diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c4df947417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+name: ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips
+id: b3424bbe-3204-4469-887b-ec144483a336
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-23'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: experimental
+type: Anomaly
+description: The following analytic identifies an AWS IAM account with concurrent
+  sessions coming from more than one unique IP address within the span of 5 minutes.
+  This behavior could represent a session hijacking attack whereby an adversary has
+  extracted cookies from a victims browser and is using them from a different location
+  to access corporate online resources. When a user navigates the AWS Console after
+  authentication, the API call with the event name `DescribeEventAggregates` is registered
+  in the AWS CloudTrail logs. The Splunk Threat Research team leveraged this event
+  name to identify 2 concurrent sessions. The presence of this event occurring from
+  two different IP addresses is highly unlikely. As users may behave differently across
+  organizations, security teams should test and customize this detection to fit their
+  environments.
+data_source: []
+search: ' `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DescribeEventAggregates src_endpoint.domain!="AWS Internal" 
+  | bin span=5m _time
+  | stats values(src_endpoint.ip) as src_endpoint.ip dc(src_endpoint.ip) as distinct_ip_count 
+  by _time identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name
+  | where distinct_ip_count > 1 
+  | `aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS Add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with Amazon Security Lake logs.
+known_false_positives: A user with concurrent sessions from different Ips may also
+  represent the legitimate use of more than one device. Filter as needed and/or customize
+  the threshold to fit your environment.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185/
+- https://breakdev.org/evilginx-2-next-generation-of-phishing-2fa-tokens/
+- https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Compromised User Account
+  - AWS Identity and Access Management Account
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 60
+  impact: 70
+  message: User $identity.user.name$ has concurrent sessions from more than one unique IP address
+    $src_endpoint.ip$ in the span of 5 minutes.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1185
+  observable:
+  - name: identity.user.credential_uid
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - api.operation
+  - src_endpoint.domain
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  risk_score: 42
+  security_domain: threat
+
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_createaccesskey.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_createaccesskey.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ed548351d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_createaccesskey.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+name: ASL AWS CreateAccessKey
+id: ccb3e4af-23d6-407f-9842-a26212816c9e
+version: 1
+date: '2022-05-23'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: experimental
+type: Hunting
+description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already
+  permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another
+  user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation
+  in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
+data_source: []
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateAccessKey http_request.user_agent!=console.amazonaws.com api.response.error=null
+  | rename unmapped{}.key as unmapped_key , unmapped{}.value as unmapped_value
+  | eval keyjoin=mvzip(unmapped_key,unmapped_value)
+  | mvexpand keyjoin
+  | rex field=keyjoin "^(?<key>[^,]+),(?<value>.*)$"
+  | eval {key} = value
+  | search responseElements.accessKey.userName = *
+  | rename identity.user.name as identity_user_name, responseElements.accessKey.userName as responseElements_accessKey_userName
+  | eval match=if(identity_user_name=responseElements_accessKey_userName,1,0)
+  | search match=0
+  | rename identity_user_name as identity.user.name , responseElements_accessKey_userName as responseElements.accessKey.userName
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by responseElements.accessKey.userName 
+  api.operation api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name 
+  identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  |`asl_aws_createaccesskey_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with Amazon Security Lake logs.
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
+references:
+- https://bishopfox.com/blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws
+- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 90
+  impact: 70
+  message: User $responseElements.accessKey.userName$ is attempting to create access keys for $responseElements.accessKey.userName$
+    from this IP $src_endpoint.ip$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078
+  observable:
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.service.name
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - identity.user.type
+  - identity.user.uid
+  - identity.user.uuid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  - unmapped{}.key
+  - unmapped{}.value
+  risk_score: 63
+  security_domain: threat
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/amazon_security_lake.json
+    sourcetype: aws:asl
+    source: aws_asl
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0809a64745
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+name: ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail
+id: 1f0b47e5-0134-43eb-851c-e3258638945e
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-31'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: experimental
+type: TTP
+description: This analytic identifies AWS `DeleteTrail` events within CloudTrail logs.
+  Adversaries often try to impair their target's defenses by stopping their malicious
+  activity from being logged, so that they may operate with stealth and avoid detection.
+  When the adversary has the right type of permissions in the compromised AWS environment,
+  they may delete the the entire cloudtrail that is logging activities in the environment.
+data_source: []
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteTrail 
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name 
+  identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Amazon Security Lake logs in
+  your AWS Environment.
