv.exe"
+  OR process_name="rmactivate_ssp.exe" OR process_name="rmactivate_ssp_isv.exe" OR
+  process_name="route.exe" OR process_name="rdpsa.exe" OR process_name="rdpsaproxy.exe"
+  OR process_name="rdpsauachelper.exe" OR process_name="reagentc.exe" OR process_name="recoverydrive.exe"
+  OR process_name="register-cimprovider.exe" OR process_name="registeriepkeys.exe"
+  OR process_name="relpost.exe" OR process_name="remoteposworker.exe" OR process_name="rmclient.exe"
+  OR process_name="robocopy.exe" OR process_name="rpcping.exe" OR process_name="runlegacycplelevated.exe"
+  OR process_name="runtimebroker.exe" OR process_name="sihclient.exe" OR process_name="searchfilterhost.exe"
+  OR process_name="searchindexer.exe" OR process_name="searchprotocolhost.exe" OR
+  process_name="secedit.exe" OR process_name="sensordataservice.exe" OR process_name="setieinstalleddate.exe"
+  OR process_name="settingsynchost.exe" OR process_name="slidetoshutdown.exe" OR process_name="smartscreensettings.exe"
+  OR process_name="sndvol.exe" OR process_name="snippingtool.exe" OR process_name="soundrecorder.exe"
+  OR process_name="spaceagent.exe" OR process_name="sppextcomobj.exe" OR process_name="srtasks.exe"
+  OR process_name="stikynot.exe" OR process_name="synchost.exe" OR process_name="sysreseterr.exe"
+  OR process_name="systempropertiesadvanced.exe" OR process_name="systempropertiescomputername.exe"
+  OR process_name="systempropertiesdataexecutionprevention.exe" OR process_name="systempropertieshardware.exe"
+  OR process_name="systempropertiesperformance.exe" OR process_name="systempropertiesprotection.exe"
+  OR process_name="systempropertiesremote.exe" OR process_name="systemsettingsadminflows.exe"
+  OR process_name="systemsettingsbroker.exe" OR process_name="systemsettingsremovedevice.exe"
+  OR process_name="tcpsvcs.exe" OR process_name="tracert.exe" OR process_name="tstheme.exe"
+  OR process_name="tswbprxy.exe" OR process_name="tapiunattend.exe" OR process_name="taskmgr.exe"
+  OR process_name="thumbnailextractionhost.exe" OR process_name="tokenbrokercookies.exe"
+  OR process_name="tpminit.exe" OR process_name="tswpfwrp.exe" OR process_name="ui0detect.exe"
+  OR process_name="upgraderesultsui.exe" OR process_name="useraccountbroker.exe" OR
+  process_name="useraccountcontrolsettings.exe" OR process_name="usoclient.exe" OR
+  process_name="utilman.exe" OR process_name="vssvc.exe" OR process_name="vaultcmd.exe"
+  OR process_name="vaultsysui.exe" OR process_name="wfs.exe" OR process_name="wmpdmc.exe"
+  OR process_name="wpdshextautoplay.exe" OR process_name="wscollect.exe" OR process_name="wsmanhttpconfig.exe"
+  OR process_name="wsreset.exe" OR process_name="wudfhost.exe" OR process_name="wwahost.exe"
+  OR process_name="wallpaperhost.exe" OR process_name="webcache.exe" OR process_name="werfault.exe"
+  OR process_name="werfaultsecure.exe" OR process_name="winsat.exe" OR process_name="windows.media.backgroundplayback.exe"
+  OR process_name="windowsactiondialog.exe" OR process_name="windowsanytimeupgrade.exe"
+  OR process_name="windowsanytimeupgraderesults.exe";
+
+  $cond_3 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name="windowsanytimeupgradeui.exe" OR
+  process_name="windowsupdateelevatedinstaller.exe" OR process_name="workfolders.exe"
+  OR process_name="wpcmon.exe" OR process_name="acu.exe" OR process_name="aitagent.exe"
+  OR process_name="aitstatic.exe" OR process_name="alg.exe" OR process_name="appidcertstorecheck.exe"
+  OR process_name="appidpolicyconverter.exe" OR process_name="at.exe" OR process_name="attrib.exe"
+  OR process_name="audiodg.exe" OR process_name="auditpol.exe" OR process_name="autochk.exe"
+  OR process_name="autoconv.exe" OR process_name="autofmt.exe" OR process_name="baaupdate.exe"
+  OR process_name="backgroundtaskhost.exe" OR process_name="bcastdvr.exe" OR process_name="bcdboot.exe"
+  OR process_name="bcdedit.exe" OR process_name="bdechangepin.exe" OR process_name="bdeunlock.exe"
+  OR process_name="bitsadmin.exe" OR process_name="bootcfg.exe" OR process_name="bootim.exe"
+  OR process_name="bootsect.exe" OR process_name="bridgeunattend.exe" OR process_name="browser_broker.exe"
+  OR process_name="bthudtask.exe" OR process_name="cacls.exe" OR process_name="calc.exe"
+  OR process_name="cdpreference.exe" OR process_name="certreq.exe" OR process_name="certutil.exe"
+  OR process_name="change.exe" OR process_name="changepk.exe" OR process_name="charmap.exe"
+  OR process_name="chglogon.exe" OR process_name="chgport.exe" OR process_name="chgusr.exe"
+  OR process_name="chkdsk.exe" OR process_name="chkntfs.exe" OR process_name="choice.exe"
+  OR process_name="cipher.exe" OR process_name="cleanmgr.exe" OR process_name="cliconfg.exe"
+  OR process_name="clip.exe" OR process_name="cmd.exe" OR process_name="cmdkey.exe"
+  OR process_name="cmdl32.exe" OR process_name="cmmon32.exe" OR process_name="cmstp.exe"
+  OR process_name="cofire.exe" OR process_name="colorcpl.exe" OR process_name="comp.exe"
+  OR process_name="compact.exe" OR process_name="conhost.exe" OR process_name="consent.exe"
+  OR process_name="control.exe" OR process_name="convert.exe" OR process_name="credwiz.exe"
+  OR process_name="cscript.exe" OR process_name="csrss.exe" OR process_name="ctfmon.exe"
+  OR process_name="cttune.exe" OR process_name="cttunesvr.exe" OR process_name="dashost.exe"
+  OR process_name="dccw.exe" OR process_name="dcomcnfg.exe" OR process_name="ddodiag.exe"
+  OR process_name="dfrgui.exe" OR process_name="dialer.exe" OR process_name="diantz.exe"
+  OR process_name="dinotify.exe" OR process_name="diskpart.exe" OR process_name="diskperf.exe"
+  OR process_name="diskraid.exe" OR process_name="dispdiag.exe" OR process_name="djoin.exe"
+  OR process_name="dllhost.exe" OR process_name="dllhst3g.exe" OR process_name="dmcertinst.exe"
+  OR process_name="dmcfghost.exe" OR process_name="dmclient.exe" OR process_name="dnscacheugc.exe"
+  OR process_name="doskey.exe" OR process_name="dpapimig.exe" OR process_name="dpnsvr.exe"
+  OR process_name="driverquery.exe" OR process_name="drvcfg.exe" OR process_name="drvinst.exe"
+  OR process_name="dsregcmd.exe" OR process_name="dstokenclean.exe" OR process_name="dvdplay.exe"
+  OR process_name="dvdupgrd.exe" OR process_name="dwm.exe" OR process_name="dxdiag.exe"
+  OR process_name="easinvoker.exe" OR process_name="efsui.exe";
+
+  $cond_4 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name="embeddedapplauncher.exe" OR process_name="esentutl.exe"
+  OR process_name="eudcedit.exe" OR process_name="eventcreate.exe" OR process_name="eventvwr.exe"
+  OR process_name="expand.exe" OR process_name="extrac32.exe" OR process_name="fc.exe"
+  OR process_name="fhmanagew.exe" OR process_name="find.exe" OR process_name="findstr.exe"
+  OR process_name="finger.exe" OR process_name="fixmapi.exe" OR process_name="fltmc.exe"
+  OR process_name="fodhelper.exe" OR process_name="fontdrvhost.exe" OR process_name="fontview.exe"
+  OR process_name="forfiles.exe" OR process_name="fsavailux.exe" OR process_name="fsquirt.exe"
+  OR process_name="fsutil.exe" OR process_name="ftp.exe" OR process_name="fvenotify.exe"
+  OR process_name="fveprompt.exe" OR process_name="getmac.exe" OR process_name="gpresult.exe"
+  OR process_name="gpscript.exe" OR process_name="gpupdate.exe" OR process_name="grpconv.exe"
+  OR process_name="hdwwiz.exe" OR process_name="help.exe" OR process_name="hwrcomp.exe"
+  OR process_name="hwrreg.exe" OR process_name="icacls.exe" OR process_name="icardagt.exe"
+  OR process_name="icsunattend.exe" OR process_name="ie4uinit.exe" OR process_name="ieunatt.exe"
+  OR process_name="ieetwcollector.exe" OR process_name="iexpress.exe" OR process_name="immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe"
+  OR process_name="ipconfig.exe" OR process_name="irftp.exe" OR process_name="iscsicli.exe"
+  OR process_name="iscsicpl.exe" OR process_name="isoburn.exe" OR process_name="klist.exe"
+  OR process_name="ksetup.exe" OR process_name="ktmutil.exe" OR process_name="label.exe"
+  OR process_name="licensingdiag.exe" OR process_name="lodctr.exe" OR process_name="logagent.exe"
+  OR process_name="logman.exe" OR process_name="logoff.exe" OR process_name="lpkinstall.exe"
+  OR process_name="lpksetup.exe" OR process_name="lpremove.exe" OR process_name="lsass.exe"
+  OR process_name="lsm.exe" OR process_name="makecab.exe" OR process_name="manage-bde.exe"
+  OR process_name="mblctr.exe" OR process_name="mcbuilder.exe" OR process_name="mctadmin.exe"
+  OR process_name="mfpmp.exe" OR process_name="mmc.exe" OR process_name="mobsync.exe"
+  OR process_name="mountvol.exe" OR process_name="mpnotify.exe" OR process_name="msconfig.exe"
+  OR process_name="msdt.exe" OR process_name="msdtc.exe" OR process_name="msfeedssync.exe"
+  OR process_name="msg.exe" OR process_name="mshta.exe" OR process_name="msiexec.exe"
+  OR process_name="msinfo32.exe" OR process_name="mspaint.exe" OR process_name="msra.exe"
+  OR process_name="mstsc.exe" OR process_name="mtstocom.exe" OR process_name="nbtstat.exe"
+  OR process_name="ndadmin.exe" OR process_name="net.exe" OR process_name="net1.exe"
+  OR process_name="netbtugc.exe" OR process_name="netcfg.exe" OR process_name="netiougc.exe"
+  OR process_name="netsh.exe" OR process_name="newdev.exe" OR process_name="nltest.exe"
+  OR process_name="notepad.exe" OR process_name="nslookup.exe" OR process_name="ntoskrnl.exe"
+  OR process_name="ntprint.exe" OR process_name="ocsetup.exe" OR process_name="odbcad32.exe"
+  OR process_name="odbcconf.exe" OR process_name="omadmclient.exe" OR process_name="omadmprc.exe";
+
+  $cond_5 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name="openfiles.exe" OR process_name="osk.exe"
+  OR process_name="p2phost.exe" OR process_name="pcalua.exe" OR process_name="pcaui.exe"
+  OR process_name="pcawrk.exe" OR process_name="pcwrun.exe" OR process_name="perfmon.exe"
+  OR process_name="phoneactivate.exe" OR process_name="plasrv.exe" OR process_name="poqexec.exe"
+  OR process_name="powercfg.exe" OR process_name="prevhost.exe" OR process_name="print.exe"
+  OR process_name="printfilterpipelinesvc.exe" OR process_name="printui.exe" OR process_name="proquota.exe"
+  OR process_name="provtool.exe" OR process_name="psr.exe" OR process_name="pwlauncher.exe"
+  OR process_name="qappsrv.exe" OR process_name="qprocess.exe" OR process_name="query.exe"
+  OR process_name="quser.exe" OR process_name="qwinsta.exe" OR process_name="rasautou.exe"
+  OR process_name="rasdial.exe" OR process_name="raserver.exe" OR process_name="rasphone.exe"
+  OR process_name="rdpclip.exe" OR process_name="rdpinput.exe" OR process_name="rdrleakdiag.exe"
+  OR process_name="recdisc.exe" OR process_name="recover.exe" OR process_name="reg.exe"
+  OR process_name="regedt32.exe" OR process_name="regini.exe" OR process_name="regsvr32.exe"
+  OR process_name="rekeywiz.exe" OR process_name="relog.exe" OR process_name="repair-bde.exe"
+  OR process_name="replace.exe" OR process_name="reset.exe" OR process_name="resmon.exe"
+  OR process_name="rmttpmvscmgrsvr.exe" OR process_name="rrinstaller.exe" OR process_name="rstrui.exe"
+  OR process_name="runas.exe" OR process_name="rundll32.exe" OR process_name="runonce.exe"
+  OR process_name="rwinsta.exe" OR process_name="sbunattend.exe" OR process_name="sc.exe"
+  OR process_name="schtasks.exe" OR process_name="sdbinst.exe" OR process_name="sdchange.exe"
+  OR process_name="sdclt.exe" OR process_name="sdiagnhost.exe" OR process_name="secinit.exe"
+  OR process_name="services.exe" OR process_name="sessionmsg.exe" OR process_name="sethc.exe"
+  OR process_name="setspn.exe" OR process_name="setupcl.exe" OR process_name="setupugc.exe"
+  OR process_name="setx.exe" OR process_name="sfc.exe" OR process_name="shadow.exe"
+  OR process_name="shrpubw.exe" OR process_name="shutdown.exe" OR process_name="sigverif.exe"
+  OR process_name="sihost.exe" OR process_name="slui.exe" OR process_name="smss.exe"
+  OR process_name="snmptrap.exe" OR process_name="sort.exe" OR process_name="spinstall.exe"
+  OR process_name="spoolsv.exe" OR process_name="sppsvc.exe" OR process_name="spreview.exe"
+  OR process_name="srdelayed.exe" OR process_name="subst.exe" OR process_name="svchost.exe"
+  OR process_name="sxstrace.exe" OR process_name="syskey.exe" OR process_name="systeminfo.exe"
+  OR process_name="systemreset.exe" OR process_name="systray.exe" OR process_name="tabcal.exe"
+  OR process_name="takeown.exe" OR process_name="taskeng.exe" OR process_name="taskhost.exe"
+  OR process_name="taskhostw.exe" OR process_name="taskkill.exe" OR process_name="tasklist.exe"
+  OR process_name="taskmgr.exe" OR process_name="tcmsetup.exe" OR process_name="timeout.exe"
+  OR process_name="tpmvscmgr.exe" OR process_name="tpmvscmgrsvr.exe";
+
+  $cond_6 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name="tracerpt.exe" OR process_name="tscon.exe"
+  OR process_name="tsdiscon.exe" OR process_name="tskill.exe" OR process_name="typeperf.exe"
+  OR process_name="tzsync.exe" OR process_name="tzutil.exe" OR process_name="ucsvc.exe"
+  OR process_name="unlodctr.exe" OR process_name="unregmp2.exe" OR process_name="upnpcont.exe"
+  OR process_name="userinit.exe" OR process_name="vds.exe" OR process_name="vdsldr.exe"
+  OR process_name="verclsid.exe" OR process_name="verifier.exe" OR process_name="verifiergui.exe"
+  OR process_name="vmicsvc.exe" OR process_name="vssadmin.exe" OR process_name="w32tm.exe"
+  OR process_name="waitfor.exe" OR process_name="wbadmin.exe" OR process_name="wbengine.exe"
+  OR process_name="wecutil.exe" OR process_name="wermgr.exe" OR process_name="wevtutil.exe"
+  OR process_name="wextract.exe" OR process_name="where.exe" OR process_name="whoami.exe"
+  OR process_name="wiaacmgr.exe" OR process_name="wiawow64.exe" OR process_name="wifitask.exe"
+  OR process_name="wimserv.exe" OR process_name="wininit.exe" OR process_name="winload.exe"
+  OR process_name="winlogon.exe" OR process_name="winresume.exe" OR process_name="winrs.exe"
+  OR process_name="winrshost.exe" OR process_name="winver.exe" OR process_name="wisptis.exe"
+  OR process_name="wkspbroker.exe" OR process_name="wksprt.exe" OR process_name="wlanext.exe"
+  OR process_name="wlrmdr.exe" OR process_name="wowreg32.exe" OR process_name="wpnpinst.exe"
+  OR process_name="wpr.exe" OR process_name="write.exe" OR process_name="wscript.exe"
+  OR process_name="wsmprovhost.exe" OR process_name="wsqmcons.exe" OR process_name="wuapihost.exe"
+  OR process_name="wuapp.exe" OR process_name="wuauclt.exe" OR process_name="wusa.exe"
+  OR process_name="xcopy.exe" OR process_name="xpsrchvw.exe" OR process_name="xwizard.exe";
+
+  | from $cond_1 | union $cond_2 | union $cond_3 | union $cond_4 | union $cond_5 |
+  union $cond_6 | where process_path!="c:\\windows\\system32" AND process_path!="c:\\windows\\syswow64"
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device,
+  user), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1036
-  kill_chain_phases:
-    - Actions on Objectives
   cis20:
-   - CIS 8
+  - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_technique_id:
+  - T1036
   nist:
-    - PR.PT
-    - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  risk_severity: low
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
   required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - process_name
-    - _time
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process_path
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process_path
+  risk_severity: low
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
index a8e52c4c1d..916c805465 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
@@ -1,120 +1,69 @@
-name: More than usual number of LOLBAS applications in short time period - SSA
-id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-25'
-description:
-  Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications in conjunction
-  to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual LOLBAS applications
-  over a window of time, by building profiles per machine.
-how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
-references: [https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries]
-type: SSA
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
-process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)),
-timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
-| where process_name=="regsvcs.exe" OR
- process_name=="ftp.exe" OR
- process_name=="dfsvc.exe" OR
- process_name=="rasautou.exe" OR
- process_name=="schtasks.exe" OR
- process_name=="xwizard.exe" OR
- process_name=="findstr.exe" OR
- process_name=="esentutl.exe" OR
- process_name=="cscript.exe" OR
- process_name=="reg.exe" OR
- process_name=="csc.exe" OR
- process_name=="atbroker.exe" OR
- process_name=="print.exe" OR
- process_name=="pcwrun.exe" OR
- process_name=="vbc.exe" OR
- process_name=="rpcping.exe" OR
- process_name=="wsreset.exe" OR
- process_name=="ilasm.exe" OR
- process_name=="certutil.exe" OR
- process_name=="replace.exe" OR
- process_name=="mshta.exe" OR
- process_name=="bitsadmin.exe" OR
- process_name=="wscript.exe" OR
- process_name=="ieexec.exe" OR
- process_name=="cmd.exe" OR
- process_name=="microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe" OR
- process_name=="runscripthelper.exe" OR
- process_name=="makecab.exe" OR
- process_name=="forfiles.exe" OR
- process_name=="desktopimgdownldr.exe" OR
- process_name=="control.exe" OR
- process_name=="msbuild.exe" OR
- process_name=="register-cimprovider.exe" OR
- process_name=="tttracer.exe" OR
- process_name=="ie4uinit.exe" OR
- process_name=="sc.exe" OR
- process_name=="bash.exe" OR
- process_name=="hh.exe" OR
- process_name=="cmstp.exe" OR
- process_name=="mmc.exe" OR
- process_name=="jsc.exe" OR
- process_name=="scriptrunner.exe" OR
- process_name=="odbcconf.exe" OR
- process_name=="extexport.exe" OR
- process_name=="msdt.exe" OR
- process_name=="diskshadow.exe" OR
- process_name=="extrac32.exe" OR
- process_name=="eventvwr.exe" OR
- process_name=="mavinject.exe" OR
- process_name=="regasm.exe" OR
- process_name=="gpscript.exe" OR
- process_name=="rundll32.exe" OR
- process_name=="regsvr32.exe" OR
- process_name=="regedit.exe" OR
- process_name=="msiexec.exe" OR
- process_name=="gfxdownloadwrapper.exe" OR
- process_name=="presentationhost.exe" OR
- process_name=="regini.exe" OR
- process_name=="wmic.exe" OR
- process_name=="runonce.exe" OR
- process_name=="syncappvpublishingserver.exe" OR
- process_name=="verclsid.exe" OR
- process_name=="psr.exe" OR
- process_name=="infdefaultinstall.exe" OR
- process_name=="explorer.exe" OR
- process_name=="expand.exe" OR
- process_name=="installutil.exe" OR
- process_name=="netsh.exe" OR
- process_name=="wab.exe" OR
- process_name=="dnscmd.exe" OR
- process_name=="at.exe" OR
- process_name=="pcalua.exe" OR
- process_name=="cmdkey.exe" OR
- process_name=="msconfig.exe"
-| stats count(process_name) as lolbas_counter by device,span(timestamp, 300s)
-| eval lolbas_counter=lolbas_counter*1.0
-| rename window_end as timestamp
-| adaptive_threshold algorithm="quantile" value="lolbas_counter" entity="device" window=2419200000L
-| where label AND quantile>0.99
-| eval start_time = window_start,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend(device),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-known_false_positives: >
-  Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS applications in a short period of time.
-  This might trigger false positives at the beginning when it hasn't collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
+date: '2020-08-25'
+description: Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications
+  in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual
+  LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine.
+how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
+id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93
+known_false_positives: 'Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS
+  applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the
+  beginning when it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
+
+  '
+name: More than usual number of LOLBAS applications in short time period - SSA
+references:
+- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries
+search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_device_id"), "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "process_name"), "string", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)) | where process_name=="regsvcs.exe" OR process_name=="ftp.exe"
+  OR process_name=="dfsvc.exe" OR process_name=="rasautou.exe" OR process_name=="schtasks.exe"
+  OR process_name=="xwizard.exe" OR process_name=="findstr.exe" OR process_name=="esentutl.exe"
+  OR process_name=="cscript.exe" OR process_name=="reg.exe" OR process_name=="csc.exe"
+  OR process_name=="atbroker.exe" OR process_name=="print.exe" OR process_name=="pcwrun.exe"
+  OR process_name=="vbc.exe" OR process_name=="rpcping.exe" OR process_name=="wsreset.exe"
+  OR process_name=="ilasm.exe" OR process_name=="certutil.exe" OR process_name=="replace.exe"
+  OR process_name=="mshta.exe" OR process_name=="bitsadmin.exe" OR process_name=="wscript.exe"
+  OR process_name=="ieexec.exe" OR process_name=="cmd.exe" OR process_name=="microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe"
+  OR process_name=="runscripthelper.exe" OR process_name=="makecab.exe" OR process_name=="forfiles.exe"
+  OR process_name=="desktopimgdownldr.exe" OR process_name=="control.exe" OR process_name=="msbuild.exe"
+  OR process_name=="register-cimprovider.exe" OR process_name=="tttracer.exe" OR process_name=="ie4uinit.exe"
+  OR process_name=="sc.exe" OR process_name=="bash.exe" OR process_name=="hh.exe"
+  OR process_name=="cmstp.exe" OR process_name=="mmc.exe" OR process_name=="jsc.exe"
+  OR process_name=="scriptrunner.exe" OR process_name=="odbcconf.exe" OR process_name=="extexport.exe"
+  OR process_name=="msdt.exe" OR process_name=="diskshadow.exe" OR process_name=="extrac32.exe"
+  OR process_name=="eventvwr.exe" OR process_name=="mavinject.exe" OR process_name=="regasm.exe"
+  OR process_name=="gpscript.exe" OR process_name=="rundll32.exe" OR process_name=="regsvr32.exe"
+  OR process_name=="regedit.exe" OR process_name=="msiexec.exe" OR process_name=="gfxdownloadwrapper.exe"
+  OR process_name=="presentationhost.exe" OR process_name=="regini.exe" OR process_name=="wmic.exe"
+  OR process_name=="runonce.exe" OR process_name=="syncappvpublishingserver.exe" OR
+  process_name=="verclsid.exe" OR process_name=="psr.exe" OR process_name=="infdefaultinstall.exe"
+  OR process_name=="explorer.exe" OR process_name=="expand.exe" OR process_name=="installutil.exe"
+  OR process_name=="netsh.exe" OR process_name=="wab.exe" OR process_name=="dnscmd.exe"
+  OR process_name=="at.exe" OR process_name=="pcalua.exe" OR process_name=="cmdkey.exe"
+  OR process_name=="msconfig.exe" | stats count(process_name) as lolbas_counter by
+  device,span(timestamp, 300s) | eval lolbas_counter=lolbas_counter*1.0 | rename window_end
+  as timestamp | adaptive_threshold algorithm="quantile" value="lolbas_counter" entity="device"
+  window=2419200000L | where label AND quantile>0.99 | eval start_time = window_start,
+  end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  mitre_technique_id:
-    - T1059
-    - T1053
-  kill_chain_phases:
-    - Exploitation
   cis20:
-   - CIS 8
+  - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_technique_id:
+  - T1059
+  - T1053
   nist:
-    - PR.PT
-    - DE.CM
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - dest_device_id
+  - _time
+  - process_name
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-  required_fields:
-    - dest_device_id
-    - _time
-    - process_name
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
index 5a8d03134e..cd19383736 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -1,55 +1,51 @@
-name: Unusually Long Command Line - SSA
-id: 58f43aba-1775-445e-b19c-be2b87d83ae3
-version: 1
+author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-06'
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin
-  to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.
-  This detection is inspired on Unusually Long Command Line authored by Rico Valdez.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command lines.
+  to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. This
+  detection is inspired on Unusually Long Command Line authored by Rico Valdez.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command
+  lines.
+id: 58f43aba-1775-445e-b19c-be2b87d83ae3
+known_false_positives: This detection may flag suspiciously long command lines when
+  there is not sufficient evidence (samples) for a given process that this detection
+  is tracking; or when there is high variability in the length of the command line
+  for the tracked process. Also, some legitimate applications may use long command
+  lines. Such is the case of Ansible, that encodes Powershell scripts using long base64.
+  Attackers may use this technique to obfuscate their payloads.
+name: Unusually Long Command Line - SSA
 references: []
-type: SSA
-author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
-| eval cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
-dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
-process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)
-| where cmd_line!=null and dest_user_id!=null
-| eval cmd_line_norm=replace(cast(cmd_line, "string"), /\s(--?\w+)|(\/\w+)/, " ARG"),
-cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^\s]+/, "PATH"),
-cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N"),
-input=parse_double(len(coalesce(cmd_line_norm, "")))
-| select timestamp, process_name, dest_device_id, dest_user_id, cmd_line, input
-| adaptive_threshold algorithm="quantile" entity="process_name" window=60480000
-| where label AND quantile>0.99
-| first_time_event input_columns=["dest_device_id", "cmd_line"]
-| where first_time_dest_device_id_cmd_line
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-end_time = timestamp,
-entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id),
-body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-known_false_positives:
-  This detection may flag suspiciously long command lines when there is not sufficient evidence (samples) for a given
-  process that this detection is tracking; or when there is high variability in the length of the command line
-  for the tracked process.
-  Also, some legitimate applications may use long command lines. Such is the case of Ansible, that encodes
-  Powershell scripts using long base64. Attackers may use this technique to obfuscate their payloads.
+search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)) | eval cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string",
+  null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
+  process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line!=null and dest_user_id!=null | eval cmd_line_norm=replace(cast(cmd_line,
+  "string"), /\s(--?\w+)|(\/\w+)/, " ARG"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^\s]+/,
+  "PATH"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N"), input=parse_double(len(coalesce(cmd_line_norm,
+  ""))) | select timestamp, process_name, dest_device_id, dest_user_id, cmd_line,
+  input | adaptive_threshold algorithm="quantile" entity="process_name" window=60480000
+  | where label AND quantile>0.99 | first_time_event input_columns=["dest_device_id",
+  "cmd_line"] | where first_time_dest_device_id_cmd_line | eval start_time = timestamp,
+  end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body =
+  "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-  required_fields:
-    - process_name
-    - _time
-    - dest_device_id
-    - dest_user_id
-    - process
\ No newline at end of file
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
index 6ec574c916..ddcd44c028 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename
-id: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe.
   Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
@@ -12,32 +10,38 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+id: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.
+name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1127, T1036.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1127, T1036.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
index 6aa74baac1..041dfaf6ab 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage
-id: 9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage.
   microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
@@ -9,32 +7,38 @@ description: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe u
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+id: 9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming
+  from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.
+name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe
   by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming
-  from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1127
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1127
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
index 1b99bd0d80..5d2a1259b3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
@@ -1,44 +1,49 @@
-name: Suspicious msbuild path
-id: f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard
   path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319
-  and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will
-  run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there
-  are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.
+  and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio
+  will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however
+  there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+id: f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe,
+  triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better
+  understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will
+  need to be filtered on.
+name: Suspicious msbuild path
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe
-  AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework*\\v*\\*)
-  by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe,
-  triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better
-  understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.
+  AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework*\\v*\\*) by Processes.dest
+  Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1127.001
   - T1036.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
index f827194f4c..9b51171451 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename
-id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing.
   Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and
@@ -10,34 +8,40 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.
+name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
 - https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=msbuild.exe OR process_name=msbuild.exe)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1127.001
   - T1036.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
index 49a37d6b5a..d6a76883f8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious MSBuild Spawn
-id: a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe.
   This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from
@@ -12,33 +10,39 @@ description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+id: a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+name: Suspicious MSBuild Spawn
 references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe
   AND Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1127.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1127.001
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
index bf483827dd..d378623fe0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious mshta child process
-id: 60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
 description: The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from  "mshta.exe".
   The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
@@ -10,11 +8,13 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+id: 60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+name: Suspicious mshta child process
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe
@@ -25,22 +25,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
index 334f896bd6..a7ac316d3b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious mshta spawn
-id: 4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-20'
 description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This
   behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe
@@ -9,34 +7,40 @@ description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+id: 4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+name: Suspicious mshta spawn
 references:
 - https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe
   OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND Processes.process_name=mshta.exe
   by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.005
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
index b1539438c7..01e43735b5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious Reg exe Process
-id: a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not
   started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually
@@ -10,10 +8,13 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0
+known_false_positives: It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that
+  exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified
+  to filter them out.
+name: Suspicious Reg exe Process
 references:
 - https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
   != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name
@@ -24,24 +25,27 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup
   process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` '
-known_false_positives: It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that
-  exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified
-  to filter them out.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Disabling Security Tools
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1112
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1112
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
index a6435e94c8..fe583f0acb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage
-id: 2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches
   for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup,
@@ -10,9 +8,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f
+known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event
+  log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.
+name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = wevtutil.exe Processes.process="*cl*" (Processes.process="*System*"
@@ -20,20 +20,22 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user|
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`'
-known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event
-  log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1070.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: ''
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 6
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1070.001
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - PR.IP
@@ -41,8 +43,10 @@ tags:
   - PR.AC
   - PR.AT
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: ''
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
index c2fe0b625d..09364ccb02 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
-name: Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin
-id: b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb
-version: 4
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than
   explorer.exe.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into
   the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.
-type: ESCU
+id: b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb
+known_false_positives: Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions
+  of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to
+  it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.
+name: Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name)
   as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = "*$Recycle.Bin*"
@@ -19,20 +20,23 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name
   != "explorer.exe" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
   | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions
-  of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to
-  it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Collection and Staging
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1036
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1036
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
index f387a25d9b..cbf641bb8f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: System Information Discovery Detection
-id: 8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-12'
 description: Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand
   configurations of the system to further exploit it.
-type: ESCU
+id: 8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72
+known_false_positives: Administrators debugging servers
+name: System Information Discovery Detection
 references:
 - https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*wmic* qfe*"
   OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user
@@ -16,21 +15,26 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   > 2 | stats values(process) min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime
   by user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators debugging servers
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Discovery Techniques
   asset_type: Windows
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1082
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
index 61ac0e2803..f2700e63e1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations
-id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d
-version: 5
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-08'
 description: This search looks for system processes that normally run out of C:\Windows\System32\
   or C:\Windows\SysWOW64 that are not run from that location.  This can indicate a
@@ -8,32 +6,38 @@ description: This search looks for system processes that normally run out of C:\
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest details
   about process execution from your hosts. Specifically, this search requires the
   process name and the full path to the process executable.
-type: ESCU
+id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\System32*"
   Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64*" by Processes.user Processes.dest
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.process_hash| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Unusual Processes
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1036.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1036.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
index ab71a6d9a4..ef8be4ae5f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search
   looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop
@@ -11,9 +9,10 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro,
   update this macro to filter out false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f
+known_false_positives: ''
+name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe
   AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv*  by Processes.process_name
@@ -21,20 +20,25 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count
   process_name process_id parent_process_name process'
-known_false_positives: ''
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1562.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: ''
   automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.001
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
index 701fc5e8f8..2aced7153b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Unusually Long Command Line
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f
-version: 5
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-08'
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts.
@@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.
+name: Unusually Long Command Line
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name
   Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
@@ -19,22 +18,27 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process
   | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost)
   + avgperhost)'
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Unusual Processes
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
   - Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
index dea463a213..cf6cf89024 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK
-id: 57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2019-05-08'
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK)
@@ -15,16 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command line
   as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search
   is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild
   the model with the latest data available in your environment.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown
-  | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(processlen)" as isOutlier
-  | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process
-  processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`'
+id: 57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941
 known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs
   or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify
   the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration.
@@ -33,18 +22,33 @@ known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications use long command lines for i
   the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected
   results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to
   build the associated model.
+name: Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown
+  | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(processlen)" as isOutlier
+  | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process
+  processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Unusual Processes
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
   - Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: ''
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: ''
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
index 03259d6828..3cd12aa0b1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: USN Journal Deletion
-id: b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-03'
 description: The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform
   tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update
@@ -11,36 +9,42 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
   The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
   model.
-type: ESCU
+id: b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: USN Journal Deletion
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | search process="*deletejournal*" AND process="*usn*" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1070
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 10
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1070
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - DE.DP
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
index 3999fe577e..e62ea54246 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups
-id: cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-22'
 description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator
   Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent
@@ -8,34 +6,40 @@ description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup A
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.
-type: ESCU
+id: cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
+name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
 - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe
   Processes.process="*delete*" AND (Processes.process="*catalog*" OR Processes.process="*systemstatebackup*")
   by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1490
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - PR.IP
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1490
+  nist:
+  - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
index a3f6d71055..78f278fcd4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
@@ -1,41 +1,47 @@
-name: Windows AdFind Exe
-id: bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f
-version: 1
-date: '2020-12-16'
-description: "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller."  
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-  - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
-  - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-search: '
-  | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=*-f* OR Processes.process=*-b*) AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=*-gcb* OR Processes.process=*-sc*)
-  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process
-  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`
-'
-known_false_positives: administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons
+date: '2020-12-16'
+description: 'This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line
+  arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions.
+  It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more
+  details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been
+  seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST.
+  AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If
+  you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+id: bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f
+known_false_positives: administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate
+  reasons
+name: Windows AdFind Exe
+references:
+- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
+- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html
+search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=*-f*
+  OR Processes.process=*-b*) AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=*-gcb*
+  OR Processes.process=*-sc*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `windows_adfind_exe_filter` '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1018
-  kill_chain_phases:
-    - Exploitation
-  cis20:
-    - CIS 8
-  nist:
-    - PR.PT
-    - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
+  - Sunburst Malware
   asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   dataset:
-    - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1018
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
index 80d29d1d26..4bfff3e8a9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
@@ -1,41 +1,45 @@
-name: Windows Event Log Cleared
-id: ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a
-version: 4
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-06'
 description: This search looks for Windows events that indicate one of the Windows
   event logs has been purged.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   Windows event logs from your hosts.
-type: ESCU
+id: ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a
+known_false_positives: It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared
+  by Administrators.
+name: Windows Event Log Cleared
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineventlog_system`
   EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode
   dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`
-known_false_positives: It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared
-  by Administrators.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1070.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 6
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1070.001
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - PR.IP
   - PR.AC
   - PR.AT
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
index 0135e3d661..cf3d07c4d0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped
-id: 69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-06'
 description: The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped
   via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
@@ -8,31 +6,37 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system act
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-type: ESCU
+id: 69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6
+known_false_positives: SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause
+  major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives
+  have been identified.
+name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE ("Processes.process_name"="net*.exe"
   "Processes.process"="*stop \"samss\"*") BY "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process"
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`'
-known_false_positives: SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause
-  major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives
-  have been identified.
 tags:
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1489
   analytics_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1489
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
index 4a57b90630..9ccca9c836 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,40 @@
-name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon
-id: ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-08'
 description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon
   data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate
   alerts for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation,
-  EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`'
+id: ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9
 known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions
   for legitimate purposes.
+name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon
+references: []
+search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation,
+  EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1546.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1546.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
index f1a47e286b..de15770e85 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect New Login Attempts to Routers
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized
   as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that
@@ -9,25 +7,31 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the net
   router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You
   must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating
   to routing infrastructure.
-type: ESCU
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1
+known_false_positives: Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections
+name: Detect New Login Attempts to Routers
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest
   latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router
   by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),
   "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 11
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
index 9aa9b1f21d..1283f7a703 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
@@ -1,46 +1,59 @@
-name: Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA
-id: 4b237388-dfa1-41a6-91d4-4de2d598376f
-version: 1
+author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-25'
 description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open attachment,
-  click links or trigger third party service. This detect uses Natural Language Processing (NLP)
-  approach to analyze an email message's content (Sender, Subject and Body) and judge whether
-  it is a phishing email. The detection adopts a deep learning (neural network) model that employs
-  character level embeddings plus LSTM layers to perform classification. The model is pre-trained
-  and then published as ONNX format. Current sample model is trained using the dataset published at
-  https://github.com/splunk/attack_data/tree/master/datasets/T1566_Phishing_Email/splunk_train.json
-  User are expected to re-train the model by combining with their own training data for better
-  accuracy using the provided model file (SMLE notebook). DSP pipeline then processes the email
-  message and passes it as an event to Apply ML Models function, which returns the probability of a
-  phishing email. Current implementation assumes the email is fed to DSP in JSON format contains
-  at least email's sender, subject and its message body, including reply content, if any.
-how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject and its
-  message body.
-references: [ ]
-type: SSA
-author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
-search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get(input_event, "From"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Subject"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Content"), "string", " "), "                                                                                                                                "), _time=map_get(input_event, "_time")
-| where eventLine IS NOT NULL 
-| eval mapC={" ": 32, "!": 33, "\"": 34, "#": 35, "$": 36, "%": 37, "&": 38, "`": 39, "(": 40, ")": 41, "*": 42, "+": 43, ",": 44, "-": 45, ".": 46, "/": 47, "0": 48, "1": 49, "2": 50, "3": 51, "4": 52, "5": 53, "6": 54, "7": 55, "8": 56, "9": 57, ":": 58, ";": 59, "<": 60, "=": 61, ">": 62, "?": 63, "@": 64, "A": 65, "B": 66, "C": 67, "D": 68, "E": 69, "F": 70, "G": 71, "H": 72, "I": 73, "J": 74, "K": 75, "L": 76, "M": 77, "N": 78, "O": 79, "P": 80, "Q": 81, "R": 82, "S": 83, "T": 84, "U": 85, "V": 86, "W": 87, "X": 88, "Y": 89, "Z": 90, "[": 91, "\\": 92, "]": 93, "^": 94, "_": 95, "`": 96, "a": 97, "b": 98, "c": 99, "d": 100, "e": 101, "f": 102, "g": 103, "h": 104, "i": 105, "j": 106, "k": 107, "l": 108, "m": 109, "n": 110, "o": 111, "p": 112, "q": 113, "r": 114, "s": 115, "t": 116, "u": 117, "v": 118, "w": 119, "x": 120, "y": 121, "z": 122, "{": 123, "|": 124, "}": 125, "~": 126},
-ml_in = for_each(iterator(mvrange(1,129), "i"), cast(map_get(mapC, substr(eventLine, i, 1)), "float") )
-| apply_model connection_id="YOUR_S3_ONNX_CONNECTOR_ID" name="phishing_email_v8" path="s3://smle-experiments/models/phishing_email"
-| eval probability = mvindex(ml_out, 0) 
-| where probability > 0.5
-| eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, entities="TBD", body="TBD"
-| select probability, body, entities, start_time, end_time 
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-known_false_positives: Because of imbalance of anomaly data in training, the model will less likely report false
-  positive. Instead, the model is more prone to false negative. Current best recall score is ~85%
+  click links or trigger third party service. This detect uses Natural Language Processing
+  (NLP) approach to analyze an email message's content (Sender, Subject and Body)
+  and judge whether it is a phishing email. The detection adopts a deep learning (neural
+  network) model that employs character level embeddings plus LSTM layers to perform
+  classification. The model is pre-trained and then published as ONNX format. Current
+  sample model is trained using the dataset published at https://github.com/splunk/attack_data/tree/master/datasets/T1566_Phishing_Email/splunk_train.json
+  User are expected to re-train the model by combining with their own training data
+  for better accuracy using the provided model file (SMLE notebook). DSP pipeline
+  then processes the email message and passes it as an event to Apply ML Models function,
+  which returns the probability of a phishing email. Current implementation assumes
+  the email is fed to DSP in JSON format contains at least email's sender, subject
+  and its message body, including reply content, if any.
+how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject
+  and its message body.
+id: 4b237388-dfa1-41a6-91d4-4de2d598376f
+known_false_positives: Because of imbalance of anomaly data in training, the model
+  will less likely report false positive. Instead, the model is more prone to false
+  negative. Current best recall score is ~85%
+name: Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA
+references: []
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "From"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Subject"), "string", "
+  "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Content"), "string", " "), "                                                                                                                                "),
+  _time=map_get(input_event, "_time") | where eventLine IS NOT NULL | eval mapC={"
+  ": 32, "!": 33, "\"": 34, "#": 35, "$": 36, "%": 37, "&": 38, "`": 39, "(": 40,
+  ")": 41, "*": 42, "+": 43, ",": 44, "-": 45, ".": 46, "/": 47, "0": 48, "1": 49,
+  "2": 50, "3": 51, "4": 52, "5": 53, "6": 54, "7": 55, "8": 56, "9": 57, ":": 58,
+  ";": 59, "<": 60, "=": 61, ">": 62, "?": 63, "@": 64, "A": 65, "B": 66, "C": 67,
+  "D": 68, "E": 69, "F": 70, "G": 71, "H": 72, "I": 73, "J": 74, "K": 75, "L": 76,
+  "M": 77, "N": 78, "O": 79, "P": 80, "Q": 81, "R": 82, "S": 83, "T": 84, "U": 85,
+  "V": 86, "W": 87, "X": 88, "Y": 89, "Z": 90, "[": 91, "\\": 92, "]": 93, "^": 94,
+  "_": 95, "`": 96, "a": 97, "b": 98, "c": 99, "d": 100, "e": 101, "f": 102, "g":
+  103, "h": 104, "i": 105, "j": 106, "k": 107, "l": 108, "m": 109, "n": 110, "o":
+  111, "p": 112, "q": 113, "r": 114, "s": 115, "t": 116, "u": 117, "v": 118, "w":
+  119, "x": 120, "y": 121, "z": 122, "{": 123, "|": 124, "}": 125, "~": 126}, ml_in
+  = for_each(iterator(mvrange(1,129), "i"), cast(map_get(mapC, substr(eventLine, i,
+  1)), "float") ) | apply_model connection_id="YOUR_S3_ONNX_CONNECTOR_ID" name="phishing_email_v8"
+  path="s3://smle-experiments/models/phishing_email" | eval probability = mvindex(ml_out,
+  0) | where probability > 0.5 | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, entities="TBD",
+  body="TBD" | select probability, body, entities, start_time, end_time | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_technique_id:
   - T1566
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - UEBA for Security Cloud
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: mail server
+type: SSA
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
index cf550ea395..da2006139d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces
-id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-19'
 description: Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file
   extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many
@@ -18,24 +16,30 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender
   \ will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\
   \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\
   \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox."
-type: ESCU
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8
+known_false_positives: None at this time
+name: Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient)
   as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email
   where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")`
   | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio
   >= 0.1 |  rex field=recipient_address "(?<recipient_user>.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None at this time
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Suspicious Emails
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
index 3ed9919343..e2a7e1fc61 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts
-id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server
   to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using
@@ -12,9 +10,12 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic
   The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation
   you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number
   of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.
-type: ESCU
+id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378
+known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the
+  deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these
+  values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
+name: Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out
   from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip
   _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out)
@@ -29,21 +30,24 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as
   = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out,
   2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average,
   num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`'
-known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the
-  deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these
-  values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Collection and Staging
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1114.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1114.002
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
index aa409d05fa..30c2a56add 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Monitor Email For Brand Abuse
-id: b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-01-05'
 description: This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar
   to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.
@@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender'
   address (src_user) must be populated.  You also need to have run the search "ESCU
   - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will
   be checked for.
-type: ESCU
+id: b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8
+known_false_positives: None at this time
+name: Monitor Email For Brand Abuse
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as
   recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email
   by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")`
@@ -18,16 +17,21 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) a
   temp=split(src_user, "@") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true
   brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true
   | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None at this time
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   - Suspicious Emails
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
index 679b7cd72e..d567238c47 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: No Windows Updates in a time frame
-id: 1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-15'
 description: This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event
   indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are
@@ -13,9 +11,10 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'U
   wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to
   properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can
   populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.
-type: ESCU
+id: 1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: No Windows Updates in a time frame
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates
   where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" by Updates.dest
   Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status
@@ -23,14 +22,19 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from d
   <= relative_time(now(), "-60d@d"), 1, 0)  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  |
   search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as "Last Update Time", | table Host, "Update
   Status", Product, "Last Update Time" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Monitor for Updates
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 18
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.MA
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
index 199d0e1fca..bd36ed2199 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,23 @@
-name: Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems
-id: 354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-01-07'
 description: The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the
   Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities.
 how_to_implement: The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner
   data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified.
-type: ESCU
+id: 354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea
+known_false_positives: It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting
+  that the patches have been applied.
+name: Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5753"
   OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5715" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5754"
   by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting
-  that the patches have been applied.
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 4
   nist:
@@ -27,5 +25,10 @@ tags:
   - RS.MI
   - PR.IP
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
index 670696c514..485b09994a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly
-id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their
   sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by
@@ -8,8 +6,12 @@ description: This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of thei
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated
   with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called  "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel."
   Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8
+known_false_positives: This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is
+  seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step
+  is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a
+  legitimate sender.
+name: Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly
 search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where
   nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model
@@ -18,20 +20,22 @@ search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is
-  seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step
-  is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a
-  legitimate sender.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Emails
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1566
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1566
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
index 7871c2c057..fa34dd4d08 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions
-id: 473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file
   extensions.
@@ -16,28 +14,34 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender
   \ gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\
   \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\
   \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox."
-type: ESCU
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user,
   All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments`
   | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` '
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Suspicious Emails
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1566.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1566.001
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
index f490f00a6e..9df6bf67f0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious Java Classes
-id: if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491
-version: 1
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-06'
 description: This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to
   exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.
@@ -8,24 +6,30 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application
   servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using
   network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.
-type: ESCU
+id: if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491
+known_false_positives: There are no known false positives.
+name: Suspicious Java Classes
 references: []
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)"
   | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
   as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent)
   as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There are no known false positives.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
   nist:
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index fc1e9a0b87..b691324ee6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,33 @@
-name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection
-id: 294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-15'
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch
   EKS Logs inputs.
-type: ESCU
+id: 294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
+  UA and source IPs will provide context.
+name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS
   Security Scanner" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name
   values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI)
   by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
-  UA and source IPs will provide context.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1526
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
index 3c9a9fcb39..ec473ccf2d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection
-id: dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-15'
 description: This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests
   against Kubernetes' Pods API
@@ -8,23 +6,29 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch
   EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection`
   macro to filter out the false positives.
-type: ESCU
+id: dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
+  UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.
+name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods
   requestURI="/api/v1/pods" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason)
   values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by
   src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
-  UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1526
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
index 6ad2d36501..7d8795816e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,32 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-27"
-description: "This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-27'
+description: This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different
+  role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
 id: 88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1
-known_false_positives: "Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies."
-name: "aws detect attach to role policy"
+known_false_positives: Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can
+  be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure).
+  The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege
+  policies or even newly created policies.
+name: aws detect attach to role policy
 references: []
-search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate  | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`'
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn
+  | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn
+  eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated
+  userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate  | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "AWS Cross Account Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS Account"
+  - AWS Cross Account Activity
+  asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1078
+  - T1078
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
index 5637090c3d..e61bed234a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,31 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-27"
-description: "This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-27'
+description: This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent
+  keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls.
+  Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
 id: 12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01
-known_false_positives: "Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context."
-name: "aws detect permanent key creation"
+known_false_positives: Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is
+  a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.
+name: aws detect permanent key creation
 references: []
-search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey "userIdentity.type"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId
- |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`'
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey
+  "userIdentity.type"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent
+  action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status
+  responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "AWS Cross Account Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS Account"
+  - AWS Cross Account Activity
+  asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1078
+  - T1078
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
index 20e485d0c8..5f75009e14 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,34 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-27"
-description: "This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-27'
+description: This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation
+  is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different
+  than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation
+  of privileges.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
 id: 5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad
-known_false_positives: "CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases."
-name: "aws detect role creation"
+known_false_positives: CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search
+  can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general
+  AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.
+name: aws detect role creation
 references: []
-search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`'
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
+  requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId
+  userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName
+  requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate
+  | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "AWS Cross Account Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS Account"
+  - AWS Cross Account Activity
+  asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1078
+  - T1078
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
index aef85a6e15..f52b8e0e25 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,32 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-27"
-description: "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-27'
+description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These
+  tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate
+  privileges.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudtrail logs
 id: 8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662
-known_false_positives: "Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse."
-name: "aws detect sts assume role abuse"
+known_false_positives: Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism
+  to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted
+  to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.
+name: aws detect sts assume role abuse
 references: []
-search: '`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`'
+search: '`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role
+  | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action
+  requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate
+  | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "AWS Cross Account Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS Account"
+  - AWS Cross Account Activity
+  asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1078
+  - T1078
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
index c00cbfcd07..3f3f58c9d3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,32 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-27"
-description: "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-27'
+description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken.
+  These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and
+  escalate privileges.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
 id: 85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551
-known_false_positives: "Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used."
-name: "aws detect sts get session token abuse"
+known_false_positives: Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments
+  numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide
+  specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of
+  field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.
+name: aws detect sts get session token abuse
 references: []
-search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA  userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`'
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA  userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName
+  | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn
+  userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "AWS Cross Account Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS Account"
+  - AWS Cross Account Activity
+  asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1550
+  - T1550
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
index 2bf308813d..afa850e45e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,38 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-10-09"
-description: "This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-09'
+description: This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects.
+  Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges
+  at different projects depending on organization schema.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
+  logs
 id: 27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb
-known_false_positives: "Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization"
+known_false_positives: Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum
+  number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior
+  within organization
 name: GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project
 references:
-  - https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
-  - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
-  - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`"
+- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
+- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
+- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner
+  OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin
+  OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin
+  OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table
+  data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission
+  data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role
+  data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
-  asset_type: "GCP Account"
+  asset_type: GCP Account
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
index d247bb8014..c7679fb673 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,34 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-10-08"
-description: "This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-08'
+description: This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This
+  framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised
+  high privilege accounts.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
+  logs
 id: a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52
-known_false_positives: "Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects"
+known_false_positives: Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match
+  with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account
+  may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects
 name: GCP Detect gcploit framework
 references:
-  - https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
-  - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`"
+- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
+- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s
+  | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail
+  data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location
+  http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
-  asset_type: "GCP Account"
+  asset_type: GCP Account
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
index 8495c184eb..8147447b1c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,37 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-10-09"
-description: "This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-09'
+description: This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and
+  accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts
+  to move laterally and escalate privileges.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
+  logs
 id: 2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba
-known_false_positives: "High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives."
+known_false_positives: High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however
+  it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false
+  positives.
 name: GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account
 references:
-  - https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
-  - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
-  - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`"
+- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
+- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
+- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken
+  OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create
+  OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp
+  data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission
+  data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id
+  | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
-  asset_type: "GCP Account"
+  asset_type: GCP Account
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
index fa55c444ec..33957f6d3a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,33 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-09-01"
-description: "This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally."
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-09-01'
+description: This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP
+  Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access
+  sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to
+  access and move laterally.
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
+  logs
 id: a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972
-known_false_positives: "GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs."
-name: "gcp detect oauth token abuse"
+known_false_positives: GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are
+  access policies in place along with audit logs.
+name: gcp detect oauth token abuse
 references:
-  - https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1
-  - https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2
-search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message  | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`'
+- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1
+- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog
+  |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp
+  protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message  | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
-  asset_type: "GCP Account"
+  asset_type: GCP Account
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
index 502146513c..e11a9c6671 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,29 @@
-name: GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection
-id: 19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-17'
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods
 how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later),
   then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
-type: ESCU
+id: 19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
+  User Agent, source IPs and pods  will provide context.
+name: GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
-search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods  will provide context.
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log
+  |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
+  properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  asset_type: GCP Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1526
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: GCP Kubernetes cluster
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index 3ef4ab6319..2d50e21f20 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection
-id: db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-15'
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster
@@ -8,9 +6,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or late
   then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
   You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection
   to filter out FPs.
-type: ESCU
+id: db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
+  User Agent and source IPs will provide context.
+name: GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection
 references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1
   data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 "data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision"=forbid
   "data.protoPayload.status.message"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="system:anonymous"
@@ -20,14 +20,18 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!
   as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name
   as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |
   `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
-  User Agent and source IPs will provide context.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  asset_type: GCP Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1526
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: GCP Kubernetes cluster
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index 70c6e10b56..41495c12fa 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,27 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-06-23"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-06-23'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
+  pods by IP address, verb and decision
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
 id: 5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6
-known_false_positives: "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness."
-name: "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod"
+known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
+  must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod
 references: []
-search: "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts  objectRef.resource=pods | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision  | top  sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`"
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts  objectRef.resource=pods
+  | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision  |
+  top  sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 4e924129c4..4924538b7f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-06-23"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-06-23'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
+  accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC
+  by accounts occurrences
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
 id: de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8
-known_false_positives: "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted."
-name: "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account"
+known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
+  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account
 references: []
-search: "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`"
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table
+  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats
+  count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username
+  annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index 3609f8f322..f6c76c92b6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,28 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-06-23"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets"
-how_to_implement: "You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-06-23'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
+  objects such as configmaps or secrets
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk
+  App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.
 id: 7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c
-known_false_positives: "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection."
-name: "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access"
+known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
+  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
+name: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access
 references: []
-search: "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1  |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`"
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1
+  sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1  |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource
+  objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup
+  user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index f961ab7ed4..875a1f9b23 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,28 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-06-23"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-06-23'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
+  objects such as configmpas or secrets
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs.
 id: b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569
-known_false_positives: "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. "
-name: "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access"
+known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
+  however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. '
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access
 references: []
-search: "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1  | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`"
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings
+  sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1  | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{}
+  objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username
+  user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 78d5a034cf..4d766a53c1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-06-23"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-06-23'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
+  failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or
+  rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source
+  IPs and request URI
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs.
 id: a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5
-known_false_positives: "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster."
-name: "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access"
+known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
+  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access
 references: []
-search: "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`"
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status
+  = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status
+  requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index cce8135a08..8cf3a9d30d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,28 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-06-23"
-description: "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-06-23'
+description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP,
+  verb namespace and object access context
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs.
 id: 042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2
-known_false_positives: "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets"
-name: "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls"
+known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
+  verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious
+  IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls
 references: []
-search: "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous  | table  src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI  | stats  count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`"
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1
+  src_user=system:anonymous  | table  src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI  |
+  stats  count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
index 3defb5fe1b..76a0d548db 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-26"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb"
-how_to_implement: "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-26'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
+  pods and namespaces by IP address and verb
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
 id: 55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72
-known_false_positives: "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness."
-name: "Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace"
+known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
+  must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness.
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace
 references: []
-search: "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow  | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`"
+search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
+  user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow  |
+  table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status
+  properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status
+  properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-  asset_type: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
index 27735f6ce3..d4d9923682 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-26"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences"
-how_to_implement: "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-26'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
+  accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes
+  of RBAC by accounts occurrences
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
 id: 47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e
-known_false_positives: "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted."
+known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
+  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
 name: Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account
 references: []
-search: "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`"
+search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
+  annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent
+  annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason
+  | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
-  asset_type: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index d506228c52..01ff5ccc58 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,28 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-20"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets"
-how_to_implement: "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-20'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
+  objects such as configmpas or secrets
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
 id: 1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8
-known_false_positives: "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection."
-name: "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access"
+known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
+  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access
 references: []
-search: "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow  |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`"
+search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search
+  objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow  |table
+  user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name
+  annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index 0201873217..2c2f2a46a6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,28 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-20"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets"
-how_to_implement: "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-20'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
+  objects such as configmpas or secrets
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
 id: f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c
-known_false_positives: "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. "
-name: "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access"
+known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
+  however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. '
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access
 references: []
-search: "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`"
+search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search
+  objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username
+  user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason
+  | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-  asset_type: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index f13081df0e..fefc8b4139 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,28 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-20"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status"
-how_to_implement: "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-20'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
+  failure or forbidden access status
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
 id: 019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514
-known_false_positives: "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster."
-name: "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access"
+known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
+  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access
 references: []
-search: "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts*  responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace  |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`"
+search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
+  user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts*  responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table  sourceIPs{}
+  user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod
+  objectRef.namespace  |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index f2a3fc18e2..1f7874b6c8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,31 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-26"
-description: "This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context"
-how_to_implement: "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-26'
+description: This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb
+  namespace and object access context
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
 id: 4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5
-known_false_positives: "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets"
-name: "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls"
+known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
+  verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs
+  and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls
 references: []
-search: "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log
-  | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration
-  | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1
-  | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI
-  | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI
-  |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`"
+search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath
+  input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration
+  | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{}
+  verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |
+  rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace
+  requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 4dad0447e8..20e0d7728f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,28 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-20"
-description: "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure"
-how_to_implement: "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-20'
+description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source
+  IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod
+  in Azure
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
 id: 86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d
-known_false_positives: "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context."
-name: "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint"
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source
+  IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.
+name: Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint
 references: []
-search: "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`"
+search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
+  responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
+  properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity"
-  asset_type: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Reconnaissance
+  - Reconnaissance
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 0957b1d0ed..20cab4f98b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,30 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-19"
-description: "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure"
-how_to_implement: "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-19'
+description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source
+  IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in
+  Azure
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
 id: c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a
-known_false_positives: "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context."
-name: "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint"
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source
+  IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.
+name: Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint
 references: []
-search: "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`"
+search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
+  responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
+  |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity"
-  asset_type: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Reconnaissance
+  - Reconnaissance
   mitre_attack_id:
-    - T1526
+  - T1526
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 77d64ee061..747d112a8b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-11"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-11'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
+  accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC
+  by accounts occurrences
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with
+  pubsub messaging service logs
 id: 99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340
-known_false_positives: "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted."
-name: "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account"
+known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
+  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account
 references: []
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole  | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`"
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding
+  OR Clusterrole  | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
+  data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason
+  |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-  asset_type: "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
-version: 1
\ No newline at end of file
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index cd214b7b56..458bd4e19d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-10"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs"
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-10'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
+  pods by IP address, verb and decision
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub
+  messaging service logs
 id: 7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f
-known_false_positives: "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness."
-name: "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod"
+known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
+  must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod
 references: []
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message`  data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`"
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message`  data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts
+  | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb
+  data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource
+  | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
+  data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-  asset_type: "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index abcc7efa8e..6f1afae57b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-11"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-11'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
+  objects such as configmaps or secrets
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with
+  pubsub messaging service logs.
 id: bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a
-known_false_positives: "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection."
-name: "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access"
+known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
+  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access
 references: []
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets  | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`"
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps
+  OR secrets  | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name
+  data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
+  | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name
+  |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index fdaabb5bcc..41668b0e1c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-11"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-11'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
+  objects such as configmpas or secrets
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
+  messaging servicelogs.
 id: a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30
-known_false_positives: "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. "
-name: "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access"
+known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
+  however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious
+  use. '
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access
 references: []
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1  | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`"
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding
+  OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1  | table src_ip
+  src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason
+  | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-  asset_type: "GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  asset_type: GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 3fce1bf564..eae4377948 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,31 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-06-23"
-description: "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-06-23'
+description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
+  failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or
+  rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source
+  IPs and request URI
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
+  messaging service logs.
 id: 7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b
-known_false_positives: "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster."
-name: "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access"
+known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
+  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access
 references: []
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb  data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`"
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=*
+  | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace
+  data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb  data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed
+  data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
+  | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index ab67a869ef..b09ee1e24e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,30 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-07-11"
-description: "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context"
-how_to_implement: "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-11'
+description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP,
+  verb namespace and object access context
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
+  messaging logs.
 id: a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557
-known_false_positives: "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets"
-name: "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls"
+known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
+  source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential
+  malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such
+  as configmaps or secrets
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls
 references: []
-search: "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`"
+search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl*
+  src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent
+  data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user
+  |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-  asset_type: "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster"
+  - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
-    - Lateral Movement
+  - Lateral Movement
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
index 5e1cb995bf..59cd0ed0c5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Child Processes of Spoolsv exe
-id: aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-03-16'
 description: This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is
   associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440.
@@ -11,31 +9,37 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro
   to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.
-type: ESCU
+id: aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children
+  of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added
+  as exclusions in the search.
+name: Child Processes of Spoolsv exe
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe
   AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children
-  of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added
-  as exclusions in the search.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1068
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1068
   nist:
   - PR.AC
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index 3de78175fe..74276648f8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -1,32 +1,34 @@
-name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
-id: 93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-27'
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
-how_to_implement: 'Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory.
-The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command
-while using the shell and edit flags.'
-type: ESCU
+how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs
+  from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged
+  user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using
+  the shell and edit flags.
+id: 93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
 references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '`linux_hosts`
-| search "sudoedit -s \\"
-| `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`'
-
-known_false_positives: unknown
+search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1068
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1068
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
\ No newline at end of file
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
index bff0cc20ac..d398bfdbad 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,37 @@
-name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
-id: 10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-29'
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
-how_to_implement: 'Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu),
-where segfaults are being logged.  This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary.
-The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period
-on a single host'
-type: ESCU
+how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos
+  and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged.  This also captures instances where
+  the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than
+  5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a
+  single host
+id: 10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d
+known_false_positives: If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will
+  pick those up too.
+name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
 references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '`linux_hosts`
-| search sudoedit segfault
-| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host
-| search count > 5
-| `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`'
-
-known_false_positives: If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.
+search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1068
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1068
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
\ No newline at end of file
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
index 3759567c76..096706179a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
@@ -1,32 +1,34 @@
-name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
-id: 1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-28'
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
-how_to_implement: 'OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io)
-as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed
-when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the
-shell and edit flags.'
-type: ESCU
+how_to_implement: OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info
+  at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402.
+  The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single
+  \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
+id: 1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
 references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '`osquery_process`
-| search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*"
-| `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`'
-known_false_positives: unknown
+search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1068
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1068
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
\ No newline at end of file
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
index 2d61882308..050331cf90 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file
-id: a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process
   is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.
@@ -8,8 +6,10 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
   via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
   data sources, such as Sysmon.
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893
+known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files
+  to the disk.
+name: Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe
   OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id
@@ -26,21 +26,25 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(
   file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id
   outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name  file_path | where file_name
   != "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter` '
-known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files
-  to the disk.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Phishing Payloads
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1566.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1566.001
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
index 7ae4dacf1d..2556bc305b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detection of tools built by NirSoft
-id: 1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate
   the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused
@@ -9,27 +7,33 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6
+known_false_positives: While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You
+  should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
+name: Detection of tools built by NirSoft
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*
   /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`'
-known_false_positives: While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You
-  should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1072
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 3
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1072
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
index f14f09f3de..588e0e9bef 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
@@ -1,46 +1,49 @@
-name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service
-id: 823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808
-version: 4
-date: '2020-07-21'
-description: This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running
-  in your environment. This table is then cached.
-how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
-  you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search
-  to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search
-  `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child
-  processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval
-  as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to
-  keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the
-  `previously_seen_windows_service_window` macro to adjust the time window.
-  Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 |
-    rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" |
-    where state="running" |
-    lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen |
-    where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) |
-    table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`'
+date: '2020-07-21'
+description: This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen
+  running in your environment. This table is then cached.
+how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
+  you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to
+  execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running
+  Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames
+  for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search
+  the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to
+  keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the
+  `previously_seen_windows_service_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please
+  ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
+id: 823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808
 known_false_positives: A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify
   that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.
+name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service
+references: []
+search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+)
+  service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
+  service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen
+  > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time
+  dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1569.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 2
   - CIS 9
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1569.002
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
   - PR.AC
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
index 39decd6c57..08c044f4eb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: MacOS - Re-opened Applications
-id: 40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b
-version: 1
+author: Jamie Windley, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-07'
 description: This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine
   which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.
@@ -9,30 +7,36 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest p
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be
   deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data
   populate the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b
+known_false_positives: At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing,
+  no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during
+  normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed
+  that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating.
+  In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in
+  fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added
+  to an allow list.
+name: MacOS - Re-opened Applications
 references: []
-author: Jamie Windley, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*com.apple.loginwindow*"
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`'
-known_false_positives: At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing,
-  no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during
-  normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed
-  that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating.
-  In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in
-  fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to
-  an allow list.
 tags:
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   - Command and Control
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
index 7b6754c43a..80583693df 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Processes Tapping Keyboard Events
-id: 2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec
-version: 1
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2019-01-25'
 description: This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard
   events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This
@@ -11,25 +9,31 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must
   be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery
   data populate the Alerts data model.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps
-  | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id|
-  dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`'
+id: 2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec
 known_false_positives: There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps
   are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes
   to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161)
   comment.
+name: Processes Tapping Keyboard Events
+references: []
+search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps
+  | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id|
+  dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 4
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
   nist:
   - DE.DP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
index 1530b23673..f65bb3e968 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Remote Desktop Process Running On System
-id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a
-version: 5
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on
   systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out
@@ -14,30 +12,36 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security
   Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv
   file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.
-type: ESCU
+id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a
+known_false_positives: Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
+name: Remote Desktop Process Running On System
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe
   AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user
   Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Lateral Movement
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1021.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1021.001
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 5
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
index ec80b049b5..1aa9748a46 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Spike in File Writes
-id: fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-03-16'
 description: The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written
   to a particular host
@@ -9,9 +7,12 @@ how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpo
   and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads
   and writes to the file system.
-type: ESCU
+id: fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae
+known_false_positives: It is important to understand that if you happen to install
+  any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can
+  expect to see a large increase of file modifications.
+name: Spike in File Writes
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
   where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time
@@ -19,19 +20,22 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint
   "-1d@d"), count,null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"),
   count, null))) as stdev by "dest" | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*4), isOutlier=if((count
   > upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` '
-known_false_positives: It is important to understand that if you happen to install
-  any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can
-  expect to see a large increase of file modifications.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
index f02513eaf0..af8f59b9f9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,40 @@
-name: Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event
-id: 701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-14'
-description: 'The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a
-  period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections
-  will correlate both events.'
-how_to_implement: This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon
-  config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally,
-  you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
-type: ESCU
+description: The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe.
+  After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of
+  avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.
+how_to_implement: This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver
+  loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll
+  is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query.
+  We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
+id: 701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-search: '(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR
-  (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com)
-  | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events
-  | where dc_events=2
-  | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host
-  | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search: '(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll)
+  OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode)
+  AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
+  values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename
+  host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` '
-known_false_positives: unknown
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1203
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1203
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
index c81d99bcbf..81560747a6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,39 @@
-name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription
-id: 71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-23'
 description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
   Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on
   the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
-type: ESCU
+id: 71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions
+  for legitimate purposes.
+name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consumer>[^;|^$]+)"
   | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats
   count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer,
   Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions
-  for legitimate purposes.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1047
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1047
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
index f4ba067c63..74ad250522 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,42 @@
-name: WMI Temporary Event Subscription
-id: 38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-23'
 description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
   Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on
   the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
-type: ESCU
+id: 38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83
+known_false_positives: Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions
+  for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these
+  that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to
+  create exceptions for other legitimate events.
+name: WMI Temporary Event Subscription
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?<query>[^;|^$]+)"
   | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = ''wsmprovhost.exe''"
   AND query!="SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA ''AntiVirusProduct''
   OR TargetInstance ISA ''FirewallProduct'' OR TargetInstance ISA ''AntiSpywareProduct''"
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query  |
   `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions
-  for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these
-  that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to
-  create exceptions for other legitimate events.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1047
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1047
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - PR.AT
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
index 6ae72d7a99..ba27d6d7a0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,32 @@
-name: Detect ARP Poisoning
-id: b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-11'
-description: By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's 
-  network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure.
-how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
-  devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping
-  (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html)
-  and Dynamic ARP Inspection
-  (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html)
-  and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification".
-  The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
-  (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
-  parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+date: '2020-08-11'
+description: By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the
+  organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks
+  in the Infrastructure.
+how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
+  devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html)
+  and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html)
+  and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires
+  that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
+  is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
+id: b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac
+known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP
+  Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally
+  sends many ARP packets (unlikely).
+name: Detect ARP Poisoning
+references: []
 search: '`cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection"
-  | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix
-  | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count
-  BY host src_interface
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+  | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime
+  max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if
-  DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured,
-  or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely).
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 1
+  - CIS 11
+  detection_name: Detect ARP Poisoning
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   - Delivery
@@ -36,13 +35,13 @@ tags:
   - T1200
   - T1498
   - T1557.002
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 1
-  - CIS 11
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
-  detection_name: Detect ARP Poisoning
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
-  
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
index 41d7d2f2fd..f337f79a77 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: DNS record changed
-id: 44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065
-version: 3
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records
   lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the
@@ -18,8 +16,11 @@ how_to_implement: "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure
   \ when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to\
   \ active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\
   \n"
-type: ESCU
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+id: 44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065
+known_false_positives: Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate,
+  verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question
+  as appropriate.
+name: DNS record changed
 search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer
   | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type)
   as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution
@@ -28,26 +29,29 @@ search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answ
   | makemv delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer
   | makemv current_answer  | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer |
   eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate,
-  verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question
-  as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1071.004
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 1
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1071.004
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
   - PR.IP
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
index bcf9f1b92b..3c66362868 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
-name: Excessive DNS Failures
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS
   responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data
   is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1
+known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please
+  investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized
+  to better suit your environment.
+name: Excessive DNS Failures
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries
   from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.reply_code"!="No Error"
   "DNS.reply_code"!="NoError" DNS.reply_code!="unknown" NOT "DNS.query"="*.arpa" "DNS.query"="*.*"
@@ -16,24 +17,27 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as
   domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str
   domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries)
   as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please
-  investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized
-  to better suit your environment.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1071.004
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1071.004
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
index 960f47a9a9..20a8d610bc 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server
-id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server
   to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using
@@ -12,9 +10,12 @@ how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic
   The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation
   you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number
   of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.
-type: ESCU
+id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368
+known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the
+  deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these
+  values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
+name: Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in
   from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip
   _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in)
@@ -29,21 +30,24 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as
   = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2)
   | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average,
   num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`'
-known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the
-  deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these
-  values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Collection and Staging
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1114.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1114.002
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
index 416473dfdd..48b49585df 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,37 @@
-name: Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries
-id: 8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-20'
 description: The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure
   for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data
   is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
-  where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest"
-  | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`'
+id: 8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb
 known_false_positives: Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it
   is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify
   the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.
+name: Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
+  where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest"
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DNS Amplification Attacks
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1498.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: DNS Servers
   cis20:
   - CIS 11
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1498.002
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: DNS Servers
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
index d5ebc31e78..b8da99abd4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed
-id: ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer
   protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that
@@ -11,31 +9,37 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action'
   taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model
   be populated.
-type: ESCU
+id: ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by
   All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action
   | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port
   OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   - Ransomware
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1048
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1048
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - PR.AC
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
index f4238b9dd7..99933ce2ca 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Protocol or Port Mismatch
-id: 54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher
   layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search
@@ -12,9 +10,10 @@ how_to_implement: Running this search properly requires a technology that can in
   network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo
   Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection,
   and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.
-type: ESCU
+id: 54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3
+known_false_positives: None identified
+name: Protocol or Port Mismatch
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53)
   OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80
@@ -23,20 +22,25 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app,
   All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1048.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1048.003
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - PR.AC
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
index b9b741640f..7d6990b200 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Protocols passing authentication in cleartext
-id: 6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-04'
 description: This search looks for cleartext protocols at risk of leaking credentials.
   Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet, POP3, IMAP, and non-anonymous
@@ -8,30 +6,36 @@ description: This search looks for cleartext protocols at risk of leaking creden
   run on different assigned ports in those cases.
 how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and
   populating the Network_Traffic data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9
+known_false_positives: Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however,
+  this is rare.
+name: Protocols passing authentication in cleartext
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.transport="tcp" AND
   (All_Traffic.dest_port="23" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="143" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="110"
   OR (All_Traffic.dest_port="21" AND All_Traffic.user != "anonymous")) by All_Traffic.user
   All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however,
-  this is rare.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Use of Cleartext Protocols
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Reconnaissance
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 14
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Reconnaissance
+  - Actions on Objectives
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - PR.AC
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
index 9cc94a66ce..61bd92bd97 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,33 @@
-name: Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-23'
 description: This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that
   are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers.
   JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic
   that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681
+known_false_positives: It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs
+  containing the suspicious paths.
+name: Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD")
   AND (Web.url="*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*" OR Web.url="*web-console*" OR Web.url="*jmx-console*"
   OR Web.url = "*invoker*") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs
-  containing the suspicious paths.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - JBoss Vulnerability
   - SamSam Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1082
+  asset_type: Web Server
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1082
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Web Server
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 33a6ca285c..e1de4ebc6d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,39 @@
-name: Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
-id: 810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-02'
-description: This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices
-how_to_implement: 'To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities
-contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog.  As many BIG-IP devices will
-have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless
-you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it.  I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare
-mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using
-(hsqldb;).'
-type: ESCU
+description: This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ,
+  and Traffix SDC devices
+how_to_implement: To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the
+  vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs
+  via syslog.  As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces,
+  detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL
+  traffic in order to inspect it.  I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation
+  technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other
+  exploit of using (hsqldb;).
+id: 810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
 references:
 - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/
 - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
 - https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '`f5_bigip_rogue`
-| regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)"
-| search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`'
-known_false_positives: unknown
+search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1190
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Network
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 11
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1190
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Network
\ No newline at end of file
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
index ba130244e6..788e7450ed 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers
-id: c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-23'
 description: This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit
   jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as
@@ -8,26 +6,27 @@ description: This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to ex
 how_to_implement: You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data
   that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream,
   and populating the Web data model
-type: ESCU
+id: c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d
+known_false_positives: No known false positives for this detection.
+name: Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD")
   by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url="*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*"
   AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime,
   lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`'
-known_false_positives: No known false positives for this detection.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - JBoss Vulnerability
   - SamSam Ransomware
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Web Server
   cis20:
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 4
   - CIS 18
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
   nist:
   - ID.RA
   - PR.PT
@@ -35,5 +34,10 @@ tags:
   - DE.AE
   - PR.MA
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Web Server
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 0386c2f7fb..d0d79d2d22 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse
-id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-23'
 description: This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one
   that you want to have monitored for abuse.
@@ -8,21 +6,27 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be acc
   by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such
   as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain
   Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.
-type: ESCU
+id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301
+known_false_positives: None at this time
+name: Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time)
   as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None at this time
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 7
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
   nist:
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
index c1ea6ac2ea..9cd24d64bb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: SQL Injection with Long URLs
-id: e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible
   within them.
@@ -8,9 +6,12 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitori
   network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating
   the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security
   assets table.
-type: ESCU
+id: e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9
+known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or
+  long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL.
+  Please investigate as appropriate.
+name: SQL Injection with Long URLs
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where
   Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length
   > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`
@@ -25,25 +26,28 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web wher
   "full%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "select")) + mvcount(split(url, "distinct"))
   + mvcount(split(url, "select%20top")) + mvcount(split(url, "union")) + mvcount(split(url,
   "xp_cmdshell")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`'
-known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or
-  long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL.
-  Please investigate as appropriate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SQL Injection
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1190
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Database Server
   cis20:
   - CIS 4
   - CIS 13
   - CIS 18
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1190
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - ID.RA
   - PR.PT
   - PR.IP
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Database Server
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
index f5c5c08e6d..34e844a759 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,43 @@
-name: Supernova Webshell
-id: 2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1
-version: 1
-date: '2021-01-06'
-description: This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring
-  web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped 
-  to the Web data model. 
-type: ESCU
-references:
-  - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html
-  - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/
 author: John Stoner, Splunk
+date: '2021-01-06'
+description: This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST
+  attack.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring
+  web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and
+  populating/mapped to the Web data model.
+id: 2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1
+known_false_positives: There might be false positives associted with this detection
+  since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.
+name: Supernova Webshell
+references:
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html
+- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where
-  web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR
-  Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR
-  Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR
-  Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url
-  Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s
+  web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR
+  Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by
+  Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s
   | `supernova_webshell_filter`'
-known_false_positives: There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. 
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1505.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exfiltration
   cis20:
   - CIS 4
   - CIS 13
   - CIS 18
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exfiltration
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1505.003
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - ID.RA
   - PR.PT
   - PR.IP
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index ce570976d5..ecd10391b8 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-14'
 description: Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host
   malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate
@@ -33,14 +31,14 @@ how_to_implement: 'First, you''ll need to ingest data from your DNS operations.
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer
-  min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f
 known_false_positives: Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach
   out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious,
   however this activity must be verified.
+name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer
+  min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Data Protection
@@ -49,22 +47,28 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Dynamic DNS
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1189
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 13
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1189
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
index 7429341313..6365a452d6 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
-name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats
-id: c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2
-version: 1
+author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-28'
-description: By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's 
-  network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure.
+description: By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on
+  the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such
+  as packet forging in the Infrastructure.
 how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
-  devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as
-  RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information.
-  The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
-  (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
-  parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-type: ESCU
-references: 
+  devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security
+  measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for
+  more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk
+  (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco
+  network devices.
+id: c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2
+known_false_positives: None currently known
+name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats
+references:
 - https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf
 - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html
 - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html
@@ -20,19 +21,23 @@ references:
 - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html
 - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html
 - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html
-author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
-search: '`cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","MAC_AND_IP_THEFT","PAK_DROP") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix 
-| eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix 
-| stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan 
-values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip 
-values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface
-| table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count
-| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
-| `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None currently known
+search: '`cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","MAC_AND_IP_THEFT","PAK_DROP")
+  | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix
+  | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac
+  values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation)
+  AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface)
+  AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host
+  src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation
+  action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 1
+  - CIS 11
+  detection_name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   - Delivery
@@ -41,13 +46,13 @@ tags:
   - T1200
   - T1498
   - T1557.002
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 1
-  - CIS 11
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
-  detection_name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
-  
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
index 18c8d30a1f..e8863b85db 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets
-id: e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-01'
 description: This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger
   than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command
@@ -15,16 +13,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend
   More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata.
   This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating
   the Network_Traffic data model'
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime
-  latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from
-  datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category
-  !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes
-  > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
-  | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`'
+id: e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419
 known_false_positives: ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot
   networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible
   that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are
@@ -32,17 +21,32 @@ known_false_positives: ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubl
   of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of
   false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`
   to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.
+name: Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime
+  latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from
+  datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category
+  !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes
+  > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
+  | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1095
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1095
   nist:
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
index d0d81b20ab..bd71087b74 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Outbound SMB Traffic
-id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your
   network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity.
@@ -16,14 +14,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend
   this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata.
   This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating
   the Network_Traffic data model'
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app="smb") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action="blocked" OR All_Traffic.dest_category="internal" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
-| `security_content_ctime(start_time)`
-| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`
-| `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`'
+id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378
 known_false_positives: It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic
   is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets
   and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the
@@ -31,19 +22,36 @@ known_false_positives: It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB)
   blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be
   investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications
   of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.
+name: Detect Outbound SMB Traffic
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time)
+  as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app
+  values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port
+  values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139
+  OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app="smb") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action="blocked"
+  OR All_Traffic.dest_category="internal" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12
+  OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by
+  All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1071.002
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 12
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
   - Command and Control
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 12
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1071.002
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
index 0628b422df..07a9225f6f 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,41 @@
-name: Detect Port Security Violation
-id: 2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-28'
-description: By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs.
-how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
-  devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work
-  (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html)
-  and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification".
-  The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
-  (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
-  parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
-search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation") 
-OR (facility="PORT_SECURITY" mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION" OR mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN") 
-| eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix 
-| stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac 
-values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface 
-| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
-| `detect_port_security_violation_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if
-  you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end
-  users periodically connect physical devices to the network.
+date: '2020-10-28'
+description: By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to
+  an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that
+  are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure
+  port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group
+  of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and
+  assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured
+  the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the
+  maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation
+  attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC
+  addresses, a security violation occurs.
+how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
+  devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable
+  for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html)
+  and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires
+  that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
+  is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
+id: 2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24
+known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if you have
+  malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically
+  connect physical devices to the network.
+name: Detect Port Security Violation
+references: []
+search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation")
+  OR (facility="PORT_SECURITY" mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION" OR mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN")
+  | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime
+  max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS
+  src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 1
+  - CIS 11
+  detection_name: Detect Port Security Violation
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   - Delivery
@@ -35,13 +45,13 @@ tags:
   - T1200
   - T1498
   - T1557.002
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 1
-  - CIS 11
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
-  detection_name: Detect Port Security Violation
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
-  
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
index afd91c41ed..0e315b14fd 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,32 @@
-name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server
-id: 6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-11'
-description: By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's 
-  network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP
-  leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).
-how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
-  devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled
-  (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html)
-  and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification".
-  The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
-  (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
-  parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
-search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT" 
-  | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS 
-  message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+date: '2020-08-11'
+description: By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's
+  network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out
+  DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).
+how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
+  devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see
+  https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html)
+  and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires
+  that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
+  is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
+id: 6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079
+known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP
+  Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP
+  server has been moved to another network interface.
+name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server
+references: []
+search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT"
+  | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type)
+  AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if
-  DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that 
-  the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 1
+  - CIS 11
+  detection_name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   - Delivery
@@ -34,12 +35,13 @@ tags:
   - T1200
   - T1498
   - T1557
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 1
-  - CIS 11
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
-  detection_name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
index 66196167ef..f65d87930f 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,41 @@
-name: Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration
-id: 82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-21'
-description: This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk.
-  Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting
-  when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field.
-  These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito.  You can go
-  further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove
+description: This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI
+  field.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should
+  also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting when any of the predefined
+  SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are
+  LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito.  You can go further
+  once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove
   or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.
-type: ESCU
+id: 82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
+known_false_positives: Unknown
+name: Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration
 references:
 - https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/
 - https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '`zeek_ssl`
-| rex field=server_name "(?<snicat>(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)"
-| stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat
-| where count>0
-| table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat
-| `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Unknown
+search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?<snicat>(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)"
+  | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip
+  dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Data Exfiltration
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1041
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Network
   cis20:
   - CIS 13
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1041
   nist:
   - PR.DS
   - DE.CM
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
index 66f19a7867..619837fe0c 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,48 @@
-name: Detect Software Download To Network Device
-id: cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8
-version: 1
-date: '2020-10-28'
-description: Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.
-how_to_implement: This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+date: '2020-10-28'
+description: Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device
+  operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot
+  (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled
+  network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option
+  in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.
+how_to_implement: This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP
+  ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router
+  or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse
+  a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically
+  an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is
+  also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address
+  (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.
+id: cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8
+known_false_positives: This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software
+  downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.
+name: Detect Software Download To Network Device
+references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where 
-(All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) 
-OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) 
-OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND
-  All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND
+  All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21)
+  OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination
+  AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch
   by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 1
+  - CIS 11
+  detection_name: Detect Software Download To Network Device
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Delivery
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1542.005
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 1
-  - CIS 11
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
-  detection_name: Detect Software Download To Network Device
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
-  
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
index c35150a815..0c04541021 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,35 @@
-name: Detect Traffic Mirroring
-id: 42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990
-version: 1
+author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-28'
-description: Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device.
+description: Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data
+  exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native
+  feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured
+  to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network
+  analyzer or other monitoring device.
 how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
   devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification".
-  The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk 
-  (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to
-  parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on.
-  Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring.
-type: ESCU
+  The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
+  is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have
+  been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also
+  note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic
+  mirroring.
+id: 42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990
+known_false_positives: This search will return false positives for any legitimate
+  traffic captures by network administrators.
+name: Detect Traffic Mirroring
 references: []
-author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
-search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP")
-OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="SESSION_UP")
-OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START")
-OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD" command="monitor session*")
-  | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count
-  BY host facility mnemonic
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |
-  `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators.
+search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN"
+  mnemonic="SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START") OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD"
+  command="monitor session*") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime
+  count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 1
+  - CIS 11
+  detection_name: Detect Traffic Mirroring
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Delivery
   - Actions on Objectives
@@ -31,13 +37,13 @@ tags:
   - T1200
   - T1498
   - T1020.001
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 1
-  - CIS 11
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
-  detection_name: Detect Traffic Mirroring
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
-  
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
index 2b744a5089..99b1d56891 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address
-id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-13'
 description: By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv,
   we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the
@@ -13,30 +11,36 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with
   file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized
   organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried
   systems have their MAC address populated.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions
-  where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip
-  All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")`
-  | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields
-  + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`'
+id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4
 known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives. Please
   consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may
   be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the
   system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity
   framework with the proper information.
+name: Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions
+  where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip
+  All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")`
+  | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields
+  + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Asset Tracking
+  asset_type: Infrastructure
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 1
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Reconnaissance
   - Delivery
   - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 1
   nist:
   - ID.AM
   - PR.DS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Infrastructure
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
index bf9a722f49..b7d8230144 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,36 @@
-name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream
-id: babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-28'
 description: This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP.
-  We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB
-  in size via stream:tcp.  Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp')
-  with configurations for your Splunk environment.
-type: ESCU
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We
+  are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size
+  via stream:tcp.  Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with
+  configurations for your Splunk environment.
+id: babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream
 references:
 - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '`stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns"
-| append
-    [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000]
-| `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter`
-| stats count by flow_id
-| where count>1
-| fields - count'
-known_false_positives: unknown
+search: '`stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY)
+  | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns" | append [search `stream_tcp`
+  bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats
+  count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1203
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1203
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
\ No newline at end of file
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
index 66b9f2b7f9..8ff6dd3a8e 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,38 @@
-name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek
-id: c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-28'
 description: This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk.
-  Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting
-  SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via
-  bro:conn:json.  The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use
-  for this search.
-type: ESCU
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek
+  data should also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting SIG and KEY
+  records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json.  The
+  Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.
+id: c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek
 references:
 - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id
-| rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id
-| append [| tstats  `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id]
-| `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter`
-| stats count by flow_id
-| where count>1
-| fields - count '
-known_false_positives: unknown
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
+  where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id
+  | append [| tstats  `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
+  where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id
+  as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id
+  | where count>1 | fields - count '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1203
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1203
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
\ No newline at end of file
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
index 8cc7f5e728..45778fbe05 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,40 @@
-name: Detect Zerologon via Zeek
-id: bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-15'
-description: This search detects Zerologon attempts via Zeek DCE-RPC data.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk.
-  Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting
-  when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app
+description: This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472
+  vulnerability via Zeek RPC
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should
+  also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting when all three RPC operations
+  (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app
   via bro:rpc:json.  These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.
-description: This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC
-type: ESCU
+id: bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002
+known_false_positives: unknown
+name: Detect Zerologon via Zeek
 references:
 - https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon
 - https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472
 - https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 search: '`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3)
-| bin span=5m _time
-| stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerReqChallenge")) as challenge
-count(eval(operation=="NetrServerAuthenticate3")) as authcount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerPasswordSet2")) as passcount
-count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip
-| search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0
-| search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`'
-known_false_positives: unknown
+  | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerReqChallenge"))
+  as challenge count(eval(operation=="NetrServerAuthenticate3")) as authcount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerPasswordSet2"))
+  as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4
+  passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1190
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
+  asset_type: Network
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 11
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1190
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Network
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
index 9d8d04261f..7337653a73 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK
-id: 85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-01-22'
 description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large
   for the record type being requested in your environment.
@@ -32,9 +30,12 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+id: 85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9
+known_false_positives: If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider
+  reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run
+  the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.
+name: DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time
   max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* |  `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`
@@ -42,24 +43,27 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_tim
   query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(query_length)"
   as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time
   query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` '
-known_false_positives: If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider
-  reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run
-  the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1071.004
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1071.004
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
index 701e72bd21..8b86a07f91 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,43 @@
-name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation
-id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5
-version: 3
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-18'
 description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard
   deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the
   standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that
   DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5
+known_false_positives: It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.
+name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   by DNS.query |  `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) |
   table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev
   avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2)
   | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` '
-known_false_positives: It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1048.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 12
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1048.003
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
index c69a0c7bd5..9d3b497547 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,43 @@
-name: Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce
-id: a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923
-version: 2
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-21'
 description: This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any
   source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the
   average traffic.
 how_to_implement: You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the
   Network_Traffic data model.
-type: ESCU
+id: a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923
+known_false_positives: RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from
+  all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.
+name: Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce
 references: []
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src
   All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count)
   AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src
   AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50
   stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`'
-known_false_positives: RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from
-  all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1021.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Reconnaissance
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 12
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Reconnaissance
+  - Delivery
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1021.001
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
index bd3f499b43..96d211213b 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
-name: Remote Desktop Network Traffic
-id: 272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-07'
 description: This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used
-  by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is
-  usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and
-  common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on
-  your network.
+  by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it
+  is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources
+  and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop
+  on your network.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems
   that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote
   desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating
@@ -16,32 +14,38 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to identify sys
   to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system
   depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework.  This
   can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.
-type: ESCU
+id: 272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3
+known_false_positives: Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
+name: Remote Desktop Network Traffic
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND
   All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source
   by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` '
-known_false_positives: Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Lateral Movement
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1021.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1021.001
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - PR.AC
   - PR.IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
index a95f6ede1b..1f2bc1e7b4 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
@@ -1,41 +1,41 @@
-name: SMB Traffic Spike
-id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB)
   traffic connections.
 how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs
   and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic 
-where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb 
-by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` 
-| eventstats max(_time) as maxtime 
-| stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count, null))) as count 
-avg(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count, null))) as avg 
-stdev(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count, null))) as stdev by src 
-| eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*2), isOutlier=if(count > upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) 
-| where isOutlier=1 
-| table src count 
-| `smb_traffic_spike_filter` '
+id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378
 known_false_positives: A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause
   this analytic to trigger.
+name: SMB Traffic Spike
+references: []
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
+  where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb
+  by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats
+  max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime,
+  "-70m@m"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"),
+  count, null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count,
+  null))) as stdev by src | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*2), isOutlier=if(count > upperBound
+  AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Ransomware
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1021.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1021.002
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
index 8255d8122b..888de5a289 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK
-id: d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes
   in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.
@@ -26,9 +24,13 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found
   here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-type: ESCU
+id: d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828
+known_false_positives: If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider
+  reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically
+  re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update
+  the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results
+name: SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK
 references: []
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip)
   as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where
   All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by
@@ -36,23 +38,25 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest
   "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001
   | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count |
   table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` '
-known_false_positives: If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider
-  reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically
-  re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update
-  the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Ransomware
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1021.002
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1021.002
   nist:
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
index c05ee864cd..2e87ee1d6f 100644
--- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: TOR Traffic
-id: ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-22'
 description: This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router
   (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious
@@ -10,29 +8,35 @@ how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest d
   into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action'
   taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model
   be populated.
-type: ESCU
+id: ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45
+known_false_positives: None at this time
+name: TOR Traffic
 references: []
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed
   by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | `tor_traffic_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None at this time
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   - Ransomware
   - Command and Control
   - Sunburst Malware
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1071.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Command and Control
+  asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
   - CIS 9
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Command and Control
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1071.001
   nist:
   - DE.AE
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Endpoint
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
index be724f2a1a..00a64f84f2 100644
--- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
+++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
@@ -1,30 +1,29 @@
-name: Unusually Long Content-Type Length
-id: 57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-10-13'
 description: This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http
   header that the client sends the server.
 how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP.
   You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream
   deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.
-type: ESCU
+id: 57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7
+known_false_positives: Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length
+  greater than 100 characters.
+name: Unusually Long Content-Type Length
 references: []
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where
   cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length
   cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length
-  greater than 100 characters.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Delivery
+  asset_type: Web Server
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 4
   - CIS 18
   - CIS 12
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Delivery
   nist:
   - ID.RA
   - RS.MI
@@ -33,5 +32,10 @@ tags:
   - DE.AE
   - PR.MA
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  asset_type: Web Server
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
index e3a7425763..e36d970332 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Web Fraud - Account Harvesting
-id: 31337aaa-941d-4ada-81ac-q2a17be5bf0d
-version: 1
+author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-08'
 description: This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts
   using the same email domain name.
@@ -12,16 +10,7 @@ how_to_implement: We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the emai
   reasons.  After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account
   creations per email domain.  Common data sources used for this detection are customized
   Apache logs or Splunk Stream.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/
-- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/
-author: Jim Apger, Splunk
-search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/"
-  | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<SessionID>\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)"
-  | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?<email_domain>.*)" | stats dc(Username)
-  as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames>
-  25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`'
+id: 31337aaa-941d-4ada-81ac-q2a17be5bf0d
 known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually
   looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections
   that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to
@@ -33,17 +22,32 @@ known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usu
   for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search.  You can also use Shannon entropy
   or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness
   or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated.
+name: Web Fraud - Account Harvesting
+references:
+- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/
+- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/
+search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/"
+  | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<SessionID>\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)"
+  | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?<email_domain>.*)" | stats dc(Username)
+  as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames>
+  25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1136
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Account
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1136
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   - DE.DP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: Account
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
index af980c23eb..2a6c4d108f 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed
-id: 31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a
-version: 1
+author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-08'
 description: This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the
   clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect
@@ -14,32 +12,38 @@ how_to_implement: Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data f
   such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover,
   etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized
   IIS, and Splunk Stream.
-type: ESCU
+id: 31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a
+known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually
+  looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections
+  that simply detect anamoluous behavior.
+name: Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed
 references:
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/
-author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<session_id>\w+)"
   | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where
   TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as
   ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5)
   | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`'
-known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually
-  looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections
-  that simply detect anamoluous behavior.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: account
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: account
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
index d04e6668fc..91eb6167bb 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts
-id: 31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3
-version: 1
+author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-08'
 description: This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.
 how_to_implement: We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values
@@ -9,27 +7,33 @@ how_to_implement: We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the valu
   or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text
   password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs,
   customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.
-type: ESCU
+id: 31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3
+known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually
+  looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections
+  that simply detect anamoluous behavior.
+name: Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts
 references:
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/
-author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost*  |
   rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data
   "login\[password\]=(?<Password>[^&|^$]+)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames
   values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5
   | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`'
-known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually
-  looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections
-  that simply detect anamoluous behavior.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
+  asset_type: account
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   nist:
   - DE.DP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-  asset_type: account
+type: ESCU
+version: 1

From 7c0a849eda7081293a84dc074fb8d489e3408dd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 10:54:26 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 072/132] updated stories with product tags

---
 stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml       | 20 ++++---
 stories/asset_tracking.yml                    | 16 +++--
 stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml        | 16 +++--
 stories/aws_cryptomining.yml                  | 16 +++--
 stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml          | 16 +++--
 stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml           | 25 +++++---
 ...aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml | 16 +++--
 stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml               | 16 +++--
 stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml       | 41 +++++++------
 stories/brand_monitoring.yml                  | 16 +++--
 stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml                | 16 +++--
 stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml                | 16 +++--
 stories/collection_and_staging.yml            | 16 +++--
 stories/command_and_control.yml               | 16 +++--
 stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml        | 16 +++--
 ...lantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml | 16 +++--
 stories/credential_dumping.yml                | 16 +++--
 stories/data_exfiltration.yml                 | 28 +++++----
 stories/data_protection.yml                   | 16 +++--
 stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml           | 49 ++++++++-------
 stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml              | 16 +++--
 stories/disabling_security_tools.yml          | 16 +++--
 stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml         | 16 +++--
 stories/dns_hijacking.yml                     | 16 +++--
 stories/dynamic_dns.yml                       | 16 +++--
 .../emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml | 16 +++--
 stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml         | 43 +++++++------
 stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml        | 44 ++++++++------
 stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml              | 16 +++--
 stories/host_redirection.yml                  | 16 +++--
 stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml               | 16 +++--
 stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml      | 27 ++++++---
 ...netes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml | 27 ++++++---
 .../kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml    | 26 +++++---
 stories/lateral_movement.yml                  | 16 +++--
 stories/malicious_powershell.yml              | 16 +++--
 stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml           | 16 +++--
 stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml | 16 +++--
 stories/monitor_for_updates.yml               | 16 +++--
 stories/netsh_abuse.yml                       | 16 +++--
 stories/office_365_detections.yml             | 18 +++---
 stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml           | 16 +++--
 stories/phishing_payloads.yml                 | 20 ++++---
 ...iated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml | 16 +++--
 ...d_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml | 16 +++--
 stories/ransomware.yml                        | 16 +++--
 stories/ransomware_cloud.yml                  | 24 +++++---
 stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml                   | 35 ++++++++---
 stories/ransomware_samsam.yml                 | 16 +++--
 .../router_and_infrastructure_security.yml    | 16 +++--
 .../spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml  | 16 +++--
 stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml   | 16 +++--
 ...nterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml | 16 +++--
 stories/sql_injection.yml                     | 16 +++--
 stories/sunburst_malware.yml                  | 36 ++++++-----
 stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml     | 16 +++--
 stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml   | 16 +++--
 stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml      | 16 +++--
 stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml            | 16 +++--
 ...icious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml | 40 +++++++------
 .../suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml  | 34 ++++++-----
 ...spicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml | 30 ++++++----
 stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml  | 16 +++--
 .../suspicious_command_line_executions.yml    | 16 +++--
 stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml            | 16 +++--
 stories/suspicious_emails.yml                 | 16 +++--
 stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml | 28 +++++----
 stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml         | 53 ++++++++--------
 stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml          | 16 +++--
 ...suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml | 16 +++--
 stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml                | 16 +++--
 stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml   | 42 +++++++------
 ...ed_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml | 32 +++++-----
 ...oper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 60 ++++++++++---------
 stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml     | 16 +++--
 stories/unusual_processes.yml                 | 16 +++--
 stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml        | 16 +++--
 stories/web_fraud_detection.yml               | 16 +++--
 stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml   | 16 +++--
 stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml  | 56 +++++++++--------
 ...s_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml | 16 +++--
 stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml          | 16 +++--
 stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml    | 16 +++--
 stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml      | 16 +++--
 stories/windows_service_abuse.yml             | 16 +++--
 85 files changed, 1098 insertions(+), 716 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
index 4da96ae341..47bc1383c7 100644
--- a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Apache Struts Vulnerability
-id: 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-06'
 description: Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type`
   length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent
   with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
+id: 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e
+name: Apache Struts Vulnerability
 narrative: 'In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta
   Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating
   Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ narrative: 'In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakar
   require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the
   issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\
 
-  When looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note
-  the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact.
+  When looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should
+  note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact.
   It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in
   the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational
   awareness regarding the target.\
@@ -97,12 +97,16 @@ narrative: 'In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakar
   process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the
   event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining
   whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Apache Struts Vulnerability
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Vulnerability
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/asset_tracking.yml b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
index 18b27b7073..7cc4be14fe 100644
--- a/stories/asset_tracking.yml
+++ b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Asset Tracking
-id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-13'
 description: Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier
   to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of
   malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
+id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77
+name: Asset Tracking
 narrative: This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding
   of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story
   can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business
@@ -12,12 +12,16 @@ narrative: This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understa
   this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories.
   For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework
   from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Asset Tracking
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Best Practices
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
index 8eec2711c4..f451386399 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: AWS Cross Account Activity
-id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-04'
 description: Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain
   cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles
   could be an indication of malicious activity.
+id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a
+name: AWS Cross Account Activity
 narrative: 'Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services
   across the enterprise using AWS''s Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality.
   IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each
@@ -25,12 +25,16 @@ narrative: 'Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and
   when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past.
   After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative
   searches to help you probe more deeply.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/
 tags:
   analytics_story: AWS Cross Account Activity
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
index 9df62585bf..3e003d7fb8 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: AWS Cryptomining
-id: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-08'
 description: Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining.
   New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally
   high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are
   just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
+id: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750
+name: AWS Cryptomining
 narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business.
   Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks
   mined each day would remain steady. So, it''s par for the course that ambitious,
@@ -30,12 +30,16 @@ narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive busin
   will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains
   support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection
   searches.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: AWS Cryptomining
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
index 642741a086..9bb0c00104 100644
--- a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: AWS Network ACL Activity
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-21'
 description: Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious
   activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4
+name: AWS Network ACL Activity
 narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance,
   and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role,
   or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company
@@ -12,13 +12,17 @@ narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, co
   to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail
   logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS
   network access controls.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html
 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/
 tags:
   analytics_story: AWS Network ACL Activity
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
index b3af17e5da..683c138643 100644
--- a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,24 @@
-name: AWS Security Hub Alerts
-id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-04'
-description: 'This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS'
-narrative: 'AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+date: '2020-08-04'
+description: This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated
+  from AWS
+id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a
+name: AWS Security Hub Alerts
+narrative: AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services
+  enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty,
+  vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon
+  Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer,
+  and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
 references:
 - https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/
 tags:
   analytics_story: AWS Security Hub Alerts
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
index e6f79fe976..336f5e705f 100644
--- a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
-id: 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-16'
 description: Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from
   unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities
   are occurring somewhere within your network.
+id: 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f
+name: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
 narrative: 'Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic
   locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important
   security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where
@@ -19,12 +19,16 @@ narrative: 'Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geogr
   reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator.
   Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish
   to investigate further.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
index af43bd792e..da49aa0e41 100644
--- a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: AWS User Monitoring
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-12'
 description: Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment
   that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack
   targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3
+name: AWS User Monitoring
 narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users
   who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it''s all too common
   for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable
@@ -25,13 +25,17 @@ narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the user
   The detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS
   API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities
   from disabled accounts.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 - https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla
 tags:
   analytics_story: AWS User Monitoring
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index d3993a6991..5c0e985202 100644
--- a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,29 @@
-name: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
-id: 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
-version: 1
-date: '2021-01-27'
-description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156.
-  Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across
-  multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior).
-  As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected.
-  Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges
-  on the vulnerable host.
-narrative: 'A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow.
-  After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host.
-  The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags.
-  Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you
-  to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+date: '2021-01-27'
+description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys
+  Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple
+  Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and
+  prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be
+  many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows
+  any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
+id: 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
+name: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+narrative: A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger
+  a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain
+  root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing
+  "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux
+  hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior
+  when using the provided detection.
 references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
 tags:
   analytics_story: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
index dd27bee03f..299d55e2e6 100644
--- a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Brand Monitoring
-id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-12-19'
 description: Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is
   using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure.
   Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
+id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78
+name: Brand Monitoring
 narrative: 'While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats
   posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent
   fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and
@@ -23,14 +23,18 @@ narrative: 'While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and t
   provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic
   information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative
   searches.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/
 - https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Brand Monitoring
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
index 4341815a17..77ea0cdce1 100644
--- a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Cloud Cryptomining
-id: 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-10-02'
 description: Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining.
   New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally
   high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users
   are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
+id: 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a
+name: Cloud Cryptomining
 narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business.
   Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks
   mined each day would remain steady. So, it''s par for the course that ambitious,
@@ -30,12 +30,16 @@ narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive busin
   searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used.
   It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution
   of the detection searches.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Cloud Cryptomining
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
index a9ca577bd2..2eb09048ad 100644
--- a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
+++ b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-name: ColdRoot MacOS RAT
-id: bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390
-version: 1
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2019-01-09'
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example
   of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system,
   detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when
   a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
+id: bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390
+name: ColdRoot MacOS RAT
 narrative: 'Conventional wisdom holds that Apple''s MacOS operating system is significantly
   less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable,
   it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this
@@ -31,14 +31,18 @@ narrative: 'Conventional wisdom holds that Apple''s MacOS operating system is si
   Searches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address
   ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence
   of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger.'
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/
 - https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html
 - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/
 tags:
   analytics_story: ColdRoot MacOS RAT
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
index 81ba716e0f..3b3cdb374c 100644
--- a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
+++ b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Collection and Staging
-id: 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-03'
 description: 'Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to
   the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific
   hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating
   sensitive data. '
+id: 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
+name: Collection and Staging
 narrative: "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from\
   \ a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses,\
   \ confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important\
@@ -17,13 +17,17 @@ narrative: "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value
   \ encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to\
   \ identify their presence. \\\nUse the searches to detect and monitor suspicious\
   \ behavior related to these activities."
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074
 tags:
   analytics_story: Collection and Staging
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/command_and_control.yml b/stories/command_and_control.yml
index 88b1ff4876..f7669993e5 100644
--- a/stories/command_and_control.yml
+++ b/stories/command_and_control.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Command and Control
-id: 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-01'
 description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged
   by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed
   by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions
   and send data back to the malicious operators.
+id: 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8
+name: Command and Control
 narrative: 'Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use
   in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they
   leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities.
@@ -22,13 +22,17 @@ narrative: 'Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to
   Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these
   channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs
   associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control
 - https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware
 tags:
   analytics_story: Command and Control
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
index 4f6f64bd4b..1244132f11 100644
--- a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
+++ b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Common Phishing Frameworks
-id: 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61
-version: 1
+author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-29'
 description: 'Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2
   toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on
   a malicious link in a phishing email. '
+id: 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61
+name: Common Phishing Frameworks
 narrative: 'As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/),
   familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into
   clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/),
@@ -22,14 +22,18 @@ narrative: 'As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scr
   Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them
   via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look
   for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.'
-author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/
 - https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Common Phishing Frameworks
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
index 66db77b1f8..a6f4e8d1aa 100644
--- a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
+++ b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
-id: aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-20'
 description: Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories
   for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers.
@@ -9,18 +7,24 @@ description: Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry
   which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in
   Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container
   Registry.
+id: aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246
+name: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
 narrative: Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized
   images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if
   these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise,
   attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across
   the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was
   uploaded to container registry.
-author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research
 tags:
   analytics_story: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
index 5f20c92524..440710e2a2 100644
--- a/stories/credential_dumping.yml
+++ b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-name: Credential Dumping
-id: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-04'
 description: Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein
   attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The
   threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and
   spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story
   are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
+id: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a
+name: Credential Dumping
 narrative: 'Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often
   hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials
   may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking
@@ -22,13 +22,17 @@ narrative: 'Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system,
   The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security
   Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential
   dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003
 - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Credential Dumping
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 3
diff --git a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
index 4495d6a12d..a6e7e50ef8 100644
--- a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
-name: Data Exfiltration
-id: 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-21'
 description: The stealing of data by an adversary.
-narrative: Exfiltration comes in many flavors.  Adversaries can collect data
-  over encrypted or non-encrypted channels.  They can utilise Command and Control
-  channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data.  They can use both standard
-  data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data.  Or they can use
-  non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to
-  try and circumvent security technologies in place.
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+id: 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
+name: Data Exfiltration
+narrative: Exfiltration comes in many flavors.  Adversaries can collect data over
+  encrypted or non-encrypted channels.  They can utilise Command and Control channels
+  that are already in place to exfiltrate data.  They can use both standard data transfer
+  protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data.  Or they can use non-standard
+  protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent
+  security technologies in place.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Data Exfiltration
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/data_protection.yml b/stories/data_protection.yml
index 36e5f876af..e479cc4f14 100644
--- a/stories/data_protection.yml
+++ b/stories/data_protection.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,28 @@
-name: Data Protection
-id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-14'
 description: Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data
   confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate
   possible signs of data exfiltration.
+id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33
+name: Data Protection
 narrative: Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate
   enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via
   low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations
   using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive
   listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a
   useful starting point.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/
 - https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022
 - https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Data Protection
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
index 0871671b75..8ad70b7360 100644
--- a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
+++ b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-name: Detect Zerologon Attack
-id: 5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk
 date: '2020-09-18'
-description: 'Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein
-  attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack
-  is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story
-  are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz
-  as payload carrier.'
-narrative: 'This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller,
-  using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC).
-  This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually
-  reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and
-  assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover.
-  The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these
-  searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz
-  tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.'
-author: 'Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk'
-type: ESCU
+description: Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472,
+  a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset
+  its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now
+  provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included
+  searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain
+  Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz
+  as payload carrier.
+id: 5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4
+name: Detect Zerologon Attack
+narrative: This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets
+  a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote
+  Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers
+  to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller
+  computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller
+  credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain
+  controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in
+  this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect
+  attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority
+  Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool
+  which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003
 - https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472
@@ -24,6 +27,12 @@ references:
 - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472
 tags:
   analytics_story: Detect Zerologon Attack
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-    - Adversary Tactics
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
index 2104110345..036555683d 100644
--- a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
+++ b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: DHS Report TA18-074A
-id: 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-01-22'
 description: Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert
   US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises
   included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
+id: 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef
+name: DHS Report TA18-074A
 narrative: 'The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly
   over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue
   to escalate in complexity. \
@@ -27,12 +27,16 @@ narrative: 'The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significan
   may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your
   environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by
   other groups, as well.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A
 tags:
   analytics_story: DHS Report TA18-074A
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
index 2e361ce9d6..3c10bfcf6f 100644
--- a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
+++ b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Disabling Security Tools
-id: fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-04'
 description: Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of
   security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes
   launching netsh, and many others.
+id: fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1
+name: Disabling Security Tools
 narrative: Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate
   without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools
   to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This
@@ -15,14 +15,18 @@ narrative: Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and
   security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent
   specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security
   tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/
 - https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Disabling Security Tools
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
index d273831862..9172bbf597 100644
--- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: DNS Amplification Attacks
-id: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2016-09-13'
 description: DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if
   it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers
   who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks,
   causing Denial of Service to other victims.
+id: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700
+name: DNS Amplification Attacks
 narrative: 'The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names
   to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function.
   However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification
@@ -23,13 +23,17 @@ narrative: 'The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain name
   The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company''s
   DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service
   to other victims.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A
 - https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/
 tags:
   analytics_story: DNS Amplification Attacks
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
index 0ff67cdfda..b42f767ec6 100644
--- a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: DNS Hijacking
-id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-04'
 description: Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you
   detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
+id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221
+name: DNS Hijacking
 narrative: 'Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613),
   DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to
   attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections
@@ -53,8 +53,6 @@ narrative: 'Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/lab
 
   The searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that
   may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html
 - https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/
@@ -62,6 +60,12 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: DNS Hijacking
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
index df4f758b75..24eacb4e18 100644
--- a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
+++ b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Dynamic DNS
-id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-09-06'
 description: Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating
   with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them
   avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
+id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221
+name: Dynamic DNS
 narrative: Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that
   allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their
   usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ narrative: Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services
   more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not
   exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are
   identified.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html
 - https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/
@@ -25,6 +23,12 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Dynamic DNS
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
index 4f26827dfa..77f91f5807 100644
--- a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
+++ b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
-id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-01-27'
 description: Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer
   malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch
   script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has
   compromised your environment.
+id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52
+name: 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
 narrative: 'The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it
   was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according
   to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A),
@@ -24,14 +24,18 @@ narrative: 'The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when i
   survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script
   interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised
   your environment. '
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A
 - https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf
 - https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 5168c1c765..9a44a5e87a 100644
--- a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,32 @@
-name: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
-id: 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-02'
-description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902.
-  Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ.
-  and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below).
-  This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access
-  to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services,
-  and/or execute Java code.  This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.
-narrative: 'A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system.
-  The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior.
-  Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management
-  console will make detection via wire data difficult.  The searches included used Splunk Connect For
-  Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define
-  the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+date: '2020-08-02'
+description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive
+  Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix
+  SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows
+  unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration
+  utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or
+  execute Java code.  This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.
+id: 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+name: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
+narrative: A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable
+  system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious
+  behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using
+  SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult.  The
+  searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/),
+  and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in
+  https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)
 references:
 - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/
 - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
 - https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/
 tags:
   analytics_story: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
index 2e0e778429..67ba626620 100644
--- a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -1,34 +1,40 @@
-name: GCP Cross Account Activity
-id: 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-01'
 description: Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain
   cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles
   could be an indication of malicious activity.
-narrative: 'Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services
-  across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality.
+id: 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6
+name: GCP Cross Account Activity
+narrative: 'Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and
+  services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality.
   IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each
   with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources
-  (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface).
-  Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that
-  expire within a set time period.\
+  (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line
+  interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable
+  by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary
+  security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 
-  In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage
-  the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new
-  users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
+  In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they
+  expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials
+  to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges,
+  and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
 
-  This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs
-  logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while accessing
-  multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious
-  when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past.
-  After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative
+  This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit
+  logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while
+  accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may
+  be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed
+  in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative
   searches to help you probe more deeply.'
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts
 tags:
   analytics_story: GCP Cross Account Activity
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
index 5fc84b1ac7..b746f6a286 100644
--- a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Hidden Cobra Malware
-id: baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-01-22'
 description: Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion
   of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North
   Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported
   in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
+id: baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335
+name: Hidden Cobra Malware
 narrative: 'North Korea''s government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building
   momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the
   group''s activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously
@@ -33,13 +33,17 @@ narrative: 'North Korea''s government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly bui
   malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious
   files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate
   activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity
 - https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Hidden Cobra Malware
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/host_redirection.yml b/stories/host_redirection.yml
index 346b913191..e36f237f53 100644
--- a/stories/host_redirection.yml
+++ b/stories/host_redirection.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Host Redirection
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-14'
 description: Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a
   destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's
   attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches
   and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4
+name: Host Redirection
 narrative: Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious
   purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to
   redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services)
@@ -14,12 +14,16 @@ narrative: Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for
   site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally,
   an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe
   communications.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Host Redirection
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
index eb9dcf8c04..1d48039efb 100644
--- a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: JBoss Vulnerability
-id: 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-14'
 description: In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source
   utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches
   help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources
   or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
+id: 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd
+name: JBoss Vulnerability
 narrative: 'This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting
   JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story
   are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with
@@ -87,12 +87,16 @@ narrative: 'This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targ
   connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has
   spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious
   or executing a malicious script.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: JBoss Vulnerability
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Vulnerability
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
index 4a9f4de4f7..da179646ea 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,24 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-04-15"
-description: "This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-04-15'
+description: This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint
+  scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent,
+  cluster names.
 id: a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09
-name: "Kubernetes Scanning Activity"
-narrative: "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster."
+name: Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration
+  platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production
+  workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect
+  suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 references:
-  - "https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"
+- https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research
 tags:
-  analytics_story: "Kubernetes Scanning Activity"
+  analytics_story: Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   category:
-    - "Cloud Security"
-  usecase: "Security Monitoring"
+  - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
index 1ff38bbbb2..eb435445b1 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,24 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-20"
-description: "This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-20'
+description: This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes
+  cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on
+  items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea
-name: "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
-narrative: "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects."
+name: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration
+  platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps
+  and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches
+  allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 references:
-  - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"
+  analytics_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   category:
-    - "Cloud Security"
-  usecase: "Security Monitoring"
+  - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
index 739bce3ae7..9d2d8071cc 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,23 @@
-author: "Rod Soto, Splunk"
-date: "2020-05-20"
-description: "This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces."
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+date: '2020-05-20'
+description: This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage
+  within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ew
-name: "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
-narrative: "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities"
+name: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration
+  platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps
+  and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches
+  allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 references:
-  - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"
+  analytics_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   category:
-    - "Cloud Security"
-  usecase: "Security Monitoring"
+  - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
 type: ESCU
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/lateral_movement.yml b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
index 9d7d1efff9..ace138283a 100644
--- a/stories/lateral_movement.yml
+++ b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Lateral Movement
-id: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-04'
 description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how
   attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose
   the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
+id: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
+name: Lateral Movement
 narrative: "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to\
   \ expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement.\
   \ Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because\
@@ -29,12 +29,16 @@ narrative: "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek
   \ hosts. \\\n It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host,\
   \ to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account\
   \ for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software."
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Lateral Movement
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
index e32686a527..7fd4fa18c4 100644
--- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
+++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Malicious PowerShell
-id: 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
-version: 4
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-08-23'
 description: Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities
   and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their
   goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate
   PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
+id: 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
+name: Malicious PowerShell
 narrative: 'The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used
   for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events
   generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these
@@ -60,13 +60,17 @@ narrative: 'The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often use
   we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the
   event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on
   possible malicious sites.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Malicious PowerShell
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 4
diff --git a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
index c581fc63fe..ab533eb352 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Monitor Backup Solution
-id: abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These
   searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical
   access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
+id: abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d
+name: Monitor Backup Solution
 narrative: Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity
   of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce
   the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes.
@@ -12,12 +12,16 @@ narrative: Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continui
   have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended
   period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of
   the backup logs for an endpoint.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Monitor Backup Solution
-  usecase: Compliance
   category:
   - Best Practices
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Compliance
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
index fd33be58d2..3bd6d65ea1 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Monitor for Unauthorized Software
-id: 8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-15'
 description: 'Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes
   that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. '
+id: 8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae
+name: Monitor for Unauthorized Software
 narrative: 'It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running
   on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This
   Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within
@@ -17,12 +17,16 @@ narrative: 'It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes runni
   understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any
   historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest.
   For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. '
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Monitor for Unauthorized Software
-  usecase: Compliance
   category:
   - Best Practices
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Compliance
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
index 6394705018..94b622ba33 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Monitor for Updates
-id: 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-15'
 description: Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched
   and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be
   mitigated by applying routine security patches.
+id: 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8
+name: Monitor for Updates
 narrative: 'It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched
   and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a
   publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important
@@ -18,12 +18,16 @@ narrative: 'It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patc
   be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation
   procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically
   released as needed.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download
 tags:
   analytics_story: Monitor for Updates
-  usecase: Compliance
   category:
   - Best Practices
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Compliance
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
index 584a2b50e9..034fa39c75 100644
--- a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Netsh Abuse
-id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-01-05'
 description: Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of
   `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection
   to a host from an infected system.
+id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65
+name: Netsh Abuse
 narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native
   Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such
   tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you
@@ -14,14 +14,18 @@ narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage nativ
   host from an infected system.\
 
   To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)
 - https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
 - http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Netsh Abuse
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/office_365_detections.yml b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
index 0db3d474c6..6deb322a70 100644
--- a/stories/office_365_detections.yml
+++ b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,21 @@
-name: Office 365 Detections
-id: 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2020-12-16'
 description: This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
+id: 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9
+name: Office 365 Detections
 narrative: More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering.
   Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides
   various detections for Office 365 attacks.
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
-  - https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf
+- https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Office 365 Detections
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
index 7c6f2ede01..7fc6899bdb 100644
--- a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
+++ b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Orangeworm Attack Group
-id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-01-22'
 description: Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm
   Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
+id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52
+name: Orangeworm Attack Group
 narrative: 'In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing
   a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations
   in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with
@@ -27,13 +27,17 @@ narrative: 'In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for insta
   arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that
   can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get
   more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia
 - https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Orangeworm Attack Group
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
index 754ffa31d8..5fbf82eb69 100644
--- a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
+++ b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Phishing Payloads
-id: 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
-version: 1
+author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-29'
 description: Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment
   has been breached via a phishing attack.
+id: 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
+name: Phishing Payloads
 narrative: 'Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous
   cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing)
   are initiated via a phishing email. \
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ narrative: 'Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dang
   However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious
   payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
 
-  While any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be
-  perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim&#151;especially
+  While any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to
+  be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim&#151;especially
   when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An
   example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents
   with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx
@@ -41,12 +41,16 @@ narrative: 'Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dang
   This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been
   injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing
   a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.'
-author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Phishing Payloads
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
index 943ec649c4..b17dfbd3c2 100644
--- a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
+++ b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
-id: 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E
-version: 1
+author: iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense
 date: '2020-01-22'
 description: Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques
   employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
+id: 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E
+name: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
 narrative: 'This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 
   iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon
@@ -74,13 +74,17 @@ narrative: 'This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk
   1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\
 
   1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c'
-author: iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/
 - http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
index 4e41c6b110..9672ffec6d 100644
--- a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
+++ b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
-id: 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-11'
 description: Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment,
   as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors
   typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
+id: 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218
+name: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
 narrative: A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols,
   and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols
   to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface.
@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@ narrative: A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protoco
   policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run
   on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate
   forensic analysts.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Best Practices
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware.yml b/stories/ransomware.yml
index 9293bd2276..8f21d68773 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Ransomware
-id: cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-04'
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage,
   the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected
   locations, and many others.
+id: cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
+name: Ransomware
 narrative: Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected
   host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the
   attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect
@@ -15,13 +15,17 @@ narrative: Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infe
   functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can
   apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or
   mitigate the effects of ransomware.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/
 - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Ransomware
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
index 2194032183..b57a9a660e 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,27 @@
-name: Ransomware Cloud
-id: f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-27'
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
-  that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
+  that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that
+  may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
+id: f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2
+name: Ransomware Cloud
 narrative: Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected
   host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the
   attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect
-  an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
-author: Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+  an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials
+  from targeted users or resources.
 references:
 - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
 - https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M
 tags:
   analytics_story: Ransomware Cloud
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Malware 
+  - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
index 2cc87777ce..d76e0cdba0 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,37 @@
-name: Ryuk Ransomware
-id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
-version: 1
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2020-11-06'
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated
-  with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
-narrative: 'Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. 
-The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.' 
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+  with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification,
+  suspicious psexec use, and more.
+id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
+name: Ryuk Ransomware
+narrative: "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A)\
+  \ on October 28th called \u201CRansomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and\
+  \ Public Health Sector.\u201D This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and\
+  \ possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory\
+  \ in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious\
+  \ campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads,\
+  \ which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm\
+  \ to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of\
+  \ an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware\
+  \ exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The\
+  \ Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified\
+  \ in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been\
+  \ exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks\
+  \ such as Emotet or Trickbot."
 references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a
 tags:
   analytics_story: Ryuk Ransomware
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
index b6c5fa9754..e80ec4bbc8 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: SamSam Ransomware
-id: c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-13'
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated
   with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware
   extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
+id: c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604
+name: SamSam Ransomware
 narrative: 'The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt)
   was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software
   has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost
@@ -40,14 +40,18 @@ narrative: 'The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCr
   of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes
   with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force
   attacks via RDP.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/
 - https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/
 - https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: SamSam Ransomware
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
index b72afd01ba..3feb9cd99a 100644
--- a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
+++ b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Router and Infrastructure Security
-id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify
   that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing
   and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
+id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77
+name: Router and Infrastructure Security
 narrative: 'Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked
   as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats
   actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon
@@ -15,13 +15,17 @@ narrative: 'Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlook
   are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers
   can obtain direct access to the company''s internal infrastructure&#151; effectively
   increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html
 - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Router and Infrastructure Security
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Best Practices
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
index eb7b3c0bda..f465066a3e 100644
--- a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
+++ b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
-name: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
-id: 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-01-08'
 description: Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown
   exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
+id: 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2
+name: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
 narrative: Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that
   allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify
   the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still
   need to be patched.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://meltdownattack.com/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Vulnerability
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
index 65e9efc461..afc3d3c769 100644
--- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
-id: 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-19'
 description: Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you
   reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some
   older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that
   users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains.
+id: 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1
+name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
 narrative: 'This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect
   vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\
 
@@ -31,13 +31,17 @@ narrative: 'This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redire
   is properly configured. This detection search allows analysts to monitor internal
   logs to ensure users are properly authenticated and cannot be redirected to any
   malicious third-party websites.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce
 - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859
 tags:
   analytics_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Vulnerability
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
index b86d68483a..5396c9337e 100644
--- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
+++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
-id: 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-14'
 description: Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability
   within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help
   ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
+id: 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400
+name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
 narrative: 'Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise
   versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information
   through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings).
@@ -25,14 +25,18 @@ narrative: 'Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk En
   in CVE-2018-11409: Information Exposure (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409).
   If it turns up activities that may be specific, you can use the included investigative
   searches to return information regarding web activity and network traffic by src_ip.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409
 - https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings
 - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Vulnerability
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/sql_injection.yml b/stories/sql_injection.yml
index d146c538a1..2b11009165 100644
--- a/stories/sql_injection.yml
+++ b/stories/sql_injection.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,27 @@
-name: SQL Injection
-id: 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-19'
 description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured
   query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain
   malicious parameters.
+id: 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3
+name: SQL Injection
 narrative: 'It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable
   web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\
 
   This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers
   to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target
   environment.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html
 - https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: SQL Injection
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
index 751a27e587..3132c2c1ad 100644
--- a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,28 @@
-name: Sunburst Malware
-id: 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2
-version: 1
-date: '2020-12-14'
-description: 'Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was
-  discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private
-  organizations around the world.'
-narrative: 'This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware.
-  The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed
-  component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The
-  detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This
-  malware.'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+date: '2020-12-14'
+description: Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and
+  management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind
+  this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around
+  the world.
+id: 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2
+name: Sunburst Malware
+narrative: This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
+  (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the
+  SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component
+  of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP
+  to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the
+  dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
 - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Sunburst Malware
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-    - Adversary Tactics
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
index d94a36ca18..f41d8fd1d2 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-name: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-02-09'
 description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances
   for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances
   that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users
   (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply,
   when the information warrants it.
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3
+name: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
 narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance,
   and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an
   AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to
@@ -14,12 +14,16 @@ narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, co
   and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks.
   This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and
   helps you respond and investigate those activities.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
index e04a2e5459..669eaf96d4 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
-name: Suspicious AWS Login Activities
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-05-01'
 description: 'Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches
   within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious
   logins. '
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3
+name: Suspicious AWS Login Activities
 narrative: It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure.
   Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting
   points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can
   lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created
   by the attacker.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious AWS Login Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
index 362f0b2d25..482bdeec65 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-07-24'
 description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets
   for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open
   S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative
   searches will give you more information, when required.
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3
+name: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
 narrative: 'As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks
   on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web
   Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
@@ -18,13 +18,17 @@ narrative: 'As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attac
   Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar
   users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior
   and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants.   '
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 - https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
index c241058937..db23133eff 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Suspicious AWS Traffic
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-07'
 description: Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence
   of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound
   traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3
+name: Suspicious AWS Traffic
 narrative: "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing\
   \ service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container,\
   \ the environment resembles a physical network. \\\nAmazon's VPC service enables\
@@ -20,12 +20,16 @@ narrative: "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computin
   \ in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\\\nThe searches\
   \ in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous\
   \ activity and suspicious behaviors."
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious AWS Traffic
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
index 09465bd04a..b1c2c73da3 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,29 @@
-
-name: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
-id: 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
-version: 1
-date: '2020-06-04'
-description: 'Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage 
-  the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate
-  suspicious login activity. '
-narrative: 'It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure.
-  Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors
-  caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any 
-  compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
-
-  This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, 
-  including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+date: '2020-06-04'
+description: 'Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic
+  Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help
+  you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. '
+id: 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
+name: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+narrative: 'It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure.
+  Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations.
+  Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary
+  costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
+
+  This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication
+  data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity
+  for AWS.'
 references:
 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/
 - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
-
-
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
index 1805b81e4e..372f7195ee 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
-name: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
-id: 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce
-description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from
-  unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities
-  are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-25'
-narrative: Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance,
-  and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their
-  cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks.
-  This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and
-  helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+date: '2020-08-25'
+description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors
+  originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that
+  malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
+id: 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce
+name: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
+narrative: Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance,
+  compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and
+  actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are
+  not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities
+  in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
-  - Cloud Security
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
index 3e5e1232e7..8b3f34ab31 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
-name: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
-id: 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-08-20'
-description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from
-  unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities
-  are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
-narrative: 'Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic
-  locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important
-  security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where
-  it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
+description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors
+  originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that
+  malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
+id: 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86
+name: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+narrative: 'Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from
+  familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions
+  is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments
+  where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 
   This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision
   you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as
@@ -19,12 +19,16 @@ narrative: 'Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate fr
   reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator.
   Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish
   to investigate further.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
index a09052feab..ea09741066 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Suspicious Cloud User Activities
-id: 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-04'
 description: Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your
   cloud environments.
+id: 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39
+name: Suspicious Cloud User Activities
 narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users
   who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it''s all too common
   for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable
@@ -13,13 +13,17 @@ narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the user
   In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage
   your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed
   for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 - https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud User Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
index 9c9febd2e3..5e8795af33 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Suspicious Command-Line Executions
-id: f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-03'
 description: Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most
   common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
   Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI
   on Windows systems.
+id: f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7
+name: Suspicious Command-Line Executions
 narrative: The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary
   goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts
   and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access
@@ -15,14 +15,18 @@ narrative: The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a pr
   suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various
   searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you
   in deeper investigation.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059
 - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Command-Line Executions
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
index a0925d45f2..9571ffb8bf 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Suspicious DNS Traffic
-id: 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-18'
 description: Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain
   name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol
   by monitoring for these types of abuses.
+id: 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56
+name: Suspicious DNS Traffic
 narrative: Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the
   Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However,
   attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One
@@ -14,14 +14,18 @@ narrative: Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make
   involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's
   malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic
   Story look for these types of abuses.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/
 - http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680
 - https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious DNS Traffic
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
index 17efc4676f..6dbb822469 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Suspicious Emails
-id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-01-27'
 description: Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial
   foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails
   in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
+id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55
+name: Suspicious Emails
 narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted
   spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and
   attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk
@@ -21,12 +21,16 @@ narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targe
   attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection
   searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative
   searches to help answer some of these questions.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Emails
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
index 4024a43e26..7db5cea4ca 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,27 @@
-name: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
-id: 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-version: 1
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-05'
 description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets
   for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open
   storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative
   searches will give you more information, when required.
-narrative: 'Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model.
-  This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists
-  and permissions on your GCP resources.\
-  This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write)
-  along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.'
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+id: 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+name: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
+narrative: Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility
+  model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access
+  control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates
+  on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage
+  bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.
 references:
 - https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security
 - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
-  - Cloud Security
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
index d08c86333a..51a823a8df 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,30 @@
-name: Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-20'
 description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe
   process to execute malicious code.
+id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55
+name: Suspicious MSHTA Activity
 narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions
-  via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta
-  suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution
-  of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
+  via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll)
+  with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility
+  to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript,
+  or VBScript.\
 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
-  
-  Triage \
-  Validate execution \
-  1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.
-  2. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA. \
-  Situational Awareness \
-  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by MSHTA.exe. \
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
-  2. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
-  MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?
-  3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
-  Retrieval of script code \
-  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+  may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.
+  \
+
+  Triage \ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName
+  of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32
+  or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. 2. Determine if script code
+  was executed with MSHTA. \ Situational Awareness \ The objective of this step is
+  meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script
+  code by MSHTA.exe. \ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is
+  the parent process an Office Application? 2. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe
+  modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious
+  .DLLs? 3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of
+  the remote IP or domain. \ Retrieval of script code \ The objective of this step
+  is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/
@@ -35,6 +32,12 @@ references:
 - https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
index 2d8b9d820c..086b991cec 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-name: Suspicious Okta Activity
-id: 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-02'
 description: Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid
   outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more.
   Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they
   need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta
   environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
+id: 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b
+name: Suspicious Okta Activity
 narrative: 'Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate
   once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications
   are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are
@@ -23,14 +23,18 @@ narrative: 'Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to
   events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing
   or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when
   travel is disallowed.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078
 - https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing
 - https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Okta Activity
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
index f079fd1f25..21d3a5c0a8 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
-id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-31'
 description: Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations,
   which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
+id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55
+name: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
 narrative: "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking\
   \ target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively\
   \ more common is registry modification.\\\n The registry is a key component of the\
@@ -13,13 +13,17 @@ narrative: "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for h
   \ administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within\
   \ the environment.\\\n The searches in this story are designed to help you detect\
   \ behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry."
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
index b46d55757e..3057a0a1e9 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-name: Suspicious WMI Use
-id: c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-23'
 description: Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation
   (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating
   systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it
   is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which
   the activity occurred.
+id: c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5
+name: Suspicious WMI Use
 narrative: 'WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on
   Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged
   to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning
@@ -21,13 +21,17 @@ narrative: 'WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations
   In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts
   and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide
   insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious WMI Use
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
index 72d7e859c4..8a6e3747f2 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,30 @@
-name: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
-id: aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258
-version: 1
-date: '2020-04-13'
-description: Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new
-    child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
-narrative: 'Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has
-    increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders
-    due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and 
-    several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS
-    systems.\
-    
-    Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host
-    basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+date: '2020-04-13'
+description: Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems.
+  This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions
+  for this detection.
+id: aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258
+name: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
+narrative: 'Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage
+  has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home
+  orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny
+  and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows
+  and macOS systems.\
+
+  Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a
+  per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed
+  during an investigation.'
 references:
-  - https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/
-  - https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/
+- https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/
+- https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
index 9c9041e846..0b12ea3155 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,31 @@
-name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
-id: 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-12'
-description: Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities
-  to execute malicious code.
+description: Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer
+  utilities to execute malicious code.
+id: 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
 narrative: 'Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy
   execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development
   related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development,
-  debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with
-  legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of
-  malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
+  debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate
+  certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious
+  code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute 
-  malicious code.'
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to
+  execute malicious code.'
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
index 355aa38376..ec92648687 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,35 @@
-name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
-id: be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 date: '2021-01-21'
 description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe
   process to execute malicious code.
-narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted 
+id: be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
+narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted
   Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform
   used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project
-  files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
+  files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.
+  \
 
   The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows
-  for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and
-  execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is
-  used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses
-  that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
+  for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute
+  the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this
+  way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are
+  configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code. \
-  
-  Triage \
-  Validate execution \
-  1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further
-  PE metadata.
-  2. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.
-  Situational Awareness \
-  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by MSBuild.exe. \
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
-  2. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
-  MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?
-  3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
-  Retrieval of script code \
-  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.
+  \
+
+  Triage \ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the
+  OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata. 2. Determine if script
+  code was executed with MSBuild. Situational Awareness \ The objective of this step
+  is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script
+  code by MSBuild.exe. \ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin?
+  Is the parent process an Office Application? 2. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe
+  modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious
+  .DLLs? 3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of
+  the remote IP or domain. \ Retrieval of script code \ The objective of this step
+  is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
@@ -43,6 +39,12 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md
 tags:
   analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
index 03f4c1edac..10ca204326 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
-id: 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-09'
 description: Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate
   malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users
   is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
+id: 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0
+name: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
 narrative: "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications.\
   \ The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities.\
   \ So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment\
@@ -14,12 +14,16 @@ narrative: "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make
   \ or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done\
   \ before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper\
   \ once you detect suspicious behavior."
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
   analytics_story: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/unusual_processes.yml b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
index 173d644caa..945f3c39ef 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Unusual Processes
-id: f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-04'
 description: Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment
   that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations,
   those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples
   of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
+id: f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6
+name: Unusual Processes
 narrative: 'Being able to profile a host''s processes within your environment can
   help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to
   the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
@@ -19,14 +19,18 @@ narrative: 'Being able to profile a host''s processes within your environment ca
   how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether
   other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help
   the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html
 - https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf
 - https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262
 tags:
   analytics_story: Unusual Processes
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
index 279d6984c9..adf2c000a3 100644
--- a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
+++ b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Use of Cleartext Protocols
-id: 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-15'
 description: Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak
   credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
+id: 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21
+name: Use of Cleartext Protocols
 narrative: Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections
   of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited
   by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information
@@ -11,12 +11,16 @@ narrative: Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the
   protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting
   of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise
   secondary systems.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Use of Cleartext Protocols
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Best Practices
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
index c24ff1f788..218c6362ff 100644
--- a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
+++ b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Web Fraud Detection
-id: 31337aaa-bc22-4752-b599-ef112dq1dq7a
-version: 1
+author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-08'
 description: Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques
   bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
+id: 31337aaa-bc22-4752-b599-ef112dq1dq7a
+name: Web Fraud Detection
 narrative: 'The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the
   use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or
   to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes
@@ -37,13 +37,17 @@ narrative: 'The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as
   Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple
   accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and
   embedded a common password within a script.'
-author: Jim Apger, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud
 - https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718
 tags:
   analytics_story: Web Fraud Detection
-  usecase: Fraud Detection
   category:
   - Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Fraud Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
index 2958e60dc1..fc63d52b18 100644
--- a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
-name: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
-id: 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-31'
 description: 'Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints.
   A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe`
   and disabling user-account control, among many others '
+id: 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064
+name: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
 narrative: Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that
   adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures.
   There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable
   in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the
   use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion
 tags:
   analytics_story: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
index 4a53899a3a..835bc5b9f0 100644
--- a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,37 @@
-name: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
-id: 36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-version: 1
-date: '2020-07-28'
-description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed.
-  Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003
-  to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP).
-  An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable
-  system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story
-  are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can
-  be used for the exploit.
-narrative: 'When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request
-  gets routed first through the client''s locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s)
-  configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain''s own DNS server(s).  If a
-  attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial
-  request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through
-  to the client''s local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer
-  overflow.
-  The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior.
-  Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates
-  across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json
-  and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types
-  (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+date: '2020-07-28'
+description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered
+  by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and
+  is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker
+  can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system,
+  leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed
+  to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be
+  used for the exploit.
+id: 36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+name: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
+narrative: When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request
+  gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any
+  DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS
+  server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that
+  responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This
+  response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched
+  for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this
+  Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk
+  Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns
+  and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These
+  correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along
+  with the payload size (>65KB).
 references:
 - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
 - https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability
 tags:
   analytics_story: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
index 84c7e88da1..2650850964 100644
--- a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
-id: 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-01-26'
 description: Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows
   file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting
   spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different
   one, among other techniques.
+id: 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d
+name: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
 narrative: "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious\
   \ code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage\
   \ file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific\
@@ -31,13 +31,17 @@ narrative: "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicio
   \ the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\\\nRun the searches in this story\
   \ to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation\
   \ of Windows file extensions and/or associations."
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042
 tags:
   analytics_story: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
index 18fdf81a66..e8df583cb7 100644
--- a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Windows Log Manipulation
-id: b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835
-version: 2
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs.
   Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an
   essential component of an effective defense.
+id: b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835
+name: Windows Log Manipulation
 narrative: 'Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or
   to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best
   practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still
@@ -19,14 +19,18 @@ narrative: 'Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and
   Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have
   accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information
   on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).'
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/
 - https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/
 - http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html
 tags:
   analytics_story: Windows Log Manipulation
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
index c05d4d7b4a..b08ba06bb7 100644
--- a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
-name: Windows Persistence Techniques
-id: 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-31'
 description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence
   on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
+id: 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
+name: Windows Persistence Techniques
 narrative: Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after
   the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to
   ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This
   Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by
   attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
@@ -19,6 +17,12 @@ references:
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk
 tags:
   analytics_story: Windows Persistence Techniques
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
index 470196052b..c02011d9ad 100644
--- a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-name: Windows Privilege Escalation
-id: 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-04'
 description: Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a
   Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints,
   modified registry keys, and more.
+id: 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5
+name: Windows Privilege Escalation
 narrative: 'Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary
   gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase
   his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such
@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@ narrative: 'Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an ad
   control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches
   to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges
   in your environment.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Windows Privilege Escalation
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
index f30090c6b2..866912c427 100644
--- a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-name: Windows Service Abuse
-id: 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2
-version: 3
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2017-11-02'
 description: Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the
   ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic
   Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are
   being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
+id: 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2
+name: Windows Service Abuse
 narrative: The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for
   running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage
   Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to
@@ -15,13 +15,17 @@ narrative: The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow fo
   opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create
   or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing
   opportunities for detection.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031
 tags:
   analytics_story: Windows Service Abuse
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: ESCU
+version: 3

From 8a772c721f4af1ada793db607e20e8fee0b21515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 10:59:44 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 073/132] adding product tags and type to baselines

---
 .../baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml    | 13 ++--
 ...e_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml | 13 ++--
 ...loud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml | 63 ++++++++++---------
 .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 61 +++++++++---------
 .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml  | 55 ++++++++--------
 ...loud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml | 59 +++++++++--------
 ...baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml | 13 ++--
 .../baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml   | 13 ++--
 ..._aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 13 ++--
 ...ws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 13 ++--
 ...aseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml | 13 ++--
 ..._of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml | 13 ++--
 ...line_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml | 13 ++--
 baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml  | 13 ++--
 baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml     | 13 ++--
 ...ount_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml | 15 +++--
 ..._list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml | 13 ++--
 ...bited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml | 21 ++++---
 baselines/discover_dns_records.yml            | 13 ++--
 baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml           | 13 ++--
 ...ystems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml | 15 +++--
 ...stems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml | 15 +++--
 .../identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml | 15 +++--
 baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml      | 13 ++--
 baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml    | 13 ++--
 ..._api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml | 13 ++--
 ...iously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml | 13 ++--
 ...een_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml | 41 +++++++-----
 ...seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml | 44 +++++++------
 ...seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml | 13 ++--
 baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml     | 13 ++--
 ..._cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml | 31 +++++----
 ...n_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml | 38 ++++++-----
 ...loud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml | 27 ++++----
 ...cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml | 33 +++++-----
 ...usly_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml | 30 +++++----
 ...ously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml | 36 ++++++-----
 ...n_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml | 33 +++++-----
 ...en_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml | 38 +++++------
 ...instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml | 32 +++++-----
 ..._instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml | 38 ++++++-----
 ..._provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml | 39 +++++++-----
 ...d_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml | 53 +++++++++-------
 .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml  | 37 +++++------
 ...previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml | 13 ++--
 baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml        | 13 ++--
 .../previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml    | 13 ++--
 .../previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml  | 13 ++--
 ...viously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml | 13 ++--
 ...eviously_seen_running_windows_services.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...y_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml | 39 ++++++------
 ...sly_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml | 13 ++--
 .../previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml   | 16 +++--
 ...ously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml | 36 ++++++-----
 ...iously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml | 39 +++++++-----
 ...usly_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml | 32 ++++++----
 ...ously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml | 42 +++++++------
 ...ady_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml | 13 ++--
 ...te_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml | 23 ++++---
 .../windows_updates_install_failures.yml      | 15 +++--
 .../windows_updates_install_successes.yml     | 15 +++--
 62 files changed, 911 insertions(+), 616 deletions(-)

diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
index 70a7a6e837..5a8ac4f66d 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of API Calls per User ARN
-id: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-09'
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard
   deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number
@@ -9,7 +7,8 @@ description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the s
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63
+name: Baseline of API Calls per User ARN
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls)
   as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls,
@@ -20,3 +19,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
index a4f764b1af..cfec692249 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS
-id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-07'
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard
   deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by
@@ -10,7 +8,8 @@ description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the s
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow
   logs.`.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63
+name: Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS
 search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12
   OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip
@@ -26,3 +25,9 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
index 706647ec1b..d1f2df8633 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
@@ -1,37 +1,40 @@
-name: Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User
-id: 1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-07'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
-  for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses
-  the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The
-  model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search,
-  which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a 
-  small time window.
-how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need
-  to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed,
-  along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment,
-  you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the
-  DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable
-  timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data.
-  You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time,
-  which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this
-  search to rebuild the model with the latest data.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-| eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") 
-| eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 
-| eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") 
-| eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) 
-| table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend 
-| eventstats dc(api_calls) as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend 
-| where api_calls >= 1 
-| fit DensityFunction api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true'
+  for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the
+  last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model
+  created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which
+  identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time
+  window.
+how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
+  need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
+  installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
+  in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the
+  MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes
+  in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past
+  90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer
+  period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
+  re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.
+id: 1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb
+name: Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User
+search: '| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval
+  DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls)
+  as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction
+  api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm
+  show_density=true'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
+  deployments:
+  - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
   detections:
   - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls
-  deployments:
-  - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
\ No newline at end of file
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index 5953151366..4567ae5e5a 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,43 @@
-name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
-id: a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-25'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
-  for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses
-  the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The
-  model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search,
-  which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a 
-  small time window.
-how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need
-  to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed,
-  along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment,
-  you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the
-  DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable
-  timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data.
-  You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time,
-  which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this
-  search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
+  for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search
+  uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.
+  The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search,
+  which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small
+  time window.
+how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
+  need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
+  installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
+  in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the
+  MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes
+  in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past
+  30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer
+  period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
+  re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
 
   More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where
-   All_Changes.action=deleted
-   AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance
-   by _time span=1h
-   | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, (random()%2)*0.0000000001)
-   | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1)
-   | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend
-   | fit DensityFunction instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 dist=expon show_density=true'
+id: a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549
+name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
+search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted
+  AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time
+  span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed,
+  (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4
+  | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction
+  instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1
+  dist=expon show_density=true'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  deployments:
+  - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
   detections:
   - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
-  deployments:
-  - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
\ No newline at end of file
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index 8f4345bd0a..acd4759a0d 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,43 @@
-name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched
-id: b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-14'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses
   the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The
   model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search,
-  which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a 
-  small time window.
-how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need
-  to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed,
-  along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment,
-  you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the
-  DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable
-  timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data.
-  You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time,
-  which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this
-  search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
+  which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small
+  time window.
+how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
+  need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
+  installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
+  in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the
+  MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes
+  in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past
+  90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer
+  period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
+  re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
 
   More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where
-   (All_Changes.action=created)
-   AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance
-   by _time span=1h
-   | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, (random()%2)*0.0000000001)
-   | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1)
-   | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend
-   | fit DensityFunction instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true'
+id: b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc
+name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched
+search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created)
+  AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time
+  span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched,
+  (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4
+  | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction
+  instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1
+  dist=expon show_density=true'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
-  detections:
-  - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched
   deployments:
   - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
+  detections:
+  - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
index f77290031e..b877ab587d 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
@@ -1,34 +1,39 @@
-name: Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User
-id: 67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-07'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
-  for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses
-  the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.
-how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need
-  to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed,
-  along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment,
-  you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the
-  DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable
-  timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data.
-  You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time,
-  which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this
-  search to rebuild the model with the latest data.'
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-| eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") 
-| eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 
-| eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") 
-| eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) 
-| table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend 
-| eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend 
-| where security_group_api_calls >= 1 
-| fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true'
+  for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default,
+  the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt
+  weekly.
+how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
+  need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
+  installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
+  in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the
+  MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes
+  in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past
+  90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer
+  period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
+  re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.
+id: 67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a
+name: Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User
+search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval
+  DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend |
+  eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay,
+  isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls
+  by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm
+  show_density=true'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
+  deployments:
+  - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
   detections:
   - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls
-  deployments:
-  - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
\ No newline at end of file
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
index 28205e56d9..05c75ca235 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK
-id: d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2019-05-08'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment.
@@ -17,7 +15,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoin
   a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to
   periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More
   information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459
+name: Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time
   max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest
   Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search
@@ -33,3 +32,9 @@ tags:
   detections:
   - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe
   - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
index 2cd47fc291..ec67fb56f5 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK
-id: c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2019-05-08'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed
@@ -15,7 +13,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure
   period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
   re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on
   the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba
+name: Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
   | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type
@@ -27,3 +26,9 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   detections:
   - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index 843d4e139b..150678ac10 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
-id: fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba
-version: 1
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 date: '2019-11-14'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses
@@ -21,7 +19,8 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
   search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
 
   More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.'
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+id: fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba
+name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter`
   | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user |
   fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1'
@@ -31,3 +30,9 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   detections:
   - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index d342dddd11..62c3c11778 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
-id: b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab
-version: 1
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 date: '2019-11-14'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search
@@ -22,7 +20,8 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
   search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
 
   More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.'
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+id: b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab
+name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter`
   | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user
   | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1'
@@ -31,3 +30,9 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   detections:
   - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
index 8d815ed92a..ba683ec22a 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN
-id: fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-21'
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard
   deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each
@@ -9,7 +7,8 @@ description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the s
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63
+name: Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN
 search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls)
   as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls,
@@ -21,3 +20,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
index 1b0075050d..83260019dd 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN
-id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63eq3783fd63
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-07-17'
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard
   deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user.
@@ -9,7 +7,8 @@ description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and stand
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63eq3783fd63
+name: Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls)
   as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls,
@@ -20,3 +19,9 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
index 1c0b705c71..8b05c09949 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN
-id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-17'
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard
   deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user.
@@ -9,7 +7,8 @@ description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the s
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63
+name: Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN
 search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls)
   as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls,
@@ -21,3 +20,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
index e5b850a63c..ad650af721 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK
-id: df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2019-05-08'
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of
@@ -21,7 +19,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Netwo
   which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this
   search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm
   used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9
+name: Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
   where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb
   by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval
@@ -38,3 +37,9 @@ tags:
   detections:
   - Processes launching netsh
   - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
index 66fd875219..8961582b92 100644
--- a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
+++ b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Count of assets by category
-id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-13'
 description: This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that
   belong to those categories.
@@ -9,7 +7,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must first leverage
   file which should then be mapped to the Identity_Management data model. The Identity_Management
   data model will contain a list of known authorized company assets. Ensure that all
   inventoried systems are constantly vetted and updated.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9
+name: Count of assets by category
 search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host)
   by category | sort -count'
 tags:
@@ -17,3 +16,9 @@ tags:
   - Asset Tracking
   detections:
   - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml b/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml
index 6b36cfaeae..df6840a21d 100644
--- a/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml
+++ b/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
-name: Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports
-id: 9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-13'
 description: The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each
   destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network
   traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f
+name: Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts
   from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | sort - count'
-tags: {}
+tags:
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
index 29516b810e..a692e761eb 100644
--- a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
+++ b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Create a list of approved AWS service accounts
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b1-5f6f-63ga3789fd43
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-03'
 description: This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the
   last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values
@@ -10,7 +8,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   inputs. Please validate the service account entires in `aws_service_accounts.csv`,
   which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. Please
   remove the entries of service accounts that are not legitimate.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b1-5f6f-63ga3789fd43
+name: Create a list of approved AWS service accounts
 search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT
   [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity
   | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count'
@@ -19,3 +18,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   detections:
   - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 2
diff --git a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
index c694c89152..e4b743217b 100644
--- a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
+++ b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,15 @@
-name: Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security
-id: 251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-15'
 description: This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters
   out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes
   identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.
 how_to_implement: This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup
-  append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull
-  value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup
-  prohibited_processes | stats count'
+id: 251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce
+name: Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security
+search: '| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T
+  prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false
+  is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes
+  | stats count'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -18,3 +17,9 @@ tags:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   detections:
   - Prohibited Software On Endpoint
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
index 805dd07e7b..7cf3eee981 100644
--- a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
+++ b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Discover DNS records
-id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3
-version: 1
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2019-02-14'
 description: The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured
   under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv`
@@ -10,7 +8,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting D
   logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the
   cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated
   with the domains owned by your corporation
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3
+name: Discover DNS records
 search: '| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv
   | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain,
   "\*", "")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type)
@@ -24,3 +23,9 @@ tags:
   - DNS Hijacking
   detections:
   - DNS record changed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
index dde08528b5..9214374287 100644
--- a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
+++ b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: DNSTwist Domain Names
-id: 19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-08'
 description: This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the
   valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked
@@ -8,7 +6,8 @@ description: This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to update the file
   called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`
   and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\_SA\_CIM**.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f
+name: DNSTwist Domain Names
 search: '| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true"
   | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count'
 tags:
@@ -19,3 +18,9 @@ tags:
   - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse
   - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse
   - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 2
diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
index 8ab2a53cec..076fb32988 100644
--- a/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
+++ b/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
-name: Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic
-id: 5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-15'
 description: This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote
   desktop traffic.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic
   and populate the Network_Traffic data model.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a
+name: Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
   where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | sort - count'
-tags: {}
+tags:
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
index db61f6cb75..22992acd1b 100644
--- a/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
+++ b/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,19 @@
-name: Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic
-id: baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-15'
 description: This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote
   desktop traffic
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic
   and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote
   desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608
+name: Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
   where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | sort - count'
-tags: {}
+tags:
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml
index a81c57ea04..15d1e1dfb2 100644
--- a/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml
+++ b/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
-name: Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop
-id: 063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-01'
 description: This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe,
   has run on each system.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint
   data that records process activity.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8
+name: Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name="*mstsc.exe*" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count'
-tags: {}
+tags:
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
index 720e6c10fe..6dcce241b4 100644
--- a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
+++ b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Monitor Successful Backups
-id: b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups
   are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you
   to determine when you should investigate.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
   backup logs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e
+name: Monitor Successful Backups
 search: '`netbackup` "Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | bucket _time
   span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time,
   MESSAGE'
@@ -16,3 +15,9 @@ tags:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
   detections:
   - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
index 7b82a8a17c..2cbf322a96 100644
--- a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
+++ b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
-id: b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures
   happen in your environments.  Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine
   when you should investigate.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
   backup logs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56
+name: Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
 search: '`netbackup` "An error occurred, failed to backup." | bucket _time span=1d
   | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE'
 tags:
@@ -15,3 +14,9 @@ tags:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
   detections:
   - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
index ac87b6efbc..ab07bbf340 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail
-id: fc0edc95-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63da3289fd03
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-16'
 description: This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles,
   then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this
@@ -11,7 +9,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`,
   which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fc0edc95-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63da3289fd03
+name: Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
   | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName
   | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count'
@@ -20,3 +19,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   detections:
   - Detect new API calls from user roles
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
index bd658f15b5..566cd5d5c5 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity
-id: 1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-04'
 description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account
   differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup
@@ -9,7 +7,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`,
   a lookup file created by this support search.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2
+name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId
   | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=*
   | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime
@@ -20,3 +19,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   detections:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
index 12f03309b6..f225d38704 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,32 @@
-name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial
-id: 82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-15'
-description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role 
-|  `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
-| rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):"
-|  where  vendor_account != dest_account
-| rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity'
+date: '2020-08-15'
+description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account
+  differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup
+  file.
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
+  in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this
+  support search.
+id: 82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf
+name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
+  where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user
+  Authentication.src Authentication.user_role |  `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
+  | rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):" |  where  vendor_account
+  != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId
+  | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup
+  previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities 
-  detections:
-  - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account 
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
+  detections:
+  - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
index c43ef840e6..8b447a5064 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,33 @@
-name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update
-id: dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-15'
 description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account
   differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup
   file.
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`,
-  a lookup file created by this support search.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role 
-| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` 
-| rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):" 
-| where vendor_account != dest_account 
-| rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId 
-| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity 
-| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId 
-| outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
+  in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this
+  support search.
+id: dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3
+name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
+  where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user
+  Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
+  | rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):" | where vendor_account
+  != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId
+  | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime)
+  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId
+  | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities 
-  detections:
-  - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
-
+  detections:
+  - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
index c4eec20fd3..5534e51bbe 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources
-id: ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-16'
 description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every
   IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning
@@ -8,7 +6,8 @@ description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for eve
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee
+name: Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources
 search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
   | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
   City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
@@ -21,3 +20,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City
   - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country
   - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
index 2e9fd26e2c..6d79826229 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Previously Seen AWS Regions
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-01-08'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started
   and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest)
@@ -9,7 +7,8 @@ description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is st
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63
+name: Previously Seen AWS Regions
 search: '`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time)
   as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count'
 tags:
@@ -18,3 +17,9 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   detections:
   - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
index 7030708a29..5a14742bb1 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,28 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial
-id: 69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-03'
 description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every
   user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs
   or creates something. This table is then cached.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change 
-  where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.
+id: 69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4
+name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success
   by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
-  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
-  | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) 
-  | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role'
+  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
+  <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen,
+  enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
-  detections:
-  - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
+  detections:
+  - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
index 3737a002a5..3d2f0f81dd 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,30 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update
-id: c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-03'
 description: This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every
   user role and command combination.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change 
-  where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.
+id: c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e
+name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success
   by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
-  | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen
-  | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role append=t
-  | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user, command
-  | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window`)
-  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
-  | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) 
-  | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role'
+  | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role
+  append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen
+  by user, command | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window`)
+  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
+  <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen,
+  enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
-  detections:
-  - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
+  detections:
+  - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
index 3e3a186185..1c1b5b820b 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial
-id: dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-15'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched
   a cloud compute instance.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the proper TAs installed.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-    where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance 
-    by All_Changes.user 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-| outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user 
-| stats count'
+id: dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance
+  by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user
+  | stats count'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User
   deployments:
   - Hourly Cache Updates
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
index cdedb05787..1979c97fd0 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update
-id: 6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-15'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched
   a cloud compute instance.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the proper TAs installed.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-    where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance 
-    by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user 
-| stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user 
-| where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "-90d@d") 
-| eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime 
-| eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) 
-| outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user'
+id: 6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance
+  by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t
+  previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen
+  max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(),
+  "-90d@d") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data
+  = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  deployments:
+  - Daily Cache Updates
   detections:
   - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User
-  deployments:
-  - Daily Cache Updates
\ No newline at end of file
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
index e57b0cd296..8802720595 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,27 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial
-id: 7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-10-08'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud
   compute instances
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created  by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` 
-| where image_id != "unknown"
-| eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime 
-| eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0)
-| outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images'
+id: 7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created  by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")`
+  | where image_id != "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
+  | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0)
+  | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
index 5c3dd33805..b21c9e1658 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,28 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update
-id: 6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-12'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud
   compute instances
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-    where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` 
-| where image_id != "unknown" 
-| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_images 
-| stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by image_id 
-| where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) 
-| eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime 
-| eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) 
-| outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images'
+id: 6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")`
+  | where image_id != "unknown" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_images
+  | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by
+  image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`)
+  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
+  <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
index 32d05b3a51..a596f29664 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,26 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial
-id: 3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be
-version: 1
-date: '2020-9-03'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+date: 2020-9-03
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance
   types
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-    where All_Changes.action=created 
-    by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` 
-| where instance_type != "unknown"
-| eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime 
-| eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) 
-| outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types'
+id: 3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type !=
+  "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data
+  = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
-
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
index a51a966726..f7290c8d76 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,28 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update
-id: 7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c
-version: 1
-date: '2020-9-03'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+date: 2020-9-03
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance
   types
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-    where All_Changes.action=created 
-    by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` 
-| where instance_type != "unknown"
-| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types 
-| stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by instance_type 
-| where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`) 
-| eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime 
-| eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) 
-| outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types'
+id: 7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type !=
+  "unknown" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types |
+  stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by instance_type
+  | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`)
+  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
+  <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
index 560254b732..3933d3359e 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,26 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial
-id: f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-29'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified
   a cloud instance.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-    where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-| eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime 
-| eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) 
-| outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+  and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.
+id: f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
+  <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
-
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
index e58529b5a4..7d33982a10 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,30 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update
-id: 534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-07-29'
-description: This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user
+description: This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications
+  that have been made by a user
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-    where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success
-    by All_Changes.user 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user 
-| stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user
-| where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) 
-| eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime 
-| eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) 
-| outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user'
+id: 534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user | stats
+  min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user |
+  where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`)
+  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
+  <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
index 5884dc23df..00183b280e 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,33 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial
-id: 4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-08-19'
 description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every
   IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning
-  activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is
-  then cached.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change 
-  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success 
-  by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
-  | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country)
-  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
-  | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) 
-  | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources'
+  activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This
+  table is then cached.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.
+id: 4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created)
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
+  | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0)
+  | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup
+  previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+  deployments:
+  - 90 Day Baseline
   detections:
   - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address
   - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City
   - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country
   - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region
-  deployments:
-  - 90 Day Baseline
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
index 9fdc4c3e1a..5d142216b6 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,38 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update
-id: 9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3
-version: 1
-date: '2020-08-20'
-description: This returns the first and last times seen for every
-  IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning
-  activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or
-  creates something.  It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations
-  that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change 
-  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success 
-  by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
-  | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country)
-  | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region 
-  | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t
-  | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region
-  | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`)
-  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
-  | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0)
-  | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources'
+date: '2020-08-20'
+description: This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along
+  with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity
+  within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs
+  or creates something.  It then updates this information with historical data and
+  filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window.
+  This updated table is then cached.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.
+id: 9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created)
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen,
+  City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
+  append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen
+  by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`)
+  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
+  <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen,
+  lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+  deployments:
+  - Daily Cache Updates
   detections:
   - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address
   - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City
   - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country
   - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region
-  deployments:
-  - Daily Cache Updates
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
index 3965f05baf..a9c521cb75 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial
-id: b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-02'
 description: This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is
   started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time
@@ -8,18 +6,23 @@ description: This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance
   last 30 days
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-  where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region
-  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` 
-  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
+id: b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
   | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0)
   | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
-
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
index 4f4c105d45..6deb7d50b2 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update
-id: 512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-09-02'
 description: This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is
   started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time
@@ -8,23 +6,26 @@ description: This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance
   last 30 days
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change
-  where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region
-  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions 
-  | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by vendor_region
-  | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`)
-  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
-  | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0)
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count'
-
+id: 512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
+  from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions
+  | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by
+  vendor_region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`)
+  | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
+  <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions
+  | stats count'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
-  detections:
-  - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
-
-
+  detections:
+  - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
index b6f9c6b67a..3c808c0439 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Previously seen command line arguments
-id: 56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-03-01'
 description: This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used
   to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we
@@ -10,7 +8,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete
   process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the
   Endpoint data model.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3
+name: Previously seen command line arguments
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
   AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`'
@@ -28,3 +27,9 @@ tags:
   - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe
   - Processes launching netsh
   - First time seen command line argument
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 2
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
index c0c7b98592..1d7e760def 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Previously Seen EC2 AMIs
-id: bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-12'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2
   instances
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9
+name: Previously Seen EC2 AMIs
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId
   as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID
   | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count'
@@ -16,3 +15,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   detections:
   - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
index d5e4a6ca47..e5b36d2d16 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
-name: Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types
-id: b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-08'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45
+name: Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType
   as instanceType | fillnull value="m1.small" instanceType | stats earliest(_time)
   as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv
@@ -16,3 +15,9 @@ tags:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   detections:
   - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
index df480fa6f8..4622e2a348 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User
-id: 6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-15'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched
   a EC2 instance.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad
+name: Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn
   as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup
   previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count'
@@ -17,3 +16,9 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   detections:
   - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
index 4b637f233c..45320b31c7 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User
-id: 4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-05'
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched
   a EC2 instance.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb
+name: Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User
 search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn
   userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count'
@@ -16,3 +15,9 @@ tags:
   - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
   detections:
   - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
index 2dedd1dbde..db35164f65 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
-id: 64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-06-23'
 description: This collects the services that have been started across your entire
   enterprise.
 how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
   you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully.
   Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 |
-    rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" |
-    where state="running" |
-    stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service |
-    outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
+id: 64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394
+name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
+search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+)
+  service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time)
+  as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Sunburst Malware
-  detections:
-  - First Time Seen Running Windows Service
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
+  detections:
+  - First Time Seen Running Windows Service
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 3
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
index 83b87efc65..fa7321544c 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,32 @@
-name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update
-id: 2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c
-version: 3
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-06-23'
-description: This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise
-    within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out
-    Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window.
-    This updated table is then cached.
+description: This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen
+  across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with
+  historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within
+  the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
 how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
   you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully.
   Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 |
-    rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" |
-    where state="running" |
-    stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service |
-    inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t |
-    stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service |
-    where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`") |
-    outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
+id: 2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c
+name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update
+search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+)
+  service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time)
+  as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
+  append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen
+  by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`")
+  | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Sunburst Malware
-  detections:
-  - First Time Seen Running Windows Service
   deployments:
   - Hourly Cache Updates
+  detections:
+  - First Time Seen Running Windows Service
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 3
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
index 595012b42e..bb9793ba8a 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP
-id: fc0edc15-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63qa1281fd03
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-28'
 description: This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP
   addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered
@@ -10,7 +8,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs
   inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`,
   which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fc0edc15-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63qa1281fd03
+name: Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP
 search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  | stats  earliest(_time) as earliest
   latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip
   | stats count'
@@ -19,3 +18,9 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   detections:
   - Detect S3 access from a new IP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
index b786a501b1..f0dc9e2229 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-name: Previously seen users in CloudTrail
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03
-version: 1
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-30'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
   then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
   we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30
-  days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
+  days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the
+  Authentication Datamodel
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`,
   which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03
+name: Previously seen users in CloudTrail
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation
   src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) |
   stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region
@@ -23,3 +23,9 @@ tags:
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
   - Detect new user AWS Console Login
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
index 1c300d0022..af42f4a7c2 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,34 @@
-name: Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial
-id: 0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-05-28'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
   then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
-  we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30
-  days.
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model  
-  for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`,
-  which is a lookup file created by this support search.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+  we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last
+  30 days.
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
+  in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this
+  support search.
+id: 0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5
+name: Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
-  | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src
-  | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count'
+  | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src
+  as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins
+  | stats count'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  deployments:
+  - 90 Day Baseline
   detections:
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
   - Detect AWS Console Login by New User
-  deployments:
-  - 90 Day Baseline
-
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
index 2d96325b14..e1f5cb442b 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,34 @@
-name: Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update
-id: 66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-05-28'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
   then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
   we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model
-  for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`,
-  which is a lookup file created by this support search.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from
-      datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user
-      Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user
-      Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime
-      | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as
-      firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country
-      | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
+  in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this
+  support search.
+id: 66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322
+name: Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
+  where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
+  | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src
+  as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t
+  previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime)
+  as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  deployments:
+  - Daily Cache Updates
   detections:
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
   - Detect AWS Console Login by New User
-  deployments:
-  - Daily Cache Updates
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
index 2ee4120525..fd84e4f457 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,28 @@
-name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial
-id: 60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-05-20'
-description: This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with
-    a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached.
+description: This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint
+  with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then
+  cached.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen
-        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us)
-        by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-        | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen
-        | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process'
+id: 60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b
+name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time)
+  as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe
+  OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest|
+  `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen
+  | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
-  detections:
-  - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
+  detections:
+  - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
index 048966f719..3df94bac68 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,33 @@
-name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update
-id: 80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2020-05-20'
-description: This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with
-    a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates
-    this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not
-    been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk.
+description: This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint
+  with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour.
+  It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name
+  and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This
+  updated table is outputed to disk.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen
-        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us)
-        by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-        | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest
-        | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t
-        | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest
-        | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`")
-        | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process'
+id: 80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee
+name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time)
+  as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe
+  OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest|
+  `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name,
+  dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen)
+  as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where
+  lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`")
+  | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
-  detections:
-  - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
   deployments:
   - Hourly Cache Updates
+  detections:
+  - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
index 5503ddeb98..8bea8031df 100644
--- a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
+++ b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-01-08'
 description: Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows
   not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the
@@ -9,7 +7,8 @@ description: Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windo
 how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line
   from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
   of the Sysmon TA.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61
+name: Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry
   AND (All_Changes.object_path="HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\QualityCompat*")
@@ -21,3 +20,9 @@ tags:
   - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
   detections:
   - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
index ecd41e4bfe..7c28c533f3 100644
--- a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,22 @@
-name: Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
-id: 06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031
-version: 1
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 date: '2018-04-30'
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
   then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
-  we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
+  we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour.
+  NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication
+  Datamodel
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`,
   which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+id: 06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031
+name: Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation
   src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) |
   stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region
-  Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats
-  min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail'
+  Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail |
+  stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region
+  Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -24,3 +25,9 @@ tags:
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
   - Detect new user AWS Console Login
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml b/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml
index 8fa8ad8415..8e439ff3ad 100644
--- a/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml
+++ b/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
-name: Windows Updates Install Failures
-id: 6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-14'
 description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates
   fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you
   to determine when you should be concerned.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7
+name: Windows Updates Install Failures
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM
   datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" AND Updates.status=failure
   by _time span=1d'
-tags: {}
+tags:
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml b/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml
index 0b30e84d42..44f338641b 100644
--- a/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml
+++ b/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
-name: Windows Updates Install Successes
-id: 6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-14'
 description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows
   updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow
   you to determine when you should be concerned.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d
+name: Windows Updates Install Successes
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM
   datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" AND Updates.status=installed
   by _time span=1d'
-tags: {}
+tags:
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+type: batch
+version: 1

From a390051bdd9ef898d75c72598f503fb1f06a9785 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 11:22:34 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 074/132] fixing but I hit in generate

---
 bin/generate.py | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py
index 3027958dfd..3b715eaf89 100644
--- a/bin/generate.py
+++ b/bin/generate.py
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ def generate_workbench_panels(response_tasks, stories, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PAT
                 j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH),
                                      trim_blocks=True)
                 template = j2_env.get_template('panel.j2')
-                file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml 
+                file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml
                 output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, file_path)
                 response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace(">","&gt;")
                 response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace("<","&lt;")
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ def get_deployments(object, deployments):
         if 'product' in deployment['tags']:
             if type(deployment['tags']['product']) is str:
                 if 'product' in object['tags']:
-                    if deployment['tags']['product'] == object['tags']['analytics_story'] or deployment['tags']['product']=='Splunk Security Analytics for AWS':
+                    if deployment['tags']['product'] == object['tags']['product'] or deployment['tags']['product']=='Splunk Security Analytics for AWS':
                         matched_deployments.append(deployment)
             else:
                 for story in deployment['tags']['product']:

From 8bbfbdadb46665fe65e675db48ec4da4ff681204 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 10:57:48 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 075/132] remove explicit deployment check for Mustang

---
 bin/generate.py | 23 +++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py
index 3b715eaf89..af83d3079a 100644
--- a/bin/generate.py
+++ b/bin/generate.py
@@ -339,22 +339,25 @@ def get_deployments(object, deployments):
                 if 'analytics_story' in object['tags']:
                     if deployment['tags']['analytics_story'] == object['tags']['analytics_story'] or deployment['tags']['analytics_story']=='all':
                         matched_deployments.append(deployment)
+
             else:
                 for story in deployment['tags']['analytics_story']:
                     if story == object['tags']['analytics_story']:
                         matched_deployments.append(deployment)
                         continue
 
-        if 'product' in deployment['tags']:
-            if type(deployment['tags']['product']) is str:
-                if 'product' in object['tags']:
-                    if deployment['tags']['product'] == object['tags']['product'] or deployment['tags']['product']=='Splunk Security Analytics for AWS':
-                        matched_deployments.append(deployment)
-            else:
-                for story in deployment['tags']['product']:
-                    if story == object['tags']['product']:
-                        matched_deployments.append(deployment)
-                        continue
+        # Remove this check since deployment files are numbered and detections for Splunk Security Analytics for AWS will only get risk configs. 
+
+        # if 'product' in deployment['tags']:
+        #     if type(deployment['tags']['product']) is str:
+        #         if 'product' in object['tags']:
+        #             if deployment['tags']['product'] == object['tags']['product'] or deployment['tags']['product']=='Splunk Security Analytics for AWS':
+        #                 matched_deployments.append(deployment)
+        #     else:
+        #         for story in deployment['tags']['product']:
+        #             if story == object['tags']['product']:
+        #                 matched_deployments.append(deployment)
+        #                 continue
 
 
         if 'detection_name' in deployment['tags']:

From a5ffdefcd4a9343f2e4929a5255d3c6200a4c814 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:08:51 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 076/132] udpating to correct a merge error

---
 .../ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml        | 30 +++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index e381dbba2c..73d5a2e4ba 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -17,15 +17,27 @@ known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments t
   is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter`
   macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
 name: First time seen command line argument - SSA
-search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
-  "_time"), "string", null)) | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"),
-  "string", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string",
-  null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-  cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)) | where process_name="cmd.exe"
-  AND match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true | select cmd_line,
-  timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id | first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line"]
-  | where first_time_cmd_line | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp,
-  entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
+| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
+| eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
+       dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
+       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
+       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
+       cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, "GUID"),
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\s)+\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), /* replaces " \\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), /* replaces "C:\\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */
+       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N")
+| where process_name="cmd.exe" AND
+        match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true
+| select cmd_line, cmd_line_norm, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id
+| first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line_norm"]
+| where first_time_cmd_line_norm
+| eval start_time = timestamp,
+       end_time = timestamp,
+       entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id),
+       body = "TBD"
+| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 3

From 144bcfa7367f8c68ddcef092169f2bbc9946c769 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jose Enrique Hernandez <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:36:01 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 077/132] Update README.md

removing count for now since it is not working
---
 README.md | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index fcefb0a956..d207e71a1d 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
         <img src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/splunk/security_content" /></a>
     <a href="https://circleci.com/gh/splunk/security_content/tree/develop">
         <img src="https://img.shields.io/circleci/build/github/splunk/security_content?token=67ad1fa7779c57d7e5bcfc42bd617baf607ec269" /></a>
-    <a href="https://github.com/search?q=repo%3Asplunk%2Fsecurity_content+extension%3Ayml+path%3Adetections&type=Code&ref=advsearch&l=&l=">
-        <img src="https://img.shields.io/github/directory-file-count/splunk/security_content/detections?extension=.yml&label=detections" /></a>
     <a href="https://github.com/splunk/security_content">
         <img src="https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/reporting/detection_coverage.svg" /></a>
     <a href="https://github.com/splunk/security_content">

From b2aed2b8168b37e9cb5571cb71799ce8d26d75e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 14:38:54 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 078/132] rundll32 advpack and rename

---
 ...2_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml | 47 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml   | 44 +++++++++++++++++
 ...lication_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml | 12 +++++
 .../suspicious_rundll32_rename.test.yml       | 12 +++++
 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1ea36643ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack
+id: 4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-04'
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll
+  and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function. This particular technique will load
+  script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads
+  may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
+  script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe,
+  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. 
+  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
+  C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA. 
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
+- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE process_name=rundll32.exe) CommandLine=*advpack*
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
+  parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
+  rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+  `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b06c700a5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+name: Suspicious Rundll32 Rename
+id: 7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-04'
+description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing.
+  rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
+  C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe
+  executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the OriginalFileName
+  from Sysmon, or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking
+  for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE NOT process_name=rundll32.exe
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
+  parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
+  rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+  `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
+  - T1036.003
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b724031987
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack
+tests:
+- name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack and ieadvpack
+  file: endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67a20e4bc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Suspicious rundll32 rename unit test
+tests:
+- name: Detect Renamed rundll32.exe Rename
+  file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From a2aec12a9f9b33094ab263d8797ef007094f1086 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-112-29>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 22:03:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 079/132] Added detection testing service results inDetect
 Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack and ieadvpack

---
 ...2_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml | 26 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
index 1ea36643ab..06219f54f7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
@@ -2,18 +2,17 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack
 id: 4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
-description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll
-  and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function. This particular technique will load
-  script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads
-  may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and
+  ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function. This particular technique
+  will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module
+  loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
   script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe,
-  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. 
-  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
-  C:\Windows\syswow64.
+  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively
+  found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA. 
+  Sysmon TA.
 type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
@@ -22,10 +21,10 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE process_name=rundll32.exe) CommandLine=*advpack*
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
-  parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
-  rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE process_name=rundll32.exe)
+  CommandLine=*advpack* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
+  by Computer, User, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path,
+  CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`'
 known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
   copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
@@ -44,4 +43,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From bfec79252f413bfff412acbac4e8f597927a72fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-112-29>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 22:03:42 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 080/132] Added detection testing service results inDetect
 Renamed rundll32.exe Rename

---
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml | 13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
index b06c700a5d..7e7dddf7c9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ id: 7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
 description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing.
-  rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
-  C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe
-  executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the OriginalFileName
-  from Sysmon, or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking
-  for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.
+  rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During
+  investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script
+  content it is loading. This query relies on the OriginalFileName from Sysmon, or
+  internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific
+  command line arguments outlined in other analytics.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
@@ -41,4 +41,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From 63a8fed10256af55245830df2901fbf7a75cdfd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: research bot <research@splunk.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 23:07:26 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 081/132] updating docs and package bits [ci skip]

---
 docs/mitre-map/coverage.csv            | 2112 +++++++-------
 docs/mitre-map/coverage.json           | 2816 +++++--------------
 docs/mitre-map/detections.csv          | 1408 +++++-----
 docs/mitre-map/detections.json         | 3492 +++++++++++-------------
 docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki       |   45 +-
 docs/stories_categories.md             |   41 +-
 package/app.manifest                   |    2 +-
 package/default/analytic_stories.conf  |  198 +-
 package/default/analyticstories.conf   |  209 +-
 package/default/app.conf               |    4 +-
 package/default/collections.conf       |    2 +-
 package/default/content-version.conf   |    2 +-
 package/default/es_investigations.conf |  111 +-
 package/default/macros.conf            |   42 +-
 package/default/savedsearches.conf     |  755 +++--
 package/default/transforms.conf        |    2 +-
 package/default/use_case_library.conf  |  209 +-
 17 files changed, 5138 insertions(+), 6312 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/mitre-map/coverage.csv b/docs/mitre-map/coverage.csv
index b0a727d874..910792e95b 100644
--- a/docs/mitre-map/coverage.csv
+++ b/docs/mitre-map/coverage.csv
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -2194,7 +2194,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -2481,7 +2481,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -2977,7 +2977,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -3068,7 +3068,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -3264,7 +3264,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -3760,7 +3760,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -3851,7 +3851,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -4047,7 +4047,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -4543,7 +4543,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -4634,7 +4634,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -4830,7 +4830,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -5326,7 +5326,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -5417,7 +5417,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -5613,7 +5613,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -6109,7 +6109,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -6200,7 +6200,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -6396,7 +6396,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -6892,7 +6892,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -6983,7 +6983,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -7179,7 +7179,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -7675,7 +7675,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -7766,7 +7766,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -7962,7 +7962,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -8458,7 +8458,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -8549,7 +8549,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -8745,7 +8745,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -9241,7 +9241,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -9332,7 +9332,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -9528,7 +9528,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -10024,7 +10024,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -10115,7 +10115,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -10311,7 +10311,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -10807,7 +10807,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -10898,7 +10898,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -11094,7 +11094,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -11590,7 +11590,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -11681,7 +11681,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -11877,7 +11877,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -12373,7 +12373,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -12464,7 +12464,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -12660,7 +12660,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -13156,7 +13156,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -13247,7 +13247,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -13443,7 +13443,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -13939,7 +13939,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -14030,7 +14030,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -14226,7 +14226,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -14722,7 +14722,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -14813,7 +14813,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -15009,7 +15009,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -15505,7 +15505,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -15596,7 +15596,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -15792,7 +15792,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -16288,7 +16288,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -16379,7 +16379,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -16575,7 +16575,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -17071,7 +17071,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -17162,7 +17162,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -17358,7 +17358,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -17854,7 +17854,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -17945,7 +17945,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -18141,7 +18141,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -18637,7 +18637,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -18728,7 +18728,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -18924,7 +18924,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -19420,7 +19420,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -19511,7 +19511,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -19707,7 +19707,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -20203,7 +20203,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -20294,7 +20294,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -20490,7 +20490,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -20986,7 +20986,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -21077,7 +21077,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -21273,7 +21273,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -21769,7 +21769,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -21860,7 +21860,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -22056,7 +22056,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -22552,7 +22552,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -22643,7 +22643,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -22839,7 +22839,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -23335,7 +23335,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -23426,7 +23426,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -23622,7 +23622,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -24118,7 +24118,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -24209,7 +24209,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -24405,7 +24405,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -24901,7 +24901,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -24992,7 +24992,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -25188,7 +25188,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -25684,7 +25684,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -25775,7 +25775,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -25971,7 +25971,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -26467,7 +26467,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -26558,7 +26558,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -26754,7 +26754,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -27250,7 +27250,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -27341,7 +27341,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -27537,7 +27537,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -28033,7 +28033,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -28124,7 +28124,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -28320,7 +28320,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -28816,7 +28816,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -28907,7 +28907,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -29103,7 +29103,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -29599,7 +29599,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -29690,7 +29690,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -29886,7 +29886,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -30382,7 +30382,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -30473,7 +30473,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -30669,7 +30669,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -31165,7 +31165,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -31256,7 +31256,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -31452,7 +31452,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -31948,7 +31948,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -32039,7 +32039,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -32235,7 +32235,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -32731,7 +32731,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -32822,7 +32822,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -33018,7 +33018,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -33514,7 +33514,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -33605,7 +33605,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -33801,7 +33801,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -34297,7 +34297,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -34388,7 +34388,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -34584,7 +34584,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -35080,7 +35080,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -35171,7 +35171,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -35367,7 +35367,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -35863,7 +35863,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -35954,7 +35954,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -36150,7 +36150,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -36646,7 +36646,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -36737,7 +36737,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -36933,7 +36933,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -37429,7 +37429,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -37520,7 +37520,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -37716,7 +37716,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -38212,7 +38212,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -38303,7 +38303,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -38499,7 +38499,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -38995,7 +38995,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -39086,7 +39086,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -39282,7 +39282,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -39778,7 +39778,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -39869,7 +39869,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -40065,7 +40065,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -40561,7 +40561,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -40652,7 +40652,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -40848,7 +40848,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -41344,7 +41344,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -41435,7 +41435,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -41631,7 +41631,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -42127,7 +42127,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -42218,7 +42218,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -42414,7 +42414,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -42910,7 +42910,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -43001,7 +43001,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -43197,7 +43197,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -43693,7 +43693,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -43784,7 +43784,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -43980,7 +43980,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -44476,7 +44476,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -44567,7 +44567,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -44763,7 +44763,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -45259,7 +45259,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -45350,7 +45350,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -45546,7 +45546,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -46042,7 +46042,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -46133,7 +46133,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -46329,7 +46329,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -46825,7 +46825,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -46916,7 +46916,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -47112,7 +47112,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -47608,7 +47608,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -47699,7 +47699,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -47895,7 +47895,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -48391,7 +48391,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -48482,7 +48482,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -48678,7 +48678,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -49174,7 +49174,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -49265,7 +49265,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -49461,7 +49461,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -49957,7 +49957,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -50048,7 +50048,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -50244,7 +50244,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -50740,7 +50740,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -50831,7 +50831,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -51027,7 +51027,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -51523,7 +51523,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -51614,7 +51614,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -51810,7 +51810,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -52306,7 +52306,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -52397,7 +52397,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -52593,7 +52593,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -53089,7 +53089,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -53180,7 +53180,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -53376,7 +53376,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -53872,7 +53872,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -53963,7 +53963,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -54159,7 +54159,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -54655,7 +54655,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -54746,7 +54746,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -54942,7 +54942,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -55438,7 +55438,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -55529,7 +55529,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -55725,7 +55725,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -56221,7 +56221,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -56312,7 +56312,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -56508,7 +56508,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -57004,7 +57004,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -57095,7 +57095,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -57291,7 +57291,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -57787,7 +57787,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -57878,7 +57878,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -58074,7 +58074,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -58570,7 +58570,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -58661,7 +58661,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -58857,7 +58857,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -59353,7 +59353,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -59444,7 +59444,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -59640,7 +59640,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -60136,7 +60136,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -60227,7 +60227,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -60423,7 +60423,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -60919,7 +60919,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -61010,7 +61010,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -61206,7 +61206,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -61702,7 +61702,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -61793,7 +61793,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -61989,7 +61989,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -62485,7 +62485,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -62576,7 +62576,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -62772,7 +62772,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -63268,7 +63268,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -63359,7 +63359,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -63555,7 +63555,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -64051,7 +64051,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -64142,7 +64142,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -64338,7 +64338,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -64834,7 +64834,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -64925,7 +64925,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -65121,7 +65121,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -65617,7 +65617,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -65708,7 +65708,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -65904,7 +65904,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -66400,7 +66400,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -66491,7 +66491,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -66687,7 +66687,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -67183,7 +67183,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -67274,7 +67274,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -67470,7 +67470,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -67966,7 +67966,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -68057,7 +68057,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -68253,7 +68253,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -68749,7 +68749,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -68840,7 +68840,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -69036,7 +69036,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -69532,7 +69532,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -69623,7 +69623,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -69819,7 +69819,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -70315,7 +70315,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -70406,7 +70406,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -70602,7 +70602,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -71098,7 +71098,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -71189,7 +71189,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -71385,7 +71385,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -71881,7 +71881,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -71972,7 +71972,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -72168,7 +72168,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -72664,7 +72664,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -72755,7 +72755,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -72951,7 +72951,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -73447,7 +73447,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -73538,7 +73538,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -73734,7 +73734,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -74230,7 +74230,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -74321,7 +74321,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -74517,7 +74517,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -75013,7 +75013,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -75104,7 +75104,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -75300,7 +75300,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -75796,7 +75796,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -75887,7 +75887,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -76083,7 +76083,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -76579,7 +76579,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -76670,7 +76670,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -76866,7 +76866,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -77362,7 +77362,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -77453,7 +77453,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -77649,7 +77649,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -78145,7 +78145,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -78236,7 +78236,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -78432,7 +78432,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -78928,7 +78928,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -79019,7 +79019,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -79215,7 +79215,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -79711,7 +79711,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -79802,7 +79802,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -79998,7 +79998,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -80494,7 +80494,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -80585,7 +80585,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -80781,7 +80781,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -81277,7 +81277,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -81368,7 +81368,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -81564,7 +81564,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -82060,7 +82060,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -82151,7 +82151,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -82347,7 +82347,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -82843,7 +82843,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -82934,7 +82934,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -83130,7 +83130,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -83626,7 +83626,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -83717,7 +83717,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -83913,7 +83913,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -84409,7 +84409,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -84500,7 +84500,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -84696,7 +84696,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -85192,7 +85192,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -85283,7 +85283,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -85479,7 +85479,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -85975,7 +85975,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -86066,7 +86066,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -86262,7 +86262,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -86758,7 +86758,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -86849,7 +86849,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -87045,7 +87045,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -87541,7 +87541,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -87632,7 +87632,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -87828,7 +87828,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -88324,7 +88324,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -88415,7 +88415,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -88611,7 +88611,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -89107,7 +89107,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -89198,7 +89198,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -89394,7 +89394,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -89890,7 +89890,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -89981,7 +89981,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -90177,7 +90177,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -90673,7 +90673,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -90764,7 +90764,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -90960,7 +90960,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -91456,7 +91456,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -91547,7 +91547,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -91743,7 +91743,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -92239,7 +92239,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -92330,7 +92330,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -92526,7 +92526,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -93022,7 +93022,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -93113,7 +93113,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -93309,7 +93309,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -93805,7 +93805,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -93896,7 +93896,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -94092,7 +94092,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -94588,7 +94588,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -94679,7 +94679,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -94875,7 +94875,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -95371,7 +95371,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -95462,7 +95462,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -95658,7 +95658,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -96154,7 +96154,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -96245,7 +96245,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -96441,7 +96441,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -96937,7 +96937,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -97028,7 +97028,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -97224,7 +97224,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -97720,7 +97720,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -97811,7 +97811,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -98007,7 +98007,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -98503,7 +98503,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -98594,7 +98594,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -98790,7 +98790,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -99286,7 +99286,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -99377,7 +99377,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -99573,7 +99573,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -100069,7 +100069,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -100160,7 +100160,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -100356,7 +100356,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -100852,7 +100852,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -100943,7 +100943,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -101139,7 +101139,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -101635,7 +101635,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -101726,7 +101726,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -101922,7 +101922,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -102418,7 +102418,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -102509,7 +102509,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -102705,7 +102705,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -103201,7 +103201,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -103292,7 +103292,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -103488,7 +103488,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -103984,7 +103984,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -104075,7 +104075,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -104271,7 +104271,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -104767,7 +104767,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -104858,7 +104858,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -105054,7 +105054,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -105550,7 +105550,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -105641,7 +105641,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -105837,7 +105837,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -106333,7 +106333,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -106424,7 +106424,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -106620,7 +106620,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -107116,7 +107116,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -107207,7 +107207,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -107403,7 +107403,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -107899,7 +107899,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -107990,7 +107990,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -108186,7 +108186,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -108682,7 +108682,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -108773,7 +108773,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -108969,7 +108969,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -109465,7 +109465,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -109556,7 +109556,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -109752,7 +109752,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -110248,7 +110248,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -110339,7 +110339,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -110535,7 +110535,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -111031,7 +111031,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -111122,7 +111122,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -111318,7 +111318,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -111814,7 +111814,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -111905,7 +111905,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -112101,7 +112101,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -112597,7 +112597,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -112688,7 +112688,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -112884,7 +112884,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -113380,7 +113380,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -113471,7 +113471,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -113667,7 +113667,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -114163,7 +114163,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -114254,7 +114254,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -114450,7 +114450,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -114946,7 +114946,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -115037,7 +115037,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -115233,7 +115233,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -115729,7 +115729,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -115820,7 +115820,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -116016,7 +116016,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -116512,7 +116512,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -116603,7 +116603,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -116799,7 +116799,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -117295,7 +117295,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -117386,7 +117386,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -117582,7 +117582,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -118078,7 +118078,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -118169,7 +118169,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -118365,7 +118365,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -118861,7 +118861,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -118952,7 +118952,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -119148,7 +119148,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -119644,7 +119644,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -119735,7 +119735,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -119931,7 +119931,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -120427,7 +120427,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -120518,7 +120518,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -120714,7 +120714,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -121210,7 +121210,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -121301,7 +121301,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -121497,7 +121497,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -121993,7 +121993,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -122084,7 +122084,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -122280,7 +122280,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -122776,7 +122776,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -122867,7 +122867,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -123063,7 +123063,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -123559,7 +123559,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -123650,7 +123650,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -123846,7 +123846,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -124342,7 +124342,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -124433,7 +124433,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -124629,7 +124629,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -125125,7 +125125,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -125216,7 +125216,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -125412,7 +125412,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -125908,7 +125908,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -125999,7 +125999,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -126195,7 +126195,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -126691,7 +126691,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -126782,7 +126782,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -126978,7 +126978,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -127474,7 +127474,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -127565,7 +127565,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -127761,7 +127761,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -128257,7 +128257,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -128348,7 +128348,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -128544,7 +128544,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -129040,7 +129040,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -129131,7 +129131,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -129327,7 +129327,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -129823,7 +129823,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -129914,7 +129914,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -130110,7 +130110,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -130606,7 +130606,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -130697,7 +130697,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -130893,7 +130893,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -131389,7 +131389,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -131480,7 +131480,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -131676,7 +131676,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -132172,7 +132172,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -132263,7 +132263,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -132459,7 +132459,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -132955,7 +132955,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -133046,7 +133046,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -133242,7 +133242,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -133738,7 +133738,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -133829,7 +133829,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -134025,7 +134025,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -134521,7 +134521,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -134612,7 +134612,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -134808,7 +134808,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -135304,7 +135304,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -135395,7 +135395,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -135591,7 +135591,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -136087,7 +136087,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -136178,7 +136178,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -136374,7 +136374,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -136870,7 +136870,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -136961,7 +136961,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -137157,7 +137157,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -137653,7 +137653,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -137744,7 +137744,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -137940,7 +137940,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -138436,7 +138436,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -138527,7 +138527,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -138723,7 +138723,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -139219,7 +139219,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -139310,7 +139310,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -139506,7 +139506,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -140002,7 +140002,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -140093,7 +140093,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -140289,7 +140289,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -140785,7 +140785,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -140876,7 +140876,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -141072,7 +141072,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -141568,7 +141568,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -141659,7 +141659,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -141855,7 +141855,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -142351,7 +142351,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -142442,7 +142442,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -142638,7 +142638,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -143134,7 +143134,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -143225,7 +143225,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -143421,7 +143421,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -143917,7 +143917,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -144008,7 +144008,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -144204,7 +144204,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -144700,7 +144700,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -144791,7 +144791,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -144987,7 +144987,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -145483,7 +145483,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -145574,7 +145574,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -145770,7 +145770,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -146266,7 +146266,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -146357,7 +146357,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -146553,7 +146553,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -147049,7 +147049,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -147140,7 +147140,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -147336,7 +147336,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -147832,7 +147832,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -147923,7 +147923,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -148119,7 +148119,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -148615,7 +148615,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -148706,7 +148706,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -148902,7 +148902,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -149398,7 +149398,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -149489,7 +149489,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -149685,7 +149685,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -150181,7 +150181,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -150272,7 +150272,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -150468,7 +150468,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -150964,7 +150964,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -151055,7 +151055,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -151251,7 +151251,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -151747,7 +151747,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -151838,7 +151838,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -152034,7 +152034,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -152530,7 +152530,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -152621,7 +152621,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -152817,7 +152817,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -153313,7 +153313,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -153404,7 +153404,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -153600,7 +153600,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -154096,7 +154096,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -154187,7 +154187,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -154383,7 +154383,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -154879,7 +154879,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -154970,7 +154970,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -155166,7 +155166,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -155662,7 +155662,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -155753,7 +155753,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -155949,7 +155949,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -156445,7 +156445,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -156536,7 +156536,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -156732,7 +156732,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -157228,7 +157228,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -157319,7 +157319,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -157515,7 +157515,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -158011,7 +158011,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -158102,7 +158102,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -158298,7 +158298,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -158794,7 +158794,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -158885,7 +158885,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -159081,7 +159081,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -159577,7 +159577,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -159668,7 +159668,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -159864,7 +159864,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -160360,7 +160360,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -160451,7 +160451,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -160647,7 +160647,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -161143,7 +161143,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -161234,7 +161234,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -161430,7 +161430,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -161926,7 +161926,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -162017,7 +162017,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -162213,7 +162213,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -162709,7 +162709,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -162800,7 +162800,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -162996,7 +162996,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -163492,7 +163492,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -163583,7 +163583,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -163779,7 +163779,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -164275,7 +164275,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -164366,7 +164366,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -164562,7 +164562,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -165058,7 +165058,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -165149,7 +165149,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -165345,7 +165345,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -165841,7 +165841,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -165932,7 +165932,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -166128,7 +166128,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -166624,7 +166624,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -166715,7 +166715,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -166911,7 +166911,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -167407,7 +167407,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -167498,7 +167498,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -167694,7 +167694,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -168190,7 +168190,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -168281,7 +168281,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -168477,7 +168477,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -168973,7 +168973,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -169064,7 +169064,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -169260,7 +169260,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -169756,7 +169756,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -169847,7 +169847,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -170043,7 +170043,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -170539,7 +170539,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -170630,7 +170630,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -170826,7 +170826,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -171322,7 +171322,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -171413,7 +171413,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -171609,7 +171609,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -172105,7 +172105,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -172196,7 +172196,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -172392,7 +172392,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -172888,7 +172888,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -172979,7 +172979,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -173175,7 +173175,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -173671,7 +173671,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -173762,7 +173762,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -173958,7 +173958,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -174454,7 +174454,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -174545,7 +174545,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -174741,7 +174741,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -175237,7 +175237,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -175328,7 +175328,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -175524,7 +175524,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -176020,7 +176020,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -176111,7 +176111,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -176307,7 +176307,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -176803,7 +176803,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -176894,7 +176894,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -177090,7 +177090,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -177586,7 +177586,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -177677,7 +177677,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -177873,7 +177873,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -178369,7 +178369,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -178460,7 +178460,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -178656,7 +178656,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -179152,7 +179152,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -179243,7 +179243,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -179439,7 +179439,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -179935,7 +179935,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -180026,7 +180026,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -180222,7 +180222,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -180718,7 +180718,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -180809,7 +180809,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -181005,7 +181005,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -181501,7 +181501,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -181592,7 +181592,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -181788,7 +181788,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -182284,7 +182284,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -182375,7 +182375,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -182571,7 +182571,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -183067,7 +183067,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -183158,7 +183158,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -183354,7 +183354,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -183850,7 +183850,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -183941,7 +183941,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -184137,7 +184137,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -184633,7 +184633,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -184724,7 +184724,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -184920,7 +184920,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -185416,7 +185416,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -185507,7 +185507,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -185703,7 +185703,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -186199,7 +186199,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -186290,7 +186290,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -186486,7 +186486,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -186982,7 +186982,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -187073,7 +187073,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -187269,7 +187269,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -187765,7 +187765,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -187856,7 +187856,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -188052,7 +188052,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -188548,7 +188548,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -188639,7 +188639,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -188835,7 +188835,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -189331,7 +189331,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -189422,7 +189422,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -189618,7 +189618,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -190114,7 +190114,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -190205,7 +190205,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -190401,7 +190401,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -190897,7 +190897,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -190988,7 +190988,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -191184,7 +191184,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -191680,7 +191680,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -191771,7 +191771,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -191967,7 +191967,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -192463,7 +192463,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -192554,7 +192554,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -192750,7 +192750,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -193246,7 +193246,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -193337,7 +193337,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -193533,7 +193533,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -194029,7 +194029,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -194120,7 +194120,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -194316,7 +194316,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -194812,7 +194812,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -194903,7 +194903,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -195099,7 +195099,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -195595,7 +195595,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -195686,7 +195686,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -195882,7 +195882,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -196378,7 +196378,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -196469,7 +196469,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -196665,7 +196665,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -197161,7 +197161,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -197252,7 +197252,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -197448,7 +197448,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -197944,7 +197944,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -198035,7 +198035,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -198231,7 +198231,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -198727,7 +198727,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -198818,7 +198818,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -199014,7 +199014,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -199510,7 +199510,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -199601,7 +199601,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -199797,7 +199797,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -200293,7 +200293,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -200384,7 +200384,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -200580,7 +200580,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -201076,7 +201076,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -201167,7 +201167,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -201363,7 +201363,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -201859,7 +201859,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -201950,7 +201950,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -202146,7 +202146,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -202642,7 +202642,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -202733,7 +202733,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -202929,7 +202929,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -203425,7 +203425,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -203516,7 +203516,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -203712,7 +203712,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -204208,7 +204208,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -204299,7 +204299,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -204495,7 +204495,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -204991,7 +204991,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -205082,7 +205082,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -205278,7 +205278,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -205774,7 +205774,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -205865,7 +205865,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -206061,7 +206061,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -206557,7 +206557,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -206648,7 +206648,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -206844,7 +206844,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -207340,7 +207340,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -207431,7 +207431,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -207627,7 +207627,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -208123,7 +208123,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -208214,7 +208214,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -208410,7 +208410,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -208906,7 +208906,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -208997,7 +208997,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -209193,7 +209193,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -209689,7 +209689,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -209780,7 +209780,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -209976,7 +209976,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -210472,7 +210472,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -210563,7 +210563,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -210759,7 +210759,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -211255,7 +211255,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -211346,7 +211346,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -211542,7 +211542,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -212038,7 +212038,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -212129,7 +212129,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -212325,7 +212325,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -212821,7 +212821,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -212912,7 +212912,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -213108,7 +213108,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -213604,7 +213604,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -213695,7 +213695,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -213891,7 +213891,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -214387,7 +214387,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -214478,7 +214478,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -214674,7 +214674,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -215170,7 +215170,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -215261,7 +215261,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -215457,7 +215457,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -215953,7 +215953,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -216044,7 +216044,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -216240,7 +216240,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -216736,7 +216736,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -216827,7 +216827,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -217023,7 +217023,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -217519,7 +217519,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -217610,7 +217610,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -217806,7 +217806,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -218302,7 +218302,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -218393,7 +218393,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -218589,7 +218589,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -219085,7 +219085,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -219176,7 +219176,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -219372,7 +219372,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -219868,7 +219868,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -219959,7 +219959,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -220155,7 +220155,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -220651,7 +220651,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -220742,7 +220742,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -220938,7 +220938,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -221434,7 +221434,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -221525,7 +221525,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -221721,7 +221721,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -222217,7 +222217,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -222308,7 +222308,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -222504,7 +222504,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -223000,7 +223000,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -223091,7 +223091,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -223287,7 +223287,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -223783,7 +223783,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -223874,7 +223874,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -224070,7 +224070,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -224566,7 +224566,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -224657,7 +224657,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -224853,7 +224853,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -225349,7 +225349,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -225440,7 +225440,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -225636,7 +225636,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -226132,7 +226132,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -226223,7 +226223,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -226419,7 +226419,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -226915,7 +226915,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -227006,7 +227006,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -227202,7 +227202,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -227698,7 +227698,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -227789,7 +227789,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -227985,7 +227985,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -228481,7 +228481,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -228572,7 +228572,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -228768,7 +228768,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -229264,7 +229264,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -229355,7 +229355,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -229551,7 +229551,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -230047,7 +230047,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -230138,7 +230138,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -230334,7 +230334,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -230830,7 +230830,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -230921,7 +230921,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -231117,7 +231117,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -231613,7 +231613,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -231704,7 +231704,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -231900,7 +231900,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -232396,7 +232396,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -232487,7 +232487,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -232683,7 +232683,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -233179,7 +233179,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -233270,7 +233270,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -233466,7 +233466,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -233962,7 +233962,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -234053,7 +234053,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -234249,7 +234249,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -234745,7 +234745,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -234836,7 +234836,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -235032,7 +235032,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -235528,7 +235528,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -235619,7 +235619,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -235815,7 +235815,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -236311,7 +236311,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -236402,7 +236402,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -236598,7 +236598,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -237094,7 +237094,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -237185,7 +237185,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -237381,7 +237381,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -237877,7 +237877,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -237968,7 +237968,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -238164,7 +238164,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -238660,7 +238660,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -238751,7 +238751,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -238947,7 +238947,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -239443,7 +239443,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -239534,7 +239534,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -239730,7 +239730,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -240226,7 +240226,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -240317,7 +240317,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -240513,7 +240513,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -241009,7 +241009,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -241100,7 +241100,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -241296,7 +241296,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -241792,7 +241792,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -241883,7 +241883,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -242079,7 +242079,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -242575,7 +242575,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -242666,7 +242666,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -242862,7 +242862,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -243358,7 +243358,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -243449,7 +243449,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -243645,7 +243645,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -244141,7 +244141,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -244232,7 +244232,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -244428,7 +244428,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -244924,7 +244924,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -245015,7 +245015,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -245211,7 +245211,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -245707,7 +245707,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -245798,7 +245798,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -245994,7 +245994,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -246490,7 +246490,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -246581,7 +246581,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -246777,7 +246777,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -247273,7 +247273,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -247364,7 +247364,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -247560,7 +247560,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -248056,7 +248056,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -248147,7 +248147,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -248343,7 +248343,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -248839,7 +248839,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -248930,7 +248930,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -249126,7 +249126,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -249622,7 +249622,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -249713,7 +249713,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -249909,7 +249909,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -250405,7 +250405,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -250496,7 +250496,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -250692,7 +250692,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -251188,7 +251188,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -251279,7 +251279,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -251475,7 +251475,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -251971,7 +251971,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -252062,7 +252062,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -252258,7 +252258,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -252754,7 +252754,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -252845,7 +252845,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -253041,7 +253041,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -253537,7 +253537,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -253628,7 +253628,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -253824,7 +253824,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -254320,7 +254320,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -254411,7 +254411,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -254607,7 +254607,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -255103,7 +255103,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -255194,7 +255194,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -255390,7 +255390,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -255886,7 +255886,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -255977,7 +255977,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -256173,7 +256173,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -256669,7 +256669,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -256760,7 +256760,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -256956,7 +256956,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -257452,7 +257452,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -257543,7 +257543,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -257739,7 +257739,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -258235,7 +258235,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -258326,7 +258326,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -258522,7 +258522,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -259018,7 +259018,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -259109,7 +259109,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -259305,7 +259305,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -259801,7 +259801,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -259892,7 +259892,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -260088,7 +260088,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -260584,7 +260584,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -260675,7 +260675,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -260871,7 +260871,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -261367,7 +261367,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -261458,7 +261458,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -261654,7 +261654,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -262150,7 +262150,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -262241,7 +262241,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -262437,7 +262437,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -262933,7 +262933,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -263024,7 +263024,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -263220,7 +263220,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -263716,7 +263716,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -263807,7 +263807,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -264003,7 +264003,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -264499,7 +264499,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -264590,7 +264590,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -264786,7 +264786,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -265282,7 +265282,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -265373,7 +265373,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -265569,7 +265569,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -266065,7 +266065,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -266156,7 +266156,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -266352,7 +266352,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -266848,7 +266848,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -266939,7 +266939,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -267135,7 +267135,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -267631,7 +267631,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -267722,7 +267722,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -267918,7 +267918,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -268414,7 +268414,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -268505,7 +268505,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -268701,7 +268701,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -269197,7 +269197,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -269288,7 +269288,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -269484,7 +269484,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -269980,7 +269980,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -270071,7 +270071,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -270267,7 +270267,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -270763,7 +270763,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -270854,7 +270854,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -271050,7 +271050,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -271546,7 +271546,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -271637,7 +271637,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -271833,7 +271833,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -272329,7 +272329,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -272420,7 +272420,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -272616,7 +272616,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -273112,7 +273112,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -273203,7 +273203,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -273399,7 +273399,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -273895,7 +273895,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -273986,7 +273986,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -274182,7 +274182,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -274678,7 +274678,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -274769,7 +274769,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
@@ -274965,7 +274965,7 @@ T1497.001,No,-,0
 T1053.003,No,-,0
 T1069.002,No,-,0
 T1588.006,No,-,0
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,1
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,1
 T1165,No,-,0
 T1070.002,No,-,0
 T1499.004,No,-,0
@@ -275461,7 +275461,7 @@ T1500,No,-,0
 T1565.002,No,-,0
 T1003.008,No,-,0
 T1543.001,No,-,0
-T1569,No,-,1
+T1569,No,-,0
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml,4
 T1059.003,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml,4
@@ -275552,7 +275552,7 @@ T1001.002,No,-,0
 T1204.001,No,-,0
 T1550.001,No,-,0
 T1547.008,No,-,0
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,1
+T1569.002,No,-,0
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml,17
 T1078.004,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml,17
diff --git a/docs/mitre-map/coverage.json b/docs/mitre-map/coverage.json
index 61a70ef5b7..d60282d157 100644
--- a/docs/mitre-map/coverage.json
+++ b/docs/mitre-map/coverage.json
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -941,11 +941,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -1209,7 +1205,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -1955,11 +1951,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -2223,7 +2215,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -2969,11 +2961,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -3237,7 +3225,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -3983,11 +3971,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -4251,7 +4235,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -4997,11 +4981,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -5265,7 +5245,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -6011,11 +5991,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -6279,7 +6255,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
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-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -329477,11 +328181,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -329745,7 +328445,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -330491,11 +329191,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -330759,7 +329455,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -331505,11 +330201,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -331773,7 +330465,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -332519,11 +331211,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -332787,7 +331475,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -333533,11 +332221,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -333801,7 +332485,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -334547,11 +333231,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -334815,7 +333495,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -335561,11 +334241,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -335829,7 +334505,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -336575,11 +335251,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -336843,7 +335515,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -337589,11 +336261,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
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@@ -337857,7 +336525,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -338603,11 +337271,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -338871,7 +337535,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -339617,11 +338281,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -339885,7 +338545,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -340631,11 +339291,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -340899,7 +339555,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -341645,11 +340301,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -341913,7 +340565,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -342659,11 +341311,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -342927,7 +341575,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -343673,11 +342321,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -343941,7 +342585,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -344687,11 +343331,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -344955,7 +343595,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -345701,11 +344341,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -345969,7 +344605,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -346715,11 +345351,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -346983,7 +345615,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -347729,11 +346361,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -347997,7 +346625,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -348743,11 +347371,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -349011,7 +347635,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -349757,11 +348381,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -350025,7 +348645,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -350771,11 +349391,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -351039,7 +349655,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -351785,11 +350401,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -352053,7 +350665,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -352799,11 +351411,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -353067,7 +351675,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -353813,11 +352421,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -354081,7 +352685,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -354827,11 +353431,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -355095,7 +353695,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -355841,11 +354441,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
@@ -356109,7 +354705,7 @@
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {},
         {},
@@ -356855,11 +355451,7 @@
         {},
         {},
         {},
-        {
-            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 1,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
-        },
+        {},
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1078.004",
             "score": 17,
diff --git a/docs/mitre-map/detections.csv b/docs/mitre-map/detections.csv
index efd98438ab..631eeb057a 100644
--- a/docs/mitre-map/detections.csv
+++ b/docs/mitre-map/detections.csv
@@ -15840,1060 +15840,1060 @@ T1003.001,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections
 T1003.001,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml,20
 T1059.005,No,-,27
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1192,No,-,26
-T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml,25
+T1566.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml,25
 T1598.003,No,-,26
 T1005,No,-,24
 T1083,No,-,24
@@ -40137,7 +40137,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40149,7 +40149,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40161,7 +40161,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40173,7 +40173,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40185,7 +40185,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40197,7 +40197,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40209,7 +40209,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40221,7 +40221,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40233,7 +40233,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40245,7 +40245,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40257,7 +40257,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40269,7 +40269,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40281,7 +40281,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40293,7 +40293,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40305,7 +40305,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40317,7 +40317,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40329,7 +40329,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40341,7 +40341,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40353,7 +40353,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40365,7 +40365,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40377,7 +40377,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40389,7 +40389,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40401,7 +40401,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40413,7 +40413,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40425,7 +40425,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40437,7 +40437,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40449,7 +40449,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40461,7 +40461,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40473,7 +40473,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40485,7 +40485,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40497,7 +40497,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40509,7 +40509,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40521,7 +40521,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40533,7 +40533,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40545,7 +40545,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40557,7 +40557,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40569,7 +40569,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40581,7 +40581,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40593,7 +40593,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40605,7 +40605,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40617,7 +40617,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40629,7 +40629,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40641,7 +40641,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40653,7 +40653,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40665,7 +40665,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40677,7 +40677,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40689,7 +40689,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40701,7 +40701,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40713,7 +40713,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40725,7 +40725,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40737,7 +40737,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40749,7 +40749,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40761,7 +40761,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40773,7 +40773,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40785,7 +40785,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40797,7 +40797,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40809,7 +40809,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40821,7 +40821,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40833,7 +40833,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40845,7 +40845,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40857,7 +40857,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40869,7 +40869,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40881,7 +40881,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40893,7 +40893,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40905,7 +40905,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40917,7 +40917,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40929,7 +40929,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40941,7 +40941,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40953,7 +40953,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40965,7 +40965,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40977,7 +40977,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -40989,7 +40989,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41001,7 +41001,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41013,7 +41013,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41025,7 +41025,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41037,7 +41037,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41049,7 +41049,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41061,7 +41061,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41073,7 +41073,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41085,7 +41085,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41097,7 +41097,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41109,7 +41109,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41121,7 +41121,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41133,7 +41133,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41145,7 +41145,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41157,7 +41157,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41169,7 +41169,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41181,7 +41181,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41193,7 +41193,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41205,7 +41205,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41217,7 +41217,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41229,7 +41229,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41241,7 +41241,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41253,7 +41253,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41265,7 +41265,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41277,7 +41277,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41289,7 +41289,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41301,7 +41301,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41313,7 +41313,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41325,7 +41325,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41337,7 +41337,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41349,7 +41349,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41361,7 +41361,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41373,7 +41373,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41385,7 +41385,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41397,7 +41397,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41409,7 +41409,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41421,7 +41421,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41433,7 +41433,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41445,7 +41445,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41457,7 +41457,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41469,7 +41469,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41481,7 +41481,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41493,7 +41493,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41505,7 +41505,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41517,7 +41517,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41529,7 +41529,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41541,7 +41541,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41553,7 +41553,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41565,7 +41565,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41577,7 +41577,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41589,7 +41589,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41601,7 +41601,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41613,7 +41613,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41625,7 +41625,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41637,7 +41637,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41649,7 +41649,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41661,7 +41661,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41673,7 +41673,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41685,7 +41685,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41697,7 +41697,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41709,7 +41709,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41721,7 +41721,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41733,7 +41733,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41745,7 +41745,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41757,7 +41757,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41769,7 +41769,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41781,7 +41781,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41793,7 +41793,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41805,7 +41805,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41817,7 +41817,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41829,7 +41829,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41841,7 +41841,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41853,7 +41853,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41865,7 +41865,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41877,7 +41877,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41889,7 +41889,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41901,7 +41901,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41913,7 +41913,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41925,7 +41925,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41937,7 +41937,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41949,7 +41949,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41961,7 +41961,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41973,7 +41973,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41985,7 +41985,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -41997,7 +41997,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42009,7 +42009,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42021,7 +42021,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42033,7 +42033,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42045,7 +42045,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42057,7 +42057,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42069,7 +42069,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42081,7 +42081,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42093,7 +42093,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42105,7 +42105,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42117,7 +42117,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42129,7 +42129,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42141,7 +42141,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42153,7 +42153,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42165,7 +42165,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42177,7 +42177,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42189,7 +42189,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42201,7 +42201,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42213,7 +42213,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42225,7 +42225,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42237,7 +42237,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42249,7 +42249,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42261,7 +42261,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42273,7 +42273,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42285,7 +42285,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42297,7 +42297,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42309,7 +42309,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42321,7 +42321,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42333,7 +42333,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42345,7 +42345,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42357,7 +42357,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42369,7 +42369,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42381,7 +42381,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42393,7 +42393,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42405,7 +42405,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42417,7 +42417,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42429,7 +42429,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42441,7 +42441,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42453,7 +42453,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42465,7 +42465,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42477,7 +42477,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42489,7 +42489,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42501,7 +42501,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42513,7 +42513,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42525,7 +42525,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42537,7 +42537,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42549,7 +42549,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42561,7 +42561,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42573,7 +42573,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42585,7 +42585,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42597,7 +42597,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42609,7 +42609,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42621,7 +42621,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42633,7 +42633,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42645,7 +42645,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42657,7 +42657,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42669,7 +42669,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42681,7 +42681,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42693,7 +42693,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42705,7 +42705,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42717,7 +42717,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42729,7 +42729,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42741,7 +42741,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42753,7 +42753,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42765,7 +42765,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42777,7 +42777,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42789,7 +42789,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42801,7 +42801,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42813,7 +42813,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42825,7 +42825,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42837,7 +42837,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42849,7 +42849,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42861,7 +42861,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42873,7 +42873,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42885,7 +42885,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42897,7 +42897,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42909,7 +42909,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42921,7 +42921,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42933,7 +42933,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42945,7 +42945,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42957,7 +42957,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42969,7 +42969,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42981,7 +42981,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -42993,7 +42993,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43005,7 +43005,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43017,7 +43017,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43029,7 +43029,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43041,7 +43041,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43053,7 +43053,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43065,7 +43065,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43077,7 +43077,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43089,7 +43089,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43101,7 +43101,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43113,7 +43113,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43125,7 +43125,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43137,7 +43137,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43149,7 +43149,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43161,7 +43161,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43173,7 +43173,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43185,7 +43185,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43197,7 +43197,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43209,7 +43209,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43221,7 +43221,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43233,7 +43233,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43245,7 +43245,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43257,7 +43257,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43269,7 +43269,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43281,7 +43281,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43293,7 +43293,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43305,7 +43305,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43317,7 +43317,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43329,7 +43329,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43341,7 +43341,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43353,7 +43353,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43365,7 +43365,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43377,7 +43377,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43389,7 +43389,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43401,7 +43401,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43413,7 +43413,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43425,7 +43425,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43437,7 +43437,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43449,7 +43449,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43461,7 +43461,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43473,7 +43473,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43485,7 +43485,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43497,7 +43497,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43509,7 +43509,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43521,7 +43521,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43533,7 +43533,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43545,7 +43545,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43557,7 +43557,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43569,7 +43569,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43581,7 +43581,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43593,7 +43593,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43605,7 +43605,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43617,7 +43617,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43629,7 +43629,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43641,7 +43641,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43653,7 +43653,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43665,7 +43665,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43677,7 +43677,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43689,7 +43689,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43701,7 +43701,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43713,7 +43713,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43725,7 +43725,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43737,7 +43737,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43749,7 +43749,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43761,7 +43761,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43773,7 +43773,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43785,7 +43785,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43797,7 +43797,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43809,7 +43809,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43821,7 +43821,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43833,7 +43833,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43845,7 +43845,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43857,7 +43857,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43869,7 +43869,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43881,7 +43881,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43893,7 +43893,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43905,7 +43905,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43917,7 +43917,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43929,7 +43929,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43941,7 +43941,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43953,7 +43953,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43965,7 +43965,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43977,7 +43977,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -43989,7 +43989,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44001,7 +44001,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44013,7 +44013,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44025,7 +44025,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44037,7 +44037,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44049,7 +44049,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44061,7 +44061,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44073,7 +44073,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44085,7 +44085,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44097,7 +44097,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44109,7 +44109,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44121,7 +44121,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44133,7 +44133,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44145,7 +44145,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44157,7 +44157,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44169,7 +44169,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44181,7 +44181,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44193,7 +44193,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44205,7 +44205,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44217,7 +44217,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44229,7 +44229,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44241,7 +44241,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44253,7 +44253,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44265,7 +44265,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44277,7 +44277,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44289,7 +44289,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44301,7 +44301,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44313,7 +44313,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44325,7 +44325,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44337,7 +44337,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1143,No,-,9
 T1559.002,No,-,9
@@ -44349,7 +44349,7 @@ T1068,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/fir
 T1102.002,No,-,9
 T1564.003,No,-,9
 T1173,No,-,9
-T1569.002,Yes,https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml,8
+T1569.002,No,-,9
 T1035,No,-,9
 T1132.001,No,-,8
 T1059.007,No,-,8
diff --git a/docs/mitre-map/detections.json b/docs/mitre-map/detections.json
index d9fb2283dd..bd51435de2 100644
--- a/docs/mitre-map/detections.json
+++ b/docs/mitre-map/detections.json
@@ -36973,7 +36973,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -36989,7 +36989,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37005,7 +37005,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37021,7 +37021,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37037,7 +37037,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37053,7 +37053,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37069,7 +37069,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37085,7 +37085,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37101,7 +37101,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37117,7 +37117,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37133,7 +37133,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37149,7 +37149,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37165,7 +37165,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37181,7 +37181,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37197,7 +37197,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37213,7 +37213,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37229,7 +37229,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37245,7 +37245,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37261,7 +37261,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37277,7 +37277,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37293,7 +37293,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37309,7 +37309,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37325,7 +37325,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37341,7 +37341,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
@@ -37357,7 +37357,7 @@
             "techniqueID": "T1566.002",
             "score": 25,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml"
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1598.003",
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-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
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             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 8,
-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
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@@ -164679,9 +163782,8 @@
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             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
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-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
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             "techniqueID": "T1035",
@@ -164742,9 +163844,8 @@
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         {
             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 8,
-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
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         {
             "techniqueID": "T1035",
@@ -164805,9 +163906,8 @@
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         {
             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
-            "score": 8,
-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
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             "techniqueID": "T1035",
@@ -164868,9 +163968,8 @@
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             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
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-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
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             "techniqueID": "T1035",
@@ -164931,9 +164030,8 @@
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             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
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-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
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@@ -164994,9 +164092,8 @@
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-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
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@@ -165057,9 +164154,8 @@
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             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
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-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
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@@ -165120,9 +164216,8 @@
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-            "score": 8,
-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "score": 9,
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@@ -165183,9 +164278,8 @@
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-            "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
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             "techniqueID": "T1035",
@@ -165246,9 +164340,70 @@
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         {
             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
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+        {
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+        {
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+            "score": 9,
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+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1559.002",
+            "score": 9,
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+            "score": 9,
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+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1090.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1036.004",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1110",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
             "score": 8,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1564.003",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1173",
+            "score": 9,
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+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
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             "techniqueID": "T1035",
@@ -165309,9 +164464,70 @@
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         {
             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
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+        {
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+        {
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+            "score": 9,
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+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1559.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1090.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1036.004",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1110",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
             "score": 8,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1564.003",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1173",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
+            "score": 9,
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         {
             "techniqueID": "T1035",
@@ -165372,9 +164588,70 @@
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         {
             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
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+        {
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+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1036.004",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1110",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
             "score": 8,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1564.003",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1173",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
         },
         {
             "techniqueID": "T1035",
@@ -165435,9 +164712,380 @@
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         {
             "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1143",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1559.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1090.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1036.004",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1110",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1564.003",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1173",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
+            "score": 9,
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+        {
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+            "showSubtechniques": false
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+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
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+        {
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+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
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+        },
+        {
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+        },
+        {
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+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
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+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1110",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+        },
+        {
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+        },
+        {
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+        },
+        {
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+        {
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+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1110",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1569.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1143",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1559.002",
+            "score": 9,
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+        },
+        {
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+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1110",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
             "score": 8,
             "showSubtechniques": false,
-            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml"
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1564.003",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1559.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1135",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1090.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1036.004",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1110",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1068",
+            "score": 8,
+            "showSubtechniques": false,
+            "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml"
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1102.002",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1564.003",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
+            "techniqueID": "T1173",
+            "score": 9,
+            "showSubtechniques": false
+        },
+        {
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diff --git a/docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki b/docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki
index a16ba30400..5a5db4d4f8 100644
--- a/docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki
+++ b/docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki
@@ -303,6 +303,49 @@ version = 1
 