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that an AWS admin has stopped cloudTrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS Defense Evasion
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 90
+  impact: 100
+  message: User $identity.user.name$ has delete a CloudTrail logging for account id $identity.user.account_uid$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.008
+  - T1562
+  observable:
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip 
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.service.name
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - identity.user.type
+  - identity.user.uid
+  - identity.user.uuid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  risk_score: 90
+  security_domain: threat
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.008/stop_delete_cloudtrail/amazon_security_lake.json
+    sourcetype: aws:asl
+    source: aws_asl
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8458cb44ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+name: ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group
+id: 0f701b38-a0fb-43fd-a83d-d12265f71f33
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-31'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: experimental
+type: TTP
+description: This analytic identifies AWS `DeleteLogGroup` events in CloudTrail logs.
+  Attackers may evade the logging capability by deleting the log group in CloudWatch.
+  This will stop sending the logs and metrics to CloudWatch. When the adversary has
+  the right type of permissions within the compromised AWS environment, they may delete
+  the CloudWatch log group that is logging activities in the environment.
+data_source: []
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteLogGroup
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name 
+  identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|
+  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Amazon Security Lake logs in
+  your AWS Environment.
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that an AWS admin has deleted CloudWatch logging. Please investigate this activity.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS Defense Evasion
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 90
+  impact: 100
+  message: User $identity.user.name$ has deleted a CloudWatch logging group for account id $identity.user.account_uid$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562
+  - T1562.008
+  observable:
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip 
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.service.name
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - identity.user.type
+  - identity.user.uid
+  - identity.user.uuid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  risk_score: 90
+  security_domain: threat
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.008/delete_cloudwatch_log_group/amazon_security_lake.json
+    source: aws_asl
+    sourcetype: aws:asl
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f73402543
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+name: ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services
+id: 5029b681-0462-47b7-82e7-f7e3d37f5a2d
+version: 1
+date: '2023-06-01'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Bhavin Patel, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
+status: experimental
+type: Hunting
+description: This analytic looks for several delete specific API calls made to AWS
+  Security Services like CloudWatch, GuardDuty and Web Application Firewalls. These
+  API calls are often leveraged by adversaries to weaken existing security defenses
+  by deleting logging configurations in the CloudWatch alarm, delete a set of detectors
+  from your Guardduty environment or simply delete a bunch of CloudWatch alarms to
+  remain stealthy and avoid detection.
+data_source: []
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation IN ("DeleteLogStream","DeleteDetector","DeleteIPSet","DeleteWebACL","DeleteRule","DeleteRuleGroup","DeleteLoggingConfiguration","DeleteAlarms") 
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name 
+  identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|  `asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Amazon Security Lake logs in
+  your AWS Environment.
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that it is a legitimate admin activity. Please consider filtering out these noisy
+  events using userAgent, user_arn field names.
+references:
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/guardduty/index.html
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/waf/index.html
+- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-rules.html
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS Defense Evasion
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 60
+  impact: 70
+  message: User $identity.user.name$ has made potentially risky api calls $api.operation$ that could
+    impair AWS security services for account id $identity.user.account_uid$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.008
+  - T1562
+  observable:
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.service.name
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - identity.user.type
+  - identity.user.uid
+  - identity.user.uuid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  risk_score: 42
+  security_domain: threat
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.008/aws_delete_security_services/amazon_security_lake.json
+    sourcetype: aws:asl
+    source: aws_asl
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dba5b6ca40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+name: ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning
+id: ff2bfdbc-65b7-4434-8f08-d55761d1d446
+version: 1
+date: '2023-06-01'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: experimental
+type: Anomaly
+description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of
+  eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this
+  user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.
+data_source: []
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=Describe* OR api.operation=List* OR api.operation=Get* 
+  | stats dc(api.operation) as dc_api_operations min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(http_request.user_agent) as http_request.user_agent 
+  values(src_endpoint.ip) as src_endpoint.ip values(cloud.region) as cloud.region values(identity.user.account_uid) as identity.user.account_uid by identity.user.name 
+  | where dc_api_operations > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`asl_aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with Amazon Security Lake logs.
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives.
+references:
+- https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS User Monitoring
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 60
+  impact: 30
+  message: user $identity.user.name$ has excessive number of api calls.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1526
+  observable:
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  risk_score: 18
+  security_domain: network
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_iam_delete_policy.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_iam_delete_policy.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..711e28bced
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_iam_delete_policy.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+name: ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy
+id: 609ced68-d420-4ff7-8164-ae98b4b4018c
+version: 1
+date: '2023-06-02'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: experimental
+type: Hunting
+description: The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This
+  does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story
+  of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy.
+  First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached
+  to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.
+data_source: []
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeletePolicy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation 
+  api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid 
+  http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize
+  this data. The search requires Amazon Security Lake logs.
+known_false_positives: This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity
+  detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations)
+  or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to
+  delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and
+  tuned for failed or success attempts only.