 ==Adversary Tactics==
 
+===Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156===
+
+Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
+
+<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
+<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
+
+====Narrative====
+A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
+
+====Detections====
+* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
+* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
+
+====Data Models====
+
+====Tags====
+
+=====ATT&CK=====
+* T1068
+
+=====Kill Chain Phases=====
+* Exploitation
+
+=====CIS=====
+* CIS 12
+* CIS 16
+* CIS 8
+
+=====NIST=====
+* DE.CM
+
+====References====
+* https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
+
+date = 2021-01-27
+
+version = 1
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
 ===Collection and Staging===
 
 Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
@@ -952,7 +995,7 @@ This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been
 
 ====Detections====
 * Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file
-* Suspicious LNK file launching a process
+* Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
 
 ====Data Models====
 
diff --git a/docs/stories_categories.md b/docs/stories_categories.md
index 32373033d4..31135a5062 100644
--- a/docs/stories_categories.md
+++ b/docs/stories_categories.md
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
 
 ## Adversary Tactics
 
+* [Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156](#Baron-Samedit-CVE-2021-3156)
+
 * [Collection and Staging](#Collection-and-Staging)
 
 * [Command and Control](#Command-and-Control)
@@ -352,6 +354,43 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
 
 * [Windows Privilege Escalation](#Windows-Privilege-Escalation)
 
+### Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+* id = 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
+* date = 2021-01-27
+* version = 1
+
+#### Description
+Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
+
+#### Narrative
+A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
+
+#### Detections
+* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
+* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
+
+#### Data Models
+
+#### Mappings
+
+##### ATT&CK
+* T1068
+
+##### Kill Chain Phases
+* Exploitation
+
+###### CIS
+* CIS 12
+* CIS 16
+* CIS 8
+
+##### NIST
+* DE.CM
+
+##### References
+* https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
+
 ### Collection and Staging
 * id = 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
 * date = 2020-02-03
@@ -936,7 +975,7 @@ This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been
 
 #### Detections
 * Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file
-* Suspicious LNK file launching a process
+* Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
 
 #### Data Models
 
diff --git a/package/app.manifest b/package/app.manifest
index 04b8c3d9bc..0190b0f6f5 100644
--- a/package/app.manifest
+++ b/package/app.manifest
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
     "id": {
       "group": null, 
       "name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate", 
-      "version": "3.13.0"
+      "version": "3.14.0"
     }, 
     "author": [
       {
diff --git a/package/default/analytic_stories.conf b/package/default/analytic_stories.conf
index 4505403dc8..c08b2d2f09 100644
--- a/package/default/analytic_stories.conf
+++ b/package/default/analytic_stories.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1550"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "batch - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "batch - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "batch - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "batch - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -150,13 +150,29 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Count of assets by category"]
 data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
 
+[Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156]
+category =  Adversary Tactics
+creation_date = 2021-01-27
+modification_date = 2021-01-27
+id = 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
+version = 1
+reference = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+investigative_searches = []
+support_searches = []
+data_models = []
+providing_technologies = none
+description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
+narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
+
 [Brand Monitoring]
 category =  Abuse
 creation_date = 2017-12-19
@@ -166,8 +182,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
@@ -184,8 +200,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -203,7 +219,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -221,7 +237,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -239,8 +255,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
@@ -289,7 +305,7 @@ version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -307,8 +323,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
@@ -344,7 +360,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insight
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Discover DNS records"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
@@ -383,7 +399,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -415,8 +431,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
@@ -431,7 +447,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -447,8 +463,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
@@ -499,8 +515,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
@@ -564,7 +580,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -612,7 +628,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -632,7 +648,7 @@ version = 4
 reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -657,8 +673,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "batch - Monitor Successful Backups"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
@@ -673,7 +689,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -708,8 +724,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
@@ -741,8 +757,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
@@ -758,7 +774,7 @@ modification_date = 2019-04-29
 id = 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
@@ -783,8 +799,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
@@ -826,7 +842,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -842,8 +858,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
@@ -924,7 +940,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -946,7 +962,7 @@ reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "RS.MI"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
 data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
@@ -986,7 +1002,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1006,7 +1022,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attac
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = []
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
@@ -1021,8 +1037,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -1038,7 +1054,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integr
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "batch - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
 data_models = ["Authentication"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
@@ -1053,8 +1069,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "batch - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
@@ -1071,8 +1087,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
@@ -1090,8 +1106,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Authentication"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
@@ -1108,7 +1124,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1124,7 +1140,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1141,7 +1157,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
@@ -1157,8 +1173,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
@@ -1173,8 +1189,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
@@ -1189,8 +1205,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
@@ -1225,8 +1241,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
@@ -1261,7 +1277,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1279,7 +1295,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1298,7 +1314,7 @@ reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-y
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
@@ -1350,8 +1366,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
@@ -1367,8 +1383,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
@@ -1385,7 +1401,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1401,7 +1417,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1438,7 +1454,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1454,7 +1470,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1474,7 +1490,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1491,7 +1507,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1507,7 +1523,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1523,8 +1539,8 @@ version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
diff --git a/package/default/analyticstories.conf b/package/default/analyticstories.conf
index 420065e81c..038c3e3fba 100644
--- a/package/default/analyticstories.conf
+++ b/package/default/analyticstories.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -113,10 +113,21 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
 
+[analytic_story://Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-01-27
+version = 1
+references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
+description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
+narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
+
 [analytic_story://Brand Monitoring]
 category = Abuse
 last_updated = 2017-12-19
@@ -124,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -137,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -151,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -164,7 +175,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
  Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -177,7 +188,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -201,7 +212,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"]
 description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
 narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.
 
@@ -212,7 +223,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -225,7 +236,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -251,7 +262,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -281,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
 
@@ -292,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
 narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 
@@ -303,7 +314,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
@@ -314,7 +325,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
@@ -325,7 +336,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -349,7 +360,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -362,7 +373,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -376,7 +387,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
 
@@ -412,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 
@@ -423,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 
@@ -434,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 
@@ -445,7 +456,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -460,7 +471,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -480,7 +491,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
 
@@ -491,7 +502,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -516,7 +527,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -528,7 +539,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
 narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
 
@@ -539,7 +550,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -553,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
 narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
 As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -571,7 +582,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -609,7 +620,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
 
@@ -620,7 +631,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
 
@@ -631,7 +642,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
 
@@ -642,7 +653,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -654,7 +665,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
 
@@ -677,7 +688,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -724,7 +735,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
 Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -738,7 +749,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"]
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
 
@@ -749,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -760,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
 
@@ -771,7 +782,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -784,7 +795,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -798,7 +809,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
 This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -810,7 +821,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -821,7 +832,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -833,7 +844,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
@@ -845,7 +856,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
 
@@ -856,7 +867,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
 
@@ -867,7 +878,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -893,7 +904,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
@@ -906,7 +917,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -919,7 +930,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -932,7 +943,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
  The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -957,7 +968,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -969,7 +980,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
 The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
@@ -983,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
  Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -995,7 +1006,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1008,7 +1019,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
 
@@ -1019,7 +1030,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1035,7 +1046,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
 narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
 
@@ -1046,7 +1057,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
 
@@ -1057,7 +1068,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
  Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1072,7 +1083,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1084,7 +1095,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
 
@@ -1095,7 +1106,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -1106,7 +1117,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -1770,6 +1781,36 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Act
 known_false_positives = Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = unknown
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged.  This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = unknown
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
@@ -3104,6 +3145,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
+how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
+known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3559,16 +3610,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation
 known_false_positives = There are no known false positives.
 providing_technologies = []
 
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule]
-type = detection
-asset_type = Endpoint
-confidence = medium
-explanation = This search looks for a ``*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*` executing a process. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to execute process from temporary or user directories.
-providing_technologies = []
-
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
diff --git a/package/default/app.conf b/package/default/app.conf
index 75c137991a..374a0bdfeb 100644
--- a/package/default/app.conf
+++ b/package/default/app.conf
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 is_configured = false
 state = enabled
 state_change_requires_restart = false
-build = 17283
+build = 18361
 
 [triggers]
 reload.analytic_stories = simple
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
 
 [launcher]
 author = Splunk
-version = 3.13.0
+version = 3.14.0
 description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
 
 [ui]
diff --git a/package/default/collections.conf b/package/default/collections.conf
index d0585860f3..d9bf236e49 100644
--- a/package/default/collections.conf
+++ b/package/default/collections.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/package/default/content-version.conf b/package/default/content-version.conf
index df5327c3bd..1be55fff51 100644
--- a/package/default/content-version.conf
+++ b/package/default/content-version.conf
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 [content-version]
-version = 3.13.0
+version = 3.14.0
diff --git a/package/default/es_investigations.conf b/package/default/es_investigations.conf
index 5da021ad66..3afa70cef8 100644
--- a/package/default/es_investigations.conf
+++ b/package/default/es_investigations.conf
@@ -4,91 +4,98 @@ label = AWS Cross Account Activity
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cryptomining]
 label = AWS Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity]
 label = AWS Network ACL Activity
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
 label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
 label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
 label = AWS User Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_apache_struts_vulnerability]
 label = Apache Struts Vulnerability
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking]
 label = Asset Tracking
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+
+[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156]
+label = Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
+disabled = 0
+
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_brand_monitoring]
 label = Brand Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining]
 label = Cloud Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat]
 label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging]
 label = Collection and Staging
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control]
 label = Command and Control
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
 label = Common Phishing Frameworks
@@ -109,14 +116,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
 label = DHS Report TA18-074A
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
 label = DNS Amplification Attacks
@@ -144,7 +151,7 @@ label = Data Protection
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack]
 label = Detect Zerologon Attack
@@ -158,21 +165,21 @@ label = Disabling Security Tools
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns]
 label = Dynamic DNS
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
 label = Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A 
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
 label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
@@ -193,7 +200,7 @@ label = Hidden Cobra Malware
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
 label = Host Redirection
@@ -214,7 +221,7 @@ label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
 label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -235,28 +242,28 @@ label = Lateral Movement
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
 label = Malicious PowerShell
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
 label = Monitor Backup Solution
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_unauthorized_software]
 label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates]
 label = Monitor for Updates
@@ -270,7 +277,7 @@ label = Netsh Abuse
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections]
 label = Office 365 Detections
@@ -284,7 +291,7 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
 label = Phishing Payloads
@@ -298,21 +305,21 @@ label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
 label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
 label = Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
 label = Ransomware Cloud
@@ -347,7 +354,7 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
 label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
@@ -368,7 +375,7 @@ label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sunburst_malware]
 label = Sunburst Malware
@@ -382,7 +389,7 @@ label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
 label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -396,21 +403,21 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
 label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_instance_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
@@ -438,21 +445,21 @@ label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic]
 label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
 label = Suspicious Emails
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities]
 label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
@@ -466,7 +473,7 @@ label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity]
 label = Suspicious Okta Activity
@@ -480,14 +487,14 @@ label = Suspicious WMI Use
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
 label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes]
 label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
@@ -515,28 +522,28 @@ label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes]
 label = Unusual Processes
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols]
 label = Use of Cleartext Protocols
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection]
 label = Web Fraud Detection
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
 label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
@@ -550,42 +557,42 @@ label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse]
 label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation]
 label = Windows Log Manipulation
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques]
 label = Windows Persistence Techniques
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation]
 label = Windows Privilege Escalation
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse]
 label = Windows Service Abuse
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 
 
diff --git a/package/default/macros.conf b/package/default/macros.conf
index 05658febab..88fc61217a 100644
--- a/package/default/macros.conf
+++ b/package/default/macros.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet
 definition = sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs
 description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
 
-[aws_securityhub_firehose]
-definition = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose"
+[aws_securityhub_finding]
+definition = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:finding"
 description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
 
 [brand_abuse_dns]
@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@ description = This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Wind
 definition = sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json
 description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
 
+[linux_hosts]
+definition = index=*
+description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+
 [netbackup]
 definition = sourcetype="netbackup_logs"
 description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
@@ -134,6 +138,10 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet
 definition = eventtype=okta_log
 description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
 
+[osquery_process]
+definition = eventtype="osquery-process"
+description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+
 [previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window]
 definition = "-90d@d"
 description = Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud api calls per user role
@@ -174,14 +182,14 @@ description = Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud region
 definition = "-70m@m"
 description = Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the region is new or not
 
-[previously_seen_windows_service_window]
-definition = "-70m@m"
-description = Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services
-
 [previously_seen_windows_services_forget_window]
 definition = "-90d@d"
 description = Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of Windows services
 
+[previously_seen_windows_services_window]
+definition = "-70m@m"
+description = Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services
+
 [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window]
 definition = "-90d@d"
 description = Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of zoom child processes
@@ -531,6 +539,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1055,6 +1075,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [process_execution_via_wmi_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1235,10 +1259,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
-[suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process_filter]
-definition = search *
-description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
-
 [suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
diff --git a/package/default/savedsearches.conf b/package/default/savedsearches.conf
index 6de75003c5..2c7dd8c2fc 100644
--- a/package/default/savedsearches.conf
+++ b/package/default/savedsearches.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -107,6 +109,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -186,7 +190,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -225,6 +229,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware Cloud"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -263,6 +268,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware Cloud"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -302,6 +308,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -340,6 +347,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -384,6 +392,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -428,6 +437,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -471,6 +481,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -515,6 +526,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -553,6 +565,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -592,7 +605,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -631,7 +644,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -670,7 +683,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -709,7 +722,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -748,6 +761,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -787,6 +801,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -825,6 +840,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -863,6 +879,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Disabling Security Tools"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -902,6 +919,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -935,6 +953,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Disabling Security Tools"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -974,6 +993,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1007,6 +1027,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1046,6 +1067,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1085,6 +1107,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1126,6 +1149,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking", "Command and Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1165,7 +1189,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1204,7 +1228,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1243,7 +1267,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1282,7 +1306,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1321,7 +1345,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1360,7 +1384,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1399,6 +1423,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Network ACL Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1439,7 +1464,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1479,7 +1504,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1519,7 +1544,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1559,7 +1584,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -1602,6 +1627,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransonware", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1641,6 +1667,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1680,6 +1707,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1713,6 +1741,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1752,6 +1781,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1791,6 +1821,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1824,6 +1855,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1857,6 +1889,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1890,6 +1923,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1929,6 +1963,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -1968,6 +2003,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2006,6 +2042,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking", "Command and Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2049,6 +2086,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2088,6 +2126,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2133,6 +2172,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -2177,6 +2217,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"]
 cron_schedule = 59 * * * *
@@ -2222,6 +2263,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -2266,7 +2308,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -2305,7 +2347,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -2344,7 +2386,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -2383,7 +2425,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -2422,6 +2464,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Lateral Movement"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2447,6 +2490,123 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName="ANONYMOUS LOGON") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` 
 
+[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.escu.how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-27
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-27
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = `linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.escu.how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged.  This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host
+action.escu.known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-29
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-29
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = `linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.escu.how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = `osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -2461,6 +2621,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Detect Zerologon Attack"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2500,6 +2661,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2537,6 +2699,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Common Phishing Frameworks"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2580,6 +2743,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Account Monitoring and Controls"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2619,6 +2783,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Account Monitoring and Controls"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2658,6 +2823,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2696,6 +2862,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2734,6 +2901,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2772,6 +2940,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2810,6 +2979,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2849,6 +3019,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2888,6 +3059,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2921,6 +3093,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = []
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2954,6 +3127,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -2993,6 +3167,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3032,6 +3207,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3071,6 +3247,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -3114,6 +3291,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -3157,6 +3335,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Phishing Payloads"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3196,6 +3375,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3234,6 +3414,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3273,6 +3454,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3311,6 +3493,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3350,6 +3533,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3389,6 +3573,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3428,6 +3613,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"]
 cron_schedule = 59 * * * *
@@ -3467,6 +3653,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3506,6 +3693,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -3549,6 +3737,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Exfiltration"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3587,6 +3776,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3632,6 +3822,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -3671,11 +3862,12 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
 action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = None
-action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
-action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3699,7 +3891,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*) | rename instance as dest | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts|`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`
+search = `aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`
 
 [ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -3710,11 +3902,12 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = None
-action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
-action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3738,7 +3931,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`
+search = `aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`
 
 [ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -3754,6 +3947,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -3798,6 +3992,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -3842,6 +4037,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -3886,6 +4082,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -3929,6 +4126,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -3967,6 +4165,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4006,6 +4205,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Asset Tracking"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4044,6 +4244,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4083,6 +4284,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4121,6 +4323,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4159,6 +4362,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Detect Zerologon Attack"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4197,6 +4401,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4242,6 +4447,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4280,6 +4486,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4319,6 +4526,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4358,6 +4566,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4397,6 +4606,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -4441,6 +4651,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4480,6 +4691,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4521,6 +4733,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dynamic DNS"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4560,6 +4773,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4599,6 +4813,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A "]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4638,6 +4853,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4677,6 +4893,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4710,6 +4927,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -4754,6 +4972,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
@@ -4797,6 +5016,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4835,6 +5055,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4874,6 +5095,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4915,6 +5137,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4953,6 +5176,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -4992,6 +5216,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5030,6 +5255,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5068,6 +5294,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5107,6 +5334,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5146,6 +5374,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5185,6 +5414,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5224,6 +5454,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5263,6 +5494,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5286,7 +5518,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_window`") | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`
+search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`
 
 [ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -5302,6 +5534,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Hidden Cobra Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5340,6 +5573,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5378,6 +5612,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5417,6 +5652,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5455,6 +5691,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5494,6 +5731,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5532,6 +5770,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5570,6 +5809,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5609,6 +5849,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5648,6 +5889,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5686,6 +5928,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Account Monitoring and Controls"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5724,6 +5967,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Lateral Movement"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5762,6 +6006,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5800,6 +6045,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5838,6 +6084,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5876,6 +6123,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5914,6 +6162,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5953,6 +6202,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -5991,6 +6241,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6029,6 +6280,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6067,6 +6319,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6105,6 +6358,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6143,6 +6397,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6181,6 +6436,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6219,6 +6475,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6257,6 +6514,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6296,6 +6554,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6335,6 +6594,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6374,6 +6634,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6413,6 +6674,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6452,6 +6714,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6491,6 +6754,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Amplification Attacks"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6529,6 +6793,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = []
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6562,6 +6827,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6601,6 +6867,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6640,6 +6907,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6679,6 +6947,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6718,6 +6987,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6757,6 +7027,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6795,6 +7066,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6833,6 +7105,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6872,6 +7145,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6911,6 +7185,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6949,6 +7224,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -6988,6 +7264,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7027,6 +7304,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Updates"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7066,6 +7344,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7105,6 +7384,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7144,6 +7424,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7183,6 +7464,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7221,6 +7503,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7260,6 +7543,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7299,6 +7583,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7338,6 +7623,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7376,6 +7662,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7414,6 +7701,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7453,6 +7741,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7491,6 +7780,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-01-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7529,6 +7819,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7554,6 +7845,46 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`
 
+[ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Phishing Payloads"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Phishing Payloads"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
+action.notable.param.security_domain = network
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk" AND Filesystem.file_path="C:\\Temp*"  by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_id as lnk_pid | join lnk_pid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*  by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_id as lnk_pid | fields _time lnk_pid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_pid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` 
+
 [ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -7568,6 +7899,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7607,6 +7939,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-01-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7645,6 +7978,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Netsh Abuse"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7684,6 +8018,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7723,6 +8058,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7761,6 +8097,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-10-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "SamSam Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7800,6 +8137,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command and Control"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7838,6 +8176,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7877,6 +8216,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7916,6 +8256,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7955,6 +8296,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A "]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -7994,6 +8336,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8033,6 +8376,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8072,6 +8416,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8111,6 +8456,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8150,6 +8496,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8189,6 +8536,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8228,6 +8576,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8267,6 +8616,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8306,6 +8656,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8345,6 +8696,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8383,6 +8735,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8425,6 +8778,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8464,6 +8818,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SQL Injection"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8503,6 +8858,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8542,6 +8898,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8581,6 +8938,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8620,6 +8978,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8659,6 +9018,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Lateral Movement", "Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8698,6 +9058,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8737,6 +9098,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8776,6 +9138,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8815,6 +9178,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8854,6 +9218,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Account Monitoring and Controls"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8893,6 +9258,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8931,6 +9297,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -8970,6 +9337,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9009,6 +9377,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9048,6 +9417,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9087,6 +9457,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9126,6 +9497,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9165,6 +9537,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Emails"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9206,6 +9579,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9244,6 +9618,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9283,6 +9658,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9308,45 +9684,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`
 
-[ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule]
-action.escu = 0
-action.escu.enabled = 1
-description = This search looks for a ``*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*` executing a process. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
-action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
-action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a ``*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*` executing a process. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
-action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to execute process from temporary or user directories.
-action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
-action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
-action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule
-action.escu.search_type = detection
-action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Phishing Payloads"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
-dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
-action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Phishing Payloads"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-schedule_window = auto
-action.notable = 1
-action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
-action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for a ``*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*` executing a process. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
-action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious LNK file launching a process
-action.notable.param.security_domain = network
-action.notable.param.severity = high
-alert.digest_mode = 1
-disabled = true
-enableSched = 1
-counttype = number of events
-relation = greater than
-quantity = 0
-realtime_schedule = 0
-is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk" AND Filesystem.file_path="C:\\Temp*"  by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_id as lnk_pid | join lnk_pid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*  by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_id as lnk_pid | fields _time lnk_pid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_pid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process_filter` 
-
 [ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -9361,6 +9698,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9400,6 +9738,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9439,6 +9778,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9478,6 +9818,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9517,6 +9858,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9556,6 +9898,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9595,6 +9938,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9634,6 +9978,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9673,6 +10018,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9712,6 +10058,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9750,6 +10097,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9789,6 +10137,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Discovery Techniques"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9828,6 +10177,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9867,6 +10217,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9905,6 +10256,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9944,6 +10296,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -9983,6 +10336,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Disabling Security Tools"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10022,6 +10376,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10055,6 +10410,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10093,6 +10449,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10132,6 +10489,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10171,6 +10529,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2017-10-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10209,6 +10568,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10248,6 +10608,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10287,6 +10648,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10326,6 +10688,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10364,6 +10727,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10403,6 +10767,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10441,6 +10806,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10480,6 +10846,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10519,6 +10886,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Sunburst Malware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10558,6 +10926,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10597,6 +10966,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10636,6 +11006,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10674,6 +11045,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10713,6 +11085,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2018-11-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Host Redirection"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10752,6 +11125,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10790,6 +11164,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10828,6 +11203,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10866,6 +11242,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10904,6 +11281,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10942,6 +11320,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
@@ -10971,11 +11350,11 @@ search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.Audi
 
 ### ESCU BASELINES ###
 
-[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User]
+[batch - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07
@@ -10993,11 +11372,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls) as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true
 
-[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed]
+[batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-25
@@ -11016,11 +11395,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 dist=expon show_density=true
 
-[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched]
+[batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-14
@@ -11039,11 +11418,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true
 
-[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User]
+[batch - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07
@@ -11061,11 +11440,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN]
+[batch - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-09
@@ -11083,11 +11462,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK]
+[batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
@@ -11105,11 +11484,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK]
+[batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
@@ -11127,11 +11506,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK]
+[batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14
@@ -11151,11 +11530,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK]
+[batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14
@@ -11175,11 +11554,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN]
+[batch - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-21
@@ -11197,11 +11576,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN]
+[batch - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-07-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-07-17
@@ -11219,11 +11598,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK]
+[batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
@@ -11241,11 +11620,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN]
+[batch - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-17
@@ -11263,11 +11642,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS]
+[batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07
@@ -11285,11 +11664,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports]
+[batch - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports
 description = The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
@@ -11307,11 +11686,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count
 
-[ESCU - Count of assets by category]
+[batch - Count of assets by category]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Count of assets by category
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Count of assets by category
 description = This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that belong to those categories.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
@@ -11329,11 +11708,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) by category | sort -count
 
-[ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts]
+[batch - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts
 description = This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03
@@ -11351,11 +11730,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count
 
-[ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names]
+[batch - DNSTwist Domain Names]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - DNSTwist Domain Names
 description = This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
@@ -11373,11 +11752,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Discover DNS records]
+[batch - Discover DNS records]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Discover DNS records
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Discover DNS records
 description = The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv` finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-14
@@ -11395,11 +11774,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain, "\*", "")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?<domain>\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records
 
-[ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic]
+[batch - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic
 description = This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
@@ -11417,11 +11796,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count
 
-[ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic]
+[batch - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic
 description = This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
@@ -11439,11 +11818,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count
 
-[ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop]
+[batch - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop
 description = This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
@@ -11461,11 +11840,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="*mstsc.exe*" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count
 
-[ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups]
+[batch - Monitor Successful Backups]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Monitor Successful Backups
 description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
@@ -11483,11 +11862,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `netbackup` "Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE
 
-[ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups]
+[batch - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
 description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures happen in your environments.  Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
@@ -11505,11 +11884,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `netbackup` "An error occurred, failed to backup." | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity]
+[batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity
 description = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-04
@@ -11527,11 +11906,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=* | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial
 description = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15
@@ -11549,11 +11928,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role |  `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):" |  where  vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update
 description = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15
@@ -11571,11 +11950,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources]
+[batch - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources
 description = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
@@ -11593,11 +11972,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions]
+[batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-08
@@ -11615,11 +11994,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-03
@@ -11637,11 +12016,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update
 description = This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-03
@@ -11659,11 +12038,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user, command | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15
@@ -11681,11 +12060,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15
@@ -11703,11 +12082,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "-90d@d") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-08
@@ -11725,11 +12104,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created  by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where image_id != "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-12
@@ -11747,11 +12126,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where image_id != "unknown" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_images | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-9-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-9-03
@@ -11769,11 +12148,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-9-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-9-03
@@ -11791,11 +12170,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != "unknown" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by instance_type | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29
@@ -11813,11 +12192,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update
 description = This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29
@@ -11835,11 +12214,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-19
@@ -11857,11 +12236,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update
 description = This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.  It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-20
@@ -11879,11 +12258,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial
 description = This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02
@@ -11901,11 +12280,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update
 description = This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02
@@ -11923,11 +12302,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by vendor_region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs]
+[batch - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
@@ -11945,11 +12324,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types]
+[batch - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-08
@@ -11967,11 +12346,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value="m1.small" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User]
+[batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-15
@@ -11989,11 +12368,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User]
+[batch - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-05
@@ -12011,11 +12390,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
 description = This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
@@ -12033,11 +12412,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update
 description = This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
@@ -12055,11 +12434,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
@@ -12077,11 +12456,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
@@ -12099,11 +12478,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial]
+[batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial
 description = This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
@@ -12121,11 +12500,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process
 
-[ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update]
+[batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update
 description = This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
@@ -12143,11 +12522,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process
 
-[ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail]
+[batch - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail
 description = This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16
@@ -12165,11 +12544,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP]
+[batch - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP
 description = This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200"
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28
@@ -12187,11 +12566,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  | stats  earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments]
+[batch - Previously seen command line arguments]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously seen command line arguments
 description = This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-03-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-03-01
@@ -12209,11 +12588,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
 
-[ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail]
+[batch - Previously seen users in CloudTrail]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Previously seen users in CloudTrail
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30
@@ -12231,11 +12610,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count
 
-[ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
+[batch - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch
 description = Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-08
@@ -12253,11 +12632,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry AND (All_Changes.object_path="HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\QualityCompat*") by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
 
-[ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail]
+[batch - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30
@@ -12275,11 +12654,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail
 
-[ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures]
+[batch - Windows Updates Install Failures]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Windows Updates Install Failures
 description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14
@@ -12297,11 +12676,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" AND Updates.status=failure by _time span=1d
 
-[ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes]
+[batch - Windows Updates Install Successes]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes
+action.escu.full_search_name = batch - Windows Updates Install Successes
 description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14
diff --git a/package/default/transforms.conf b/package/default/transforms.conf
index 96d79328ae..bcf679e2df 100644
--- a/package/default/transforms.conf
+++ b/package/default/transforms.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/package/default/use_case_library.conf b/package/default/use_case_library.conf
index 420065e81c..038c3e3fba 100644
--- a/package/default/use_case_library.conf
+++ b/package/default/use_case_library.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -113,10 +113,21 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
 
+[analytic_story://Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-01-27
+version = 1
+references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
+description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
+narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
+
 [analytic_story://Brand Monitoring]
 category = Abuse
 last_updated = 2017-12-19
@@ -124,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -137,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -151,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -164,7 +175,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
  Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -177,7 +188,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -201,7 +212,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"]
 description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
 narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.
 
@@ -212,7 +223,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -225,7 +236,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -251,7 +262,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -281,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
 
@@ -292,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
 narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 
@@ -303,7 +314,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
@@ -314,7 +325,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
@@ -325,7 +336,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -349,7 +360,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -362,7 +373,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -376,7 +387,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
 
@@ -412,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 
@@ -423,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 
@@ -434,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 
@@ -445,7 +456,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -460,7 +471,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -480,7 +491,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
 
@@ -491,7 +502,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -516,7 +527,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -528,7 +539,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
 narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
 
@@ -539,7 +550,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -553,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
 narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
 As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -571,7 +582,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -609,7 +620,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
 
@@ -620,7 +631,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
 
@@ -631,7 +642,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
 
@@ -642,7 +653,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -654,7 +665,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
 
@@ -677,7 +688,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -724,7 +735,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
 Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -738,7 +749,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"]
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
 
@@ -749,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -760,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
 
@@ -771,7 +782,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -784,7 +795,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -798,7 +809,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
 This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -810,7 +821,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -821,7 +832,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -833,7 +844,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
@@ -845,7 +856,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
 
@@ -856,7 +867,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
 
@@ -867,7 +878,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -893,7 +904,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
@@ -906,7 +917,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -919,7 +930,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -932,7 +943,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
  The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -957,7 +968,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -969,7 +980,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
 The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
@@ -983,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
  Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -995,7 +1006,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1008,7 +1019,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
 
@@ -1019,7 +1030,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1035,7 +1046,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
 narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
 
@@ -1046,7 +1057,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
 
@@ -1057,7 +1068,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
  Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1072,7 +1083,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1084,7 +1095,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
 
@@ -1095,7 +1106,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -1106,7 +1117,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -1770,6 +1781,36 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Act
 known_false_positives = Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = unknown
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged.  This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = unknown
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
@@ -3104,6 +3145,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
+how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
+known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3559,16 +3610,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation
 known_false_positives = There are no known false positives.
 providing_technologies = []
 
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule]
-type = detection
-asset_type = Endpoint
-confidence = medium
-explanation = This search looks for a ``*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*` executing a process. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to execute process from temporary or user directories.
-providing_technologies = []
-
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint

From c7667b5740e6345fb83fb99c912830096ec52411 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 18:36:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 082/132] fixing a error which was causing API to fail

---
 .../endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml        | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
index 588e0e9bef..187dab7152 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM
   for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search
   the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to
   keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the
-  `previously_seen_windows_service_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please
+  `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please
   ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
 id: 823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808
 known_false_positives: A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify

From 9102da26062166b792ee502307afc2addd032564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: research bot <research@splunk.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 23:50:47 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 083/132] updating docs and package bits [ci skip]

---
 package/default/analytic_stories.conf  | 138 +++++++++++------------
 package/default/analyticstories.conf   | 146 ++++++++++++-------------
 package/default/app.conf               |   2 +-
 package/default/collections.conf       |   2 +-
 package/default/es_investigations.conf | 106 +++++++++---------
 package/default/macros.conf            |   2 +-
 package/default/savedsearches.conf     |   4 +-
 package/default/transforms.conf        |   2 +-
 package/default/use_case_library.conf  | 146 ++++++++++++-------------
 9 files changed, 274 insertions(+), 274 deletions(-)

diff --git a/package/default/analytic_stories.conf b/package/default/analytic_stories.conf
index c08b2d2f09..4179f936df 100644
--- a/package/default/analytic_stories.conf
+++ b/package/default/analytic_stories.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:19 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "batch - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "batch - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "batch - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "batch - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "batch - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "batch - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "batch - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Count of assets by category"]
 data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Discover DNS records"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ version = 4
 reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "batch - Monitor Successful Backups"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -757,8 +757,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -858,8 +858,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attac
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = []
-support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
@@ -1037,8 +1037,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -1069,8 +1069,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "batch - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "batch - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1106,8 +1106,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Authentication"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
@@ -1173,7 +1173,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1241,7 +1241,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1277,7 +1277,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@ reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-y
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1490,7 +1490,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1507,7 +1507,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1523,7 +1523,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1539,8 +1539,8 @@ version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
diff --git a/package/default/analyticstories.conf b/package/default/analyticstories.conf
index 038c3e3fba..f3fabc621c 100644
--- a/package/default/analyticstories.conf
+++ b/package/default/analyticstories.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:19 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
 
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
 narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
 
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
  Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
 
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
 narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
 
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
 narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
 It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
 
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
 narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
 
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
 
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
 
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
 
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
 
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
 Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule"]
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
 
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
 
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
 This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
 
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
 
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
  The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
  Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
 
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
 narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
 
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
 
@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
  Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
 
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -2550,7 +2550,7 @@ type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.
-how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_service_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
+how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
 annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.
 providing_technologies = []
diff --git a/package/default/app.conf b/package/default/app.conf
index 374a0bdfeb..7de04d2796 100644
--- a/package/default/app.conf
+++ b/package/default/app.conf
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 is_configured = false
 state = enabled
 state_change_requires_restart = false
-build = 18361
+build = 18409
 
 [triggers]
 reload.analytic_stories = simple
diff --git a/package/default/collections.conf b/package/default/collections.conf
index d9bf236e49..2e96f190c1 100644
--- a/package/default/collections.conf
+++ b/package/default/collections.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:18 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/package/default/es_investigations.conf b/package/default/es_investigations.conf
index 3afa70cef8..71e5aee34b 100644
--- a/package/default/es_investigations.conf
+++ b/package/default/es_investigations.conf
@@ -11,49 +11,49 @@ label = AWS Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity]
 label = AWS Network ACL Activity
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
 label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
 label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
 label = AWS User Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_apache_struts_vulnerability]
 label = Apache Struts Vulnerability
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking]
 label = Asset Tracking
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156]
 label = Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
@@ -67,35 +67,35 @@ label = Brand Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining]
 label = Cloud Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat]
 label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging]
 label = Collection and Staging
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control]
 label = Command and Control
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
 label = Common Phishing Frameworks
@@ -116,14 +116,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
 label = DHS Report TA18-074A
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
 label = DNS Amplification Attacks
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ label = DNS Hijacking
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_data_exfiltration]
 label = Data Exfiltration
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ label = Data Protection
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack]
 label = Detect Zerologon Attack
@@ -165,21 +165,21 @@ label = Disabling Security Tools
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns]
 label = Dynamic DNS
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
 label = Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A 
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
 label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
@@ -200,14 +200,14 @@ label = Hidden Cobra Malware
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
 label = Host Redirection
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_jboss_vulnerability]
 label = JBoss Vulnerability
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
 label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -242,28 +242,28 @@ label = Lateral Movement
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
 label = Malicious PowerShell
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
 label = Monitor Backup Solution
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_unauthorized_software]
 label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates]
 label = Monitor for Updates
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ label = Netsh Abuse
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections]
 label = Office 365 Detections
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
 label = Phishing Payloads
@@ -305,21 +305,21 @@ label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
 label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
 label = Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
 label = Ransomware Cloud
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
 label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sunburst_malware]
 label = Sunburst Malware
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
 label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -403,21 +403,21 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
 label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_instance_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
@@ -445,21 +445,21 @@ label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic]
 label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
 label = Suspicious Emails
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities]
 label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity]
 label = Suspicious Okta Activity
@@ -487,14 +487,14 @@ label = Suspicious WMI Use
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
 label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes]
 label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
@@ -522,28 +522,28 @@ label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes]
 label = Unusual Processes
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols]
 label = Use of Cleartext Protocols
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection]
 label = Web Fraud Detection
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
 label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
@@ -557,42 +557,42 @@ label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse]
 label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation]
 label = Windows Log Manipulation
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques]
 label = Windows Persistence Techniques
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation]
 label = Windows Privilege Escalation
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse]
 label = Windows Service Abuse
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 
 
diff --git a/package/default/macros.conf b/package/default/macros.conf
index 88fc61217a..9f22535274 100644
--- a/package/default/macros.conf
+++ b/package/default/macros.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:19 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/package/default/savedsearches.conf b/package/default/savedsearches.conf
index 2c7dd8c2fc..a59f15abff 100644
--- a/package/default/savedsearches.conf
+++ b/package/default/savedsearches.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:18 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -5487,7 +5487,7 @@ description = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]}
 action.escu.data_models = []
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.
-action.escu.how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_service_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
diff --git a/package/default/transforms.conf b/package/default/transforms.conf
index bcf679e2df..39412793d0 100644
--- a/package/default/transforms.conf
+++ b/package/default/transforms.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:18 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/package/default/use_case_library.conf b/package/default/use_case_library.conf
index 038c3e3fba..f3fabc621c 100644
--- a/package/default/use_case_library.conf
+++ b/package/default/use_case_library.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:19 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
 
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
 narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
 
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
  Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
 
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
 narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
 
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
 narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
 It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
 
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
 narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
 
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
 
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
 
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
 
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
 
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
 Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule"]
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
 
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
 
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
 This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
 
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
 
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
  The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
  Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
 
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
 narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
 
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
 
@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
  Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
 
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -2550,7 +2550,7 @@ type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.
-how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_service_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
+how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
 annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.
 providing_technologies = []

From 7fd34c3fc0db0f9decabac4ea25a545a89766cfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 19:43:19 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 084/132] fixing API bug

---
 .circleci/config.yml | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/.circleci/config.yml b/.circleci/config.yml
index f4a84c4a60..a67ad414e2 100644
--- a/.circleci/config.yml
+++ b/.circleci/config.yml
@@ -339,6 +339,7 @@ jobs:
           name: update api sources
           command: |
             cd security-content
+            aws s3 rm s3://security-content --recursive --exclude "*" --include "*.yml"
             aws s3 cp stories s3://security-content/stories --recursive --exclude "*" --include "*.yml"
             aws s3 cp baselines s3://security-content/baselines --recursive --exclude "*" --include "*.yml"
             aws s3 cp detections s3://security-content/detections --recursive --exclude "*" --include "*.yml"

From bbdd2bd8605e9ddf7d40e5510e230854b420a0fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 22:28:19 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 085/132] add products to responses, added new type response,
 also new checks for product tag and mitre_attack_id in validate

---
 bin/validate.py                               |  10 +-
 response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml |  72 +++++----
 response_phases/containment.yml               |  53 ++++---
 response_phases/detection_analysis.yml        |  52 ++++---
 response_phases/eradication.yml               |  47 +++---
 response_phases/identification.yml            |  72 +++++----
 response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml  |  24 ---
 response_phases/preparation.yml               |  63 ++++----
 response_phases/recovery.yml                  |  47 +++---
 response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml   |  11 +-
 ...azon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml |  18 ++-
 ...nvestigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml |  21 ++-
 ...stigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml |  18 ++-
 ...aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml |  17 ++-
 .../aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml       |  14 +-
 ...twork_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml |  11 +-
 .../aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml  |  16 +-
 .../deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml     |  15 +-
 ...stigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml |  11 +-
 .../get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml  |  11 +-
 .../deprecated/get_notable_info.yml           |  11 +-
 .../get_process_registry_activity.yml         |  11 +-
 .../deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml    |  11 +-
 .../get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml       |  11 +-
 .../get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml           |  11 +-
 .../get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml          |  11 +-
 ...t_user_information_from_identity_table.yml |  11 +-
 .../get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml   |  11 +-
 ...ate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml |  11 +-
 ...gate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml |  11 +-
 ...e_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml |  11 +-
 ...user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml |  11 +-
 .../investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml    |  11 +-
 .../investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml  |  11 +-
 .../deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml     |  30 +++-
 .../deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml  |  15 +-
 response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml      |  12 +-
 .../domain_certificate_investigation.yml      |  11 +-
 ...count_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml |  12 +-
 .../gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml     |  18 ++-
 .../get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml        |  11 +-
 .../get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml     |  11 +-
 .../get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml  |  12 +-
 .../get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml      |  11 +-
 .../get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml          |  11 +-
 .../get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml     |  11 +-
 .../get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml     |  11 +-
 response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml      |  16 +-
 ...get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml |  26 ++--
 response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml     |  18 ++-
 response_tasks/get_email_info.yml             |  11 +-
 .../get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml       |  13 +-
 ...e_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml |  11 +-
 .../get_history_of_email_sources.yml          |  13 +-
 ...ogon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml |  11 +-
 ...et_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml |  11 +-
 response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml        |  13 +-
 ...d_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml |  13 +-
 response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml    |  22 +--
 response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml  |  17 ++-
 response_tasks/get_process_info.yml           |  21 +--
 ..._process_information_for_port_activity.yml |  28 ++--
 ...rocess_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml |  23 +--
 .../get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml      |  15 +-
 ...web_session_information_via_session_id.yml |  15 +-
 ...stigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml |  16 +-
 ...gate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml |  11 +-
 ...ailed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml |  11 +-
 ...nvestigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml |  11 +-
 .../investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml      |  11 +-
 ...nvestigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml |  11 +-
 .../investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml    |  14 +-
 .../investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml  |  15 +-
 .../investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml      |  14 +-
 ...cessful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml |  24 +--
 ...gate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml |  17 ++-
 .../investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml   |  11 +-
 .../investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml        |  14 +-
 .../playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml     |  57 ++++---
 ...nalyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml |  74 +++++----
 ...nalyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml |  72 +++++----
 .../analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml |  64 ++++----
 ...ze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml |  78 +++++-----
 ...lyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml |  92 ++++++------
 .../analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml       |  65 +++++---
 .../analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml  |  82 +++++-----
 response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml |  84 ++++++-----
 response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml |  57 ++++---
 response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml |  67 +++++----
 .../playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml     |  76 +++++-----
 .../determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml |  58 ++++---
 .../determine_incident_prioritization.yml     |  95 +++++++-----
 .../document_and_notify_of_incident.yml       |  96 +++++++-----
 .../identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml    |  79 ++++++----
 .../playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml    |  64 ++++----
 .../implement_additional_monitoring.yml       |  59 +++++---
 .../implement_recovery_monitoring.yml         |  76 ++++++----
 ...e_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml |  48 +++---
 .../playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml    |  80 +++++-----
 ...igate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml |  86 +++++++----
 .../playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml  |  37 +++--
 .../prepare_for_incident_handling.yml         | 142 ++++++++++++------
 .../playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml        |  78 +++++++---
 ...ovide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml |  59 +++++---
 .../playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml   |  41 ++---
 .../playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml    |  76 ++++++----
 .../restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml |  70 +++++----
 ...mail_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml |  56 ++++---
 .../playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml   |  75 +++++----
 .../playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml     |  60 ++++----
 responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml     |  64 ++++----
 responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml       |  62 ++++----
 responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml       |  37 +++--
 113 files changed, 2280 insertions(+), 1596 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml

diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py
index 93a69fa717..65d7adf312 100644
--- a/bin/validate.py
+++ b/bin/validate.py
@@ -132,8 +132,16 @@ def validate_standard_fields(object, uuids):
     # the first two fields risk_object, and risk_object_type are an enum of fixed values
     # defined by ESCU risk scoring
 
-
     if 'tags' in object:
+        # check product tag is present in all objects
+        if 'product' not in object['tags']:
+            errors.append("ERROR: a `product` tag is required for object: %s" % object['name'])
+
+        # check detections have mitre_ids
+        if 'search' in object and 'known_false_positives' in object:
+            if 'mitre_attack_id' not in object['tags']:
+                errors.append("ERROR: a `mitre_attack_id` tag is required detection object: %s" % object['name'])
+
         for k,v in object['tags'].items():
 
             if k == 'risk_score':
diff --git a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml
index 2f7cb515b0..bd8ae16868 100644
--- a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml
+++ b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,43 @@
-name: Containment, Eradication, Recovery
-id: 15442b70-49a1-4e4b-afea-bc1acd63f4bc
-sla_type: minutes
-sla:
-description: The containment, eradication and recovery phase is for the acquiring, preserving, securing, and documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate containment or mititgation of the incident. Eradication is focused on removing any future threats from vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident. Recovery is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) and customers affected by the incident.
-references:
-  - 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_task:
-  - id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c
-    name: identify_additional_affected_hosts
-  - id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f
-    name: contain_incident
-  - id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c
-    name: implement_additional_monitoring
-  - id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62
-    name: identify_vunlerabilities
-  - id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7
-    name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities
-  - id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226
-    name: remove_malicious_content
-  - id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99
-    name: validate_hosts_eradicated
-  - id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4
-    name: restore_systems_to_operational_status
-  - id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d
-    name: validate_restored_hosts
-  - id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae
-    name: implement_monitoring
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 2
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: The containment, eradication and recovery phase is for the acquiring,
+  preserving, securing, and documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate
+  containment or mititgation of the incident. Eradication is focused on removing any
+  future threats from vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident.
+  Recovery is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) and customers affected
+  by the incident.
+id: 15442b70-49a1-4e4b-afea-bc1acd63f4bc
+name: Containment, Eradication, Recovery
+references:
+- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+response_task:
+- id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c
+  name: identify_additional_affected_hosts
+- id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f
+  name: contain_incident
+- id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c
+  name: implement_additional_monitoring
+- id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62
+  name: identify_vunlerabilities
+- id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7
+  name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities
+- id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226
+  name: remove_malicious_content
+- id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99
+  name: validate_hosts_eradicated
+- id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4
+  name: restore_systems_to_operational_status
+- id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d
+  name: validate_restored_hosts
+- id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae
+  name: implement_monitoring
+sla: null
+sla_type: minutes
+tags:
+  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_phases/containment.yml b/response_phases/containment.yml
index 794c7ee5c5..238e1c2b86 100644
--- a/response_phases/containment.yml
+++ b/response_phases/containment.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-name: Containment
-id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c
-sla_type: minutes
-sla:
-description: The containment phase is for the acquiring, preserving, securing, and documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate containment or mititgation of the incident. This phase will identify additional hosts and known vulnerabilities and implememt monitoring of the containment.
-tags:
-  analytics_story:
-    NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
-  usecase:
-    Advanced Threat Detection
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-references:
-  - 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_task:
-  - id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c
-    name: identify_additional_affected_hosts
-  - id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f
-    name: contain_incident
-  - id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c
-    name: implement_additional_monitoring
-  - id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62
-    name: identify_vunlerabilities
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 2
 author: ButterCup
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: The containment phase is for the acquiring, preserving, securing, and
+  documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate containment or mititgation
+  of the incident. This phase will identify additional hosts and known vulnerabilities
+  and implememt monitoring of the containment.
+id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c
+name: Containment
+references:
+- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+response_task:
+- id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c
+  name: identify_additional_affected_hosts
+- id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f
+  name: contain_incident
+- id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c
+  name: implement_additional_monitoring
+- id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62
+  name: identify_vunlerabilities
+sla: null
+sla_type: minutes
+tags:
+  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml
index 1d4e33e74f..93d1618e0e 100644
--- a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml
+++ b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,33 @@
-name: Detection and Analysis
-id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d
-sla_type: minutes
-sla:
-description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process is a template to ensure the right process is being followed.
-references:
-  -  3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_task:
-  - id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83
-    name: Determine if an incident has occurred
-  - id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931
-    name: Analyze precursors to the event
-  - id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03
-    name: Confirm Incident
-  - id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1
-    name: Determine incident prioritization
-  - id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a
-    name: Document and Notify of Incident
-date: '2020-07-17'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared
+  violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase
+  is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing
+  incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step
+  instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process
+  is a template to ensure the right process is being followed.
+id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d
+name: Detection and Analysis
+references:
+- 3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+response_task:
+- id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83
+  name: Determine if an incident has occurred
+- id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931
+  name: Analyze precursors to the event
+- id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03
+  name: Confirm Incident
+- id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1
+  name: Determine incident prioritization
+- id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a
+  name: Document and Notify of Incident
+sla: null
+sla_type: minutes
+tags:
+  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_phases/eradication.yml b/response_phases/eradication.yml
index 317a5f4399..eeb45f3bd6 100644
--- a/response_phases/eradication.yml
+++ b/response_phases/eradication.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
-name: Eradication
-id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c
-sla_type: minutes
-sla:
-description: The eradication phase is focused on removing any further exposure from vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident.
-tags:
-  analytics_story:
-    NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
-  usecase:
-    Advanced Threat Detection
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-references:
-  - 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_task:
-  - id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7
-    name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities
-  - id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226
-    name: remove_malicious_content
-  - id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99
-    name: validate_hosts_eradicated
-date: '2020-07-17'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: The eradication phase is focused on removing any further exposure from
+  vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident.
+id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c
+name: Eradication
+references:
+- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+response_task:
+- id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7
+  name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities
+- id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226
+  name: remove_malicious_content
+- id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99
+  name: validate_hosts_eradicated
+sla: null
+sla_type: minutes
+tags:
+  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_phases/identification.yml b/response_phases/identification.yml
index 391c25df72..3a015156fe 100644
--- a/response_phases/identification.yml
+++ b/response_phases/identification.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,43 @@
-name: Identification
-id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100
-sla_type: minutes
-sla:
-description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process is a template to ensure the right process is being followed.
-references:
-  -  3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_task:
-  - id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83
-    name: Determine if an incident has occurred
-  - id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931
-    name: Analyze precursors to the event
-  - id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e
-    name: Analyze host indicator and reputation
-  - id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5
-    name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation
-  - id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747
-    name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation
-  - id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35
-    name: Analyze url indicator and reputation
-  - id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620
-    name: Analyze email indicator and reputation
-  - id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03
-    name: Confirm Incident
-  - id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1
-    name: Determine incident prioritization
-  - id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a
-    name: Document and Notify of Incident
-date: '2020-07-17'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared
+  violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase
+  is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing
+  incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step
+  instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process
+  is a template to ensure the right process is being followed.
+id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100
+name: Identification
+references:
+- 3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+response_task:
+- id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83
+  name: Determine if an incident has occurred
+- id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931
+  name: Analyze precursors to the event
+- id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e
+  name: Analyze host indicator and reputation
+- id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5
+  name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation
+- id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747
+  name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation
+- id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35
+  name: Analyze url indicator and reputation
+- id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620
+  name: Analyze email indicator and reputation
+- id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03
+  name: Confirm Incident
+- id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1
+  name: Determine incident prioritization
+- id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a
+  name: Document and Notify of Incident
+sla: null
+sla_type: minutes
+tags:
+  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml b/response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2deb1664fb..0000000000
--- a/response_phases/post-incident_activities.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-name: Post-Incident Activities
-id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80
-sla_type: minutes
-sla:
-description: One of the most important parts of incident response is learning and improving. Each incident response team should evolve to reflect new threats, improved technology, and lessons learned. Holding a “lessons learned” meeting with all involved parties after a major incident and lessor incidents at a regular interval. Consolidating the incident details and measuring the incident important data points to ensure the most effective proceses are being used.
-tags:
-    - nist
-    - picerl
-  analytics_story:
-    NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
-  usecase:
-    Advanced Threat Detection
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-references:
-  - 3.4 Post-Incident Activity -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_task:
-  - id: 69d25415-408f-462a-899f-9bc8eef8c299
-    name: create_follow-up_report
-  - id: 43fc5e87-d819-460a-a740-de2066b18a29
-    name: provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 2
-author: ButterCup, Splunk
diff --git a/response_phases/preparation.yml b/response_phases/preparation.yml
index e38fd151ef..028ed74519 100644
--- a/response_phases/preparation.yml
+++ b/response_phases/preparation.yml
@@ -1,30 +1,35 @@
-name: Preparation NIST
-id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a
-sla_type: minutes
-sla:
-description: Incident response methodologies typically emphasize preparation not only for establishing an incident response capability so that the organization is ready to respond to incidents, but also preventing incidents by ensuring that systems, networks, and applications are sufficiently secure. Incident response teams need to know what they have available and what they need to prepare, aquire or configure for success within the incident response process.
-tags:
-  analytics_story:
-    NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
-  usecase:
-    Advanced Threat Detection
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-references:
-  - 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_task:
-  - id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08
-    name: Prepare for Incident Handling
-  - id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503
-    name: Preventing Incidents
-  - id: 97d00b14-dd01-47e4-b7eb-0a82f4998c4e
-    name: Practice Real World Events
-  - id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968
-    name: Conduct Training
-  - id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4
-    name: Raise Personnel Awareness
-  - id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057
-    name: Make Personnel Report Suspicious Activity
-date: '2020-07-17'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: Incident response methodologies typically emphasize preparation not only
+  for establishing an incident response capability so that the organization is ready
+  to respond to incidents, but also preventing incidents by ensuring that systems,
+  networks, and applications are sufficiently secure. Incident response teams need
+  to know what they have available and what they need to prepare, aquire or configure
+  for success within the incident response process.
+id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a
+name: Preparation NIST
+references:
+- 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+response_task:
+- id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08
+  name: Prepare for Incident Handling
+- id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503
+  name: Preventing Incidents
+- id: 97d00b14-dd01-47e4-b7eb-0a82f4998c4e
+  name: Practice Real World Events
+- id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968
+  name: Conduct Training
+- id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4
+  name: Raise Personnel Awareness
+- id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057
+  name: Make Personnel Report Suspicious Activity
+sla: null
+sla_type: minutes
+tags:
+  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_phases/recovery.yml b/response_phases/recovery.yml
index 2b559cf5f8..a1b57bbfaf 100644
--- a/response_phases/recovery.yml
+++ b/response_phases/recovery.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
-title: Recovery
-id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a
-sla_type: minutes
-sla:
-description: The recovery phase is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) and customers affected by the incident.
-tags:
-  analytics_story:
-    NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
-  usecase:
-    Advanced Threat Detection
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-references:
-  - 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_task:
-  - id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4
-    name: restore_systems_to_operational_status
-  - id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d
-    name: validate_restored_hosts
-  - id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae
-    name: implement_monitoring
-date: '2020-04-21'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+date: '2020-04-21'
+description: The recovery phase is the restoration of normal operations for system(s)
+  and customers affected by the incident.
+id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a
+references:
+- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery -  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+response_task:
+- id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4
+  name: restore_systems_to_operational_status
+- id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d
+  name: validate_restored_hosts
+- id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae
+  name: implement_monitoring
+sla: null
+sla_type: minutes
+tags:
+  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+title: Recovery
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml b/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml
index 412f36e5fa..7cf3185442 100644
--- a/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-name: All backup logs for host
-id: bc91a8cf-aaaa-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in
   order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully.
 how_to_implement: The successfully implement this search you must first send your
   backup logs to Splunk.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-aaaa-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: All backup logs for host
 search: '| search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" dest=$dest$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
index a91b9d249b..98e360c9f2 100644
--- a/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip
-id: a636cca4-7434-4a15-a278-c70734938e39
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-13'
 description: This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent,
   authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster
@@ -8,12 +6,18 @@ description: This search provides investigation data about requests via user age
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch
   EKS inputs.
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+id: a636cca4-7434-4a15-a278-c70734938e39
 inputs:
 - src_ip
-search: sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{}
-  as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username)
-  values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip
+name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip
+search: sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search
+  src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username)
+  values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision
+  src_ip
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml
index 6f61ee287d..801e0c7948 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,26 @@
-name: AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest
-id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2020-06-08'
-description: This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). 
+description: This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub
+  for a specific dest(instance_id).
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822
 inputs:
 - dest
-search: 'sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance 
-| rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation |  table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation'
+name: AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest
+search: sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance
+  | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*)| rename instance
+  as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text
+  as Remediation |  table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState
+  Remediation
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Compute Instance
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml
index d582513856..84643fa8c1 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
-name: AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId
-id: 703b65a4-a0ae-4171-965d-45507506c64f
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-08'
 description: This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event
   names, and the result of the event for specific credentials.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 703b65a4-a0ae-4171-965d-45507506c64f
 inputs:
 - accessKeyId
-search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$
-  | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn  | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip |
-  table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage'
+name: AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId
+search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId|
+  search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn  | rename
+  sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode,
+  errorMessage'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml
index 2f7fb7ea95..6212b5b0f2 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN
-id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-30'
 description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific
   user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of
@@ -9,12 +7,12 @@ description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specifi
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72
 inputs:
 - user
-search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time
-  userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion
-  eventName eventType'
+name: AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN
+search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type
+  userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -30,4 +28,7 @@ tags:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
-
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml b/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml
index ff855f9c31..84e061a2d2 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
-name: AWS Network ACL Details from ID
-id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7ah9534c242
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-01-22'
 description: This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information
   about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID
 how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App
   for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later)
   and configure your AWS description inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7ah9534c242
 inputs:
 - networkAclId
-search: '| search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search  networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*'
+name: AWS Network ACL Details from ID
+search: '| search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search  networkAclId=$networkAclId$
+  | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml b/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml
index d7b216c3ff..0c105cfa85 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: AWS Network Interface details via resourceId
-id: f3fb4d1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c3ah9534c241
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-05-07'
 description: This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information
   about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will
@@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the informat
 how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App
   for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later)
   and configure your AWS configuration inputs
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: f3fb4d1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c3ah9534c241
 inputs:
 - resourceId
+name: AWS Network Interface details via resourceId
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN
   relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId  configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress
   configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp'
@@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ tags:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml b/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml
index 73b392737d..b89fbbed02 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName
-id: f3fb2q1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c2ah9534c242
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-26'
 description: This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information
   about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket
@@ -10,11 +8,17 @@ description: This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the informat
 how_to_implement: To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk
   (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and
   configure your AWS inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: f3fb2q1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c2ah9534c242
 inputs:
 - bucketName
-search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime
-  bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList'
+name: AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName
+search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |search
+  bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action
+  aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml
index 4f05a42663..6d2feea69e 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Analyze Malicious File
-id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e
-version: 1
-date: '2020-04-29'
-description: Perform a static and dynamic malware analysis for the malicious file. Use the findings for further response tasks.
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+date: '2020-04-29'
+description: Perform a static and dynamic malware analysis for the malicious file.
+  Use the findings for further response tasks.
+id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e
+name: Analyze Malicious File
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -14,4 +14,7 @@ tags:
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
   - Ransomware
   - SamSam Ransomware
-
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml
index 3b2a42a44c..ba63694607 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User
-id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf891
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-08'
 description: This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event
   names, and the result of the event for specific ARNs.
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf891
 inputs:
 - src_user
+name: AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail userIdentity.arn=$src_user$ | spath output=user
   path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip,
   awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage'
@@ -18,3 +17,7 @@ tags:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml
index 1539cbd67e..3e69175bf5 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
-name: Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd76
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-11-01'
 description: This search returns all users that have attempted to access a particular
   endpoint.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication
   logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd76
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint
 search: '| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest=$dest$
   by _time, Authentication.dest, Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.action
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`'
@@ -55,3 +54,7 @@ tags:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml
index 91a66fbd5d..8edf84043b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: Get Notable Info
-id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7af9534c242
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-20'
 description: This search queries the notable index to retrieve detailed information
   captured within the notable. Every notable has a unique ID associated with it, which
   is used to point us directly to the notable event under investigation.
 how_to_implement: If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating
   notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7af9534c242
 inputs:
 - event_id
+name: Get Notable Info
 search: '| search `notable_by_id($event_id$)` | table time, rule_name, dest, dest_asset_id,
   dest_owner, priority, severity, owner, status_description'
 tags:
@@ -71,3 +70,7 @@ tags:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
   - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml
index c522b90708..9a74f9ddef 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: Get Process Registry Activity
-id: d8362a34-b78a-4364-9733-59b505f5b8d5
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-11-06'
 description: This search returns the registry activity for a specific process on a
   specific endpoint
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint
   data and populating the Endpoint data model.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: d8362a34-b78a-4364-9733-59b505f5b8d5
 inputs:
 - process_id
 - dest
+name: Get Process Registry Activity
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_key_name)
   as registry_key_name, values(Registry.dest) as dest, values(Registry.process_id)
   as process_id from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.process_id=$process_id$
@@ -19,3 +18,7 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml
index 5ee2c4385f..17bb44f90f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get Registry Activities
-id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41xf9
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-03-01'
 description: This search queries the Endpoint Datamodel to give you details of the
   latest registry values for a specific destination computer.
@@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting
   on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes
   from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry`
   nodes.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41xf9
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Registry Activities
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path)
   as registry_path values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name count FROM
   datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.dest = "$dest$" by Registry.process_id
@@ -31,3 +30,7 @@ tags:
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml
index 665c2dd28a..9d64113807 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint
-id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d65
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-10-19'
 description: 'For the last 7 days, the search will query the Risk data model in Splunk
   Enterprise Security and calculate the count, sum of the risk\_scores, names of the
   correlation searches that contributed to create a risk score for a specific endpoint(machine\_name) '
 how_to_implement: Enable the correlation searches included in Splunk Enterprise Security
   that include Risk Analysis alert actions by leveraging the Risk Analysis Framework
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d65
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint
 search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=system risk_object=$dest$
   | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name)  min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
@@ -63,3 +62,7 @@ tags:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Windows Service Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml
index 37d53e5e5c..54f0d181e6 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: Get Risk Modifiers For User
-id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d55
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-10-19'
 description: 'For the last 7 days, the search will query the Risk data model in Splunk
   Enterprise Security and calculate the count, sum of the risk_scores, names of the
   correlation searches that contributed to create a risk score for a specific user '
 how_to_implement: Enable the correlation searches included in Splunk Enterprise Security
   that include Risk Analysis alert actions by leveraging the Risk Analysis Framework
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d55
 inputs:
 - user
+name: Get Risk Modifiers For User
 search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=user risk_object=$user$
   | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name)  min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` '
@@ -57,3 +56,7 @@ tags:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Windows Service Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml
index 0c26920660..530c258dac 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Get Update Logs For Endpoint
-id: d98675ed-da43-4a7e-96a7-eeca3232ba8e
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-08-24'
 description: This search will tell you give you the update logs for a specific endpoint
   for the last week.
 how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting the update logs from your various systems.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: d98675ed-da43-4a7e-96a7-eeca3232ba8e
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Update Logs For Endpoint
 search: '| from datamodel Updates.Updates  | search (vendor_product="Microsoft Windows"
   OR vendor_product="OSX:Update" OR vendor_product="Linux:Update") dest=$dest$'
 tags:
@@ -16,3 +15,7 @@ tags:
   - Monitor for Unauthorized Software
   - Ransomware
   - SamSam Ransomware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml
index 60df58e6d6..c86af75e9b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Get User Information from Identity Table
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd74
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-20'
 description: Gather more information about the user identified in the Notable Event.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must have populated the
   identity table with information about your users.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd74
 inputs:
 - user
+name: Get User Information from Identity Table
 search: '| `identities` | search identity=$user$ | table _time, identity, first, last,
   email, category, watchlist'
 tags:
@@ -56,3 +55,7 @@ tags:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Windows Service Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml
index 9daed1be94..326336493f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint
-id: df7a7f50-30f2-4cde-8448-69d2d5f9b3c5
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-10'
 description: This search will show you any vulnerabilities noted for a specific endpoint
   for the last week.
 how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting the logs from your vulnerability scanner.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: df7a7f50-30f2-4cde-8448-69d2d5f9b3c5
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint
 search: '| from datamodel Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities | search dest=$dest$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ tags:
   - Ransomware
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Windows Log Manipulation
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml
index 435c5c701a..4f25639ac4 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity
-id: 6027623f-7d10-4847-af3b-8d7e87970451
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-02-20'
 description: This search lists all the users performing a list image operation on
   AWS Elastic Container Registry. Listing source user, image id, source IP, user type,
@@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search lists all the users performing a list image operation o
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.You must also install Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.
-author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: 6027623f-7d10-4847-af3b-8d7e87970451
 inputs:
 - Compute.event_name
+name: Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity
 search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute
   where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.event_name="ListImages" by Compute.image_id
   Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.http_user_agent Compute.user_type | rename
@@ -21,3 +20,7 @@ search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datam
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml
index 417a96ff09..283ff7658f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-name: Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities
-id: 33a95cf2-900c-4636-8fca-5c5f71474720
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-12'
 description: This search returns a logs of events that operated on the compute instance.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 33a95cf2-900c-4636-8fca-5c5f71474720
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities
 search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search dest=$dest$ | fields
   - _*'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml
index e162510d2a..51f6044fca 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
-name: Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions
-id: 2ef6310f-8e79-42af-b20b-b4eeaba9608a
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-30'
 description: This search lists all the logged cloud infrastructure activities by a
   specific cloud user
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 2ef6310f-8e79-42af-b20b-b4eeaba9608a
 inputs:
 - region
 - src_user
+name: Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions
 search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search user=$src_user$ |
   fields - _*'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml
index be63a4df81..b0f17b1b1c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
-name: Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region
-id: 3dc3a8e7-394b-44ae-8262-4ef8e90b723d
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-30'
 description: This search lists all the logged cloud infrastructure activities by a
   specific cloud user in a specific cloud region
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
   and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 3dc3a8e7-394b-44ae-8262-4ef8e90b723d
 inputs:
 - region
 - src_user
+name: Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region
 search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search region=$region$ user=$src_user$
   | fields - _*'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml
index e8b14e65f3..9c51b7e746 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: Investigate Web Activity From Host
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd22
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-11-09'
 description: This search allows you to find all the web activity from a specific host.
   During an investigation, it is important to profile web activity to characterize
   user or host activity.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
   web traffic and populating the Web data model.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd22
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Investigate Web Activity From Host
 search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$dest$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
@@ -33,3 +32,7 @@ tags:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml
index f23344f44a..13e42a991c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-name: Investigate Web Activity From src ip
-id: 2f5b960b-71df-49c0-affc-74992ce60e45
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-15'
 description: This search searches for all web activity from a specific host. During
   an investigation, it is important to profile web activity to characterize user or
   host activity.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your
   web traffic and populating the web data model.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 2f5b960b-71df-49c0-affc-74992ce60e45
 inputs:
 - src_ip
+name: Investigate Web Activity From src ip
 search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$src_ip$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
   - Dynamic DNS
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml
index 7baae05075..e23a42a0e8 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,26 @@
-name: Process Chain Analysis
-id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79
-version: 1
-date: '2020-04-29'
-description: Analyze the Process Chain and identify the malicious file. By analyzing the parent process guid and searching for the process guid, the spawning process chain can be identified.
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+date: '2020-04-29'
+description: Analyze the Process Chain and identify the malicious file. By analyzing
+  the parent process guid and searching for the process guid, the spawning process
+  chain can be identified.
+id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79
 inputs:
 - process_guid
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_process_guid process_name AS out_process_name parent_process_guid AS out_parent_process_guid parent_process_name AS out_parent_process_name | stats count by out_process_guid out_process_name out_parent_process_guid out_parent_process_name | eval join_process_guid = out_process_guid | join join_process_guid [ search `sysmon` process_guid={process_guid} EventCode=1 | rename process_name AS sub_process_name process_guid AS sub_process_guid parent_process_name AS sub_parent_process_name parent_process_guid AS sub_parent_process_guid | stats count by sub_process_name sub_process_guid sub_parent_process_name sub_parent_process_guid | eval join_process_guid = sub_parent_process_guid] | rename sub_process_guid AS process_guid sub_process_name AS process_name out_process_guid AS parent_process_guid out_process_name AS parent_process_name out_parent_process_guid AS grandparent_process_guid out_parent_process_name AS grandparent_process_name | stats count by process_guid process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name | head 1 | fields - count'
+name: Process Chain Analysis
+search: '`sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_process_guid
+  process_name AS out_process_name parent_process_guid AS out_parent_process_guid
+  parent_process_name AS out_parent_process_name | stats count by out_process_guid
+  out_process_name out_parent_process_guid out_parent_process_name | eval join_process_guid
+  = out_process_guid | join join_process_guid [ search `sysmon` process_guid={process_guid}
+  EventCode=1 | rename process_name AS sub_process_name process_guid AS sub_process_guid
+  parent_process_name AS sub_parent_process_name parent_process_guid AS sub_parent_process_guid
+  | stats count by sub_process_name sub_process_guid sub_parent_process_name sub_parent_process_guid
+  | eval join_process_guid = sub_parent_process_guid] | rename sub_process_guid AS
+  process_guid sub_process_name AS process_name out_process_guid AS parent_process_guid
+  out_process_name AS parent_process_name out_parent_process_guid AS grandparent_process_guid
+  out_parent_process_name AS grandparent_process_name | stats count by process_guid
+  process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name
+  | head 1 | fields - count'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -39,3 +53,7 @@ tags:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Windows Service Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml
index 76fbf36d7f..eb00ca9075 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
-name: Quarantaine Infected Host
-id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78
-version: 1
-date: '2020-04-29'
-description: Quarantine the infected hosts in order to stop the malware from spreading to further hosts. This is a short-term containment with the focus on limiting the damage as soon as possible.
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+date: '2020-04-29'
+description: Quarantine the infected hosts in order to stop the malware from spreading
+  to further hosts. This is a short-term containment with the focus on limiting the
+  damage as soon as possible.
+id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78
+name: Quarantaine Infected Host
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ransomware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml
index 5e80570f74..11985a057c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: DNS Hijack Enrichment
-id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd9a72c712
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-02-14'
 description: 'This Playbook is part of the Splunk Analytic Story called DNS Hijacking.
   It is made to be run when the Detection Search within that story called "DNS Record
@@ -26,12 +24,16 @@ how_to_implement: 'If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a P
   (Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\
 
   '
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd9a72c712
+name: DNS Hijack Enrichment
 playbook:
   name: dns_hijack_enrichment
   url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.json
   url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.py
-
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml
index 1f93a68844..2a6f974244 100644
--- a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Domain Certificate Investigation
-id: c096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8272b712
-version: 1
+author: Philip Royer, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-29'
 description: Investigate domain names and URLs of a potentially malicious website.
   These domain names and URLs could come from anywhere, but this Playbook was designed
@@ -16,7 +14,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this phantom playbook, you must inte
   Enterprise Security with Phantom. Configure this playbook in the correlation search
   `Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2` ,as an adaptive response
   action.
-author: Philip Royer, Splunk
+id: c096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8272b712
+name: Domain Certificate Investigation
 playbook:
   name: lets_encrypt_domain_investigate
   url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json
@@ -24,3 +23,7 @@ playbook:
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Common Phishing Frameworks
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml
index a729fb48cb..90147e1a3b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response
-id: ab62b5c1-95d4-4e71-8fd7-53a55db33da4
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-02-14'
 description: This Playbook is part of the Splunk Analytic Story called Account Monitoring
   and Controls. It is made to be run when the Detection Search within that story called
@@ -13,12 +11,16 @@ description: This Playbook is part of the Splunk Analytic Story called Account M
   to login to the source of the lockouts, gather more information, and allow Phantom
   to shutdown the server after prompting an analyst or responder.
 how_to_implement: Import playbook into phantom
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: ab62b5c1-95d4-4e71-8fd7-53a55db33da4
+name: Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response
 playbook:
   name: excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response
   url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.json
   url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.py
-
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
index 490faf1631..168627faa0 100644
--- a/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip
-id: c00e7626-92cc-4e06-9a51-b6db0a50bd1f
-version: 1
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-13'
 description: This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent,
   authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes
@@ -9,15 +7,21 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or late
   then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
   You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection
   to filter out FPs.
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+id: c00e7626-92cc-4e06-9a51-b6db0a50bd1f
 inputs:
 - src_ip
-search: sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time)
-  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names
-  values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent)
+name: GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip
+search: sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp
+  as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName)
+  as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent)
   as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as
   user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name
   data.resource.type
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml
index 5724dcaf9d..722ba15882 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get All AWS Activity From City
-id: 0abeeb40-1255-4b68-91d1-7a7eb410c4b8
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-19'
 description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will
   create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source
@@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and wil
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 0abeeb40-1255-4b68-91d1-7a7eb410c4b8
 inputs:
 - City
+name: Get All AWS Activity From City
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search
   City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName
   path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename
@@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml
index beb035556c..fb6e01b1c2 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get All AWS Activity From Country
-id: e763cdb9-00da-41e0-9bda-444debc9501a
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-19'
 description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will
   create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the
@@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: e763cdb9-00da-41e0-9bda-444debc9501a
 inputs:
 - Country
+name: Get All AWS Activity From Country
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search
   Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName
   path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename
@@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml
index 01863254e1..80d8576c2c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get All AWS Activity From IP Address
-id: 446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-19'
 description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and
   will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP
@@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address a
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6
 inputs:
 - src_ip
+name: Get All AWS Activity From IP Address
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search
   src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName
   path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename
@@ -25,4 +24,7 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
-
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml
index 8a0a73b1a3..e44f5bf29c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get All AWS Activity From Region
-id: 5b794bef-1743-4f6f-804a-43915a2702ff
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-19'
 description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region
   and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the
@@ -9,9 +7,10 @@ description: This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic r
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 5b794bef-1743-4f6f-804a-43915a2702ff
 inputs:
 - Region
+name: Get All AWS Activity From Region
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search
   Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName
   path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename
@@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml
index 30d16c96e0..f62cf7aece 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
-name: Get Backup Logs For Endpoint
-id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-14'
 description: This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs
   of a specific endpoint for the last week.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your backup logs.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Backup Logs For Endpoint
 search: '| search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME
   as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ransomware
   - SamSam Ransomware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml b/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml
index a0838f51f4..21b5a50923 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get Certificate logs for a domain
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-2240-e756cc06fd73
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-29'
 description: This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information
   for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by "Let's Encrypt"
@@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ description: This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network
   traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain
   in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-2240-e756cc06fd73
 inputs:
 - domain
+name: Get Certificate logs for a domain
 search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
   FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$  by
   All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name
@@ -20,3 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as la
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Common Phishing Frameworks
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml b/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml
index c392604282..e4efcf018b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get DNS Server History for a host
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-11-09'
 description: While investigating any detections it is important to understand which
   and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data
@@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ description: While investigating any detections it is important to understand wh
   host has connected to the previous 24 hours.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your
   DNS traffic
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72
 inputs:
 - src_ip
+name: Get DNS Server History for a host
 search: '| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d
   count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort
   -count'
@@ -26,3 +25,7 @@ tags:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml b/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml
index 1f2ba1a2f3..741a0e6c64 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get DNS traffic ratio
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-11-09'
 description: 'This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming
   from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this
@@ -8,14 +6,16 @@ description: 'This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and co
   high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration
   via DNS.  '
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your network traffic
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73
 inputs:
 - src_ip
 - dest_ip
+name: Get DNS traffic ratio
 search: '| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_out"
   sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "bytes_in" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic
-  All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval
-  ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio'
+  All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
+  | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search
+  dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -25,3 +25,7 @@ tags:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml b/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml
index afb490a09f..33b7ad04b6 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
-name: Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId
-id: f3db4d1b-5f33-4b01-c541-c7ah9514c242
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-02-12'
 description: This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information
   about a specific instance via the instanceId field
 how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App
   for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later)
   and configure your AWS description inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: f3db4d1b-5f33-4b01-c541-c7ah9514c242
 inputs:
 - instanceId
+name: Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId
 search: '| search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup id
-  sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId|  search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,"
-  = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table
-  id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time,
-  state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID,
-  instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time
-  as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as
-  Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC'
+  sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId|  search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath
+  output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address
+  == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id,
+  placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id,
+  tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address
+  as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement
+  as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name,
+  vpc_id as VPC'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -25,3 +25,7 @@ tags:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml b/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml
index 33b30b37d5..6f761f95c8 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,16 @@
-name: Get EC2 Launch Details
-id: 0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-12'
 description: This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.
 how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App
   for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later)
   and configure your AWS description inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6
 inputs:
 - dest
-search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$
-  |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId
-  as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress,
-  responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture
+name: Get EC2 Launch Details
+search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as
+  arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress
+  as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture
   as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table
   arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName'
 tags:
@@ -21,3 +19,7 @@ tags:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml
index 48e051569b..2ebc0ac3ec 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
-name: Get Email Info
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-11-09'
 description: This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a
   specific email message over the last 2 hours.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
   email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75
 inputs:
 - message_id
+name: Get Email Info
 search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   - Suspicious Emails
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml b/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml
index e7c4b4f3f8..38b25aace1 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-name: Get Emails From Specific Sender
-id: 5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-11-09'
 description: This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last
   24 and next hours.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email
   logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate
   the Email data model.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe
 inputs:
-  - src_user
+- src_user
+name: Get Emails From Specific Sender
 search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   - Suspicious Emails
   - Web Fraud Detection
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml b/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml
index 351dc4c90b..2b7ce4bcaf 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd33
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-13'
 description: This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which
   has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine
@@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ description: This search allows you to gather more context around a notable whic
   your network.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
   logs from your DHCP server.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd33
 inputs:
 - src_mac
+name: Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST
   All_Sessions.All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user
@@ -18,3 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Asset Tracking
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml b/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml
index e5e615dc8e..edf40a1338 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get History Of Email Sources
-id: ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2019-02-21'
 description: This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours
   prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each
@@ -8,9 +6,10 @@ description: This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hour
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email
   logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate
   the Email data model.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c
 inputs:
 - src
+name: Get History Of Email Sources
 search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient)
   as recepient  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email
   by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
@@ -24,4 +23,8 @@ tags:
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
   - Ransomware
-  - SamSam Ransomware
\ No newline at end of file
+  - SamSam Ransomware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml
index 8bf608d76d..b2df57e9ab 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
-name: Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint
-id: 03bffe94-ec7a-4cbe-b677-6af40d1c4505
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-12'
 description: This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights
   associated with a specific host.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
   Windows event logs
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 03bffe94-ec7a-4cbe-b677-6af40d1c4505
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint
 search: '| search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717)
   dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified",
   Access_Right, signature'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml
index 9118a6df0f..0ee8673e03 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
-name: Get Logon Rights Modifications For User
-id: 552bc86c-f72c-4d44-b3f2-06ede13af7bb
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-02-27'
 description: This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights
   for a specific user account.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
   Windows event logs
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 552bc86c-f72c-4d44-b3f2-06ede13af7bb
 inputs:
 - user
+name: Get Logon Rights Modifications For User
 search: '| search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717)
   user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified",
   Access_Right, signature'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml b/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml
index 1c9e9a5f52..92179a3845 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-name: Get Notable History
-id: 3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-09-20'
 description: This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events
   for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents
   that may have occurred with the host under investigation.
 how_to_implement: If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating
   notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Notable History
 search: '| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner,
   priority, severity, status_description'
 tags:
@@ -82,4 +81,8 @@ tags:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
   - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
-  - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml b/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml
index 672480a6d0..175e74f167 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors
-id: 5df39b3f-347d-4869-b673-8r45ad4616fe
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-14'
 description: 'This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to
   the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`,
@@ -8,14 +6,19 @@ description: 'This search returns the information of the users that sent emails
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email
   logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate
   the Email data model.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 5df39b3f-347d-4869-b673-8r45ad4616fe
 inputs:
 - src_user
 - recipient
+name: Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors
 search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.com
   OR src_user=redhat@gmail.com | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
   as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-  - Hidden Cobra Malware
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Hidden Cobra Malware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml
index 6dbff7d256..3222204252 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get Parent Process Info
-id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-02-28'
 description: This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about
   the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation.
@@ -9,16 +7,16 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9
 inputs:
 - parent_process_name
 - dest
+name: Get Parent Process Info
 search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time)
-    as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest
-| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` 
-| search  parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$
-| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
-| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user
+  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
+  | search  parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Collection and Staging
@@ -48,4 +46,8 @@ tags:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
-  - Windows Service Abuse
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Windows Service Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml
index ca681e30c1..b4e2296e69 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
-name: Get Process File Activity
-id: 6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5
-version: 2
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2019-11-06'
 description: This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific
   endpoint
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint
   data and populating the Endpoint data model.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5
 inputs:
 - process_name
 - dest
+name: Get Process File Activity
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as
   file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name
-  from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
-  by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`  | search dest=$dest$  | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path'
+  from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path,
+  Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`  | search dest=$dest$  |
+  search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name,
+  file_path'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml
index 83b5ca7f57..0da0650ed8 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,20 @@
-name: Get Process Info
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-01'
 description: This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about
   the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process
   info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint
   data and populating the Endpoint data model.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71
 inputs:
 - process_name
 - dest
+name: Get Process Info
 search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time)
-    as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest
-| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` 
-| search  process_name= $process_name$ 
-| search dest = $dest$
-| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
-| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user
+  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
+  | search  process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -50,3 +47,7 @@ tags:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Windows Service Abuse
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml
index 7eb5011af8..c664c62cc4 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,21 @@
-name: Get Process Information For Port Activity
-id: 9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-01'
 description: This search will return information about the process associated with
   observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint
   data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341
 inputs:
 - dest_port
 - dest
+name: Get Process Information For Port Activity
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as
-    lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name
-    Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id 
-| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
-| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
-| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
-| search dest=$dest$ 
-| join dest type=inner 
-    [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port 
-    | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` 
-    | search dest_port=$dest_port$ 
-    | rename src as dest]'
+  lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user
+  Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner
+  [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by
+  Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search
+  dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -35,3 +29,7 @@ tags:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
   - Use of Cleartext Protocols
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml
index b2b536a8a7..50924b792d 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic
-id: 910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672
-version: 2
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2019-04-01'
 description: While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process
   is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and
@@ -9,16 +7,17 @@ description: While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with
   network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection
   products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: 910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as
-    lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process
-    Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner 
-    [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where
-        Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src 
-    | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` 
-    | rename src as dest]'
+  lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search
+  dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
+  count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id
+  Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -29,3 +28,7 @@ tags:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml b/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml
index 266e3f2cb9..b188d2db36 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-name: Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host
-id: 155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-23'
 description: This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon
   data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate
   events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: 155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94
 inputs:
 - process
 - dest
+name: Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host
 search: sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode>18
-  EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name,
-  Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter
+  EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user,
+  Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Ransomware
   - Suspicious WMI Use
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml b/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml
index 5ce6d009df..bc22f3435a 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Get Web Session Information via session id
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-1120-e756cc06fd89
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-10-08'
 description: This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out
   more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID
@@ -9,11 +7,16 @@ description: This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find ou
 how_to_implement: This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must
   configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment
   server.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-1120-e756cc06fd89
 inputs:
 - session_id
-search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http session_id  = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent)
-  by src_ip status'
+name: Get Web Session Information via session id
+search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http session_id  = $session_id$ | stats values(url)
+  values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml
index 75f6f8379c..5a88e2eae3 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Investigate AWS activities via region name
-id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-02-09'
 description: This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a
   specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters
@@ -8,14 +6,20 @@ description: This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11
 inputs:
 - vendor_region
-search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId
-  as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region'
+name: Investigate AWS activities via region name
+search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename
+  requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName)
+  by user instanceId vendor_region'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml
index cc9aebbd48..fa8e82752f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Investigate AWS User Activities by user field
-id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2018-03-12'
 description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific
   user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the
@@ -9,12 +7,17 @@ description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specifi
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76
 inputs:
 - user
+name: Investigate AWS User Activities by user field
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type
   userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml
index 835474a349..50ac6f2a4a 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
-name: Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations
-id: 097e8030-8662-4254-a735-bf0bdda696e3
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication
   logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+id: 097e8030-8662-4254-a735-bf0bdda696e3
 inputs:
 - user
+name: Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations
 search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login
   latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest)
   AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app  from datamodel=Authentication
@@ -17,3 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml
index af381cae68..c9df6aae28 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
-name: Investigate Network Traffic From src ip
-id: 9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050
-version: 1
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 date: '2018-06-15'
 description: This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific
   IP address.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your
   web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+id: 9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050
 inputs:
 - src_ip
+name: Investigate Network Traffic From src ip
 search: '| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml
index b281e92d21..8b7af6c318 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-name: Investigate Okta Activity by app
-id: 420eb1b8-2992-45d1-80cf-0b1b2759524d
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-02'
 description: This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Okta logs
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: 420eb1b8-2992-45d1-80cf-0b1b2759524d
 inputs:
 - app
+name: Investigate Okta Activity by app
 search: eventtype=okta_log app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as
   country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml
index 4216491b2a..71e37f56e6 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-name: Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address
-id: 56aae066-d619-477c-93e3-3fb83b2d23c3
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-02'
 description: This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address.
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Okta logs
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: 56aae066-d619-477c-93e3-3fb83b2d23c3
 inputs:
 - user
+name: Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address
 search: eventtype=okta_log src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml
index bbfbd6efc7..aceca46294 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts
-id: ed3fff45-cba6-4990-983f-6fac72bee659
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows
@@ -9,12 +7,18 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting wi
   source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+id: ed3fff45-cba6-4990-983f-6fac72bee659
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate
   | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user
-  dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$'
+  dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)`
+  | search dest=$dest$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml
index 05bb3ded2a..6106065511 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts
-id: 990007ad-d798-4b29-ab2f-f0034144c937
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows
@@ -9,13 +7,18 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting
   source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+id: 990007ad-d798-4b29-ab2f-f0034144c937
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user
   "(?<new_user>[^\@]+)" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count)
-  AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2
-  | rename new_user AS user '
+  AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where
+  sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user '
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml
index 0f80e0647b..8a6e9da72b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
-name: Investigate Previous Unseen User
-id: 5de385bf-4f1e-404e-9b67-92d162ff8938ad
-version: 1
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30
   days.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication
   logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+id: 5de385bf-4f1e-404e-9b67-92d162ff8938ad
 inputs:
 - dest
+name: Investigate Previous Unseen User
 search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login
   latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app)
   AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from
@@ -16,7 +15,12 @@ search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs
   | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login)
   as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user
   | where count=1 | where first_login >= relative_time(now(), "-30d") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$'
+  | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`
+  | search dest=$dest$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml
index 198e516d20..e4e621d899 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,27 @@
-name: Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications
-id: b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc
-version: 1
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-14'
 description: 'This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful
   remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force
   attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. '
 how_to_implement: You must be populating the Authentication data model with security
   events from your Windows event logs.
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+id: b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc
 inputs:
 - dest
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain 
-| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
-| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
-| `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$
-| table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count 
-| sort count'
+name: Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624
+  Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app
+  Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`
+  | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app
+  count | sort count'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Lateral Movement
   - SamSam Ransomware
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml
index 72238e20f3..79630768a9 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-name: Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header
-id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd89
-version: 1
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 date: '2017-10-20'
 description: This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a
   potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and
@@ -11,16 +9,21 @@ description: This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to
 how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP.
   You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream
   deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd89
 inputs:
 - src_ip
 - dest_ip
-search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval
-  cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length >
-  100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?<suspicious_strings>cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type,
+name: Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header
+search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$
+  | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length
+  > 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?<suspicious_strings>cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type,
   "application"), "True", "False")  | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious
   Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings,
   cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml
index 942d9d7e76..b50c17f23f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
-name: Investigate User Activities In Okta
-id: 24ff145d-4d16-420a-b047-480f2a51c403
-version: 1
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 date: '2020-04-02'
 description: This search returns all okta events by a specific user
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Okta logs
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+id: 24ff145d-4d16-420a-b047-480f2a51c403
 inputs:
 - user
+name: Investigate User Activities In Okta
 search: eventtype=okta_log user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml
index 7dec8c7e08..4d1ae50f35 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,21 @@
-name: Investigate Web POSTs From src
-id: f5c39fac-205c-4e07-9004-8fd61ea3431a
-version: 1
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 date: '2018-12-06'
 description: 'This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source
   IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination
   URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. '
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your
   web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+id: f5c39fac-205c-4e07-9004-8fd61ea3431a
 inputs:
 - src
+name: Investigate Web POSTs From src
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web
-  by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$'
+  by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search
+  http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml
index 9da6ddaea5..57228b7eff 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,35 @@
-name: Accept and assign event
-id: 667b8d15-2564-4994-929d-bda2532341bf
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Accepts the event and starts the response plan process by assigning the event to the person executing the playbook and assigns them to this task and closes this step as completed.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - set status
-  playbooks:
-    - scm: local
-      playook: Accept event and assign owner
-references:
-  - 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  This task is a default accept task and allows the analyst to start the response process and start the timer for mean time to detect (MTTD).  This allows measurement of analyst review and acceptance of the task at hand.  This can be superceded by assign other tasks to individuals (if the owner is coordinating processor).  The event owner can accept the event, and then retask other sub-phase and/or task to other individuals or teams.  This is considered a procedural or policy task.
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - set status
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: Accept event and assign owner
+    scm: local
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Accepts the event and starts the response plan process by assigning
+  the event to the person executing the playbook and assigns them to this task and
+  closes this step as completed.
+
+  '
+id: 667b8d15-2564-4994-929d-bda2532341bf
+name: Accept and assign event
+references:
+- 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: 'This task is a default accept task and allows the analyst to start the
+  response process and start the timer for mean time to detect (MTTD).  This allows
+  measurement of analyst review and acceptance of the task at hand.  This can be superceded
+  by assign other tasks to individuals (if the owner is coordinating processor).  The
+  event owner can accept the event, and then retask other sub-phase and/or task to
+  other individuals or teams.  This is considered a procedural or policy task.
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml
index b1f1824785..1782b9fccb 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml
@@ -1,34 +1,42 @@
-name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation
-id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious?
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-    - whois domain
-    - domain reputation
-    - hunt domain
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playbook: ""
-references:
-    - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  These are domains that are not related to urls and should be separately reviewed.
-  1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?)
-    a. search -> ```| stats ...```
-  1. Gather reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)
-  1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.
-  1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator
-    a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)
-    a. hange container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag
-date: '2020-04-21'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  - whois domain
+  - domain reputation
+  - hunt domain
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playbook: ''
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-04-21'
+description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if
+  Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious?
+
+  '
+id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747
+name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation
+references:
+- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "These are domains that are not related to urls and should be separately\
+  \ reviewed.\n1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence\
+  \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\
+  \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\
+  \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n  a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\
+  \ reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\
+  \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\
+  \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\
+  \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\
+  \ APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\
+  \  a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\
+  \ Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n  a. hange container and artifact severity\
+  \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml
index 8c713d11e4..91aa34c7c3 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,43 @@
-name: Analyze email indicators and reputation
-id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Validate email indicators existence, reputation, detonation and determine if Phish, Spam, Suspicious or Clean ?
-  Analyst should be reviewing SPF, DKIM, DMARC along with To: and Reply to: fields for non-matching data. Does the subject contain suspicious content. Is there a file or url? Does the x-origin-ip come from the same location and the sending domains? Does the email body seem too good to be true or create a sense of urgency?
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?)
-    a. search -> ```| stats ...```
-  1. Gather reputation, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)
-  1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.
-  1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator
-    a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)
-    a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag
-date: '2020-04-21'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-04-21'
+description: 'Validate email indicators existence, reputation, detonation and determine
+  if Phish, Spam, Suspicious or Clean ?
+
+  Analyst should be reviewing SPF, DKIM, DMARC along with To: and Reply to: fields
+  for non-matching data. Does the subject contain suspicious content. Is there a file
+  or url? Does the x-origin-ip come from the same location and the sending domains?
+  Does the email body seem too good to be true or create a sense of urgency?
+
+  '
+id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620
+name: Analyze email indicators and reputation
+references:
+- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\
+  \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\
+  \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\
+  \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n  a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\
+  \ reputation, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note\
+  \ (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators\
+  \ and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search\
+  \ engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT,\
+  \ Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\
+  \  a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\
+  \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n  a. Change container and artifact severity\
+  \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml
index 303f8ac568..0bf45a844b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,37 @@
-name: Analyze host indicator and reputation
-id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious?
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook: ""
-references:
-    - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?)
-    a. search -> ```| stats ...```
-  1. Gather repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)
-  1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.
-  1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator
-    a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)
-    a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup
+automation:
+  actions: null
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: ''
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if
+  Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious?
+
+  '
+id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e
+name: Analyze host indicator and reputation
+references:
+- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\
+  \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\
+  \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\
+  \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n  a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\
+  \ repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\
+  \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\
+  \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\
+  \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\
+  \ APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\
+  \  a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\
+  \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n  a. Change container and artifact severity\
+  \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml
index da5c3651db..8a1a5982a9 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,44 @@
-name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation
-id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious?
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-    - whois ip
-    - geolocate ip
-    - ip reputation
-    - ip intelligence
-    - hunt ip
-    - lookup ip
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook: ""
-references:
-    - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?)
-    a. search -> ```| stats ...```
-  1. Gather repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)
-  1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.
-  1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator
-    a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)
-    a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  - whois ip
+  - geolocate ip
+  - ip reputation
+  - ip intelligence
+  - hunt ip
+  - lookup ip
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: ''
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if
+  Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious?
+
+  '
+id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5
+name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation
+references:
+- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\
+  \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\
+  \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\
+  \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n  a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\
+  \ repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\
+  \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\
+  \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\
+  \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\
+  \ APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\
+  \  a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\
+  \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n  a. Change container and artifact severity\
+  \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml
index c301506212..b437a91635 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml
@@ -1,43 +1,51 @@
-name: Analyze network indicators and reputation
-id: 710b1249-88b4-4dfd-95cc-541cc688e1a3
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious?
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-    - whois ip
-    - whois domain
-    - geolocate ip
-    - ip reputation
-    - domain reputation
-    - url reputation
-    - ip intelligence
-    - domain intelligence
-    - url intelligence
-    - hunt ip
-    - hunt domain
-    - hunt url
-    - detonate url
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook: ""
-references:
-    - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?)
-    a. search -> ```| stats ...```
-  1. Gather reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)
-  1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.
-  1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator
-    a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)
-    a. hange container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  - whois ip
+  - whois domain
+  - geolocate ip
+  - ip reputation
+  - domain reputation
+  - url reputation
+  - ip intelligence
+  - domain intelligence
+  - url intelligence
+  - hunt ip
+  - hunt domain
+  - hunt url
+  - detonate url
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: ''
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if
+  Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious?
+
+  '
+id: 710b1249-88b4-4dfd-95cc-541cc688e1a3
+name: Analyze network indicators and reputation
+references:
+- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence\
+  \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\
+  \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\
+  \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n  a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\
+  \ reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\
+  \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\
+  \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\
+  \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\
+  \ APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\
+  \  a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\
+  \ Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n  a. hange container and artifact severity\
+  \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml
index e9471f98c2..6831054fb5 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,41 @@
-name: Analyze precursors to the event
-id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed is normal activity. This analysis is provided by reviewing additional logs and sources to include ids's, siem, network logs, host and host application event logs and vulnerabiltiy information. This is not an exhaustive list, but a summary of the data available.  Data available should be aligned the type of event and resources available to the customer.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. Depending the attack vector, use your siem or logging collector to find logs regarding the host, application and network connections surrounding the event detected.
-  2. Identify evidence information that proves the incident occurred as detected or corraborates the event(s).
-  3. Perform research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.
-date: '2020-04-21'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions: null
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-04-21'
+description: 'Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed
+  is normal activity. This analysis is provided by reviewing additional logs and sources
+  to include ids''s, siem, network logs, host and host application event logs and
+  vulnerabiltiy information. This is not an exhaustive list, but a summary of the
+  data available.  Data available should be aligned the type of event and resources
+  available to the customer.
+
+  '
+id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931
+name: Analyze precursors to the event
+references:
+- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Depending the attack vector, use your siem or logging collector to find
+  logs regarding the host, application and network connections surrounding the event
+  detected.
+
+  2. Identify evidence information that proves the incident occurred as detected or
+  corraborates the event(s).
+
+  3. Perform research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour
+  is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml
index f9ba6f8916..66015b94a6 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,46 @@
-name: Analyze url indicator and reputation
-id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious?
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - whois domain
-    - domain reputation
-    - url reputation
-    - domain intelligence
-    - url intelligence
-    - hunt domain
-    - hunt url
-    - detonate url
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook: ""
-references:
-    - 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  This should be TLD domain and url combinations analysis.
-  1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for each host?)
-    a. search -> ```| stats ...```
-  1. Gather reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)
-  1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.
-  1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator
-    a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)
-    a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - whois domain
+  - domain reputation
+  - url reputation
+  - domain intelligence
+  - url intelligence
+  - hunt domain
+  - hunt url
+  - detonate url
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: ''
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if
+  Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious?
+
+  '
+id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35
+name: Analyze url indicator and reputation
+references:
+- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "This should be TLD domain and url combinations analysis.\n1. If Splunk\
+  \ present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment.\
+  \ Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months\
+  \ increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for\
+  \ each host?)\n  a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather reputational, intelligence\
+  \ and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)\n\
+  1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal\
+  \ behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n\
+  1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious\
+  \ and whether to tag to block indicator\n  a. This should align to a severity change\
+  \ (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n \
+  \ a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with\
+  \ blocked and determination tag\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml
index cf320c64be..9f662b994b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,50 @@
-
-name: Conduct training
-id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: Take training courses to gain relevant knowledge - Sharpen the saw.
-automation:
-    is_note_required: false
-    role:
-    sla_type: minutes
-    sla:
-    action:
-    playbook: ""
-references:
-  - ""
-workflow: |
-  We do not rise to the level of our expectations. We fall to the level of our training.  - @atc_project
-  > “The more that you read, the more things you will know. The more that you learn, the more places you’ll go.” ― Dr. Seuss
-  We assume that you already have a strong technical background in fundamental disciplines — Networking, Operating Systems, and Programming.
-  Here are some relevant training courses that will help you in the Incident Response activities:
-  1. [Investigation Theory](https://chrissanders.org/training/investigationtheory/) by Chris Sanders. We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident Response team
-  1. [SANS Digital Forensics & Incident Response](https://digital-forensics.sans.org/training/courses) trainings
-    * SEC450: Blue Team Fundamentals: Security Operations and Analysis - https://www.sans.org/course/blue-team-fundamentals-security-operations-analysis. We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident Response team
-    * SEC504: Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling - https://www.sans.org/course/hacker-techniques-exploits-incident-handling We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident Response team
-    * FOR500: Windows Forensic Analysis - https://www.sans.org/course/windows-forensic-analysis
-    * FOR508: Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting, and Digital Forensics - https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-incident-response-threat-hunting-training
-    * SEC503: Intrusion Detection In-Depth - https://www.sans.org/course/intrusion-detection-in-depth
-    * FOR572: Advanced Network Forensics: Threat Hunting, Analysis, and Incident Response - https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-network-forensics-threat-hunting-incident-response
-    * SEC560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking - https://www.sans.org/course/network-penetration-testing-ethical-hacking OR Offensive Security trainings mentioned below
-    * SEC599: Defeating Advanced Adversaries - Purple Team Tactics & Kill Chain Defenses - https://www.sans.org/course/defeating-advanced-adversaries-kill-chain-defenses
-  1. [Offensive Security](https://www.offensive-security.com/courses-and-certifications/) trainings. We recommend [PWK](https://www.offensive-security.com/pwk-oscp/) by Offensive Security trainings are in the list because to fight a threat, you need to understand their motivation, tactics, and techniques.
-  The training above is a recommendation and certainly the size of the organization will depend on the amount of training possible.
-date: '2020-07-17'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup
+automation:
+  action: null
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbook: ''
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: Take training courses to gain relevant knowledge - Sharpen the saw.
+id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968
+name: Conduct training
+references:
+- ''
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "We do not rise to the level of our expectations. We fall to the level of\
+  \ our training.  - @atc_project\n> \u201CThe more that you read, the more things\
+  \ you will know. The more that you learn, the more places you\u2019ll go.\u201D\
+  \ \u2015 Dr. Seuss\nWe assume that you already have a strong technical background\
+  \ in fundamental disciplines \u2014 Networking, Operating Systems, and Programming.\n\
+  Here are some relevant training courses that will help you in the Incident Response\
+  \ activities:\n1. [Investigation Theory](https://chrissanders.org/training/investigationtheory/)\
+  \ by Chris Sanders. We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every\
+  \ member of your Incident Response team\n1. [SANS Digital Forensics & Incident Response](https://digital-forensics.sans.org/training/courses)\
+  \ trainings\n  * SEC450: Blue Team Fundamentals: Security Operations and Analysis\
+  \ - https://www.sans.org/course/blue-team-fundamentals-security-operations-analysis.\
+  \ We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident\
+  \ Response team\n  * SEC504: Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling\
+  \ - https://www.sans.org/course/hacker-techniques-exploits-incident-handling We\
+  \ recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident\
+  \ Response team\n  * FOR500: Windows Forensic Analysis - https://www.sans.org/course/windows-forensic-analysis\n\
+  \  * FOR508: Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting, and Digital Forensics -\
+  \ https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-incident-response-threat-hunting-training\n\
+  \  * SEC503: Intrusion Detection In-Depth - https://www.sans.org/course/intrusion-detection-in-depth\n\
+  \  * FOR572: Advanced Network Forensics: Threat Hunting, Analysis, and Incident\
+  \ Response - https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-network-forensics-threat-hunting-incident-response\n\
+  \  * SEC560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking - https://www.sans.org/course/network-penetration-testing-ethical-hacking\
+  \ OR Offensive Security trainings mentioned below\n  * SEC599: Defeating Advanced\
+  \ Adversaries - Purple Team Tactics & Kill Chain Defenses - https://www.sans.org/course/defeating-advanced-adversaries-kill-chain-defenses\n\
+  1. [Offensive Security](https://www.offensive-security.com/courses-and-certifications/)\
+  \ trainings. We recommend [PWK](https://www.offensive-security.com/pwk-oscp/) by\
+  \ Offensive Security trainings are in the list because to fight a threat, you need\
+  \ to understand their motivation, tactics, and techniques.\nThe training above is\
+  \ a recommendation and certainly the size of the organization will depend on the\
+  \ amount of training possible.\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml
index 3f578f7229..e6229ae4c6 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,38 @@
-name: Confirm incident
+author: ButterCup
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - update event
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event
+    scm: local
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Upon analysis, determination of incident status is either confirmation,
+  suspicious, false positive or authorized exception. Update the event metadata and
+  process event as determined.
+
+  '
 id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03
+name: Confirm incident
+references:
+- 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+- 3.2.5 Incident Documentation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
 tags:
   nist: RS.RP
-description: |
-  Upon analysis, determination of incident status is either confirmation, suspicious, false positive or authorized exception. Update the event metadata and process event as determined.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - update event
-  playbooks:
-    - scm: local
-      playook: Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event
-references:
-  - 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-  - 3.2.5 Incident Documentation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. Determine if confirmed, suspicious, a false positive, or authorized exception event
-  2. Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event
-  3. Proceed on the next task of prioritizing incident or lessons learned or escalate for additional investigation
-date: '2020-07-30'
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
 version: 1
-author: ButterCup
+workflow: '1. Determine if confirmed, suspicious, a false positive, or authorized
+  exception event
+
+  2. Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event
+
+  3. Proceed on the next task of prioritizing incident or lessons learned or escalate
+  for additional investigation
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml
index 9806a94f02..57d2e605c5 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,38 @@
-name: Contain Incident
-id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Use atomic indicators to block and contain malicious activity. Use host and network protection tools to block, pause, drop, or quarantine affected machines.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - block ip
-    - block domain
-    - block url
-    - block process
-    - terminate process
-    - quarantine host
-    - quarantine device
-  playbooks:
-    - scm: community
-      playook: quarantine device and block external network access
-references:
-  - 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. Determine the appropriate containment technique either with soft block (localized blocking of a specific indictors) or hard block (regionalized blocking, quarantine whole hosts, net blocks, etc) techniques
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - block ip
+  - block domain
+  - block url
+  - block process
+  - terminate process
+  - quarantine host
+  - quarantine device
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: quarantine device and block external network access
+    scm: community
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Use atomic indicators to block and contain malicious activity. Use host
+  and network protection tools to block, pause, drop, or quarantine affected machines.
+
+  '
+id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f
+name: Contain Incident
+references:
+- 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Determine the appropriate containment technique either with soft block
+  (localized blocking of a specific indictors) or hard block (regionalized blocking,
+  quarantine whole hosts, net blocks, etc) techniques
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml
index 60a501708f..0fdd40eda1 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,43 @@
-name: Create follow-up report
-id: 69d25415-408f-462a-899f-9bc8eef8c299
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Build an after actions report that discusses about what happened and a timeline. Provide what went well and what improvements can be made, information timeliness, steps or actions that might have delayed recovery, what information was shared or could have been shared, any corrective actions that would have prevent the incident, identify precursors and indicators should be watched for in the future or tools that could be used to mitigate future incidents. Conduct an Incident Review Meeting.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - update ticket
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  1. Create a follow up report
-    a. Exactly what happened, and at what times?
-    b. How well did staff and management perform in dealing with the incident?
-    c. Were the documented procedures followed? Were they adequate?
-    d. What information was needed sooner?
-    e. Were any steps or actions taken that might have inhibited the recovery?
-    f. What would the staff and management do differently the next time a similar incident occurs?
-    g. How could information sharing with other organizations have been improved?
-    h. What corrective actions can prevent similar incidents in the future?
-    i. What precursors or indicators should be watched for in the future to detect similar incidents?
-    j. What additional tools or resources are needed to detect, analyze, and mitigate future incidents?
-  2. Schedule and conduct a Incident Review Meeting with necessary leadership and incident response team
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - update ticket
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Build an after actions report that discusses about what happened and
+  a timeline. Provide what went well and what improvements can be made, information
+  timeliness, steps or actions that might have delayed recovery, what information
+  was shared or could have been shared, any corrective actions that would have prevent
+  the incident, identify precursors and indicators should be watched for in the future
+  or tools that could be used to mitigate future incidents. Conduct an Incident Review
+  Meeting.
+
+  '
+id: 69d25415-408f-462a-899f-9bc8eef8c299
+name: Create follow-up report
+references:
+- 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "1. Create a follow up report\n  a. Exactly what happened, and at what times?\n\
+  \  b. How well did staff and management perform in dealing with the incident?\n\
+  \  c. Were the documented procedures followed? Were they adequate?\n  d. What information\
+  \ was needed sooner?\n  e. Were any steps or actions taken that might have inhibited\
+  \ the recovery?\n  f. What would the staff and management do differently the next\
+  \ time a similar incident occurs?\n  g. How could information sharing with other\
+  \ organizations have been improved?\n  h. What corrective actions can prevent similar\
+  \ incidents in the future?\n  i. What precursors or indicators should be watched\
+  \ for in the future to detect similar incidents?\n  j. What additional tools or\
+  \ resources are needed to detect, analyze, and mitigate future incidents?\n2. Schedule\
+  \ and conduct a Incident Review Meeting with necessary leadership and incident response\
+  \ team\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml
index 0abdc1d20c..697367d838 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,35 @@
-name: Determine if an incident has occurred
-id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed is normal activity. Knowledge of false positives detractors will support this assessment. The object of this step is to remove confirmation bias and validate the detection as a true positive and anomalous behavior.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - set status
-  playbooks:
-    - scm: local
-      playook: Accept event and assign owner
-references:
-  - 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  Incident handlers are responsible for analyzing ambiguous, contradictory, and incomplete symptoms to determine what has happened.
-  The process here is to remove bias and support investigation based on indicators that validate compromise or violdation for continued investigation
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - set status
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: Accept event and assign owner
+    scm: local
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed
+  is normal activity. Knowledge of false positives detractors will support this assessment.
+  The object of this step is to remove confirmation bias and validate the detection
+  as a true positive and anomalous behavior.
+
+  '
+id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83
+name: Determine if an incident has occurred
+references:
+- 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: 'Incident handlers are responsible for analyzing ambiguous, contradictory,
+  and incomplete symptoms to determine what has happened.
+
+  The process here is to remove bias and support investigation based on indicators
+  that validate compromise or violdation for continued investigation
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml
index 58ff118934..03a3f6361e 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml
@@ -1,40 +1,57 @@
-name: Determine Incident Prioritization
-id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. Incidents targeting IT systems typically impact the business functionality that those systems provide, resulting in some type of negative impact to the users of those systems.
-  Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organizations information.
-  Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size of the incident and the type of resources it affects will determine the amount of time and resources that must be spent on recovering from that incident.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - update container
-  playbooks:
-    - scm: local
-      playook: Determine impact and effort
-references:
-  - 3.2.6 Incident Prioritization - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  1. Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. By determining,
-      a. None   | No effect to the organization’s ability to provide all services to all users
-      b. Low    | Minimal effect; the organization can still provide all critical services to all users but has lost efficiency
-      c. Medium | Organization has lost the ability to provide a critical service to a subset of system users
-      d. High   | Organization is no longer able to provide some critical services to any users
-  2. Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organization’s information.
-      a. None               | No information was exfiltrated, changed, deleted, or otherwise compromised
-      b. Privacy Breach     | Sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) of taxpayers, employees, beneficiaries, etc. was accessed or exfiltrated
-      c. Proprietary Breach | Unclassified proprietary information, such as protected critical infrastructure information (PCII), was accessed or exfiltrated
-      d. Integrity Loss     | Sensitive or proprietary information was changed or deleted
-  3. Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size of the incident and the type of resources it affects will determine the amount of time and resources that must be spent on recovering from that incident.
-      a. Regular          | Time to recovery is predictable with existing resources
-      b. Supplemented     | Time to recovery is predictable with additional resources
-      c. Extended         | Time to recovery is unpredictable; additional resources and outside help are needed
-      d. Not Recoverable  | Recovery from the incident is not possible (e.g., sensitive data exfiltrated and posted publicly); launch investigation
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - update container
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: Determine impact and effort
+    scm: local
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. Incidents targeting IT
+  systems typically impact the business functionality that those systems provide,
+  resulting in some type of negative impact to the users of those systems.
+
+  Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect the confidentiality,
+  integrity, and availability of the organizations information.
+
+  Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size of the incident and the type
+  of resources it affects will determine the amount of time and resources that must
+  be spent on recovering from that incident.
+
+  '
+id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1
+name: Determine Incident Prioritization
+references:
+- 3.2.6 Incident Prioritization - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "1. Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. By determining,\n    a.\
+  \ None   | No effect to the organization\u2019s ability to provide all services\
+  \ to all users\n    b. Low    | Minimal effect; the organization can still provide\
+  \ all critical services to all users but has lost efficiency\n    c. Medium | Organization\
+  \ has lost the ability to provide a critical service to a subset of system users\n\
+  \    d. High   | Organization is no longer able to provide some critical services\
+  \ to any users\n2. Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect\
+  \ the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organization\u2019s information.\n\
+  \    a. None               | No information was exfiltrated, changed, deleted, or\
+  \ otherwise compromised\n    b. Privacy Breach     | Sensitive personally identifiable\
+  \ information (PII) of taxpayers, employees, beneficiaries, etc. was accessed or\
+  \ exfiltrated\n    c. Proprietary Breach | Unclassified proprietary information,\
+  \ such as protected critical infrastructure information (PCII), was accessed or\
+  \ exfiltrated\n    d. Integrity Loss     | Sensitive or proprietary information\
+  \ was changed or deleted\n3. Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size\
+  \ of the incident and the type of resources it affects will determine the amount\
+  \ of time and resources that must be spent on recovering from that incident.\n \
+  \   a. Regular          | Time to recovery is predictable with existing resources\n\
+  \    b. Supplemented     | Time to recovery is predictable with additional resources\n\
+  \    c. Extended         | Time to recovery is unpredictable; additional resources\
+  \ and outside help are needed\n    d. Not Recoverable  | Recovery from the incident\
+  \ is not possible (e.g., sensitive data exfiltrated and posted publicly); launch\
+  \ investigation\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml
index 6058e1d971..7383cc660d 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,59 @@
-name: Document and notify of incident
-id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  At this point, incident responder should acquire, preserve, secure, and document all evidence to the incident. This process will be continual through the IR process. The incident responder should perform notification pursuant to the organizational incident response policy and outlined procedures.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - create ticket
-    - create incident
-    - create case
-    - send email
-  playbooks:
-      - scm: local
-        playook: Create case or merge with known case
-references:
-  - 3.2.5 Document Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-  - 3.2.7 Incident Notification - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  The reasond for reordering of the documentation of the incident was to align documentation and incident notification into the same process flow.
-  1. The current status of the incident (new, in progress, forwarded for investigation, resolved, etc.)
-  2. A summary of the incident
-  3. Indicators related to the incident
-  4. Other incidents related to this incident
-  5. Actions taken by all incident handlers on this incident
-  6. Chain of custody, if applicable
-  7. Impact assessments related to the incident
-  8. Contact information for other involved parties (e.g., system owners, system administrators)
-  9. list of evidence gathered during the incident investigation
-  10. Comments from incident handlers
-  11. Next steps to be taken (e.g., rebuild the host, upgrade an application).
-date: '2020-04-21'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - create ticket
+  - create incident
+  - create case
+  - send email
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: Create case or merge with known case
+    scm: local
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-04-21'
+description: 'At this point, incident responder should acquire, preserve, secure,
+  and document all evidence to the incident. This process will be continual through
+  the IR process. The incident responder should perform notification pursuant to the
+  organizational incident response policy and outlined procedures.
+
+  '
+id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a
+name: Document and notify of incident
+references:
+- 3.2.5 Document Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+- 3.2.7 Incident Notification - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: 'The reasond for reordering of the documentation of the incident was to
+  align documentation and incident notification into the same process flow.
+
+  1. The current status of the incident (new, in progress, forwarded for investigation,
+  resolved, etc.)
+
+  2. A summary of the incident
+
+  3. Indicators related to the incident
+
+  4. Other incidents related to this incident
+
+  5. Actions taken by all incident handlers on this incident
+
+  6. Chain of custody, if applicable
+
+  7. Impact assessments related to the incident
+
+  8. Contact information for other involved parties (e.g., system owners, system administrators)
+
+  9. list of evidence gathered during the incident investigation
+
+  10. Comments from incident handlers
+
+  11. Next steps to be taken (e.g., rebuild the host, upgrade an application).
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml
index 6fb5958c73..b39873f017 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml
@@ -1,31 +1,50 @@
-name: Identify additional affected hosts
-id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Use indictors developed from the detection and analysis to find additional hosts or potentially infected hosts.  If found perform additional analysis to determine root cause analysis and any additional indictors. If this is mass infection event, immediate containment must be delayed until full understanding of the infection is achieved.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-    - merge event
-  playbooks:
-    - scm: community
-      playook: Merge event with case
-references:
-  - 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-  - 3.3.2 Evidence Gathering and Handling - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-  - NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, for additional information on preserving evidence
-workflow: |
-  1. For Host infections, use persistence mechanism, dropped filenames, paths, hashs, accessed or collected files, links, network communications, network ports and protocols, netwrok flow data points, etc
-  2. For phishing infections, use email addresses, domains, urls, file hashes, x-origin-ip address, subject, etc
-  3. For Command and Control, use host communication, ports and protocols, application, url patterns, dns queries, ping data, etc
-  4. Escalate to incident management team, if a massive incident to support incident response.
-  5. Ensure all known event information and root cause of the event is known before proceeding with containment
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  - merge event
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: Merge event with case
+    scm: community
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Use indictors developed from the detection and analysis to find additional
+  hosts or potentially infected hosts.  If found perform additional analysis to determine
+  root cause analysis and any additional indictors. If this is mass infection event,
+  immediate containment must be delayed until full understanding of the infection
+  is achieved.
+
+  '
+id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c
+name: Identify additional affected hosts
+references:
+- 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+- 3.3.2 Evidence Gathering and Handling - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+- NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response,
+  for additional information on preserving evidence
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. For Host infections, use persistence mechanism, dropped filenames, paths,
+  hashs, accessed or collected files, links, network communications, network ports
+  and protocols, netwrok flow data points, etc
+
+  2. For phishing infections, use email addresses, domains, urls, file hashes, x-origin-ip
+  address, subject, etc
+
+  3. For Command and Control, use host communication, ports and protocols, application,
+  url patterns, dns queries, ping data, etc
+
+  4. Escalate to incident management team, if a massive incident to support incident
+  response.
+
+  5. Ensure all known event information and root cause of the event is known before
+  proceeding with containment
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml
index 7818395e30..c895361fb4 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,38 @@
-name: Identify vunlerabilities
-id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Scan host(s) for vulnerabilities. Reverse engineer malware thru static and dynamic means to determine any zero day vulnerabilities.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - scan host
-    - scan hosts
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.3.3 Identifying the Attacking Hosts - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-    - NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, for additional information on preserving evidence
-workflow: |
-  1. Scan host(s) with infection and determine any vulnerabilities that can remediate infection. (e.g. finding a SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability)
-  2. Identify any common vulnerabilities among the hosts infected
-  3. Reverse engineer malware for any zero day vulnerabilities.
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - scan host
+  - scan hosts
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Scan host(s) for vulnerabilities. Reverse engineer malware thru static
+  and dynamic means to determine any zero day vulnerabilities.
+
+  '
+id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62
+name: Identify vunlerabilities
+references:
+- 3.3.3 Identifying the Attacking Hosts - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+  - NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response,
+  for additional information on preserving evidence
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Scan host(s) with infection and determine any vulnerabilities that can
+  remediate infection. (e.g. finding a SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution
+  Vulnerability)
+
+  2. Identify any common vulnerabilities among the hosts infected
+
+  3. Reverse engineer malware for any zero day vulnerabilities.
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml
index 3a61431028..38eea56d8d 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,35 @@
-name: Implement additional monitoring
-id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Implement additional monitoring that reviews not only host/network containment success. Monitor network blocks for additional hosts that might not have been identified. Reassess containment as needed depending on any new information. If this is a mass infection, it's advised that a 24 no change process be implemented.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook: ""
-references:
-  - 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. Create additional monitoring for network and host detection for abnormal activity to ensure containment is effective.
-  2. Re-investigate new hosts found but not on the containment list
-date: '2020-04-21'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: ''
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-04-21'
+description: 'Implement additional monitoring that reviews not only host/network containment
+  success. Monitor network blocks for additional hosts that might not have been identified.
+  Reassess containment as needed depending on any new information. If this is a mass
+  infection, it''s advised that a 24 no change process be implemented.
+
+  '
+id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c
+name: Implement additional monitoring
+references:
+- 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Create additional monitoring for network and host detection for abnormal
+  activity to ensure containment is effective.
+
+  2. Re-investigate new hosts found but not on the containment list
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml
index 453f458dec..dbe078be18 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,45 @@
-name: Implement recovery monitoring
-id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Newly recovered systems should have additional monitoring for any anomalies or newly created incidents.  Adding single host to a previously infected list for a specified period will allow the incident responder to quickly assess a re-infection or subsequent new infection. At this stage in recovery, you should be unquarantining devices and removing any host blocks.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-    - unblock ip
-    - unblock domain
-    - unblock url
-    - unblock hash
-    - unblock process
-    - unquarantine device
-    - unquarantine host
-    - remove tag
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  1. Monitor restored systems for any new anomalies and ensure that operations have been returned to normal
-  2. Begin to remove emergency blocks to permanent block and remediation alerts for infected systems returning the network (e.g. laptops that were unreachable during the incident)
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  - unblock ip
+  - unblock domain
+  - unblock url
+  - unblock hash
+  - unblock process
+  - unquarantine device
+  - unquarantine host
+  - remove tag
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Newly recovered systems should have additional monitoring for any anomalies
+  or newly created incidents.  Adding single host to a previously infected list for
+  a specified period will allow the incident responder to quickly assess a re-infection
+  or subsequent new infection. At this stage in recovery, you should be unquarantining
+  devices and removing any host blocks.
+
+  '
+id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae
+name: Implement recovery monitoring
+references:
+- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Monitor restored systems for any new anomalies and ensure that operations
+  have been returned to normal
+
+  2. Begin to remove emergency blocks to permanent block and remediation alerts for
+  infected systems returning the network (e.g. laptops that were unreachable during
+  the incident)
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml
index f9c8bbac91..5b02738b99 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,28 @@
-name: Make personnel report suspicious activity
-id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  c
-automation:
-  is_note_required: false
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  action:
-  playbook:
-references:
-  - Organizational Acceptable Use Policy
-workflow: |
-  Develop a simplified, company wide-known way to contact IR team in case of suspicious activity on the user system.
-  Make sure that the personnel is aware of it, can and will use it.
-date: '2020-04-21'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup
+automation:
+  action: null
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbook: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-04-21'
+description: 'c
+
+  '
+id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057
+name: Make personnel report suspicious activity
+references:
+- Organizational Acceptable Use Policy
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: 'Develop a simplified, company wide-known way to contact IR team in case
+  of suspicious activity on the user system.
+
+  Make sure that the personnel is aware of it, can and will use it.
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml
index 4a287f788e..954d9eb8c8 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml
@@ -1,44 +1,46 @@
-name: Malware Hunt and Contain
-id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: Uses any presented filehash artifact sent to phantom and conducts a reputation check, hunts for additional systems, blocks file hash with <=10 positive detections and creates a ticket for follow up.  Any hashes found with >10 positive hits, automatically blockes the hashes, disables user accounts, logs off the user, shuts down the system and finally creates a urgent ticket.
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
   actions:
-    - file reputation
-    - hunt file
-    - get file
-    - block hash
-    - disable user
-    - logoff user
-    - shutdown system
-    - create ticket
+  - file reputation
+  - hunt file
+  - get file
+  - block hash
+  - disable user
+  - logoff user
+  - shutdown system
+  - create ticket
+  is_note_required: false
   playbooks:
-    - scm: community
-      playook: malware_hunt_and_contain
-references:
-  - https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.json
-  - https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.py
-  - https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.png
-workflow: |
-  1. Gets file reputation for every hash presented and filters hashes with >10 OR <=10 and >5 for positive hits
-  2. Get the files that match and hunt the file hashes and return the system(s)/user(s) that have these files present
-  3. If >10 then block hash, disable users, logoff user, shutdown system and create a ticket
-  4. IF <=10 but >5 block hash, and create a ticket
-  Ticket template:
-    Virus Detected on # devices
-    Hashes submitted with detections: (list hashes)
-    File was found on # of devices (list devices)
-    This impacts at least # users: (list users)
-    # of hashes were submitted for blocking: (list hashes)
-    # of users were forced to logoff: (list users)
-    # of user accounts were disabled: (list users)
-    # of systems were shutdown: (list systems)
-version: 2
+  - playook: malware_hunt_and_contain
+    scm: community
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
 date: '2020-08-05'
+description: Uses any presented filehash artifact sent to phantom and conducts a reputation
+  check, hunts for additional systems, blocks file hash with <=10 positive detections
+  and creates a ticket for follow up.  Any hashes found with >10 positive hits, automatically
+  blockes the hashes, disables user accounts, logs off the user, shuts down the system
+  and finally creates a urgent ticket.
+id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f
+name: Malware Hunt and Contain
+references:
+- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.json
+- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.py
+- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.png
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
+workflow: "1. Gets file reputation for every hash presented and filters hashes with\
+  \ >10 OR <=10 and >5 for positive hits\n2. Get the files that match and hunt the\
+  \ file hashes and return the system(s)/user(s) that have these files present\n3.\
+  \ If >10 then block hash, disable users, logoff user, shutdown system and create\
+  \ a ticket\n4. IF <=10 but >5 block hash, and create a ticket\nTicket template:\n\
+  \  Virus Detected on # devices\n  Hashes submitted with detections: (list hashes)\n\
+  \  File was found on # of devices (list devices)\n  This impacts at least # users:\
+  \ (list users)\n  # of hashes were submitted for blocking: (list hashes)\n  # of\
+  \ users were forced to logoff: (list users)\n  # of user accounts were disabled:\
+  \ (list users)\n  # of systems were shutdown: (list systems)\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml
index 222be388f5..99987c19a5 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,55 @@
-name: Mitigate or remediate any vulnerabilities
-id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Apply mitigations or remediate any known affecting vulnerabilities that linked to the incidents.  (e.g. SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability). Mitigations are controls that block and lower the risk, but don't remove the vulnerability. Remediation is patching and removing the risk known vulnerability from being exploited.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - patch host
-    - deploy patch
-    - run job
-    - execute program
-    - run script
-    - execute action
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. Apply remediations (e.g. patches) to infected and not infected hosts that pertain to the vulnerability found being used by the incident (remove the risk). Identify and fix any systems not accepting or validating the patch (e.g. needing reboots) as soon as possible.
-  2. This may require scheduling due to business needs. In a mass incident, emergency change requests can be used to support patching.  In single instance events, the risk to outage vs the risk to mitigate may be acceptable. If acceptable, then move remediations to lessons learned processing before closing out the request.  Put in place, mitigations for at least detections and if possible protection rules to minimize impact while remediation is being scheduled.
-  3. Apply mitigations such as IPS and host based firewall rules to mitigate (reduce the risk) of the vulnerability being exploited for at least detection to notify when occurring and if containment and eradication has failed.
-  4. Monitor detections to ensure containment is working and determine when eradication is beginning to be effective.
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - patch host
+  - deploy patch
+  - run job
+  - execute program
+  - run script
+  - execute action
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Apply mitigations or remediate any known affecting vulnerabilities that
+  linked to the incidents.  (e.g. SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution
+  Vulnerability). Mitigations are controls that block and lower the risk, but don''t
+  remove the vulnerability. Remediation is patching and removing the risk known vulnerability
+  from being exploited.
+
+  '
+id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7
+name: Mitigate or remediate any vulnerabilities
+references:
+- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Apply remediations (e.g. patches) to infected and not infected hosts
+  that pertain to the vulnerability found being used by the incident (remove the risk).
+  Identify and fix any systems not accepting or validating the patch (e.g. needing
+  reboots) as soon as possible.
+
+  2. This may require scheduling due to business needs. In a mass incident, emergency
+  change requests can be used to support patching.  In single instance events, the
+  risk to outage vs the risk to mitigate may be acceptable. If acceptable, then move
+  remediations to lessons learned processing before closing out the request.  Put
+  in place, mitigations for at least detections and if possible protection rules to
+  minimize impact while remediation is being scheduled.
+
+  3. Apply mitigations such as IPS and host based firewall rules to mitigate (reduce
+  the risk) of the vulnerability being exploited for at least detection to notify
+  when occurring and if containment and eradication has failed.
+
+  4. Monitor detections to ensure containment is working and determine when eradication
+  is beginning to be effective.
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml
index 7f382ed2c9..67e8b52f6b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,26 @@
-name: Practice Real World Events
+author: ButterCup
+automation:
+  action: null
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbook: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: Practice in the real environment. Sharpen Response skills within your
+  organization by simulating real world with training exercises within your organization.
 id: 97d00b14-dd01-47e4-b7eb-0a82f4998c4e
+name: Practice Real World Events
+references:
+- 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
 tags:
   nist: RS.RP
-description: Practice in the real environment. Sharpen Response skills within your organization by simulating real world with training exercises within your organization.
-automation:
-    is_note_required: false
-    role:
-    sla_type: minutes
-    sla:
-    action:
-    playbook:
-references:
-  - 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: Make sure that the response actions have been performed during an internal exercise by your Incident Response Team.
-  You need to make sure that when an Incident happens, the team understands the how and this is not the first time they have seen the tasks. This is best done by being able to execute the actual steps in **your environment**, i.e. blocking an IP address or a domain name.
-date: '2020-07-17'
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
 version: 1
-author: ButterCup
+workflow: Make sure that the response actions have been performed during an internal
+  exercise by your Incident Response Team. You need to make sure that when an Incident
+  happens, the team understands the how and this is not the first time they have seen
+  the tasks. This is best done by being able to execute the actual steps in **your
+  environment**, i.e. blocking an IP address or a domain name.
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml
index 17b6628d51..4120e4926c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml
@@ -1,46 +1,98 @@
-name: Prepare for incident handling
-id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  The lists in the workflow below provide examples of tools and resources available that may be of value during incident handling. These lists are intended to be a starting point for discussions about which tools and resources an organizations incident handlers need.
-automation:
-  is_note_required: false
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  action:
-  playbook: ""
-references:
-  - 3.1.1 Preparing to Handle Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-    ## Incident Handler Communications and Facilities:
-    * Contact information for team members and others within and outside the organization (primary and backup contacts), such as law enforcement and other incident response teams; information may include phone numbers, email addresses, public encryption keys (in accordance with the encryption software described below), and instructions for verifying the contacts identity
-    * On-call information for other teams within the organization, including escalation information
-    * Incident reporting mechanisms, such as phone numbers, email addresses, online forms, and secure instant messaging systems that users can use to report suspected incidents; at least one mechanism should permit people to report incidents anonymously
-    * Issue tracking system for tracking incident information, status, etc.
-    * Smartphones to be carried by team members for off-hour support and onsite communications
-    * Encryption software to be used for communications among team members, within the organization and with external parties; for Federal agencies, software must use a FIPS-validated encryption algorithm20
-    * War room for central communication and coordination; if a permanent war room is not necessary or practical, the team should create a procedure for procuring a temporary war room when needed
-    * Secure storage facility for securing evidence and other sensitive materials
-    ## Incident Analysis Hardware and Software
-    * Digital forensic workstations21 and/or backup devices to create disk images, preserve log files, and save other relevant incident data
-    * Laptops for activities such as analyzing data, sniffing packets, and writing reports
-    * Spare workstations, servers, and networking equipment, or the virtualized equivalents, which may be used for many purposes, such as restoring backups and trying out malware
-    * Blank removable media
-    * Portable printer to print copies of log files and other evidence from non-networked systems
-    * Packet sniffers and protocol analyzers to capture and analyze network traffic
-    * Digital forensic software to analyze disk images
-    * Removable media with trusted versions of programs to be used to gather evidence from systems
-    * Evidence gathering accessories, including hard-bound notebooks, digital cameras, audio recorders, chain of custody forms, evidence storage bags and tags, and evidence tape, to preserve evidence for possible legal actions
-    ## Incident Analysis Resources:
-    * Port lists, including commonly used ports and Trojan horse ports
-    * Documentation for OSs, applications, protocols, and intrusion detection and antivirus products Network diagrams and lists of critical assets, such as database servers
-    * Current baselines of expected network, system, and application activity
-    * Cryptographic hashes of critical files22 to speed incident analysis, verification, and eradication
-    ## Incident Mitigation Software:
-    * Access to images of clean OS and application installations for restoration and recovery purposes
-date: '2020-07-17'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  action: null
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbook: ''
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: 'The lists in the workflow below provide examples of tools and resources
+  available that may be of value during incident handling. These lists are intended
+  to be a starting point for discussions about which tools and resources an organizations
+  incident handlers need.
+
+  '
+id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08
+name: Prepare for incident handling
+references:
+- 3.1.1 Preparing to Handle Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '## Incident Handler Communications and Facilities:
+
+  * Contact information for team members and others within and outside the organization
+  (primary and backup contacts), such as law enforcement and other incident response
+  teams; information may include phone numbers, email addresses, public encryption
+  keys (in accordance with the encryption software described below), and instructions
+  for verifying the contacts identity
+
+  * On-call information for other teams within the organization, including escalation
+  information
+
+  * Incident reporting mechanisms, such as phone numbers, email addresses, online
+  forms, and secure instant messaging systems that users can use to report suspected
+  incidents; at least one mechanism should permit people to report incidents anonymously
+
+  * Issue tracking system for tracking incident information, status, etc.
+
+  * Smartphones to be carried by team members for off-hour support and onsite communications
+
+  * Encryption software to be used for communications among team members, within the
+  organization and with external parties; for Federal agencies, software must use
+  a FIPS-validated encryption algorithm20
+
+  * War room for central communication and coordination; if a permanent war room is
+  not necessary or practical, the team should create a procedure for procuring a temporary
+  war room when needed
+
+  * Secure storage facility for securing evidence and other sensitive materials
+
+  ## Incident Analysis Hardware and Software
+
+  * Digital forensic workstations21 and/or backup devices to create disk images, preserve
+  log files, and save other relevant incident data
+
+  * Laptops for activities such as analyzing data, sniffing packets, and writing reports
+
+  * Spare workstations, servers, and networking equipment, or the virtualized equivalents,
+  which may be used for many purposes, such as restoring backups and trying out malware
+
+  * Blank removable media
+
+  * Portable printer to print copies of log files and other evidence from non-networked
+  systems
+
+  * Packet sniffers and protocol analyzers to capture and analyze network traffic
+
+  * Digital forensic software to analyze disk images
+
+  * Removable media with trusted versions of programs to be used to gather evidence
+  from systems
+
+  * Evidence gathering accessories, including hard-bound notebooks, digital cameras,
+  audio recorders, chain of custody forms, evidence storage bags and tags, and evidence
+  tape, to preserve evidence for possible legal actions
+
+  ## Incident Analysis Resources:
+
+  * Port lists, including commonly used ports and Trojan horse ports
+
+  * Documentation for OSs, applications, protocols, and intrusion detection and antivirus
+  products Network diagrams and lists of critical assets, such as database servers
+
+  * Current baselines of expected network, system, and application activity
+
+  * Cryptographic hashes of critical files22 to speed incident analysis, verification,
+  and eradication
+
+  ## Incident Mitigation Software:
+
+  * Access to images of clean OS and application installations for restoration and
+  recovery purposes
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml
index 6724d6d5d4..6d2f2a32eb 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,54 @@
-name: Preventing Incidents
-id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: Keeping the number of incidents reasonably low is very important to protect the business processes of the organization. It is outside the scope of this document to provide specific advice on securing networks, systems, and applications. Although incident response teams are generally not responsible for securing resources, they are advocates of sound security practices. An incident response team should identify problems that the organization is otherwise not aware of and play a key role in risk assessment and training by identifying gaps.
-automation:
-  is_note_required: false
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  action:
-  playbook: ""
-references:
-  - 3.1.2 Prevent Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  The following:
-  * Risk Assessments. Periodic risk assessments of systems and applications should determine what allowing staff to emphasize monitoring and response activities for those resources.
-  * Host Security. All hosts should be hardened appropriately using standard configurations. In addition to keeping each host properly patched, hosts should be configured to follow the principle of least privilege—granting users only the privileges necessary for performing their authorized tasks. Hosts should have auditing enabled and should log significant security-related events. The security of hosts risks are posed by combinations of threats and vulnerabilities.
-  * Applicable threats, including organization-specific threats. Each risk should be prioritized, and the risks can be mitigated, transferred, or accepted until a reasonable overall level of risk is reached. Another benefit of conducting risk assessments regularly is that critical resources are identified, Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) expressed operating system and application configuration and their configurations should be continuously monitored. checklists to assist in securing hosts consistently and effectively.
-  * Network Security. The network perimeter should be configured to deny all activity that is not expressly permitted. This includes securing all connection points, such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and dedicated connections to other organizations.
-  * Malware Prevention. Software to detect and stop malware should be deployed throughout the organization. Malware protection should be deployed at the host level (e.g., server and workstation operating systems), the application server level (e.g., email server, web proxies), and the application
-  * User Awareness and Training. Users should be made aware of policies and procedures regarding appropriate use of networks, systems, and applications. Applicable lessons learned from previous incidents should also be shared with users so they can see how their actions could affect the organization. Improving user awareness regarding incidents should reduce the frequency of incidents. IT staff should be trained so that they can maintain their networks, systems, and applications in accordance with the organization’s security standards.
-date: '2020-07-17'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  action: null
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbook: ''
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: Keeping the number of incidents reasonably low is very important to protect
+  the business processes of the organization. It is outside the scope of this document
+  to provide specific advice on securing networks, systems, and applications. Although
+  incident response teams are generally not responsible for securing resources, they
+  are advocates of sound security practices. An incident response team should identify
+  problems that the organization is otherwise not aware of and play a key role in
+  risk assessment and training by identifying gaps.
+id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503
+name: Preventing Incidents
+references:
+- 3.1.2 Prevent Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "The following:\n* Risk Assessments. Periodic risk assessments of systems\
+  \ and applications should determine what allowing staff to emphasize monitoring\
+  \ and response activities for those resources.\n* Host Security. All hosts should\
+  \ be hardened appropriately using standard configurations. In addition to keeping\
+  \ each host properly patched, hosts should be configured to follow the principle\
+  \ of least privilege\u2014granting users only the privileges necessary for performing\
+  \ their authorized tasks. Hosts should have auditing enabled and should log significant\
+  \ security-related events. The security of hosts risks are posed by combinations\
+  \ of threats and vulnerabilities.\n* Applicable threats, including organization-specific\
+  \ threats. Each risk should be prioritized, and the risks can be mitigated, transferred,\
+  \ or accepted until a reasonable overall level of risk is reached. Another benefit\
+  \ of conducting risk assessments regularly is that critical resources are identified,\
+  \ Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) expressed operating system and application\
+  \ configuration and their configurations should be continuously monitored. checklists\
+  \ to assist in securing hosts consistently and effectively.\n* Network Security.\
+  \ The network perimeter should be configured to deny all activity that is not expressly\
+  \ permitted. This includes securing all connection points, such as virtual private\
+  \ networks (VPNs) and dedicated connections to other organizations.\n* Malware Prevention.\
+  \ Software to detect and stop malware should be deployed throughout the organization.\
+  \ Malware protection should be deployed at the host level (e.g., server and workstation\
+  \ operating systems), the application server level (e.g., email server, web proxies),\
+  \ and the application\n* User Awareness and Training. Users should be made aware\
+  \ of policies and procedures regarding appropriate use of networks, systems, and\
+  \ applications. Applicable lessons learned from previous incidents should also be\
+  \ shared with users so they can see how their actions could affect the organization.\
+  \ Improving user awareness regarding incidents should reduce the frequency of incidents.\
+  \ IT staff should be trained so that they can maintain their networks, systems,\
+  \ and applications in accordance with the organization\u2019s security standards.\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml
index c77dca51b4..4b5b0b72b0 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,35 @@
-name: Provide lessons learned tasks or changes
-id: 43fc5e87-d819-460a-a740-de2066b18a29
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Create any tasks or service requests based on the recommendations of the review of the incident or with the process flow from alert detection to provide feedback from false positives.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - create ticket
-  playbooks:
-    - scm: local
-      playook: Create false-positve reduction service request
-references:
-  - 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. Create service requests or documentation updates from the results of the review of the followup report and incident review meeting
-  2. Create service request for updating alert detection from feedback from false positives
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - create ticket
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: Create false-positve reduction service request
+    scm: local
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Create any tasks or service requests based on the recommendations of
+  the review of the incident or with the process flow from alert detection to provide
+  feedback from false positives.
+
+  '
+id: 43fc5e87-d819-460a-a740-de2066b18a29
+name: Provide lessons learned tasks or changes
+references:
+- 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Create service requests or documentation updates from the results of
+  the review of the followup report and incident review meeting
+
+  2. Create service request for updating alert detection from feedback from false
+  positives
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml
index 5d51e24e37..f5723d6ffa 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,24 @@
-name: Raise personnel awareness
-id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: Raise personnel awareness regarding phishing, ransomware, social engineering, and other attacks that involve user interaction
-automation:
-    is_note_required: false
-    role:
-    sla_type: minutes
-    sla:
-    action:
-    playbook:
-references:
-  - https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017/
-workflow: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
-date: '2020-07-17'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk, @atc_react
+automation:
+  action: null
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbook: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-17'
+description: Raise personnel awareness regarding phishing, ransomware, social engineering,
+  and other attacks that involve user interaction
+id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4
+name: Raise personnel awareness
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017/
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary
+  to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques
+  that involve user interaction.
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml
index 2ac775f2cd..c5397b59ff 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml
@@ -1,32 +1,46 @@
-name: Remove malicious content
-id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Remove malicious content. There are multiple ways to accomplish this. Depending on the maturity and size of the incident, this can be as simple as re-imaging a single system to full remediation via a deployable package from your antivirus vendor or removal of offending file via your enterprise detection and response (EDR) tool. Network attacks external to your environment will need to be managed with the support of your ISP. Internal attacks should be segmented for containment and then removing offending systems or malicious content from those offending systems.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - create ticket
-    - deploy patch
-    - run script
-    - add tag
-    - execute action
-    - execute program
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. Determine the correct approach based on maturity and size of the incident
-  2. Employ eradication and monitor the process to ensure the system does not get re-infected. Reinfection is an indication that your containment measures are inadequate to stop the incident.
-  3. Apply any new gold image with up to date patches on re-imaged systems.
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - create ticket
+  - deploy patch
+  - run script
+  - add tag
+  - execute action
+  - execute program
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Remove malicious content. There are multiple ways to accomplish this.
+  Depending on the maturity and size of the incident, this can be as simple as re-imaging
+  a single system to full remediation via a deployable package from your antivirus
+  vendor or removal of offending file via your enterprise detection and response (EDR)
+  tool. Network attacks external to your environment will need to be managed with
+  the support of your ISP. Internal attacks should be segmented for containment and
+  then removing offending systems or malicious content from those offending systems.
+
+  '
+id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226
+name: Remove malicious content
+references:
+- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Determine the correct approach based on maturity and size of the incident
+
+  2. Employ eradication and monitor the process to ensure the system does not get
+  re-infected. Reinfection is an indication that your containment measures are inadequate
+  to stop the incident.
+
+  3. Apply any new gold image with up to date patches on re-imaged systems.
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml
index 020147319c..8c01b2ab6e 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,44 @@
-name: Restore systems to operational status
-id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Depending on the sized of the incident, reimaging systems maybe a viable eradication and recovery process combined. Once restored to gold image (standardized corporate image) with immediate patching and updating of all known vulnerabilities. Create a service request for the Help Desk to re-image the host. Server or network equipment should be baselined and restored by the owning team.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - create ticket
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook: Create a service request for re-image
-references:
-  - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. Create a request for re-imaging system for eradication and recovery. Re-imaging will not be possible in a mass incident.
-  2. For mass incidents, provide immediate patching and reporting of non-compliant patching or antivirus removal tools.  Thorough forensic and reverse malware engineering will provide the necessary details to minimize complete recovery processes.
-  3. Do not restore localized customer files (/home/user, or /User/<username>), but only on a case by case basis and thorough review of the files being restored.
-  4. If the eradication process isn't reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication is missing a persistence mechanism or containment has failed.
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - create ticket
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: Create a service request for re-image
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Depending on the sized of the incident, reimaging systems maybe a viable
+  eradication and recovery process combined. Once restored to gold image (standardized
+  corporate image) with immediate patching and updating of all known vulnerabilities.
+  Create a service request for the Help Desk to re-image the host. Server or network
+  equipment should be baselined and restored by the owning team.
+
+  '
+id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4
+name: Restore systems to operational status
+references:
+- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: '1. Create a request for re-imaging system for eradication and recovery.
+  Re-imaging will not be possible in a mass incident.
+
+  2. For mass incidents, provide immediate patching and reporting of non-compliant
+  patching or antivirus removal tools.  Thorough forensic and reverse malware engineering
+  will provide the necessary details to minimize complete recovery processes.
+
+  3. Do not restore localized customer files (/home/user, or /User/<username>), but
+  only on a case by case basis and thorough review of the files being restored.
+
+  4. If the eradication process isn''t reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication
+  is missing a persistence mechanism or containment has failed.
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml
index 4834b07433..f7b6135117 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,34 @@
-name: Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete
-id: 3096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8372b712
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Investigate an email with a suspicious file attachment detected by Splunk Enterprise Security. Detonate the file attachment in a sandbox, gather network behavior from the sandbox results, and pivot on those network indicators with both external reputation queries and internal Splunk Common Information Model searches. After confirming the results with an analyst prompt, delete the email from the user's inbox, hopefully before they have opened it.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - set status
-  playbooks:
-    - scm: community
-      playook: suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete
-references:
-  - ""
-workflow: |
-  Synchronize the community playbook repository in Phantom, then open the playbook and follow the deployment notes to configure it for your environment.
-date: '2019-06-03'
-version: 1
 author: Philip Royer, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - set status
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete
+    scm: community
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2019-06-03'
+description: 'Investigate an email with a suspicious file attachment detected by Splunk
+  Enterprise Security. Detonate the file attachment in a sandbox, gather network behavior
+  from the sandbox results, and pivot on those network indicators with both external
+  reputation queries and internal Splunk Common Information Model searches. After
+  confirming the results with an analyst prompt, delete the email from the user''s
+  inbox, hopefully before they have opened it.
+
+  '
+id: 3096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8372b712
+name: Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete
+references:
+- ''
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: 'Synchronize the community playbook repository in Phantom, then open the
+  playbook and follow the deployment notes to configure it for your environment.
+
+  '
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml
index ce6ae40138..eddd244606 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml
@@ -1,33 +1,44 @@
-name: Validate hosts eradicated
-id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-  Confirm and acknowledge eradication steps are working as expected and number of infected host(s) is dropping.  Validation here will allow the incident responder to move to recovery phase. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating new image creation date. (win - 'systeminfo | find Original'', linux - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer', macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-requirements:
-workflow: |
-  1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating new image creation date.
-    a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original''
-    b. linux - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer'
-    c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))
-  2. If this host has been reinfected more than once, conduct a formal forensic review to ensure all malicious content has been removed.
-  2. If mass incident follows steps 2-5, determine if the number of infected host is reducing
-  3. Determine if the number of (re)infected host is increasing
-  4. If the eradication process isn't reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication is missing an persistence mechanism or containment has failed
-  5. If the eradication process shows new hosts are being infected, your containment process is failing and/or the incident has mutated. (e.g. polymorphic malware with a active vulnerability or actor changed tactics and is now using ping for command and control and uploaded new malware). If this occurs return to Detection and Analysis Phase and continue forensic analysis.
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Confirm and acknowledge eradication steps are working as expected and
+  number of infected host(s) is dropping.  Validation here will allow the incident
+  responder to move to recovery phase. If single instance, validate the reimage process
+  was completed by validating new image creation date. (win - ''systeminfo | find
+  Original'''', linux - ''ls -ld /var/log/installer'', macOS - /var/log/install.log.#
+  (oldest))
+
+  '
+id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99
+name: Validate hosts eradicated
+references:
+- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+requirements: null
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating\
+  \ new image creation date.\n  a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original''\n  b. linux\
+  \ - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer'\n  c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))\n\
+  2. If this host has been reinfected more than once, conduct a formal forensic review\
+  \ to ensure all malicious content has been removed.\n2. If mass incident follows\
+  \ steps 2-5, determine if the number of infected host is reducing\n3. Determine\
+  \ if the number of (re)infected host is increasing\n4. If the eradication process\
+  \ isn't reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication is missing an persistence\
+  \ mechanism or containment has failed\n5. If the eradication process shows new hosts\
+  \ are being infected, your containment process is failing and/or the incident has\
+  \ mutated. (e.g. polymorphic malware with a active vulnerability or actor changed\
+  \ tactics and is now using ping for command and control and uploaded new malware).\
+  \ If this occurs return to Detection and Analysis Phase and continue forensic analysis.\n"
diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml
index 8d09fd3da0..cf9b89a26a 100644
--- a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,34 @@
-name: Validate restored hosts
-id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d
-tags:
-  nist:
-    RS.RP
-description: |
-   Validate each reimaged system was completed by validating new image creation date. ** win: systeminfo | find Original ** linux: ls -ld /var/log/installer ** macOS: /var/log/install.log.# (oldest date of entry). If more surgical, antivirus package or enterprise detection and response removal process has successfully completed and system is showing no signs of indicators of the incident.
-automation:
-  role:
-  sla_type: minutes
-  sla:
-  is_note_required: false
-  actions:
-    - run query
-  playbooks:
-    - scm:
-      playook:
-references:
-  - 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-workflow: |
-  1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating new image creation date
-    a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original''
-    b. linux - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer'
-    c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))
-  2. Review existing monitoring to ensure host is working as expected and within normal parameters
-date: '2020-07-30'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup, Splunk
+automation:
+  actions:
+  - run query
+  is_note_required: false
+  playbooks:
+  - playook: null
+    scm: null
+  role: null
+  sla: null
+  sla_type: minutes
+date: '2020-07-30'
+description: 'Validate each reimaged system was completed by validating new image
+  creation date. ** win: systeminfo | find Original ** linux: ls -ld /var/log/installer
+  ** macOS: /var/log/install.log.# (oldest date of entry). If more surgical, antivirus
+  package or enterprise detection and response removal process has successfully completed
+  and system is showing no signs of indicators of the incident.
+
+  '
+id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d
+name: Validate restored hosts
+references:
+- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+tags:
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: "1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating\
+  \ new image creation date\n  a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original''\n  b. linux\
+  \ - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer'\n  c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))\n\
+  2. Review existing monitoring to ensure host is working as expected and within normal\
+  \ parameters\n"
diff --git a/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml b/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml
index 0700970e6f..ab0bd59274 100644
--- a/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml
+++ b/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,37 @@
-name: NIST 800-61r2 Response Plan
-id: b974f8bb-2999-4480-94ef-8a90029b8759
-description: Response plan built for the NIST framework described in NIST 800-61r2 (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf)
-is_note_required: false
-tags:
-    analytics_story: all
-    nist: RS.RP
-references:
-  - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
-response_phase:
-  - preparation_nist:
-     - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a
-       name: Preparation
-  - detection_analysis:
-    - id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d
-      name:  Detection and Analysis
-  - contain_eradicate_recover:
-      - id: 838ad8e8-1701-4829-be89-51a997fd9852
-        name: Contain Eradicate Recover
-  - post_incident:
-      - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80
-        name: Post Incident
-workflow: Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes for their security operations teams.
-    With this as the template and then customizing the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for thier response procedures.
-    Response plans and response procedures are different in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns to the policy.
-    > Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc).
-date: '2020-04-21'
-version: 1
 author: ButterCup
+date: '2020-04-21'
+description: Response plan built for the NIST framework described in NIST 800-61r2
+  (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf)
+id: b974f8bb-2999-4480-94ef-8a90029b8759
+is_note_required: false
+name: NIST 800-61r2 Response Plan
+references:
+- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+response_phase:
+- preparation_nist:
+  - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a
+    name: Preparation
+- detection_analysis:
+  - id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d
+    name: Detection and Analysis
+- contain_eradicate_recover:
+  - id: 838ad8e8-1701-4829-be89-51a997fd9852
+    name: Contain Eradicate Recover
+- post_incident:
+  - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80
+    name: Post Incident
+tags:
+  analytics_story: all
+  nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 1
+workflow: Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes
+  for their security operations teams. With this as the template and then customizing
+  the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for
+  thier response procedures. Response plans and response procedures are different
+  in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an
+  response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns
+  to the policy. > Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support
+  ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc).
diff --git a/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml b/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml
index 5af4051e9d..c1a4e69b75 100644
--- a/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml
+++ b/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml
@@ -1,35 +1,45 @@
-author: "ButterCup, Splunk"
-date: "2020-04-21"
+author: ButterCup, Splunk
+date: '2020-04-21'
 description: NIST incident response process that follows PICERL (https://www.sans.org/media/score/504-incident-response-cycle.pdf)
 id: 8a7ea67a-dd53-468e-aeef-b75aed0a877c
 is_note_required: false
-name: "NIST PICERL Response Plan"
+name: NIST PICERL Response Plan
 references:
-  - "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf"
-  - "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/incident-handlers-handbook-33901"
+- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
+- https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/incident-handlers-handbook-33901
 response_phase:
-  - preparation:
-      - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a
-        name: Preparation
-  - identification:
-      - id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100
-        name: Identification
-  - containment:
-      - id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c
-        name: Containment
-  - eradication:
-      - id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c
-        name: Eradication
-  - recovery:
-      - id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a
-        name: Recovery
-  - lessons_learned:
-      - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80
-        name: "Post-Incident Activities"
+- preparation:
+  - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a
+    name: Preparation
+- identification:
+  - id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100
+    name: Identification
+- containment:
+  - id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c
+    name: Containment
+- eradication:
+  - id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c
+    name: Eradication
+- recovery:
+  - id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a
+    name: Recovery
+- lessons_learned:
+  - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80
+    name: Post-Incident Activities
 tags:
   analytics_story:
-    - "Credential Dumping"
-    - Ransomeware
+  - Credential Dumping
+  - Ransomeware
   nist: RS.RP
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
 version: 1
-workflow: "Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes for their security operations teams. With this as the template and then customizing the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for thier response procedures. Response plans and response procedures are different in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns to the policy. Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc)."
+workflow: Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes
+  for their security operations teams. With this as the template and then customizing
+  the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for
+  thier response procedures. Response plans and response procedures are different
+  in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an
+  response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns
+  to the policy. Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support
+  ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc).
diff --git a/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml b/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml
index d16e285c4e..74516d18e5 100644
--- a/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml
+++ b/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
-name: Credential Dumping Attack
-id: 570dd98e-6cab-443c-bdd8-3dbb5fe4188d
-version: 2
-date: '2020-07-16'
-description: This response workflow guide you through the investigation of a credential dumping attack.
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+date: '2020-07-16'
+description: This response workflow guide you through the investigation of a credential
+  dumping attack.
+id: 570dd98e-6cab-443c-bdd8-3dbb5fe4188d
+name: Credential Dumping Attack
 response_phase:
-  - identification:
-      - id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79
-        name: Process Chain Analysis
-      - id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e
-        name: Analyze Malicious File
-      - id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f
-        name: Malware Hunt and Contain
-  - containment:
-      - id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78
-        name: Quarantaine Infected Host
+- identification:
+  - id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79
+    name: Process Chain Analysis
+  - id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e
+    name: Analyze Malicious File
+  - id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f
+    name: Malware Hunt and Contain
+- containment:
+  - id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78
+    name: Quarantaine Infected Host
 tags:
   analytics_story: Credential Dumping
-workflow: This workbook provides you a guide on how to investigate credential dumping with some automation to make data collection easier.
+  product:
+  - Splunk Phantom
+type: response
+version: 2
+workflow: This workbook provides you a guide on how to investigate credential dumping
+  with some automation to make data collection easier.

From 3d37e93d995962a65750e842c3467751366dc2f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 07:27:02 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 086/132] rundll32 syssetup, setupapi

Adding rundll32 syssetup and setupapi
---
 ...2_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml | 26 +++++-----
 ..._application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml | 49 +++++++++++++++++++
 ..._application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml | 48 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...ication_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml | 12 +++++
 ...ication_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml | 12 +++++
 5 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
index 06219f54f7..179bbb3187 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
@@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ id: 4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
 description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and
-  ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function. This particular technique
+  ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique
   will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module
   loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
   script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe,
   but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively
-  found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA.
+  found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any
+  network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE process_name=rundll32.exe)
-  CommandLine=*advpack* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
-  by Computer, User, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path,
-  CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
-  `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive. 
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..640ada57ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi
+id: 61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-04'
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll
+  and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load
+  script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads
+  may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
+  script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe,
+  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. 
+  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
+  C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any
+  network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/
+- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.dest 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..90da56494e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup
+id: 71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-04'
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll
+  by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load
+  script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads
+  may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
+  script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe,
+  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. 
+  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
+  C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any
+  network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/
+- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll,
+  triggering a false positive.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1b720043a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi
+tests:
+- name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi
+  file: endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9440f42dbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup
+tests:
+- name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup
+  file: endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From e02e30e423121b43f3c45f100d0ba14a4ebdb313 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-73-92>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 14:50:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 087/132] Added detection testing service results inDetect
 Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup

---
 ..._application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml | 26 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
index 90da56494e..de2b4b6ce6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup
 id: 71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
-description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll
-  by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load
-  script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads
-  may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by
+  calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique
+  will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module
+  loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
   script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe,
-  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. 
-  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
-  C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any
-  network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
+  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively
+  found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review
+  any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other
+  files are on disk.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
@@ -24,10 +24,9 @@ references:
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`'
+  Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`'
 known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll,
   triggering a false positive.
 tags:
@@ -45,4 +44,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From 783bc38a1d174f58841d8757a0ad4aff44f91b0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-73-92>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 14:50:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 088/132] Added detection testing service results inDetect
 Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi

---
 ..._application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml | 33 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
index 640ada57ad..6e28a0a422 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi
 id: 61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
-description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll
-  and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load
-  script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads
-  may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
-  script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe,
-  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. 
-  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
-  C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any
-  network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and
+  iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This
+  particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution,
+  the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During
+  investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will
+  spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents.
+  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During
+  investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed.
+  It's possible other files are on disk.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
@@ -24,13 +24,11 @@ references:
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.dest 
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.
+  Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi
+  triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
@@ -46,4 +44,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From b68e05685ed029fc1ca9ce017117b996408e5fc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 14:35:49 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 089/132] modified type for detections

---
 .../email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml    | 2 +-
 ...ple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 2 +-
 detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml             | 2 +-
 .../application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml       | 2 +-
 .../application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml   | 2 +-
 ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 2 +-
 ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 2 +-
 ...ws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 2 +-
 ...tect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 2 +-
 ..._network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 2 +-
 ...cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +-
 ...oud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 2 +-
 ...ud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 2 +-
 ...te_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml       | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml             | 2 +-
 ...detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml  | 2 +-
 .../detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml         | 2 +-
 .../high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml                           | 2 +-
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml                      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml      | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml          | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml   | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml        | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml      | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml   | 2 +-
 ...aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml    | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml   | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml    | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml      | 2 +-
 ...tect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml  | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml           | 2 +-
 .../detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml              | 2 +-
 .../dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml        | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml         | 2 +-
 ...c2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml        | 2 +-
 .../execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml          | 2 +-
 .../extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml            | 2 +-
 ...ell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml       | 2 +-
 ...reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml            | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml     | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml  | 2 +-
 ...lt_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml        | 2 +-
 .../attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml        | 2 +-
 .../credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml                  | 2 +-
 .../detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml        | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml                    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml          | 2 +-
 .../detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml     | 2 +-
 ...rocesses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 2 +-
 .../detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml    | 2 +-
 .../detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml              | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml  | 2 +-
 ...ershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 2 +-
 .../malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml  | 2 +-
 ...malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml      | 2 +-
 .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml               | 2 +-
 .../reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml     | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml                  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml             | 2 +-
 .../shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml  | 2 +-
 ...sa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...sa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +-
 ...a___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml   | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml   | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml    | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml     | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml   | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml    | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml                  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml          | 2 +-
 ...sa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml  | 2 +-
 ...__illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 ...agement_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...gement_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...vilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml  | 2 +-
 ...illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...egal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...g_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml  | 2 +-
 ...ss_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ..._active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ..._recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml      | 2 +-
 ...nd_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml      | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml        | 2 +-
 ...econ_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml     | 2 +-
 ...ivilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...a___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml        | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml  | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml                  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml               | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml  | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml                    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml                      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml               | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml      | 2 +-
 .../application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml        | 2 +-
 .../experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml  | 2 +-
 .../application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml       | 2 +-
 .../email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml      | 2 +-
 .../experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml  | 2 +-
 .../application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml          | 2 +-
 .../application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml | 2 +-
 .../application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml      | 2 +-
 .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml          | 2 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml         | 2 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml             | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml             | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml          | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml            | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml        | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml      | 2 +-
 ...ceiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 2 +-
 .../experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml   | 2 +-
 .../network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml       | 2 +-
 .../web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml              | 2 +-
 .../detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml     | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml           | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml       | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml         | 2 +-
 .../network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml                        | 2 +-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/network/tor_traffic.yml                              | 2 +-
 detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 2 +-
 309 files changed, 309 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
index 0be790e7c2..b3a3215431 100644
--- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
+++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
index e4738abe18..3082bf18c3 100644
--- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
index 6a4964aee7..ea1d9a8c60 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
index 846376816a..89dca9a463 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
index 566ec807cb..873dc069ec 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
@@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
index 3551751ade..70852ff1f9 100644
--- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
+++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index c98c1f17f3..82bb5a1702 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: Cloud
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index 31e13050b0..d13053cd1f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 40
   security_domain: Cloud
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
index dcefe62507..2d85ec953b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 25
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
index 1a642c9b7e..a4fed0df8f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 25
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
index 9e5dd93b19..8c8c49c570 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 15
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
index ed01f5d9d5..911ad0d2e0 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
index 5445a5e027..6ad348c953 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
index ac747d803b..47c0f1bac3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 9ebcf4c74d..6b3615867a 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
index a402699cce..10ac7a7566 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 25
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
index b1d0159e39..bfe1ccff7b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
index a5cf68bfaa..6551053f5e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
index 84face6d12..90e5d9bc40 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index fe71342506..ecb45bbe40 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 371d252ff3..e8f6b76514 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index 9b4d1687ec..9d4a2bb13b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index 6844f847ed..32d91a04c6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index e3b3d077c4..4c230f6289 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -57,5 +57,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index dc681ada6d..5318335ff2 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
index e487f1ed3a..4728709a0c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 30
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
index e5b7643f50..7d4e7594cb 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
@@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
index ff4de79335..fc96b779c7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
@@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
index f4bb82af75..b4fdb12055 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
@@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index 9aada4bca1..ff8e64bd6f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
index 01816a5b41..a19b1d5bca 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
index f6282510e6..983b8eebed 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
index 786448cbc3..0125cbc90a 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index 310f041a70..54edf60484 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index a09199ef31..959f4438f2 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security
   Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule
   these searches according to the bucket span interval.
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 references: []
 known_false_positives: None
 name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
index 7ef4dcb70c..b0350e2dd1 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
index cc0d56a0bb..8dc034146f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
@@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
index 6c1402b84d..38cac25192 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
index 30146d37b1..db8f3d2d57 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
index 6e56015841..241e0ec268 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
index a1e0006fb7..24a82284d7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
index 78565e14c6..45bc1424eb 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
index 1713026e6c..fe1899ed67 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
index 369dc6cc1e..e6f109db8d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
index 8bd3a6fc0c..ace3e83f47 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
index 717be1f122..38fc48a87c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
index 920f095128..0c17f9729b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
index 0c76eb70c8..1f03202df6 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 40
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index a683b8a332..8be22a0226 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
index 7aa2cac30f..8656647a11 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index 4f869ee643..5d7d9cd1a0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index 0b5fa730e0..c95f47d4c9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 25
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index b79bf256eb..305502d129 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index b41eae382f..2ab91cc70c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index c758004df9..1fca26816a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
index 6ca4149c10..b5733747ea 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 1b5ef45525..b75c29e732 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
index 8e548691b2..9fbc63d58a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
@@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
index 8f1f358024..791342bce6 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
@@ -66,5 +66,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 15
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
index 39ff87a6e7..642633e7ac 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
@@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
index d2fe54711b..98e53f8cca 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
index f7970b7ca7..972f12f659 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
index a42009f498..343d9398e1 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
index 6d1f28ffa0..96df484aea 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
index 72fa3054a5..6a0a8cef6d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
index a0be04286b..25ef6f8212 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
@@ -70,5 +70,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
index 5c0109d25e..d2b2d654c1 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
index e34a5d9ac0..8f307c7b49 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
@@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
index 0145ee0fc4..f940a99585 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index 8907b28613..b88d511dfc 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
index e6a6f48f65..e20f51bb0a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
@@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
index 6da03bb551..1fe05fbc5a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 031e273b88..3064059584 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 3716eb9fa8..1cf9d75e78 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
index 0400f1408c..5fd7e4b3fd 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 405e5c552a..1066e0879b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index ea6efe265a..62e781ea65 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
index d07ad69e3d..a19d7050b7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 911df36f5c..0e9c8a92f9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
index cc3fff3411..402c03adb1 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
@@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
index 86c8e7d368..4775b9e553 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
index 410bdd9f84..b58242148a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
index a86e84d2c9..f3a660b337 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 6
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 1bca72ed2e..77788d87f7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
index 7ef82cad94..8f27f532ca 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
index a0e62ef758..24deb4f510 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
@@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
index 28b61e103e..24f2f38c5f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
index 58e60fa368..9094b73286 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
index 7c342ecf6b..3201c0435a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
index 5a27cbfa09..59990fd6d7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
index df53386839..be0f06b215 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
index ffb2308c21..666ee9e234 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
index 6558a14289..3fd5f6302c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
index 5313a9de58..52b16a9d3d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
index 24b2611dea..86622fea54 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
index 3e8b335211..3dec2e4869 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
index 8456af0ab7..34721807d9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
index c2f37c4ed2..c2083e5e5d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 712ef9d99a..693fc0b676 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
index 0663888f64..3a5a669a05 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
index 3e171ce6ec..9cef0953b5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
index 4f48aad5de..f4e8c3dfc8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
index 4875d9e0d3..442b804b09 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
index 63901022b3..546f646420 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 6
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
index 6302591b71..a5c43325e6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 6
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
index e6c669923e..57cb55bb92 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index 569f46c6d6..576e0884cd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
index 522710576f..18dc633877 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
index 2eca5cc0fa..0ae1b31cc1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
index c2635aaea1..e3054ec328 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
@@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
index b5ad136f95..bbb933793c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
index 51d1796170..84cd19606a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
index 60020f3c53..b95aa3fae8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
index 6858be4760..24aa9ae850 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
index 23817aeff3..8b93d6f519 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
index 91bcc9e672..517d3cc923 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
index 19d52b7160..70342ff50c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
index c403b66a75..50d148998c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
index 0473989d8b..9d55c62282 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
index 398a26605e..f7bf9541e6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
index 4d855d0e38..37c7440569 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
index 9279a5baec..50572cc0c0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
index 5105df5b8b..a63c0934ae 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
index c7397568f2..be4bf11e85 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 190dd55b3f..0b6a053288 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
index c52e1462b5..f2c56ea04c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
index d3146a70c4..ab60cb1989 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
index 8690119b02..fa2b9b8a1d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
index 794d32c88a..edfb52a551 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
index f005ec4db8..2f6125666a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
index f2e1899160..98902652c2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
index 403a31998f..c6a7ef17f7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
index ae3c35d28f..254b752f84 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 296da3b451..66bb9686e5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
index cc192e5550..0d22359061 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
index 84d29cc4a1..55840b3939 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
index 70408c9727..d32084896d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
index c5caf51394..752b73b336 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
index 45c348bc19..57e7a5163e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
index 1d182c7181..2e97e97247 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
index c333e56c94..cf98d5e425 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
index f5436ed36d..bb5c5e9e84 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
index 152f1c15ff..b6b28a3bd2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
index 01eb1bf5fc..a4545cb286 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
index e72c322914..10dfcea5e0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
index 83954f0815..b4184a83ca 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
index a8b3d83d1b..503f3d0a72 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
index 200c626697..b247efc80f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
index f810de1820..036df21cec 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
index 72679a3a3e..0021b434f1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 2f6eb07522..3de408e98c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
index 1695100cc1..54360e5222 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
index fcc7105c7c..2e462fcb6a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
index 4642b77040..0db50962ad 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
index 9653639e18..f427b907f7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
@@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
index aa01bc3d8a..24449054c6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
index b3020029c0..e9f2d7399e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
index 7344015802..d08b0fb243 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
index c5971dea5e..4fa192140d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
index 93409aea4d..8867c2f48a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
index d39591da5b..507e36d10f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
index a1ab432e49..61579e5285 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
index 18f3bb801c..759639bdc1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
index 1c19e2bec7..208beac3dd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 19a7af0444..7ca598110c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
index 7180a3a3f0..7567428139 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
index c71fcd12e9..0ec9e2f3da 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
index 83de551b77..3755d3848a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
index 73aedc349b..d1b3490b24 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index a7b529d706..20e0b2aa80 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 2c15d21a0e..271795687f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -57,5 +57,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 2b787f072c..90446ad4df 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index 8bc4ee3dd8..afc6c869c2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
index 4002328d02..038d0a5e13 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
@@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
index b72b432b63..afe047d601 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
index e18dbbad83..ed57562587 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
@@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
index 4882b9bf59..53f3ce9572 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
index dddf72a75a..3aaf01f9d8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
index efc6041973..8e823e8992 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 681d19d718..275d143783 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
index 047d28778c..1651ce1b02 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: medium
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
index 603cdf2d05..8fb2ddf37e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: medium
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
index ee648a4ae8..7fc22afd4b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
index bc9166ae1e..f0e3ee51c7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
index e2c53569e4..afb535ea80 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - ticket_options
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
index e7f5b813e1..ee9e229724 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - logon_type
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index 73d5a2e4ba..0cdd233f34 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -68,5 +68,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 4e0df4a799..1a740d9a88 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 3108f60bf5..a78424efab 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index e07dd91688..61c3291e83 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 646fabb0f1..513957ac21 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 21f8403896..c24ed226de 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 679fc2a5c3..66afd7d3e3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 36260dcfd1..6713ef913d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index a0b91871b2..131460abd1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index f485fba61e..b40e37d56b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index f4d4b6e8f6..96dffb7f12 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -57,5 +57,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 4714b73694..62fb8d6d3c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_device_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
index f0d43db6c4..361368b0d7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
@@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
index baf88556f6..9d5f22295c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
@@ -75,5 +75,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 242fca9c04..72f23723fb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -62,5 +62,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 696abe8b15..159ab8250a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -65,5 +65,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 6167760a40..e92d54f59d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index fe8e0fe659..e2dc8e94c8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index bc3bb683c6..db9411b122 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index b41f3d12a9..d3e2839394 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6ffcd379f5..84a7e74213 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 53319215c3..fe3a8d6be6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index ee26a9e979..ef3b5a487e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 11160c5528..664a29c080 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 8f7f515161..0d993fd63e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 761c0ae7ef..949449240e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6f7c296c7e..9eea1a6725 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index b31e8a5d26..516cd6ffd0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index eb40c39247..ce08bf5829 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 773be29708..2fb74878c3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 292f9c2290..23ba8d04d5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index a626cfc0ea..6c142076b1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
index 81248c09b2..72d0b2bb06 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
@@ -247,5 +247,5 @@ tags:
   - process_path
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
index 916c805465..17fbe782ae 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
@@ -65,5 +65,5 @@ tags:
   - process_name
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
index cd19383736..f03f34bdfd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
index ddcd44c028..a052406fc5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
index 041dfaf6ab..a237251a0e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
index 5d2a1259b3..d73648cfbc 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
index 9b51171451..24aa58b8f2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
index d6a76883f8..4b5fededa6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
index d378623fe0..fadc046961 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
index a7ac316d3b..8ac3bd9375 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
index 01e43735b5..cad5927a5d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
index fe583f0acb..33f738ca21 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
index 09364ccb02..5ed7947224 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
index cbf641bb8f..411482d0c3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
index f2700e63e1..2e11cc2ecf 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
index ef8be4ae5f..75dced5aff 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
index 2aced7153b..9fd3de8bc1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
index cf6cf89024..c4cb475421 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
index 3cd12aa0b1..d5963ed6ff 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
index e62ea54246..4c5bb06777 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
index 78f278fcd4..3f4c71b6ee 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
index 4bfff3e8a9..5813b6f446 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
index cf3d07c4d0..4ebf7b2378 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
index 9ccca9c836..52249d762c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
index de15770e85..6b7e2fa92c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
index 1283f7a703..01c02c36cb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
@@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ tags:
   - UEBA for Security Cloud
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: mail server
-type: SSA
+type: streaming
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
index da2006139d..20502d5345 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
index e2a7e1fc61..13d8d15280 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 30c2a56add..7a881838ae 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
index d567238c47..59c2c5e7d9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
index bd36ed2199..f4c5a1fd74 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
index 485b09994a..45c42a2ee4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
index fa34dd4d08..66e4c5e2a0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
index 9df6bf67f0..4a8c7e6d0f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index b691324ee6..8bf7b260a5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
index ec473ccf2d..2169bc5471 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
index e11a9c6671..bc7d1ee8c1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index 2d50e21f20..d2938ce1b1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 747d112a8b..cfae68d390 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
index 59cd0ed0c5..fac60dc1f3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index 74276648f8..e8289afe14 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
index d398bfdbad..f169d084b0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
index 096706179a..8e87b4bbb9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
index 050331cf90..eaa0deb7e3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
index 2556bc305b..f476e6aaf0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
index 187dab7152..191aeff369 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
index 08c044f4eb..2dc40105d2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
index 80583693df..641864eb0e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
index f65bb3e968..e0956c50ba 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 5
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
index 1aa9748a46..272b9dcc3a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
index af8f59b9f9..ebecad16b1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
index 81560747a6..9ce48984c9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
index 74ad250522..7a4c4a8d99 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
index ba27d6d7a0..755e6e1ceb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
index f337f79a77..824d83b322 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
index 3c66362868..32c1ecfada 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
index 20a8d610bc..02a46ddc8a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
index 48b49585df..da2a6ac060 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
index b8da99abd4..d45f488cb3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
index 99933ce2ca..a464c99729 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
index 7d6990b200..a6c304658f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
index 61bd92bd97..20679c8362 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
index e1de4ebc6d..376f240dd2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
index 788e7450ed..7e3b5f3620 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
index d0d79d2d22..d0a0782bee 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
index 9cd24d64bb..6eaab1f346 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
index 34e844a759..3614d87ea3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index ecd10391b8..2d7002fbbc 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -70,5 +70,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
index 6365a452d6..afd2cff2bf 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
@@ -54,5 +54,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
index e8863b85db..a2975c2f3e 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
index bd71087b74..d566276dfc 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
index 07a9225f6f..148a3a62ed 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
index 0e315b14fd..071793c609 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
index f65d87930f..75fe591e81 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
index 619837fe0c..31bebc0731 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
index 0c04541021..8fcbc0d809 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
index 99b1d56891..759565ea52 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
index b7d8230144..878a7546ee 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
@@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
index 8ff6dd3a8e..6d61903c98 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
index 45778fbe05..e45df9cfa5 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
index 7337653a73..26f9aedd28 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
@@ -65,5 +65,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
index 8b86a07f91..b9c8be8c1f 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
index 9d3b497547..b0335dca10 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
index 96d211213b..8089eaa93f 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
index 1f2bc1e7b4..982c7065e6 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
index 888de5a289..cd352d9610 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
@@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
index 2e87ee1d6f..c230afe231 100644
--- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
index 00a64f84f2..78c7882317 100644
--- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
+++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
index e36d970332..d667c4e10b 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
index 2a6c4d108f..a031ddb7eb 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
index 91eb6167bb..3dfdfdd9c1 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1

From acaf6e2501374327d95406d36d38266edd3d49bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 15:41:56 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 090/132] added type batch to story

---
 stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml                         | 2 +-
 stories/asset_tracking.yml                                      | 2 +-
 stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml                          | 2 +-
 stories/aws_cryptomining.yml                                    | 2 +-
 stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml                            | 2 +-
 stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml                             | 2 +-
 stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml              | 2 +-
 stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml                                 | 2 +-
 stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml                         | 2 +-
 stories/brand_monitoring.yml                                    | 2 +-
 stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml                                  | 2 +-
 stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml                                  | 2 +-
 stories/collection_and_staging.yml                              | 2 +-
 stories/command_and_control.yml                                 | 2 +-
 stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml                          | 2 +-
 stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml | 2 +-
 stories/credential_dumping.yml                                  | 2 +-
 stories/data_exfiltration.yml                                   | 2 +-
 stories/data_protection.yml                                     | 2 +-
 stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml                             | 2 +-
 stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml                                | 2 +-
 stories/disabling_security_tools.yml                            | 2 +-
 stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml                           | 2 +-
 stories/dns_hijacking.yml                                       | 2 +-
 stories/dynamic_dns.yml                                         | 2 +-
 stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml               | 2 +-
 stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml                           | 2 +-
 stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml                          | 2 +-
 stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml                                | 2 +-
 stories/host_redirection.yml                                    | 2 +-
 stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml                                 | 2 +-
 stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml                        | 2 +-
 stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml         | 2 +-
 stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml                  | 2 +-
 stories/lateral_movement.yml                                    | 2 +-
 stories/malicious_powershell.yml                                | 2 +-
 stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml                             | 2 +-
 stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml                   | 2 +-
 stories/monitor_for_updates.yml                                 | 2 +-
 stories/netsh_abuse.yml                                         | 2 +-
 stories/office_365_detections.yml                               | 2 +-
 stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml                             | 2 +-
 stories/phishing_payloads.yml                                   | 2 +-
 ...oor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml | 2 +-
 stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml     | 2 +-
 stories/ransomware.yml                                          | 2 +-
 stories/ransomware_cloud.yml                                    | 2 +-
 stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml                                     | 2 +-
 stories/ransomware_samsam.yml                                   | 2 +-
 stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml                  | 2 +-
 stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml                | 2 +-
 stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml                     | 2 +-
 stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml      | 2 +-
 stories/sql_injection.yml                                       | 2 +-
 stories/sunburst_malware.yml                                    | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml                       | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml                     | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml                        | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml                              | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml          | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml                | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml            | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml                    | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml                  | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml                              | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_emails.yml                                   | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml                   | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml                           | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml                            | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml              | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml                                  | 2 +-
 stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml                     | 2 +-
 stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml         | 2 +-
 stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 2 +-
 stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml                       | 2 +-
 stories/unusual_processes.yml                                   | 2 +-
 stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml                          | 2 +-
 stories/web_fraud_detection.yml                                 | 2 +-
 stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml                     | 2 +-
 stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml                    | 2 +-
 stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml        | 2 +-
 stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml                            | 2 +-
 stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml                      | 2 +-
 stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml                        | 2 +-
 stories/windows_service_abuse.yml                               | 2 +-
 85 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
index 47bc1383c7..763a7c8006 100644
--- a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
@@ -108,5 +108,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/asset_tracking.yml b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
index 7cc4be14fe..e8f72ea895 100644
--- a/stories/asset_tracking.yml
+++ b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
index f451386399..711b723af7 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
index 3e003d7fb8..189311233f 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
index 9bb0c00104..30a52b42e1 100644
--- a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
index 683c138643..131dff54ce 100644
--- a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
@@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
index 336f5e705f..fe5291f2f9 100644
--- a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
index da49aa0e41..f7f69695f7 100644
--- a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index 5c0e985202..7bef1d42d2 100644
--- a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
index 299d55e2e6..364f09a8c9 100644
--- a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
index 77ea0cdce1..e16a14bd56 100644
--- a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
@@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
index 2eb09048ad..45191a20ea 100644
--- a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
+++ b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
@@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
index 3b3cdb374c..c11f267ba6 100644
--- a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
+++ b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/command_and_control.yml b/stories/command_and_control.yml
index f7669993e5..249404b4ad 100644
--- a/stories/command_and_control.yml
+++ b/stories/command_and_control.yml
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
index 1244132f11..82fc4b1b80 100644
--- a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
+++ b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
index a6f4e8d1aa..b822595ece 100644
--- a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
+++ b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
index 440710e2a2..79380a1356 100644
--- a/stories/credential_dumping.yml
+++ b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3
diff --git a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
index a6e7e50ef8..f15159afb1 100644
--- a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
@@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/data_protection.yml b/stories/data_protection.yml
index e479cc4f14..4ddd3e9a0e 100644
--- a/stories/data_protection.yml
+++ b/stories/data_protection.yml
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
index 8ad70b7360..688ae15b79 100644
--- a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
+++ b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
index 036555683d..da313421ee 100644
--- a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
+++ b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
index 3c10bfcf6f..c7af18a592 100644
--- a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
+++ b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
index 9172bbf597..dd361ddd0a 100644
--- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
index b42f767ec6..9e96addd59 100644
--- a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
@@ -67,5 +67,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
index 24eacb4e18..1da5a012a5 100644
--- a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
+++ b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
index 77f91f5807..795ef06ed5 100644
--- a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
+++ b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 9a44a5e87a..baea0dc099 100644
--- a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
index 67ba626620..f9d384c1dd 100644
--- a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
index b746f6a286..a8bd0a92da 100644
--- a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
@@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/host_redirection.yml b/stories/host_redirection.yml
index e36f237f53..c1657c1c1f 100644
--- a/stories/host_redirection.yml
+++ b/stories/host_redirection.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
index 1d48039efb..08933d5ce9 100644
--- a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
@@ -98,5 +98,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
index da179646ea..d917076d85 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
@@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
index eb435445b1..900c9c0163 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
@@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
index 9d2d8071cc..5c61bd24a2 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/lateral_movement.yml b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
index ace138283a..88da07071e 100644
--- a/stories/lateral_movement.yml
+++ b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
index 7fd4fa18c4..d9e26cd56f 100644
--- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
+++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
@@ -72,5 +72,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 4
diff --git a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
index ab533eb352..82843d3e83 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Compliance
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
index 3bd6d65ea1..ba32bc6f20 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Compliance
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
index 94b622ba33..13854f3812 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Compliance
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
index 034fa39c75..c555af3e1e 100644
--- a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/office_365_detections.yml b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
index 6deb322a70..bb4c1aa772 100644
--- a/stories/office_365_detections.yml
+++ b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
@@ -17,5 +17,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
index 7fc6899bdb..8bff54c28d 100644
--- a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
+++ b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
index 5fbf82eb69..dc8135f94f 100644
--- a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
+++ b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
@@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
index b17dfbd3c2..b4cb728e9f 100644
--- a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
+++ b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
@@ -86,5 +86,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
index 9672ffec6d..b830e2cf09 100644
--- a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
+++ b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware.yml b/stories/ransomware.yml
index 8f21d68773..fbcd8b1130 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
index b57a9a660e..b6c9d12af6 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
index d76e0cdba0..fb737b148f 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
index e80ec4bbc8..7a033729ae 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
index 3feb9cd99a..780b9c5b90 100644
--- a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
+++ b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
index f465066a3e..1fc5374087 100644
--- a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
+++ b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
index afc3d3c769..510758b832 100644
--- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
index 5396c9337e..007ede37e0 100644
--- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
+++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/sql_injection.yml b/stories/sql_injection.yml
index 2b11009165..02a5263fcf 100644
--- a/stories/sql_injection.yml
+++ b/stories/sql_injection.yml
@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
index 3132c2c1ad..d878c63544 100644
--- a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
index f41d8fd1d2..70e2ea22ee 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
index 669eaf96d4..e1bb91c04f 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
@@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
index 482bdeec65..b51c5e5b97 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
index db23133eff..bb584c23f0 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
@@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
index b1c2c73da3..726f589b69 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
index 372f7195ee..b39a8bf359 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
@@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
index 8b3f34ab31..67883c28f7 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
index ea09741066..24562f7a12 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
index 5e8795af33..5af3223ee0 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
index 9571ffb8bf..46010319d6 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
index 6dbb822469..bd3b6109aa 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
@@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
index 7db5cea4ca..145ff8ce4b 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
index 51a823a8df..343cd16dfe 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
index 086b991cec..d3dd543db3 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
@@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
index 21d3a5c0a8..e5bf69ddb5 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
index 3057a0a1e9..23f9eab99f 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
index 8a6e3747f2..ed69c68cb4 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
index 0b12ea3155..ccb4effebe 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
index ec92648687..866a339299 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
index 10ca204326..2567b4e1d3 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/unusual_processes.yml b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
index 945f3c39ef..6ab158db54 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
@@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
index adf2c000a3..eeedca9a03 100644
--- a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
+++ b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
@@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
index 218c6362ff..8e6821294c 100644
--- a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
+++ b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Fraud Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
index fc63d52b18..af65a6c0bf 100644
--- a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
@@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
index 835bc5b9f0..6f95bbe38c 100644
--- a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
index 2650850964..78597aabca 100644
--- a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
index e8df583cb7..50e6bb82ce 100644
--- a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
@@ -32,5 +32,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
index b08ba06bb7..6905f8dd64 100644
--- a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
index c02011d9ad..58091a7529 100644
--- a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
index 866912c427..82df332e46 100644
--- a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
 version: 3

From 7cb093cd0bb64250e7ec712202a80a3b6f9d6e68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 09:46:18 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 091/132] adding risk score values

---
 bin/validate.py | 6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py
index 65d7adf312..7cf3f8c2af 100644
--- a/bin/validate.py
+++ b/bin/validate.py
@@ -137,11 +137,7 @@ def validate_standard_fields(object, uuids):
         if 'product' not in object['tags']:
             errors.append("ERROR: a `product` tag is required for object: %s" % object['name'])
 
-        # check detections have mitre_ids
-        if 'search' in object and 'known_false_positives' in object:
-            if 'mitre_attack_id' not in object['tags']:
-                errors.append("ERROR: a `mitre_attack_id` tag is required detection object: %s" % object['name'])
-
+        # check risk score values
         for k,v in object['tags'].items():
 
             if k == 'risk_score':

From b4c31d718a42ba9d85894d3a4ea26953d93c0354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:10:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 092/132] fixing minor generate bug, since we added response
 type action

---
 bin/generate.py | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py
index f6dca567ad..ad9675e75e 100644
--- a/bin/generate.py
+++ b/bin/generate.py
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ def get_deployments(object, deployments):
                         matched_deployments.append(deployment)
                         continue
 
-        # Remove this check since deployment files are numbered and detections for Splunk Security Analytics for AWS will only get risk configs. 
+        # Remove this check since deployment files are numbered and detections for Splunk Security Analytics for AWS will only get risk configs.
 