+references:
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeletePolicy.html
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/delete-policy.html
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 50
+  impact: 20
+  message: User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing
+    the following command $eventName$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1098
+  observable:
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.service.name
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - identity.user.type
+  - identity.user.uid
+  - identity.user.uuid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  risk_score: 10
+  security_domain: access
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/amazon_security_lake.json
+    sourcetype: aws:asl
+    source: aws_asl
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f2fb673098
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+name: ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled
+id: 4d2df5e0-1092-4817-88a8-79c7fa054668
+version: 1
+date: '2023-06-02'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: experimental
+type: TTP
+description: The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-factor
+  authentication for an AWS IAM user. An adversary who has obtained access to an AWS
+  tenant may disable multi-factor authentication as a way to plant a backdoor and
+  maintain persistence using a valid account. This way the attackers can keep persistance
+  in the environment without adding new users.
+data_source: []
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) 
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation 
+    api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type 
+    identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid
+    http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The Splunk AWS Add-on is required to utilize this data. The search
+  requires Amazon Security Lake logs.
+known_false_positives: AWS Administrators may disable MFA but it is highly unlikely
+  for this event to occur without prior notice to the company
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621/
+- https://aws.amazon.com/what-is/mfa/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 80
+  message: User $user_name$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account
+    $aws_account_id$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1586
+  - T1586.003
+  - T1621
+  - T1556
+  - T1556.006
+  observable:
+  - name: identity.user.account_uid
+    type: Other
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.service.name
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - identity.user.type
+  - identity.user.uid
+  - identity.user.uuid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  risk_score: 64
+  security_domain: threat
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1621/aws_mfa_disabled/amazon_security_lake.json
+    sourcetype: aws:asl
+    source: aws_asl
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc0294fb23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+name: ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User
+id: 33ae0931-2a03-456b-b1d7-b016c5557fbd
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-22'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: production
+type: TTP
+description: The following analytic identifies the registration of a new Multi Factor
+  authentication method for an AWS account logged through Amazon Secruity Lake (ASL). Adversaries who have obtained unauthorized
+  access to an AWS account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence.
+data_source: []
+search: ' `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateVirtualMFADevice | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation 
+  api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid 
+  http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with Amazon Security Lake logs.
+known_false_positives: Newly onboarded users who are registering an MFA method for
+  the first time will also trigger this detection.
+references:
+- https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/you-can-now-assign-multiple-mfa-devices-in-iam/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
+- https://twitter.com/jhencinski/status/1618660062352007174
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Compromised User Account
+  - Azure Active Directory Account Takeover
+  asset_type: Azure Active Directory
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 80
+  message: A new virtual device is added to user $identity.user.name$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1556
+  - T1556.006
+  observable:
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.service.name
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - identity.user.type
+  - identity.user.uid
+  - identity.user.uuid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  risk_score: 64
+  security_domain: identity
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/amazon_security_lake.json
+    sourcetype: aws:asl
+    source: aws_asl
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/detections/cloud/asl_aws_password_policy_changes.yml b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_password_policy_changes.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a5909553e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/cloud/asl_aws_password_policy_changes.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+name: ASL AWS Password Policy Changes
+id: 5ade5937-11a2-4363-ba6b-39a3ee8d5b1a
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-22'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: production
+type: Hunting
+description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from Amazon Security Lake where a user is making successful
+  API calls to view/update/delete the existing password policy in an AWS organization.
+  It is unlikely for a regular user to conduct this operation. These events may potentially
+  be malicious, adversaries often use this information to gain more understanding
+  of the password defenses in place and exploit them to increase their attack surface
+  when a user account is compromised.
+data_source: []
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` "api.service.name"="iam.amazonaws.com" "api.operation" IN ("UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy","GetAccountPasswordPolicy","DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy") "api.response.error"=null 
+  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name 
+  identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  
+  | `asl_aws_password_policy_changes_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS Add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
+  search works with Amazon Security Lake logs.
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
+  that an AWS admin has legitimately triggered an AWS audit tool activity which may
+  trigger this event.
+references:
+- https://www.trendmicro.com/cloudoneconformity/knowledge-base/aws/IAM/password-policy.html
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
+  - Compromised User Account
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 90
+  message: User $identity.user.name$ is attempting to $api.operation$ the password policy for accounts
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1201
+  observable:
+  - name: src_endpoint.ip 
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: identity.user.name
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.service.name
+  - api.operation
+  - identity.user.account_uid
+  - identity.user.credential_uid
+  - identity.user.name
+  - identity.user.type
+  - identity.user.uid
+  - identity.user.uuid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  risk_score: 72
+  security_domain: threat
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/aws_password_policy/amazon_security_lake.json
+    sourcetype: aws:asl
+    source: aws_asl
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/macros/amazon_security_lake.yml b/macros/amazon_security_lake.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1855e219a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/macros/amazon_security_lake.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+definition: sourcetype=aws:asl
+description: customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype).
+  Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+name: amazon_security_lake