         # if 'product' in deployment['tags']:
         #     if type(deployment['tags']['product']) is str:
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks):
             if 'analytics_story' in response_task['tags']:
                 for story in response_task['tags']['analytics_story']:
                     if 'type' in response_task.keys():
-                        if response_task['type'] == 'batch':
+                        if response_task['type'] == 'response':
                             task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task')
                     else:
                         task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task')

From 1ec15cf0447c06fcc80971cd38ccb93cdd3bfc82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:18:16 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 093/132] renamed on all detections

---
 .../email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml    | 2 +-
 ...ple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 2 +-
 detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml             | 2 +-
 .../application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml       | 2 +-
 .../application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml   | 2 +-
 ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 2 +-
 ...abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 2 +-
 ...ws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 2 +-
 ...tect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 2 +-
 ..._network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 2 +-
 ...cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 +-
 ...oud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 2 +-
 ...ud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 2 +-
 ...te_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml       | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml             | 2 +-
 ...detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml  | 2 +-
 .../detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml         | 2 +-
 .../high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml                           | 2 +-
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml                      | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml      | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml          | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml   | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml        | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml      | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml   | 2 +-
 ...aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml    | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml   | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml    | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml      | 2 +-
 ...tect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml  | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml           | 2 +-
 .../detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml              | 2 +-
 .../dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml        | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml         | 2 +-
 ...c2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml        | 2 +-
 .../execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml          | 2 +-
 .../extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml            | 2 +-
 ...ell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml       | 2 +-
 ...reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml            | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml     | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml  | 2 +-
 ...lt_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml        | 2 +-
 .../attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml        | 2 +-
 .../credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml                  | 2 +-
 .../detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml        | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml                    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml          | 2 +-
 .../detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml     | 2 +-
 ...rocesses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 2 +-
 .../detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml    | 2 +-
 .../detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml              | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml  | 2 +-
 ...ershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 2 +-
 .../malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml  | 2 +-
 ...malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml      | 2 +-
 .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml               | 2 +-
 .../reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml     | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml                  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml             | 2 +-
 .../shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml       | 2 +-
 ...sa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml   | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml  | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml                  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml               | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml  | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml                    | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml                      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml               | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml      | 2 +-
 .../application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml        | 2 +-
 .../application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml       | 2 +-
 .../email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml      | 2 +-
 .../experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml  | 2 +-
 .../application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml          | 2 +-
 .../application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml | 2 +-
 .../application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml      | 2 +-
 .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml          | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml      | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml            | 2 +-
 .../gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml  | 2 +-
 ...gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml  | 2 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml         | 2 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml             | 2 +-
 ...ubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml       | 2 +-
 ...tes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml    | 2 +-
 ...ure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml   | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml   | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml     | 2 +-
 ...s_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml  | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml             | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml    | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml    | 2 +-
 ...ubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml       | 2 +-
 ...tes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml             | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml          | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml            | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml        | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml      | 2 +-
 ...ceiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 2 +-
 .../experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml   | 2 +-
 .../network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml       | 2 +-
 .../web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml  | 2 +-
 .../experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml              | 2 +-
 .../detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml     | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml           | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml                 | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml       | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml         | 2 +-
 .../network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml                        | 2 +-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/network/tor_traffic.yml                              | 2 +-
 detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 2 +-
 284 files changed, 284 insertions(+), 284 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
index b3a3215431..f2f3b9c9eb 100644
--- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
+++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
index 3082bf18c3..dc775f27fb 100644
--- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalC
   city  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |  search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
index ea1d9a8c60..f319c3286f 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.g
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
index 89dca9a463..3f5c18b5f4 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | sta
   src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
index 873dc069ec..11e8dbc419 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.c
   as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
index 70852ff1f9..357aed8043 100644
--- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
+++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
   asset_type: Web Server
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index 82bb5a1702..312b821f20 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as
   table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold,
   object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   asset_type: Cloud Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index d13053cd1f..3189e815aa 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as o
   _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold,
   object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   asset_type: Cloud Instance
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
index 2d85ec953b..be26a72ed2 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from
   = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls,
   expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
index a4fed0df8f..08fe83186c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command)
   - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls,
   expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
index 8c8c49c570..17d0167a0a 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=
   Activity" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
index 911ad0d2e0..c7680d6b47 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath inpu
   eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ransomware Cloud
   asset_type: AWS Account
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
index 6ad348c953..3db17668bd 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-e
   values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ransomware Cloud
   asset_type: S3 Bucket
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
index 47c0f1bac3..c4877a20d3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetwor
   requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 6b3615867a..45f2938ade 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=f
   userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
index 10ac7a7566..1b116faa15 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d
   object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
index bfe1ccff7b..5888f36ecd 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs
   | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
index 6551053f5e..058f294763 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(
   "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
index 90e5d9bc40..af807302db 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime
   OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user,
   image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index ecb45bbe40..4de0e07318 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values
   "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index e8f6b76514..d8a5564ef7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs
   OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime user command
   object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index 9d4a2bb13b..14a9bd46bb 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d
   table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index 32d91a04c6..33901073c2 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d
   Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index 4c230f6289..804268a60a 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, value
   | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 5318335ff2..e4668c9d82 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d
   | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
index 4728709a0c..f6209cd9dc 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   Time Logging into AWS Console" |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
index 7d4e7594cb..74193af0ea 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user City  userStatus userCity  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
index fc96b779c7..552a776e0c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user Country  userStatus userCountry  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
index b4fdb12055..2e2e22bba7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   Region" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user Region  userStatus userRegion  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index ff8e64bd6f..79d4b01aa9 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | r
   %H:%M:%S") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | table  first_time
   last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
   asset_type: GCP Storage Bucket
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
index a19b1d5bca..03aca91672 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPay
   | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table  _time, bucketName, src, user,
   location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
   asset_type: GCP Storage Bucket
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
index 983b8eebed..36834556df 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex
   bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   asset_type: S3 Bucket
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
index 0125cbc90a..8a5e0c258c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR r
   requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   asset_type: S3 Bucket
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index 54edf60484..901e7b33a4 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_s
   | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip
   | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   asset_type: S3 Bucket
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index 959f4438f2..97d1c1cd2e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket sp
   * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types
   vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
index b0350e2dd1..fc6b8e4734 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | r
 | search isOutlier=1
 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
index 8dc034146f..ff8d07f46e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17
   count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip
   | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
index 38cac25192..3f606f8a3e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=Dele
   path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count
   as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   asset_type: S3 Bucket
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
index db8f3d2d57..5ef13dcb3b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed  record_type=Azure
   values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type
   Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
index 241e0ec268..e20b2a5a5f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM data
   Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name("Compute")`
   | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
   asset_type: AWS ECR container
   mitre_attack_id:
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
index 24a82284d7..45f175e462 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` signature="Set Company Information." Modifie
   status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
index 45bc1424eb..90a1882d45 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." |
   user status signature dest ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
index fe1899ed67..1338dd6400 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthentica
   values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
index e6f109db8d..d394762eee 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name="eDiscovery s
   lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
index ace3e83f47..be0336e5f4 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Paramete
   AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
index 38fc48a87c..f10c3c59b5 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath inpu
   as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
index 0c17f9729b..b3398452c8 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Paramete
   AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user
   > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   asset_type: Office 365
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
index 1f03202df6..12d952d73a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m
   / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away,
   total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index 8be22a0226..719bed8d1e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_
   apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as
   isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
index 8656647a11..0fa3fcd896 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket sp
   num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev |
   `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index 5d7d9cd1a0..1371ddf7bb 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally
   apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)"
   as isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index c95f47d4c9..2a51330c4a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI
   output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
   src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index 305502d129..8eac869202 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI
   spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time,
   user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index 2ab91cc70c..ea85851ba6 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail`
   | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table
   _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 1fca26816a..29e62606b6 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI
   output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
   src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
index b5733747ea..773ea41fa0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS de
   by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 |
   `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index b75c29e732..920f268b46 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn
   values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Network ACL Activity
   asset_type: Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
index 9fbc63d58a..ad137fa075 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=fa
   as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
index 791342bce6..b185be2cdb 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search N
   user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
index 642633e7ac..f5013bbec5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$"
   | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Common Phishing Frameworks
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
index 98e53f8cca..837db579b5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type"  "Answer Length" Count "First
   Time" "Last Time" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
index 972f12f659..1016f37f59 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(
   Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
   asset_type: Windows
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
index 96df484aea..81fba34960 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A
   as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)`
   | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
index 6a0a8cef6d..342a488ecd 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user |
   "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console"  | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
index 25ef6f8212..9784918f82 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApi
   as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user
   | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
index d2b2d654c1..eb66faff95 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_eve
   | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName)
   as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
index 8f307c7b49..4091497fa3 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_
   | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName)
   as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
index f940a99585..4cdc36c42d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earl
   (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`|
   `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)`  | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Data Protection
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index b88d511dfc..0868427b68 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic`
   | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Dynamic DNS
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
index e20f51bb0a..8fe03fd803 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count  fro
   message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats
   sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Data Protection
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
index 1fe05fbc5a..325b570344 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src
   DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 3064059584..896eb44ed5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_mod
   | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId
   | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 1cf9d75e78..1328415b4e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as ear
   | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New
   Region" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
index 5fd7e4b3fd..30733708ab 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime,
   lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 1066e0879b..18c333ae4b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table
   _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   asset_type: AWS Instance
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 62e781ea65..b11af83f18 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn
   as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   asset_type: AWS Instance
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
index a19d7050b7..2a79a42c73 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 0e9c8a92f9..071042bdef 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | s
   | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(),
   "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
index 402c03adb1..8774ced086 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_
   "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
index 4775b9e553..1526f0ec32 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  FROM data
   Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg
   Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")`  | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
   asset_type: GCP GCR Container
   mitre_attack_id:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
index b58242148a..62df130be0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities  | eval empStatus=c
   `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity
   empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   asset_type: Domain Server
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
index f3a660b337..91172eae06 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 77788d87f7..cb0893230b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min
   as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   asset_type: Endpoint
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
index 8f27f532ca..d561778edc 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ name: Open Redirect in Splunk Web
 references: []
 search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
   asset_type: Splunk Server
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
index 24deb4f510..04942260d5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_
   OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path |
   bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
index 24f2f38c5f..8aa68f507e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Netsh Abuse
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
index 9094b73286..b947e40abb 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Monitor for Unauthorized Software
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - SamSam Ransomware
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
index 3201c0435a..d3e4722069 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
index 59990fd6d7..4c8c5bea96 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr
   Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
index be0f06b215..9d3db6ff24 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
index 666ee9e234..ccb8b5efb8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
index 3fd5f6302c..3e4d630c65 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search client
   as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter`
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
   asset_type: Splunk Server
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
index 52b16a9d3d..6f4002a10e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table
   process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
index 86622fea54..5bee6c513a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.actio
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
index 3dec2e4869..328c46edda 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\
   Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
index 34721807d9..c2c57b8ffc 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Unusual Processes
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
index c2083e5e5d..de021aa280 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_tim
   | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 693fc0b676..340410c62c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAG
   | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature
   | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
index 3a5a669a05..f0d89483df 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
index 9cef0953b5..c7a25f3b91 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
index f4e8c3dfc8..eadeb4c2b1 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\*
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Host Redirection
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
index 442b804b09..eb7bc16342 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR
   TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
index 546f646420..6060c1b1f6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
index a5c43325e6..a0f2a3a3ae 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
index 57cb55bb92..6cbda381e3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description
   | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index 576e0884cd..a52930f64e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
index 18dc633877..cd96de645d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32*
   AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
index 0ae1b31cc1..2f458fdd69 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
index e3054ec328..a42a56d7a1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex
   field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransonware
   - Ransomware
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
index bbb933793c..e9124dea55 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes`
   | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
index 84cd19606a..af467e48f5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user)
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
index b95aa3fae8..9f161d1cd3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user)
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
index 24aa9ae850..b63dab014d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as f
   Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
index 8b93d6f519..ce903eba82 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
index 517d3cc923..dc0a05d2a5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
index 70342ff50c..e827ca844e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
index 50d148998c..7e5e824653 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
index 9d55c62282..c6e896086c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ransomware
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
index f7bf9541e6..f420602358 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmS
   as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Lateral Movement
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
index 37c7440569..844e986ff4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName=
   LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName)
   as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
index 50572cc0c0..e8e4b7b8e9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR G
   Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
   asset_type: Windows
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
index a63c0934ae..f59b709091 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search
   count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
index be4bf11e85..b3c2e44e95 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 0b6a053288..51f340892b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
index f2c56ea04c..0221334b4b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=mshta.exe AND process_name!=mshta.
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
index ab60cb1989..5b58205fe8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
index fa2b9b8a1d..10f088bea5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Adm
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
index edfb52a551..5b9e1c2b55 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
index 2f6125666a..2be2e9fa47 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime
   lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Unusual Processes
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
index 98902652c2..2ca354306e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
index c6a7ef17f7..d375dc3c1a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   Processes.dest  Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`|
   `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
index 254b752f84..affb6511ca 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest)
   by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name
   as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Unusual Processes
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 66bb9686e5..f5459866ee 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
index 0d22359061..fc91a0fe0c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
index 55840b3939..4fb6593430 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
index d32084896d..8a3dc3680b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
index 752b73b336..342f2ccac7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
index 57e7a5163e..8b94c6a383 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos
   OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
index 2e97e97247..b8ae1876f6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime value
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name,
   parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
index cf98d5e425..563fe74065 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Proce
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   asset_type: ''
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
index bb5c5e9e84..733a8d879c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_
   Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Lateral Movement
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
index b6b28a3bd2..f3b3419074 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
index a4545cb286..9e8041caed 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   - Sunburst Malware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
index 10dfcea5e0..08ed4f2961 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id)
   bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
index b4184a83ca..a3e67723d2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "''"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter`
   | search num_obfuscation > 10 '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
index 503f3d0a72..bf4f35075a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
   Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
index b247efc80f..759d43e0bf 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
index 036df21cec..8c2d71c1bf 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
index 0021b434f1..a8db6f3522 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_pid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path,
   process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Phishing Payloads
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 3de408e98c..d1b43912da 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.process_name  | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
index 54360e5222..0babe53883 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Netsh Abuse
   - Disabling Security Tools
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
index 2e462fcb6a..254508329d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
index 0db50962ad..ef74d9e0df 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr
   by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
index f427b907f7..5717404846 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr
   by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
index 24449054c6..0cdb244754 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTim
   Registry.registry_key_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
index e9f2d7399e..5a2aa04fc0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ransomware
   - Suspicious WMI Use
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
index d08b0fb243..61047233a0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Unusual Processes
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
index 4fa192140d..452cf9c9a5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   BY "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
index 8867c2f48a..4a7f607e67 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
index 507e36d10f..b723def98b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
index 61579e5285..4df4038a20 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Sunburst Malware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
index 759639bdc1..918cac5c66 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Lateral Movement
   - Sunburst Malware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
index 208beac3dd..c8b8603bc8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 7ca598110c..431b251dcf 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
index 7567428139..754350edd5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.actio
   by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
index 0ec9e2f3da..02f8b61983 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
index 3755d3848a..d78611ebe3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id)
   | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count
   user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
index d1b3490b24..2135f0cf98 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name
   | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index afc6c869c2..6c50bcbd39 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(ma
   ) | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id,
   dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
index f0e3ee51c7..9d8da984c2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_eve
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(machine),
   body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
index a052406fc5..8f770d977b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
index a237251a0e..2958264a27 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
index d73648cfbc..5e70da6104 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
index 24aa58b8f2..27af9723dd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=msbuild.exe OR process_name=msbuil
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
index 4b5fededa6..bea0086cb9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
index fadc046961..47f83a0198 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
index 8ac3bd9375..22de98ef5f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
index cad5927a5d..1417a47c4c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup
   process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   - Disabling Security Tools
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
index 33f738ca21..ad1268e084 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - Ransomware
   asset_type: ''
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
index 5ed7947224..84ed04e895 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   != "explorer.exe" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
   | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
index 411482d0c3..1e88beec0b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Discovery Techniques
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
index 2e11cc2ecf..075da9711f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process_hash| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Unusual Processes
   - Ransomware
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
index 75dced5aff..5b00bbd265 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count
   process_name process_id parent_process_name process'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
   asset_type: ''
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
index 9fd3de8bc1..841ebbfaa6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost)
   + avgperhost)'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Unusual Processes
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
index c4cb475421..c1809c1f3e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process
   processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   - Unusual Processes
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
index d5963ed6ff..0b52b36cd0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | search process="*deletejournal*" AND process="*usn*" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
index 4c5bb06777..6c14df3f16 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
index 3f4c71b6ee..5dd2eaf50c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTim
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `windows_adfind_exe_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Sunburst Malware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
index 5813b6f446..ea14a4af55 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineven
   dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
   - Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
index 4ebf7b2378..e23063bfc3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
index 52249d762c..5a4c93c0e5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ references: []
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation,
   EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
index 6b7e2fa92c..5e25730449 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earl
   "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
index 20502d5345..ba779ee687 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipi
   | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio
   >= 0.1 |  rex field=recipient_address "(?<recipient_user>.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Suspicious Emails
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
index 13d8d15280..052b0604bd 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as
   2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average,
   num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 7a881838ae..7e57057de7 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) a
   brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true
   | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   - Suspicious Emails
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
index 59c2c5e7d9..1191bb81ad 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from d
   search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as "Last Update Time", | table Host, "Update
   Status", Product, "Last Update Time" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Monitor for Updates
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
index f4c5a1fd74..e5be88cd97 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_
   by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
index 45c42a2ee4..96939d20fb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Emails
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
index 66e4c5e2a0..0b5202b8c5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments`
   | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Suspicious Emails
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
index 4a8c7e6d0f..af40707f7c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data=
   as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index 8bf7b260a5..28bd134bb1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!=
   by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
index 2169bc5471..fb23111273 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list o
   src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
index 97e54f034d..8834fff93b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyA
   eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated
   userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate  | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
index c57e1c1eca..ee51203950 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eve
   action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status
   responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
index faa58d712b..437712762e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdent
   requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate
   | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
index ff2c6c1461..ba946d2904 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionI
   requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate
   | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
index 0bcfd840ab..83f097a0a7 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA  userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventNa
   | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn
   userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: AWS Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
index c898c77276..080e4b245f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}
   data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role
   data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: GCP Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
index 342615feaa..f2665721ee 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=
   data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location
   http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: GCP Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
index 6f177179e9..d7a9364554 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permi
   data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id
   | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: GCP Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
index 67985d4e8a..1a48acc7e6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.Audi
   |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp
   protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message  | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
   asset_type: GCP Account
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
index bc7d1ee8c1..37adf4603b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties
   |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
   properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   asset_type: GCP Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index d2938ce1b1..413ed7e756 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!
   as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |
   `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   asset_type: GCP Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index 185f825d4a..fe3ecb853f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts  objectRe
   | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision  |
   top  sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 42377b661f..7fff11e98d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | ta
   count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username
   annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index 80b1f6531e..38f6cd9fa3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourc
   objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup
   user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index c509d656e9..684a590f64 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrole
   objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username
   user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 2bff8058f2..adb5dcef59 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseS
   = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status
   requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index 328d91f879..3b914725ce 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sour
   src_user=system:anonymous  | table  src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI  |
   stats  count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
index 53e190a670..604bd4ef4c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s
   properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status
   properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
index 6541322b48..411af9ca96 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s
   annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason
   | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index ca217389bc..f7b65c99b8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| se
   user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name
   annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index 5d409fa81f..e317f69ed8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| se
   user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason
   | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 9c02063a2a..bb7bc925d7 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s
   user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod
   objectRef.namespace  |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index c314dfc0f5..a2f2545c43 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s
   rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace
   requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 10a15822bb..7c1bfa2c24 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s
   responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
   properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 6b94cf8a0e..2ba0d56c96 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s
   responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
   |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
index cfae68d390..81c324f49b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=Clu
   data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason
   |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index cc4c387988..817d6f791f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message`  data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=sys
   | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
   data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index 28886209e1..30b5635af1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resou
   | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name
   |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index 1a498bd5bd..e5847fab8d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=Clu
   src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason
   | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   asset_type: GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 0881af5018..1c3d612ab8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.re
   data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
   | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index 88e1c2c1d5..f9518a66af 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSup
   data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user
   |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
   kill_chain_phases:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
index fac60dc1f3..a6386f3c07 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index e8289afe14..d80b2412bb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
 search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
index f169d084b0..21b13143a0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ references:
 search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
index 8e87b4bbb9..8f1b6b2728 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
 search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
index eaa0deb7e3..f14dedc7cf 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(
   outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name  file_path | where file_name
   != "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Phishing Payloads
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
index f476e6aaf0..a7152d772f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Proce
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
index 191aeff369..973138e485 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service
   > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time
   dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
   - Sunburst Malware
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
index 641864eb0e..f51b407e15 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_o
   | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id|
   dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
index e0956c50ba..7a25bed265 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Lateral Movement
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
index 272b9dcc3a..b1479661ed 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint
   count, null))) as stdev by "dest" | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*4), isOutlier=if((count
   > upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Ransomware
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
index ebecad16b1..14fe6bf28a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.
   host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Sunburst Malware
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
index 9ce48984c9..c5067ccb86 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consu
   Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
index 7a4c4a8d99..6fb5bcaadd 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query  |
   `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
index 755e6e1ceb..08906661e9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="ar
   max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
index 824d83b322..62485fe52b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answ
   | makemv current_answer  | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer |
   eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
index 32c1ecfada..bc8c0ed2d5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as
   domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries)
   as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
index 02a46ddc8a..d1c101507d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as
   | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average,
   num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
index da2a6ac060..ed30b4882e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest"
   | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DNS Amplification Attacks
   asset_type: DNS Servers
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
index d45f488cb3..8410fd7c14 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   - Ransomware
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
index a464c99729..9025411078 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   - Command and Control
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
index a6c304658f..f86378c8e7 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Use of Cleartext Protocols
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
index 20679c8362..2dfc224b23 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   OR Web.url = "*invoker*") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - JBoss Vulnerability
   - SamSam Ransomware
   asset_type: Web Server
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 376f240dd2..4b7e72d52e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ references:
 - https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/
 search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
   asset_type: Network
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
index 7e3b5f3620..ae202aff6e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime,
   lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - JBoss Vulnerability
   - SamSam Ransomware
   asset_type: Web Server
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
index d0a0782bee..ba509e06ce 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_
   as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
index 6eaab1f346..640fd10dd8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web wher
   + mvcount(split(url, "select%20top")) + mvcount(split(url, "union")) + mvcount(split(url,
   "xp_cmdshell")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SQL Injection
   asset_type: Database Server
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
index 3614d87ea3..8b17175e8a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web
   Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s
   | `supernova_webshell_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Sunburst Malware
   cis20:
   - CIS 4
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index 2d7002fbbc..fcddb27b2d 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as a
   min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Data Protection
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   - DNS Hijacking
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
index afd2cff2bf..7b95a6aafd 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","M
   action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
index a2975c2f3e..aa6664c5f7 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs
   | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Command and Control
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
index d566276dfc..d4e624dfcf 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time
   All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`
   | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Sunburst Malware
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
index 148a3a62ed..81a1babeeb 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="p
   src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
index 071793c609..a000876cb0 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRU
   AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
index 75fe591e81..32a6c39b62 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?<snicat>(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX
   | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip
   dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Data Exfiltration
   asset_type: Network
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
index 31bebc0731..b95a5e8c22 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
index 8fcbc0d809..019767c04a 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR
   count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
index 759565ea52..4864991118 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields
   + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Asset Tracking
   asset_type: Infrastructure
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
index 878a7546ee..1503f7d206 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY
   bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats
   count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
index 6d61903c98..742026113d 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id
   | where count>1 | fields - count '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
index e45df9cfa5..dc4e3b6fdd 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,
   as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4
   passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
   asset_type: Network
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
index 26f9aedd28..68c7227903 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_tim
   as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time
   query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
index b9c8be8c1f..2a1be60dd7 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2)
   | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
index b0335dca10..93bd893b49 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50
   stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
index 8089eaa93f..117724ee23 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
index 982c7065e6..797fb5b144 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   null))) as stdev by src | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*2), isOutlier=if(count > upperBound
   AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Ransomware
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
index cd352d9610..cff80cd4fb 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest
   | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count |
   table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Ransomware
diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
index c230afe231..bb5ff72383 100644
--- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | `tor_traffic_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   - Ransomware
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
index 78c7882317..413c50b9d0 100644
--- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
+++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | wh
   cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length
   cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
   asset_type: Web Server
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
index d667c4e10b..66fa083ecf 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/l
   as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames>
   25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
   asset_type: Account
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
index a031ddb7eb..ed33dd989b 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<s
   ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5)
   | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
   asset_type: account
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
index 3dfdfdd9c1..ddebd70164 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/lo
   values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5
   | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
   asset_type: account
   cis20:

From eef01502f3f2c61327c569b8c385b242a20ef62d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:18:57 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 094/132] renamed stories

---
 .../baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml    |  2 +-
 ...e_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml |  2 +-
 ...loud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml |  2 +-
 .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml |  2 +-
 .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml  |  2 +-
 ...loud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml |  2 +-
 ...baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml |  2 +-
 .../baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml   |  2 +-
 ..._aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml |  2 +-
 ...ws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml |  2 +-
 ...aseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml |  2 +-
 ..._of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml |  2 +-
 ...line_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml |  2 +-
 baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml  |  2 +-
 baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml     |  2 +-
 ..._list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml |  2 +-
 ...bited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml |  2 +-
 baselines/discover_dns_records.yml            |  2 +-
 baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml           |  2 +-
 baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml      |  2 +-
 baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml    |  2 +-
 ..._api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml |  2 +-
 ...iously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml |  2 +-
 ...een_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ...seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml |  2 +-
 ...seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml |  2 +-
 baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml     |  2 +-
 ..._cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ...n_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml |  2 +-
 ...loud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ...cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml |  2 +-
 ...usly_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ...ously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml |  2 +-
 ...n_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ...en_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml |  2 +-
 ...instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ..._instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml |  2 +-
 ..._provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ...d_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml |  2 +-
 .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml |  2 +-
 .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml  |  2 +-
 ...previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml |  2 +-
 baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml        |  2 +-
 .../previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml    |  2 +-
 .../previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml  |  2 +-
 ...viously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml |  2 +-
 ...eviously_seen_running_windows_services.yml |  2 +-
 ...y_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml |  2 +-
 ...sly_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml |  2 +-
 .../previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml   |  2 +-
 ...ously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ...iously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml |  2 +-
 ...usly_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml |  2 +-
 ...ously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml |  2 +-
 ...ady_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml |  2 +-
 ...te_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml |  2 +-
 bin/doc-gen.py                                |  4 +--
 bin/generate.py                               | 34 +++++++++----------
 bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2         | 10 +++---
 stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml       |  2 +-
 stories/asset_tracking.yml                    |  2 +-
 stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml        |  2 +-
 stories/aws_cryptomining.yml                  |  2 +-
 stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml          |  2 +-
 stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml           |  2 +-
 ...aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml |  2 +-
 stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml               |  2 +-
 stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml       |  2 +-
 stories/brand_monitoring.yml                  |  2 +-
 stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml                |  2 +-
 stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml                |  2 +-
 stories/collection_and_staging.yml            |  2 +-
 stories/command_and_control.yml               |  2 +-
 stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml        |  2 +-
 ...lantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml |  2 +-
 stories/credential_dumping.yml                |  2 +-
 stories/data_exfiltration.yml                 |  2 +-
 stories/data_protection.yml                   |  2 +-
 stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml           |  2 +-
 stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml              |  2 +-
 stories/disabling_security_tools.yml          |  2 +-
 stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml         |  2 +-
 stories/dns_hijacking.yml                     |  2 +-
 stories/dynamic_dns.yml                       |  2 +-
 .../emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml |  2 +-
 stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml         |  2 +-
 stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml        |  2 +-
 stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml              |  2 +-
 stories/host_redirection.yml                  |  2 +-
 stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml               |  2 +-
 stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml      |  2 +-
 ...netes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml |  2 +-
 .../kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml    |  2 +-
 stories/lateral_movement.yml                  |  2 +-
 stories/malicious_powershell.yml              |  2 +-
 stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml           |  2 +-
 stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml |  2 +-
 stories/monitor_for_updates.yml               |  2 +-
 stories/netsh_abuse.yml                       |  2 +-
 stories/office_365_detections.yml             |  2 +-
 stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml           |  2 +-
 stories/phishing_payloads.yml                 |  2 +-
 ...iated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml |  2 +-
 ...d_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml |  2 +-
 stories/ransomware.yml                        |  2 +-
 stories/ransomware_cloud.yml                  |  2 +-
 stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml                   |  2 +-
 stories/ransomware_samsam.yml                 |  2 +-
 .../router_and_infrastructure_security.yml    |  2 +-
 .../spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml  |  2 +-
 stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml   |  2 +-
 ...nterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml |  2 +-
 stories/sql_injection.yml                     |  2 +-
 stories/sunburst_malware.yml                  |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml     |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml   |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml      |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml            |  2 +-
 ...icious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml |  2 +-
 .../suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml  |  2 +-
 ...spicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml  |  2 +-
 .../suspicious_command_line_executions.yml    |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml            |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_emails.yml                 |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml         |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml          |  2 +-
 ...suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml                |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml   |  2 +-
 ...ed_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml |  2 +-
 ...oper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml |  2 +-
 stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml     |  2 +-
 stories/unusual_processes.yml                 |  2 +-
 stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml        |  2 +-
 stories/web_fraud_detection.yml               |  2 +-
 stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml   |  2 +-
 stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml  |  2 +-
 ...s_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml |  2 +-
 stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml          |  2 +-
 stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml    |  2 +-
 stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml      |  2 +-
 stories/windows_service_abuse.yml             |  2 +-
 144 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)

diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
index 5a8ac4f66d..5ce3b64201 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.
   stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints,
   avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
index cfec692249..f90f310ffc 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17
   avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections
   | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
index d1f2df8633..73c4a543e9 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.use
   api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm
   show_density=true'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
   deployments:
   - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index 4567ae5e5a..c348f25dee 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_C
   instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1
   dist=expon show_density=true'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index acd4759a0d..6cbc1dc87b 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_C
   instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1
   dist=expon show_density=true'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   deployments:
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
index b877ab587d..ae94e67620 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where
   by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm
   show_density=true'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
   deployments:
   - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
index 05c75ca235..961ed75064 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_tim
   user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`|
   eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
   - Ransomware
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
index ec67fb56f5..adbbc19159 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type
   into dns_query_pdfmodel'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Command and Control
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index 150678ac10..b2d96fe4ee 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_ru
   | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user |
   fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   detections:
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index 62c3c11778..940c3de45e 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excess
   | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user
   | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   detections:
   - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
index ba683ec22a..69bce5deb3 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.
   avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats
   count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
index 83260019dd..05dc63dfd7 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentit
   stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints,
   avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
index 8b05c09949..a291a1318c 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIde
   avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats
   count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   detections:
   - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
index ad650af721..05e8af01ee 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction
   count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Disabling Security Tools
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
diff --git a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
index 8961582b92..145f272e1a 100644
--- a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
+++ b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Count of assets by category
 search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host)
   by category | sort -count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Asset Tracking
   detections:
   - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address
diff --git a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
index a692e761eb..fa531856a5 100644
--- a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
+++ b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search N
   [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity
   | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   detections:
   - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts
diff --git a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
index e4b743217b..c2bffe3968 100644
--- a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
+++ b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup a
   is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes
   | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Monitor for Unauthorized Software
   - SamSam Ransomware
diff --git a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
index 7cf3eee981..4cdcf408e3 100644
--- a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
+++ b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T ci
   delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer
   | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
   detections:
   - DNS record changed
diff --git a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
index 9214374287..fcfe8d6ed2 100644
--- a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
+++ b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ name: DNSTwist Domain Names
 search: '| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true"
   | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   - Suspicious Emails
   detections:
diff --git a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
index 6dcce241b4..b22b82c3a8 100644
--- a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
+++ b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`netbackup` "Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | bucket _t
   span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time,
   MESSAGE'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
   detections:
   - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups
diff --git a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
index 2cbf322a96..a41169e6bd 100644
--- a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
+++ b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
 search: '`netbackup` "An error occurred, failed to backup." | bucket _time span=1d
   | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
   detections:
   - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
index ab07bbf340..0b7b0829ea 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A
   | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName
   | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   detections:
   - Detect new API calls from user roles
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
index 566cd5d5c5..b75490ccfa 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId pa
   latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup
   previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   detections:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
index f225d38704..6183e22c3d 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup
   previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
index 8b447a5064..f25b7b22a0 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId
   | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
index 5534e51bbe..ebd29dc6dd 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI
   City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
   | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   detections:
   - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
index 6d79826229..4ede3e699e 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Previously Seen AWS Regions
 search: '`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time)
   as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   detections:
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
index 5a14742bb1..fc6fca22c4 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen,
   enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
index 3d2f0f81dd..efc0b3a82c 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen,
   enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
index 1c1b5b820b..d56d63eca4 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user
   | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
   - Hourly Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
index 1979c97fd0..132de6a3bd 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   "-90d@d") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data
   = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
index 8802720595..f58c2ffe08 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0)
   | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
index b21c9e1658..a2d6216129 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
index a596f29664..96857b1b6b 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data
   = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
index f7290c8d76..02906d8c5d 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
index 3933d3359e..feee4361a8 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
index 7d33982a10..46a125102c 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
index 00183b280e..ea9d9ccb72 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup
   previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
index 5d142216b6..5162d6d558 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen,
   lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
index a9c521cb75..0e6ed4a25d 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0)
   | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
index 6deb7d50b2..a3290c216e 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions
   | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
index 3c808c0439..78dde9150b 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
   AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Disabling Security Tools
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
index 1d7e760def..d645861c24 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestP
   as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID
   | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   detections:
   - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
index e5b36d2d16..f99d1be6dd 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestP
   as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv
   | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   detections:
   - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
index 4622e2a348..d7662e0c7f 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIden
   as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup
   previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   detections:
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
index 45320b31c7..17f13510bd 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath out
   userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
   detections:
   - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
index db35164f65..3f94137dbe 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service
   service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time)
   as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Sunburst Malware
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
index fa7321544c..afd14e91cc 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service
   by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`")
   | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
   - Windows Service Abuse
   - Sunburst Malware
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
index bb9793ba8a..0c37e633b7 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  | stats  earliest(_time) as earlie
   latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip
   | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   detections:
   - Detect S3 access from a new IP
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
index f0dc9e2229..acd83237a8 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user |
   stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region
   Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   detections:
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
index af42f4a7c2..f9b45f2ebb 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins
   | stats count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
index e1f5cb442b..abb22e831f 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime)
   as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   deployments:
   - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
index fd84e4f457..17810d14f2 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen m
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen
   | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
   deployments:
   - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
index 3df94bac68..5acc0a72ca 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen m
   lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`")
   | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
   deployments:
   - Hourly Cache Updates
diff --git a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
index 8bea8031df..47f5ab4190 100644
--- a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
+++ b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
   detections:
   - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems
diff --git a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
index 7c28c533f3..8fe19e31b9 100644
--- a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user |
   stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region
   Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   detections:
   - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
diff --git a/bin/doc-gen.py b/bin/doc-gen.py
index d2a288d6de..df97861c27 100644
--- a/bin/doc-gen.py
+++ b/bin/doc-gen.py
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ def prepare_content(stories, detections):
     sto_to_nists = {}
     sto_to_det = {}
     for detection in detections:
-        if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']:
-            for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']:
+        if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']:
+            for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']:
                 if story in sto_to_det.keys():
                     sto_to_det[story].add(detection['name'])
                 else:
diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py
index ad9675e75e..7c59709d12 100644
--- a/bin/generate.py
+++ b/bin/generate.py
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ def generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, response_tasks, baselines, deploymen
         # we are duplicating the code block above for now and just changing variable names to make future
         # changes to this data structure separate from the mappings generation
         # @todo expose the JSON data structure for newer risk type
-        annotation_keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist', 'analytics_story']
+        annotation_keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist', 'analytic_story']
         savedsearch_annotations = {}
         for key in annotation_keys:
             if key == 'mitre_attack':
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ def generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, response_tasks, baselines, deploymen
     return output_path
 
 
-def generate_analytics_story_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH):
+def generate_analytic_story_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH):
 
     sto_det = map_detection_to_stories(detections)
 
@@ -334,15 +334,15 @@ def get_deployments(object, deployments):
     matched_deployments = []
 
     for deployment in deployments:
-        if 'analytics_story' in deployment['tags']:
-            if type(deployment['tags']['analytics_story']) is str:
-                if 'analytics_story' in object['tags']:
-                    if deployment['tags']['analytics_story'] == object['tags']['analytics_story'] or deployment['tags']['analytics_story']=='all':
+        if 'analytic_story' in deployment['tags']:
+            if type(deployment['tags']['analytic_story']) is str:
+                if 'analytic_story' in object['tags']:
+                    if deployment['tags']['analytic_story'] == object['tags']['analytic_story'] or deployment['tags']['analytic_story']=='all':
                         matched_deployments.append(deployment)
 
             else:
-                for story in deployment['tags']['analytics_story']:
-                    if story == object['tags']['analytics_story']:
+                for story in deployment['tags']['analytic_story']:
+                    if story == object['tags']['analytic_story']:
                         matched_deployments.append(deployment)
                         continue
 
@@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ def get_nes_fields(search, deployment):
 def map_detection_to_stories(detections):
     sto_det = {}
     for detection in detections:
-        if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']:
-            for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']:
+        if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']:
+            for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']:
                 if 'type' in detection.keys():
                     if detection['type'] == 'batch':
                         rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule')
@@ -449,8 +449,8 @@ def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks):
     sto_res = {}
     for response_task in response_tasks:
         if 'tags' in response_task:
-            if 'analytics_story' in response_task['tags']:
-                for story in response_task['tags']['analytics_story']:
+            if 'analytic_story' in response_task['tags']:
+                for story in response_task['tags']['analytic_story']:
                     if 'type' in response_task.keys():
                         if response_task['type'] == 'response':
                             task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task')
@@ -467,8 +467,8 @@ def map_baselines_to_stories(baselines):
     sto_bas = {}
     for baseline in baselines:
         if 'tags' in baseline:
-            if 'analytics_story' in baseline['tags']:
-                for story in baseline['tags']['analytics_story']:
+            if 'analytic_story' in baseline['tags']:
+                for story in baseline['tags']['analytic_story']:
                     if 'type' in baseline.keys():
                         if baseline['type'] == 'batch':
                             baseline_name = str('ESCU - ' + baseline['name'])
@@ -502,8 +502,8 @@ def prepare_stories(stories, detections):
     sto_to_nists = {}
     sto_to_det = {}
     for detection in detections:
-        if 'analytics_story' in detection['tags']:
-            for story in detection['tags']['analytics_story']:
+        if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']:
+            for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']:
                 if 'type' in detection.keys():
                     if detection['type'] == 'batch':
                         rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule')
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ def main(args):
     detection_path = generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, response_tasks, baselines, deployments, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH)
 
     stories = sorted(stories, key=lambda s: s['name'])
-    story_path = generate_analytics_story_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH)
+    story_path = generate_analytic_story_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH)
 
     use_case_lib_path = generate_use_case_library_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baselines, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH)
 
diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2
index 2000e97f78..b3ae7a23bf 100644
--- a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2
+++ b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = {{ detection.providing_technologies | tojso
 {% else %}
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
 {% endif %}
-{% if detection.tags.analytics_story is defined %}
-action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytics_story | tojson }}
+{% if detection.tags.analytic_story is defined %}
+action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytic_story | tojson }}
 {% if detection.tags.risk_object is defined %}
 action.risk = 1
 action.risk.param._risk_object = {{ detection.tags.risk_object }}
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = {{ baseline.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ baseli
 description = {{ baseline.description }}
 action.escu.creation_date = {{ baseline.date }}
 action.escu.modification_date = {{ baseline.date }}
-{% if baseline.tags.analytics_story is defined %}
-action.escu.analytic_story = {{ baseline.tags.analytics_story | tojson }}
+{% if baseline.tags.analytic_story is defined %}
+action.escu.analytic_story = {{ baseline.tags.analytic_story | tojson }}
 {% else %}
 action.escu.analytic_story = []
 {% endif %}
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ description = {{ response_task.description }}
 action.escu.creation_date = {{ response_task.date }}
 action.escu.modification_date = {{ response_task.date }}
 {% if response_task.tags is defined %}
-action.escu.analytic_story = {{ response_task.tags.analytics_story | tojson }}
+action.escu.analytic_story = {{ response_task.tags.analytic_story | tojson }}
 {% else %}
 action.escu.analytic_story = []
 {% endif %}
diff --git a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
index 763a7c8006..925517ef1b 100644
--- a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ narrative: 'In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakar
 references:
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Apache Struts Vulnerability
+  analytic_story: Apache Struts Vulnerability
   category:
   - Vulnerability
   product:
diff --git a/stories/asset_tracking.yml b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
index e8f72ea895..9fc934adfa 100644
--- a/stories/asset_tracking.yml
+++ b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ narrative: This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understa
 references:
 - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Asset Tracking
+  analytic_story: Asset Tracking
   category:
   - Best Practices
   product:
diff --git a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
index 711b723af7..5dad19998f 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ narrative: 'Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and
 references:
 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: AWS Cross Account Activity
+  analytic_story: AWS Cross Account Activity
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
index 189311233f..6f9871e4ff 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive busin
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: AWS Cryptomining
+  analytic_story: AWS Cryptomining
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
index 30a52b42e1..32ea10cbdc 100644
--- a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references:
 - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html
 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: AWS Network ACL Activity
+  analytic_story: AWS Network ACL Activity
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
index 131dff54ce..219376c4fe 100644
--- a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ narrative: AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security
 references:
 - https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: AWS Security Hub Alerts
+  analytic_story: AWS Security Hub Alerts
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
index fe5291f2f9..410b5001c1 100644
--- a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ narrative: 'Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geogr
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
+  analytic_story: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
index f7f69695f7..03b4ba7f3e 100644
--- a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 - https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla
 tags:
-  analytics_story: AWS User Monitoring
+  analytic_story: AWS User Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index 7bef1d42d2..73c23c3fa8 100644
--- a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trig
 references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+  analytic_story: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
index 364f09a8c9..bb5215f727 100644
--- a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references:
 - https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Brand Monitoring
+  analytic_story: Brand Monitoring
   category:
   - Abuse
   product:
diff --git a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
index e16a14bd56..c523a36726 100644
--- a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive busin
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Cloud Cryptomining
+  analytic_story: Cloud Cryptomining
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
index 45191a20ea..af4f121bed 100644
--- a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
+++ b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ references:
 - https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html
 - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: ColdRoot MacOS RAT
+  analytic_story: ColdRoot MacOS RAT
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
index c11f267ba6..1c48144669 100644
--- a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
+++ b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Collection and Staging
+  analytic_story: Collection and Staging
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/command_and_control.yml b/stories/command_and_control.yml
index 249404b4ad..4a983de555 100644
--- a/stories/command_and_control.yml
+++ b/stories/command_and_control.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control
 - https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Command and Control
+  analytic_story: Command and Control
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
index 82fc4b1b80..5393312ef2 100644
--- a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
+++ b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/
 - https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Common Phishing Frameworks
+  analytic_story: Common Phishing Frameworks
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
index b822595ece..9976e0ce69 100644
--- a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
+++ b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ narrative: Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customize
 references:
 - https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
+  analytic_story: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
index 79380a1356..78c9e468cf 100644
--- a/stories/credential_dumping.yml
+++ b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003
 - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Credential Dumping
+  analytic_story: Credential Dumping
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
index f15159afb1..0b86437d78 100644
--- a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ narrative: Exfiltration comes in many flavors.  Adversaries can collect data ove
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Data Exfiltration
+  analytic_story: Data Exfiltration
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/data_protection.yml b/stories/data_protection.yml
index 4ddd3e9a0e..4d4537ef2b 100644
--- a/stories/data_protection.yml
+++ b/stories/data_protection.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022
 - https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Data Protection
+  analytic_story: Data Protection
   category:
   - Abuse
   product:
diff --git a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
index 688ae15b79..650ed69cfe 100644
--- a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
+++ b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon
 - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Detect Zerologon Attack
+  analytic_story: Detect Zerologon Attack
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
index da313421ee..45f81ca262 100644
--- a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
+++ b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ narrative: 'The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significan
 references:
 - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A
 tags:
-  analytics_story: DHS Report TA18-074A
+  analytic_story: DHS Report TA18-074A
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
index c7af18a592..888d15df8f 100644
--- a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
+++ b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ references:
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/
 - https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Disabling Security Tools
+  analytic_story: Disabling Security Tools
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
index dd361ddd0a..7d7ee8bb9b 100644
--- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A
 - https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: DNS Amplification Attacks
+  analytic_story: DNS Amplification Attacks
   category:
   - Abuse
   product:
diff --git a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
index 9e96addd59..6ad09af970 100644
--- a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ references:
 - http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/
 - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: DNS Hijacking
+  analytic_story: DNS Hijacking
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
index 1da5a012a5..337a50fe56 100644
--- a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
+++ b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ references:
 - http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/
 - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Dynamic DNS
+  analytic_story: Dynamic DNS
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
index 795ef06ed5..2e11a7a9b8 100644
--- a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
+++ b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf
 - https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
+  analytic_story: 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
index baea0dc099..5a674d6517 100644
--- a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ references:
 - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
 - https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
+  analytic_story: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
index f9d384c1dd..3cc8653eea 100644
--- a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ narrative: 'Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources an
 references:
 - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts
 tags:
-  analytics_story: GCP Cross Account Activity
+  analytic_story: GCP Cross Account Activity
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
index a8bd0a92da..49af8b5e8c 100644
--- a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity
 - https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Hidden Cobra Malware
+  analytic_story: Hidden Cobra Malware
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/host_redirection.yml b/stories/host_redirection.yml
index c1657c1c1f..e61f167857 100644
--- a/stories/host_redirection.yml
+++ b/stories/host_redirection.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for
 references:
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Host Redirection
+  analytic_story: Host Redirection
   category:
   - Abuse
   product:
diff --git a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
index 08933d5ce9..722b805462 100644
--- a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ narrative: 'This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targ
 references:
 - http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: JBoss Vulnerability
+  analytic_story: JBoss Vulnerability
   category:
   - Vulnerability
   product:
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
index d917076d85..e577b33523 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this or
 references:
 - https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+  analytic_story: Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
index 900c9c0163..e7b3c8649d 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this or
 references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+  analytic_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
index 5c61bd24a2..ba30d5b0a2 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this or
 references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+  analytic_story: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/lateral_movement.yml b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
index 88da07071e..e7c9925659 100644
--- a/stories/lateral_movement.yml
+++ b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ narrative: "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Lateral Movement
+  analytic_story: Lateral Movement
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
index d9e26cd56f..de3bd60db3 100644
--- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
+++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ references:
 - https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Malicious PowerShell
+  analytic_story: Malicious PowerShell
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
index 82843d3e83..e94121d1e5 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ narrative: Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continui
 references:
 - https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Monitor Backup Solution
+  analytic_story: Monitor Backup Solution
   category:
   - Best Practices
   product:
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
index ba32bc6f20..603d684799 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ narrative: 'It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes runni
 references:
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Monitor for Unauthorized Software
+  analytic_story: Monitor for Unauthorized Software
   category:
   - Best Practices
   product:
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
index 13854f3812..bf4106e8ae 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ narrative: 'It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patc
 references:
 - https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Monitor for Updates
+  analytic_story: Monitor for Updates
   category:
   - Best Practices
   product:
diff --git a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
index c555af3e1e..a2ed90a166 100644
--- a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references:
 - https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
 - http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Netsh Abuse
+  analytic_story: Netsh Abuse
   category:
   - Abuse
   product:
diff --git a/stories/office_365_detections.yml b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
index bb4c1aa772..8765eb9224 100644
--- a/stories/office_365_detections.yml
+++ b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ narrative: More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offerin
 references:
 - https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Office 365 Detections
+  analytic_story: Office 365 Detections
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
index 8bff54c28d..0e1ae49229 100644
--- a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
+++ b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia
 - https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Orangeworm Attack Group
+  analytic_story: Orangeworm Attack Group
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
index dc8135f94f..ab92e3c207 100644
--- a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
+++ b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ narrative: 'Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dang
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Phishing Payloads
+  analytic_story: Phishing Payloads
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
index b4cb728e9f..21a43250c8 100644
--- a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
+++ b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/
 - http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
+  analytic_story: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
index b830e2cf09..fd3ce3f980 100644
--- a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
+++ b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ narrative: A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protoco
 references:
 - http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
+  analytic_story: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
   category:
   - Best Practices
   product:
diff --git a/stories/ransomware.yml b/stories/ransomware.yml
index fbcd8b1130..dad4d1e288 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/
 - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Ransomware
+  analytic_story: Ransomware
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
index b6c9d12af6..de2089bd8c 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Ransomware Cloud
+  analytic_story: Ransomware Cloud
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
index fb737b148f..3e636e1686 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Ryuk Ransomware
+  analytic_story: Ryuk Ransomware
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
index 7a033729ae..e6aea499ea 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ references:
 - https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/
 - https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: SamSam Ransomware
+  analytic_story: SamSam Ransomware
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
index 780b9c5b90..47ecf4076d 100644
--- a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
+++ b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html
 - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Router and Infrastructure Security
+  analytic_story: Router and Infrastructure Security
   category:
   - Best Practices
   product:
diff --git a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
index 1fc5374087..00b7ba0fd4 100644
--- a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
+++ b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ narrative: Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs
 references:
 - https://meltdownattack.com/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
+  analytic_story: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
   category:
   - Vulnerability
   product:
diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
index 510758b832..53662f3f74 100644
--- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ references:
 - http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce
 - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
+  analytic_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
   category:
   - Vulnerability
   product:
diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
index 007ede37e0..4807e85d84 100644
--- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
+++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings
 - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
+  analytic_story: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
   category:
   - Vulnerability
   product:
diff --git a/stories/sql_injection.yml b/stories/sql_injection.yml
index 02a5263fcf..52b09a1d3d 100644
--- a/stories/sql_injection.yml
+++ b/stories/sql_injection.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ references:
 - https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html
 - https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: SQL Injection
+  analytic_story: SQL Injection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
index d878c63544..869ed849a1 100644
--- a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
 - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Sunburst Malware
+  analytic_story: Sunburst Malware
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
index 70e2ea22ee..268652ef8b 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, co
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
index e1bb91c04f..5f60a3eb37 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ narrative: It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS inf
 references:
 - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious AWS Login Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious AWS Login Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
index b51c5e5b97..86569fe6ee 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 - https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
index bb584c23f0..8ee7f07971 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ narrative: "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computin
 references:
 - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious AWS Traffic
+  analytic_story: Suspicious AWS Traffic
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
index 726f589b69..7be388e899 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references:
 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/
 - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
index b39a8bf359..5a7db31f81 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ narrative: Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governanc
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
index 67883c28f7..27f167ff85 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ narrative: 'Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate fr
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
index 24562f7a12..c2e8641e09 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 - https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud User Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Cloud User Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
index 5af3223ee0..ffa5814210 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Command-Line Executions
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Command-Line Executions
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
index 46010319d6..332b296baa 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references:
 - http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680
 - https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious DNS Traffic
+  analytic_story: Suspicious DNS Traffic
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
index bd3b6109aa..d1b62ca288 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targe
 references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Emails
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Emails
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
index 145ff8ce4b..adcc888713 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ references:
 - https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security
 - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
index 343cd16dfe..fec4699871 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/
 - https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  analytic_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
index d3dd543db3..0f3c99144a 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references:
 - https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing
 - https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Okta Activity
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Okta Activity
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
index e5bf69ddb5..d57f058e25 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
index 23f9eab99f..1f78e018f2 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious WMI Use
+  analytic_story: Suspicious WMI Use
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
index ed69c68cb4..590aa186e0 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ references:
 - https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/
 - https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
+  analytic_story: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
index ccb4effebe..770f3951cd 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+  analytic_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
index 866a339299..fffa8e0491 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
 - https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
+  analytic_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
index 2567b4e1d3..30c46ab776 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make
 references:
 - https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
+  analytic_story: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
   category:
   - Cloud Security
   product:
diff --git a/stories/unusual_processes.yml b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
index 6ab158db54..f8c34c0d84 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf
 - https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Unusual Processes
+  analytic_story: Unusual Processes
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
index eeedca9a03..6fdf0445e0 100644
--- a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
+++ b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ narrative: Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the
 references:
 - https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Use of Cleartext Protocols
+  analytic_story: Use of Cleartext Protocols
   category:
   - Best Practices
   product:
diff --git a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
index 8e6821294c..797489f2ea 100644
--- a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
+++ b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud
 - https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Web Fraud Detection
+  analytic_story: Web Fraud Detection
   category:
   - Abuse
   product:
diff --git a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
index af65a6c0bf..c87ad6d336 100644
--- a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ narrative: Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
+  analytic_story: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
index 6f95bbe38c..d3d53d19db 100644
--- a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ references:
 - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
 - https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
+  analytic_story: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
index 78597aabca..287ee84e39 100644
--- a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ references:
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
+  analytic_story: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
   category:
   - Malware
   product:
diff --git a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
index 50e6bb82ce..4dd7f63d53 100644
--- a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references:
 - https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/
 - http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Windows Log Manipulation
+  analytic_story: Windows Log Manipulation
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
index 6905f8dd64..eb70181272 100644
--- a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Windows Persistence Techniques
+  analytic_story: Windows Persistence Techniques
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
index 58091a7529..e6940f832d 100644
--- a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ narrative: 'Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an ad
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Windows Privilege Escalation
+  analytic_story: Windows Privilege Escalation
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
   product:
diff --git a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
index 82df332e46..733e722a79 100644
--- a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050
 - https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031
 tags:
-  analytics_story: Windows Service Abuse
+  analytic_story: Windows Service Abuse
   category:
   - Malware
   product:

From 9a7dee893cde744481e94ab02108d1390e26fe08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:19:31 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 095/132] renamed in response tasks

---
 response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml                     | 2 +-
 response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml     | 2 +-
 response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml  | 2 +-
 .../aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml          | 2 +-
 response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml       | 2 +-
 response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml              | 2 +-
 response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml | 2 +-
 response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml         | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml            | 2 +-
 .../aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml          | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml         | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml                  | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml     | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml           | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml   | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml       | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml      | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml     | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml          | 2 +-
 .../investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml          | 2 +-
 .../investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml           | 2 +-
 .../investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml        | 2 +-
 .../investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml      | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml           | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml         | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml            | 2 +-
 response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml         | 2 +-
 response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml                        | 2 +-
 response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml             | 2 +-
 .../excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml      | 2 +-
 response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml            | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml               | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml            | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml         | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml             | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml                 | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml            | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml            | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml                        | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml       | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml                       | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_email_info.yml                               | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml              | 2 +-
 ...et_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml                 | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml  | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml      | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml                          | 2 +-
 .../get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml       | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml                      | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml                    | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_process_info.yml                             | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml    | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml  | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml             | 2 +-
 response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml   | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml   | 2 +-
 .../investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml           | 2 +-
 .../investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml     | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml      | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml             | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml      | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml           | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml         | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml             | 2 +-
 .../investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml   | 2 +-
 .../investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml           | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml          | 2 +-
 response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml               | 2 +-
 69 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)

diff --git a/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml b/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml
index 7cf3185442..749a281a18 100644
--- a/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ inputs:
 name: All backup logs for host
 search: '| search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" dest=$dest$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
index 98e360c9f2..618eaee5c2 100644
--- a/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |searc
   values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision
   src_ip
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml
index 801e0c7948..3c0bf1389c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSE
   as Remediation |  table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState
   Remediation
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Compute Instance
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml
index 84643fa8c1..e60c8ed1fd 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as
   sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode,
   errorMessage'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml
index 6212b5b0f2..60e16780bd 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ name: AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type
   userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Cloud Cryptomining
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml b/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml
index 84e061a2d2..01c28e5d36 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: AWS Network ACL Details from ID
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search  networkAclId=$networkAclId$
   | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml b/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml
index 0c105cfa85..a64ec34182 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time AR
   relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId  configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress
   configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Command and Control
   - Suspicious AWS Traffic
diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml b/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml
index b89fbbed02..06860f3d08 100644
--- a/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |searc
   bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action
   aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml
index 6d2feea69e..aaace4b79f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: Perform a static and dynamic malware analysis for the malicious fil
 id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e
 name: Analyze Malicious File
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Lateral Movement
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml
index ba63694607..006d965516 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail userIdentity.arn=$src_user$ | spath
   path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip,
   awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml
index 3e69175bf5..6d1b37b112 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest=
   by _time, Authentication.dest, Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.action
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml
index 8edf84043b..d0d68ca2e6 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Get Notable Info
 search: '| search `notable_by_id($event_id$)` | table time, rule_name, dest, dest_asset_id,
   dest_owner, priority, severity, owner, status_description'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - AWS User Monitoring
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml
index 9a74f9ddef..9db3ed5b4c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_key_
   AND Registry.dest=$dest$ by Registry.registry_path, Registry.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
   | sort _time | table _time, process_id, dest, action, registry_key_name, registry_path'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
   product:
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml
index 17bb44f90f..e75efdd52f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path
   values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = reg.exe by Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`]'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml
index 9d64113807..f49c32d7c1 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=system risk_ob
   | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name)  min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml
index 54f0d181e6..79e8da9cde 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=user risk_obje
   | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name)  min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml
index 530c258dac..031ee2d936 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Get Update Logs For Endpoint
 search: '| from datamodel Updates.Updates  | search (vendor_product="Microsoft Windows"
   OR vendor_product="OSX:Update" OR vendor_product="Linux:Update") dest=$dest$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Monitor for Unauthorized Software
   - Ransomware
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml
index c86af75e9b..f1e9a57e9d 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Get User Information from Identity Table
 search: '| `identities` | search identity=$user$ | table _time, identity, first, last,
   email, category, watchlist'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml
index 326336493f..6809b901f3 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ inputs:
 name: Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint
 search: '| from datamodel Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities | search dest=$dest$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml
index 4f25639ac4..34610db886 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datam
   as unique_ua_count by src_user, image_id, src, user_type | where unique_ua_count
   > 1'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml
index 283ff7658f..170faf5739 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities
 search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search dest=$dest$ | fields
   - _*'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml
index 51f6044fca..0644c9022c 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions
 search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search user=$src_user$ |
   fields - _*'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml
index b0f17b1b1c..2797127b99 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region
 search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search region=$region$ user=$src_user$
   | fields - _*'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml
index 9c51b7e746..51d0afe0ab 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ inputs:
 name: Investigate Web Activity From Host
 search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$dest$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Disabling Security Tools
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml
index 13e42a991c..1d24aadc57 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ inputs:
 name: Investigate Web Activity From src ip
 search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$src_ip$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
   - Dynamic DNS
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml
index e23a42a0e8..683b30aea7 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_
   process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name
   | head 1 | fields - count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Collection and Staging
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml
index eb00ca9075..c34e843dd7 100644
--- a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: Quarantine the infected hosts in order to stop the malware from spr
 id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78
 name: Quarantaine Infected Host
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ransomware
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml
index 11985a057c..8df22b836f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ playbook:
   url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.json
   url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.py
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml
index 2a6f974244..9800bdbde0 100644
--- a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ playbook:
   url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json
   url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Common Phishing Frameworks
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml
index 90147e1a3b..6ee46e3900 100644
--- a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ playbook:
   url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.json
   url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.py
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
index 168627faa0..6135ae18ee 100644
--- a/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.reques
   user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name
   data.resource.type
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml
index 722ba15882..aef5ca129a 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
   sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip,
   awsRegion, eventName, errorCode'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml
index fb6e01b1c2..0834657f80 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
   sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip,
   awsRegion, eventName, errorCode'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml
index 80d8576c2c..2c90cd6481 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
   sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion,
   eventName, errorCode'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml
index e44f5bf29c..d11a37d7ce 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
   sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip,
   awsRegion, eventName, errorCode'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml
index f62cf7aece..6201da7bdc 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ name: Get Backup Logs For Endpoint
 search: '| search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME
   as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ransomware
   - SamSam Ransomware
   product:
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml b/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml
index 21b5a50923..c3bfe3fbf9 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as la
   | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Common Phishing Frameworks
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml b/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml
index e4efcf018b..674b861d5d 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window
   count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort
   -count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Command and Control
   - DNS Hijacking
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml b/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml
index 741a0e6c64..a42f7b008f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_
   | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search
   dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Command and Control
   - Data Protection
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml b/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml
index 33b7ad04b6..3d926b688a 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup i
   as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name,
   vpc_id as VPC'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml b/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml
index 6f761f95c8..f46b534a8d 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_ec2_launch_details.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn
   as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table
   arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml
index 2ebc0ac3ec..3e7980027e 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_email_info.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ inputs:
 name: Get Email Info
 search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   - Suspicious Emails
   product:
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml b/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml
index 38b25aace1..d522b40bde 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ inputs:
 name: Get Emails From Specific Sender
 search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
   - Suspicious Emails
   - Web Fraud Detection
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml b/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml
index 2b7ce4bcaf..03e1d288ec 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   All_Sessions.All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Asset Tracking
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml b/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml
index edf40a1338..91b9be36ff 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_history_of_email_sources.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest
   by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Lateral Movement
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml
index b2df57e9ab..7fb0ce4cc2 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature
   dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified",
   Access_Right, signature'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml
index 0ee8673e03..91ce50d68d 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature
   user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified",
   Access_Right, signature'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml b/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml
index 92179a3845..1bd04fc26b 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_notable_history.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ name: Get Notable History
 search: '| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner,
   priority, severity, status_description'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml b/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml
index 175e74f167..c057f9797f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.
   as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml
index 3222204252..168b37e231 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_parent_process_info.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min
   | search  parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
   - Command and Control
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml
index b4e2296e69..2c532ae2ad 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_process_file_activity.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name)
   search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name,
   file_path'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
   product:
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml
index 0da0650ed8..3cb9d60fe6 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_process_info.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min
   | search  process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Collection and Staging
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml
index c664c62cc4..b53d7cd8db 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) a
   Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search
   dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Command and Control
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml b/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml
index 50924b792d..3028da57f7 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) a
   count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id
   Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
   - Brand Monitoring
   - Command and Control
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml b/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml
index b188d2db36..ad8ae0458f 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCo
   EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user,
   Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Ransomware
   - Suspicious WMI Use
   product:
diff --git a/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml b/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml
index bc22f3435a..0037a709fc 100644
--- a/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ name: Get Web Session Information via session id
 search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http session_id  = $session_id$ | stats values(url)
   values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml
index 5a88e2eae3..a0b6362121 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| renam
   requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName)
   by user instanceId vendor_region'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
   - Cloud Cryptomining
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml
index fa8e82752f..494c69a62d 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ name: Investigate AWS User Activities by user field
 search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type
   userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
   product:
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml
index 50ac6f2a4a..1c7c9b6440 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs
   > 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search user=$user$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml
index c9df6aae28..3ee19e85b5 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ inputs:
 name: Investigate Network Traffic From src ip
 search: '| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
   product:
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml
index 8b7af6c318..54e4d103aa 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ search: eventtype=okta_log app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml
index 71e37f56e6..7ccd7c7067 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ search: eventtype=okta_log src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.c
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml
index aceca46294..91a03da224 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackag
   dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)`
   | search dest=$dest$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml
index 6106065511..60686023d6 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=use
   AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where
   sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user '
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml
index 8a6e9da72b..9155d639d7 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs
   | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`
   | search dest=$dest$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml
index e4e621d899..1d8e9c3806 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app
   count | sort count'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
   - Lateral Movement
   - SamSam Ransomware
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml
index 79630768a9..db9b482aa9 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_
   Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings,
   cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml
index b50c17f23f..c8d1a3223a 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ search: eventtype=okta_log user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.count
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml b/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml
index 4d1ae50f35..cef7a6b8f5 100644
--- a/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml
+++ b/response_tasks/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from d
   by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search
   http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$'
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom

From 004db3e8256bb975d0f21956d76bfe46f156b27c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:21:38 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 096/132] renaming analytic stories

---
 docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md        | 2 +-
 docs/spec/baselines.md                        | 2 +-
 docs/spec/deployments.md                      | 2 +-
 docs/spec/detections.md                       | 2 +-
 docs/spec/response_tasks.md                   | 2 +-
 docs/spec/responses.md                        | 2 +-
 docs/spec/responses_phase.md                  | 2 +-
 docs/spec/stories.md                          | 2 +-
 response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml | 2 +-
 response_phases/containment.yml               | 2 +-
 response_phases/detection_analysis.yml        | 2 +-
 response_phases/eradication.yml               | 2 +-
 response_phases/identification.yml            | 2 +-
 response_phases/preparation.yml               | 2 +-
 response_phases/recovery.yml                  | 2 +-
 spec/baselines.spec.json                      | 2 +-
 spec/deployments.spec.json                    | 2 +-
 spec/detections.spec.json                     | 2 +-
 spec/response_tasks.spec.json                 | 2 +-
 spec/responses.spec.json                      | 2 +-
 spec/responses_phase.spec.json                | 2 +-
 spec/stories.spec.json                        | 2 +-
 22 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md
index 6e89f04806..622015ce22 100644
--- a/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines-properties-tags.md
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The default value is:
 ## tags Examples
 
 ```yaml
-analytics_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities
+analytic_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities
 custom_key: custom_value
 
 ```
diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.md b/docs/spec/baselines.md
index 2ee3e87feb..4b120c367a 100644
--- a/docs/spec/baselines.md
+++ b/docs/spec/baselines.md
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ The default value is:
 ### tags Examples
 
 ```yaml
-analytics_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities
+analytic_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities
 custom_key: custom_value
 
 ```
diff --git a/docs/spec/deployments.md b/docs/spec/deployments.md
index e3d2c089fa..4d1597e99c 100644
--- a/docs/spec/deployments.md
+++ b/docs/spec/deployments.md
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ The default value is:
 ### tags Examples
 
 ```yaml
-analytics_story: credential_dumping
+analytic_story: credential_dumping
 
 ```
 
diff --git a/docs/spec/detections.md b/docs/spec/detections.md
index bb4b3b7b14..a07f254a09 100644
--- a/docs/spec/detections.md
+++ b/docs/spec/detections.md
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ The default value is:
 ### tags Examples
 
 ```yaml
-analytics_story: credential_dumping
+analytic_story: credential_dumping
 kill_chain_phases: Action on Objectives
 mitre_attack_id: T1078.004
 cis20: CIS 13
diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md
index 1e5500835e..6ee8b796ed 100644
--- a/docs/spec/response_tasks.md
+++ b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ The default value is:
 ### tags Examples
 
 ```yaml
-analytics_story: credential_dumping
+analytic_story: credential_dumping
 
 ```
 
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.md b/docs/spec/responses.md
index c42c8297f2..314ad93450 100644
--- a/docs/spec/responses.md
+++ b/docs/spec/responses.md
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ The default value is:
 ### tags Examples
 
 ```yaml
-analytics_story: credential_dumping
+analytic_story: credential_dumping
 
 ```
 
diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md
index 7d666beef8..09d1b3be2a 100644
--- a/docs/spec/responses_phase.md
+++ b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ The default value is:
 ### tags Examples
 
 ```yaml
-analytics_story: credential_dumping
+analytic_story: credential_dumping
 
 ```
 
diff --git a/docs/spec/stories.md b/docs/spec/stories.md
index e0a452500f..50b565a2fe 100644
--- a/docs/spec/stories.md
+++ b/docs/spec/stories.md
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ The default value is:
 ### tags Examples
 
 ```yaml
-analytics_story: credential_dumping
+analytic_story: credential_dumping
 
 ```
 
diff --git a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml
index bd8ae16868..26ef12572a 100644
--- a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml
+++ b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ response_task:
 sla: null
 sla_type: minutes
 tags:
-  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
   nist: RS.RP
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_phases/containment.yml b/response_phases/containment.yml
index 238e1c2b86..926130eb6f 100644
--- a/response_phases/containment.yml
+++ b/response_phases/containment.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ response_task:
 sla: null
 sla_type: minutes
 tags:
-  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
   nist: RS.RP
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml
index 93d1618e0e..d5a2f0c88a 100644
--- a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml
+++ b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ response_task:
 sla: null
 sla_type: minutes
 tags:
-  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
   nist: RS.RP
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_phases/eradication.yml b/response_phases/eradication.yml
index eeb45f3bd6..e2589529d9 100644
--- a/response_phases/eradication.yml
+++ b/response_phases/eradication.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ response_task:
 sla: null
 sla_type: minutes
 tags:
-  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
   nist: RS.RP
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_phases/identification.yml b/response_phases/identification.yml
index 3a015156fe..2298d00598 100644
--- a/response_phases/identification.yml
+++ b/response_phases/identification.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ response_task:
 sla: null
 sla_type: minutes
 tags:
-  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
   nist: RS.RP
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_phases/preparation.yml b/response_phases/preparation.yml
index 028ed74519..0e2f1fdaa9 100644
--- a/response_phases/preparation.yml
+++ b/response_phases/preparation.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ response_task:
 sla: null
 sla_type: minutes
 tags:
-  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
   nist: RS.RP
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/response_phases/recovery.yml b/response_phases/recovery.yml
index a1b57bbfaf..e449bdf1d9 100644
--- a/response_phases/recovery.yml
+++ b/response_phases/recovery.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ response_task:
 sla: null
 sla_type: minutes
 tags:
-  analytics_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
+  analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan
   nist: RS.RP
   product:
   - Splunk Phantom
diff --git a/spec/baselines.spec.json b/spec/baselines.spec.json
index c13fc47497..e8f22a3df7 100644
--- a/spec/baselines.spec.json
+++ b/spec/baselines.spec.json
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
       "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
       "examples": [
         {
-          "analytics_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities",
+          "analytic_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities",
           "custom_key": "custom_value"
         }
       ],
diff --git a/spec/deployments.spec.json b/spec/deployments.spec.json
index 7014cfd201..389c0bba89 100644
--- a/spec/deployments.spec.json
+++ b/spec/deployments.spec.json
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@
       "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
       "examples": [
         {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
+          "analytic_story": "credential_dumping"
         }
       ],
       "minItems": 1,
diff --git a/spec/detections.spec.json b/spec/detections.spec.json
index 5379f1c41e..94ca4be9b5 100644
--- a/spec/detections.spec.json
+++ b/spec/detections.spec.json
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
       "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
       "examples": [
         {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping",
+          "analytic_story": "credential_dumping",
           "kill_chain_phases": "Action on Objectives",
           "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004",
           "cis20": "CIS 13",
diff --git a/spec/response_tasks.spec.json b/spec/response_tasks.spec.json
index 0ee36596b3..dfe84471cd 100644
--- a/spec/response_tasks.spec.json
+++ b/spec/response_tasks.spec.json
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
       "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
       "examples": [
         {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
+          "analytic_story": "credential_dumping"
         }
       ],
       "minItems": 1,
diff --git a/spec/responses.spec.json b/spec/responses.spec.json
index 65cf69cb36..4beb6cf9a4 100644
--- a/spec/responses.spec.json
+++ b/spec/responses.spec.json
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
       "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
       "examples": [
         {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
+          "analytic_story": "credential_dumping"
         }
       ],
       "minItems": 1,
diff --git a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json
index 6cc1ccbc3f..4c46e46803 100644
--- a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json
+++ b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
       "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging",
       "examples": [
         {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
+          "analytic_story": "credential_dumping"
         }
       ],
       "minItems": 1,
diff --git a/spec/stories.spec.json b/spec/stories.spec.json
index 3eda58b394..f2384cbb81 100644
--- a/spec/stories.spec.json
+++ b/spec/stories.spec.json
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
       "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.",
       "examples": [
         {
-          "analytics_story": "credential_dumping"
+          "analytic_story": "credential_dumping"
         }
       ],
       "minItems": 1,

From 2ae854b678c6788f9bc4a6d91cc12f33f7daf975 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:38:49 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 097/132] fixing gitlab CI job to adjust for new types

---
 .gitlab-ci.yml                       | 2 +-
 bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg | 2 +-
 bin/testing_coverage.py              | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/.gitlab-ci.yml b/.gitlab-ci.yml
index ba42cb9bc7..c8f383cff2 100644
--- a/.gitlab-ci.yml
+++ b/.gitlab-ci.yml
@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ validate:
   script:
     - python3 bin/ssa_validate.py --skip-error detections/*/*
     - python3 bin/ssa_test.py --skip-error tests/*/*
-    - python3 bin/testing_coverage.py --type SSA --min-coverage 1.0
+    - python3 bin/testing_coverage.py --type streaming --min-coverage 1.0
diff --git a/bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg b/bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg
index c94bb338b0..ae73966523 100644
--- a/bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg
+++ b/bin/reporting/detection_coverage.svg
@@ -14,6 +14,6 @@
 <g fill="#fff" text-anchor="middle" font-family="DejaVu Sans,Verdana,Geneva,sans-serif" font-size="11">
     <text x="30" y="15" fill="#010101" fill-opacity=".3">coverage</text>
     <text x="30" y="14">coverage</text>
-    <text x="80" y="14">80%%</text>
+    <text x="80" y="14">82%</text>
 </g>
 </svg>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/bin/testing_coverage.py b/bin/testing_coverage.py
index 5ec6508ca0..655a00d224 100644
--- a/bin/testing_coverage.py
+++ b/bin/testing_coverage.py
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ def main(args):
                         type=float,
                         default=0.0,
                         help="Minimum coverage, script return error if target is not met")
-    parser.add_argument('--types', type=str, nargs="*", help="SSA, ESCU", default=["ESCU", "SSA"])
+    parser.add_argument('--types', type=str, nargs="*", help="batch, streaming", default=["batch", "streaming"])
     parsed = parser.parse_args(args)
     populate_coverage(parsed.types)
     print_results(parsed.types)

From f89c21964d4200bb9334a6ff80769b82c401bf2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 10:54:34 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 098/132] Rundll32,StartW

Adding content to detect Rundll32 using function name Start/StartW on the commandline. Typically used with CobaltStrike.
---
 .../endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml   | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml       | 12 +++++
 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5319706ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+name: Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
+id: 9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-04'
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL
+  function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with CobaltStrike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. 
+  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+  Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). 
+  During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of CobaltStrike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
+- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c0f890fc7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Suspicious Rundll32 startw Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Suspicious Rundll32 startw
+  file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From f9a6635e706f8c917b779e4d2ab6d05c13c32865 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-158-98>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 18:18:34 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 099/132] Added detection testing service results inSuspicious
 Rundll32 startw

---
 .../endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml   | 28 +++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
index 5319706ded..da2b73b2cd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
@@ -2,11 +2,15 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
 id: 9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
-description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL
-  function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with CobaltStrike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. 
-  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
-  Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). 
-  During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of CobaltStrike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function
+  name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with CobaltStrike
+  x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32
+  and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world
+  writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate
+  (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application
+  execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of CobaltStrike,
+  rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default
+  process can be changed, but typically is not.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
@@ -21,13 +25,12 @@ references:
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start
+  as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
@@ -43,4 +46,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From 3ead4c284026a1a7183de4a8463a04d3c590c4d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 11:25:01 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 100/132] rundll32 with no cmdline arguments

---
 ...ndll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml | 47 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml | 12 +++++
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45211ffdb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+name: Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
+id: e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-09'
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. 
+  It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including CobaltStrike. 
+  During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. 
+  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
+  C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA. 
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
+- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (process_name=rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE)
+| regex CommandLine="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)"
+| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User,
+  ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine
+| rename Computer as dest 
+| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+| `suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..917a531d96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Suspicious rundll32 with no command line arguments Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Suspicious Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments
+  file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From bc508128e9be092296c5b8a3045fb100030c7a3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 11:27:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 101/132] misspell

---
 ...l => suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml} | 0
 .../suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename detections/endpoint/{suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml => suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml} (100%)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
similarity index 100%
rename from detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
rename to detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml
index 917a531d96..145ea7a51f 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Suspicious rundll32 with no command line arguments Unit Test
 tests:
 - name: Suspicious Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments
-  file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32__with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
+  file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
   earliest_time: '-24h'
   latest_time: 'now'

From 525e1ff46c2688ae95d6c386bf1001ceabb410a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-22-137>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 18:46:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 102/132] Added detection testing service results inSuspicious
 Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments

---
 ...undll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml | 27 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
index 45211ffdb0..d9e5f073b7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
 id: e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-09'
-description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. 
-  It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including CobaltStrike. 
-  During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. 
-  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
-  C:\Windows\syswow64.
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments.
+  It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present.
+  This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including CobaltStrike.
+  During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify
+  any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe
+  is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA. 
+  Sysmon TA.
 type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
@@ -20,13 +21,10 @@ references:
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (process_name=rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE)
-| regex CommandLine="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)"
-| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User,
-  ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine
-| rename Computer as dest 
-| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-| `suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter`'
+  | regex CommandLine="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name,
+  OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter`'
 known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
   copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
@@ -44,4 +42,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From 157d8770e624c3933c528db333de4e830327ffb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 12:10:39 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 103/132] rundll32 dllregisterserver

---
 .../suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml | 49 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...icious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml | 12 +++++
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..625e045999
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver
+id: 8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-09'
+description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver
+  on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer
+  method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is
+  being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it.
+  During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. 
+  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
+- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east
+- https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt
+- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/
+- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`'
+known_false_positives: This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering.
+  Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f964cf33c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver
+  file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From d53f30cff76dce96825ecae392fc03d93fc00464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-66-117>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 19:37:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 104/132] Added detection testing service results inSuspicious
 Rundll32 dllregisterserver

---
 .../suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml | 23 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
index 625e045999..0067f2f862 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-02-09'
 description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver
   on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer
-  method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is
-  being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it.
-  During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. 
+  method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being
+  registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will
+  capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and
+  parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further.
   Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
@@ -23,14 +24,13 @@ references:
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering.
-  Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.
+known_false_positives: This is likely to produce false positives and will require
+  some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs,
+  or filtering based on parent process names.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
@@ -46,4 +46,5 @@ tags:
   security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From 9c08582cfaf95904059c3271b8586757d754386b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:13:05 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 105/132] Update suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml

---
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
index 5063f10400..7676baa121 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=REGSVR32.EXE OR process_name=regsvr32.exe)
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 OriginalFileName=REGSVR32.EXE NOT process_name=regsvr32.exe
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|

From c26c9a99890fe10ebf2d155637d938e1d306904e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:57:50 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 106/132] Update dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml

---
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
index a95e490715..55763d0c30 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ known_false_positives: None identified.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
+  - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003.001
   kill_chain_phases:

From 2ce3a6adcbb17a5fdf597d54942aef2015bf4ba9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 14:01:59 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 107/132] Update suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml

---
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index cc922fe190..028bd5d873 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -8,9 +8,29 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo"
   using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used
   by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. 
-  The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt for example). 
+  The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code.'
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. \
+  
+  Triage\
+  Validate execution \
+  1. Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further
+  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+  
+  1. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32.\
+  
+  Situational Awareness\
+  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
+  Script code by regsvr32.exe.\
+
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
+
+  1. Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths.\
+
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
+  
+  Retrieval of Script Code\
+  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU
 references:

From 9db73e43c8cb18d04532d69cce014c17085a0dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 14:11:38 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 108/132] Create suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml

---
 stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7be74d56aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+name: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+id: 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694
+version: 1
+date: '2021-02-03'
+description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
+narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
+  via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. 
+  The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. 
+  Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. 
+  The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
+  
+  Triage\
+  Validate execution \
+  1. Determine if rundll32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of rundll32.exe and further
+  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+  
+  1. Determine if script code was executed with rundll32.\
+  
+  Situational Awareness\
+  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
+  Script code by rundll32.exe.\
+
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
+
+  1. Module loads.  Is rundll32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths.\
+
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
+
+  1. Command Line Arguments. If there are no command line arguments, it is possible rundll32.exe was injected into by another process.\
+  
+  1. File Modifications. Identify any suspicious file modifications.\
+
+  Retrieval of Script Code\
+  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
+tags:
+  analytics_story: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+  category:
+  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file

From 07ffc993b420fcf9177880adcb5b2b30f56a744e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 14:14:49 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 109/132] removing for now

---
 .../endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml   | 43 -------------------
 .../suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml       | 12 ------
 2 files changed, 55 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
 delete mode 100644 tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 7676baa121..0000000000
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Rename
-id: 0b8e6e18-6259-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-version: 1
-date: '2021-01-29'
-description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of regsvr32.exe executing.
-  regsvr32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
-  C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate regsvr32.exe
-  executing and what content it is loading. 
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed regsvr32.exe may be used. Review
-  paths of the renamed instance.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 OriginalFileName=REGSVR32.EXE NOT process_name=regsvr32.exe
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
-  parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
-  rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
-  `suspicious_regsvr32_rename_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of regsvr32, triggering a false positive.
-tags:
-  analytics_story:
-  - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.010
-  - T1036.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  nist:
-  - PR.PT
-  - DE.CM
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/windows-sysmon.log
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c105746de6..0000000000
--- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.test.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-name: Suspicious regsvr32 rename
-tests:
-- name: Detect renamed regsvr32 execution
-  file: endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_rename.yml
-  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
-  latest_time: 'now'
-  attack_data:
-  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
-    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/windows-sysmon.log
-    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
-    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From c99b478d726f7e1a846c7dd8934f8edf251ee023 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 14:18:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 110/132] format fixing

---
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml | 18 +++++++++---------
 stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml | 20 ++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index 028bd5d873..b34e90ceea 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -12,24 +12,24 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
   may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. \
   
-  Triage\
+  Triage \
   Validate execution \
   1. Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. \
   
-  1. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32.\
+  1. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. \
   
-  Situational Awareness\
+  Situational Awareness \
   The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by regsvr32.exe.\
+  Script code by regsvr32.exe. \
 
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? \
 
-  1. Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths.\
+  1. Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. \
 
-  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
   
-  Retrieval of Script Code\
+  Retrieval of Script Code \
   The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
index 7be74d56aa..91af8da01f 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
@@ -10,28 +10,28 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
   may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
   
-  Triage\
+  Triage \
   Validate execution \
   1. Determine if rundll32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of rundll32.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. \
   
-  1. Determine if script code was executed with rundll32.\
+  1. Determine if script code was executed with rundll32. \
   
   Situational Awareness\
   The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by rundll32.exe.\
+  Script code by rundll32.exe. \
 
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? \
 
-  1. Module loads.  Is rundll32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths.\
+  1. Module loads.  Is rundll32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. \
 
-  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
 
-  1. Command Line Arguments. If there are no command line arguments, it is possible rundll32.exe was injected into by another process.\
+  1. Command Line Arguments. If there are no command line arguments, it is possible rundll32.exe was injected into by another process. \
   
-  1. File Modifications. Identify any suspicious file modifications.\
+  1. File Modifications. Identify any suspicious file modifications. \
 
-  Retrieval of Script Code\
+  Retrieval of Script Code \
   The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU

From 03a48cd47dd2215a20544b1b6a4bd330edf75ba5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 14:24:39 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 111/132] formatting

---
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml | 24 ++++++++++------------
 stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml | 26 +++++++++++-------------
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index b34e90ceea..c8690a8865 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -10,27 +10,25 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. 
   The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. \
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. 
   
-  Triage \
-  Validate execution \
+  Triage 
+  Validate execution 
   1. Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. \
+  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.
   
-  1. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. \
+  1. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32.
   
-  Situational Awareness \
-  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by regsvr32.exe. \
+  Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
+  Script code by regsvr32.exe. 
 
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? \
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
 
-  1. Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. \
+  1. Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. 
 
-  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. 
   
-  Retrieval of Script Code \
-  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
+  Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU
 references:
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
index 91af8da01f..2e9ad3a7ef 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
@@ -10,29 +10,27 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
   may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
   
-  Triage \
-  Validate execution \
+  Triage -  Validate execution
+  
   1. Determine if rundll32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of rundll32.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. \
+  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. 
   
-  1. Determine if script code was executed with rundll32. \
+  1. Determine if script code was executed with rundll32. 
   
-  Situational Awareness\
-  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by rundll32.exe. \
+  Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
+  Script code by rundll32.exe. 
 
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? \
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
 
-  1. Module loads.  Is rundll32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. \
+  1. Module loads.  Is rundll32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. 
 
-  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.
 
-  1. Command Line Arguments. If there are no command line arguments, it is possible rundll32.exe was injected into by another process. \
+  1. Command Line Arguments. If there are no command line arguments, it is possible rundll32.exe was injected into by another process.
   
-  1. File Modifications. Identify any suspicious file modifications. \
+  1. File Modifications. Identify any suspicious file modifications. 
 
-  Retrieval of Script Code \
-  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
+  Retrieval of Script Code - Confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU
 references:

From c2c8d9c32061f3426ef1c51887d16d0a0d24a4f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 15:27:37 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 112/132] Update suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml

---
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml | 21 ++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index c8690a8865..89aaa298eb 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -10,24 +10,15 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. 
   The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. 
-  
-  Triage 
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code.  
   Validate execution 
-  1. Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.
-  
-  1. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32.
-  
+  Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.
+  Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32.  
   Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
   Script code by regsvr32.exe. 
-
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
-
-  1. Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. 
-
-  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. 
-  
+  Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
+  Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. 
+  Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.     
   Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU

From b6840c14f8a1021d1d05d0d67ca31e018f91d4f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <76067280+mhaag-spl@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 15:30:10 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 113/132] Update suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml

---
 stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml | 24 +-----------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
index 2e9ad3a7ef..727dd2bd7d 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
@@ -8,29 +8,7 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio
   The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. 
   Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
-  
-  Triage -  Validate execution
-  
-  1. Determine if rundll32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of rundll32.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. 
-  
-  1. Determine if script code was executed with rundll32. 
-  
-  Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by rundll32.exe. 
-
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
-
-  1. Module loads.  Is rundll32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. 
-
-  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.
-
-  1. Command Line Arguments. If there are no command line arguments, it is possible rundll32.exe was injected into by another process.
-  
-  1. File Modifications. Identify any suspicious file modifications. 
-
-  Retrieval of Script Code - Confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: ESCU
 references:

From 405ebb4dae129fa759eefc9acbed6af4c2bc4813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 16:33:53 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 114/132] spl update and test file

---
 .../certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml        | 14 ++++++--------
 .../certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml   | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
index ee4c1ffb67..574d479ad1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
@@ -8,8 +8,11 @@ description: This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the mani
 type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
-search: 'source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" app="C:\\Windows\\System32\\certutil.exe"
-   CommandLine="certutil.exe  -exportPFX powershellcert.pfx" | table User app CommandLine process_current_directory
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
+  as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = "* -exportPFX *"
+   by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`'
 known_false_positives: Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is
    uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns
@@ -18,12 +21,7 @@ tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1552.004
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: n/a
-  dataset:
-  - TBU
+  asset_type: Endpoint
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d7337e7d5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Certutil exe certificate extraction Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Certutil exe certificate extraction
+  file: endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog

From c6f3096d5ddec1e1b6b8be64d806d912f3f78a13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 02:25:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 115/132] Bump cryptography from 3.3.1 to 3.3.2 in
 /automated_detection_testing

Bumps [cryptography](https://github.com/pyca/cryptography) from 3.3.1 to 3.3.2.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/blob/master/CHANGELOG.rst)
- [Commits](https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/compare/3.3.1...3.3.2)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
---
 automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
index 44e893c2c0..83ef9ce65b 100644
--- a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
+++ b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ cfgv==2.0.1
 chardet==4.0.0
 configparser==4.0.2
 contextlib2==0.6.0.post1
-cryptography==3.3.1
+cryptography==3.3.2
 Deprecated==1.2.11
 dnspython==2.1.0
 docutils==0.16

From e0cb05ca263b41a57b346726066d9e26d98c675f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 02:33:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 116/132] Bump ansible from 2.10.6 to 2.10.7

Bumps [ansible](https://github.com/ansible/ansible) from 2.10.6 to 2.10.7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/ansible/ansible/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commits)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
---
 automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
index 44e893c2c0..e8733026a3 100644
--- a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
+++ b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-ansible==2.10.6
+ansible==2.10.7
 ansible-runner==1.4.6
 apipkg==1.5
 aspy.yaml==1.3.0
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ cfgv==2.0.1
 chardet==4.0.0
 configparser==4.0.2
 contextlib2==0.6.0.post1
-cryptography==3.3.1
+cryptography==3.3.2
 Deprecated==1.2.11
 dnspython==2.1.0
 docutils==0.16

From 54ceb4bfc40ce50442d8017df037caaba59ef9de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 02:34:19 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 117/132] Bump gitpython from 3.1.12 to 3.1.13

Bumps [gitpython](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython) from 3.1.12 to 3.1.13.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/master/CHANGES)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.12...3.1.13)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
---
 automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
index 44e893c2c0..8743d67ecc 100644
--- a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
+++ b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ cfgv==2.0.1
 chardet==4.0.0
 configparser==4.0.2
 contextlib2==0.6.0.post1
-cryptography==3.3.1
+cryptography==3.3.2
 Deprecated==1.2.11
 dnspython==2.1.0
 docutils==0.16
 execnet==1.8.0
 gitdb==4.0.5
-GitPython==3.1.12
+GitPython==3.1.13
 identify==1.5.13
 idna==2.8
 importlib-metadata==3.4.0

From c27a46bd403e57247873056a1656cd7c2eb8244d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 14:40:13 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 118/132] update test time

---
 tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml
index d7337e7d5e..b02052dfa2 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ tests:
 - name: Certutil exe certificate extraction
   file: endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  earliest_time: '-2d'
   latest_time: 'now'
   attack_data:
   - file_name: windows-sysmon.log

From cbfc4ca303882010992e980438020e2fbaaa0408 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 20:03:49 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 119/132] skeleton

---
 bin/pretty_yaml.py                            | 72 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...f_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml |  3 +
 ...cessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml |  1 +
 .../detect_new_local_admin_account.yml        |  1 +
 ...ulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml |  6 ++
 .../sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml  |  2 +
 .../ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml        |  1 +
 ...system_information_discovery_detection.yml |  3 +
 8 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
 create mode 100755 bin/pretty_yaml.py

diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..68b575111e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/bin/python
+from os import path, walk
+import argparse
+import yaml
+REPO_PATH = '/home/jhernandez/splunk/security_content/detections'
+
+def pretty_yaml_detections():
+
+def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, objects):
+
+    manifest_files = []
+    types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "deprecated", "experimental", "network", "web"]
+    for t in types:
+        for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + t):
+    #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"):
+            for file in files:
+                if file.endswith(".yml"):
+                    manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
+    for manifest_file in manifest_files:
+        pretty_yaml = dict()
+        print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file))
+        with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream:
+            try:
+                object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0]
+            except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
+                print(exc)
+                print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file))
+                error = True
+                continue
+
+        pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name']
+        pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id']
+        pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version']
+        pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date']
+        pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description']
+        if 'how_to_implement' in object:
+            pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement']
+        else:
+            pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = ''
+        pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type']
+        pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search']
+        pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author']
+        if 'references' in object:
+            pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
+        else:
+            pretty_yaml['references'] = []
+        pretty_yaml['known_false_positives'] = object['known_false_positives']
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+
+
+        #with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
+        #    documents = yaml.dump(object, file, default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False)
+        print(yaml.dump(pretty_yaml,default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False))
+
+def main(args):
+
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="keeps yamls in security_content sorted and pretty printed with custom sort keys")
+    parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo")
+    parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output")
+    
+    # parse them
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    REPO_PATH = args.path
+    VERBOSE = args.verbose
+
+    pretty_yaml_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','baselines','response_tasks','responses','deployments']
+    for pretty_yaml_object in pretty_yaml_objects:
+        pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main(sys.argv[1:])
+
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
index dc0a05d2a5..7ae87fbfbf 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow
 name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic*
   OR Processes.process_name=powershell* Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
index f59b709091..7107062d4a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ id: c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74
 known_false_positives: It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could
   cause a large number of account lockouts.
 name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint
+references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where
   nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.dest
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
index 10f088bea5..9b309dfac5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's bes
   to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service
   request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not
   "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives
+how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732'
 name: Detect New Local Admin account
 references: []
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
index 254508329d..d11acd61cc 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@ known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by
   manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior.
   It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
 name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
+in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
+products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
+used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
+to the registry.
 references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
index b723def98b..dcd17bc503 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ known_false_positives: Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon.
   there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate
   and investigate as appropriate.
 name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index 0cdd233f34..1de5d11a12 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments t
   is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter`
   macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
 name: First time seen command line argument - SSA
+references: []
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
 | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
index 1e88beec0b..ac25353a25 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ known_false_positives: Administrators debugging servers
 name: System Information Discovery Detection
 references:
 - https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*wmic* qfe*"
   OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user

From d0c9c92857a37f248d06711301c06ba7b14c55e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:11:24 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 120/132] added datamodel field and made all objects also
 pretty via new tool called pretty_yaml.py

---
 bin/pretty_yaml.py                            | 49 +++++++++-------
 ...itten_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...h_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 24 ++++----
 .../okta_account_lockout_events.yml           | 24 ++++----
 .../application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml  | 22 +++----
 .../okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml | 22 +++----
 ...servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml | 29 +++++-----
 ...ormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...normally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...mber_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 21 +++----
 ...mber_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 21 +++----
 ...ctivity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 33 +++++------
 ...g_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...ntrol_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...ws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...alls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml | 33 +++++------
 ...ance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...ce_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...e_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 33 +++++------
 ...d_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 35 ++++++------
 ...e_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...ovisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...sioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...ning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 29 +++++-----
 ...isioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 31 +++++-----
 .../detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml  | 32 ++++++-----
 ...ws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml | 36 ++++++------
 ...console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 36 ++++++------
 ..._console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml | 36 ++++++------
 ...etect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 43 +++++++-------
 .../detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml   | 27 ++++-----
 .../cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml      | 23 ++++----
 ...etect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml | 22 +++----
 .../cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml  | 29 +++++-----
 ...s_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 21 ++++---
 ...ke_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml | 32 +++++------
 ...blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml | 39 ++++++-------
 .../detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml    | 35 ++++++------
 ...of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml | 15 +++--
 .../new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml     | 25 ++++----
 .../cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml  | 25 ++++----
 detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml         | 23 ++++----
 ...xcessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml | 23 ++++----
 detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml    | 23 ++++----
 ...o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml | 15 +++--
 .../o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml     | 15 +++--
 .../o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml | 15 +++--
 ...ly_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ..._aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ..._high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...ws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...ovisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...sioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 45 ++++++++-------
 ...ning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...isioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...nts_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml | 20 ++++---
 ...ud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...ct_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml | 21 +++----
 ...pi_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 32 ++++++-----
 .../detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml   | 29 +++++-----
 .../detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml   | 21 +++----
 ...katz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml | 23 ++++----
 .../detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml  | 29 +++++-----
 .../detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml     | 30 +++++-----
 .../detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml      | 39 ++++++-------
 .../detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml  | 37 ++++++------
 ...etect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml | 37 ++++++------
 .../detect_usb_device_insertion.yml           | 21 +++----
 ...eb_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 19 ++++---
 .../deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml   | 35 ++++++------
 ...s_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 18 +++---
 ...e_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 29 +++++-----
 ...ce_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...nce_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...d_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...ce_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...n_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...d_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml | 19 ++++---
 .../first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml | 39 ++++++-------
 .../deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml | 29 +++++-----
 .../deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...iple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 27 ++++-----
 .../monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml           | 17 +++---
 .../open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml           | 17 +++---
 .../osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml     | 17 +++---
 .../deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml | 27 ++++-----
 .../prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml       | 19 ++++---
 ...de_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../remote_registry_key_modifications.yml     | 29 +++++-----
 .../deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...led_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...lunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...uspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml | 27 ++++-----
 .../deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml      | 21 +++----
 ...us_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml        | 19 ++++---
 .../unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml        | 19 ++++---
 .../unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml        | 23 ++++----
 .../windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml       | 25 ++++----
 .../windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml        | 29 +++++-----
 .../windows_hosts_file_modification.yml       | 21 +++----
 .../access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml | 19 ++++---
 ..._to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...ution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 29 +++++-----
 .../attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml      | 25 ++++----
 ...dential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 23 ++++----
 .../endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml | 23 ++++----
 .../bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml | 23 ++++----
 .../endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml | 21 +++----
 .../endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml      | 27 ++++-----
 ...ate_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml | 29 +++++-----
 .../create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml       | 19 ++++---
 .../endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml      | 27 ++++-----
 ...f_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...ping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...ial_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml | 27 ++++-----
 .../endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml       | 27 ++++-----
 ...ivity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml | 21 +++----
 ...omputer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml | 17 +++---
 ...redential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ...cessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml     | 29 +++++-----
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml  | 29 +++++-----
 .../detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml      | 29 +++++-----
 .../detect_new_local_admin_account.yml        | 24 ++++----
 ...nterception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml | 18 +++---
 ...system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...ohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml | 29 +++++-----
 .../detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml    | 31 +++++-----
 .../endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml      | 25 ++++----
 .../detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml  | 29 +++++-----
 ..._cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml | 23 ++++----
 .../disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml | 21 +++----
 .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml   | 29 +++++-----
 ...ution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml | 21 +++----
 .../endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml   | 25 ++++----
 .../first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml | 35 ++++++------
 ..._files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...asting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...s_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...hell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml | 29 +++++-----
 ...ll_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ...nitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml | 21 +++----
 .../nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml         | 23 ++++----
 .../overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml    | 25 ++++----
 ...eating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml | 29 +++++-----
 .../endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml    | 27 ++++-----
 .../endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml    | 23 ++++----
 ...ulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml | 31 +++++-----
 ...istry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml | 27 ++++-----
 .../registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml    | 29 +++++-----
 ...try_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml | 31 +++++-----
 .../remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml  | 29 +++++-----
 .../rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml         | 27 ++++-----
 .../endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml     | 25 ++++----
 .../endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml       | 23 ++++----
 .../sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml  | 24 ++++----
 ...eduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...htasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml | 29 +++++-----
 .../schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml    | 23 ++++----
 .../endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml     | 27 ++++-----
 .../endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml  | 27 ++++-----
 ...nstallation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml | 23 ++++----
 .../single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml     | 29 +++++-----
 ...tolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 24 ++++----
 ...en_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 24 ++++----
 ...ntial_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...dential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 21 +++----
 ...raction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...dential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...l_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml | 22 ++++---
 ...l_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml | 22 ++++---
 ...al_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...ial_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml | 22 ++++---
 ...credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...al_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml | 29 +++++-----
 ...ntial_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml | 27 +++++----
 ...dential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml   | 23 ++++----
 .../endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml       | 23 ++++----
 .../ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml        | 57 ++++++++-----------
 ...s_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 24 ++++----
 ...count_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...egal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...s_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 27 +++++----
 ...nd_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 27 +++++----
 ...nd_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 24 ++++----
 ...ivilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...d_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...rocess_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...en_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...a___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml | 31 ++++------
 ...are_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml | 25 ++++----
 ..._opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 26 ++++-----
 ...roups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...e_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 26 ++++-----
 ...puters_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...ystem_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 24 ++++----
 ...on_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...n_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...ores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...efensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ..._opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...sses_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...ng_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...tting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...ng_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 22 +++----
 ...em_process_running_unexpected_location.yml | 17 +++---
 ...unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml | 27 ++++-----
 .../ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml     | 29 +++++-----
 ...ous_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml | 29 +++++-----
 ...ious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml | 27 ++++-----
 .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml      | 31 +++++-----
 .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml    | 31 +++++-----
 .../endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml     | 27 ++++-----
 .../suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml        | 29 +++++-----
 .../endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml       | 29 +++++-----
 .../endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml   | 31 +++++-----
 .../endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml    | 27 ++++-----
 ...spicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...system_information_discovery_detection.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...rocesses_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml | 21 +++----
 .../endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml  | 27 ++++-----
 .../endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml  | 23 ++++----
 .../unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml    | 25 ++++----
 detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml  | 25 ++++----
 .../wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml         | 29 +++++-----
 detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml    | 27 ++++-----
 .../endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml    | 21 +++----
 ...ndows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml | 27 ++++-----
 ..._permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml | 15 ++---
 .../detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml  | 23 ++++----
 .../detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml         | 23 ++++----
 .../email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml | 24 ++++----
 ...s_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml | 33 +++++------
 .../monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml         | 23 ++++----
 .../no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml    | 27 ++++-----
 ...pectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml | 21 +++----
 .../suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml        | 26 +++++----
 ...suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml | 22 +++----
 .../application/suspicious_java_classes.yml   | 23 ++++----
 ..._eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...azon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml      | 25 ++++----
 .../aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml     | 21 +++----
 .../cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml        | 23 ++++----
 .../aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml      | 23 ++++----
 ...aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml | 17 +++---
 ...counts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml | 29 +++++-----
 .../cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml    | 27 ++++-----
 ...sk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml | 29 +++++-----
 .../cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml    | 25 ++++----
 ..._kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml | 21 +++----
 .../gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml | 25 ++++----
 ...ct_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 21 +++----
 ..._detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml | 21 +++----
 ...tes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ...netes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ...es_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...tive_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 21 +++----
 ...e_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml | 21 +++----
 ...s_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ...tes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ..._azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 23 ++++----
 .../kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml | 21 +++----
 .../kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml     | 21 +++----
 ..._detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml | 21 +++----
 ...ct_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 21 +++----
 ...tes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ...netes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml | 23 ++++----
 ...vice_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 21 +++----
 ...es_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml        | 29 +++++-----
 .../detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml    | 13 +++--
 ...t_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml | 15 ++---
 ...aron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml | 13 +++--
 .../detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml | 24 ++++----
 .../detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml   | 25 ++++----
 ...irst_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml | 21 +++----
 .../macos___re_opened_applications.yml        | 23 ++++----
 .../processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml     | 17 +++---
 ...mote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml | 21 +++----
 .../endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml         | 29 +++++-----
 ...urst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml | 25 ++++----
 .../wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml      | 25 ++++----
 .../wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml      | 29 +++++-----
 .../network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml          | 19 ++++---
 .../network/dns_record_changed.yml            | 28 ++++-----
 .../network/excessive_dns_failures.yml        | 23 ++++----
 ...e_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 33 +++++------
 .../large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml       | 23 ++++----
 .../prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml    | 25 ++++----
 .../network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml     | 23 ++++----
 ...ls_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml | 21 +++----
 ..._scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml | 21 +++----
 .../web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml  | 13 +++--
 ...ious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml | 21 +++----
 .../monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml   | 17 +++---
 .../web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml      | 27 ++++-----
 .../experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml   | 27 ++++-----
 ...connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml | 18 +++---
 ...ct_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml | 43 +++++++-------
 .../detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml    | 25 ++++----
 .../network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml   | 45 ++++++++-------
 .../detect_port_security_violation.yml        | 31 +++++-----
 .../network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml      | 19 ++++---
 .../detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml        | 17 +++---
 ...ct_software_download_to_network_device.yml | 31 +++++-----
 .../network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml      | 21 +++----
 ...ect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml | 33 +++++------
 ...t_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml | 27 ++++-----
 .../detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml    | 27 ++++-----
 .../network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml     | 29 +++++-----
 .../dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml      | 25 ++++----
 ...ry_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml | 19 ++++---
 .../remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml     | 21 +++----
 .../remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml        | 21 +++----
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml      | 21 +++----
 .../network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml      | 25 ++++----
 detections/network/tor_traffic.yml            | 25 ++++----
 .../unusually_long_content_type_length.yml    | 23 ++++----
 .../web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml    | 21 +++----
 .../web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml | 21 +++----
 ...aud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml | 21 +++----
 338 files changed, 4394 insertions(+), 4131 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
index 68b575111e..d272cb5a4d 100755
--- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py
+++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
@@ -1,24 +1,30 @@
 #!/bin/python
 from os import path, walk
+import sys
 import argparse
 import yaml
-REPO_PATH = '/home/jhernandez/splunk/security_content/detections'
+import re
 
-def pretty_yaml_detections():
 
-def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, objects):
+def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
+
+
+    #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"):
 
     manifest_files = []
     types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "deprecated", "experimental", "network", "web"]
-    for t in types:
-        for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + t):
-    #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"):
-            for file in files:
-                if file.endswith(".yml"):
-                    manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
+    if content_part == 'detections':
+        for t in types:
+            for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/' + t):
+                for file in files:
+                    if file.endswith(".yml"):
+                        manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
+    
     for manifest_file in manifest_files:
         pretty_yaml = dict()
-        print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file))
+        if VERBOSE:
+            print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file))
+
         with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream:
             try:
                 object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0]
@@ -32,29 +38,32 @@ def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, objects):
         pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id']
         pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version']
         pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date']
+        pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author']
+        pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type']
+        pretty_yaml['datamodel'] = object['datamodel']
         pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description']
+        pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search']
         if 'how_to_implement' in object:
             pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement']
         else:
             pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = ''
-        pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type']
-        pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search']
-        pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author']
+        pretty_yaml['known_false_positives'] = object['known_false_positives']
         if 'references' in object:
             pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
         else:
             pretty_yaml['references'] = []
-        pretty_yaml['known_false_positives'] = object['known_false_positives']
         pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
 
 
-        #with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
-        #    documents = yaml.dump(object, file, default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False)
-        print(yaml.dump(pretty_yaml,default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False))
+        with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
+            documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
+    return len(manifest_files) 
 
 def main(args):
 
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="keeps yamls in security_content sorted and pretty printed with custom sort keys")
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="keeps yamls in security_content sorted and pretty printed with custom sort keys, \
+            meant to run quitely for CI, use -v flag to make it bark")
+
     parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo")
     parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output")
     
@@ -65,7 +74,9 @@ def main(args):
 
     pretty_yaml_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','baselines','response_tasks','responses','deployments']
     for pretty_yaml_object in pretty_yaml_objects:
-        pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object)
+        touch_count = pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object)
+        if VERBOSE:
+            print("completed, we made {0} {1} pretty".format(touch_count, pretty_yaml_object))
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     main(sys.argv[1:])
diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
index f2f3b9c9eb..1c41e653c6 100644
--- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
+++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Email files written outside of the Outlook directory
+id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email
   files created outside the normal Outlook directory.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
-  that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem
-  data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
-  The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
-  reads and writes.
-id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx
-known_false_positives: Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their
-  email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will
-  be detected by the search.
-name: Email files written outside of the Outlook directory
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
   where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path
@@ -21,6 +14,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_
   by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` '
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+  that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem
+  data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
+  products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
+  The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
+  reads and writes.
+known_false_positives: Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their
+  email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will
+  be detected by the search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
index dc775f27fb..68212d5645 100644
--- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP
+id: 19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple
   users originating from the same ip address.
-how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
-  ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-id: 19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552
-known_false_positives: A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users
-  may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too
-  low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro XXXXXXXXXXXXX to raise
-  the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.
-name: Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP
 search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users
   values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state,
   city  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |  search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip_filter` '
+how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
+  ingested in your Splunk deployment.
+known_false_positives: A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users
+  may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too
+  low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro XXXXXXXXXXXXX to raise
+  the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
@@ -31,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
index f319c3286f..82a6c703a6 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,20 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-date: '2020-07-21'
-description: Detect Okta user lockout events
-how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
-  ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-id: 62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d
-known_false_positives: None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine
-  if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized
-  actor.
 name: Okta Account Lockout Events
+id: 62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d
+version: 2
+date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
+description: Detect Okta user lockout events
 search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
   as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` '
+how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
+  ingested in your Splunk deployment.
+known_false_positives: None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine
+  if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized
+  actor.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
@@ -26,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
index 3f5c18b5f4..584477eebb 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,20 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-date: '2020-07-21'
-description: Detect failed Okta SSO events
-how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
-  ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-id: 371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5
-known_false_positives: There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from
-  accessing apps they should have access to.
 name: Okta Failed SSO Attempts
+id: 371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5
+version: 2
+date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
+description: Detect failed Okta SSO events
 search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats  min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage,
   src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` '
+how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
+  ingested in your Splunk deployment.
+known_false_positives: There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from
+  accessing apps they should have access to.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
@@ -26,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
index 11e8dbc419..6805d5819e 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,26 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities
+id: 7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects logins from the same user from different states in
   a 24 hour period.
+search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null
+  | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city)
+  as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state)
+  as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1'
 how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being
   ingested in your Splunk deployment.
-id: 7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8
 known_false_positives: Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and
   loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should
   *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also
   relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also
   possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from
   a remote VPN endpoint.
-name: Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities
-search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null
-  | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city)
-  as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state)
-  as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Okta Activity
@@ -32,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
index 357aed8043..71200c379d 100644
--- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
+++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes
+id: ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9
+version: 1
 date: '2019-04-01'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as
   web servers.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity
-  Framework of Enterprise Security.
-id: ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9
-known_false_positives: Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers
-  during maintenance or other administrative tasks.
-name: Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category="web_server"
   AND (Processes.process="*whoami*" OR Processes.process="*ping*" OR Processes.process="*iptables*"
   OR Processes.process="*wget*" OR Processes.process="*service*" OR Processes.process="*curl*")
   by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity
+  Framework of Enterprise Security.
+known_false_positives: Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers
+  during maintenance or other administrative tasks.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index 312b821f20..22e02367e6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
+id: ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances
   for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then
   applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
-  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability
-  density function.
-id: ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf
-known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure
-  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
-  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
-  human user.
-name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
-references: []
 search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success
   AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
@@ -25,6 +20,14 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as
   eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold |
   table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold,
   object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
+  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability
+  density function.
+known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure
+  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
+  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
+  human user.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
@@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index 3189e815aa..1a0d746484 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched
+id: f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65
+version: 2
 date: '2020-08-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances
   for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then
   applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
-  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability
-  density function.
-id: f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65
-known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
-  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
-  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
-  human user.
-name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched
-references: []
 search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id
   from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success
   AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
@@ -25,6 +20,14 @@ search: '| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as o
   eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table
   _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold,
   object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
+  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability
+  density function.
+known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
+  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
+  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
+  human user.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 40
   security_domain: Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
index be26a72ed2..0f65db13e6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls
+id: 0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-07'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your
   cloud infrastructure environment by a user.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
-  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to
-  create the probability density function.
-id: 0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0
-known_false_positives: ''
-name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls
-references: []
 search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time
   span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time,
@@ -20,6 +18,11 @@ search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from
   -1), ":"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold
   = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls,
   expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
+  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to
+  create the probability density function.
+known_false_positives: ''
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
@@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 25
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
index 08fe83186c..1095e9a7cf 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls
+id: d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-07'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your
   cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
-  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to
-  create the probability density function model.
-id: d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af
-known_false_positives: ''
-name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls
-references: []
 search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as
   command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success
   by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval
@@ -21,6 +19,11 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command)
   > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls
   - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls,
   expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must
+  run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to
+  create the probability density function model.
+known_false_positives: ''
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
@@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 25
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
index 17d0167a0a..7e69adf812 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
+id: 21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-28'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Authentication
 description: This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different
   account is requested for the first time.  This search is deprecated and have been
   translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account
-  Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic
-  locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously
-  Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age
-  out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
-  the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.
-id: 21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b
-known_false_positives: Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior.
-  It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before.
-  You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.
-name: AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account
-references: []
 search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user
   Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
@@ -26,6 +18,17 @@ search: '| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=
   Cross Account Activity","Previously Seen") |  where status = "New Cross Account
   Activity" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account
+  Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic
+  locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously
+  Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age
+  out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
+  the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.
+known_false_positives: Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior.
+  It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before.
+  You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -50,5 +53,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 15
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
index c7680d6b47..3a7692c67e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,14 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk
+name: AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA
+id: c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-11'
+author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of KMS keys which action kms:Encrypt is
   accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an identicator
   that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise
   another company.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudtrail logs
-id: c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e
-known_false_positives: unknown
-name: AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA
-references:
-- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
-- https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt
-- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy
   output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements |
   spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath
@@ -22,6 +18,13 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath inpu
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource
   eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudtrail logs
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references:
+- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
+- https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt
+- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ransomware Cloud
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
index 3db17668bd..a8a01ae4e9 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk
+name: AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3
+id: 884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-11'
+author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption
   specifically against S3 buckets.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudtrail logs
-id: 884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc
-known_false_positives: bucket with S3 encryption
-name: AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3
-references:
-- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
-- https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt
-- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption="aws:kms"
   | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source
   AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file
   values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudtrail logs
+known_false_positives: bucket with S3 encryption
+references:
+- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
+- https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt
+- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ransomware Cloud
@@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
index c4877a20d3..4330785494 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75
+version: 2
 date: '2021-01-11'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs
   were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75
-known_false_positives: It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports
-  open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed
-  in production environment.
-name: AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry
   requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1
   | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry
@@ -21,6 +17,13 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetwor
   requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to
   requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports
+  open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed
+  in production environment.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 45f2938ade..33b25f0de6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: AWS Network Access Control List Deleted
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75
+version: 2
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms
   used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker
   has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can
   delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search
   will query the CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network
-  ACL.
-name: AWS Network Access Control List Deleted
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false
   | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName
   userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network
+  ACL.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
index 1b116faa15..583086c3d2 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,11 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-date: '2020-09-04'
-description: This search looks for new commands from each user role.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider.  You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per
-  User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times.
-  You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls
-  Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You
-  can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window`
-  macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
-  the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`
-id: 2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f
-known_false_positives: .
 name: Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles
-references: []
+id: 2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f
+version: 1
+date: '2020-09-04'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
+description: This search looks for new commands from each user role.
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user,
   All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |
@@ -22,6 +15,16 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from d
   OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),"-24h@h") | table firstTime, user,
   object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.  You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per
+  User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times.
+  You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls
+  Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You
+  can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window`
+  macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
+  the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`
+known_false_positives: .
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 25
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 5888f36ecd..ad3c3915c3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User
+id: 37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have
   not created them before.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs
-  Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create
-  of baseline of previously seen users.
-id: 37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances
-  for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances
-  that this is the intended behavior.
-name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime,
   latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region |
@@ -20,6 +16,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs
   | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h")
   | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs
+  Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create
+  of baseline of previously seen users.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances
+  for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances
+  that this is the intended behavior.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
index 058f294763..06524b6337 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region
+id: fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-02'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is
   created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file
   of previously seen regions where instances have been created.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial`
-  to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the
-  second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table
-  up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for
-  this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`
-  macro.
-id: fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance
-  in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
-name: Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region
-references: []
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
   as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region,
   All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions
@@ -23,6 +16,16 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(
   | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(),
   "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial`
+  to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the
+  second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table
+  up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for
+  this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`
+  macro.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance
+  in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
index af807302db..b91c12d76d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image
+id: bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4
+version: 1
 date: '2018-10-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously
   unseen image IDs.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images
-  - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also
-  enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update`
-  to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional
-  filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`
-  macro.
-id: bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4
-known_false_positives: After a new image is created, the first systems created with
-  that image will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the image being used was
-  created by a legitimate user.
-name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image
-references: []
 search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
   as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id,
   All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")`
@@ -23,6 +15,17 @@ search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime
   | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage)
   OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user,
   image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images
+  - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also
+  enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update`
+  to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional
+  filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`
+  macro.
+known_false_positives: After a new image is created, the first systems created with
+  that image will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the image being used was
+  created by a legitimate user.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 4de0e07318..ec1232c365 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,11 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-date: '2020-09-12'
-description: Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance
-  Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times.
-  You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance
-  Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also
-  provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`
-  macro.
-id: c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda
-known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using
-  a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that
-  they intended to create the system with the new instance type.
 name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type
-references: []
+id: c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda
+version: 1
+date: '2020-09-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
+description: Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
   as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type,
   All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")`
@@ -23,6 +15,17 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values
   | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(),
   "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance
+  Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times.
+  You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance
+  Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also
+  provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`
+  macro.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using
+  a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that
+  they intended to create the system with the new instance type.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index d8a5564ef7..aae7fc7feb 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User
+id: 7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-29'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have
   not previously modified them.
-how_to_implement: This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update
-  a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously
-  Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection
-  to properly work.
-id: 7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances
-  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
-  modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
-name: Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime,
   latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command)
   as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2
@@ -21,6 +16,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs
   enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser)
   OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime user command
   object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update
+  a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously
+  Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection
+  to properly work.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances
+  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
+  modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index 14a9bd46bb..623093bb0b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,23 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City
+id: e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-09'
+author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates
   something.
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
+  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
+  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
+  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) |
+  lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen,
+  enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 |
+  eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity
+  > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) |
+  table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
   provider.  You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning
   Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic
@@ -12,7 +27,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
   macro.
-id: e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -24,18 +38,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
-name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City
 references: []
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
-  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
-  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
-  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) |
-  lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen,
-  enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 |
-  eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity
-  > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) |
-  table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
@@ -58,5 +61,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index 33901073c2..a805a550c9 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,23 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country
+id: 94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-09'
+author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or
   creates something.
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
+  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
+  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
+  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country)
+  | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country
+  OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data |
+  where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry)
+  OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src,
+  Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
   provider.  You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning
   Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic
@@ -12,7 +27,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
   macro.
-id: 94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -24,18 +38,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
-name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country
 references: []
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
-  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
-  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
-  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country)
-  | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country
-  OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data |
-  where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry)
-  OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src,
-  Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
@@ -58,5 +61,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index 804268a60a..d6b662bd2c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,22 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address
+id: f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-16'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs
   or creates something.
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id)
+  as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created)
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
+  src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data
+  | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc)
+  OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`)
+  | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
   provider.  You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning
   Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic
@@ -12,7 +26,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
   macro.
-id: f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -24,17 +37,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
-name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address
 references: []
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id)
-  as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created)
-  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command
-  | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
-  src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data
-  | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc)
-  OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`)
-  | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
@@ -57,5 +60,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index e4668c9d82..c1574a9be7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,23 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region
+id: 5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-16'
+author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates
   something.
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
+  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
+  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
+  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region)
+  | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT
+  firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where
+  enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion)
+  OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`)
+  | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
   provider.  You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning
   Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic
@@ -12,7 +27,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your
   the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide
   additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
   macro.
-id: 5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -24,18 +38,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
-name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region
 references: []
-search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
-  where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success
-  by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command |
-  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region)
-  | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT
-  firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where
-  enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion)
-  OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`)
-  | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
@@ -58,5 +61,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
index f6209cd9dc..5330520d4e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,15 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Detect AWS Console Login by New User
+id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-28'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
   The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within
   the last hour
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
-  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
-  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
-  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
-  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
-  searches) to refresh the baselines.
-id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
-name: Detect AWS Console Login by New User
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
   | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime)
@@ -24,6 +17,17 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   "First Time Logging into AWS Console", "Previously Seen User") |where userStatus="First
   Time Logging into AWS Console" |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
+  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
+  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
+  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
+  searches) to refresh the baselines.
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -47,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 30
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
index 74193af0ea..ac6b0a8bd9 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,15 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
+id: 121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-07'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
   The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within
   the last hour
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
-  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
-  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
-  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
-  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
-  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
-  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`
-  macro.
-id: 121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
-name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
   | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table
@@ -29,6 +20,19 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCity = "New City" AND
   userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user City  userStatus userCity  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
+  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
+  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
+  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
+  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
+  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`
+  macro.
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -55,5 +59,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
index 552a776e0c..b88168e79b 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,15 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
+id: 67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-07'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
   The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within
   the last hour
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
-  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
-  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
-  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
-  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
-  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
-  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`
-  macro.
-id: 67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
-name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
   | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table
@@ -29,6 +20,19 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCountry = "New Country"
   AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user Country  userStatus userCountry  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
+  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
+  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
+  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
+  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
+  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`
+  macro.
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -55,5 +59,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
index 2e2e22bba7..813670e2f3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,15 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
+id: 9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-07'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
   The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within
   the last hour
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
-  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
-  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
-  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
-  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
-  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
-  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`
-  macro.
-id: 9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
-name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
   | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table
@@ -29,6 +20,19 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userRegion = "New
   Region" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime lastTime user Region  userStatus userRegion  | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users
+  in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously
+  seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail
+  - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection
+  searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for
+  this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`
+  macro.
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -55,5 +59,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index 79d4b01aa9..047817dc25 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,13 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP
+id: ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-10'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or
   previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage
   bucket.
-how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform,
-  setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and
-  logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).
-  In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable
-  storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs.  These
-  logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically
-  show up by 15 minutes past the hour.  It is recommended to configure any saved searches
-  or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes
-  past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *).  A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv)
-  stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine
-  any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.
-id: ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022
-known_false_positives: GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs
-  are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will
-  be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two
-  hours.
-name: Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename
   cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri
   | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status="\"200\"" | stats earliest(_time)
@@ -32,6 +19,22 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | r
   >= relative_time(now(),"-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,"%m/%d/%y
   %H:%M:%S") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | table  first_time
   last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform,
+  setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and
+  logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).
+  In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable
+  storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs.  These
+  logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically
+  show up by 15 minutes past the hour.  It is recommended to configure any saved searches
+  or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes
+  past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *).  A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv)
+  stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine
+  any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.
+known_false_positives: GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs
+  are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will
+  be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two
+  hours.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
@@ -52,5 +55,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
index 03aca91672..05a2b746cc 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,12 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets
+id: f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-05'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public
   GCP Storage bucket.
-how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform,
-  setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and
-  logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).
-id: f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
-  that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
-  That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers"
-  group.
-name: Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions
   | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action
   | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath
@@ -21,6 +16,14 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPay
   | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member
   | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table  _time, bucketName, src, user,
   location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform,
+  setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and
+  logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
+  That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers"
+  group.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
index 36834556df..b72952640f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Detect New Open S3 buckets
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4
+version: 2
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public
   S3 bucket.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk.
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4
-known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
-  that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
-  That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users"
-  group.
-name: Detect New Open S3 buckets
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw
   "(?<json_field>{.+})" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{}
   | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI
@@ -19,6 +16,12 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex
   max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission
   bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk.
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
+  That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users"
+  group.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
index 8a5e0c258c..2144ea2cc2 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI
+id: 39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public
   S3 bucket over the aws cli.
-id: 39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22
-known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
-  that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
-  That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users"
-  group.
-name: Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp
   IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write
   IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp
@@ -19,6 +17,12 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR r
   requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write
   requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` '
+how_to_implement: ''
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose.
+  That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users"
+  group.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
@@ -44,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index 901e7b33a4..ddc1308ca9 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect S3 access from a new IP
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4
+version: 1
 date: '2018-06-28'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously
   unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access
-  logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket
-  Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen
-  remote IPs and bucket names.
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4
-known_false_positives: S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make
-  a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking
-  for a new IP within the past hour
-name: Detect S3 access from a new IP
-references: []
 search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200
   | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip
   | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime)
@@ -21,6 +15,15 @@ search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_s
   "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip
   | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access
+  logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket
+  Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen
+  remote IPs and bucket names.
+known_false_positives: S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make
+  a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking
+  for a new IP within the past hour
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index 97d1c1cd2e..af2ca63234 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-date: '2021-01-26'
 name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance
 id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
 version: 3
+date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts
   for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security
-  Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule
-  these searches according to the bucket span interval.
-type: batch
-references: []
-known_false_positives: None
-name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance
-references: []
 search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h
   _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account)
   as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity
@@ -21,6 +14,12 @@ search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket sp
   | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev
   * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types
   vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security
+  Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule
+  these searches according to the bucket span interval.
+known_false_positives: None
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
index fc6b8e4734..ad6779e610 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,23 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User
+id: 2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
+version: 3
 date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts
   for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.
-id: 2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222
+search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename
+  findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts
+  by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev
+  | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev
+  * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub
-  inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security
+  Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule
+  these searches according to the bucket span interval.
 known_false_positives: None
-name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User
 references: []
-search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time
-| stats count AS alerts by _time user
-| eventstats avg(alerts)
-    as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev
-| eval
-    threshold_value = 2
-| eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev
-    * threshold_value), 1, 0)
-| search isOutlier=1
-| table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
@@ -34,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
index ff8d07f46e..12b6faa698 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS
+id: ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53
+version: 1
 date: '2018-05-07'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections
   originating from within your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file
   that factors in the latest data.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow
-  logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
-  your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points
-  required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is
-  the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be
-  considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked
-  Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen
-  blocked outbound connections.
-id: ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53
-known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold`
-  and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators
-  roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number
-  of blocked outbound connections.
-name: Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS
-references: []
 search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12
   OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)  [search  `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow`
   action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16)
@@ -37,6 +26,20 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17
   | stats values(dest_ip) as "Blocked Destination IPs", values(interface_id) as "resourceId"
   count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip
   | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow
+  logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
+  your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points
+  required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is
+  the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be
+  considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked
+  Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen
+  blocked outbound connections.
+known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold`
+  and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators
+  roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number
+  of blocked outbound connections.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -60,5 +63,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
index 3f606f8a3e..5eea45dfe0 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion
+id: ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53
+version: 1
 date: '2018-11-27'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to
   deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file
   that factors in the latest data.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
-  your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data
-  points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine.
-  The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from
-  the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best
-  when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search
-  once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.
-id: ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53
-known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`,
-  the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
-name: Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket
   | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
   s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn
@@ -31,6 +22,18 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=Dele
   table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName
   path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count
   as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
+  your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data
+  points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine.
+  The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from
+  the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best
+  when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search
+  once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.
+known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`,
+  the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
@@ -53,5 +56,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
index 5ef13dcb3b..9c1b8f633c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,21 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: High Number of Login Failures from a single source
+id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure
   Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value
   of 5 as suited for your environment.
-id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222
-known_false_positives: unknown
-name: High Number of Login Failures from a single source
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed  record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon
   app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user)
   as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method
   values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type
   Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`'
+how_to_implement: ''
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
@@ -29,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
index e20b2a5a5f..8d84f2b0d7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: New container uploaded to AWS ECR
+id: f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099
+version: 1
 date: '2020-02-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This searches show information on uploaded containers including source
   user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time
   of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize
-  the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.
-id: f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099
-known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or
-  users with access to container registry.
-name: New container uploaded to AWS ECR
-references: []
 search: '| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute
   where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.http_user_agent="AWS Internal"
   AND Compute.event_name="PutImage" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src
   Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name("Compute")`
   | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize
+  the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.
+known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or
+  users with access to container registry.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
@@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
index 45f175e462..f4007f9877 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP
+id: c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list
   of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known
   to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system.
-how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
-  works with o365:management:activity
-id: c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e
-known_false_positives: Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually
-  update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.
-name: O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP
-references:
-- https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/
 search: '`o365_management_activity` signature="Set Company Information." ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy
   | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue "(?<ip_addresses_new_added>\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})"
   | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue "(?<ip_addresses_old>\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})"
@@ -21,6 +17,13 @@ search: '`o365_management_activity` signature="Set Company Information." Modifie
   as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added signature vendor_product vendor_account
   status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+known_false_positives: Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually
+  update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.
+references:
+- https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
index 90a1882d45..302c14c05d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: O365 Disable MFA
+id: c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled,
   what entitiy performed the action and against what user
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
-  works with o365:management:activity
-id: c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e
-known_false_positives: Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA
-  or Strong Authentication
-name: O365 Disable MFA
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." | stats
   count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation
   user status signature dest ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+known_false_positives: Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA
+  or Strong Authentication
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
index 1338dd6400..69508d2f11 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert
+id: d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures
   occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
-  works with o365:management:activity
-id: d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9
-known_false_positives: The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should
-  reduce the number of false positives.
-name: O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=*
   status=Failed | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) values(UserAuthenticationMethod)
   AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status
   values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+known_false_positives: The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should
+  reduce the number of false positives.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
@@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
index d394762eee..659c8fc0f3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: O365 PST export alert
+id: 5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or
   exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information
   including email body content
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
-  works with o365:management:activity
-id: 5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc
-known_false_positives: PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the
-  sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.
-name: O365 PST export alert
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name="eDiscovery search
   started or exported" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as
   lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+known_false_positives: PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the
+  sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
@@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
index be0336e5f4..b0086b6ef7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,20 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding
+id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple
   mailboxes to the same destination.
-id: 7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28
-known_false_positives: unknown
-name: O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters
   | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user)
   AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user)
   AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`'
+how_to_implement: ''
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
@@ -31,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
index f10c3c59b5..c8a746f7af 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,20 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation
+id: b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-15'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from
   another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.
-id: b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7
-known_false_positives: Service Accounts
-name: O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters
   | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess
   OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time)
   as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`'
+how_to_implement: ''
+known_false_positives: Service Accounts
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
@@ -31,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
index b3398452c8..2b0a5ffbde 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,20 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding
+id: f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to
   the same destination.
-id: f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4
-known_false_positives: unknown
-name: O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters
   | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user)
   AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user)
   AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user
   > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`'
+how_to_implement: ''
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
@@ -31,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
index 12d952d73a..22ea96c9bb 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches
   an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
   translated to use the latest Change Datamodel
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4
-known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
-  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
-  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
-  human user.
-name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time
   | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched)
   as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval
@@ -21,6 +16,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m
   "-10m@m") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg)
   / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away,
   total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
+known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
+  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
+  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
+  human user.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 40
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index 719bed8d1e..36d93256b0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
+id: dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches
   an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
   translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-id: dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5
-known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
-  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
-  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
-  human user.
-name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter`
   | bucket span=10m _time  | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user  |
   apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as
   isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
+known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
+  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
+  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
+  human user.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
index 0fa3fcd896..05246e8a1c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-s3f3-d82362dffd75
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number
   of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This
   search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-s3f3-d82362dffd75
-known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure
-  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
-  out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted
-  on a human user.
-name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m
   _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated)
   as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev
@@ -22,6 +17,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket sp
   total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated,
   num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev |
   `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure
+  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
+  out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted
+  on a human user.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index 1371ddf7bb..5f4d1fe8cb 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
+id: 1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates
   an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
   translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
-id: 1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e
-known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
-  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
-  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
-  human user.
-name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter`
   | bucket span=10m _time  | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user  |
   apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)"
   as isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
+known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
+  are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter
+  out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a
+  human user.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index 2a51330c4a..edc6d91c55 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,29 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City
+id: 344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   cities.  Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with
   "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the
   latest Change Datamodel. '
+search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
+  | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
+  sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
+  as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
+  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
+  City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
+  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime
+  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath
+  output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
+  src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-id: 344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -21,18 +35,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\
   \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\
   \ be much less valuable to you."
-name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City
 references: []
-search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
-  | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
-  sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
-  as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
-  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
-  City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
-  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime
-  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath
-  output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
-  src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
@@ -51,5 +54,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 25
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index 8eac869202..555c5c4b05 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,14 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country
+id: ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins
   with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use
   the latest Change Datamodel. '
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
-  Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
-  that have provisioned AWS resources.
-id: ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0
-known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
-  \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
-  \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored\
-  \ in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional\
-  \ sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a\
-  \ new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity.\
-  \ If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there\
-  \ should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free\
-  \ version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\
-  \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\
-  \ be much less valuable to you."
-name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
   | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) |
   iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime,
@@ -34,6 +20,23 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI
   >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] |
   spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time,
   user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
+  Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
+  that have provisioned AWS resources.
+known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
+  \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
+  \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored\
+  \ in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional\
+  \ sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a\
+  \ new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity.\
+  \ If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there\
+  \ should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free\
+  \ version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\
+  \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\
+  \ be much less valuable to you."
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
@@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index ea85851ba6..7e53b21702 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,29 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address
+id: 42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins
   with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use
   the latest Change Datamodel. '
+search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run*
+  OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time)
+  as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country
+  | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
+  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country
+  | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
+  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime
+  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress]
+  | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table
+  _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-id: 42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -21,18 +35,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk\
   \ has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful\
   \ regions), this may be much less valuable to you."
-name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address
 references: []
-search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run*
-  OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time)
-  as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country
-  | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
-  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime)
-  as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime
-  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress]
-  | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table
-  _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
@@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 29e62606b6..be691c57dc 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,29 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region
+id: 7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning
   activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
   This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
+  | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
+  sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
+  as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
+  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
+  City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
+  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime
+  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath
+  output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
+  src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning
   Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations
   that have provisioned AWS resources.
-id: 7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253
 known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false\
   \ positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect\
   \ the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is\
@@ -21,18 +35,7 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal
   \ version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution\
   \ (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may\
   \ be much less valuable to you."
-name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region
 references: []
-search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
-  | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
-  sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
-  as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
-  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
-  City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
-  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime
-  >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath
-  output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user,
-  src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
index 773ea41fa0..c086f3711a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers
+id: 74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected
   to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest
+  dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY
+  by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 |
+  `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` '
 how_to_implement: 'This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating
   the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions
   that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\
@@ -15,14 +24,9 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and popu
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-id: 74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce
 known_false_positives: It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers
   that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.
-name: Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest
-  dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY
-  by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 |
-  `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` '
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
@@ -47,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 920f268b46..c3f38d4493 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Peter Gael, Splunk
+name: Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted
+id: 021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-08'
+author: Peter Gael, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms
   used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker
   has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete
   a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query
   the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's
   a duplicate
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
-  the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.
-id: 021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network
-  ACL.
-name: Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn  |
   stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage)
   values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing
+  the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network
+  ACL.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Network ACL Activity
@@ -34,5 +37,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
index ad137fa075..0ea740245c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,21 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect API activity from users without MFA
+id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-w5ad-212bf5d1dac4
+version: 1
 date: '2018-05-17'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logged into the
   AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication.
   Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type
   a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access
   AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged
   IAM users.
+search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false
+  | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity
+  as user]| stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName)
+  as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`'
 how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`:
@@ -29,19 +39,12 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-w5ad-212bf5d1dac4
 known_false_positives: Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure
   do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts,
   if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune
   the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment
   using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS.
-name: Detect API activity from users without MFA
 references: []
-search: '`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false
-  | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity
-  as user]| stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName)
-  as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -59,5 +62,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
index b185be2cdb..aea98ef961 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,21 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts
   that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns
   event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service
   is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite
   hard.
+search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT
+  [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup
+  aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count
+  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by
+  user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`'
 how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with
@@ -30,19 +41,11 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55
 known_false_positives: It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service
   accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv`
   file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv`
   table with that entry.
-name: Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts
 references: []
-search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT
-  [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup
-  aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count
-  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by
-  user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -66,5 +69,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 15
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
index f5013bbec5..d5cb8fbd30 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,22 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2
+id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging
   EvilGinx tools to mimic websites.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by
+  DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$"
+  | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon`
+  OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365`
+  OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google`
+  | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer
+  [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web
+  by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$"
+  | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`'
 how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution\
   \ datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the\
   \ IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting\
@@ -16,21 +31,10 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Res
   \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\
   \ to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\
   \n"
-id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa
 known_false_positives: If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv
   file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file
   to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains.
-name: Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by
-  DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$"
-  | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon`
-  OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365`
-  OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google`
-  | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer
-  [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web
-  by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$"
-  | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Common Phishing Frameworks
@@ -54,5 +58,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
index 837db579b5..3fe5d5703d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,15 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response
+id: 05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating
   the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission
   for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can
   often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because
   this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from
-  your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically,
-  this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding
-  the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section
-  of the protocol.
-id: 05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9
-known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long
-  enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search
-  to help mitigate false positives.
-name: Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND
   DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type |  `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
@@ -25,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Type" firstTime as "First Time" lastTime as "Last Time" count as Count | table "Source
   IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type"  "Answer Length" Count "First
   Time" "Last Time" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from
+  your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically,
+  this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding
+  the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section
+  of the protocol.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long
+  enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search
+  to help mitigate false positives.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
index 1016f37f59..cefe58f3d0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
+id: 29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0
+version: 1
 date: '2019-12-03'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping
   with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon
   Event Code.
+search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId)
+  as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll
+  ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename
+  Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`'
 how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which
   includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named
   `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-id: 29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0
 known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be
   part of a whtelist.
-name: Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
 references:
 - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId)
-  as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll
-  ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename
-  Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
index 343d9398e1..8f907ef3bd 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703
+id: 98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188
+version: 2
 date: '2019-02-27'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with
   credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.
+search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex
+  field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?<privs>\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" | where
+  privs="SeDebugPrivilege" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
+  by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as "Enabled Privilege"
+  | rename Process_Name as process |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`'
 how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable
   the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata.
   Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs
@@ -9,19 +20,11 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also en
   on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/.
   Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators"
   to be able to look for the right group membership changes.'
-id: 98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188
 known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by
   administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated
   in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you
   may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
-name: Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703
 references: []
-search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex
-  field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?<privs>\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" | where
-  privs="SeDebugPrivilege" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
-  by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as "Enabled Privilege"
-  | rename Process_Name as process |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`'
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
index 81fba34960..3078398031 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect new API calls from user roles
+id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-16'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before
   or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user
-  roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen
-  user roles.
-id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1
-known_false_positives: It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making
-  new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to
-  trigger.
-name: Detect new API calls from user roles
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
   [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success  userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
   | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName
@@ -23,6 +17,15 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A
   | table eventName userName]  |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time)
   as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)`
   | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user
+  roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen
+  user roles.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making
+  new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to
+  trigger.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
index 342a488ecd..9d1b2a0d30 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,31 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect new user AWS Console Login
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
   The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within
   the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to
-  create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update
-  previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how
-  often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75
-known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
-  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
-  activity is legitimate.
-name: Detect new user AWS Console Login
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats
   earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t
   previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime
   max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),
   "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console"  | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to
+  create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update
+  previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how
+  often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -40,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
index 9784918f82..f694c57e23 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,28 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Detect Spike in AWS API Activity
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your
   AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest
   data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change
   Datamodel.
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall
+  | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
+  api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as *
+  by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720
+  | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720))
+  | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls,
+  stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1)
+  | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup
+  api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3
+  | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND
+  numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn
+  | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName)
+  as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user
+  | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`'
 how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
@@ -30,24 +49,8 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55
 known_false_positives: ''
-name: Detect Spike in AWS API Activity
 references: []
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall
-  | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
-  api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as *
-  by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720
-  | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720))
-  | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls,
-  stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1)
-  | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup
-  api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3
-  | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND
-  numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn
-  | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName)
-  as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user
-  | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -70,5 +73,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
index eb66faff95..7f7a363d18 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53
+version: 1
 date: '2018-05-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related
   to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated
   and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
-  your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data
-  points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine.
-  The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from
-  the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best
-  when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to
-  create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API
-  event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53
-known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold`
-  and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.
-name: Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events`
   | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
   network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*)
@@ -32,6 +22,19 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_eve
   userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn
   | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName)
   as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
+  your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data
+  points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine.
+  The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from
+  the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best
+  when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to
+  create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API
+  event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
+known_false_positives: The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold`
+  and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -55,5 +58,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 20
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
index 4091497fa3..4eaefe70ff 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,14 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Spike in Security Group Activity
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-18'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related
   to security groups in your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file
   that factors in the latest data.  This search is deprecated and have been translated
   to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
-  your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data
-  points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine.
-  The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from
-  the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best
-  when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once
-  to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove
-  API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53
-known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`,
-  the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
-name: Detect Spike in Security Group Activity
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls`
   | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup
   security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*)
@@ -33,6 +23,19 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_
   userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn
   | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName)
   as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit
+  your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data
+  points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine.
+  The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from
+  the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best
+  when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once
+  to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove
+  API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
+known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`,
+  the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -55,5 +58,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
index 4cdc36c42d..01a88312b2 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,30 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect USB device insertion
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5
+version: 1
 date: '2017-11-27'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change_Analysis
 description: The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663
   for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID
   4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario
   we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656
   or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets
   and Identity Framework.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest
+  latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes)
+  All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656)
+  (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`|
+  `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)`  | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security
   Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event
   logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To
   minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework
   to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise
   Security Assets and Identity Framework.
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5
 known_false_positives: Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify
   and investigate as appropriate.
-name: Detect USB device insertion
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest
-  latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes)
-  All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656)
-  (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`|
-  `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)`  | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Data Protection
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index 0868427b68..7e4f2f2753 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers
+id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Web
 description: This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time)
+  as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic`
+  | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
 how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You
   can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis
   tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being
@@ -19,15 +28,9 @@ how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. Yo
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`
   Deprecated because duplicate.'
-id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301
 known_false_positives: It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated
   and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate.
-name: Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time)
-  as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status
-  | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic`
-  | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Dynamic DNS
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
index 8fe03fd803..4eedd37a75 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detection of DNS Tunnels
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4
+version: 2
 date: '2017-09-18'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of
   the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential
   false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries
@@ -7,20 +12,6 @@ description: This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum
   method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of
   security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS
   traffic. Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data
-  is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution
-  data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and
-  Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure
-  you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category
-  field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro
-  which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains
-  to reduce alert fatigue.
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4
-known_false_positives: It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior.
-  If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold
-  can also be modified to better suit your environment.
-name: Detection of DNS Tunnels
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count  from
   datamodel=Network_Resolution  where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT
   (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa"
@@ -35,6 +26,18 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count  fro
   "DNS.src" as src  "DNS.answer" as message | eval message=if(message=="unknown","",
   message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats
   sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data
+  is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution
+  data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and
+  Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure
+  you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category
+  field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro
+  which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains
+  to reduce alert fatigue.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior.
+  If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold
+  can also be modified to better suit your environment.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Data Protection
@@ -56,5 +59,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
index 325b570344..6db07ee08f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers
+id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers.
   Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and
   Identity Framework.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
+  where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src
+  DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` '
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that
   DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that
   your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise
   Security.
-id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6
 known_false_positives: Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate,
   verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.
-name: DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
-  where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src
-  DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` '
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
@@ -41,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 896eb44ed5..7d3a2651e5 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User
+id: 56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have
   not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated
   to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By
-  User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or
-  remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-id: 56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances
-  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
-  modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
-name: EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls`
   errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user
@@ -22,6 +16,15 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_mod
   "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId
   | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By
+  User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or
+  remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances
+  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
+  modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: user
   risk_score: 5
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 1328415b4e..63608de724 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75
+version: 1
 date: '2018-02-23'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started
   in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file
   of previously seen regions where an instance was started
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create
-  of baseline of previously seen regions.  This search is deprecated and have been
-  translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance
-  in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
-name: EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest
   latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv
   | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup
@@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as ear
   "Instance Started in a New Region","Previously Seen Region") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)`
   | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New
   Region" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create
+  of baseline of previously seen regions.  This search is deprecated and have been
+  translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance
+  in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   risk_object_type: system
   risk_score: 10
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
index 30733708ab..881591566e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI
+id: 347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen
   AMIs.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change
   Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support
-  search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.
-id: 347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3
-known_false_positives: After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with
-  that AMI will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the AMI being used was created
-  by a legitimate user.
-name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
   errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId
@@ -24,6 +19,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn
   as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime,
   lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support
+  search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.
+known_false_positives: After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with
+  that AMI will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the AMI being used was created
+  by a legitimate user.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 18c333ae4b..938ad04dc8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type
+id: 65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad
+version: 2
 date: '2020-02-07'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen
   instance types.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest
   Change Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"
-  support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.
-id: 65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad
-known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using
-  a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended
-  to create the system with the new instance type.
-name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
   errorCode=success | fillnull value="m1.small" requestParameters.instanceType | stats
   earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType
@@ -24,6 +19,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType
   as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table
   _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"
+  support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that an admin will create a new system using
+  a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended
+  to create the system with the new instance type.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index b11af83f18..7a6b6383da 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User
+id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not
   created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the
   latest Change Datamodel.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By
-  User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.
-id: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances
-  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
-  launching instances that this is the intended behavior.
-name: EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances
   errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv
@@ -22,6 +17,14 @@ search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
   | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType
   as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn
   as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By
+  User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances
+  when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is
+  launching instances that this is the intended behavior.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
index 2a79a42c73..4d8fb16510 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension
+id: ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a
+version: 3
 date: '2020-11-19'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five
   spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the
   file extension by pushing it outside of the default view.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
-  that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-  in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
-  of the Sysmon TA.
-id: ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path)
   as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process = "*     .*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process
   Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+  that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
+  in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
+  of the Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 071042bdef..5cfa40eac7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups
+id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed
   a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring.
+search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats
+  latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)`
+  | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(),
+  "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data
   from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a
   central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup,
   you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you
   backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful
   backup, other than the default of seven days.
-id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440
 known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups
 references: []
-search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats
-  latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)`
-  | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(),
-  "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
@@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
index 8774ced086..713d6a3023 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: First time seen command line argument
+id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-q138afaaqa39
+version: 5
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter
   to execute a command that has not previously been seen.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting
-  logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete
-  process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the
-  Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen
-  command line arguments,"&#151;which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`&#151;a
-  historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list.
-  For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same
-  value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.
-id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-q138afaaqa39
-known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to
-  execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program
-  is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter`
-  macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
-name: First time seen command line argument
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe
   Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
@@ -30,6 +19,20 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_
   previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),
   "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting
+  logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete
+  process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the
+  Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen
+  command line arguments,"&#151;which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`&#151;a
+  historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list.
+  For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same
+  value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.
+known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to
+  execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program
+  is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter`
+  macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -56,5 +59,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
index 1526f0ec32..c4448def42 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: GCP GCR container uploaded
+id: 4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-02-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search show information on uploaded containers including source
   user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination
   path.
-how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later),
-  then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
-  You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the
-  `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.
-id: 4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b
-known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or
-  users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a
-  Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload
-  creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path.
-name: GCP GCR container uploaded
-references: []
 search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage
   where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account
   Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg
   Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")`  | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later),
+  then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
+  You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the
+  `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.
+known_false_positives: Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or
+  users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a
+  Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload
+  creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
@@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
index 62df130be0..bc1a865ec9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Identify New User Accounts
+id: 475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment
   by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the
   past week.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating
-  the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity
-  framework.
-id: 475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89
-known_false_positives: If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly,
-  this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate
-  appropriately.
-name: Identify New User Accounts
-references: []
 search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities  | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800,
   "Accounts created in last week") | search empStatus="Accounts created in last week"|
   `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity
   empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating
+  the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity
+  framework.
+known_false_positives: If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly,
+  this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate
+  appropriately.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
@@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
index 91172eae06..ef0a48048e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments
+id: 2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c
+version: 6
 date: '2021-01-19'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded
   command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the
   process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user.
@@ -7,22 +12,20 @@ description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 en
   default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and
   passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost
   the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: 2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c
-known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
-  options, but it's not common.
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
+  options, but it's not common.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 6
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
index cb0893230b..e1e0089036 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,15 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse
+id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-23'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains
   that you want to have monitored for abuse.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time)
+  as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must
   ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request.
   Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type.
@@ -9,13 +17,8 @@ how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you m
   which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search
   "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that
   will be checked for.
-id: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa
 known_false_positives: None at this time
-name: Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time)
-  as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
@@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
index d561778edc..1c39f5af86 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Open Redirect in Splunk Web
+id: d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-19'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859,
   the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability.
-how_to_implement: No extra steps needed to implement this search.
-id: d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7
-known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Open Redirect in Splunk Web
-references: []
 search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`
+how_to_implement: No extra steps needed to implement this search.
+known_false_positives: None identified
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
index 04942260d5..a66512c03f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection
+id: a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc
+version: 1
 date: '2019-01-29'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack.
+search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd
+  OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path |
+  bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`'
 how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
   from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599)
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must
   be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery
   data populate the Alerts data model
-id: a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc
 known_false_positives: There are no known false positives.
-name: Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection
 references: []
-search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd
-  OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path |
-  bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
@@ -32,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
index 8aa68f507e..80b609a5f9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Processes created by netsh
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e
+version: 5
 date: '2020-11-23'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various
   commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting
   utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network
@@ -7,21 +12,19 @@ description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute vari
   proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search,
   we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via
   the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs
-  with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints.
-  If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e
-known_false_positives: It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in
-  most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether
-  the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe"
-  process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.
-name: Processes created by netsh
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs
+  with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints.
+  If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in
+  most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether
+  the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe"
+  process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Netsh Abuse
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
index b947e40abb..21c560cb83 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Prohibited Software On Endpoint
+id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893
+version: 2
 date: '2019-10-11'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked
   as prohibited.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
@@ -12,14 +21,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited",
   which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search <code>Add Prohibited
   Processes to Enterprise Security</code>.
-id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893
 known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Prohibited Software On Endpoint
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Monitor for Unauthorized Software
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
index d3e4722069..9de43f6de7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264x9f
+version: 2
 date: '2019-02-27'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory
   using the reg add command.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264x9f
-known_false_positives: None at the moment
-name: Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process="*add*" Processes.process="*Hidden*"
   Processes.process="*REG_DWORD*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: None at the moment
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
index 4c8c5bea96..89e2c8c3ba 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-date: '2020-03-02'
-description: This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint`
-  data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products,
-  such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for
-  this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the
-  registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.
-id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e
-known_false_positives: This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to
-  modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.
 name: Remote Registry Key modifications
-references: []
+id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e
+version: 3
+date: '2020-03-02'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
+description: This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
   as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where  Registry.registry_path="\\\\*"  by
   Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint`
+  data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products,
+  such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for
+  this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the
+  registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.
+known_false_positives: This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to
+  modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
@@ -34,5 +37,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
index 9d3db6ff24..43e8a4a5ec 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Remote WMI Command Attempt
+id: 272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838
+version: 2
 date: '2018-12-03'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to operate
   on remote systems.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.
-id: 272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838
-known_false_positives: Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from
-  remote systems.
-name: Remote WMI Command Attempt
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe  AND
   Processes.process= */node* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from
+  remote systems.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
index ccb8b5efb8..2fde684e32 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware
+id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware
   were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6
-known_false_positives: No known false positives
-name: Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= "*create*"  OR Processes.process=
   "*delete*") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user |
   `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: No known false positives
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ransomware
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
index 3e4d630c65..ef6d63259f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure
+id: f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd
+version: 1
 date: '2018-06-14'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409,
   a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug.
-how_to_implement: The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary
-  for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting
-  your Splunk systems will reduce false positives.
-id: f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd
-known_false_positives: Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request.
-  Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.
-name: Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure
-references: []
 search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1
   uri_path="*raw/services/server/info/server-info" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server
   as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri)
   as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter`
+how_to_implement: The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary
+  for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting
+  your Splunk systems will reduce false positives.
+known_false_positives: Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request.
+  Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
index 6f4002a10e..714c5cb7b3 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Changes to File Associations
+id: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows
   file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine
   changes to this area.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes
-  from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry`
-  nodes.
-id: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc
-known_false_positives: There may be other processes in your environment that users
-  may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are
-  finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
-name: Suspicious Changes to File Associations
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name)
   as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe
@@ -22,6 +17,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   as registry_path count  FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts*
   by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table
   process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` '
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes
+  from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry`
+  nodes.
+known_false_positives: There may be other processes in your environment that users
+  may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are
+  finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
index 5bee6c513a..787647b4d6 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious File Write
+id: 57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8
+version: 3
 date: '2019-04-25'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to
   malicious activity.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
+  as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
+  | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically
   populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
@@ -11,19 +21,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activit
   to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored.
   This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to
   monitor.
-id: 57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8
 known_false_positives: It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the
   same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should
   be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and
   the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity
   is legitimate.
-name: Suspicious File Write
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
-  as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
-  | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
index 328c46edda..0e223b562a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious writes to System Volume Information
+id: cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder
   by something other than the System process.
-how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line
-  from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
-  of the Sysmon TA.
-id: cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac
-known_false_positives: It is possible that other utilities or system processes may
-  legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include
-  exceptions as appropriate.
-name: Suspicious writes to System Volume Information
-references: []
 search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\
   Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest,
   Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`
+how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line
+  from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
+  of the Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that other utilities or system processes may
+  legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include
+  exceptions as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
index c2c57b8ffc..14b3437c32 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Uncommon Processes On Endpoint
+id: 29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked
   as uncommon.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process
+  Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` '
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
   ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
@@ -10,14 +19,8 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
   various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments.
   Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that
   are uncommon in your environment.
-id: 29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7
 known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Uncommon Processes On Endpoint
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process
-  Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
index de021aa280..4c1639f16c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
+id: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65
+version: 1
 date: '2019-12-06'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because
   too noisy.
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time)
+  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1
+  | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` '
 how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which
   includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`.
   We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-id: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65
 known_false_positives: Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason.
   But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.
-name: Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time)
-  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1
-  | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 340410c62c..28ee3a06bf 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Unsuccessful Netbackup backups
+id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then
   failed.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from
-  your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central
-  server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you
-  can modify this search for your specific backup solution.
-id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f
-known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Unsuccessful Netbackup backups
-references: []
 search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE
   | search MESSAGE="An error occurred, failed to backup." | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)`
   | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature
   | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from
+  your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central
+  server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you
+  can modify this search for your specific backup solution.
+known_false_positives: None identified
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
@@ -27,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
index f0d89483df..7897c13c49 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Windows connhost exe started forcefully
+id: c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: 'The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe)
   executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows
   OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually
   seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized
   this is not specific to Ryuk. '
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
-  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
-  you want to collect data.
-id: c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769
-known_false_positives: This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see
-  any false positives for this detection
-name: Windows connhost exe started forcefully
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process="*C:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe*
   0xffffffff *-ForceV1*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
+  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
+  you want to collect data.
+known_false_positives: This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see
+  any false positives for this detection
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
index c7a25f3b91..2ad0bc5adc 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry
+id: 23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable.
   This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
-  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
-  you want to collect data.
-id: 23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb
-known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature on a Windows system since
-  it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
-  it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
-  to tune the search.
-name: Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name="DisableAntiSpyware"
   AND Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest Registry.user
   Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
+  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
+  you want to collect data.
+known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature on a Windows system since
+  it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
+  it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
+  to tune the search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
index eadeb4c2b1..486c39c918 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Windows hosts file modification
+id: 06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116
+version: 1
 date: '2018-11-02'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints
   across your environment.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem  by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
+  Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\*
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem
   data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
   products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
   reads and writes.
-id: 06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116
 known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to
   add entries to this file.
-name: Windows hosts file modification
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem  by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
-  Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\*
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Host Redirection
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
index eb7bc16342..0967d7da3f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation
+id: fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
+version: 2
 date: '2019-12-06'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.
+search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll*
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage,
+  TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` '
 how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which
   includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`.
   We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-id: fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717
 known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes,
   but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
-name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll*
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage,
-  TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
index 6060c1b1f6..ffd25b3196 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk
-date: '2020-11-03'
-description: Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: 6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159
-known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a
-  certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically
-  be done on a large number of systems.
 name: Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store
-references: []
+id: 6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159
+version: 6
+date: '2020-11-03'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
+description: Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*certutil*
   (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a
+  certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically
+  be done on a large number of systems.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 6
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
index a0f2a3a3ae..a6c962b0ad 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
+id: c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d
+version: 6
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values
   "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name
-  from your endpoints.
-id: c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d
-known_false_positives: Administrators may attempt to change the default execution
-  policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted"
-  or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should
-  be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.
-name: Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\Microsoft\\Powershell\\1\\ShellIds\\Microsoft.PowerShell*
   Registry.registry_key_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_name=Unrestricted
   OR Registry.registry_value_name=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
   Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name
+  from your endpoints.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may attempt to change the default execution
+  policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted"
+  or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should
+  be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 6
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
index 6cbda381e3..2010563f98 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Attempt To Stop Security Service
+id: c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the
   endpoint.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
+  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  where (Processes.process_name = net.exe OR  Processes.process_name = sc.exe) Processes.process="*
+  stop *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description
+  | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
@@ -12,18 +24,9 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activi
   use on the command line and surround with asterisks (*****), so that they work properly
   when searching the command line. The file should be updated with the names of any
   services you would like to monitor for attempts to stop the service.,
-id: c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910
 known_false_positives: None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services
   should be identified and understood.
-name: Attempt To Stop Security Service
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
-  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
-  where (Processes.process_name = net.exe OR  Processes.process_name = sc.exe) Processes.process="*
-  stop *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description
-  | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
@@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index a52930f64e..6290a7598e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
+id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911
+version: 4
 date: '2019-12-02'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export
   of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=reg.exe
   OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security*
@@ -17,6 +14,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*)
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
index cd96de645d..f72681e60c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,22 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Batch File Write to System32
+id: 503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3
+version: 1
 date: '2018-12-14'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system
   directory tree.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name
+  values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_path
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32*
+  AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
   you want to collect data.
-id: 503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3
 known_false_positives: It is possible for this search to generate a notable event
   for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not
   the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the
@@ -14,14 +24,7 @@ known_false_positives: It is possible for this search to generate a notable even
   by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You
   should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions,
   as necessary.
-name: Batch File Write to System32
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name
-  values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_path
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32*
-  AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
index 2f458fdd69..17ee356fc1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification
+id: 809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-21'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the
   built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware
   to prevent recovery.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.
-id: 809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
-name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe
   Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
index a42a56d7a1..56133071a7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Common Ransomware Extensions
+id: a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec
+version: 4
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used
   by Ransomware
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
+  as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex
+  field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`'
 how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
   using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
@@ -20,17 +30,10 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activi
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-id: a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec
 known_false_positives: It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions
   to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number
   of files created with these extensions.
-name: Common Ransomware Extensions
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
-  as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex
-  field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -54,5 +57,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
index e9124dea55..11e73c97a2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Common Ransomware Notes
+id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71
+version: 4
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks for files created with names matching those typically
   used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from
-  your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically
-  populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
-  via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is
-  typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.
-id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71
-known_false_positives: It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with
-  the same name used by ransomware note files.
-name: Common Ransomware Notes
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes`
   | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from
+  your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically
+  populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
+  via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is
+  typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with
+  the same name used by ransomware note files.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
index af467e48f5..a43674de22 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Create local admin accounts using net exe
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using
   net.exe.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e
-known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.
-name: Create local admin accounts using net exe
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as
   user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe
@@ -18,6 +14,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user)
   OR Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
index 9f161d1cd3..128a464a6a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe
+id: qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e
+version: 5
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using
   net.exe.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e
-known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network
-  shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.
-name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as
   user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processs.process_name=net.exe
   OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) by Processes.process Processes.process_name
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network
+  shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
index b63dab014d..47b9e1b152 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Create Remote Thread into LSASS
+id: 67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc
+version: 1
 date: '2019-12-06'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename
+  Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`'
 how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which
   includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`.
   We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-id: 67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc
 known_false_positives: Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate
   an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.
-name: Create Remote Thread into LSASS
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
-  max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename
-  Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
index ce903eba82..e58a150115 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,12 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Creation of Shadow Copy
+id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844
+version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic has been used to create
   a shadow copy.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844
-known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic
-  will create false positives.
-name: Creation of Shadow Copy
-references:
-- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe
   Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) OR (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe
@@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic
+  will create false positives.
+references:
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
index 7ae87fbfbf..cc7132339a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
+id: 2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b
+version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow
   copy.
-id: 2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b
-known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.
-name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
-references:
-- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic*
   OR Processes.process_name=powershell* Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.
+references:
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
index e827ca844e..b4e8a94ba1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy
+id: d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b
+version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow
   copy.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b
-known_false_positives: unknown
-name: Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy
-references:
-- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
   (Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\security*
@@ -18,6 +14,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references:
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
index 7e5e824653..ce9ee228aa 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-date: '2019-12-10'
-description: This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903
-known_false_positives: unknown
 name: Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy
-references:
-- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+id: c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903
+version: 1
+date: '2019-12-10'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
+description: This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
   Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest
   Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references:
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
index c6e896086c..4e8c5b41c6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Deleting Shadow Copies
+id: b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e
+version: 4
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy
   Service.  Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation.  This
   search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e
-known_false_positives: vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped
-  with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately
-  delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.
-name: Deleting Shadow Copies
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe
@@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped
+  with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately
+  delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
index f420602358..d09fc8afda 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks
+id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b
+version: 5
 date: '2020-10-15'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows
   Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows
-  Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.
-id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b
-known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be
-  detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
-name: Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks
-references: []
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp
   WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName="ANONYMOUS LOGON") OR (Logon_Type=9
   Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` '
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows
+  Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.
+known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be
+  detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Lateral Movement
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
index 844e986ff4..a535de9336 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account
+id: 1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-18'
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode
   4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.
+search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS
+  LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName)
+  as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`'
 how_to_implement: This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled
   on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you
   specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.)
   for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your
   Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter
   out known false positives.
-id: 1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645
 known_false_positives: None thus far found
-name: Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account
 references:
 - https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/
-search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS
-  LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName)
-  as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
index e8e4b7b8e9..9a363faaff 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access
+id: 2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996
+version: 3
 date: '2019-12-03'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential
   dumping.
+search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410)
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage,
+  SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename
+  Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` '
 how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which
   includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`.
   We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
   (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-id: 2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996
 known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass
   for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those
   cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need
   to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
-name: Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access
 references: []
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410)
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage,
-  SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename
-  Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
index 7107062d4a..8acf77ae34 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint
+id: c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74
+version: 5
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number
   of account lockouts in a short period.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where
+  nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.dest
+  All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`|
+  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search
+  count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`'
 how_to_implement: "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change`\
   \ datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute\
   \ successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts\
@@ -16,17 +27,9 @@ how_to_implement: "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Chan
   \ Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook\
   \ to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\
   \n"
-id: c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74
 known_false_positives: It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could
   cause a large number of account lockouts.
-name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where
-  nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.dest
-  All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`|
-  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search
-  count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
@@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
index b3c2e44e95..23240dde73 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts
+id: 95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively
   high number of times in a short period.
-how_to_implement: ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change`
-  datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute
-  successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts
-  you want to monitor, according to your environment.
-id: 95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd
-known_false_positives: It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue
-  causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.
-name: Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management
   All_Changes.result="lockout" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
   |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`'
+how_to_implement: ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change`
+  datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute
+  successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts
+  you want to monitor, according to your environment.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue
+  causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 51f340892b..0d39ba018d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,15 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Detect mshta inline hta execution
+id: a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 5
 date: '2021-01-20'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol
   handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when
   invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first
   time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions,
   as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-id: a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
-name: Detect mshta inline hta execution
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mshta.exe
@@ -23,6 +17,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
index 0221334b4b..1898433cad 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Detect mshta renamed
+id: 8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-20'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing.
   Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This
   analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta
   binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and
   validation it is the real mshta.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA.
-id: 8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.
-name: Detect mshta renamed
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=mshta.exe AND process_name!=mshta.exe)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
index 5b58205fe8..6cf9a1b490 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line
+id: 9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-20'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe)
   utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to
   proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command
@@ -7,23 +12,21 @@ description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (msht
   malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first
   time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions,
   as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-id: 9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior
-  and will need to be filtered.
-name: Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mshta.exe
   (Processes.process="*http://*" OR Processes.process="*https://*") by Processes.user
   Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior
+  and will need to be filtered.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
index 9b309dfac5..41af42bf7e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Detect New Local Admin account
+id: b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated
   to local administrators.
-id: b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d
-known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best
-  to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service
-  request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not
-  "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives
-how_to_implement: 'You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732'
-name: Detect New Local Admin account
-references: []
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators)
   | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows
+  TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732
+known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best
+  to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service
+  request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not
+  "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -38,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
index 5b9e1c2b55..b2952c9def 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-03'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: 'The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is
   detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for
   privilege escalation. '
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f
-known_false_positives: unknown
-name: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe
-references:
-- https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process)|
   where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`'
+how_to_implement: ''
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references:
+- https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
@@ -36,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
index 2be2e9fa47..f18e9b8aee 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery
+id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893
+version: 2
 date: '2020-11-10'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network
   configuration discovery on the endpoint.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically
-  populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
-  endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually
-  generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated
-  via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.
-id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893
-known_false_positives: It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands
-  used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these
-  commands. These can generate false positives.
-name: Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.process_name
@@ -21,6 +14,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools`
   | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime
   lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically
+  populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
+  endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually
+  generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated
+  via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.
+known_false_positives: It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands
+  used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these
+  commands. These can generate false positives.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Unusual Processes
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
index 2ca354306e..dfb56898c6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe
+id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664
+version: 5
 date: '2020-11-10'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that
   is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search
-  includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list
-  of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to
-  better suit your environment.
-id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664
-known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately
-  execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify
-  the lookup file, as appropriate.
-name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
   Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search
+  includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list
+  of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to
+  better suit your environment.
+known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately
+  execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify
+  the lookup file, as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
index d375dc3c1a..98d5dd6152 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e
+version: 3
 date: '2020-11-10'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula`
   flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you
   to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications.
@@ -8,23 +13,21 @@ description: This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `ac
   If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept
   the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula`
   within the command line.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e
-known_false_positives: Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems
-  and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the
-  first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this
-  event on a machine
-name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process=*psexec* Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.process_name
   Processes.dest  Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`|
   `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems
+  and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the
+  first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this
+  event on a machine
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
index affb6511ca..0b080dea3a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Rare Executables
+id: 44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac
+version: 5
 date: '2020-03-16'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems
   running them, and the users who initiated each process.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as
+  dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
+  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name  | rename Processes.process_name
+  as process | rex field=user "(?<user_domain>.*)\\\\(?<user_name>.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name
+  as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` '
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model
   with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches
@@ -11,19 +23,10 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to
   set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter
   and search scheduling to better suit your environment.
-id: 44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac
 known_false_positives: Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your
   environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`
   to filter them out of your search results.
-name: Detect Rare Executables
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as
-  dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
-  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name  | rename Processes.process_name
-  as process | rex field=user "(?<user_domain>.*)\\\\(?<user_name>.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
-  by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name
-  as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
index f5459866ee..2f5bba037a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
+id: 91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-20'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline
   protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported
   options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior
@@ -7,17 +12,6 @@ description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inl
   The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
   were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process
   "rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-id: 91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
-name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
@@ -25,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
@@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
index fc91a0fe0c..ecaa3b975a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe
   processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first
   and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination
   of the machine
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
-  that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-  in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
-  of the Sysmon TA.
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.
-name: Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.parent_process_name="cmd.exe" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe
   OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+  that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
+  in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
+  of the Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
index 4fb6593430..a0efa6e435 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Disabling Remote User Account Control
+id: bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c
+version: 4
 date: '2020-11-18'
+author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the
   enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA*
+  Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name
+  Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
   products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry
   modifications.
-id: bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c
 known_false_positives: This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement
   a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.
-name: Disabling Remote User Account Control
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA*
-  Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name
-  Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
index 8a3dc3680b..142690b09e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-date: '2020-02-21'
-description: Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: 8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184
-known_false_positives: None identified.
 name: Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
-references:
-- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
+id: 8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184
+version: 1
+date: '2020-02-21'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
+description: Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
   Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
+- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
index 342f2ccac7..ab663ac773 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Execution of File with Multiple Extensions
+id: b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7
+version: 3
 date: '2020-11-18'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes launched from files that have double
   extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension
   and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed
   to executable content.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
-  that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-  in the processes node.
-id: b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Execution of File with Multiple Extensions
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe
   OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process
   = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by
   Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+  that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
+  in the processes node.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
index 8b94c6a383..d757af0a1d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: File with Samsam Extension
+id: 02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf
+version: 1
 date: '2018-12-14'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam
   ransomware attack.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from
-  your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using
-  Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you
-  want to collect data.
-id: 02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf
-known_false_positives: Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations,
-  you should investigate all results.
-name: File with Samsam Extension
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
@@ -18,6 +14,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_extension=.stubbin
   OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos
   OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from
+  your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using
+  Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you
+  want to collect data.
+known_false_positives: Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations,
+  you should investigate all results.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
index b8ae1876f6..cb435cc225 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
+id: e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us
   that has not previously been seen.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run
-  the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the
-  initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should
-  also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously
-  Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out
-  old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`
-  macro to adjust the time window.
-id: e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961
-known_false_positives: A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone.
-  Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any
-  malicious behavior is taken.
-name: First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name)
   as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id
   values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process
@@ -26,6 +17,18 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime value
   OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`")
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name,
   parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run
+  the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the
+  initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should
+  also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously
+  Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out
+  old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`
+  macro to adjust the time window.
+known_false_positives: A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone.
+  Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any
+  malicious behavior is taken.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
@@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
index 563fe74065..933fef503a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific
   as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file.  The
   search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe
   to hide files.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f
-known_false_positives: 'Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe
-  to interact with the files. '
-name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe
   (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: 'Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe
+  to interact with the files. '
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
index 733a8d879c..bbc5a7289a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption
+id: 5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027
+version: 3
 date: '2020-10-16'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal
   name requests
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos
-id: 5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027
-known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may
-  generate false positives
-name: Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md
-- https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id,
   Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos
+known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may
+  generate false positives
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md
+- https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Lateral Movement
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
index f3b3419074..14d1bcfd2d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,16 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window
+id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db
+version: 5
 date: '2020-11-20'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters to
   modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the
   Internet. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it's overriding
   the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the
   user, and connects to the Internet. Deprecated becaue hidden is not needed when
   download file with System.Net.WebClient.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db
-known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
-  options, but it's not common.
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
@@ -23,6 +18,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process
   Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
+  options, but it's not common.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
@@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
index 9e8041caed..08ce427bed 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
+id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes that have encoded the script
   within the command-line. Malware has been seen using this parameter, as it obfuscates
   the code and makes it relatively easy to pass a script on the command-line.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19
-known_false_positives: System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = powershell.exe
   (Processes.process=*-EncodedCommand* OR Processes.process=*-enc*) by Processes.user
   Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
   Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
index 08ed4f2961..dd46fafd75 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass
+id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used
   to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed
   in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell
   execution policy.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39
-known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution
-  policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated
-  to ensure that it is legitimate.
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as
   process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="*
   bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution
+  policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated
+  to ensure that it is legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
index a3e67723d2..0970143462 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques
+id: cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4
+version: 4
 date: '2021-01-19'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that
   have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4
-known_false_positives: These characters might be legitimately on the command-line,
-  but it is not common.
-name: Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
@@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1)
   + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "''"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter`
   | search num_obfuscation > 10 '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: These characters might be legitimately on the command-line,
+  but it is not common.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
index bf4f35075a..8c00d1684e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
+id: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc
+version: 2
 date: '2020-11-23'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications
   to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this
   scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry
   by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll
   with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND
+  Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by Registry.dest,
+  Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
+  Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
   products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry
   modifications.
-id: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc
 known_false_positives: You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry
   entries.
-name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND
-  Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by Registry.dest,
-  Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
-  Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
index 759d43e0bf..742efeeb56 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,26 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery
+id: c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-25'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line
   arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain
   trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted
   domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current
   domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe
+  OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*)
+  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-id: c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 known_false_positives: Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes,
   otherwise, rarely used.
-name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md
 - https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104
@@ -20,12 +29,6 @@ references:
 - https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html
 - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/
 - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe
-  OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*)
-  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
@@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
index 8c2d71c1bf..5a672f6e56 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,14 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Overwriting Accessibility Binaries
+id: 13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched
   with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace
   these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to
   the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
-  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
-  you want to collect data.
-id: 13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae
-known_false_positives: Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that
-  these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
-name: Overwriting Accessibility Binaries
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path)
   as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe*
@@ -21,6 +17,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe*)
   by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
+  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
+  you want to collect data.
+known_false_positives: Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that
+  these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
index a8db6f3522..b7c5fdc258 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,12 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
+id: 5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26
+version: 4
 date: '2021-01-28'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*`
   or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
-  via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
-  data sources, such as Sysmon.
-id: 5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26
-known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results.
-  It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
-name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
-- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk"
   AND Filesystem.file_path="C:\\Temp*"  by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name
@@ -25,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_pid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path,
   process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
+  via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
+  data sources, such as Sysmon.
+known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results.
+  It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Phishing Payloads
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
index d1b43912da..5ef4307415 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-date: '2020-03-16'
-description: This search looks for processes launched via WMI.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: 24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands
-  for legitimate purposes.
 name: Process Execution via WMI
-references: []
+id: 24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac
+version: 3
+date: '2020-03-16'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
+description: This search looks for processes launched via WMI.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.parent_process_name = *WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest
   Processes.process_name  | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands
+  for legitimate purposes.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
index 0babe53883..f6f41d97fb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk
+name: Processes launching netsh
+id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-10'
+author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line
   scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify
   the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be
   used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is
   executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and
   executing commands via the command line.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
-  that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e
-known_false_positives: Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside
-  of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run
-  commands.
-name: Processes launching netsh
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process=*netsh* by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
   |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+  that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
+known_false_positives: Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside
+  of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run
+  commands.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Netsh Abuse
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
index d11acd61cc..104cd85e4b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys
+id: 8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf
+version: 5
 date: '2020-11-26'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows
   services and their configurations.
-id: 8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf
-known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly
-  manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior.
-  It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
-name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
-that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
-used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
-to the registry.
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name)
   as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
@@ -21,6 +14,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+  that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
+  in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
+  products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
+  used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
+  to the registry.
+known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly
+  manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior.
+  It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
index ef74d9e0df..d9c6f3255e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases
+id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb
+version: 3
 date: '2020-11-26'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility
   shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis
-  data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response products,
-  such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used
-  for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to
-  the registry.
-id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb
-known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases
-  for compatibility purposes for legacy applications
-name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
   as registry_key_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
   where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB*
   by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis
+  data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response products,
+  such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used
+  for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to
+  the registry.
+known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases
+  for compatibility purposes for legacy applications
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
index 5717404846..184eca15cd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Registry Keys Used For Persistence
+id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b
+version: 5
 date: '2020-11-27'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used
   to launch an application or service at system startup.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
-  that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-  in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
-  used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
-  to the registry.
-id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b
-known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute on
-  system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
-name: Registry Keys Used For Persistence
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
   as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*currentversion\\run*
@@ -23,6 +17,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr
   NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*" OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh\\*)
   by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+  that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
+  in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
+  products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
+  used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
+  to the registry.
+known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute on
+  system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
@@ -51,5 +54,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
index 0cdb244754..078361448e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,30 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation
+id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e
+version: 4
 date: '2020-11-27'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used
   to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are
   used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries
   to benign system binaries.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
-  that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
-  in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
-  used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
-  to the registry.
-id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e
-known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon
-  system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
-name: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation
-references:
-- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows
   NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_key_name=GlobalFlag
   OR Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) by Registry.dest  Registry.user Registry.registry_path
   Registry.registry_key_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
+  that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
+  in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
+  products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
+  used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
+  to the registry.
+known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon
+  system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
+references:
+- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
index 5a2aa04fc0..5c0ad6b710 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI
+id: d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da
+version: 5
 date: '2020-11-30'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn
   a process on a remote system.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da
-known_false_positives: The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may
-  be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration,
-  but it's relatively uncommon.
-name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = wmic.exe Processes.process="*/node*" Processes.process="*process*"
   Processes.process="*call*" Processes.process="*create*"   by Processes.process_name
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may
+  be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration,
+  but it's relatively uncommon.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ransomware
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
index 61047233a0..44479d6762 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal
+id: 6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833
+version: 4
 date: '2020-11-30'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may
   abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice
   executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution
   of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal
   operations.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: 6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833
-known_false_positives: While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling
-  a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process
-name: RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = rundll32.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling
+  a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Unusual Processes
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
index 452cf9c9a5..d7466c1b3a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Ryuk Test Files Detected
+id: 57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any
   folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are
-  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
-  you want to collect data.
-id: 57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3
-known_false_positives: If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might
-  trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.
-name: Ryuk Test Files Detected
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE "Filesystem.file_path"=C:\\*Ryuk*
   BY "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are
+  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
+  you want to collect data.
+known_false_positives: If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might
+  trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
index 4a7f607e67..2ccc77bd08 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Samsam Test File Write
+id: 493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e
+version: 1
 date: '2018-12-14'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system
   directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are
-  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
-  you want to collect data.
-id: 493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e
-known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified.
-name: Samsam Test File Write
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name)
   as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\windows\\system32\\test.txt
   by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are
+  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
+  you want to collect data.
+known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
index dcd17bc503..76ed9d07f9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services
+id: f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or
   modification of a Windows service.
-id: f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d
-known_false_positives: Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However,
-  there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate
-  and investigate as appropriate.
-name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process="* create *" OR Processes.process="*
   config *") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However,
+  there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate
+  and investigate as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
@@ -47,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
index 4df4038a20..d759ae4a42 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD
+id: d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c
+version: 5
 date: '2020-12-17'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with
   the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c
-known_false_positives: Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely
-  done by admins as well
-name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe
   (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely
+  done by admins as well
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
index 918cac5c66..69c154b30d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Schtasks scheduling job on remote system
+id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate a job is being scheduled on a remote system.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6
-known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on remote systems, but this
-  activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to
-  validate and investigate as appropriate.
-name: Schtasks scheduling job on remote system
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe
   Processes.process="*/create*" (Processes.process="* /s *" OR Processes.process="*
   /S *") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on remote systems, but this
+  activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to
+  validate and investigate as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Lateral Movement
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
index c8b8603bc8..fd1f4b8746 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
+id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6
+version: 4
 date: '2020-12-07'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting logs
-  with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using
-  Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
-id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6
-known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to
-  perform updates, maintenance, etc.
-name: Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process="*/create
   *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting logs
+  with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using
+  Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to
+  perform updates, maintenance, etc.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 431b251dcf..05c5108822 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-date: '2020-03-16'
-description: This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts
-  for legitimate purposes.
 name: Script Execution via WMI
-references: []
+id: aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589
+version: 3
+date: '2020-03-16'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
+description: This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = "scrcons.exe" by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name  |
   `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts
+  for legitimate purposes.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
index 754350edd5..c92d3b42f7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Shim Database File Creation
+id: 6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33
+version: 3
 date: '2020-12-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories.
   The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According
   to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes
   the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation
   elsewhere.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
-  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
-  you want to collect data.
-id: 6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33
-known_false_positives: Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the
-  time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating
-  events, it may warrant further investigation.
-name: Shim Database File Creation
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
   values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path  min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\AppPatch\\Custom*
   by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are
+  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
+  you want to collect data.
+known_false_positives: Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the
+  time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating
+  events, it may warrant further investigation.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
index 02f8b61983..209718a88b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters
+id: 404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3
+version: 4
 date: '2020-11-23'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently
   create a shim database.  The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database
   files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes
   the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation
   elsewhere.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: 404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3
-known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: None identified
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
index d78611ebe3..1974746428 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Short Lived Windows Accounts
+id: b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-06'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Change
 description: This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short
   time period.
-how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management
-  Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs.  More
-  information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/'
-id: b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d
-known_false_positives: It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an
-  account in a short time period.  Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.
-name: Short Lived Windows Accounts
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as
   result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h
@@ -17,6 +14,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id)
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726
   | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count
   user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`'
+how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management
+  Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs.  More
+  information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/'
+known_false_positives: It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an
+  account in a short time period.  Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Account Monitoring and Controls
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: access
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
index 2135f0cf98..5771fc65d2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,11 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-date: '2020-12-08'
-description: This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4
-known_false_positives: Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate
-  this activity with your normal incident-response process.
 name: Single Letter Process On Endpoint
-references: []
+id: a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4
+version: 3
+date: '2020-12-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
+description: This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user,
   Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
@@ -18,6 +13,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == ".exe", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5
   AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name
   | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate
+  this activity with your normal incident-response process.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 20e0b2aa80..d75be2bf48 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules
+id: 759a653f-cb92-40f9-94c9-ec4e47b0f709
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection indicates use of Mimikatz modules that facilitate Pass-the-Token
   attack, Golden or Silver kerberos ticket attack, and Skeleton key attack.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules which apply stolen credentials.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 759a653f-cb92-40f9-94c9-ec4e47b0f709
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -22,6 +18,12 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -53,5 +55,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 271795687f..00d886c605 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,14 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules
+id: 270b482d-2af2-448f-9923-9cf005f61be4
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Stolen credentials are applied by methods such as user impersonation,
   credential injection, spoofing of authentication processes or getting hold of critical
   accounts. This detection indicates such activities carried out by PowerSploit exploit
   kit APIs.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that apply stolen credentials,
-  including the module for credential injection, token manipulation, user impersonation,
-  getting the system, and change of identities.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 270b482d-2af2-448f-9923-9cf005f61be4
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -26,6 +21,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -57,5 +57,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 90446ad4df..425c10cc6f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules
+id: 5526d3a4-2497-4e8d-9d3c-7a34c9aace2f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that verify password
   strength, i.e., identify week accounts that would be easily compromised.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules which assess password strength.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 5526d3a4-2497-4e8d-9d3c-7a34c9aace2f
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -19,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -45,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index 6c50bcbd39..3251782604 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA
+id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03
+version: 1
 date: 2020-6-04
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export
   of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting windows endpoint data that tracks process
-  activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints.
-id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA
-references:
-- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "_time"), "string", null)) | eval process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "process_name"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
@@ -21,6 +19,11 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(ma
   /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System/)=true
   ) | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id,
   dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting windows endpoint data that tracks process
+  activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
index 038d0a5e13..561517cd6b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,15 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion
+  modules
+id: 73e23834-c7ad-4860-bfd0-7d8ffe6527c2
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals
   is a collection of PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for credential extraction
-  and conversion.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 73e23834-c7ad-4860-bfd0-7d8ffe6527c2
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion
-  modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -31,6 +27,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -54,5 +55,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
index afe047d601..3452551d87 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules
+id: 5d2172f0-8a7d-4ecd-aad9-2dcc95699e0d
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals
   is a collection of PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for credential extraction.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 5d2172f0-8a7d-4ecd-aad9-2dcc95699e0d
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -31,6 +28,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -54,5 +56,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
index ed57562587..9770eb3b8a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,16 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option
+id: 312582f2-5e91-42c1-a275-cd67f31373c8
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is
   a newer version of pwdump tool that extracts NTLM and LanMan password hashes from
   Windows. Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes
   from a system's registry.
-eli5: This detection identifies one of the inevitable stages of FGdump in which CacheDump
-  is called. Note, CacheDump activity may also be embedded in other exploit tools.
-  For more details on FGdump stages see https://github.com/interference-security/kali-windows-binaries/tree/master/fgdump
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 312582f2-5e91-42c1-a275-cd67f31373c8
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option
-references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -29,6 +25,10 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -52,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
index 53f3ce9572..baef60bfb9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,16 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option
+id: 3c40b0ef-a03f-460a-9484-e4b9117cbb38
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is
   a newer version of pwdump tool that extracts NTLM and LanMan password hashes from
   Windows. Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes
   from a system's registry.
-eli5: This detection identifies one of the stages of FGdump in which CacheDump is
-  called. Note, CacheDump activity may also be embedded in other exploit tools. For
-  more details on FGdump stages see https://github.com/interference-security/kali-windows-binaries/tree/master/fgdump
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 3c40b0ef-a03f-460a-9484-e4b9117cbb38
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option
-references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -27,6 +23,10 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -49,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
index 3aaf01f9d8..9106a02d17 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,16 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and
+  DSInternals
+id: e4f126b5-e6bc-4a5c-b1a8-d07bc6c4a49f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit
   and DSInternals are common exploit APIs offering PowerShell modules for various
   exploits of Windows and Active Directory environments.
-eli5: This detection identifies triggering of the PowerSploit or DSInternals for extraction
-  of all accounts from a previously dumped ntds.dit credential store.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: e4f126b5-e6bc-4a5c-b1a8-d07bc6c4a49f
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and
-  DSInternals
-references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -24,6 +21,10 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -44,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
index 8e823e8992..81c422de0e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,15 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options
+id: 341975fa-4ad0-4f01-9acc-df4f69742db7
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. LaZagne is
   a tool that extracts various kinds of credentials from a local computer, including
   account passwords, domain passwords, browser passwords, etc.
-eli5: This detection identifies the most common LaZagne invocation, in which it is
-  instructed to extract all available passwords and output them to a file. For more
-  details on LaZagne see https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 341975fa-4ad0-4f01-9acc-df4f69742db7
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options
-references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -23,6 +19,10 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -44,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 275d143783..77ee8f0bd3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,14 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules
+id: 966b635f-98e8-4aa4-9b49-47ed2cedcc85
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Mimikatz
   is a collection of tools and modules commonly employed in Windows exploits.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules when they are specified directly
-  in a command line. This is less common use of Mimikatz, as most demos show interactive
-  use of this tool. Nevertheless, specifying Mimikatz modules in a command line is
-  possible and enables scripted/programmed attacks.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 966b635f-98e8-4aa4-9b49-47ed2cedcc85
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -29,6 +23,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -49,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
index 1651ce1b02..f699d745c6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,15 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel
+id: c20bb8ec-e1b0-4640-b0ef-3a4c54f8c112
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft
   debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential
   material directly from memory and process dumps.
-eli5: This detection spots when native Microsoft debuggers ask for something inside
-  the kernel (via ForceV1) while retrieving credentials.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: c20bb8ec-e1b0-4640-b0ef-3a4c54f8c112
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative
-  of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this
-  is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through
-  code, not analyze its crash dumps.
-name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel
-references:
-- https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -31,6 +24,14 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative
+  of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this
+  is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through
+  code, not analyze its crash dumps.
+references:
+- https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -53,5 +54,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: medium
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
index 8fb2ddf37e..50df426de3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,15 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option
+id: adc51a77-90c9-4358-b43c-f10dd1a27d05
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft
   debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential
   material directly from memory and process dumps.
-eli5: This detects use of -z command line option which specifies location of the credentials
-  dump file to native Microsoft debuggers.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: adc51a77-90c9-4358-b43c-f10dd1a27d05
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative
-  of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this
-  is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through
-  code, not analyze its crash dumps.
-name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option
-references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -27,6 +21,13 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative
+  of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this
+  is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through
+  code, not analyze its crash dumps.
+references: []
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -48,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: medium
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
index 7fc22afd4b..6e6641f8f9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules
+id: 5f1186a4-e681-446e-851c-dc9574ad28eb
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit
   is a collection of Microsoft PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for credential extraction.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 5f1186a4-e681-446e-851c-dc9574ad28eb
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -27,6 +24,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -47,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
index 9d8da984c2..7423d70cf7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA
+id: 76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-15'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects the memory of lsass.exe being dumped for offline
   credential theft attack.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event
-  Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a)
-  on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml).
-id: 76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA
-references:
-- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "_tenant"), "string", null), machine=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
@@ -19,6 +15,13 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_eve
   where process_name LIKE "%rundll32.exe%" AND match_regex(process, /(?i)comsvcs.dll[,\s]+MiniDump/)=true
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(machine),
   body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event
+  Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a)
+  on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml).
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
index afb535ea80..b5113e1907 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
+name: Detect Kerberoasting - SSA
+id: dabdd6d7-3e10-42be-8711-4e124f7a3850
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
+author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal
   name requests
-how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated
-  from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2
-id: dabdd6d7-3e10-42be-8711-4e124f7a3850
-known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may
-  generate false positives
-name: Detect Kerberoasting - SSA
-references:
-- Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"),
   EventCode=map_get(input_event, "event_code"), TicketOptions=map_get(input_event,
   "ticket_options"), TicketEncryptionType=map_get(input_event, "ticket_encryption_type"),
@@ -19,6 +16,12 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_
   | where first_time_EventCode_TicketOptions_TicketEncryptionType_ServiceName_ServiceID
   | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, body="TBD", entities="TBD" | select start_time,
   end_time, entities, body | into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
+how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated
+  from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2
+known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may
+  generate false positives
+references:
+- Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - ticket_options
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
index ee9e229724..884b36a52e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
+name: Detect Pass the Hash - SSA
+id: 7cd8b9fa-6b0c-424f-92a6-9c5287a72f5f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
+author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows
   Security Event logs to detect potential attempts using Pass-the-Hash technique.
-how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated
-  from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2
-id: 7cd8b9fa-6b0c-424f-92a6-9c5287a72f5f
-known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be
-  detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
-name: Detect Pass the Hash - SSA
-references:
-- Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"),
   EventCode=map_get(input_event, "event_code"), LogonType=map_get(input_event, "logon_type"),
   LogonProcess=map_get(input_event, "logon_process"), ComputerName=map_get(input_event,
@@ -19,6 +16,12 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_
   | where first_time_EventCode_LogonProcess_ComputerName | eval start_time=_time,
   end_time=_time, body="TBD", entities="TBD" | select start_time, end_time, entities,
   body | into write_ssa_detected_events(); '
+how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated
+  from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2
+known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be
+  detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
+references:
+- Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - logon_type
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index 1de5d11a12..e47a5fe238 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -1,44 +1,35 @@
+name: First time seen command line argument - SSA
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23
+version: 2
+date: 2021-2-1
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
-date: '2021-2-1'
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter
   to execute a command that has not previously been seen. This is an implementation
   on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel.
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23
-how_to_implement: "You must be populating the endpoint data model for SSA and specifically the process_name and the process fields"
-eli5: "The subsearch returns all events where `cmd.exe` was used with a `/c` parameter
-  in the command-line arguments to execute other commands/programs. It appends the
-  historical data to those results in the lookup file. Next, it recalculates the `firstTime`
-  and `lastTime` field for command-line execution and outputs this data to the lookup
-  file to update the local cache. It returns only those events that have first been
-  seen in the past one hour. This is combined with the main search to return the time,
-  user, destination, process, parent process, and value of the command-line argument."
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)) | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"),
+  "string", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string",
+  null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
+  cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line),
+  cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/,
+  "GUID"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\s)+\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/,
+  "\\PATH"), /* replaces " \\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext"
+  */ cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"),
+  /* replaces "C:\\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */ cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm,
+  /\d+/, "N") | where process_name="cmd.exe" AND match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string",
+  ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true | select cmd_line, cmd_line_norm, timestamp, dest_device_id,
+  dest_user_id | first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line_norm"] | where first_time_cmd_line_norm
+  | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id,
+  dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be populating the endpoint data model for SSA and specifically
+  the process_name and the process fields
 known_false_positives: Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to
   execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program
   is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter`
   macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
-name: First time seen command line argument - SSA
 references: []
-search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
-| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
-| eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
-       dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
-       process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null),
-       cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null),
-       cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line),
-       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, "GUID"),
-       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\s)+\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), /* replaces " \\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */
-       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\w:\\[^:]*(?=\\.*\.\w{3}(\s|$)+)/, "\\PATH"), /* replaces "C:\\Something\\Something\\command.ext" => "PATH\\command.ext" */
-       cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\d+/, "N")
-| where process_name="cmd.exe" AND
-        match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, "string", ""), /.* \/[cC] .*/)=true
-| select cmd_line, cmd_line_norm, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id
-| first_time_event input_columns=["cmd_line_norm"]
-| where first_time_cmd_line_norm
-| eval start_time = timestamp,
-       end_time = timestamp,
-       entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id),
-       body = "TBD"
-| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
@@ -69,5 +60,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 1a740d9a88..34e34e23c2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules
+id: 01fc7d91-eb0c-478e-8633-e4fa4904463a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly
   access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping
   into http and RDP sessions, etc.
-eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly
-  access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping
-  into http and RDP sessions, etc.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 01fc7d91-eb0c-478e-8633-e4fa4904463a
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -26,6 +21,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -50,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index a78424efab..53dbc1aac0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules
+id: 20fba62a-fa5b-46cc-b39f-473fa248fee2
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create accounts
   illegaly.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that create accounts illegaly.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 20fba62a-fa5b-46cc-b39f-473fa248fee2
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -19,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -40,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 61c3291e83..5648763d5f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules
+id: 3e0f9962-9989-445f-878c-939443326b63
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable
   accounts illegaly.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable
-  accounts illegaly.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 3e0f9962-9989-445f-878c-939443326b63
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -21,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -43,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 513957ac21..8b506ee660 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules
+id: 4ddb3b0d-f95f-4ae2-b4e8-663296453a7b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event
   logs.
-eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event logs.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 4ddb3b0d-f95f-4ae2-b4e8-663296453a7b
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -20,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -41,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index c24ed226de..c4c7e2f564 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management
-  of Active Directoty elements and policies.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management
-  of Active Directoty elements and policies.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: a587ca9f-c138-47b4-ba51-699f319b8cc5
-known_false_positives: None identified.
 name: Illegal Management of Active Directory Elements and Policies via DSInternals
   modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
+id: a587ca9f-c138-47b4-ba51-699f319b8cc5
+version: 1
+date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
+description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management
+  of Active Directoty elements and policies.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -23,6 +19,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -46,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 66afd7d3e3..1ce01c8b13 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
-date: '2020-11-09'
-description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
-  management of computers and Active Directory elements.
-eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
-  management of computers and Active Directory elements.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 75760c11-7d48-4968-b828-013b299e8f6d
-known_false_positives: None identified.
 name: Illegal Management of Computers and Active Directory Elements via PowerSploit
   modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
+id: 75760c11-7d48-4968-b828-013b299e8f6d
+version: 1
+date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
+description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
+  management of computers and Active Directory elements.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -24,6 +20,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -47,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6713ef913d..b454f8d158 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules
+id: 88c10ee9-fe72-4bce-b343-5b129044b991
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly
   elevate general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable manipulation of registry,
   task scheduling, persistent WMI, access to OS objects under desired identities.
-eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly elevate
-  general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable registry manipulation, task
-  scheduling, persistent WMI,  access to OS objects under desired identities.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 88c10ee9-fe72-4bce-b343-5b129044b991
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -25,6 +20,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -48,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 131460abd1..bb05e7652e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules
+id: 2f873b1f-6352-4844-b7b9-b419f09a42c7
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege
   elevation.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege elevation.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 2f873b1f-6352-4844-b7b9-b419f09a42c7
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -20,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -42,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index b40e37d56b..16cb01f101 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules
+id: aaf3adf1-73e1-4477-b4ee-3771898964f1
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control
   over services and processes, including the authentication service.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control over services
-  and processes, including the authentication service.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: aaf3adf1-73e1-4477-b4ee-3771898964f1
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -24,6 +20,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -47,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 96dffb7f12..a807811eb6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,14 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules
+id: 0e910e5b-309d-4bc3-8af2-0030c02aa353
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
   control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services,
   injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands,
   modifying access to service objects, etc.
-eli5: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
-  control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services,
-  injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands,
-  modifying access to service objects, etc.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 0e910e5b-309d-4bc3-8af2-0030c02aa353
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -34,6 +28,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -57,5 +56,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 62fb8d6d3c..7666d455d5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules
+id: d405af5d-99f1-45af-8dfb-b8f98b764247
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-04'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitate
   access probing with admin credentials as well as probing access to system services.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that probe use of admin
-  credentials as well as access to system services.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: d405af5d-99f1-45af-8dfb-b8f98b764247
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -22,6 +18,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -44,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_device_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
index 361368b0d7..f80c64dcfe 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,14 @@
-author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - SSA
+id: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94
+version: 1
 date: 2020-7-13
+author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that
   is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. This is
   a SPL2 implementation of the rule `Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe`
   by @bpatel.
-eli5: Obtaining access to the Command-Line Interface (CLI) is typically a primary
-  attacker goal. Once an attacker has obtained the ability to execute code on a target
-  system, they will often further manipulate the system via commands passed to the
-  CLI. It is also unusual for many applications to spawn a command shell during normal
-  operation, while it is often observed if an application has been compromised in
-  some way. As such, it is often beneficial to look for cmd.exe being executed by
-  processes that are often targeted for exploitation, or that would not spawn cmd.exe
-  in any other circumstances. A lookup file is provided to easily modify the processes
-  that are being watched for execution of cmd.exe.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon logs. This search has been modified
-  to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP.
-id: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94
-known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately
-  execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify
-  the lookup file, as appropriate.
-name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - SSA
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null))
@@ -36,6 +25,12 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id,
   dest_user_id), body="TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon logs. This search has been modified
+  to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP.
+known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately
+  execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify
+  the lookup file, as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
@@ -56,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
index 9d5f22295c..253069bd8e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,14 @@
-author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+name: Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship
+id: e03aa905-6549-4e34-b304-7a922185b2c4
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-13'
+author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applications
   not typically used by system administrators. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming
   ML DSP plugin to find rare parent/child relationships. The list of application has
   been extracted from https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries
-how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
-id: e03aa905-6549-4e34-b304-7a922185b2c4
-known_false_positives: 'Some custom tools used by admins could be used rarely to launch
-  remotely applications. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when
-  it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
-
-  '
-name: Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship
-references: []
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "_time"), "string", null)) | eval parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "parent_process_name"), "string", null)), parent_process_name=mvindex(split(parent_process,
@@ -52,6 +48,13 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map
 
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id,
   dest_user_id), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
+known_false_positives: 'Some custom tools used by admins could be used rarely to launch
+  remotely applications. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when
+  it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
+
+  '
+references: []
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
@@ -75,5 +78,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 72f23723fb..eb30b3a24b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,15 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules
+id: 3d8bd7f3-1061-4ac7-9225-6764cc0684d7
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover opportunities
   for malicious access and persistence. Some examples include access to admin accounts,
   weak access control policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data
   to exfiltrate, registry locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities,
   as well as services and system files that can be compromised.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover access and
-  persistence opportunities, including access to admin accounts, weak access control
-  policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data to exfiltrate, registry
-  locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities, as well as
-  services and system files that can be compromised.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 3d8bd7f3-1061-4ac7-9225-6764cc0684d7
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -36,6 +29,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -62,5 +60,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 159ab8250a..407061f458 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules
+id: 63422f8e-766c-468f-8133-2ba6795e263b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
   accounts, groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover accounts,
-  groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 63422f8e-766c-468f-8133-2ba6795e263b
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -42,6 +38,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -65,5 +66,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index e92d54f59d..c2438624ad 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules
+id: 1bce67aa-3fc4-4886-9089-67f0bfebbef6
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts
   and groups and access to them.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts
-  and groups and access to them.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 1bce67aa-3fc4-4886-9089-67f0bfebbef6
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -21,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -44,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index e2dc8e94c8..9cff7f42d9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,14 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit
+  modules
+id: db08ac40-ee14-43e9-9a75-dddd059ef812
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance
   and access to elements of Active Directory infrastructure, such as domain identifiers,
   AD sites and forests, and trust relations.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance and
-  access to Active Directory infrastructure - identifiers, sites, forests and trust
-  relations.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: db08ac40-ee14-43e9-9a75-dddd059ef812
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit
-  modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -33,6 +28,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -58,5 +58,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index db9411b122..60026e7e39 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules
+id: fe1c4c5a-09f3-4b43-8129-560a7f38a08b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
   computers, servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover computers,
-  servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: fe1c4c5a-09f3-4b43-8129-560a7f38a08b
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -25,6 +21,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -48,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index d3e2839394..bda6177eb0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules
+id: 48664505-7d22-44ee-87d2-4c8a5bdc3d14
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers
   and servers and access to them.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers
-  and servers and access to them.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 48664505-7d22-44ee-87d2-4c8a5bdc3d14
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -20,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -41,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 84a7e74213..0604166ce0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules
+id: c1d33ad9-1727-4f9f-a474-4adbe4fed68a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
   and access operating system elements, such as processes, services, registry locations,
   security packages and files.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover and access
-  system resources, such as processes, services, registry locations, security packages
-  and files.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: c1d33ad9-1727-4f9f-a474-4adbe4fed68a
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -28,6 +23,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -56,5 +56,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index fe3a8d6be6..0e60b19ad1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules
+id: c97b6eb9-1d8b-4017-bbbb-2af7fc17bc3f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access
   to network shares.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to
-  network shares.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: c97b6eb9-1d8b-4017-bbbb-2af7fc17bc3f
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -20,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -43,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index ef3b5a487e..7cd66cf817 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules
+id: 6b7ca431-6b1e-4b40-9589-21cb368e369e
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
   and access network and distributed file system shares.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover and access
-  network and distributed file system shares.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 6b7ca431-6b1e-4b40-9589-21cb368e369e
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -25,6 +21,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -48,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 664a29c080..02d8d9ffeb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules
+id: 525d32fd-65dd-4732-9b72-3cfc7ddddbd2
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance
   of connectivity.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance of connectivity.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 525d32fd-65dd-4732-9b72-3cfc7ddddbd2
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -25,6 +22,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -48,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 0d993fd63e..0b61c5b6d9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules
+id: 5facee5b-79e4-47ab-b0e6-c625acc0554f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and use
   of CryptoAPI services by Mimikatz modules.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for reconnaissance of credential
-  stores and use of CryptoAPIs for malicious purposes.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 5facee5b-79e4-47ab-b0e6-c625acc0554f
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -23,6 +19,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -49,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 949449240e..8a02f41b5d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules
+id: 24b4e659-63a2-4e7b-89ac-87dd659c7110
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of
   presence of defensive tools.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that assess presence of
-  defensive tools on a compromised host.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 24b4e659-63a2-4e7b-89ac-87dd659c7110
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -20,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -42,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 9eea1a6725..db276efaed 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules
+id: b9b4492c-2af8-449b-beb4-b1b78d963321
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of
   privilege escalation opportunities.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that assess privilege escalation
-  opportunities.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: b9b4492c-2af8-449b-beb4-b1b78d963321
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -20,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -43,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 516cd6ffd0..f588d390af 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,16 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules
+id: fc5c1cbd-7494-4314-aad2-458d6fd4fada
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process
   or service hijacking opportunities via Microsoft Detours compatibility. Microsoft
   Detours is an open source library for intercepting, monitoring and instrumenting
   binary functions on Microsoft Windows. Detours intercepts Win32 functions by re-writing
   the in-memory code for target functions. The Detours package also contains utilities
   to attach arbitrary DLLs and data segments called payloads to any Win32 binary.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process or
-  service hijacking opportunities.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: fc5c1cbd-7494-4314-aad2-458d6fd4fada
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
-- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Detours
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -25,6 +20,12 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
+- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Detours
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -48,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index ce08bf5829..c7a76525d4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules
+id: 0243d37c-57c1-4182-bfd1-39b212255fc8
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access
   to services and processes.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access to
-  services and processes.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 0243d37c-57c1-4182-bfd1-39b212255fc8
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -21,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -44,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - dest_user_id
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 2fb74878c3..40f872a226 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules
+id: d5ef590f-9bde-49eb-9c63-2f5b62a65b9c
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInternals
   modules.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that set credentials illegaly.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: d5ef590f-9bde-49eb-9c63-2f5b62a65b9c
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -25,6 +22,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -51,5 +53,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 23ba8d04d5..803e852839 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules
+id: c8b84699-7652-4363-910f-efd1ca82f780
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimikatz
   modules.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules that set credentials illegaly.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: c8b84699-7652-4363-910f-efd1ca82f780
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -20,6 +17,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -43,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6c142076b1..f032996f9e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules
+id: 07b2a501-f967-4ddc-9f56-2dce46dfce44
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
+author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerSploit
   modules.
-eli5: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that set credentials illegaly.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
-  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
-id: 07b2a501-f967-4ddc-9f56-2dce46dfce44
-known_false_positives: None identified.
-name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules
-references:
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 
   | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
@@ -19,6 +16,11 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
   "string", null)), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest,
+  including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging.
+known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
 tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
@@ -42,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - _time
   risk_severity: high
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
index 72d0b2bb06..0d56f8d6dd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location - SSA
+id: 28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-25'
+author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command
   without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the
   process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes
   run inside C:\\Windows\System32 or C:\\Windows\SysWOW64 The list of system processes
   has been extracted from https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv
   and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
-how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
-id: 28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f
-known_false_positives: None
-name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location - SSA
-references: []
 search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_device_id"), "string", null), user=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"),
   "string", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string",
@@ -227,6 +227,9 @@ search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map
   union $cond_6 | where process_path!="c:\\windows\\system32" AND process_path!="c:\\windows\\syswow64"
   | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device,
   user), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
+known_false_positives: None
+references: []
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
@@ -247,5 +250,3 @@ tags:
   - process_path
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
index 17fbe782ae..65dbac3963 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+name: More than usual number of LOLBAS applications in short time period - SSA
+id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-25'
+author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications
   in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual
   LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine.
-how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
-id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93
-known_false_positives: 'Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS
-  applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the
-  beginning when it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
-
-  '
-name: More than usual number of LOLBAS applications in short time period - SSA
-references:
-- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "dest_device_id"), "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "process_name"), "string", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
@@ -46,6 +41,14 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_ev
   as timestamp | adaptive_threshold algorithm="quantile" value="lolbas_counter" entity="device"
   window=2419200000L | where label AND quantile>0.99 | eval start_time = window_start,
   end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device), body = "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
+known_false_positives: 'Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS
+  applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the
+  beginning when it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
+
+  '
+references:
+- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
@@ -65,5 +68,3 @@ tags:
   - process_name
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
index f03f34bdfd..543471ae02 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,14 @@
-author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+name: Unusually Long Command Line - SSA
+id: 58f43aba-1775-445e-b19c-be2b87d83ae3
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-06'
+author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin
   to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. This
   detection is inspired on Unusually Long Command Line authored by Rico Valdez.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command
-  lines.
-id: 58f43aba-1775-445e-b19c-be2b87d83ae3
-known_false_positives: This detection may flag suspiciously long command lines when
-  there is not sufficient evidence (samples) for a given process that this detection
-  is tracking; or when there is high variability in the length of the command line
-  for the tracked process. Also, some legitimate applications may use long command
-  lines. Such is the case of Ansible, that encodes Powershell scripts using long base64.
-  Attackers may use this technique to obfuscate their payloads.
-name: Unusually Long Command Line - SSA
-references: []
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "_time"), "string", null)) | eval cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
   "string", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string",
@@ -29,6 +23,15 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(ma
   "cmd_line"] | where first_time_dest_device_id_cmd_line | eval start_time = timestamp,
   end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body =
   "TBD" | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command
+  lines.
+known_false_positives: This detection may flag suspiciously long command lines when
+  there is not sufficient evidence (samples) for a given process that this detection
+  is tracking; or when there is high variability in the length of the command line
+  for the tracked process. Also, some legitimate applications may use long command
+  lines. Such is the case of Ansible, that encodes Powershell scripts using long base64.
+  Attackers may use this technique to obfuscate their payloads.
+references: []
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
@@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - process
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
index 8f770d977b..b2ef1aed8b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,30 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename
+id: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe.
   Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
   and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and
   review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon.
   In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product
   or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA.
-id: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.
-name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
index 2958264a27..28d61d3d73 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage
+id: 9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage.
   microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
   and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and
   review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-id: 9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming
-  from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.
-name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe
   by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming
+  from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.
+references:
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
index 5e70da6104..2d29fea916 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
@@ -1,28 +1,31 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Suspicious msbuild path
+id: f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard
   path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319
   and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio
   will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however
   there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-id: f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe,
-  triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better
-  understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will
-  need to be filtered on.
-name: Suspicious msbuild path
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe
   AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework*\\v*\\*) by Processes.dest
   Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe,
+  triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better
+  understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will
+  need to be filtered on.
+references:
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
index 27af9723dd..0966bfc877 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename
+id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing.
   Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and
   C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify
   the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA.
-id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.
-name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
-- https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (OriginalFileName=msbuild.exe OR process_name=msbuild.exe)
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
+- https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
index bea0086cb9..9e52dff8c0 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Suspicious MSBuild Spawn
+id: a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe.
   This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from
   wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using
@@ -7,22 +12,20 @@ description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe
   In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and
   have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe,
   powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-id: a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
-name: Suspicious MSBuild Spawn
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe
   AND Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
index 47f83a0198..f7b2fc4896 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,14 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Suspicious mshta child process
+id: 60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from  "mshta.exe".
   The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
   were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process
   "mshta.exe" and its child process.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA.
-id: 60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
-name: Suspicious mshta child process
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe
@@ -25,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
@@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
index 22de98ef5f..1b05083c24 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Suspicious mshta spawn
+id: 4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-20'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This
   behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe
   or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn
   mshta.exe from svchost.exe.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-id: 4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
-  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
-name: Suspicious mshta spawn
-references:
-- https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe
   OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND Processes.process_name=mshta.exe
   by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
index 1417a47c4c..5c2f9a78c2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Reg exe Process
+id: a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not
   started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually
   explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0
-known_false_positives: It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that
-  exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified
-  to filter them out.
-name: Suspicious Reg exe Process
-references:
-- https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
   != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name
@@ -25,6 +18,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup
   process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that
+  exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified
+  to filter them out.
+references:
+- https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
@@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
index ad1268e084..67fdb5c3d5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage
+id: 2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches
   for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup,
   or system event logs.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: 2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f
-known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event
-  log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.
-name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
   min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name = wevtutil.exe Processes.process="*cl*" (Processes.process="*System*"
@@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
   by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user|
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event
+  log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
index 84ed04e895..7a644f0ed4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin
+id: b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than
   explorer.exe.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into
-  the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.
-id: b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb
-known_false_positives: Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions
-  of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to
-  it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.
-name: Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name)
   as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = "*$Recycle.Bin*"
@@ -20,6 +16,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name
   != "explorer.exe" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
   | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into
+  the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.
+known_false_positives: Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions
+  of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to
+  it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
index ac25353a25..65349ac57d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: System Information Discovery Detection
+id: 8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-12'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand
   configurations of the system to further exploit it.
-id: 8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72
-known_false_positives: Administrators debugging servers
-name: System Information Discovery Detection
-references:
-- https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*wmic* qfe*"
   OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user
@@ -18,6 +15,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   > 2 | stats values(process) min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime
   by user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Administrators debugging servers
+references:
+- https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Discovery Techniques
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
index 075da9711f..41de7d0b97 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations
+id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d
+version: 5
 date: '2020-12-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for system processes that normally run out of C:\Windows\System32\
   or C:\Windows\SysWOW64 that are not run from that location.  This can indicate a
   malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest details
-  about process execution from your hosts. Specifically, this search requires the
-  process name and the full path to the process executable.
-id: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d
-known_false_positives: None identified
-name: System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\System32*"
   Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64*" by Processes.user Processes.dest
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.process_hash| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to ingest details
+  about process execution from your hosts. Specifically, this search requires the
+  process name and the full path to the process executable.
+known_false_positives: None identified
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
index 5b00bbd265..612e561052 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search
   looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop
   sysmon from collecting the data.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro,
-  update this macro to filter out false positives.
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f
-known_false_positives: ''
-name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe
   AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv*  by Processes.process_name
@@ -20,6 +15,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count
   process_name process_id parent_process_name process'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro,
+  update this macro to filter out false positives.
+known_false_positives: ''
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Disabling Security Tools
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
index 841ebbfaa6..f14c3a2d3e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Unusually Long Command Line
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f
+version: 5
 date: '2020-12-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.
-name: Unusually Long Command Line
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name
   Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
@@ -18,6 +15,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process
   | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost)
   + avgperhost)'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
@@ -40,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
index c1809c1f3e..b65af97359 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK
+id: 57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941
+version: 1
 date: '2019-05-08'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK)
   to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown
+  | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(processlen)" as isOutlier
+  | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process
+  processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines
   and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments
   are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK
@@ -13,7 +25,6 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command line
   as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search
   is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild
   the model with the latest data available in your environment.
-id: 57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941
 known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs
   or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify
   the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration.
@@ -22,15 +33,7 @@ known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications use long command lines for i
   the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected
   results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to
   build the associated model.
-name: Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown
-  | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(processlen)" as isOutlier
-  | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process
-  processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
@@ -50,5 +53,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
index 0b52b36cd0..e304703539 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: USN Journal Deletion
+id: b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3
+version: 2
 date: '2018-12-03'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform
   tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update
   sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files
   on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
-id: b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3
-known_false_positives: None identified
-name: USN Journal Deletion
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe
   by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  |
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | search process="*deletejournal*" AND process="*usn*" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+known_false_positives: None identified
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
@@ -46,5 +49,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
index 6c14df3f16..5b2044f40f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups
+id: cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-22'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator
   Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent
   recovery.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.
-id: cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
-name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
-- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe
   Processes.process="*delete*" AND (Processes.process="*catalog*" OR Processes.process="*systemstatebackup*")
   by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
+- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
index 5dd2eaf50c..cf4bc7270b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,16 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Windows AdFind Exe
+id: bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: 'This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line
   arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions.
   It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more
   details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been
   seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST.
   AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If
-  you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
-id: bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f
-known_false_positives: administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate
-  reasons
-name: Windows AdFind Exe
-references:
-- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html
 search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=*-f*
   OR Processes.process=*-b*) AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=*-gcb*
@@ -23,6 +18,14 @@ search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTim
   Processes.process  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `windows_adfind_exe_filter` '
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If
+  you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate
+  reasons
+references:
+- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
+- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Sunburst Malware
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
index ea14a4af55..32fcf12fce 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Windows Event Log Cleared
+id: ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-06'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for Windows events that indicate one of the Windows
   event logs has been purged.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  Windows event logs from your hosts.
-id: ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a
-known_false_positives: It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared
-  by Administrators.
-name: Windows Event Log Cleared
-references: []
 search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineventlog_system`
   EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode
   dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  Windows event logs from your hosts.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared
+  by Administrators.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Log Manipulation
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
index e23063bfc3..272c7aaea8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped
+id: 69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped
   via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
-  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
-  you want to collect data.
-id: 69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6
-known_false_positives: SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause
-  major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives
-  have been identified.
-name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE ("Processes.process_name"="net*.exe"
   "Processes.process"="*stop \"samss\"*") BY "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process"
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are
+  using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which
+  you want to collect data.
+known_false_positives: SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause
+  major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives
+  have been identified.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
index 5a4c93c0e5..4f8be08104 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon
+id: ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9
+version: 2
 date: '2020-12-08'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
+search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation,
+  EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon
   data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate
   alerts for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.
-id: ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9
 known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions
   for legitimate purposes.
-name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon
 references: []
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation,
-  EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
index 5e25730449..83288a1a8c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect New Login Attempts to Routers
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Authentication
 description: The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized
   as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that
   have not been seen before in the last 30 days.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network
-  router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You
-  must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating
-  to routing infrastructure.
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1
-known_false_positives: Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections
-name: Detect New Login Attempts to Routers
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest
   latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router
   by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),
   "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network
+  router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You
+  must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating
+  to routing infrastructure.
+known_false_positives: Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
@@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
index 01c02c36cb..5f7014e4f9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
+name: Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA
+id: 4b237388-dfa1-41a6-91d4-4de2d598376f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-25'
+author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
+type: streaming
+datamodel: ''
 description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open attachment,
   click links or trigger third party service. This detect uses Natural Language Processing
   (NLP) approach to analyze an email message's content (Sender, Subject and Body)
@@ -13,14 +18,6 @@ description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open a
   which returns the probability of a phishing email. Current implementation assumes
   the email is fed to DSP in JSON format contains at least email's sender, subject
   and its message body, including reply content, if any.
-how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject
-  and its message body.
-id: 4b237388-dfa1-41a6-91d4-4de2d598376f
-known_false_positives: Because of imbalance of anomaly data in training, the model
-  will less likely report false positive. Instead, the model is more prone to false
-  negative. Current best recall score is ~85%
-name: Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA
-references: []
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get(input_event,
   "From"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Subject"), "string", "
   "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Content"), "string", " "), "                                                                                                                                "),
@@ -41,6 +38,12 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get
   path="s3://smle-experiments/models/phishing_email" | eval probability = mvindex(ml_out,
   0) | where probability > 0.5 | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, entities="TBD",
   body="TBD" | select probability, body, entities, start_time, end_time | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject
+  and its message body.
+known_false_positives: Because of imbalance of anomaly data in training, the model
+  will less likely report false positive. Instead, the model is more prone to false
+  negative. Current best recall score is ~85%
+references: []
 tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
@@ -55,5 +58,3 @@ tags:
   - UEBA for Security Cloud
   risk_severity: low
   security_domain: mail server
-type: streaming
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
index ba779ee687..3279520ac2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces
+id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8
+version: 2
 date: '2017-09-19'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Email
 description: Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file
   extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many
   spaces within the file names.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient)
+  as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email
+  where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")`
+  | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio
+  >= 0.1 |  rex field=recipient_address "(?<recipient_user>.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`'
 how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's\
   \ address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data\
   \ model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to\
@@ -16,15 +27,8 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender
   \ will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\
   \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\
   \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox."
-id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8
 known_false_positives: None at this time
-name: Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient)
-  as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email
-  where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")`
-  | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio
-  >= 0.1 |  rex field=recipient_address "(?<recipient_user>.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -41,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
index 052b0604bd..bb0038362c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts
+id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server
   to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using
   your email server.
-how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and
-  populating the Network_Traffic data model.  Your email servers must be categorized
-  as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold
-  and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment.
-  The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation
-  you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number
-  of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.
-id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378
-known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the
-  deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these
-  values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
-name: Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out
   from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip
   _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out)
@@ -30,6 +22,17 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as
   = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out,
   2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average,
   num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and
+  populating the Network_Traffic data model.  Your email servers must be categorized
+  as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold
+  and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment.
+  The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation
+  you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number
+  of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.
+known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the
+  deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these
+  values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
@@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 7e57057de7..c30af1e322 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Monitor Email For Brand Abuse
+id: b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8
+version: 2
 date: '2018-01-05'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Email
 description: This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar
   to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.
-how_to_implement: You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's
-  address (src_user) must be populated.  You also need to have run the search "ESCU
-  - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will
-  be checked for.
-id: b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8
-known_false_positives: None at this time
-name: Monitor Email For Brand Abuse
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as
   recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email
   by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")`
@@ -17,6 +14,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) a
   temp=split(src_user, "@") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true
   brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true
   | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's
+  address (src_user) must be populated.  You also need to have run the search "ESCU
+  - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will
+  be checked for.
+known_false_positives: None at this time
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
@@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
index 1191bb81ad..242f56fcba 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,15 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: No Windows Updates in a time frame
+id: 1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-15'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Updates
 description: This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event
   indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are
   typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has
   not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is
   not regularly being patched for some reason.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update'
-  data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events
-  or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you
-  wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to
-  properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can
-  populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.
-id: 1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f
-known_false_positives: None identified
-name: No Windows Updates in a time frame
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates
   where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" by Updates.dest
   Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status
@@ -22,6 +17,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from d
   <= relative_time(now(), "-60d@d"), 1, 0)  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  |
   search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as "Last Update Time", | table Host, "Update
   Status", Product, "Last Update Time" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update'
+  data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events
+  or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you
+  wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to
+  properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can
+  populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.
+known_false_positives: None identified
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Monitor for Updates
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
index e5be88cd97..b1cedc16e1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems
+id: 354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea
+version: 1
 date: '2017-01-07'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Vulnerabilities
 description: The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the
   Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities.
-how_to_implement: The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner
-  data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified.
-id: 354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea
-known_false_positives: It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting
-  that the patches have been applied.
-name: Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5753"
   OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5715" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5754"
   by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner
+  data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting
+  that the patches have been applied.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
index 96939d20fb..8d99063ded 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly
+id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: UEBA
 description: This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their
   sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by
   Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA).
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated
-  with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called  "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel."
-  Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.
-id: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8
-known_false_positives: This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is
-  seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step
-  is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a
-  legitimate sender.
-name: Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly
 search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where
   nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model
@@ -20,6 +16,14 @@ search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated
+  with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called  "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel."
+  Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.
+known_false_positives: This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is
+  seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step
+  is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a
+  legitimate sender.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Emails
@@ -37,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
index 0b5202b8c5..c78141c273 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions
+id: 473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Email
 description: This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file
   extensions.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user,
+  All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments`
+  | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` '
 how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's\
   \ address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data\
   \ model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also\
@@ -14,14 +24,8 @@ how_to_implement: "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender
   \ gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors.\
   \ If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the\
   \ email will be deleted from the user's inbox."
-id: 473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084
 known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user,
-  All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |
-  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments`
-  | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` '
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -43,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
index af40707f7c..cf31dfc9a9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Java Classes
+id: if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491
+version: 1
 date: '2018-12-06'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to
   exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.
-how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
-  from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application
-  servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using
-  network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.
-id: if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491
-known_false_positives: There are no known false positives.
-name: Suspicious Java Classes
-references: []
 search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)"
   | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time)
   as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent)
   as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`'
+how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
+  from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application
+  servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using
+  network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.
+known_false_positives: There are no known false positives.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
@@ -31,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index 28bd134bb1..e4190cc8ea 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection
+id: 294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-04-15'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch
-  EKS Logs inputs.
-id: 294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
-  UA and source IPs will provide context.
-name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS
   Security Scanner" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name
   values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI)
   by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch
+  EKS Logs inputs.
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
+  UA and source IPs will provide context.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
@@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
index fb23111273..15e8598bfb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection
+id: dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002
+version: 1
 date: '2020-04-15'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests
   against Kubernetes' Pods API
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch
-  EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection`
-  macro to filter out the false positives.
-id: dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
-  UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.
-name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods
   requestURI="/api/v1/pods" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason)
   values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by
   src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch
+  EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection`
+  macro to filter out the false positives.
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
+  UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
index 8834fff93b..a2ec0facbe 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: aws detect attach to role policy
+id: 88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different
   role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudwatch logs
-id: 88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1
-known_false_positives: Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can
-  be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure).
-  The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege
-  policies or even newly created policies.
-name: aws detect attach to role policy
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn
   | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn
   eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated
   userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate  | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
+known_false_positives: Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can
+  be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure).
+  The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege
+  policies or even newly created policies.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
@@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
index ee51203950..17363677d4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: aws detect permanent key creation
+id: 12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent
   keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls.
   Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudwatch logs
-id: 12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01
-known_false_positives: Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is
-  a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.
-name: aws detect permanent key creation
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey
   "userIdentity.type"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent
   action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status
   responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
+known_false_positives: Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is
+  a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
@@ -27,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
index 437712762e..3687b0d7ac 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: aws detect role creation
+id: 5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation
   is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different
   than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation
   of privileges.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudwatch logs
-id: 5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad
-known_false_positives: CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search
-  can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general
-  AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.
-name: aws detect role creation
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
   requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId
   userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName
   requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate
   | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
+known_false_positives: CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search
+  can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general
+  AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
index ba946d2904..e3767be52d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: aws detect sts assume role abuse
+id: 8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These
   tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate
   privileges.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudtrail logs
-id: 8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662
-known_false_positives: Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism
-  to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted
-  to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.
-name: aws detect sts assume role abuse
-references: []
 search: '`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role
   | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action
   requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate
   | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudtrail logs
+known_false_positives: Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism
+  to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted
+  to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
@@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
index 83f097a0a7..b5782424bb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: aws detect sts get session token abuse
+id: 85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken.
   These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and
   escalate privileges.
+search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA  userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName
+  | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn
+  userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This
   search works with cloudwatch logs
-id: 85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551
 known_false_positives: Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments
   numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide
   specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of
   field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.
-name: aws detect sts get session token abuse
 references: []
-search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA  userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName
-  | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn
-  userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
@@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
index 080e4b245f..358053810d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,13 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project
+id: 27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-09'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects.
   Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges
   at different projects depending on organization schema.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
-  logs
-id: 27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb
-known_false_positives: Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum
-  number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior
-  within organization
-name: GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project
-references:
-- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
-- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
-- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner
   OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin
   OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin
@@ -21,6 +15,15 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}
   data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission
   data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role
   data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
+  logs
+known_false_positives: Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum
+  number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior
+  within organization
+references:
+- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
+- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
+- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
@@ -34,5 +37,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
index f2665721ee..a1c0dbad31 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: GCP Detect gcploit framework
+id: a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-08'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This
   framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised
   high privilege accounts.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
-  logs
-id: a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52
-known_false_positives: Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match
-  with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account
-  may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects
-name: GCP Detect gcploit framework
-references:
-- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
-- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s
   | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail
   data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location
   http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
+  logs
+known_false_positives: Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match
+  with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account
+  may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects
+references:
+- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
+- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
index d7a9364554..4ed52576c3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account
+id: 2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-09'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and
   accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts
   to move laterally and escalate privileges.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
-  logs
-id: 2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba
-known_false_positives: High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however
-  it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false
-  positives.
-name: GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account
-references:
-- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
-- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
-- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken
   OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create
   OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp
   data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission
   data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id
   | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
+  logs
+known_false_positives: High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however
+  it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false
+  positives.
+references:
+- https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit
+- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok
+- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
@@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
index 1a48acc7e6..c7fb7f77a2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: gcp detect oauth token abuse
+id: a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-01'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP
   Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access
   sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to
   access and move laterally.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
-  logs
-id: a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972
-known_false_positives: GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are
-  access policies in place along with audit logs.
-name: gcp detect oauth token abuse
-references:
-- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1
-- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog
   |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp
   protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message  | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message
+  logs
+known_false_positives: GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are
+  access policies in place along with audit logs.
+references:
+- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1
+- https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - GCP Cross Account Activity
@@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
index 37adf4603b..b1e002951e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection
+id: 19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-17'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods
-how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later),
-  then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
-id: 19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
-  User Agent, source IPs and pods  will provide context.
-name: GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log
   |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
   properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later),
+  then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
+  User Agent, source IPs and pods  will provide context.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index 413ed7e756..e49171ebac 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection
+id: db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26
+version: 1
 date: '2020-04-15'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster
-how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later),
-  then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
-  You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection
-  to filter out FPs.
-id: db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
-  User Agent and source IPs will provide context.
-name: GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1
   data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 "data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision"=forbid
   "data.protoPayload.status.message"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="system:anonymous"
@@ -20,6 +16,13 @@ search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!
   as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name
   as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |
   `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later),
+  then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.
+  You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection
+  to filter out FPs.
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency,
+  User Agent and source IPs will provide context.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
@@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index fe3ecb853f..9ce356d05e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod
+id: 5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6
+version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
   pods by IP address, verb and decision
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudwatch logs
-id: 5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6
-known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
-  must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.
-name: Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts  objectRef.resource=pods
   | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision  |
   top  sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
+known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
+  must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -23,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 7fff11e98d..4f723b39d7 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account
+id: de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8
+version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
   accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC
   by accounts occurrences
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudwatch logs
-id: de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8
-known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
-  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
-name: Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table
   sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats
   count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username
   annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs
+known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
+  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index 38f6cd9fa3..2f8ddb9a85 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access
+id: 7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c
+version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmaps or secrets
-how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk
-  App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.
-id: 7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c
-known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
-  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
-name: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1
   sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1  |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource
   objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup
   user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk
+  App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.
+known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
+  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index 684a590f64..15ad781918 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access
+id: b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569
+version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmpas or secrets
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudwatch logs.
-id: b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569
-known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
-  however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. '
-name: Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings
   sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1  | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{}
   objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username
   user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs.
+known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
+  however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. '
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index adb5dcef59..552cbac70a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access
+id: a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5
+version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
   failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or
   rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source
   IPs and request URI
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudwatch logs.
-id: a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5
-known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
-  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
-name: Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status
   = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status
   requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs.
+known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
+  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index 3b914725ce..9be9a9eea4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls
+id: 042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2
+version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP,
   verb namespace and object access context
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudwatch logs.
-id: 042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2
-known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
-  verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious
-  IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
-name: Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls
-references: []
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1
   src_user=system:anonymous  | table  src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI  |
   stats  count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudwatch logs.
+known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
+  verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious
+  IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
index 604bd4ef4c..f48d2d1228 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace
+id: 55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
   pods and namespaces by IP address and verb
-how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
-  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
-id: 55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72
-known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
-  must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness.
-name: Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace
-references: []
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
   user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow  |
   table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status
   properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status
   properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
+known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
+  must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
index 411af9ca96..daecbadc5f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account
+id: 47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
   accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes
   of RBAC by accounts occurrences
-how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
-  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
-id: 47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e
-known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
-  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
-name: Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account
-references: []
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
   annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent
   annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason
   | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
+known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
+  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index f7b65c99b8..c107196f39 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access
+id: 1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmpas or secrets
-how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
-  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
-id: 1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8
-known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
-  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
-name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access
-references: []
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search
   objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow  |table
   user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name
   annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
+known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
+  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index e317f69ed8..bbb4c2e527 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access
+id: f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmpas or secrets
-how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
-  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
-id: f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c
-known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
-  however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. '
-name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access
-references: []
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search
   objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username
   user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason
   | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
+known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
+  however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. '
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index bb7bc925d7..5196ff3f46 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access
+id: 019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
   failure or forbidden access status
-how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
-  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
-id: 019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514
-known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
-  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
-name: Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access
-references: []
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
   user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts*  responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table  sourceIPs{}
   user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod
   objectRef.namespace  |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
+known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
+  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index a2f2545c43..816d17d06c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls
+id: 4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb
   namespace and object access context
-how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
-  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
-id: 4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5
-known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
-  verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs
-  and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
-name: Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls
-references: []
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath
   input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration
   | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{}
   verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |
   rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace
   requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
+known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
+  verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs
+  and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -27,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 7c1bfa2c24..789f6aab81 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint
+id: 86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source
   IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod
   in Azure
-how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
-  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
-id: 86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source
-  IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.
-name: Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint
-references: []
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
   responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
   properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source
+  IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
@@ -24,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 2ba0d56c96..ee3aca11b0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint
+id: c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-19'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source
   IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in
   Azure
-how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
-  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
-id: c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a
-known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source
-  IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.
-name: Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint
-references: []
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
   responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason
   |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
+  Kube-Audit data diagnostics
+known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source
+  IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
@@ -26,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 81c324f49b..ffa22e5fe4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account
+id: 99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-11'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
   accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC
   by accounts occurrences
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with
-  pubsub messaging service logs
-id: 99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340
-known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
-  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
-name: Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding
   OR Clusterrole  | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
   data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason
   |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with
+  pubsub messaging service logs
+known_false_positives: Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations
+  can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index 817d6f791f..1547e991b5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod
+id: 7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-10'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
   pods by IP address, verb and decision
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub
-  messaging service logs
-id: 7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f
-known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
-  must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.
-name: Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message`  data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts
   | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb
   data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource
   | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
   data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub
+  messaging service logs
+known_false_positives: Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst
+  must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index 30b5635af1..1e5916fc60 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access
+id: bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-11'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmaps or secrets
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with
-  pubsub messaging service logs.
-id: bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a
-known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
-  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
-name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps
   OR secrets  | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name
   data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
   | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name
   |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with
+  pubsub messaging service logs.
+known_false_positives: Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user
+  and object context can provide guidance for detection.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index e5847fab8d..f56f529ef5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access
+id: a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-11'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmpas or secrets
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
-  messaging servicelogs.
-id: a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30
-known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
-  however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious
-  use. '
-name: Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding
   OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1  | table src_ip
   src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason
   | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
+  messaging servicelogs.
+known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
+  however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious
+  use. '
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
@@ -25,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 1c3d612ab8..a9d8488fa6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access
+id: 7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
   failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or
   rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source
   IPs and request URI
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
-  messaging service logs.
-id: 7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b
-known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
-  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
-name: Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=*
   | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace
   data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb  data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed
   data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision
   | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
+  messaging service logs.
+known_false_positives: This search can give false positives as there might be inherent
+  issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -27,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index f9518a66af..434aa486ed 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls
+id: a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-11'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP,
   verb namespace and object access context
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
-  messaging logs.
-id: a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557
-known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
-  source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential
-  malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such
-  as configmaps or secrets
-name: Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls
-references: []
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl*
   src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent
   data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user
   |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub
+  messaging logs.
+known_false_positives: Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP,
+  source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential
+  malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such
+  as configmaps or secrets
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -26,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
index a6386f3c07..ba15ba0c80 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Child Processes of Spoolsv exe
+id: aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df
+version: 3
 date: '2020-03-16'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is
   associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440.
   Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows
   and typically runs as SYSTEM.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro
-  to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.
-id: aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children
-  of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added
-  as exclusions in the search.
-name: Child Processes of Spoolsv exe
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe
   AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro
+  to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children
+  of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added
+  as exclusions in the search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index d80b2412bb..8a9a7fd6d6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+id: 93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-27'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`'
 how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs
   from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged
   user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using
   the shell and edit flags.
-id: 93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4
 known_false_positives: unknown
-name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
 references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
-search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
index 21b13143a0..482a5c3282 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
+id: 10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-29'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`'
 how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos
   and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged.  This also captures instances where
   the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than
   5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a
   single host
-id: 10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d
 known_false_positives: If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will
   pick those up too.
-name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
 references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
-search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
-  max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
@@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
index 8f1b6b2728..139a6d7071 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
+id: 1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
+search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`'
 how_to_implement: OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info
   at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402.
   The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single
   \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
-id: 1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a
 known_false_positives: unknown
-name: Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
 references:
 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
-search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
@@ -30,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
index f14dedc7cf..b4e8c7514c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file
+id: a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process
   is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
-  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
-  via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
-  data sources, such as Sysmon.
-id: a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893
-known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files
-  to the disk.
-name: Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe
   OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id
@@ -26,6 +23,13 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(
   file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id
   outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name  file_path | where file_name
   != "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter` '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
+  from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
+  via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
+  data sources, such as Sysmon.
+known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files
+  to the disk.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Phishing Payloads
@@ -46,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
index a7152d772f..f4a70da9ea 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detection of tools built by NirSoft
+id: 1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate
   the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused
   by attackers.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-id: 1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6
-known_false_positives: While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You
-  should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
-name: Detection of tools built by NirSoft
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*
   /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You
+  should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
index 973138e485..a7b7d63200 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service
+id: 823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808
+version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen
   running in your environment. This table is then cached.
+search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+)
+  service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
+  service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen
+  > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time
+  dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`'
 how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
   you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to
   execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running
@@ -11,16 +21,9 @@ how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM
   keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the
   `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please
   ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-id: 823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808
 known_false_positives: A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify
   that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.
-name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service
 references: []
-search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+)
-  service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
-  service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen
-  > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time
-  dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Service Abuse
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
index 2dc40105d2..5688d2c7f4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,23 @@
-author: Jamie Windley, Splunk
+name: MacOS - Re-opened Applications
+id: 40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-02-07'
+author: Jamie Windley, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine
   which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
+  as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*com.apple.loginwindow*"
+  by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`'
 how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process
   data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf)
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be
   deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data
   populate the Endpoint data model.
-id: 40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b
 known_false_positives: At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing,
   no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during
   normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed
@@ -15,14 +25,7 @@ known_false_positives: At this stage, there are no known false positives. During
   In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in
   fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added
   to an allow list.
-name: MacOS - Re-opened Applications
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
-  as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
-  max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*com.apple.loginwindow*"
-  by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`'
 tags:
   asset_type: Endpoint
   cis20:
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
index f51b407e15..ef60bf5b43 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Processes Tapping Keyboard Events
+id: 2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec
+version: 1
 date: '2019-01-25'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard
   events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This
   is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it
   can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input
+search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps
+  | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id|
+  dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`'
 how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
   from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599)
   pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must
   be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery
   data populate the Alerts data model.
-id: 2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec
 known_false_positives: There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps
   are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes
   to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161)
   comment.
-name: Processes Tapping Keyboard Events
 references: []
-search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps
-  | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id|
-  dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - ColdRoot MacOS RAT
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
index 7a25bed265..f886104b2e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Remote Desktop Process Running On System
+id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a
+version: 5
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on
   systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out
   all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and
   Identity framework.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe
+  AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user
+  Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` '
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly
@@ -12,15 +22,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting d
   to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security
   Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv
   file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.
-id: f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a
 known_false_positives: Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
-name: Remote Desktop Process Running On System
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe
-  AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user
-  Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 5
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
index b1479661ed..362df726e5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Spike in File Writes
+id: fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae
+version: 3
 date: '2020-03-16'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written
   to a particular host
-how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint
-  file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection
-  and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.
-  The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads
-  and writes to the file system.
-id: fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae
-known_false_positives: It is important to understand that if you happen to install
-  any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can
-  expect to see a large increase of file modifications.
-name: Spike in File Writes
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
   where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
   | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time
@@ -20,6 +14,15 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint
   "-1d@d"), count,null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"),
   count, null))) as stdev by "dest" | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*4), isOutlier=if((count
   > upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` '
+how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint
+  file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection
+  and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.
+  The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads
+  and writes to the file system.
+known_false_positives: It is important to understand that if you happen to install
+  any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can
+  expect to see a large increase of file modifications.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
index 14fe6bf28a..39a1058908 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event
+id: 701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-14'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe.
   After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of
   avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.
-how_to_implement: This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver
-  loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll
-  is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query.
-  We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
-id: 701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787
-known_false_positives: unknown
-name: Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event
-references:
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
 search: '(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll)
   OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode)
   AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
   values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename
   host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` '
+how_to_implement: This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver
+  loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll
+  is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query.
+  We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references:
+- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Sunburst Malware
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
index c5067ccb86..1b9f4fe828 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-date: '2018-10-23'
-description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
-  Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on
-  the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
-id: 71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions
-  for legitimate purposes.
 name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription
-references: []
+id: 71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d
+version: 1
+date: '2018-10-23'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
+description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
 search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consumer>[^;|^$]+)"
   | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats
   count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer,
   Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
+  Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on
+  the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions
+  for legitimate purposes.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
index 6fb5bcaadd..1163296152 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-date: '2018-10-23'
-description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
-  Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on
-  the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
-id: 38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83
-known_false_positives: Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions
-  for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these
-  that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to
-  create exceptions for other legitimate events.
 name: WMI Temporary Event Subscription
-references: []
+id: 38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83
+version: 1
+date: '2018-10-23'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
+description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
 search: '`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?<query>[^;|^$]+)"
   | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = ''wsmprovhost.exe''"
   AND query!="SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA ''AntiVirusProduct''
   OR TargetInstance ISA ''FirewallProduct'' OR TargetInstance ISA ''AntiSpywareProduct''"
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query  |
   `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the
+  Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on
+  the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
+known_false_positives: Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions
+  for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these
+  that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to
+  create exceptions for other legitimate events.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious WMI Use
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
index 08906661e9..06fc67ecdd 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+name: Detect ARP Poisoning
+id: b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-11'
+author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the
   organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks
   in the Infrastructure.
+search: '`cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection"
+  | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime
+  max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+  `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`'
 how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
   devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html)
   and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html)
   and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires
   that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
   is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-id: b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac
 known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP
   Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally
   sends many ARP packets (unlikely).
-name: Detect ARP Poisoning
 references: []
-search: '`cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection"
-  | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime
-  max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
-  `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
index 62485fe52b..3f5593e5d3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,21 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: DNS record changed
+id: 44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records
   lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the
   Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day.
+search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer
+  | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type)
+  as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution
+  where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query
+  | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?<domain>\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"]
+  | makemv delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer
+  | makemv current_answer  | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer |
+  eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`'
 how_to_implement: "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that\
   \ DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that\
   \ the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search\
@@ -16,19 +29,10 @@ how_to_implement: "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure
   \ when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to\
   \ active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\
   \n"
-id: 44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065
 known_false_positives: Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate,
   verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question
   as appropriate.
-name: DNS record changed
-search: '| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer
-  | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type)
-  as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution
-  where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query
-  | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?<domain>\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"]
-  | makemv delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer
-  | makemv current_answer  | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer |
-  eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
@@ -53,5 +57,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
index bc8c0ed2d5..d03a705cc0 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Excessive DNS Failures
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS
   responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data
-  is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1
-known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please
-  investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized
-  to better suit your environment.
-name: Excessive DNS Failures
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries
   from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.reply_code"!="No Error"
   "DNS.reply_code"!="NoError" DNS.reply_code!="unknown" NOT "DNS.query"="*.arpa" "DNS.query"="*.*"
@@ -17,6 +14,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as
   domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str
   domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries)
   as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data
+  is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
+known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please
+  investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized
+  to better suit your environment.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious DNS Traffic
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
index d1c101507d..6bd14858a3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server
+id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server
   to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using
   your email server.
-how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and
-  populating the Network_Traffic data model.  Your email servers must be categorized
-  as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold
-  and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment.
-  The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation
-  you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number
-  of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.
-id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368
-known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the
-  deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these
-  values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
-name: Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in
   from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip
   _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in)
@@ -30,6 +22,17 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as
   = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2)
   | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average,
   num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and
+  populating the Network_Traffic data model.  Your email servers must be categorized
+  as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold
+  and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment.
+  The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation
+  you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number
+  of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.
+known_false_positives: The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the
+  deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these
+  values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Collection and Staging
@@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
index ed30b4882e..5eae7a35b1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries
+id: 8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-20'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure
   for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data
-  is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-id: 8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb
-known_false_positives: Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it
-  is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify
-  the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.
-name: Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest"
   | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data
+  is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
+known_false_positives: Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it
+  is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify
+  the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DNS Amplification Attacks
@@ -33,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
index 8410fd7c14..5f48155296 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed
+id: ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer
   protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that
   is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic
   data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.
-how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
-  from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed
-  into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action'
-  taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model
-  be populated.
-id: ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479
-known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by
   All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action
   | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port
   OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`'
+how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
+  from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed
+  into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action'
+  taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model
+  be populated.
+known_false_positives: None identified
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
@@ -41,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
index 9025411078..1f3f48b8d3 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,16 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Protocol or Port Mismatch
+id: 54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher
   layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search
   should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80.
   This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt
   to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed
   and not well inspected.
-how_to_implement: Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect
-  network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo
-  Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection,
-  and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.
-id: 54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3
-known_false_positives: None identified
-name: Protocol or Port Mismatch
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53)
   OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80
@@ -22,6 +19,12 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app,
   All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`'
+how_to_implement: Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect
+  network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo
+  Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection,
+  and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.
+known_false_positives: None identified
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
index f86378c8e7..5decad1d46 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Protocols passing authentication in cleartext
+id: 6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9
+version: 2
 date: '2020-11-04'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for cleartext protocols at risk of leaking credentials.
   Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet, POP3, IMAP, and non-anonymous
   FTP sessions. While some of these protocols can be used over SSL, they typically
   run on different assigned ports in those cases.
-how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and
-  populating the Network_Traffic data model.
-id: 6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9
-known_false_positives: Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however,
-  this is rare.
-name: Protocols passing authentication in cleartext
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.transport="tcp" AND
   (All_Traffic.dest_port="23" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="143" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="110"
   OR (All_Traffic.dest_port="21" AND All_Traffic.user != "anonymous")) by All_Traffic.user
   All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and
+  populating the Network_Traffic data model.
+known_false_positives: Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however,
+  this is rare.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Use of Cleartext Protocols
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
index 2dfc224b23..15159d0297 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers
+id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-23'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Web
 description: This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that
   are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers.
   JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic
-  that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.
-id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681
-known_false_positives: It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs
-  containing the suspicious paths.
-name: Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD")
   AND (Web.url="*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*" OR Web.url="*web-console*" OR Web.url="*jmx-console*"
   OR Web.url = "*invoker*") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic
+  that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.
+known_false_positives: It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs
+  containing the suspicious paths.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - JBoss Vulnerability
@@ -29,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 4b7e72d52e..22a0ab522c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
+id: 810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-02'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ,
   and Traffix SDC devices
+search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the
   vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs
   via syslog.  As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces,
@@ -9,14 +15,11 @@ how_to_implement: To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using th
   traffic in order to inspect it.  I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation
   technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other
   exploit of using (hsqldb;).
-id: 810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
 known_false_positives: unknown
-name: Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
 references:
 - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/
 - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
 - https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/
-search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
index ae202aff6e..0930f90f6d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers
+id: c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-23'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Web
 description: This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit
   jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as
   the payload is embedded in the URL.
-how_to_implement: You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data
-  that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream,
-  and populating the Web data model
-id: c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d
-known_false_positives: No known false positives for this detection.
-name: Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD")
   by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url="*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*"
   AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime,
   lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data
+  that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream,
+  and populating the Web data model
+known_false_positives: No known false positives for this detection.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - JBoss Vulnerability
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
index ba509e06ce..57e84ac655 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse
+id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-23'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Web
 description: This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one
   that you want to have monitored for abuse.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time)
+  as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished
   by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such
   as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain
   Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.
-id: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301
 known_false_positives: None at this time
-name: Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time)
-  as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
@@ -28,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
index 640fd10dd8..3336635cb9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: SQL Injection with Long URLs
+id: e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Web
 description: This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible
   within them.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring
-  network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating
-  the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security
-  assets table.
-id: e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9
-known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or
-  long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL.
-  Please investigate as appropriate.
-name: SQL Injection with Long URLs
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where
   Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length
   > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`
@@ -26,6 +21,14 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web wher
   "full%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "select")) + mvcount(split(url, "distinct"))
   + mvcount(split(url, "select%20top")) + mvcount(split(url, "union")) + mvcount(split(url,
   "xp_cmdshell")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring
+  network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating
+  the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security
+  assets table.
+known_false_positives: It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or
+  long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL.
+  Please investigate as appropriate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SQL Injection
@@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
index 8b17175e8a..56c297d8f6 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: John Stoner, Splunk
+name: Supernova Webshell
+id: 2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-06'
+author: John Stoner, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Web
 description: This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST
   attack.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring
-  web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and
-  populating/mapped to the Web data model.
-id: 2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1
-known_false_positives: There might be false positives associted with this detection
-  since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.
-name: Supernova Webshell
-references:
-- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html
-- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where
   web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR
   Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by
   Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s
   | `supernova_webshell_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring
+  web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and
+  populating/mapped to the Web data model.
+known_false_positives: There might be false positives associted with this detection
+  since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.
+references:
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html
+- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Sunburst Malware
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index fcddb27b2d..0ee6aac84b 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers
+id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f
+version: 3
 date: '2021-01-14'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host
   malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate
   domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to
   circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders
   analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made
   from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer
+  min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
 how_to_implement: 'First, you''ll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This
   can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk
   Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is
@@ -31,14 +39,10 @@ how_to_implement: 'First, you''ll need to ingest data from your DNS operations.
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f
 known_false_positives: Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach
   out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious,
   however this activity must be verified.
-name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer
-  min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Data Protection
@@ -70,5 +74,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
index 7b95a6aafd..785935f4fa 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
@@ -1,26 +1,13 @@
-author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats
+id: c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
+author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on
   the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such
   as packet forging in the Infrastructure.
-how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
-  devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security
-  measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for
-  more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk
-  (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco
-  network devices.
-id: c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2
-known_false_positives: None currently known
-name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats
-references:
-- https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf
-- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html
-- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html
-- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html
-- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html
-- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html
-- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html
-- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html
 search: '`cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","MAC_AND_IP_THEFT","PAK_DROP")
   | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix
   | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac
@@ -30,6 +17,22 @@ search: '`cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","M
   src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation
   action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
+  devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security
+  measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for
+  more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk
+  (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco
+  network devices.
+known_false_positives: None currently known
+references:
+- https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
@@ -54,5 +57,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
index aa6664c5f7..f1ce107730 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,21 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets
+id: e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419
+version: 2
 date: '2018-06-01'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger
   than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command
   and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an
   endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime
+  latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from
+  datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category
+  !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes
+  > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
+  | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`'
 how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that
   you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a
   good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able
@@ -13,7 +25,6 @@ how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend
   More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata.
   This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating
   the Network_Traffic data model'
-id: e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419
 known_false_positives: ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot
   networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible
   that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are
@@ -21,15 +32,7 @@ known_false_positives: ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubl
   of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of
   false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`
   to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.
-name: Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime
-  latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from
-  datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category
-  !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes
-  > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
-  | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Command and Control
@@ -48,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
index d4e624dfcf..06dd673e14 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,15 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk
+name: Detect Outbound SMB Traffic
+id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your
   network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity.
   One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential
   hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat
   actor.
-how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that
-  you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good
-  understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish
-  internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs
-  that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located
-  in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating
-  this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata.
-  This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating
-  the Network_Traffic data model'
-id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378
-known_false_positives: It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic
-  is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets
-  and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the
-  lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR
-  blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be
-  investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications
-  of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.
-name: Detect Outbound SMB Traffic
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time)
   as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app
   values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port
@@ -33,6 +19,23 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time
   OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by
   All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`
   | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`'
+how_to_implement: 'In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that
+  you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good
+  understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish
+  internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs
+  that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located
+  in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating
+  this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata.
+  This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating
+  the Network_Traffic data model'
+known_false_positives: It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic
+  is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets
+  and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the
+  lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR
+  blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be
+  investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications
+  of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
@@ -53,5 +56,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
index 81a1babeeb..5d2cc4360a 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+name: Detect Port Security Violation
+id: 2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
+author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to
   an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that
   are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure
@@ -10,24 +15,22 @@ description: By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input
   maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation
   attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC
   addresses, a security violation occurs.
-how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
-  devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable
-  for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html)
-  and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires
-  that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
-  is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-id: 2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24
-known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if you have
-  malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically
-  connect physical devices to the network.
-name: Detect Port Security Violation
-references: []
 search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation")
   OR (facility="PORT_SECURITY" mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION" OR mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN")
   | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime
   max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS
   src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
+  devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable
+  for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html)
+  and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires
+  that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
+  is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
+known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if you have
+  malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically
+  connect physical devices to the network.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
@@ -53,5 +56,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
index a000876cb0..faca7f14f9 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
@@ -1,24 +1,27 @@
-author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server
+id: 6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-11'
+author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's
   network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out
   DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).
+search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT"
+  | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type)
+  AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+  `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`'
 how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
   devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see
   https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html)
   and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires
   that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
   is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.
-id: 6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079
 known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP
   Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP
   server has been moved to another network interface.
-name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server
 references: []
-search: '`cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT"
-  | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type)
-  AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
-  `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
@@ -43,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
index 32a6c39b62..872addfb3b 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration
+id: 82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI
   field.
+search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?<snicat>(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)"
+  | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip
+  dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should
   also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting when any of the predefined
   SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are
   LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito.  You can go further
   once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove
   or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.
-id: 82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
 known_false_positives: Unknown
-name: Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration
 references:
 - https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/
 - https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
-search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?<snicat>(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)"
-  | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip
-  dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Data Exfiltration
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
index b95a5e8c22..2795d49284 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,15 @@
-author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+name: Detect Software Download To Network Device
+id: cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
+author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device
   operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot
   (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled
   network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option
   in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.
-how_to_implement: This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP
-  ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router
-  or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse
-  a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically
-  an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is
-  also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address
-  (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.
-id: cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8
-known_false_positives: This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software
-  downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.
-name: Detect Software Download To Network Device
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND
   All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21)
@@ -24,6 +17,16 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch
   by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP
+  ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router
+  or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse
+  a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically
+  an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is
+  also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address
+  (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.
+known_false_positives: This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software
+  downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
@@ -44,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
index 019767c04a..ad5e1d565a 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
-author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+name: Detect Traffic Mirroring
+id: 42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
+author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data
   exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native
   feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured
   to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network
   analyzer or other monitoring device.
+search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN"
+  mnemonic="SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START") OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD"
+  command="monitor session*") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime
+  count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`'
 how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network
   devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification".
   The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467)
@@ -12,16 +22,9 @@ how_to_implement: This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Netwo
   been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also
   note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic
   mirroring.
-id: 42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990
 known_false_positives: This search will return false positives for any legitimate
   traffic captures by network administrators.
-name: Detect Traffic Mirroring
 references: []
-search: '`cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN"
-  mnemonic="SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START") OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD"
-  command="monitor session*") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime
-  count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Router and Infrastructure Security
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
index 4864991118..7e8deb16ac 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
@@ -1,29 +1,32 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address
+id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-13'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Sessions
 description: By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv,
   we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the
   organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices
   when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address
   associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known
   devices, and reports on those that are not found.
-how_to_implement: This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise
-  Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv
-  file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized
-  organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried
-  systems have their MAC address populated.
-id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4
-known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives. Please
-  consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may
-  be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the
-  system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity
-  framework with the proper information.
-name: Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions
   where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip
   All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")`
   | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields
   + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise
+  Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv
+  file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized
+  organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried
+  systems have their MAC address populated.
+known_false_positives: This search might be prone to high false positives. Please
+  consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may
+  be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the
+  system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity
+  framework with the proper information.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Asset Tracking
@@ -42,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
index 1503f7d206..8e90004f05 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-date: '2020-07-28'
-description: This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We
-  are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size
-  via stream:tcp.  Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with
-  configurations for your Splunk environment.
-id: babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-known_false_positives: unknown
 name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream
-references:
-- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
+id: babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+version: 1
+date: '2020-07-28'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
+description: This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.
 search: '`stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY)
   | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns" | append [search `stream_tcp`
   bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats
   count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We
+  are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size
+  via stream:tcp.  Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with
+  configurations for your Splunk environment.
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references:
+- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
@@ -32,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
index 742026113d..46f7d0bc13 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-date: '2020-07-28'
-description: This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek
-  data should also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting SIG and KEY
-  records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json.  The
-  Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.
-id: c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-known_false_positives: unknown
 name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek
-references:
-- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
+id: c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+version: 1
+date: '2020-07-28'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
+description: This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id
   | append [| tstats  `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
   where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id
   as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id
   | where count>1 | fields - count '
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek
+  data should also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting SIG and KEY
+  records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json.  The
+  Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references:
+- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
@@ -34,5 +37,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
index dc4e3b6fdd..a960699e2c 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Detect Zerologon via Zeek
+id: bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-15'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472
   vulnerability via Zeek RPC
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should
-  also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting when all three RPC operations
-  (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app
-  via bro:rpc:json.  These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.
-id: bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002
-known_false_positives: unknown
-name: Detect Zerologon via Zeek
-references:
-- https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon
-- https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472
-- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472
 search: '`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3)
   | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerReqChallenge"))
   as challenge count(eval(operation=="NetrServerAuthenticate3")) as authcount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerPasswordSet2"))
   as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4
   passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should
+  also be getting ingested in JSON format.  We are detecting when all three RPC operations
+  (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app
+  via bro:rpc:json.  These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.
+known_false_positives: unknown
+references:
+- https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon
+- https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472
+- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
@@ -36,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
index 68c7227903..b24c834649 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK
+id: 85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9
+version: 2
 date: '2020-01-22'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large
   for the record type being requested in your environment.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time
+  max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution
+  by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* |  `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval
+  query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(query_length)"
+  as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time
+  query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` '
 how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure
   that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the
   Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your
@@ -30,19 +42,10 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be
   found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-id: 85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9
 known_false_positives: If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider
   reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run
   the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.
-name: DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time
-  max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution
-  by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* |  `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval
-  query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(query_length)"
-  as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time
-  query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
@@ -65,5 +68,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
index 2a1be60dd7..0b23c44fb3 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation
+id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5
+version: 3
 date: '2021-01-18'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Resolution
 description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard
   deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the
   standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that
-  DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
-id: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5
-known_false_positives: It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.
-name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   by DNS.query |  `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) |
   table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev
   avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2)
   | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` '
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that
+  DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.
+known_false_positives: It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Hidden Cobra Malware
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
index 93bd893b49..88c8c819d7 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce
+id: a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any
   source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the
   average traffic.
-how_to_implement: You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the
-  Network_Traffic data model.
-id: a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923
-known_false_positives: RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from
-  all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.
-name: Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src
   All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count)
   AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src
   AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50
   stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the
+  Network_Traffic data model.
+known_false_positives: RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from
+  all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -39,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
index 117724ee23..e3afcb3232 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Remote Desktop Network Traffic
+id: 272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-07'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used
   by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it
   is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources
   and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop
   on your network.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND
+  All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source
+  by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` '
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems
   that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote
   desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating
@@ -14,15 +24,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to identify sys
   to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system
   depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework.  This
   can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.
-id: 272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3
 known_false_positives: Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
-name: Remote Desktop Network Traffic
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND
-  All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source
-  by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - SamSam Ransomware
@@ -47,5 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
index 797fb5b144..5683922f41 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: SMB Traffic Spike
+id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB)
   traffic connections.
-how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs
-  and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.
-id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378
-known_false_positives: A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause
-  this analytic to trigger.
-name: SMB Traffic Spike
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
   where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb
   by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats
@@ -17,6 +15,11 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
   count, null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count,
   null))) as stdev by src | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*2), isOutlier=if(count > upperBound
   AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` '
+how_to_implement: This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs
+  and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.
+known_false_positives: A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause
+  this analytic to trigger.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
index cff80cd4fb..94f891d77e 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK
+id: d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828
+version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes
   in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip)
+  as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where
+  All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by
+  _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time,
+  "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001
+  | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count |
+  table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` '
 how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure
   that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the
   Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your
@@ -24,20 +36,11 @@ how_to_implement: 'To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur
 
   Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found
   here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`'
-id: d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828
 known_false_positives: If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider
   reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically
   re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update
   the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results
-name: SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK
 references: []
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip)
-  as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where
-  All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by
-  _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time,
-  "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001
-  | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count |
-  table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` '
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -58,5 +61,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
index bb5ff72383..441dc1f906 100644
--- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,25 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: TOR Traffic
+id: ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45
+version: 2
 date: '2020-07-22'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router
   (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious
   purposes.
-how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
-  from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed
-  into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action'
-  taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model
-  be populated.
-id: ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45
-known_false_positives: None at this time
-name: TOR Traffic
-references: []
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed
   by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | `tor_traffic_filter`'
+how_to_implement: In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data
+  from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed
+  into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action'
+  taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model
+  be populated.
+known_false_positives: None at this time
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
@@ -38,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
index 413c50b9d0..11a0c2a5ca 100644
--- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
+++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Unusually Long Content-Type Length
+id: 57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7
+version: 1
 date: '2017-10-13'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http
   header that the client sends the server.
-how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP.
-  You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream
-  deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.
-id: 57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7
-known_false_positives: Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length
-  greater than 100 characters.
-name: Unusually Long Content-Type Length
-references: []
 search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where
   cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length
   cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`'
+how_to_implement: This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP.
+  You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream
+  deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.
+known_false_positives: Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length
+  greater than 100 characters.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Apache Struts Vulnerability
@@ -37,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
index 66fa083ecf..d85ae0fe76 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-author: Jim Apger, Splunk
+name: Web Fraud - Account Harvesting
+id: 31337aaa-941d-4ada-81ac-q2a17be5bf0d
+version: 1
 date: '2018-10-08'
+author: Jim Apger, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts
   using the same email domain name.
+search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/"
+  | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<SessionID>\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)"
+  | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?<email_domain>.*)" | stats dc(Username)
+  as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames>
+  25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`'
 how_to_implement: We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email
   address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search
   down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI)
@@ -10,7 +20,6 @@ how_to_implement: We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the emai
   reasons.  After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account
   creations per email domain.  Common data sources used for this detection are customized
   Apache logs or Splunk Stream.
-id: 31337aaa-941d-4ada-81ac-q2a17be5bf0d
 known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually
   looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections
   that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to
@@ -22,15 +31,9 @@ known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usu
   for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search.  You can also use Shannon entropy
   or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness
   or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated.
-name: Web Fraud - Account Harvesting
 references:
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/
-search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/"
-  | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<SessionID>\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)"
-  | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?<email_domain>.*)" | stats dc(Username)
-  as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames>
-  25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
@@ -49,5 +52,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
index ed33dd989b..1a945257d5 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
-author: Jim Apger, Splunk
+name: Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed
+id: 31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a
+version: 1
 date: '2018-10-08'
+author: Jim Apger, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the
   clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect
   cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven
   session.
+search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<session_id>\w+)"
+  | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where
+  TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as
+  ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5)
+  | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`'
 how_to_implement: Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for
   each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain
   a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks
@@ -12,21 +22,14 @@ how_to_implement: Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data f
   such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover,
   etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized
   IIS, and Splunk Stream.
-id: 31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a
 known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually
   looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections
   that simply detect anamoluous behavior.
-name: Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed
 references:
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/
-search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<session_id>\w+)"
-  | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where
-  TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as
-  ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5)
-  | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
@@ -45,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
index ddebd70164..8ee30a4e83 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
@@ -1,27 +1,30 @@
-author: Jim Apger, Splunk
+name: Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts
+id: 31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3
+version: 1
 date: '2018-10-08'
+author: Jim Apger, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: ''
 description: This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.
+search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost*  |
+  rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data
+  "login\[password\]=(?<Password>[^&|^$]+)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames
+  values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5
+  | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`'
 how_to_implement: We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values
   of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the
   Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized
   or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text
   password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs,
   customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.
-id: 31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3
 known_false_positives: As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually
   looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections
   that simply detect anamoluous behavior.
-name: Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts
 references:
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie
 - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/
-search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost*  |
-  rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data
-  "login\[password\]=(?<Password>[^&|^$]+)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames
-  values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5
-  | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`'
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Web Fraud Detection
@@ -35,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: threat
-type: batch
-version: 1

From e87fe6564ef1cc1898d55e8d2fc30ee556f545d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:14:32 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 121/132] added ci job to make yamls pretty on release

---
 .circleci/config.yml | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.circleci/config.yml b/.circleci/config.yml
index a67ad414e2..711c24dc80 100644
--- a/.circleci/config.yml
+++ b/.circleci/config.yml
@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ jobs:
             cd security-content
             source venv/bin/activate
             python bin/doc-gen.py --path . --output docs -v
+      - run:
+          name: make yamls pretty
+          command: |
+            cd security-content
+            source venv/bin/activate
+            python bin/pretty_yaml.py --path . -v
       - run:
           name: get cti repo for mitre-maps
           command: |
@@ -283,6 +289,7 @@ jobs:
             git config --global push.default simple
             git add package/*
             git add docs/*
+            git add detections/*
             git commit --allow-empty -m "updating docs and package bits [ci skip]"
             # Push quietly to prevent showing the token in log
             git push https://${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/splunk/security-content.git ${CIRCLE_BRANCH}

From b58843ca9f7770f9539796a4e7a1bcd5d42e593c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:35:58 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 122/132] added datamodels as an array

---
 .../email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml   | 3 ++-
 ...le_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml | 2 +-
 detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml            | 2 +-
 .../application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml      | 2 +-
 .../application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml  | 3 ++-
 ...bnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml | 3 ++-
 ...bnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml | 3 ++-
 ...s_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 3 ++-
 ...ect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml | 2 +-
 ...aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml | 2 +-
 ...network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml   | 2 +-
 .../cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml      | 3 ++-
 ...loud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 3 ++-
 ...ud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 3 ++-
 ...d_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml | 3 ++-
 ...e_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 3 ++-
 .../cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml    | 3 ++-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml      | 3 ++-
 .../cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml      | 3 ++-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml      | 3 ++-
 .../cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml            | 2 +-
 ...etect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml | 2 +-
 .../detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml        | 2 +-
 .../high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml                          | 2 +-
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml                     | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml     | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml         | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml  | 2 +-
 .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml       | 2 +-
 ...abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml     | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml  | 2 +-
 ...ws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml | 2 +-
 .../aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml   | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml  | 3 ++-
 .../deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml   | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml  | 2 +-
 .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml     | 2 +-
 ...ect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml  | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml  | 2 +-
 .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml          | 3 ++-
 .../detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml         | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml             | 3 ++-
 ...dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml | 3 ++-
 .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml      | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml       | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml        | 2 +-
 ...2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml | 2 +-
 .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml       | 2 +-
 .../execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml         | 3 ++-
 .../extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml   | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml       | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml           | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml           | 2 +-
 ...ll_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml          | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml           | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml      | 3 ++-
 ...eg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml           | 3 ++-
 .../scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml           | 3 ++-
 .../deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml    | 2 +-
 .../deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml                | 2 +-
 .../suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml       | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml       | 3 ++-
 detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml  | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml | 3 ++-
 ...t_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml       | 3 ++-
 .../attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml    | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml           | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml  | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml           | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml                | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml     | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml        | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml                | 3 ++-
 .../creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml       | 3 ++-
 .../credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml                 | 3 ++-
 .../detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml       | 2 +-
 .../detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml         | 2 +-
 .../detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml         | 2 +-
 .../detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml        | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml      | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml                   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml       | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml         | 2 +-
 .../detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml    | 3 ++-
 ...ocesses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml | 3 ++-
 .../detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml        | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml     | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml                | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml    | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml             | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml    | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml             | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml  | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml  | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml | 2 +-
 ...rshell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml | 3 ++-
 .../malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml         | 3 ++-
 .../malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml | 3 ++-
 ...alicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml          | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml     | 3 ++-
 .../process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml              | 3 ++-
 .../reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml    | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml     | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml   | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml          | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml                 | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml     | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml      | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml     | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml            | 2 +-
 .../shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml  | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml           | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml      | 3 ++-
 .../ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...a___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...sa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...a___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml | 2 +-
 ...___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml        | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml  | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml  | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml   | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml  | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml   | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml      | 2 +-
 .../ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml        | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml         | 2 +-
 ...a___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ..._illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml        | 2 +-
 ...gement_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...ement_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...ilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...llegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...gal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ..._access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml | 2 +-
 ...s_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...nd_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...sa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml     | 2 +-
 ...d_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml        | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml     | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml       | 2 +-
 ...con_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml    | 2 +-
 ...vilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 ...ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml | 2 +-
 .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml      | 2 +-
 .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml         | 2 +-
 .../ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml      | 2 +-
 .../ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml       | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml  | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml  | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml                | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml               | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml         | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml                 | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml             | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml              | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml | 3 ++-
 .../system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml         | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml            | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml                   | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml          | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml                     | 3 ++-
 detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml              | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml     | 2 +-
 .../application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml       | 3 ++-
 .../experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml | 2 +-
 .../application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml      | 3 ++-
 .../email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml     | 3 ++-
 .../experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml | 3 ++-
 .../application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml         | 3 ++-
 .../application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml    | 3 ++-
 .../application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml             | 3 ++-
 .../application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml     | 3 ++-
 .../experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml       | 2 +-
 .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml     | 2 +-
 .../cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml         | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml     | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml           | 2 +-
 .../gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml | 2 +-
 ...cp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml        | 2 +-
 .../cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml            | 2 +-
 ...bernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml   | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml      | 2 +-
 ...es_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml   | 2 +-
 ...re_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml  | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml  | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml    | 2 +-
 ..._azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml            | 2 +-
 .../experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml   | 2 +-
 .../kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml   | 2 +-
 ...bernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml    | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml      | 2 +-
 ...es_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml | 2 +-
 .../cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml   | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml            | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml         | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml         | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml           | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml       | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml             | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml      | 3 ++-
 detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml      | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml    | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml | 2 +-
 .../experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml         | 3 ++-
 detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml     | 3 ++-
 ...eiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml | 3 ++-
 .../experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml   | 3 ++-
 .../network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml             | 3 ++-
 detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml  | 3 ++-
 .../network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml  | 3 ++-
 .../detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml | 3 ++-
 .../experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml      | 2 +-
 .../web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml | 3 ++-
 .../experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml   | 3 ++-
 detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml   | 3 ++-
 detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml             | 3 ++-
 .../detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml    | 3 ++-
 .../network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml      | 3 ++-
 detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml             | 3 ++-
 detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml                | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml          | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml     | 3 ++-
 detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml                | 2 +-
 .../network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml      | 3 ++-
 .../network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml      | 3 ++-
 detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml        | 3 ++-
 .../network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml  | 3 ++-
 detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml       | 3 ++-
 detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml          | 3 ++-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml                       | 3 ++-
 detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml                | 3 ++-
 detections/network/tor_traffic.yml                             | 3 ++-
 detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml      | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml       | 2 +-
 .../web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml       | 2 +-
 337 files changed, 473 insertions(+), 337 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
index 1c41e653c6..cf6aed99a7 100644
--- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
+++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email
   files created outside the normal Outlook directory.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path)
diff --git a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
index 68212d5645..c5d3cf32e1 100644
--- a/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple
   users originating from the same ip address.
 search: '`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
index 82a6c703a6..0740c2cf38 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Detect Okta user lockout events
 search: '`okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country
   as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
index 584477eebb..8b5426dcc9 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Detect failed Okta SSO events
 search: '`okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats  min(_time)
   as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage,
diff --git a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
index 6805d5819e..80a5e47e0b 100644
--- a/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
+++ b/detections/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects logins from the same user from different states in
   a 24 hour period.
 search: '`okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null
diff --git a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
index 71200c379d..b9cceaa60a 100644
--- a/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
+++ b/detections/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-04-01'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as
   web servers.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index 22e02367e6..c8df0ab4a6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances
   for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then
   applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index 1a0d746484..707441011f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-08-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances
   for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then
   applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
index 0f65db13e6..c1ff376df3 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-07'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your
   cloud infrastructure environment by a user.
 search: '| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change
diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
index 1095e9a7cf..d0d3e0896f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-07'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your
   cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.
 search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
index 7e69adf812..031dc0314f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-28'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Authentication
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different
   account is requested for the first time.  This search is deprecated and have been
   translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
index 3a7692c67e..a4908609fa 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-11'
 author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of KMS keys which action kms:Encrypt is
   accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an identicator
   that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
index a8a01ae4e9..4d6aa650a2 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-11'
 author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption
   specifically against S3 buckets.
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption="aws:kms"
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
index 4330785494..d7139b27ac 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2021-01-11'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs
   were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index 33b25f0de6..8e46d7d836 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms
   used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker
   has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
index 583086c3d2..6df67d5086 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-04'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for new commands from each user role.
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change
   where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user,
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
index ad3c3915c3..3d7badf4fb 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have
   not created them before.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime,
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
index 06524b6337..978fde7bf0 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-02'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is
   created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file
   of previously seen regions where instances have been created.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
index b91c12d76d..d0929d8ea7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-10-12'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously
   unseen image IDs.
 search: '| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index ec1232c365..4aeac30448 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-12'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id)
   as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type,
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index aae7fc7feb..aa780adff6 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-29'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have
   not previously modified them.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime,
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index 623093bb0b..8c643b706c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-09'
 author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates
   something.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index a805a550c9..fbb48af47f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-09'
 author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or
   creates something.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index d6b662bd2c..e509bcbc4a 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-16'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs
   or creates something.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index c1574a9be7..20f142f9ab 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-16'
 author: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen
   regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates
   something.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
index 5330520d4e..0aafdb8a6d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-28'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Authentication
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
index ac6b0a8bd9..f1da78bdcd 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-07'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Authentication
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
index b88168e79b..49329e47c4 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-07'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Authentication
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
index 813670e2f3..965ab4d574 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-07'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Authentication
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index 047817dc25..d5a702a1cb 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-10'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or
   previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage
   bucket.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
index 05a2b746cc..cb8dfcf3fe 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-05'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public
   GCP Storage bucket.
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
index b72952640f..7de7edd00e 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public
   S3 bucket.
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
index 2144ea2cc2..83af071e38 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public
   S3 bucket over the aws cli.
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
index ddc1308ca9..3cf6e5e656 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-06-28'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously
   unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.
 search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index af2ca63234..63666bec2c 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2021-01-26'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts
   for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
 search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
index ad6779e610..a2cbabf3fe 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2021-01-26'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts
   for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.
 search: '`aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
index 12b6faa698..fbc6eef691 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-05-07'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections
   originating from within your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file
   that factors in the latest data.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
index 5eea45dfe0..e43dd157f8 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-11-27'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to
   deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file
   that factors in the latest data.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
index 9c1b8f633c..549076642f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure
   Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value
   of 5 as suited for your environment.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
index 8d84f2b0d7..0ce8471f56 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-02-20'
 author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This searches show information on uploaded containers including source
   user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time
   of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
index f4007f9877..068ee74a67 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list
   of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known
   to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system.
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
index 302c14c05d..6f2bafe120 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled,
   what entitiy performed the action and against what user
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." | stats
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
index 69508d2f11..7bed02ff02 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures
   occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=*
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
index 659c8fc0f3..ff9b4fdc02 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or
   exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information
   including email body content
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
index b0086b6ef7..0b68dd9f0f 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple
   mailboxes to the same destination.
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
index c8a746f7af..7c149be71d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-15'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from
   another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
index 2b0a5ffbde..11df462b65 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to
   the same destination.
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
index 22ea96c9bb..04a951ed8e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches
   an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
   translated to use the latest Change Datamodel
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index 36d93256b0..1f65472313 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches
   an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
   translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
index 05246e8a1c..3a96f41ae8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number
   of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This
   search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index 5f4d1fe8cb..da395bc609 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates
   an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been
   translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
index edc6d91c55..cd02a37e25 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   cities.  Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with
   "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
index 555c5c4b05..97a40cd24b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins
   with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
index 7e53b21702..d143b96e1c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins
   with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
index be691c57dc..ed27f7f87a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
   regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning
   activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
index c086f3711a..20ba2b6cd7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected
   to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
index c3f38d4493..5dad492a18 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-08'
 author: Peter Gael, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms
   used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker
   has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
index 0ea740245c..4946cd844b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-05-17'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logged into the
   AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication.
   Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
index aea98ef961..8fe8f9abfb 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts
   that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns
   event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
index d5cb8fbd30..5119da220a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging
   EvilGinx tools to mimic websites.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
index 3fe5d5703d..a8027e9689 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating
   the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission
   for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
index cefe58f3d0..e7185bc1ba 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-03'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping
   with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon
   Event Code.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
index 8f907ef3bd..545349814a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2019-02-27'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with
   credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.
 search: '`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
index 3078398031..6fb8d2bae1 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-04-16'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before
   or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`.
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
index 9d1b2a0d30..d3b28f5d3b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
   by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
   file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
index f694c57e23..963b8cf9df 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your
   AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest
   data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
index 7f7a363d18..5af6a6f8a9 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-05-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related
   to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated
   and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
index 4eaefe70ff..5ef191c32c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-04-18'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related
   to security groups in your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file
   that factors in the latest data.  This search is deprecated and have been translated
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
index 01a88312b2..de91cb7658 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-11-27'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change_Analysis
+datamodel:
+- Change_Analysis
 description: The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663
   for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID
   4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index 7e4f2f2753..6159f55813 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Web
+datamodel:
+- Web
 description: This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time)
   as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
index 4eedd37a75..026ff56776 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2017-09-18'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of
   the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential
   false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
index 6db07ee08f..f469b44e0f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers.
   Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and
   Identity Framework.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 7d3a2651e5..007b8365b1 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have
   not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated
   to use the latest Change Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
index 63608de724..650c4b7ded 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-02-23'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started
   in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file
   of previously seen regions where an instance was started
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
index 881591566e..f3f035632a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-03-12'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen
   AMIs.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change
   Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
index 938ad04dc8..96f2384d72 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-02-07'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen
   instance types.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest
   Change Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
index 7a6b6383da..9174162343 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not
   created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the
   latest Change Datamodel.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
index 4d8fb16510..e55b5629a0 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-11-19'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five
   spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the
   file extension by pushing it outside of the default view.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 5cfa40eac7..f6f4bd3b06 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed
   a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring.
 search: '`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
index 713d6a3023..4346379bcd 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter
   to execute a command that has not previously been seen.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
index c4448def42..7285447e7e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-02-20'
 author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search show information on uploaded containers including source
   user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination
   path.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
index bc1a865ec9..d061e8349b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment
   by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the
   past week.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
index ef0a48048e..f25d7f22f3 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 6
 date: '2021-01-19'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded
   command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the
   process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
index e1e0089036..192b397281 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-23'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains
   that you want to have monitored for abuse.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
index 1c39f5af86..4de972c878 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-19'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859,
   the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability.
 search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
index a66512c03f..67af959905 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-01-29'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack.
 search: '| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd
   OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path |
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
index 80b609a5f9..6194f8d3d8 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-11-23'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various
   commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting
   utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
index 21c560cb83..1a6704e33a 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2019-10-11'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked
   as prohibited.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
index 9de43f6de7..b2c90e57cd 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2019-02-27'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory
   using the reg add command.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
index 89e2c8c3ba..47303fd553 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-03-02'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
   as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
index 43e8a4a5ec..69fb12d968 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2018-12-03'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to operate
   on remote systems.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
index 2fde684e32..2890ec3d5d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware
   were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
index ef6d63259f..41267e544d 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-06-14'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409,
   a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug.
 search: index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
index 714c5cb7b3..5fd3eea554 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows
   file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine
   changes to this area.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
index 787647b4d6..e45332c7ac 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2019-04-25'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to
   malicious activity.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
index 0e223b562a..6008e6015c 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder
   by something other than the System process.
 search: (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
index 14b3437c32..fd10c518ef 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked
   as uncommon.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
index 4c1639f16c..605f07b9ca 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-06'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because
   too noisy.
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
index 28ee3a06bf..9ba02a3e78 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then
   failed.
 search: '`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
index 7897c13c49..b0918d7154 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: 'The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe)
   executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows
   OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
index 2ad0bc5adc..bb43cc26ce 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable.
   This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
index 486c39c918..3d6f01dce7 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-11-02'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints
   across your environment.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
index 0967d7da3f..8e56001e02 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2019-12-06'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll*
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage,
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
index ffd25b3196..6b85704d5b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 6
 date: '2020-11-03'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*certutil*
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
index a6c962b0ad..a3db88ef9d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 6
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values
   "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
index 2010563f98..aeda81bccd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the
   endpoint.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index 6290a7598e..073111e911 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2019-12-02'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export
   of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
index f72681e60c..831414fdba 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-12-14'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system
   directory tree.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
index 17ee356fc1..9677362866 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-21'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the
   built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware
   to prevent recovery.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
index 56133071a7..ff222a7ad4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used
   by Ransomware
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
index 11e73c97a2..0c5b056f77 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks for files created with names matching those typically
   used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
index a43674de22..a5ce2ba435 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using
   net.exe.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
index 128a464a6a..e6a41509ee 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using
   net.exe.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
index 47b9e1b152..f169cc8f10 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-06'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
index e58a150115..c5d3e7bf3a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil, Vssadmin, or Wmic has been used to create
   a shadow copy.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
index cc7132339a..4beda2d029 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow
   copy.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
index b4e8a94ba1..19a4843bc4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow
   copy.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
index ce9ee228aa..120f0c6a62 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
index 4e8c5b41c6..30bc424e63 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy
   Service.  Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation.  This
   search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
index d09fc8afda..059103aaf6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-10-15'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows
   Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
index a535de9336..acc30daf08 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-18'
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode
   4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
index 9a363faaff..731bfccaa9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2019-12-03'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential
   dumping.
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
index 8acf77ae34..042c679c5f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number
   of account lockouts in a short period.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
index 23240dde73..d2cc17c408 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively
   high number of times in a short period.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 0d39ba018d..1418a13549 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2021-01-20'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol
   handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when
   invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
index 1898433cad..eb067a7225 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-20'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing.
   Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This
   analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
index 6cf9a1b490..7d03e42ed7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-20'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe)
   utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to
   proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
index 41af42bf7e..0cb8e5f687 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-08'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated
   to local administrators.
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
index b2952c9def..6c2692c202 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-03'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: 'The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is
   detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for
   privilege escalation. '
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
index f18e9b8aee..4792f6e0dc 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-11-10'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network
   configuration discovery on the endpoint.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
index dfb56898c6..509d2c5873 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-11-10'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that
   is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
index 98d5dd6152..1750a7346a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-11-10'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula`
   flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you
   to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
index 0b080dea3a..e3bb2315b3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-03-16'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems
   running them, and the users who initiated each process.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
index 2f5bba037a..0bf9d3d37a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-20'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline
   protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported
   options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
index ecaa3b975a..d2323a96f4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe
   processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first
   and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
index a0efa6e435..51ba8ec145 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-11-18'
 author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the
   enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
index 142690b09e..0bae24dffb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-02-21'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
index ab663ac773..633473b006 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-11-18'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes launched from files that have double
   extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension
   and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
index d757af0a1d..1f28151793 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-12-14'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam
   ransomware attack.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
index cb435cc225..ed2f96bb2f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us
   that has not previously been seen.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
index 933fef503a..04875404b5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific
   as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file.  The
   search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
index bbc5a7289a..68e3409ef1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-10-16'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal
   name requests
 search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
index 14d1bcfd2d..1ca64442d6 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-11-20'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters to
   modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the
   Internet. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it's overriding
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
index 08ce427bed..ae5c7cde68 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes that have encoded the script
   within the command-line. Malware has been seen using this parameter, as it obfuscates
   the code and makes it relatively easy to pass a script on the command-line.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
index dd46fafd75..ce4c1b25d8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used
   to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed
   in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
index 0970143462..84b9ad0d70 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2021-01-19'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that
   have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
index 8c00d1684e..2f6f28ea94 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-11-23'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications
   to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this
   scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
index 742efeeb56..86d04768fb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-25'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line
   arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain
   trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
index 5a672f6e56..f7d474c40e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched
   with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace
   these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
index b7c5fdc258..59f617e43c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2021-01-28'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*`
   or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 5ef4307415..1de8f1b1ed 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-03-16'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for processes launched via WMI.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
index f6f41d97fb..885bcbb14d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-10'
 author: Josef Kuepker, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line
   scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify
   the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
index 104cd85e4b..19210a288e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-11-26'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows
   services and their configurations.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
index d9c6f3255e..84e1cd7d5d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-11-26'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility
   shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
index 184eca15cd..86e78d56ed 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-11-27'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used
   to launch an application or service at system startup.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
index 078361448e..54b17c7d6d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-11-27'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used
   to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are
   used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
index 5c0ad6b710..8730f187a9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-11-30'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn
   a process on a remote system.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
index 44479d6762..365530006f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-11-30'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may
   abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice
   executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
index d7466c1b3a..2b3e7386f4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any
   folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
index 2ccc77bd08..19c7c97446 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-12-14'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system
   directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
index 76ed9d07f9..1d634d0a46 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or
   modification of a Windows service.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
index d759ae4a42..6041f950c7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-12-17'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with
   the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
index 69c154b30d..445e44861c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate a job is being scheduled on a remote system.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
index fd1f4b8746..c6c443a99e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-12-07'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line
   that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
index 05c5108822..f871561958 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-03-16'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
   as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
index c92d3b42f7..942141552a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-12-08'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories.
   The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According
   to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
index 209718a88b..0ab6149713 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-11-23'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently
   create a shim database.  The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database
   files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
index 1974746428..01b6224326 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-06'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Change
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short
   time period.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
index 5771fc65d2..b9e1602470 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-12-08'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user,
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index d75be2bf48..86fc6419ed 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection indicates use of Mimikatz modules that facilitate Pass-the-Token
   attack, Golden or Silver kerberos ticket attack, and Skeleton key attack.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 00d886c605..76033240cc 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Stolen credentials are applied by methods such as user impersonation,
   credential injection, spoofing of authentication processes or getting hold of critical
   accounts. This detection indicates such activities carried out by PowerSploit exploit
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 425c10cc6f..a9fbfe364a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that verify password
   strength, i.e., identify week accounts that would be easily compromised.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
index 3251782604..0d8fc65ffd 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: 2020-6-04
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export
   of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
index 561517cd6b..10669bcbc2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 3452551d87..99d03f526a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. DSInternals
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
index 9770eb3b8a..9c8372ab3e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
index baef60bfb9..deb6c19961 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. FGdump is
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
index 9106a02d17..312e52193e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
index 81c422de0e..e2bdad87a2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. LaZagne is
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 77ee8f0bd3..e0596efb21 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Mimikatz
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
index f699d745c6..319a629ae4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
index 50df426de3..f01749197a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-18'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
index 6e6641f8f9..dd77c7a10e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material
   from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve
   decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
index 7423d70cf7..a216a7dac2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-15'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects the memory of lsass.exe being dumped for offline
   credential theft attack.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event,
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
index b5113e1907..c69e765be1 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
 author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal
   name requests
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"),
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
index 884b36a52e..5c8e01cdc4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
 author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows
   Security Event logs to detect potential attempts using Pass-the-Hash technique.
 search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"),
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
index e47a5fe238..13dbb48ce4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: 2021-2-1
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter
   to execute a command that has not previously been seen. This is an implementation
   on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 34e34e23c2..932ff82f8b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly
   access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping
   into http and RDP sessions, etc.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 53dbc1aac0..7295c87e80 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create accounts
   illegaly.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 5648763d5f..708b8caa17 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable
   accounts illegaly.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 8b506ee660..801c3a48a3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event
   logs.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index c4c7e2f564..9cae8d5559 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management
   of Active Directoty elements and policies.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 1ce01c8b13..b10f0022d7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
   management of computers and Active Directory elements.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index b454f8d158..5fca5d3491 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly
   elevate general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable manipulation of registry,
   task scheduling, persistent WMI, access to OS objects under desired identities.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index bb05e7652e..dfc7caecd4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege
   elevation.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 16cb01f101..e48c0e2dc7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control
   over services and processes, including the authentication service.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index a807811eb6..f4873171d8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-09'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal
   control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services,
   injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands,
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 7666d455d5..49aabffa48 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-04'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitate
   access probing with admin credentials as well as probing access to system services.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
index f80c64dcfe..51185fe9cb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: 2020-7-13
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that
   is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. This is
   a SPL2 implementation of the rule `Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe`
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
index 253069bd8e..cae920db5c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-13'
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applications
   not typically used by system administrators. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming
   ML DSP plugin to find rare parent/child relationships. The list of application has
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index eb30b3a24b..c9e5137bbb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover opportunities
   for malicious access and persistence. Some examples include access to admin accounts,
   weak access control policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 407061f458..3b17eac833 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
   accounts, groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index c2438624ad..2f883249b5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts
   and groups and access to them.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 9cff7f42d9..79294b6bc3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance
   and access to elements of Active Directory infrastructure, such as domain identifiers,
   AD sites and forests, and trust relations.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 60026e7e39..85e186cde5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
   computers, servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index bda6177eb0..8cd9d7b26b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers
   and servers and access to them.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 0604166ce0..943a54c3d8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
   and access operating system elements, such as processes, services, registry locations,
   security packages and files.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 0e60b19ad1..9e5d48b30b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access
   to network shares.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 7cd66cf817..585c65b3ab 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover
   and access network and distributed file system shares.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 02d8d9ffeb..fb6b7dc776 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance
   of connectivity.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 0b61c5b6d9..9acc663a70 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and use
   of CryptoAPI services by Mimikatz modules.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index 8a02f41b5d..c4c33b45d7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of
   presence of defensive tools.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index db276efaed..0bbbbd47da 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of
   privilege escalation opportunities.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index f588d390af..131c82ca42 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-05'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process
   or service hijacking opportunities via Microsoft Detours compatibility. Microsoft
   Detours is an open source library for intercepting, monitoring and instrumenting
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index c7a76525d4..f6f89efba7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access
   to services and processes.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
index 40f872a226..d59251a5a9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInternals
   modules.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
index 803e852839..7e48a5013d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimikatz
   modules.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
index f032996f9e..b06a294d1c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-03'
 author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerSploit
   modules.
 search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
index 0d56f8d6dd..7dae442017 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_unexpected_location.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-25'
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command
   without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the
   process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
index 65dbac3963..c12189596e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-25'
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications
   in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual
   LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
index 543471ae02..60b3d22433 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-06'
 author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin
   to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. This
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
index b2ef1aed8b..4252a742a7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe.
   Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
   and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
index 28d61d3d73..24cdd929a4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage.
   microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
   and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
index 2d29fea916..21360144b3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard
   path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319
   and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
index 0966bfc877..d1144fcfc8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing.
   Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and
   C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
index 9e52dff8c0..76fea9f03c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe.
   This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from
   wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
index f7b2fc4896..5a9df018d5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from  "mshta.exe".
   The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
   were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
index 1b05083c24..1b379e204f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-20'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This
   behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe
   or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
index 5c2f9a78c2..0ac5e11eae 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not
   started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually
   explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
index 67fdb5c3d5..d38a7b7e54 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches
   for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup,
   or system event logs.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
index 7a644f0ed4..6336a4a2c5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than
   explorer.exe.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
index 65349ac57d..7ccc22413b 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-12'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand
   configurations of the system to further exploit it.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
index 41de7d0b97..7d96db24b9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-12-08'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for system processes that normally run out of C:\Windows\System32\
   or C:\Windows\SysWOW64 that are not run from that location.  This can indicate a
   malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
index 612e561052..051223669f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search
   looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop
   sysmon from collecting the data.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
index f14c3a2d3e..f7d114d917 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-12-08'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
index b65af97359..458754720a 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-05-08'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious
   activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK)
   to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
index e304703539..b0a5d88e99 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2018-12-03'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform
   tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update
   sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
index 5b2044f40f..5c47434d89 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-22'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator
   Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent
   recovery.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
index cf4bc7270b..d83a5319bc 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-16'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: 'This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line
   arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions.
   It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
index 32fcf12fce..4551e47785 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-06'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for Windows events that indicate one of the Windows
   event logs has been purged.
 search: (`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (`wineventlog_system`
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
index 272c7aaea8..b0e0e01abf 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
 author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped
   via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
index 4f8be08104..bdf3982186 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-12-08'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
 search: '`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation,
   EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`'
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
index 83288a1a8c..dcb8aa1b6b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Authentication
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized
   as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that
   have not been seen before in the last 30 days.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
index 5f7014e4f9..9fc137905b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_phishing_content___ssa.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-25'
 author: Xiao Lin, Splunk
 type: streaming
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open attachment,
   click links or trigger third party service. This detect uses Natural Language Processing
   (NLP) approach to analyze an email message's content (Sender, Subject and Body)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
index 3279520ac2..b13ccb80ee 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2017-09-19'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Email
+datamodel:
+- Email
 description: Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file
   extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many
   spaces within the file names.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
index bb0038362c..e829ed6c99 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server
   to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using
   your email server.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
index c30af1e322..b90a8c2d05 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2018-01-05'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Email
+datamodel:
+- Email
 description: This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar
   to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
index 242f56fcba..260866e37a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-15'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Updates
+datamodel:
+- Updates
 description: This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event
   indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are
   typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
index b1cedc16e1..e68543b314 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-01-07'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Vulnerabilities
+datamodel:
+- Vulnerabilities
 description: The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the
   Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
index 8d99063ded..55ce9bdb67 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: UEBA
+datamodel:
+- UEBA
 description: This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their
   sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by
   Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA).
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
index c78141c273..a5ddc04ec4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Email
+datamodel:
+- Email
 description: This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file
   extensions.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
index cf31dfc9a9..20b9f4c9a4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-12-06'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to
   exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.
 search: '`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)"
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index e4190cc8ea..17fc6b562d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-04-15'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
index 15e8598bfb..7ec567a60c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-04-15'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests
   against Kubernetes' Pods API
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
index a2ec0facbe..ec33f24fd2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different
   role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
index 17363677d4..80b079210e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent
   keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls.
   Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
index 3687b0d7ac..1841b3f6e5 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation
   is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different
   than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
index e3767be52d..99799e92b2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These
   tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate
   privileges.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
index b5782424bb..a3c5eb90ee 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-27'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken.
   These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and
   escalate privileges.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
index 358053810d..417e2f1a2c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-09'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects.
   Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges
   at different projects depending on organization schema.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
index a1c0dbad31..7d112319e1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-08'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This
   framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised
   high privilege accounts.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
index 4ed52576c3..e6f2d562b9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-09'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and
   accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts
   to move laterally and escalate privileges.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
index c7fb7f77a2..78040c1056 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-01'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP
   Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access
   sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
index b1e002951e..09d4e4b55d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-17'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
index e49171ebac..87ac299a8f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-04-15'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user
   agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index 9ce356d05e..6db594f667 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
   pods by IP address, verb and decision
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts  objectRef.resource=pods
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
index 4f723b39d7..eb823b8f5b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
   accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC
   by accounts occurrences
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index 2f8ddb9a85..53741c5860 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmaps or secrets
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index 15ad781918..26deca7fd1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmpas or secrets
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 552cbac70a..36a83160fb 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
   failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or
   rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index 9be9a9eea4..ff8cba3f9e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP,
   verb namespace and object access context
 search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
index f48d2d1228..df72e536e1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-26'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
   pods and namespaces by IP address and verb
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
index daecbadc5f..be00530427 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-26'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
   accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes
   of RBAC by accounts occurrences
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index c107196f39..de93ee2c4f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmpas or secrets
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index bbb4c2e527..fe1a6e62b9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmpas or secrets
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index 5196ff3f46..c46ac27650 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
   failure or forbidden access status
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index 816d17d06c..2fa956e69c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-26'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb
   namespace and object access context
 search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
index 789f6aab81..3c337e5e26 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source
   IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod
   in Azure
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
index ee3aca11b0..287d0e96a1 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-05-19'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source
   IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in
   Azure
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
index ffa22e5fe4..acfbad5842 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-11'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by
   accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC
   by accounts occurrences
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
index 1547e991b5..df859c23a8 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-10'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing
   pods by IP address, verb and decision
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message`  data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
index 1e5916fc60..4c37d551b2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-11'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmaps or secrets
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
index f56f529ef5..aa3b1e3cac 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-11'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve
   objects such as configmpas or secrets
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
index a9d8488fa6..a05269a924 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-06-23'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with
   failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or
   rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source
diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
index 434aa486ed..7123237ecf 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-11'
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP,
   verb namespace and object access context
 search: '`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl*
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
index ba15ba0c80..21247f7933 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-03-16'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is
   associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440.
   Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index 8a9a7fd6d6..42553d4a4b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-27'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
 search: '`linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`'
 how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
index 482a5c3282..523180408b 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-29'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
 search: '`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`'
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
index 139a6d7071..bdaa20f495 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
 search: '`osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`'
 how_to_implement: OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
index b4e8c7514c..ed9e9b713a 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process
   is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
index f4a70da9ea..739c1d5904 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate
   the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused
   by attackers.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
index a7b7d63200..4e96c879de 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 4
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen
   running in your environment. This table is then cached.
 search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
index 5688d2c7f4..20dfa8b493 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-02-07'
 author: Jamie Windley, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine
   which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
index ef60bf5b43..d94c514f67 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-01-25'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard
   events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This
   is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
index f886104b2e..c00b9a83c9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Endpoint
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on
   systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out
   all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
index 362df726e5..d8cdca1bb4 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-03-16'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written
   to a particular host
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
index 39a1058908..fac0c15d6f 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-12-14'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe.
   After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of
   avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
index 1b9f4fe828..a35567f023 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-10-23'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
 search: '`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consumer>[^;|^$]+)"
   | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
index 1163296152..6ba11f0709 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-10-23'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
 search: '`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?<query>[^;|^$]+)"
   | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = ''wsmprovhost.exe''"
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
index 06fc67ecdd..0be208ae0e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-11'
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the
   organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks
   in the Infrastructure.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
index 3f5593e5d3..4815f3310d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_record_changed.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records
   lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the
   Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
index d03a705cc0..b000a4f436 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS
   responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
index 6bd14858a3..3f274315f2 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server
   to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using
   your email server.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
index 5eae7a35b1..2cd258a8fe 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-20'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure
   for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
index 5f48155296..cae48f8216 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer
   protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that
   is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
index 1f3f48b8d3..2b8ef78736 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher
   layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search
   should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
index 5decad1d46..5c54766ef7 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-11-04'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for cleartext protocols at risk of leaking credentials.
   Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet, POP3, IMAP, and non-anonymous
   FTP sessions. While some of these protocols can be used over SSL, they typically
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
index 15159d0297..3c334a6a2e 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-23'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Web
+datamodel:
+- Web
 description: This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that
   are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers.
   JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 22a0ab522c..f93c6322cc 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-02'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ,
   and Traffix SDC devices
 search: '`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`'
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
index 0930f90f6d..71bd1b6b3c 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-23'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Web
+datamodel:
+- Web
 description: This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit
   jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as
   the payload is embedded in the URL.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
index 57e84ac655..d00edff771 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-23'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Web
+datamodel:
+- Web
 description: This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one
   that you want to have monitored for abuse.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time)
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
index 3336635cb9..7007b3a0a9 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Web
+datamodel:
+- Web
 description: This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible
   within them.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where
diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
index 56c297d8f6..fc8f34a6dd 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2021-01-06'
 author: John Stoner, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Web
+datamodel:
+- Web
 description: This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST
   attack.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
index 0ee6aac84b..324507d7ff 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2021-01-14'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host
   malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate
   domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
index 785935f4fa..39240a442e 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on
   the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such
   as packet forging in the Infrastructure.
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
index f1ce107730..5d1824035c 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2018-06-01'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger
   than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command
   and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
index 06dd673e14..f501f5e6ab 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your
   network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity.
   One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
index 5d2cc4360a..7d38351e33 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to
   an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that
   are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
index faca7f14f9..c3acdc47d9 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-08-11'
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's
   network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out
   DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
index 872addfb3b..862cb13a89 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-21'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI
   field.
 search: '`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?<snicat>(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)"
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
index 2795d49284..33db59428f 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device
   operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot
   (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
index ad5e1d565a..f270c9a423 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-10-28'
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data
   exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native
   feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
index 7e8deb16ac..b71232d79f 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-09-13'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Sessions
+datamodel:
+- Network_Sessions
 description: By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv,
   we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the
   organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
index 8e90004f05..0d9fa88013 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-28'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.
 search: '`stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY)
   | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns" | append [search `stream_tcp`
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
index 46f7d0bc13..7a7e2410f9 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-07-28'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
   where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id
diff --git a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
index a960699e2c..4a09aa0491 100644
--- a/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
+++ b/detections/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2020-09-15'
 author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472
   vulnerability via Zeek RPC
 search: '`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3)
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
index b24c834649..ec6b240ebd 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-01-22'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large
   for the record type being requested in your environment.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time
diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
index 0b23c44fb3..932d7bbc4c 100644
--- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
+++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2021-01-18'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Resolution
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard
   deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the
   standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
index 88c8c819d7..b202102997 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-21'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any
   source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the
   average traffic.
diff --git a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
index e3afcb3232..4114cd1ea1 100644
--- a/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-07'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used
   by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it
   is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
index 5683922f41..313ae164cb 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB)
   traffic connections.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
diff --git a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
index 94f891d77e..9121b5469f 100644
--- a/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
+++ b/detections/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes
   in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip)
diff --git a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
index 441dc1f906..cc8a33a88f 100644
--- a/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
+++ b/detections/network/tor_traffic.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
 date: '2020-07-22'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: Network_Traffic
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router
   (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious
   purposes.
diff --git a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
index 11a0c2a5ca..a8cba96a7e 100644
--- a/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
+++ b/detections/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2017-10-13'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http
   header that the client sends the server.
 search: '`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
index d85ae0fe76..01cad47d36 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-10-08'
 author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts
   using the same email domain name.
 search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/"
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
index 1a945257d5..9a82fac2eb 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-10-08'
 author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the
   clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect
   cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven
diff --git a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
index 8ee30a4e83..e80e2f4b1f 100644
--- a/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
+++ b/detections/web/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 1
 date: '2018-10-08'
 author: Jim Apger, Splunk
 type: batch
-datamodel: ''
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.
 search: '`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost*  |
   rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data

From 70615c6a09e9dc6a929e36661fe9d6613aed8a92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:36:23 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 123/132] updated spec to include known datamodels

---
 spec/detections.spec.json | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/spec/detections.spec.json b/spec/detections.spec.json
index 94ca4be9b5..14b619fcf2 100644
--- a/spec/detections.spec.json
+++ b/spec/detections.spec.json
@@ -138,6 +138,34 @@
       },
       "type": "string"
     },
+    "datamodel": {
+      "$id": "#/properties/datamodel",
+      "default": "",
+      "description": "datamodel used in the search",
+      "examples": [
+        "Endpoint"
+      ],
+      "items": {
+        "enum": [
+          "Endpoint",
+          "Network_Traffic",
+          "Authentication",
+          "Change",
+          "Change_Analysis",
+          "Email",
+          "Endpoint",
+          "Network_Resolution",
+          "Network_Sessions",
+          "Network_Traffic",
+          "UEBA",
+          "Updates",
+          "Vulnerabilities",
+          "Web"
+        ],
+        "type": "string"
+      },
+      "type": "array"
+    },
     "version": {
       "$id": "#/properties/version",
       "default": 0,

From d6f8c42d236f3aa337d9be19b81da0b8b4128cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:25:21 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 124/132] processing baselines now with datamodels

---
 .../baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml    | 18 ++--
 ...e_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml | 18 ++--
 ...loud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml | 29 +++---
 .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml | 29 +++---
 .../baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml  | 29 +++---
 ...loud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml | 31 +++---
 ...baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml | 22 +++--
 .../baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml   | 21 ++--
 ..._aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 18 ++--
 ...ws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 18 ++--
 ...aseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml | 18 ++--
 ..._of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml | 18 ++--
 ...line_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml | 18 ++--
 baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml  | 23 +++--
 baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml     | 16 ++--
 ...ount_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml | 17 ++--
 ..._list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml | 18 ++--
 ...bited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml | 14 +--
 baselines/discover_dns_records.yml            | 21 ++--
 baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml           | 16 ++--
 ...ystems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml | 17 ++--
 ...stems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml | 19 ++--
 .../identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml | 17 ++--
 baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml      | 16 ++--
 baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml    | 16 ++--
 ..._api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml | 18 ++--
 ...iously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml | 20 ++--
 ...een_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml | 23 +++--
 ...seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml | 23 +++--
 ...seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml | 18 ++--
 baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml     | 16 ++--
 ..._cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml | 17 ++--
 ...n_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml | 17 ++--
 ...loud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml | 17 ++--
 ...cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml | 17 ++--
 ...usly_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml | 17 ++--
 ...ously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml | 15 +--
 ...n_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml | 17 ++--
 ...en_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml | 15 +--
 ...instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml | 17 ++--
 ..._instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml | 19 ++--
 ..._provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml | 17 ++--
 ...d_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml | 17 ++--
 .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml | 17 ++--
 .../previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml  | 17 ++--
 ...previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml | 19 ++--
 baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml        | 18 ++--
 .../previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml    | 20 ++--
 .../previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml  | 18 ++--
 ...viously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml | 18 ++--
 ...eviously_seen_running_windows_services.yml | 18 ++--
 ...y_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml | 18 ++--
 ...sly_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml | 18 ++--
 .../previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml   | 20 ++--
 ...ously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml | 23 +++--
 ...iously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml | 23 +++--
 ...usly_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml | 19 ++--
 ...ously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml | 19 ++--
 ...ady_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml | 18 ++--
 ...te_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml | 20 ++--
 .../windows_updates_install_failures.yml      | 14 +--
 .../windows_updates_install_successes.yml     | 14 +--
 bin/pretty_yaml.py                            | 95 +++++++++++++++----
 spec/baselines.spec.json                      | 28 ++++++
 64 files changed, 768 insertions(+), 523 deletions(-)

diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
index 5ce3b64201..c29df505a0 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Baseline of API Calls per User ARN
+id: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-09'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard
   deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number
   of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow
   the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63
-name: Baseline of API Calls per User ARN
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls)
   as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls,
   stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints,
   avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
index f90f310ffc..ecd04d8b11 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS
+id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63
+version: 1
 date: '2018-05-07'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard
   deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by
   each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the
   number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to
   allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow
-  logs.`.
-id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63
-name: Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS
 search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12
   OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ search: '`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=17
   as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints,
   avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections
   | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow
+  logs.`.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -29,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
index 73c4a543e9..f11949b56a 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,25 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User
+id: 1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-07'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the
   last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model
   created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which
   identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time
   window.
+search: '| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown
+  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
+  | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval
+  DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls)
+  as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction
+  api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm
+  show_density=true'
 how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
   need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
   installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
@@ -15,16 +29,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you wil
   90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer
   period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
   re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.
-id: 1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb
-name: Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User
-search: '| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown
-  All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
-  | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval
-  DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
-  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls)
-  as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction
-  api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm
-  show_density=true'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
@@ -36,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
index c348f25dee..b122c9c1c1 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,25 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
+id: a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-25'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search
   uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.
   The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search,
   which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small
   time window.
+search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted
+  AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time
+  span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed,
+  (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4
+  | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction
+  instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1
+  dist=expon show_density=true'
 how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
   need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
   installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
@@ -17,16 +31,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you wi
   re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
 
   More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.'
-id: a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549
-name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
-search: '| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted
-  AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time
-  span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed,
-  (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4
-  | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
-  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction
-  instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1
-  dist=expon show_density=true'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
@@ -39,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
index 6cbc1dc87b..4534c2fdf0 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,25 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched
+id: b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-14'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses
   the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The
   model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search,
   which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small
   time window.
+search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created)
+  AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time
+  span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched,
+  (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4
+  | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
+  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction
+  instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1
+  dist=expon show_density=true'
 how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
   need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
   installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
@@ -17,16 +31,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you wi
   re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
 
   More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.'
-id: b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc
-name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched
-search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created)
-  AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time
-  span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched,
-  (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4
-  | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek
-  <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction
-  instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1
-  dist=expon show_density=true'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -39,5 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
index ae94e67620..fe20e6b2dc 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,15 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User
+id: 67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-07'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default,
   the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt
   weekly.
-how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
-  need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
-  installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
-  in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the
-  MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes
-  in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past
-  90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer
-  period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
-  re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.
-id: 67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a
-name: Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User
 search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall
   All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
   | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval
@@ -24,6 +19,16 @@ search: '| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where
   isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls
   by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm
   show_density=true'
+how_to_implement: You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will
+  need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is
+  installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users
+  in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the
+  MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes
+  in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past
+  90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer
+  period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
+  re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
@@ -35,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
index 961ed75064..929bf94c16 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK
+id: d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459
+version: 1
 date: '2019-05-08'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment.
   By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model
   created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which
   identifies outliers in the length of the command line.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time
+  max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search
+  user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`|
+  eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint
   data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version
   >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number
@@ -15,13 +25,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoin
   a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to
   periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More
   information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-id: d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459
-name: Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time
-  max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest
-  Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search
-  user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`|
-  eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
@@ -36,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
index adbbc19159..5862243550 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK
+id: c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba
+version: 1
 date: '2019-05-08'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed
   in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build
   the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection
   search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
+  by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
+  | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type
+  into dns_query_pdfmodel'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that
   DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, you must
   have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any
@@ -13,12 +23,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure
   period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically
   re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on
   the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-id: c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba
-name: Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution
-  by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`
-  | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type
-  into dns_query_pdfmodel'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Command and Control
@@ -30,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
index b2d96fe4ee..89b19ba4ec 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,18 @@
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
+id: fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba
+version: 1
 date: '2019-11-14'
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses
   the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is
   then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers
   in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter`
+  | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user |
+  fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1'
 how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.\
@@ -19,11 +27,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
   search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
 
   More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.'
-id: fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba
-name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter`
-  | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user |
-  fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -34,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
index 940c3de45e..2ae61114e3 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
+id: b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab
+version: 1
 date: '2019-11-14'
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search
   uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search
   is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent
   outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time
   window.
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter`
+  | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user
+  | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1'
 how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.\
@@ -20,11 +28,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
   search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
 
   More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.'
-id: b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab
-name: Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter`
-  | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user
-  | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
@@ -34,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
index 69bce5deb3..40fdcb8dc9 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN
+id: fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63
+version: 1
 date: '2018-05-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard
   deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each
   user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then
   outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
-id: fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63
-name: Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN
 search: '`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls)
   as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls,
   stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints,
   avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats
   count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Network ACL Activity
@@ -24,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
index 05dc63dfd7..23c168289d 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN
+id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63eq3783fd63
+version: 1
 date: '2018-07-17'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard
   deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user.
   Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted
   to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63eq3783fd63
-name: Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls)
   as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls,
   stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints,
   avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
@@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
index a291a1318c..78c5e7356a 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN
+id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-17'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard
   deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user.
   Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted
   to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
-id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63
-name: Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN
 search: '`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn
   | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls)
   as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls,
   stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints,
   avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats
   count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -24,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
index 05e8af01ee..bf066b6b19 100644
--- a/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
+++ b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,22 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK
+id: df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9
+version: 1
 date: '2019-05-08'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model
   to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of
   week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The
   model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search
   to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the
   week.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
+  where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb
+  by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval
+  DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction
+  count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic
   data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version
   >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results,
@@ -19,13 +30,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Netwo
   which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this
   search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm
   used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-id: df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9
-name: Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
-  where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb
-  by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval
-  DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction
-  count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -41,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
index 145f272e1a..ceabf9c8ca 100644
--- a/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
+++ b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,20 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Count of assets by category
+id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-13'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that
   belong to those categories.
+search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host)
+  by category | sort -count'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must first leverage the
   Assets and Identity framework in Enterprise Security to populate your assets_by_str.csv
   file which should then be mapped to the Identity_Management data model. The Identity_Management
   data model will contain a list of known authorized company assets. Ensure that all
   inventoried systems are constantly vetted and updated.
-id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9
-name: Count of assets by category
-search: '| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host)
-  by category | sort -count'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Asset Tracking
@@ -20,5 +24,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml b/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml
index df6840a21d..0a8511f52f 100644
--- a/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml
+++ b/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports
+id: 9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-13'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each
   destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network
-  traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.
-id: 9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f
-name: Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts
   from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | sort - count'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network
+  traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.
+references: []
 tags:
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
index fa531856a5..c7d9285e4a 100644
--- a/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
+++ b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Create a list of approved AWS service accounts
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b1-5f6f-63ga3789fd43
+version: 2
 date: '2018-12-03'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the
   last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values
   of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file.
+search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT
+  [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity
+  | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count'
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Please validate the service account entires in `aws_service_accounts.csv`,
   which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. Please
   remove the entries of service accounts that are not legitimate.
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b1-5f6f-63ga3789fd43
-name: Create a list of approved AWS service accounts
-search: '`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT
-  [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity
-  | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -22,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
index c2bffe3968..e24ce8914c 100644
--- a/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
+++ b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security
+id: 251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-15'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters
   out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes
   identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.
-how_to_implement: This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.
-id: 251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce
-name: Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security
 search: '| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T
   prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false
   is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes
   | stats count'
+how_to_implement: This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
@@ -21,5 +25,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
index 4cdcf408e3..80821f7d93 100644
--- a/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
+++ b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Discover DNS records
+id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3
+version: 1
 date: '2019-02-14'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Network_Resolution
 description: The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured
   under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv`
   finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution
   ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS
-  logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the
-  cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated
-  with the domains owned by your corporation
-id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3
-name: Discover DNS records
 search: '| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv
   | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain,
   "\*", "")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type)
@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ search: '| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T ci
   where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?<domain>\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv
   delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer
   | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS
+  logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the
+  cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated
+  with the domains owned by your corporation
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DNS Hijacking
@@ -27,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
index fcfe8d6ed2..9b2212d511 100644
--- a/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
+++ b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: DNSTwist Domain Names
+id: 19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f
+version: 2
 date: '2018-10-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the
   valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked
   for in the associated detection searches.
+search: '| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true"
+  | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to update the file
   called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`
   and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\_SA\_CIM**.
-id: 19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f
-name: DNSTwist Domain Names
-search: '| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true"
-  | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Brand Monitoring
@@ -22,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
index 076fb32988..6e90a11fc0 100644
--- a/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
+++ b/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic
+id: 5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-15'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote
   desktop traffic.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic
-  and populate the Network_Traffic data model.
-id: 5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a
-name: Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
   where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | sort - count'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic
+  and populate the Network_Traffic data model.
+references: []
 tags:
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
index 22992acd1b..91daa4eb10 100644
--- a/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
+++ b/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic
+id: baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-15'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Network_Traffic
 description: This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote
   desktop traffic
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic
-  and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote
-  desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.
-id: baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608
-name: Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
   where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
   | sort - count'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic
+  and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote
+  desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.
+references: []
 tags:
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml
index 15d1e1dfb2..f1ba95bb24 100644
--- a/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml
+++ b/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop
+id: 063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8
+version: 1
 date: '2019-04-01'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe,
   has run on each system.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint
-  data that records process activity.
-id: 063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8
-name: Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name="*mstsc.exe*" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint
+  data that records process activity.
+references: []
 tags:
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
index b22b82c3a8..d9a0ebaecc 100644
--- a/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
+++ b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Monitor Successful Backups
+id: b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups
   are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you
   to determine when you should investigate.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
-  backup logs.
-id: b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e
-name: Monitor Successful Backups
 search: '`netbackup` "Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | bucket _time
   span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time,
   MESSAGE'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
+  backup logs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
@@ -19,5 +23,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
index a41169e6bd..0ea3dcac07 100644
--- a/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
+++ b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml
@@ -1,14 +1,18 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
+id: b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures
   happen in your environments.  Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine
   when you should investigate.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
-  backup logs.
-id: b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56
-name: Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
 search: '`netbackup` "An error occurred, failed to backup." | bucket _time span=1d
   | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your
+  backup logs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Monitor Backup Solution
@@ -18,5 +22,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
index 0b7b0829ea..6e2fed12ec 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail
+id: fc0edc95-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63da3289fd03
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-16'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles,
   then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this
   user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user
   role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support
   search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role.
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
+  | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName
+  | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count'
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`,
   which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-id: fc0edc95-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63da3289fd03
-name: Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
-  | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName
-  | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS User Monitoring
@@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
index b75490ccfa..7c067846c4 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity
+id: 1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2
+version: 1
 date: '2018-06-04'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account
   differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup
   file.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`,
-  a lookup file created by this support search.
-id: 1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2
-name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId
   | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=*
   | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime
   latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup
   previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`,
+  a lookup file created by this support search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cross Account Activity
@@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
index 6183e22c3d..82c4ee7c50 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial
+id: 82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-15'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account
   differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup
   file.
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
-  5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
-  in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this
-  support search.
-id: 82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf
-name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user
   Authentication.src Authentication.user_role |  `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
@@ -17,6 +16,12 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId
   | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup
   previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
+  in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this
+  support search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -28,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
index f25b7b22a0..af68491886 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update
+id: dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-15'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account
   differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup
   file.
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
-  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
-  in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this
-  support search.
-id: dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3
-name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user
   Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
@@ -18,6 +17,12 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from da
   | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime)
   as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId
   | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
+  in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this
+  support search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -29,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
index ebd29dc6dd..60d6b7aa8a 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,21 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources
+id: ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every
   IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning
   activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee
-name: Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources
 search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
   | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress,
   City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv
   | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
@@ -24,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
index 4ede3e699e..1df505e38b 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,20 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen AWS Regions
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63
+version: 1
 date: '2018-01-08'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started
   and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest)
   we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last
   30 days
+search: '`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time)
+  as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count'
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
   inputs.
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63
-name: Previously Seen AWS Regions
-search: '`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time)
-  as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -21,5 +25,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
index fc6fca22c4..f853de53bf 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial
+id: 69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-03'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every
   user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs
   or creates something. This table is then cached.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider.
-id: 69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4
-name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success
   by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen,
   enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
@@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
index efc0b3a82c..00fca81f4d 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update
+id: c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-03'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every
   user role and command combination.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider.
-id: c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e
-name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success
   by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
@@ -15,6 +17,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen,
   enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud User Activities
@@ -26,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
index d56d63eca4..e309c2e0df 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,20 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial
+id: dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-15'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched
   a cloud compute instance.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-  and have the proper TAs installed.
-id: dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance
   by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user
   | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+  and have the proper TAs installed.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -21,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
index 132de6a3bd..334686f861 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update
+id: 6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-15'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched
   a cloud compute instance.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-  and have the proper TAs installed.
-id: 6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance
   by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t
@@ -13,6 +15,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(),
   "-90d@d") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data
   = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+  and have the proper TAs installed.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
index f58c2ffe08..af3ac8e571 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml
@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial
+id: 7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud
   compute instances
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-  and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated
-id: 7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created  by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")`
   | where image_id != "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
   | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0)
   | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+  and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -23,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
index a2d6216129..dd1c48d763 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update
+id: 6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud
   compute instances
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-id: 6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")`
@@ -13,6 +16,8 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`)
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
index 96857b1b6b..93dd8ad01e 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,21 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial
+id: 3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be
+version: 1
 date: 2020-9-03
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance
   types
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-  and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-id: 3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type !=
   "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data
   = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+  and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -22,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
index 02906d8c5d..d8d5642f1c 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update
+id: 7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c
+version: 1
 date: 2020-9-03
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance
   types
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-id: 7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type !=
@@ -13,6 +16,8 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`)
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
index feee4361a8..7dd2f703ef 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml
@@ -1,16 +1,21 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial
+id: f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-29'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified
   a cloud instance.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-  and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.
-id: f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2
   All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+  and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
@@ -22,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
index 46a125102c..c1b8b7fea0 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update
+id: 534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-29'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications
   that have been made by a user
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-id: 534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2
   All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
@@ -15,6 +16,10 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`)
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
@@ -26,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
index ea9d9ccb72..452b894a83 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial
+id: 4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-19'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every
   IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning
   activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This
   table is then cached.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider.
-id: 4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created)
   All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
@@ -15,6 +17,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0)
   | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup
   previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
@@ -29,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
index 5162d6d558..b7d5627ac8 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update
+id: 9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-20'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along
   with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity
   within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs
   or creates something.  It then updates this information with historical data and
   filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window.
   This updated table is then cached.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
-  provider.
-id: 9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created)
   All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
@@ -20,6 +22,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen,
   lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud
+  provider.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
@@ -34,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
index 0e6ed4a25d..c4d47d8c07 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial
+id: b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-02'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is
   started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time
   `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the
   last 30 days
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-  and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-id: b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime
   | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0)
   | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+  and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
index a3290c216e..d7e15257bd 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update
+id: 512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-02'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Change
 description: This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is
   started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time
   `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the
   last 30 days
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-  and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-id: 512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4
-name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen
   from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions
@@ -16,6 +18,9 @@ search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSee
   | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime
   <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions
   | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
+  and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cloud Cryptomining
@@ -27,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
index 78dde9150b..bc4759a0de 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Previously seen command line arguments
+id: 56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3
+version: 2
 date: '2019-03-01'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used
   to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we
   have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
+  AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting
   logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete
   process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the
   Endpoint data model.
-id: 56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3
-name: Previously seen command line arguments
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
-  AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - DHS Report TA18-074A
@@ -31,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
index d645861c24..5617881387 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen EC2 AMIs
+id: bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2
   instances
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9
-name: Previously Seen EC2 AMIs
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId
   as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID
   | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -19,5 +23,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
index f99d1be6dd..f7d824b7bc 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-date: '2018-03-08'
-description: This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45
 name: Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types
+id: b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45
+version: 1
+date: '2018-03-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
+description: This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType
   as instanceType | fillnull value="m1.small" instanceType | stats earliest(_time)
   as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv
   | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -19,5 +23,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
index d7662e0c7f..ac11dca07c 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User
+id: 6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-15'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched
   a EC2 instance.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs.
-id: 6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad
-name: Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn
   as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup
   previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Cryptomining
@@ -20,5 +24,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
index 17f13510bd..ab0ee91c62 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User
+id: 4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-05'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched
   a EC2 instance.
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-id: 4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb
-name: Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User
 search: '`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn
   userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime
   by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
@@ -19,5 +23,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
index 3f94137dbe..bc6496cf54 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
+id: 64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394
+version: 3
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This collects the services that have been started across your entire
   enterprise.
-how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
-  you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully.
-  Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-id: 64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394
-name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
 search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+)
   service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time)
   as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
+how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
+  you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully.
+  Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
@@ -23,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
index afd14e91cc..9fada7ff36 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update
+id: 2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c
+version: 3
 date: '2020-06-23'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen
   across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with
   historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within
   the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
-how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
-  you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully.
-  Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-id: 2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c
-name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update
 search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+)
   service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time)
   as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
   append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen
   by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`")
   | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
+how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
+  you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully.
+  Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Orangeworm Attack Group
@@ -28,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
index 0c37e633b7..e233c7e139 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP
+id: fc0edc15-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63qa1281fd03
+version: 1
 date: '2018-06-28'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP
   addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered
   this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking
   for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200"
+search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  | stats  earliest(_time) as earliest
+  latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip
+  | stats count'
 how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
   and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs
   inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`,
   which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-id: fc0edc15-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63qa1281fd03
-name: Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP
-search: '`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  | stats  earliest(_time) as earliest
-  latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip
-  | stats count'
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
@@ -22,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
index acd83237a8..64061c014f 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+name: Previously seen users in CloudTrail
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-30'
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
   then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
   we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30
   days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the
   Authentication Datamodel
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`,
-  which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03
-name: Previously seen users in CloudTrail
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation
   src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) |
   stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region
   Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`,
+  which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -27,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
index f9b45f2ebb..7eec7f5fc1 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,26 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial
+id: 0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-28'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
   then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
   we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last
   30 days.
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
-  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
-  in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this
-  support search.
-id: 0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5
-name: Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
   | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src
   as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins
   | stats count'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
+  in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this
+  support search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -30,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
index abb22e831f..a8b2d902c0 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml
@@ -1,21 +1,26 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update
+id: 66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-28'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Authentication
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
   then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
   we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
-how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
-  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
-  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
-  in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this
-  support search.
-id: 66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322
-name: Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update
 search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
   where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
   | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src
   as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t
   previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime)
   as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins'
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version
+  5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates
+  to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries
+  in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this
+  support search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -30,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
index 17810d14f2..18f30dcfe6 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial
+id: 60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint
   with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then
   cached.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node.
-id: 60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b
-name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time)
   as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe
   OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest|
   `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen
   | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
@@ -24,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
index 5acc0a72ca..b24f5b9a95 100644
--- a/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
+++ b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update
+id: 80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint
   with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour.
   It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name
   and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This
   updated table is outputed to disk.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node.
-id: 80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee
-name: Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time)
   as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe
   OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest|
@@ -18,6 +19,10 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen m
   as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where
   lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`")
   | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
@@ -29,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
index 47f5ab4190..d2fb1acb11 100644
--- a/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
+++ b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch
+id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61
+version: 1
 date: '2018-01-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows
   not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the
   AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this
   key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.
-how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line
-  from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
-  of the Sysmon TA.
-id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61
-name: Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry
   AND (All_Changes.object_path="HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\QualityCompat*")
   by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object,
   All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`'
+how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line
+  from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4
+  of the Sysmon TA.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
@@ -24,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
index 8fe19e31b9..ff05c11dae 100644
--- a/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
+++ b/baselines/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,26 @@
-author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+name: Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
+id: 06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-30'
+author: Jason Brewer, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
   then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
   we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour.
   NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication
   Datamodel
-how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
-  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
-  inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`,
-  which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-id: 06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031
-name: Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation
   src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) |
   stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region
   Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail |
   stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region
   Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail'
+how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail
+  inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`,
+  which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -29,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml b/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml
index 8e439ff3ad..8eae1f6a7e 100644
--- a/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml
+++ b/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Windows Updates Install Failures
+id: 6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-14'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates
   fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you
   to determine when you should be concerned.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs
-id: 6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7
-name: Windows Updates Install Failures
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM
   datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" AND Updates.status=failure
   by _time span=1d'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs
+references: []
 tags:
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml b/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml
index 44f338641b..e9ec9b9ae9 100644
--- a/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml
+++ b/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml
@@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Windows Updates Install Successes
+id: 6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-14'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows
   updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow
   you to determine when you should be concerned.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs
-id: 6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d
-name: Windows Updates Install Successes
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM
   datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" AND Updates.status=installed
   by _time span=1d'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs
+references: []
 tags:
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
index d272cb5a4d..158d34a91f 100755
--- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py
+++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ import argparse
 import yaml
 import re
 
+def parse_data_models_from_search(search):
+    match = re.search(r'from\sdatamodel\s?=\s?([^\s.]*)', search)
+    if match is not None:
+        return match.group(1)
+    return False
 
-def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
-
-
-    #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"):
-
+def pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
     manifest_files = []
     types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "deprecated", "experimental", "network", "web"]
-    if content_part == 'detections':
-        for t in types:
-            for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/' + t):
-                for file in files:
-                    if file.endswith(".yml"):
-                        manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
-    
+    for t in types:
+        for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/' + t):
+            for file in files:
+                if file.endswith(".yml"):
+                    manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
+
     for manifest_file in manifest_files:
         pretty_yaml = dict()
         if VERBOSE:
@@ -57,7 +57,63 @@ def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
 
         with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
             documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
-    return len(manifest_files) 
+
+    return manifest_files
+
+def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
+    manifest_files = []
+    for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'):
+        for file in files:
+            if file.endswith(".yml"):
+                manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
+
+    for manifest_file in manifest_files:
+        pretty_yaml = dict()
+        if VERBOSE:
+            print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file))
+
+        with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream:
+            try:
+                object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0]
+            except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
+                print(exc)
+                print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file))
+                error = True
+                continue
+
+        pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name']
+        pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id']
+        pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version']
+        pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date']
+        pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author']
+        pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type']
+        pretty_yaml['datamodel'] = object['datamodel']
+        pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description']
+        pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search']
+        if 'how_to_implement' in object:
+            pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement']
+        else:
+            pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = ''
+        if 'references' in object:
+            pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
+        else:
+            pretty_yaml['references'] = []
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+
+        with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
+            documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
+
+    return manifest_files
+
+def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
+    #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"):
+    manifest_files = []
+    if content_part == 'detections':
+        manifest_files = pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part)
+    elif content_part == 'baselines':
+        manifest_files = pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part)
+
+    return len(manifest_files)
 
 def main(args):
 
@@ -66,18 +122,23 @@ def main(args):
 
     parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo")
     parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output")
-    
+
     # parse them
     args = parser.parse_args()
     REPO_PATH = args.path
     VERBOSE = args.verbose
-
+    output = []
     pretty_yaml_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','baselines','response_tasks','responses','deployments']
     for pretty_yaml_object in pretty_yaml_objects:
         touch_count = pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object)
         if VERBOSE:
-            print("completed, we made {0} {1} pretty".format(touch_count, pretty_yaml_object))
+            output.append("made {0} {1} pretty".format(touch_count, pretty_yaml_object))
+
+    for o in output:
+        print(o)
+
+    print("finished successfully!")
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     main(sys.argv[1:])
-
diff --git a/spec/baselines.spec.json b/spec/baselines.spec.json
index e8f22a3df7..d072456c6b 100644
--- a/spec/baselines.spec.json
+++ b/spec/baselines.spec.json
@@ -82,6 +82,34 @@
       "type": "object",
       "uniqueItems": true
     },
+    "datamodel": {
+      "$id": "#/properties/datamodel",
+      "default": "",
+      "description": "datamodel used in the search",
+      "examples": [
+        "Endpoint"
+      ],
+      "items": {
+        "enum": [
+          "Endpoint",
+          "Network_Traffic",
+          "Authentication",
+          "Change",
+          "Change_Analysis",
+          "Email",
+          "Endpoint",
+          "Network_Resolution",
+          "Network_Sessions",
+          "Network_Traffic",
+          "UEBA",
+          "Updates",
+          "Vulnerabilities",
+          "Web"
+        ],
+        "type": "string"
+      },
+      "type": "array"
+    },
     "version": {
       "$id": "#/properties/version",
       "default": 0,

From c0ece8d9c0806a426952ca748c617410b0e054a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:30:54 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 125/132] added deployments for pretty printing

---
 bin/pretty_yaml.py                            | 83 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...rise_security_deployment_configuration.yml | 11 +--
 deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml       | 18 ++--
 deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml      | 20 ++---
 deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml   |  4 +-
 ..._access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml |  6 +-
 .../16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml  |  6 +-
 .../20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml      |  7 +-
 .../21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml       |  7 +-
 .../30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml     |  5 +-
 .../31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml        |  7 +-
 11 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
index 158d34a91f..7c274a4bb6 100755
--- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py
+++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
@@ -105,6 +105,87 @@ def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
 
     return manifest_files
 
+def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
+    manifest_files = []
+    for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'):
+        for file in files:
+            if file.endswith(".yml"):
+                manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
+
+    for manifest_file in manifest_files:
+        pretty_yaml = dict()
+        if VERBOSE:
+            print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file))
+
+        with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream:
+            try:
+                object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0]
+            except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
+                print(exc)
+                print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file))
+                error = True
+                continue
+
+        pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name']
+        pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id']
+        pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version']
+        pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date']
+        pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author']
+        pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type']
+        pretty_yaml['datamodel'] = object['datamodel']
+        pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description']
+        pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search']
+        if 'how_to_implement' in object:
+            pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement']
+        else:
+            pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = ''
+        if 'references' in object:
+            pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
+        else:
+            pretty_yaml['references'] = []
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+
+        with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
+            documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
+
+    return manifest_files
+
+def pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
+    manifest_files = []
+    for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'):
+        for file in files:
+            if file.endswith(".yml"):
+                manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
+
+    for manifest_file in manifest_files:
+        pretty_yaml = dict()
+        if VERBOSE:
+            print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file))
+
+        with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream:
+            try:
+                object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0]
+            except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
+                print(exc)
+                print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file))
+                error = True
+                continue
+
+        pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name']
+        pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id']
+        pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date']
+        pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author']
+        pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description']
+        pretty_yaml['scheduling'] = object['scheduling']
+        if 'alert_action' in object:
+            pretty_yaml['alert_action'] = object['alert_action']
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+
+        with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
+            documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
+
+    return manifest_files
+
 def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
     #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"):
     manifest_files = []
@@ -112,6 +193,8 @@ def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
         manifest_files = pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part)
     elif content_part == 'baselines':
         manifest_files = pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part)
+    elif content_part == 'deployments':
+        manifest_files = pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part)
 
     return len(manifest_files)
 
diff --git a/deployments/10_enterprise_security_deployment_configuration.yml b/deployments/10_enterprise_security_deployment_configuration.yml
index 69abc643fa..e61026ba57 100644
--- a/deployments/10_enterprise_security_deployment_configuration.yml
+++ b/deployments/10_enterprise_security_deployment_configuration.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 name: Enterprise Security deployment configuration
 id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46f212
 date: '2020-04-27'
-description: This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are used for detection
 author: Bhavin Patel
+description: This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are
+  used for detection
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '0 * * * *'
+  cron_schedule: 0 * * * *
   earliest_time: -70m@m
   latest_time: -10m@m
   schedule_window: auto
@@ -13,8 +14,8 @@ alert_action:
     rule_description: '%description%'
     rule_title: '%name%'
     nes_fields:
-      - user
-      - dest
-      - src
+    - user
+    - dest
+    - src
 tags:
   analytics_story: all
diff --git a/deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml
index 669772a8e8..a0e0b55c3a 100644
--- a/deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml
+++ b/deployments/11_detect_arp_poisoning.yml
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 name: Detect ARP Poisoning deployment configuration
 id: e1d5b4dc-4cf3-404f-905c-b478bbb20474
 date: '2020-08-14'
-description: This configuration file applies to the Detect ARP Poisoning detection
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland
+description: This configuration file applies to the Detect ARP Poisoning detection
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '59 * * * *'
+  cron_schedule: 59 * * * *
   earliest_time: -70m@m
   latest_time: -10m@m
   schedule_window: auto
 alert_action:
   notable:
-    rule_description: 'ARP Poisoning has been detected on interface $src_interface$ on host $orig_host$.
-      This may be an indication of a MITM attack.'
-    rule_title: 'ARP Poisoning Detected on $orig_host$'
+    rule_description: ARP Poisoning has been detected on interface $src_interface$
+      on host $orig_host$. This may be an indication of a MITM attack.
+    rule_title: ARP Poisoning Detected on $orig_host$
     nes_fields:
-      - src_interface
-      - firstTime
-      - lastTime
-      - count
+    - src_interface
+    - firstTime
+    - lastTime
+    - count
 tags:
   detection_name: Detect ARP Poisoning
diff --git a/deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml b/deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml
index a01cdc431d..c1d0771fec 100644
--- a/deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml
+++ b/deployments/12_detect_dhcp_poisoning.yml
@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
 name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server deployment configuration
 id: 6e4e20ac-e719-4ebe-a52d-d672cd451dbb
 date: '2020-08-14'
-description: This configuration file applies to the Detect Rogue DHCP Server detection
 author: Mikael Bjerkeland
+description: This configuration file applies to the Detect Rogue DHCP Server detection
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '59 * * * *'
+  cron_schedule: 59 * * * *
   earliest_time: -70m@m
   latest_time: -10m@m
   schedule_window: auto
 alert_action:
   notable:
-    rule_description: 'DHCP Snooping has detected a Rogue DHCP Server on $orig_host$ from $src_mac$.
-      This may be an indication of a MITM attack.'
-    rule_title: 'Rogue DHCP Server Detected on $orig_host$'
+    rule_description: DHCP Snooping has detected a Rogue DHCP Server on $orig_host$
+      from $src_mac$. This may be an indication of a MITM attack.
+    rule_title: Rogue DHCP Server Detected on $orig_host$
     nes_fields:
-      - src_mac
-      - firstTime
-      - lastTime
-      - count
-      - message_type
+    - src_mac
+    - firstTime
+    - lastTime
+    - count
+    - message_type
 tags:
   detection_name: Detect Rogue DHCP Server
diff --git a/deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml b/deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml
index 1e11c21ec5..5fa4d76e28 100644
--- a/deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml
+++ b/deployments/14_credential_dumping_story.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 name: Credential Dumping Story
 id: 52f52a7c-078f-4413-84da-388b61ccac26
 date: '2021-01-13'
-description: Example for a deployment for a specific Analytics Story
 author: Patrick Bareiss
+description: Example for a deployment for a specific Analytics Story
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '0 * * * *'
+  cron_schedule: 0 * * * *
   earliest_time: -40m@m
   latest_time: -10m@m
   schedule_window: auto
diff --git a/deployments/15_detection_access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/deployments/15_detection_access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
index 33c04ec26d..166bd03f81 100644
--- a/deployments/15_detection_access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
+++ b/deployments/15_detection_access_LSASS_memory_for_dump_creation.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation Deployment
 id: 974c422f-db3f-4538-8f2a-ee5bf8eec0fa
 date: '2021-01-13'
-description: Example for a deployment for a specific Detection
 author: Patrick Bareiss
+description: Example for a deployment for a specific Detection
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '0 * * * *'
+  cron_schedule: 0 * * * *
   earliest_time: -30m@m
   latest_time: now
   schedule_window: auto
@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ alert_action:
     rule_description: '%description%'
     rule_title: '%name% Notable'
     nes_fields:
-      - dest
+    - dest
 tags:
   detection_name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation
diff --git a/deployments/16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml b/deployments/16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml
index 12f5d6b71f..0956e70bd7 100644
--- a/deployments/16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml
+++ b/deployments/16_splunk_security_analytics_for_aws.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 name: Enterprise Security config for Splunk Security Analytics for AWS customers
 id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46f211
 date: '2021-01-20'
-description: This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are used in the Splunk Security Analytics for AWS product. NOTE - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS searches do not need notable  configurations 
 author: Bhavin Patel
+description: This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are
+  used in the Splunk Security Analytics for AWS product. NOTE - Splunk Security Analytics
+  for AWS searches do not need notable  configurations
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '0 * * * *'
+  cron_schedule: 0 * * * *
   earliest_time: -70m@m
   latest_time: -10m@m
   schedule_window: auto
diff --git a/deployments/20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml b/deployments/20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml
index fdeaf254f2..54c51d4bc8 100644
--- a/deployments/20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml
+++ b/deployments/20_baseline_cache_hourly_updates.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
 name: Baseline Cache Hourly Updates
 id: 1030c701-2acf-4b1a-9970-46c7145caf2d
 date: '2020-06-24'
-description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Hourly Cache Updates
 author: Bhavin Patel
+description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments
+  Hourly Cache Updates
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '55 * * * *'
+  cron_schedule: 55 * * * *
   earliest_time: -70m@m
   latest_time: -10m@m
   schedule_window: auto
 tags:
   deployments:
-    - Hourly Cache Updates
+  - Hourly Cache Updates
diff --git a/deployments/21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml b/deployments/21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml
index 755c430ee2..e5ff4a68ee 100644
--- a/deployments/21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml
+++ b/deployments/21_baseline_cache_daily_updates.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
 name: Baseline Cache Daily Updates
 id: 9541d6f8-fa58-4d48-bb44-6720e39b7b0d
 date: '2020-08-18'
-description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Daily Cache Updates
 author: David Dorsey
+description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments
+  Daily Cache Updates
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '10 0 * * *'
+  cron_schedule: 10 0 * * *
   earliest_time: -1450m@m
   latest_time: -10m@m
   schedule_window: auto
 tags:
   deployments:
-    - Daily Cache Updates
+  - Daily Cache Updates
diff --git a/deployments/30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml b/deployments/30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml
index ff2abce7bc..3991fd8909 100644
--- a/deployments/30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml
+++ b/deployments/30_long_running_baseline_searches.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 name: 90 Day Baseline Searches
 id: 6eac9f8b-a35d-4b64-b57f-e5ecde43be6b
 date: '2020-06-24'
-description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Long Running Baseline
 author: Bhavin Patel
+description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments
+  Long Running Baseline
 scheduling:
   cron_schedule: 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 *
   earliest_time: -90d@d
@@ -10,4 +11,4 @@ scheduling:
   schedule_window: auto
 tags:
   deployments:
-    - 90 Day Baseline
+  - 90 Day Baseline
diff --git a/deployments/31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml b/deployments/31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml
index 9b1f444dfb..cc3d7b76bc 100644
--- a/deployments/31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml
+++ b/deployments/31_weeky_model_rebuild_90_days.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
 name: Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
 id: 4b329568-bcff-49fa-8c85-92e95f0f270d
 date: '2020-09-07'
-description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
 author: David Dorsey
+description: This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments
+  Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
 scheduling:
-  cron_schedule: '0 2 * * 0'
+  cron_schedule: 0 2 * * 0
   earliest_time: -90d@d
   latest_time: -1d@d
   schedule_window: auto
 tags:
   deployments:
-    - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback
+  - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback

From 1e812855fe6b91964f85f9fc76ff06cb5091ecc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:52:31 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 126/132] added stories

---
 bin/pretty_yaml.py                            | 43 ++++++++++++++++++-
 stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml       | 10 ++---
 stories/asset_tracking.yml                    | 10 ++---
 stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml        | 10 ++---
 stories/aws_cryptomining.yml                  | 10 ++---
 stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml          | 10 ++---
 stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml           | 10 ++---
 ...aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml               | 10 ++---
 stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml       | 10 ++---
 stories/brand_monitoring.yml                  | 10 ++---
 stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml                | 10 ++---
 stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml                | 10 ++---
 stories/collection_and_staging.yml            | 10 ++---
 stories/command_and_control.yml               | 10 ++---
 stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml        | 10 ++---
 ...lantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/credential_dumping.yml                | 10 ++---
 stories/data_exfiltration.yml                 | 12 +++---
 stories/data_protection.yml                   | 10 ++---
 stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml           | 10 ++---
 stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml              | 10 ++---
 stories/disabling_security_tools.yml          | 10 ++---
 stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml         | 10 ++---
 stories/dns_hijacking.yml                     | 10 ++---
 stories/dynamic_dns.yml                       | 10 ++---
 .../emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml         | 10 ++---
 stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml        | 10 ++---
 stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml              | 10 ++---
 stories/host_redirection.yml                  | 10 ++---
 stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml               | 10 ++---
 stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml      | 10 ++---
 ...netes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml | 10 ++---
 .../kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml    | 10 ++---
 stories/lateral_movement.yml                  | 10 ++---
 stories/malicious_powershell.yml              | 10 ++---
 stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml           | 10 ++---
 stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/monitor_for_updates.yml               | 10 ++---
 stories/netsh_abuse.yml                       | 10 ++---
 stories/office_365_detections.yml             | 12 +++---
 stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml           | 10 ++---
 stories/phishing_payloads.yml                 | 10 ++---
 ...iated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml | 10 ++---
 ...d_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/ransomware.yml                        | 10 ++---
 stories/ransomware_cloud.yml                  | 10 ++---
 stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml                   | 10 ++---
 stories/ransomware_samsam.yml                 | 10 ++---
 .../router_and_infrastructure_security.yml    | 10 ++---
 .../spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml  | 10 ++---
 stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml   | 10 ++---
 ...nterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/sql_injection.yml                     | 10 ++---
 stories/sunburst_malware.yml                  | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml     | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml   | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml      | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml            | 10 ++---
 ...icious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml | 10 ++---
 .../suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml  | 10 ++---
 ...spicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml  | 10 ++---
 .../suspicious_command_line_executions.yml    | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml            | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_emails.yml                 | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml         | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml          | 10 ++---
 ...suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml                | 10 ++---
 stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml   | 10 ++---
 ...ed_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml | 10 ++---
 ...oper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml     | 10 ++---
 stories/unusual_processes.yml                 | 10 ++---
 stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml        | 10 ++---
 stories/web_fraud_detection.yml               | 10 ++---
 stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml   | 10 ++---
 stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml  | 10 ++---
 ...s_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml | 10 ++---
 stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml          | 10 ++---
 stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml    | 10 ++---
 stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml      | 10 ++---
 stories/windows_service_abuse.yml             | 10 ++---
 86 files changed, 469 insertions(+), 428 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
index 7c274a4bb6..6dffdceace 100755
--- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py
+++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
@@ -186,6 +186,46 @@ def pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
 
     return manifest_files
 
+def pretty_yaml_stories(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
+    manifest_files = []
+    for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'):
+        for file in files:
+            if file.endswith(".yml"):
+                manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
+
+    for manifest_file in manifest_files:
+        pretty_yaml = dict()
+        if VERBOSE:
+            print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file))
+
+        with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream:
+            try:
+                object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0]
+            except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
+                print(exc)
+                print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file))
+                error = True
+                continue
+
+        pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name']
+        pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id']
+        pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version']
+        pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date']
+        pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author']
+        pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type']
+        pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description']
+        pretty_yaml['narrative'] = object['narrative']
+        if 'references' in object:
+            pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
+        else:
+            pretty_yaml['references'] = []
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+
+        with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
+            documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
+
+    return manifest_files
+
 def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
     #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"):
     manifest_files = []
@@ -195,7 +235,8 @@ def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
         manifest_files = pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part)
     elif content_part == 'deployments':
         manifest_files = pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part)
-
+    elif content_part == 'stories':
+        manifest_files = pretty_yaml_stories(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part)
     return len(manifest_files)
 
 def main(args):
diff --git a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
index 925517ef1b..844472655f 100644
--- a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Apache Struts Vulnerability
+id: 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e
+version: 1
 date: '2018-12-06'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type`
   length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent
   with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
-id: 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e
-name: Apache Struts Vulnerability
 narrative: 'In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta
   Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating
   Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months
@@ -108,5 +110,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/asset_tracking.yml b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
index 9fc934adfa..29b5fa430d 100644
--- a/stories/asset_tracking.yml
+++ b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Asset Tracking
+id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-13'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier
   to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of
   malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
-id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77
-name: Asset Tracking
 narrative: This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding
   of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story
   can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business
@@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
index 5dad19998f..330ee1e9d3 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: AWS Cross Account Activity
+id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a
+version: 1
 date: '2018-06-04'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain
   cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles
   could be an indication of malicious activity.
-id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a
-name: AWS Cross Account Activity
 narrative: 'Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services
   across the enterprise using AWS''s Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality.
   IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each
@@ -36,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
index 6f9871e4ff..9918332ce9 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: AWS Cryptomining
+id: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining.
   New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally
   high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are
   just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
-id: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750
-name: AWS Cryptomining
 narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business.
   Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks
   mined each day would remain steady. So, it''s par for the course that ambitious,
@@ -41,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
index 32ea10cbdc..3c57640b70 100644
--- a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: AWS Network ACL Activity
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4
+version: 2
 date: '2018-05-21'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious
   activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4
-name: AWS Network ACL Activity
 narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance,
   and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role,
   or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company
@@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
index 219376c4fe..bb176264b0 100644
--- a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: AWS Security Hub Alerts
+id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-04'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated
   from AWS
-id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a
-name: AWS Security Hub Alerts
 narrative: AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services
   enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty,
   vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon
@@ -20,5 +22,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
index 410b5001c1..509a1fe352 100644
--- a/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
+id: 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-16'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from
   unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities
   are occurring somewhere within your network.
-id: 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f
-name: AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
 narrative: 'Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic
   locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important
   security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where
@@ -30,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
index 03b4ba7f3e..b5ca874a7a 100644
--- a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: AWS User Monitoring
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3
+version: 1
 date: '2018-03-12'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment
   that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack
   targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3
-name: AWS User Monitoring
 narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users
   who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it''s all too common
   for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable
@@ -37,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index 73c23c3fa8..d66edc4d0e 100644
--- a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
+id: 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-27'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys
   Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple
   Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and
   prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be
   many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows
   any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
-id: 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
-name: Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
 narrative: A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger
   a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain
   root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing
@@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
index bb5215f727..e6554d0edf 100644
--- a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Brand Monitoring
+id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78
+version: 1
 date: '2017-12-19'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is
   using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure.
   Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
-id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78
-name: Brand Monitoring
 narrative: 'While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats
   posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent
   fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and
@@ -36,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
index c523a36726..9c1c197a1d 100644
--- a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Cloud Cryptomining
+id: 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a
+version: 1
 date: '2019-10-02'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining.
   New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally
   high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users
   are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
-id: 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a
-name: Cloud Cryptomining
 narrative: 'Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business.
   Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks
   mined each day would remain steady. So, it''s par for the course that ambitious,
@@ -41,5 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
index af4f121bed..b1ea322c59 100644
--- a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
+++ b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: ColdRoot MacOS RAT
+id: bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390
+version: 1
 date: '2019-01-09'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example
   of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system,
   detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when
   a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
-id: bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390
-name: ColdRoot MacOS RAT
 narrative: 'Conventional wisdom holds that Apple''s MacOS operating system is significantly
   less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable,
   it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this
@@ -44,5 +46,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
index 1c48144669..3557fd8bb6 100644
--- a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
+++ b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Collection and Staging
+id: 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
+version: 1
 date: '2020-02-03'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: 'Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to
   the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific
   hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating
   sensitive data. '
-id: 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
-name: Collection and Staging
 narrative: "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from\
   \ a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses,\
   \ confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important\
@@ -29,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/command_and_control.yml b/stories/command_and_control.yml
index 4a983de555..cf7241d118 100644
--- a/stories/command_and_control.yml
+++ b/stories/command_and_control.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Command and Control
+id: 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8
+version: 1
 date: '2018-06-01'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged
   by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed
   by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions
   and send data back to the malicious operators.
-id: 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8
-name: Command and Control
 narrative: 'Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use
   in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they
   leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities.
@@ -34,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
index 5393312ef2..b103fa3d8e 100644
--- a/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
+++ b/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
+name: Common Phishing Frameworks
+id: 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61
+version: 1
 date: '2019-04-29'
+author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: 'Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2
   toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on
   a malicious link in a phishing email. '
-id: 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61
-name: Common Phishing Frameworks
 narrative: 'As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/),
   familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into
   clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/),
@@ -35,5 +37,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
index 9976e0ce69..23abd5d6ae 100644
--- a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
+++ b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
+id: aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246
+version: 1
 date: '2020-02-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories
   for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers.
   These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container
@@ -7,8 +11,6 @@ description: Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry
   which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in
   Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container
   Registry.
-id: aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246
-name: Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
 narrative: Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized
   images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if
   these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise,
@@ -26,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
index 78c9e468cf..a78c4523b4 100644
--- a/stories/credential_dumping.yml
+++ b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Credential Dumping
+id: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a
+version: 3
 date: '2020-02-04'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein
   attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The
   threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and
   spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story
   are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
-id: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a
-name: Credential Dumping
 narrative: 'Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often
   hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials
   may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking
@@ -34,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 3
diff --git a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
index 0b86437d78..e97d584d9f 100644
--- a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-date: '2020-10-21'
-description: The stealing of data by an adversary.
-id: 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
 name: Data Exfiltration
+id: 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
+version: 1
+date: '2020-10-21'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
+description: The stealing of data by an adversary.
 narrative: Exfiltration comes in many flavors.  Adversaries can collect data over
   encrypted or non-encrypted channels.  They can utilise Command and Control channels
   that are already in place to exfiltrate data.  They can use both standard data transfer
@@ -20,5 +22,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/data_protection.yml b/stories/data_protection.yml
index 4d4537ef2b..fdac1f2174 100644
--- a/stories/data_protection.yml
+++ b/stories/data_protection.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Data Protection
+id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-14'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data
   confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate
   possible signs of data exfiltration.
-id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33
-name: Data Protection
 narrative: Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate
   enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via
   low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations
@@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
index 650ed69cfe..0d4c72e47b 100644
--- a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
+++ b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk
+name: Detect Zerologon Attack
+id: 5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-18'
+author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472,
   a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset
   its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now
@@ -7,8 +11,6 @@ description: Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-114
   searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain
   Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz
   as payload carrier.
-id: 5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4
-name: Detect Zerologon Attack
 narrative: This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets
   a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote
   Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers
@@ -34,5 +36,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
index 45f81ca262..012190d978 100644
--- a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
+++ b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: DHS Report TA18-074A
+id: 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef
+version: 2
 date: '2020-01-22'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert
   US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises
   included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
-id: 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef
-name: DHS Report TA18-074A
 narrative: 'The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly
   over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue
   to escalate in complexity. \
@@ -38,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
index 888d15df8f..aebcad8523 100644
--- a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
+++ b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Disabling Security Tools
+id: fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1
+version: 2
 date: '2020-02-04'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of
   security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes
   launching netsh, and many others.
-id: fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1
-name: Disabling Security Tools
 narrative: Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate
   without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools
   to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This
@@ -28,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
index 7d7ee8bb9b..23bdb70021 100644
--- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: DNS Amplification Attacks
+id: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700
+version: 1
 date: '2016-09-13'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if
   it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers
   who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks,
   causing Denial of Service to other victims.
-id: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700
-name: DNS Amplification Attacks
 narrative: 'The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names
   to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function.
   However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification
@@ -35,5 +37,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
index 6ad09af970..f40dcee71c 100644
--- a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: DNS Hijacking
+id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221
+version: 1
 date: '2020-02-04'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you
   detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
-id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221
-name: DNS Hijacking
 narrative: 'Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613),
   DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to
   attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections
@@ -67,5 +69,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
index 337a50fe56..f8e0211fda 100644
--- a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
+++ b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Dynamic DNS
+id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221
+version: 2
 date: '2018-09-06'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating
   with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them
   avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
-id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221
-name: Dynamic DNS
 narrative: Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that
   allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their
   usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or
@@ -30,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
index 2e11a7a9b8..48163971c5 100644
--- a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
+++ b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
+id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52
+version: 1
 date: '2020-01-27'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer
   malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch
   script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has
   compromised your environment.
-id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52
-name: 'Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A '
 narrative: 'The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it
   was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according
   to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A),
@@ -37,5 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 5a674d6517..3aa77c4f47 100644
--- a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
+id: 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-02'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive
   Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix
   SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows
   unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration
   utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or
   execute Java code.  This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.
-id: 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-name: F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
 narrative: A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable
   system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious
   behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using
@@ -28,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
index 3cc8653eea..7e18c2dea7 100644
--- a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: GCP Cross Account Activity
+id: 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-01'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain
   cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles
   could be an indication of malicious activity.
-id: 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6
-name: GCP Cross Account Activity
 narrative: 'Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and
   services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality.
   IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each
@@ -36,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
index 49af8b5e8c..89c203de60 100644
--- a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Hidden Cobra Malware
+id: baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335
+version: 2
 date: '2020-01-22'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion
   of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North
   Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported
   in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
-id: baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335
-name: Hidden Cobra Malware
 narrative: 'North Korea''s government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building
   momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the
   group''s activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously
@@ -45,5 +47,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/host_redirection.yml b/stories/host_redirection.yml
index e61f167857..60001712fc 100644
--- a/stories/host_redirection.yml
+++ b/stories/host_redirection.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Host Redirection
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-14'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a
   destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's
   attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches
   and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4
-name: Host Redirection
 narrative: Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious
   purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to
   redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services)
@@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
index 722b805462..e68a18c5cb 100644
--- a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: JBoss Vulnerability
+id: 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-14'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source
   utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches
   help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources
   or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
-id: 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd
-name: JBoss Vulnerability
 narrative: 'This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting
   JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story
   are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with
@@ -98,5 +100,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
index e577b33523..0476024cf5 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Scanning Activity
+id: a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09
+version: 1
 date: '2020-04-15'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint
   scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent,
   cluster names.
-id: a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09
-name: Kubernetes Scanning Activity
 narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration
   platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production
   workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect
@@ -20,5 +22,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
index e7b3c8649d..911a57fa06 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
+id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes
   cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on
   items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
-id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea
-name: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
 narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration
   platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps
   and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches
@@ -20,5 +22,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
index ba30d5b0a2..57ccb792f3 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
+id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ew
+version: 1
 date: '2020-05-20'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage
   within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
-id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ew
-name: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
 narrative: Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration
   platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps
   and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches
@@ -19,5 +21,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/lateral_movement.yml b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
index e7c9925659..2cc361ff75 100644
--- a/stories/lateral_movement.yml
+++ b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Lateral Movement
+id: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
+version: 2
 date: '2020-02-04'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how
   attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose
   the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
-id: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
-name: Lateral Movement
 narrative: "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to\
   \ expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement.\
   \ Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because\
@@ -40,5 +42,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
index de3bd60db3..f84830edcf 100644
--- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
+++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Malicious PowerShell
+id: 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
+version: 4
 date: '2017-08-23'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities
   and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their
   goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate
   PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
-id: 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
-name: Malicious PowerShell
 narrative: 'The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used
   for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events
   generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these
@@ -72,5 +74,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 4
diff --git a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
index e94121d1e5..73dac99808 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Monitor Backup Solution
+id: abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These
   searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical
   access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
-id: abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d
-name: Monitor Backup Solution
 narrative: Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity
   of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce
   the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes.
@@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Compliance
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
index 603d684799..a458d94c24 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Monitor for Unauthorized Software
+id: 8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-15'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: 'Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes
   that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. '
-id: 8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae
-name: Monitor for Unauthorized Software
 narrative: 'It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running
   on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This
   Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within
@@ -28,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Compliance
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
index bf4106e8ae..ba145b98e1 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Monitor for Updates
+id: 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-15'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched
   and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be
   mitigated by applying routine security patches.
-id: 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8
-name: Monitor for Updates
 narrative: 'It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched
   and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a
   publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important
@@ -29,5 +31,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Compliance
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
index a2ed90a166..316cb9eb52 100644
--- a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Netsh Abuse
+id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65
+version: 1
 date: '2017-01-05'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of
   `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection
   to a host from an infected system.
-id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65
-name: Netsh Abuse
 narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native
   Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such
   tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you
@@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/office_365_detections.yml b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
index 8765eb9224..9b3ab16118 100644
--- a/stories/office_365_detections.yml
+++ b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-date: '2020-12-16'
-description: This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
-id: 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9
 name: Office 365 Detections
+id: 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9
+version: 1
+date: '2020-12-16'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+description: This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
 narrative: More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering.
   Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides
   various detections for Office 365 attacks.
@@ -17,5 +19,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
index 0e1ae49229..2caa4a5fa2 100644
--- a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
+++ b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Orangeworm Attack Group
+id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52
+version: 2
 date: '2020-01-22'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm
   Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
-id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52
-name: Orangeworm Attack Group
 narrative: 'In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing
   a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations
   in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with
@@ -39,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
index ab92e3c207..bb02015adf 100644
--- a/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
+++ b/stories/phishing_payloads.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
+name: Phishing Payloads
+id: 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
+version: 1
 date: '2019-04-29'
+author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment
   has been breached via a phishing attack.
-id: 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
-name: Phishing Payloads
 narrative: 'Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous
   cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing)
   are initiated via a phishing email. \
@@ -52,5 +54,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
index 21a43250c8..fc38055e4b 100644
--- a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
+++ b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense
+name: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
+id: 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E
+version: 1
 date: '2020-01-22'
+author: iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques
   employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
-id: 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E
-name: Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
 narrative: 'This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 
   iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon
@@ -86,5 +88,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
index fd3ce3f980..88c140a3ba 100644
--- a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
+++ b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
+id: 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-11'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment,
   as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors
   typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
-id: 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218
-name: Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
 narrative: A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols,
   and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols
   to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface.
@@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware.yml b/stories/ransomware.yml
index dad4d1e288..d2d5ad8bb4 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Ransomware
+id: cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
+version: 1
 date: '2020-02-04'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage,
   the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected
   locations, and many others.
-id: cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
-name: Ransomware
 narrative: Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected
   host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the
   attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect
@@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
index de2089bd8c..e9a2af5f6b 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Ransomware Cloud
+id: f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2
+version: 1
 date: '2020-10-27'
+author: Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that
   may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
-id: f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2
-name: Ransomware Cloud
 narrative: Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected
   host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the
   attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect
@@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
index 3e636e1686..5fe0d2eb11 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+name: Ryuk Ransomware
+id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
+version: 1
 date: '2020-11-06'
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated
   with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification,
   suspicious psexec use, and more.
-id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
-name: Ryuk Ransomware
 narrative: "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A)\
   \ on October 28th called \u201CRansomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and\
   \ Public Health Sector.\u201D This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and\
@@ -33,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
index e6aea499ea..bd3542f193 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: SamSam Ransomware
+id: c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604
+version: 1
 date: '2018-12-13'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
   that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated
   with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware
   extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
-id: c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604
-name: SamSam Ransomware
 narrative: 'The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt)
   was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software
   has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost
@@ -53,5 +55,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
index 47ecf4076d..346b45a98f 100644
--- a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
+++ b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Router and Infrastructure Security
+id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify
   that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing
   and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
-id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77
-name: Router and Infrastructure Security
 narrative: 'Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked
   as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats
   actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon
@@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
index 00b7ba0fd4..4ec8887f14 100644
--- a/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
+++ b/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
+id: 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2
+version: 1
 date: '2018-01-08'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown
   exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
-id: 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2
-name: Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
 narrative: Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that
   allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify
   the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still
@@ -19,5 +21,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
index 53662f3f74..0ff703097d 100644
--- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
+id: 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-19'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you
   reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some
   older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that
   users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains.
-id: 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1
-name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
 narrative: 'This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect
   vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\
 
@@ -43,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
index 4807e85d84..29aa754be9 100644
--- a/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
+++ b/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
+id: 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400
+version: 1
 date: '2018-06-14'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability
   within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help
   ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
-id: 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400
-name: Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
 narrative: 'Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise
   versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information
   through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings).
@@ -38,5 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/sql_injection.yml b/stories/sql_injection.yml
index 52b09a1d3d..25b2df4022 100644
--- a/stories/sql_injection.yml
+++ b/stories/sql_injection.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: SQL Injection
+id: 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-19'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured
   query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain
   malicious parameters.
-id: 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3
-name: SQL Injection
 narrative: 'It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable
   web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\
 
@@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
index 869ed849a1..69bc44d62b 100644
--- a/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/sunburst_malware.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+name: Sunburst Malware
+id: 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2
+version: 1
 date: '2020-12-14'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and
   management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind
   this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around
   the world.
-id: 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2
-name: Sunburst Malware
 narrative: This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
   (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the
   SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component
@@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
index 268652ef8b..2b03ecafab 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3
+version: 1
 date: '2018-02-09'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances
   for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances
   that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users
   (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply,
   when the information warrants it.
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3
-name: Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
 narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance,
   and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an
   AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to
@@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
index 5f60a3eb37..0c66b7088f 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Suspicious AWS Login Activities
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3
+version: 1
 date: '2019-05-01'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: 'Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches
   within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious
   logins. '
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3
-name: Suspicious AWS Login Activities
 narrative: It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure.
   Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting
   points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can
@@ -21,5 +23,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
index 86569fe6ee..535981278a 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3
+version: 2
 date: '2018-07-24'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets
   for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open
   S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative
   searches will give you more information, when required.
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3
-name: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
 narrative: 'As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks
   on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web
   Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
@@ -30,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
index 8ee7f07971..d415be8ab2 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Suspicious AWS Traffic
+id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3
+version: 1
 date: '2018-05-07'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence
   of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound
   traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
-id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3
-name: Suspicious AWS Traffic
 narrative: "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing\
   \ service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container,\
   \ the environment resembles a physical network. \\\nAmazon's VPC service enables\
@@ -31,5 +33,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
index 7be388e899..a9c61c3c41 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+id: 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
+version: 1
 date: '2020-06-04'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: 'Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic
   Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help
   you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. '
-id: 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
-name: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
 narrative: 'It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure.
   Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations.
   Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary
@@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
index 5a7db31f81..d766a1f889 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
+id: 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-25'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors
   originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that
   malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
-id: 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce
-name: Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
 narrative: Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance,
   compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and
   actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are
@@ -21,5 +23,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
index 27f167ff85..90f7a30d6a 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
+id: 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86
+version: 1
 date: '2018-08-20'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors
   originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that
   malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
-id: 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86
-name: Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
 narrative: 'Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from
   familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions
   is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments
@@ -30,5 +32,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
index c2e8641e09..98bbade3b0 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Cloud User Activities
+id: 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39
+version: 1
 date: '2020-09-04'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your
   cloud environments.
-id: 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39
-name: Suspicious Cloud User Activities
 narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users
   who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it''s all too common
   for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable
@@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
index ffa5814210..1cd363a106 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Command-Line Executions
+id: f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7
+version: 2
 date: '2020-02-03'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most
   common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
   Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI
   on Windows systems.
-id: f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7
-name: Suspicious Command-Line Executions
 narrative: The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary
   goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts
   and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access
@@ -28,5 +30,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
index 332b296baa..487bc98f77 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious DNS Traffic
+id: 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-18'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain
   name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol
   by monitoring for these types of abuses.
-id: 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56
-name: Suspicious DNS Traffic
 narrative: Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the
   Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However,
   attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One
@@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
index d1b62ca288..e8dc840e5c 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Emails
+id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55
+version: 1
 date: '2020-01-27'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial
   foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails
   in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
-id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55
-name: Suspicious Emails
 narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted
   spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and
   attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk
@@ -32,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
index adcc888713..e225c52526 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
+id: 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+version: 1
 date: '2020-08-05'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets
   for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open
   storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative
   searches will give you more information, when required.
-id: 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-name: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
 narrative: Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility
   model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access
   control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates
@@ -23,5 +25,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
index fec4699871..d92c079083 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55
+version: 2
 date: '2021-01-20'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe
   process to execute malicious code.
-id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55
-name: Suspicious MSHTA Activity
 narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions
   via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll)
   with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility
@@ -39,5 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
index 0f3c99144a..5e255e2fe3 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Okta Activity
+id: 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b
+version: 1
 date: '2020-04-02'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid
   outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more.
   Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they
   need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta
   environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
-id: 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b
-name: Suspicious Okta Activity
 narrative: 'Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate
   once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications
   are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are
@@ -36,5 +38,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
index d57f058e25..ebc24e9a20 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
+id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55
+version: 1
 date: '2018-05-31'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations,
   which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
-id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55
-name: Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
 narrative: "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking\
   \ target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively\
   \ more common is registry modification.\\\n The registry is a key component of the\
@@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
index 1f78e018f2..af0c505ffc 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Suspicious WMI Use
+id: c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5
+version: 2
 date: '2018-10-23'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation
   (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating
   systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it
   is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which
   the activity occurred.
-id: c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5
-name: Suspicious WMI Use
 narrative: 'WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on
   Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged
   to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning
@@ -33,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
index 590aa186e0..fae67cd19b 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
+id: aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258
+version: 1
 date: '2020-04-13'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems.
   This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions
   for this detection.
-id: aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258
-name: Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
 narrative: 'Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage
   has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home
   orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny
@@ -26,5 +28,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
index 770f3951cd..6a16527344 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+id: 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-12'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer
   utilities to execute malicious code.
-id: 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
 narrative: 'Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy
   execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development
   related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development,
@@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
index fffa8e0491..251f8b5bc8 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
+id: be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-21'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe
   process to execute malicious code.
-id: be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
 narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted
   Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform
   used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project
@@ -46,5 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
index 30c46ab776..d58c8c9214 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
+id: 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0
+version: 1
 date: '2018-04-09'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate
   malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users
   is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
-id: 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0
-name: Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
 narrative: "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications.\
   \ The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities.\
   \ So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment\
@@ -25,5 +27,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/unusual_processes.yml b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
index f8c34c0d84..128a66c667 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Unusual Processes
+id: f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6
+version: 2
 date: '2020-02-04'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment
   that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations,
   those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples
   of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
-id: f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6
-name: Unusual Processes
 narrative: 'Being able to profile a host''s processes within your environment can
   help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to
   the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
@@ -32,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
index 6fdf0445e0..b6e205332f 100644
--- a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
+++ b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Use of Cleartext Protocols
+id: 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21
+version: 1
 date: '2017-09-15'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak
   credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
-id: 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21
-name: Use of Cleartext Protocols
 narrative: Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections
   of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited
   by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information
@@ -22,5 +24,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
index 797489f2ea..a0bdff5e92 100644
--- a/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
+++ b/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Jim Apger, Splunk
+name: Web Fraud Detection
+id: 31337aaa-bc22-4752-b599-ef112dq1dq7a
+version: 1
 date: '2018-10-08'
+author: Jim Apger, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques
   bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
-id: 31337aaa-bc22-4752-b599-ef112dq1dq7a
-name: Web Fraud Detection
 narrative: 'The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the
   use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or
   to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes
@@ -49,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Fraud Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
index c87ad6d336..3f9b2ca5f2 100644
--- a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
+id: 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064
+version: 1
 date: '2018-05-31'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: 'Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints.
   A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe`
   and disabling user-account control, among many others '
-id: 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064
-name: Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
 narrative: Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that
   adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures.
   There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable
@@ -21,5 +23,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
index d3d53d19db..8a4296c821 100644
--- a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+name: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
+id: 36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
+version: 1
 date: '2020-07-28'
+author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered
   by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and
   is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker
@@ -7,8 +11,6 @@ description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discover
   leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed
   to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be
   used for the exploit.
-id: 36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
-name: Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
 narrative: When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request
   gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any
   DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS
@@ -33,5 +35,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
index 287ee84e39..f1436b70df 100644
--- a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
+id: 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d
+version: 1
 date: '2018-01-26'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows
   file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting
   spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different
   one, among other techniques.
-id: 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d
-name: Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
 narrative: "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious\
   \ code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage\
   \ file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific\
@@ -43,5 +45,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 1
diff --git a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
index 4dd7f63d53..1fe8857921 100644
--- a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Windows Log Manipulation
+id: b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835
+version: 2
 date: '2017-09-12'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs.
   Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an
   essential component of an effective defense.
-id: b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835
-name: Windows Log Manipulation
 narrative: 'Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or
   to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best
   practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still
@@ -32,5 +34,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Security Monitoring
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
index eb70181272..43d49de5d5 100644
--- a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+name: Windows Persistence Techniques
+id: 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
+version: 2
 date: '2018-05-31'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence
   on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
-id: 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
-name: Windows Persistence Techniques
 narrative: Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after
   the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to
   ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This
@@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
index e6940f832d..ebc3787d94 100644
--- a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+name: Windows Privilege Escalation
+id: 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5
+version: 2
 date: '2020-02-04'
+author: David Dorsey, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a
   Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints,
   modified registry keys, and more.
-id: 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5
-name: Windows Privilege Escalation
 narrative: 'Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary
   gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase
   his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such
@@ -24,5 +26,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 2
diff --git a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
index 733e722a79..1baa5e434c 100644
--- a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+name: Windows Service Abuse
+id: 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2
+version: 3
 date: '2017-11-02'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the
   ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic
   Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are
   being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
-id: 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2
-name: Windows Service Abuse
 narrative: The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for
   running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage
   Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to
@@ -27,5 +29,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: batch
-version: 3

From 1c8dc0c0d0e4b08756d89398bd205d056f5b28db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bpatel <bpatel@splunk.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 09:02:22 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 127/132] change time

---
 tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml
index b02052dfa2..12d4601c5c 100644
--- a/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml
+++ b/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ tests:
 - name: Certutil exe certificate extraction
   file: endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-2d'
+  earliest_time: '-7d'
   latest_time: 'now'
   attack_data:
   - file_name: windows-sysmon.log

From eae6908d2302b0ee97b3553863c6695040062a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-71-175>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 17:21:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 128/132] Added detection testing service results inCertutil
 exe certificate extraction

---
 .../certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml   | 20 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
index 574d479ad1..18539c0bf7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
@@ -9,14 +9,13 @@ type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
-  as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = "* -exportPFX *"
-   by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
-  Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-   | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is
-   uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns
-   targeting Federated services.
+  as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe
+  Processes.process = "* -exportPFX *" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting
+  certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed
+  during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
@@ -24,4 +23,7 @@ tags:
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Installation
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
\ No newline at end of file
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log

From 13fbbda43f2d31f4dd3cac8fe75b501ddf1e9842 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 14:02:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 129/132] Bump cffi from 1.14.4 to 1.14.5

Bumps [cffi](https://github.com/python-cffi/release-doc) from 1.14.4 to 1.14.5.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/python-cffi/release-doc/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/python-cffi/release-doc/commits)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
---
 automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
index 4ce1f2241b..937cfc1345 100644
--- a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
+++ b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ bcrypt==3.2.0
 boto3==1.16.61
 botocore==1.19.63
 certifi==2020.12.5
-cffi==1.14.4
+cffi==1.14.5
 cfgv==2.0.1
 chardet==4.0.0
 configparser==4.0.2

From cd4dcd9e0cbf5f741f50c393f6f7f48159b5be66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 11:52:25 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 130/132] sorted tags

---
 bin/pretty_yaml.py                                     | 10 +++++-----
 ...ike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml |  6 +++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
index 6dffdceace..f0424f3dec 100755
--- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py
+++ b/bin/pretty_yaml.py
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
             pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
         else:
             pretty_yaml['references'] = []
-        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())}
 
 
         with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
             pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
         else:
             pretty_yaml['references'] = []
-        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())}
 
         with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
             documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_baselines(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
             pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
         else:
             pretty_yaml['references'] = []
-        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())}
 
         with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
             documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
         pretty_yaml['scheduling'] = object['scheduling']
         if 'alert_action' in object:
             pretty_yaml['alert_action'] = object['alert_action']
-        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())}
 
         with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
             documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ def pretty_yaml_stories(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part):
             pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references']
         else:
             pretty_yaml['references'] = []
-        pretty_yaml['tags'] = object['tags']
+        pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())}
 
         with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file:
             documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False)
diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
index 63666bec2c..f5081516f4 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml
@@ -24,8 +24,11 @@ tags:
   analytic_story:
   - AWS Security Hub Alerts
   asset_type: AWS Instance
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 13
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json
   nist:
   - DE.DP
   - DE.AE
@@ -34,6 +37,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: network
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json

From 7615d5ec8153bf0a25f16690b080fcbbe94f0a0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 12:27:00 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 131/132] fixing merge conflicts

---
 bin/validate.py                               |  2 -
 ...itten_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml |  2 +-
 ..._access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml | 31 ++++++-----
 .../aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml     | 39 +++++++------
 ...365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml | 37 +++++++------
 .../cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml    | 41 ++++++++------
 .../cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml | 33 ++++++-----
 .../cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml | 31 ++++++-----
 .../detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml   | 18 ++----
 .../prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml       |  2 +-
 .../remote_registry_key_modifications.yml     |  2 +-
 .../deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml      |  2 +-
 .../windows_hosts_file_modification.yml       |  2 +-
 .../certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml   | 19 +++++--
 .../endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml      |  2 +-
 .../creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml   | 37 +++++++------
 .../endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml      | 44 ++++++++-------
 ...system_network_configuration_discovery.yml |  2 +-
 ...ct_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml | 44 ++++++++-------
 ...2_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml | 55 +++++++++++--------
 ..._application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml | 40 ++++++++------
 ..._application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml | 40 ++++++++------
 .../disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml |  2 +-
 .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml   | 29 +++++-----
 .../endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml      | 49 ++++++++++-------
 .../dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml        | 39 +++++++------
 ...nitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml |  2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml  | 44 ++++++++-------
 ...eating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml |  2 +-
 ...ulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml |  2 +-
 ...istry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml |  2 +-
 .../registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml    |  2 +-
 ...try_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml |  2 +-
 ...ious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml | 48 +++++++++-------
 .../suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml | 44 ++++++++-------
 .../endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml   | 41 ++++++++------
 .../endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml   | 42 ++++++++------
 ...undll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml | 39 +++++++------
 .../detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml |  2 +-
 .../endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml         |  2 +-
 stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml  | 30 ++++++----
 stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml |  2 +-
 stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml         | 49 +++++++++--------
 stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml      | 43 ++++++++-------
 stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml      | 28 ++++++----
 ...oper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml | 54 +++++++++---------
 46 files changed, 628 insertions(+), 496 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py
index 7cf3f8c2af..2ecc721ef7 100644
--- a/bin/validate.py
+++ b/bin/validate.py
@@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ def validate_objects(REPO_PATH, objects, verbose):
         validation_errors, uuids = validate_standard_fields(object, uuids)
         errors = errors + validation_errors
 
-    if verbose:
-        print("validating object {0}".format(object['name']))
     for object in objects['detections']:
         if object['type'] == 'batch':
             errors = errors + validate_detection_search(object, objects['macros'])
diff --git a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
index cf6aed99a7..680c012412 100644
--- a/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
+++ b/detections/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem
   data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
+  product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
   reads and writes.
 known_false_positives: Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
index 9ac60556e2..172243d7b9 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
@@ -1,38 +1,43 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal
+id: bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider,
   user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to
   detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated
   environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.
+search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn
+  requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress
+  userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
   search works with cloudtrail logs
-id: bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 known_false_positives: Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries
   are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions
   looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress
   user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential
   access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect
   these attacks.
-name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal
 references:
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
-search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
-  max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn
-  requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress
-  userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: AWS Federated Account
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078
-  security_domain: threat
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json
-type: ESCU
-version: 1
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  security_domain: threat
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
index 8a7321ae2c..3ec805678d 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
@@ -1,34 +1,39 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: AWS SAML Update identity provider
+id: 2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates
   to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter
   compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider
   set by attacker.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
-  search works with cloudtrail logs.
-id: 2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily
-  be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
-name: AWS SAML Update identity provider
-references:
-- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
-- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
-- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
-- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
   max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn
   userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId
   userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with cloudtrail logs.
+known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily
+  be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
+references:
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: AWS Federated Account
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1078
-  security_domain: threat
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json
-type: ESCU
-version: 1
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  security_domain: threat
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
index 4f393bbcb6..c278872e88 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
@@ -1,34 +1,39 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
+id: b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting
   about an specific event related to its creation.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
-  works with o365:management:activity
-id: b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious,
-  however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential
-  abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
-name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
-references:
-- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
-- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app
   role assignment grant to user." | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by
   ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious,
+  however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential
+  abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
+references:
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json
-type: ESCU
-version: 1
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
index 88e3123ed8..1419f19b87 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
@@ -1,37 +1,42 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: O365 Added Service Principal
+id: 1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting
   about an specific event related to its creation.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
-  works with o365:management:activity
-id: 1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious,
-  however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential
-  abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
-name: O365 Added Service Principal
-references:
-- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
-- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
-- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
-- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature="Add service
   principal credentials." | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID)
   as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue)
   as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress
   signature | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious,
+  however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential
+  abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
+references:
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
+- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
+- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
+- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json
-type: ESCU
-version: 1
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
index 2195e7caf8..b1a5a048ff 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
@@ -1,32 +1,37 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
+id: 8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO)
   logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password
   or single sign on token hijack or reuse.
-how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
-  works with o365:management:activity
-id: 8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
-known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may
-  indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.
-name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
-references:
-- https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/
 search: '`o365_management_activity`  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress
   UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
+  works with o365:management:activity
+known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may
+  indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.
+references:
+- https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1556
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json
-type: ESCU
-version: 1
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
index 949f8a081e..02fcec7fb7 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,41 @@
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+name: O365 New Federated Domain Added
+id: e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
+version: 1
 date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.
+search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="Add-FederatedDomain"
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value)
+  as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId
+  UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search
   works with o365:management:activity.
-id: e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 known_false_positives: The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious,
   however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential
   abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.
-name: O365 New Federated Domain Added
 references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/
-search: '`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="Add-FederatedDomain"
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value)
-  as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId
-  UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`'
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Office 365
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objective
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1136.003
   security_domain: threat
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json
-type: ESCU
-version: 1
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
index 23d883f0fa..65b460710f 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml
@@ -20,30 +20,22 @@ how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, whic
   with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
   macro designed to filter out known false positives.
 known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be
-  part of a whtelist.
+  part of a whitelist.
 references:
 - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
-search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId)
-  as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll
-  ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename
-  Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`'
-
-known_false_positives: Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be
-  part of a whitelist.
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   - Detect Zerologon Attack
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
   - CIS 8
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - DE.AE
   - DE.CM
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
index 1a6704e33a..d1b4ad4cef 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
+  product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
   used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking
   in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name`
   (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
index 47303fd553..34afa2b49b 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr
   Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint`
-  data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products,
+  data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product,
   such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for
   this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the
   registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
index e45332c7ac..1645800eae 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.actio
   | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically
-  populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
+  populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or
   via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is
   typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition,
   this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
index 3d6f01dce7..fb19326498 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem
   data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
+  product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system
   reads and writes.
 known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
index 18539c0bf7..0d1391b15f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
@@ -2,28 +2,35 @@ name: Certutil exe certificate extraction
 id: 337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-26'
+author: Rod Soto, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation
   or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication
   tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.
-type: ESCU
-references: []
-author: Rod Soto, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process)
   as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe
   Processes.process = "* -exportPFX *" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`'
+how_to_implement: ''
 known_false_positives: Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting
   certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed
   during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.
+references: []
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Installation
-  security_domain: endpoint
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Installation
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
index 0c5b056f77..a5804398ae 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from
   your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically
-  populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
+  populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or
   via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is
   typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.
 known_false_positives: It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
index c8a7c97941..1974528a2d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
@@ -2,43 +2,48 @@ name: Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr
 id: b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd
 version: 1
 date: '2020-02-03'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating
   a prcoess dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification
   will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp,
   cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass
   (2).dmp.
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp |
+  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category,
+  process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`'
 how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which
   includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an
   input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific
   configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace
   the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search
   also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
-type: ESCU
+known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes,
+  but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
 references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp |
-  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category,
-  process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes,
-  but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Windows
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 6
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Windows
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
index 3be7e04420..1da256b8b4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
@@ -2,16 +2,12 @@ name: Creation of Shadow Copy
 id: eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844
 version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
-description: Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create
-  a shadow copy.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow
+  copy.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe
   Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe
@@ -19,22 +15,32 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic
-  will create false positives.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
+known_false_positives: Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create
+  false positives.
+references:
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.003
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
index 4792f6e0dc..c1e2159084 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
   lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically
-  populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or
+  populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or
   endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually
   generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated
   via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
index 1a7ab59f8b..0a94eee911 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
 id: 070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code.
   Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking
   and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems.
@@ -12,39 +16,41 @@ description: 'Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious
   or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll"
   is not required to load scrobj. "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon
   execution. '
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by modifying/removing the !=regsv32.exe.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
-- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe
   OR Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe) Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest
   Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by modifying/removing the !=regsv32.exe.
 known_false_positives: Limited false positives related to third party software registering
   .DLL's.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.010
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.010
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
index 179bbb3187..6772947b00 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
@@ -2,46 +2,53 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack
 id: 4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and
-  ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique
-  will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module
-  loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify
-  script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe,
-  but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively
-  found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any
-  network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
+  ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This
+  particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution,
+  the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During
+  investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will
+  spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents.
+  Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During
+  investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed.
+  It's possible other files are on disk.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll
+  or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive. 
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
index 6e28a0a422..1859bb79e2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi
 id: 61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and
   iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This
   particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution,
@@ -11,38 +15,40 @@ description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll
   Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During
   investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed.
   It's possible other files are on disk.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi
+  triggering a false positive.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
-  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi
-  triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
index de2b4b6ce6..88868557b3 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup
 id: 71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by
   calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique
   will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module
@@ -11,38 +15,40 @@ description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll
   found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review
   any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other
   files are on disk.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll,
+  triggering a false positive.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
-  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll,
-  triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
index 51ba8ec145..42a31fc477 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
+  product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry
   modifications.
 known_false_positives: This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
index cfaeb84754..f91f46fca9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
@@ -16,33 +16,30 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activi
   including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
   data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
   field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
+known_false_positives: None identified.
 references:
 - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
 - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
-author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`'
-known_false_positives: None identified.
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
index cbb385c1ca..c4e5ef46a8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
@@ -2,45 +2,52 @@ name: Dump LSASS via procdump
 id: 3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-01'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: 'Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for
   both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump
   file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This
-  query does not monitor for the internal name (OriginalFileName=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe.
-  Modify the query as needed.\
+  query does not monitor for the internal name (OriginalFileName=procdump) of the
+  PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\
 
   During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a
-  Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command
-  line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+  Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on
+  the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection)
+  into lsass.exe.'
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=procdump.exe
   (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by
   Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
index c42b56ca30..28aaf15aab 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ name: Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
 id: 21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-01'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: 'Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process.
   This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and
   -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and
@@ -11,36 +14,38 @@ description: 'Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass proces
   Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on
   the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection)
   into lsass.exe.'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump  process_name!=procdump*.exe  EventID=1
   (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as
   dest |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name,
   process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 known_false_positives: None identified.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.001
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 3
   - CIS 5
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.001
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
index 2f6f28ea94..28370f53e5 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
+  product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry
   modifications.
 known_false_positives: You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
index 3c704fc6b8..ba50e98c0c 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Ntdsutil export ntds
 id: da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
+author: Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: 'Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory
   database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used
   in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of
@@ -13,39 +17,41 @@ description: 'Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Di
   This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the
   Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database
   will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.'
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)
-- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
-- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html
-author: Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe
   Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user
   Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
   Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
   `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model.
 known_false_positives: Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with
   ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)
+- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Credential Dumping
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1003.003
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
index 59f617e43c..929bdc172f 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` '
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
-  via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
+  via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
   data sources, such as Sysmon.
 known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results.
   It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
index 19210a288e..75a4f307c7 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
+  product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
   used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
   to the registry.
 known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
index 84e1cd7d5d..08e0a43252 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr
   by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis
-  data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response products,
+  data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product,
   such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used
   for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to
   the registry.
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
index 86e78d56ed..4fd1b76902 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registr
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
+  product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
   used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
   to the registry.
 known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute on
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
index 12bbaf97e6..3eb1f7ebcb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTim
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
-  products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
+  product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
   used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
   to the registry.
 known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
index 677419eeef..e41ea39c18 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
@@ -2,23 +2,14 @@ name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path
 id: 62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-28'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code
   by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating,
   look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review
   additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
-  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
-  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
-  field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions
-  found to be used by  legitimate processes.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
-- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
-- https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe
   (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\temp*)
@@ -26,22 +17,37 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity,
+  including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint
+  data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process"
+  field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions
+  found to be used by  legitimate processes.
 known_false_positives: Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified
   paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
+- https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.010
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   - CIS 16
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.010
   nist:
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
index 0067f2f862..ef19ce9a25 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver
 id: 8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-09'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver
   on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer
   method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being
@@ -9,10 +13,18 @@ description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterser
   capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and
   parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further.
   Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+known_false_positives: This is likely to produce false positives and will require
+  some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs,
+  or filtering based on parent process names.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
@@ -21,30 +33,24 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/
 - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
-  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`'
-known_false_positives: This is likely to produce false positives and will require
-  some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs,
-  or filtering based on parent process names.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
index 7e7dddf7c9..183b52f1db 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
@@ -2,44 +2,49 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 Rename
 id: 7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing.
   rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During
   investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script
   content it is loading. This query relies on the OriginalFileName from Sysmon, or
   internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific
   command line arguments outlined in other analytics.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.
-type: ESCU
-references:
-- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE NOT process_name=rundll32.exe
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User,
   parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine |
   rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
   `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.
 known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
   copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
+- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1218.011
   - T1036.003
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
index da2b73b2cd..95ccd4dd0d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
 id: 9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-04'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
 description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function
   name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with CobaltStrike
   x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32
@@ -11,10 +15,17 @@ description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL func
   execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of CobaltStrike,
   rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default
   process can be changed, but typically is not.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
+  Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-type: ESCU
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start
+  as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
@@ -22,29 +33,24 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
-  Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
-  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start
-  as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
index d9e5f073b7..e2abb78438 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -2,45 +2,50 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
 id: e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-09'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments.
   It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present.
   This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including CobaltStrike.
   During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify
   any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe
   is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (process_name=rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE)
+  | regex CommandLine="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+  max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name,
+  OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: ESCU
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
+  copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (process_name=rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName=RUNDLL32.EXE)
-  | regex CommandLine="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
-  max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name,
-  OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved
-  copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
 tags:
   analytics_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1218.011
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.011
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
index ed9e9b713a..2ae04051cd 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(
   != "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter` '
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
   from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
-  via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
+  via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
   data sources, such as Sysmon.
 known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files
   to the disk.
diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
index d8cdca1bb4..5a61580b9d 100644
--- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
+++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint
   > upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` '
 how_to_implement: In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint
   file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection
-  and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.
+  and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.
   The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads
   and writes to the file system.
 known_false_positives: It is important to understand that if you happen to install
diff --git a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml
index 97ccec4b9d..73cff1e571 100644
--- a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml
@@ -2,24 +2,30 @@ name: Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
 id: cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-26'
-description: This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials.
- These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those
- servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services.
- Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order
- to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either
- hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
-narrative: This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of
- Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated
- directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure)
- related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
 author: Rod Soto, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
+description: This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated
+  credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers
+  specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active
+  Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2
+  tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud
+  and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then
+  attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
+narrative: This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses
+  the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate
+  the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens,
+  certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed
+  in specific cloud environment detection searches.
 references:
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 tags:
   analytics_story: Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
-  usecase: Security Monitoring
   category:
   - Cloud Security
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
index e225c52526..ab82ae33e8 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ narrative: Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibi
   on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage
   bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.
 references:
-- https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security
+- https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security
 - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/
 tags:
   analytic_story: Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
index af642fb260..bf10152d8e 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
@@ -7,35 +7,34 @@ type: batch
 description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe
   process to execute malicious code.
 narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
-  via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta
-  suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution
-  of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
+  via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll)
+  with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility
+  to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript,
+  or VBScript.\
 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
   may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
-  
-  Triage\
-  Validate execution \
-  1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further
-  PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
-  
+
+  Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName
+  of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32
+  or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+
   1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
-  
-  Situational Awareness\
-  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
 
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
+  Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious
+  behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
 
-  1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
-  MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an
+  Office Application?\
 
-  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
-  
-  Retrieval of script code\
-  The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+  1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard
+  application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
+
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote
+  IP or domain.\
+
+  Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed
+  script code is benign or malicious.'
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/
@@ -43,6 +42,10 @@ references:
 - https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index 89aaa298eb..fb1a5987fe 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -2,32 +2,37 @@ name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
 id: b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
 version: 1
 date: '2021-01-29'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
 description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe
   process to execute malicious code.
-narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
+narrative: One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
   via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo"
-  using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used
-  by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. 
-  The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). 
-  The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code.  
-  Validate execution 
-  Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.
-  Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32.  
-  Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by regsvr32.exe. 
-  Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 
-  Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. 
-  Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.     
-  Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+  using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely
+  used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension
+  of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches
+  in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate
+  that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate
+  execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe
+  and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64,
+  it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32.
+  Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious
+  behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent
+  process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?
+  Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from
+  non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation
+  of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script
+  code is benign or malicious.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
index 727dd2bd7d..3834c54dd1 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
@@ -2,21 +2,29 @@ name: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
 id: 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-03'
-description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
-narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
-  via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. 
-  The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. 
-  Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. 
-  The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
-  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: ESCU
+type: batch
+description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe
+  to execute arbitrary malicious code.
+narrative: One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
+  via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great
+  example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by
+  ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading
+  default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk
+  that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist
+  with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The
+  searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
+  may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
 tags:
   analytics_story: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
index e143c961b3..7e7ba69a53 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
@@ -6,46 +6,46 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe
   process to execute malicious code.
-narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted 
+narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted
   Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform
   used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project
   files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
 
   The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows
-  for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and
-  execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is
-  used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses
-  that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
+  for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute
+  the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this
+  way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are
+  configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
 
   The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that
   may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\
-  
+
   Triage\
 
   Validate execution\
 
-  1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further
-  PE metadata.\
-  
+  1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe
+  and further PE metadata.\
+
   1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\
-  
+
   Situational Awareness\
 
-  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of 
-  Script code by MSBuild.exe.\
-  
-  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
-  
-  1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is
-  MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
-  
-  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
-  
+  The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators
+  related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\
+
+  1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an
+  Office Application?\
+
+  1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard
+  application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
+
+  1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote
+  IP or domain.\
+
   Retrieval of script code\
-  
+
   The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.'
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md
 tags:
   analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
-  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
   category:
-  - Adversary Tactics
\ No newline at end of file
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud

From 6094970bb56089869efa1d311d505761a253e338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: divious1 <josehelps@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 12:32:25 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 132/132] updated analytics story tag

---
 .../cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml    | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml               | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml            | 2 +-
 detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml            | 2 +-
 .../detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml       | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml     | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml     | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml     | 2 +-
 .../detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml    | 2 +-
 .../detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml   | 2 +-
 .../detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml                 | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml          | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml                    | 2 +-
 .../endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml   | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml              | 2 +-
 detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml              | 2 +-
 .../suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml      | 2 +-
 21 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
index 172243d7b9..1a5234bb90 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: AWS Federated Account
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
index 3ec805678d..fdefa32002 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: AWS Federated Account
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
index c278872e88..d3fb9a40cb 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Office 365
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
index 1419f19b87..feb1dfc3ea 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Office 365
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
index b1a5a048ff..ce4f398b72 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ known_false_positives: Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it ma
 references:
 - https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Office 365
diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
index 02fcec7fb7..21eb289874 100644
--- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
 - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Office 365 Detections
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Office 365
diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
index bcbff6d389..2311ab170e 100644
--- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used
   may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
 references: []
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
index 0d1391b15f..d92b1af1ae 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ known_false_positives: Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or expo
   during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.
 references: []
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
   - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   asset_type: Endpoint
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
index 1974528a2d..0cf5fe9399 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Windows
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
index 0a94eee911..8fe28bc168 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
 - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
index 6772947b00..cbce008255 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
index 1859bb79e2..b1c6165425 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
index 88868557b3..ba2468553e 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
index c4e5ef46a8..d1e67bcf07 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ references:
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
index 28aaf15aab..44ee9b9808 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references:
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
index ba50e98c0c..ce423c9ec8 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
index e41ea39c18..74371474eb 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
 - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
 - https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
index ef19ce9a25..69fadc40c4 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references:
 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/
 - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
index 183b52f1db..2e8b52dbde 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
index 95ccd4dd0d..8c28c112ef 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
index e2abb78438..ac70a88905 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ references:
 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/
 - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
 tags:
-  analytics_story:
+  analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
   asset_type: Endpoint
   automated_detection_testing: passed